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This  is  a  study  in  the  art  and  science  of  fundamental  systems  transformation.  The  study  is  
hypothesis-generative,  based  upon  qualitative  research.  The  cases  are  selected  from  one  ongoing  
process  of  state  transformation  at  the  Arctic  fringe  of  Europe.  An  indigenous  rights  struggle  feeds  
into  the  ongoing  re-constitution  of  the  body  of  law.  The  study  contributes  to  an  ongoing  re-thinking  
of  concepts  and  methods  in  European  Political  and  Social  Sciences.  The  struggle  for  rights  is  also  a  
struggle  for  proofs,  which  feeds  into  ongoing  re-constitution  of  the  body  of  knowledge. 
 Positive  findings  describe  my  attempts  to  observe  some  possible  causal  mechanisms  
whereby  the  indigenous  human  rights  movement  has  enjoyed  some  limited  success  in  its  effort  to  
decolonize  the  four  states  that  have  divided  and  conquered  Sápmi,  the  homeland  of  the  Sámi  
(formerly  known  as  Lapps),  the  only  group  within  the  EU  recognized  by  the  UN  as  an  indigenous  
people. 
 Negative  findings  describe  my  attempts  to  observe  some  limitations  of  my  own  
observational  capacity.  Many  questions  of  relevance  to  subaltern  interest  groups  remain  under-
researched  and  under-documented:  There  is  a  great  deal  of  colonial  bias  that  must  still  be  overcome,  
not  only  within  European  political  science  at  large,  but  also  within  my  own  limited  contribution,  
even  though  I  strive  to  overcome  such  bias. 
 Seven  empirical  chapters,  discuss  two  single-case  studies:  Alta  Watershed,  ca.  1970-1980,  
and  Deatnu  Watershed,  ca.  1980-2012.  The  empirical  foundation  is  qualitative  data  from  field  
observation  and  historical  archives,  which  is  put  ino  context  with  some  quantitative  data  from  
official  registers.  The  different  chapters  operate  within  different  disciplines:  two  are  geographical,  
two  are  sociological,  one  is  historical,  one  large  one  is  anthropological,  and  one  should  be  regarded  
traditional  political  science.  Although  multi-disciplinary,  my  empirical  research  continues  what  I  
call  the  major  research  tradition  in  the  field.  This  focuses  on  collective  action  and  social  ecology,  
and  informs  human  rights  policies. 
 The  theoretical  discussion  addresses  observations  by  colleagues  within  another,  rival,  
tradition,  which  emphasizes  coercive  force  and  geo-strategy,  and  serves  public  security  policies.  
Transformative  social  movements  need  to  be  aware  that  both  traditions  remain  limited  by  a  heritage  
of  colonial  bias.  They  also  need  to  be  aware  that  both  traditions  may  be  used  in  a  complimentary  
manner,  to  help  overcoming  either  fatalism  or  over-optimism.  The  thesis  concludes  that  
transformative  social  movements  need  to  avoid  the  dual  pitfalls  of  naïve  idealism  and  naïve  realism,  
and  pursue  critical  realism. 




Dear  reader.  A  thick  monograph  you  have  set  out  to  consume.  I  serve  you  this  big  text  after  a  long  quest  –  like  an  
angler’s  struggle  to  catch  the  biggest  salmon.  The  largest  salmons  are  not  the  tastiest,  but  they  are  precious,  because  
they  are  hard  to  catch.  The  success  or  failure  of  a  tourist  angler  may  depend  on  the  ability  to  pay  a  rower  with  local  
knowledge.  My  own  catch  would  be  impossible  without  the  local  lore  that  belongs  to  indigenous  fisher-peasants,  the  
research  interviewees.  This  catch  would  also  be  impossible  if  my  expedition  along  the  river  had  not  been  enabled  by  a  
resourceful  community,  the  research  institution.  The  cred  for  success  should  be  shared,  while  falure  is  my  responsibility. 
Firstly,  I  thank  the  local  people  who  guided  me  through  the  field,  and  who  shared  their  shelter  and  their  food  
with  me,  treating  me  as  a  potential  guest  &  friend.  Thanks  to  the  fisherman  Reidar  Larsen  and  his  companion  Terje  
Pedersen,  who  luckily  survived  many  winter  storms.  Thanks  to  Hjørdis  Pedersen  who  let  me  put  my  tent,  like  a  Snufkin,  
at  the  meadow  of  the  farmhouse.  Thanks  to  Truls  Abbeddissen  and  his  grandfather  Spille-Per  whose  lineage  of  fishing  
line  lore  connected  the  bottom  of  Tarmfjord  to  the  depths  of  my  guts.  Thanks  to  Jan  Larsen  who  gave  me  a  lift  across  
the  hill,  but  moves  mountains  for  his  social  class.  Thanks  to  the  fishery  researchers  Kjell-Magne  Johnssen,  Maija  
Länsmann  and  Jørn  Stephan  Opdahl,  who  popularized  their  sciences,  and  were  brave  enough  to  accept  being  observed  
as  specimen  by  a  field-sociologist.  Thanks  to  Aage  Solbakk  and  Esther  Utsi,  who  let  me  stay  on  their  family  grounds,  at  
each  side  of  the  Deatnu  River,  letting  me  get  glimpses  of  their  competing  ways  of  keeping  the  lore  of  the  noaidi.  Thanks  
to  Aslak,  Meeri,  Tapani  and  Katja  Tapiola,  Svein  Ottar  Hellander  and  Niilla  Tapiola,  who  welcomed  the  scientific  
tourist,  and  showed  that  the  local  tourist  business  is  a  traditional  livelihood  adaptation.  Thanks  to  Olaf,  Hjalmar  and  
Håvald  Hansen,  who  thought  me  the  appropriate  usage  of  shrimps.  Thanks  to  Ražan  Chaomair  and  Klaudija  Titan,  
globetrotters  who  showed  me  the  cosmopolitanism  of  local  communities  in  the  Arctic,  and  in  particular,  how  Kurds  and  
Sámis  may  bond  as  one  nation.  Thanks  to  Nils  Larsen  who  welcomed  the  Lebanese  ethnographer,  and,  as  a  UNIFIL  
veteran,  shared  his  memories  from  Israeli  occupied  Litani  River  area.  Thanks  to  Kristin  Mellem,  who  joined  me  for  a  
Coptic  Church  service,  and  brought  me  to  a  Kvän  one.  Thanks  to  Terje  Aronsen,  whose  psalms  helped  me  to  hear  some  
of  the  subaltnern  voices  which  have  been  silenced.  Thanks  to  Joar  Nango,  Tanya  Busse,  Emilija  Skarnulyte  and  FFB  for  
party,  politics  and  wind  along  the  Barents  Coast.  Thanks  to  Inger-Johanne  Waagaard,  Arne  O.  and  the  live-art  band  
Serafine,  which  helped  to  gain  access  to  environmentally  committed  engineers  at  the  Norwegian  Water  Resources  and  
Energy  Directorate  (NVE).  Thanks  to  the  Gaia  Group  architects  Frederica  Miller  and  Chris  Butters,  to  Beit  bil  Jnoub,  
Rabih  Shibli,  New  Compass,  Sveinung  Legard,  Einar  Braathen  and  Marte  Rua  for  sharing  experiences  on  urban  and  
regional  development.  Thanks  to  Norsk  vannforening,  Aqua  Bene  Commune,  Arve  Heistad,  Christer  Rønning,  RKTL,  
Bivdi,  SEG,  TF,  LBT,  Ragnhild  Waagaard,  WWF  Norway,  FFLH,  Kystfiskarlaget  and  Karlsøyfestivalen.  Thanks  to  
Riddu  Riđđu,  Norske  kveners  forbund,  Sámiráđđi,  ČálliidLágádus,  Boulbmát  Gilli  Saervi,  Deanudat  Siida,  Svein  
Harland  Holmen,  Maria  Sofia  Aikio,  Camilla  Brattland,  Trine  Länsmann,  Esko  Aikio,  Anne  Smeland,  Aimo  Guttorm  
and  Eva  Josefsen.  Thanks  to  Phil  and  Harold  Gatensby,  natives  to  the  Yukon  River  area,  and  to  Finn-Arne  Schance  
Selfors,  Anne-Marit  Pedersen  and  Knut  Petterson,  judges  in  the  Deatnu  River  area,  who  all  thought  me  about  indigenus  
law  in  indigenous  territories.  Thanks  to  Rastegaisa  Pub  for  hot  soup  and  firewater  during  the  Arctic  winter  night. 
Secondly,  I  thank  the  scholars  who  guided  me.  Big  thanks  to  my  supervisor  Donatella  della  Porta.  Thanks  to  
my  former  supervisor  Per  Otnes.  Thanks  to  Jala  Makhzoumi  for  being  my  exernal  supervisor  during  fieldwork  in  
Lebanon.  Thanks  to  Petter  Jenssen  and  Truls.  W.  Gedde-Dahl  for  helping  me  to  start  the  project.  Thanks  to  Gro  Ween  
and  the  other  “Newcomers  to  the  Farm”,  Marianne  Lien,  Merete  Ødegaard  and  John  Law.  Thanks  to  the  politologists  
Xabier  Itçaina,  Ilaria  Favretto,  Gary  Marx,  Anne  Bregnballe,  Konstantinos  Eleftheriadis,  Bogumila  Hall,  Marion  
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Lecoquierre,  Iver  B.  Neumann,  Lorenzo  Cini,  Eliska  Drapalova,  Joldon  Kutmanaliev,  Caterina  Froio,  Pietro  Castelli,  
Herbert  Reiter,  Alice  Poma,  Susanne  Staggenborg,  Mariana  Mendes,  Lorenzo  Bosi  and  Alice  Mattoni.  Thanks  to  the  
anthropologists  Brigt  Hope,  Thomas  Hylland  Eriksen,  Brit  Kramvig,  Cecilia  Salinas,  Thomas  Gibson,  Torgeir  Kolshus,  
Signe  Howell,  Marit  Melhuus,  Vittorio  Sergi,  Gulzat  Bailalieva,  Leif  Pareli  and  Ove  Pettersen.  Thanks  to  professors,  
Martin  van  Gelderen,  Antonella  Romano,  Hettie  Pisters,  Nina  Foss,  Rainer  Bauböck,  Sven  Steinmo,  Ragnar  B.  
Myklebust,  Pascal  Vennesson,  Rami  Zurayk,  Mark  Franklin,  Sebastian  Conrad,  Michael  Keating,  Ugo  Mattei  and  
Antonio  Negri.  Thanks  to  the  Centre  of  Social  Movement  Studies  (COSMOS),  the  Gender,  Race  and  Sexuality  Working  
Group  (GRaSe),  UniNomade,  EuroNomade,  and  the  Third  Scandinavian  Roundtable  of  Critical  Sociology.  Thanks  to  
Prof.  Ciarán  Burke  for  extensive  English  language  correction,  including  terminology. 
 Thirdly,  I  thank  for  financial  and  logistic  support.  Thanks  to  the  Research  Council  Norway  for  having  hired  me  
as  a  PhD-fellow  for  a  period  of  three  years.  Thanks  to  the  European  University  Institute  for  providing  a  one-year  
stipend.  Thanks  to  the  Department  of  Social  Anthropology  at  the  University  of  Oslo  for  hosting  me  as  a  visiting  scholar.  
Thanks  for  invaluable  practical  advice  from  Alf  Christian  Jensen  and  Fatma  Sayed.  Thanks  for  further  practical  advice  
from  Gabriella  Unger,  Ken  Hulley,  Nina  Rundgren,  Adele  Battistini.  Thanks  for  guidance  in  libraries  and  archives  from  
Tone  Odden,  Gerd  Johanne  Valen,  Harald  Lindbach,  and  the  municipal  libraries  in  Tana  Bru,  Olderdalen  and  Tromsø.  
Thanks  to  to  the  Museum  of  Cultural  History  at  the  University  of  Oslo  for  providing  office  facilities  during  my  work  
with  language  correction.  Thanks  to  the  Foundation  for  Local  Health  Trials  (FFLH)  for  providing  me  with  a  stipend  in  
2007  in  order  to  attend  Peacemaking  Circles  Training  at  the  Inner  Finnmark  District  Court.  Thanks  to  the  employers  
that  hired  me  for  projects  while  I  was  finishing  my  thesis  work:  Alta  Museum  and  Folkeaksjonen,  the  Robert  Schuman  
Centre,  in  particular  Kathryn  Lum,  and  Asplan  Viak.  Thanks  to  NAV  for  good  sickness  benefits  the  autumn  2011  and  
for  some  social  assistance  the  autumn  2014.  Thanks  to  Vat  Marashi,  Isabel  Maurissens  and  the  Albanian  clan  for  
housing  me  at  their  olive  farm  during  my  prepareation  for  fieldwork.  Thanks  to  Francesca  Polidori  for  renting  out  a  
writing  place  with  sunshine  while  I  was  wrapping  up.  Thanks  to  Gard  Gitlestad  for  assisting  with  photo  editing. 
 Finally,  I  thank  friends  &  family.  Thanks  to  my  dear  comrades  &  colleagues  Pilar  Goñalons-Pons,  Wei  Jiang,  
Stefano  Palestini,  Jana  Sverdljuk,  Geir-Tore  Brenne,  Matilde  Orsecci,  Geir-Henning  Hansen,  Christine  Rinch,  Hoda  
Ghalegolabi,  William  Lu  Tanding,  Elin  T.  Sørensen,  Mari  Saugestad  Mathiesen,  Anita  Hillestad,  Kristine  Nybø,  
Myrssini  Antoniou,  Markos  Vogiatzoglou,  Anne-Hege  Grung,  Sigmund  Valaker,  Nizam  Jajjar,  Ingrid  Lamark,  Audun  
Bergwitz,  Ole  Pedersen,  Abderrahim  Mokhtarri,  Hedvig  Nygård,  Karima  Bitta,  Haakon  Ursin  Steen,  Anne  Simensen,  
Parthena  Xanthopolou-Dimitriado,  Leonidas  Oikonamakis,  Karolina  Podstawa,  Davide  Boerio,  Matteo  Cernison,  
Joseph  Lacey,  Hugo  Leal,  Lorenzo  Zamponi,  Tatiana  Bazzichelli,  Eirik  Birschoff,  Chiara  Milan,  Sharam  Alghasi,  
Katarzyna  Gracz,  and  Lars  E.  Berntzen.  Thanks  to  Henrik,  Akbar,  Niccoló,  Katharina,  Arevik,  Ingebjørg,  Jostein,  
Erlend,  Jainine,  Federico,  Huda,  Ibrahim,  Milenko,  Emilie,  Libera,  Anwar,  Vero,  Farhad,  Hussein,  Hallgeir,  Nina,  Kari,  
Sarema,  Bobbie,  Møkk,  Sub,  Adbusters,  Hausmania,  Collettivo  Prezzemolo,  Taxy  Take  Away,  Brakkebygrenda,  
Lohmühle,  Blitz,  Motmakt,  Social  Waste,  Autistici/Inventati,  CPA,  Boligaksjonen,  Circa  Clown  Army,  Lotta  per  la  casa  
and  Casa  del  popolo  Fiesole.  Thanks  to  Baba  Mikael  Abdelnour,  Teta  Nouha  Abdelnour,  and  the  Lebanese  branch  of  
my  family  for  warm  welcomes  and  safe  shelters.  Thanks  to  Mom  Anne  K.  Jensen,  with  Dad  Geir  Gitlestad  and  Bro  
Gard  Gitlestad,  for  a  safe  childhood  and  a  good  formation.   
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THE  ASSESSMENT  PROCESS 
 
To  whom  it  may  concern,  it  may  be  relevant  to  know  which  revisions  have  been  done  with  this  the-­
sis  during  the  assessment  process.  Two  members  of  the  Examining  Board,  professors  Steinar  Peder-­
sen  and  Paul  Routledge,  asked  me  to  do  certain  minor  but  significant  revisions.  Before  assessment,  
I  had  asked  them  to  consider  some  terminological  issues  raised  by  my  language  corrector,  professor  
Ciarán  Burke.  All  of  the  revisions  deal  with  either  empirical  accuracy  or  theoretical  precision  re-­
garding  the  historical  geography  of  constituted  and  constituent  power. 
 Legal  issues:  Firstly,  in  Chapter  2,  two  long  footnotes  serve  to  make  a  better  case  for  my  
statements  regarding  the  decolonisation  of  international  human  rights  law,  as  well  as  the  issue  of  
territory  and  jurisdiction  in  postcolonial  constitutional  law  (see.  e.g.  Neves  2013,  Riedel,  Giacca  &  
Golay  2014).  Secondly,  in  the  two  case  studies  and,  in  the  chapter  that  bridges  them,  three  footnotes  
specify  the  possibilities  for  citizens  to  confront  their  states  through  human  rights  regimes  (part  
6.5.0,  (at  the  end)  deals  with  Case  I;;  part  8.6.1  deals  with  new  opportunities  for  Sápmi  people,  and  
part  10.3.8  deals  with  case  Case  II).  Thirdly,  with  many  tiny  revisions,  I  have  corrected  factual  er-­
rors  regarding  the  function  of  ICCPR  and  IECSCR  for  indigenous  human  rights,  and  regarding  the  
division  of  labor  between  the  Finnmark  Commission  and  the  Outfield  Court. 
 Historical  issues:  In  part  5.2.5,  but  also  in  several  other  tiny  corrections,  a  series  of  tiny  revi-­
sions  tidy  up  the  statements  about  certain  historical  events  regarding  colonisation  and  the  estab-­
lishment  de  jure  state  boundaries  in  some  of  the  areas  where  Sápmi  and  Norway  overlap.  (In  1826,  
the  drawing  of  a  de  jure  north-eastern  border  between  Sweden-Norway  and  Finland;;  in  1820,  the  
formal  definition  of  Finnmark  County  as  a  "Colonie";;  and,  in  1852,  the  closing  of  the  border  be-­
tween  Sweden-Norway  and  Russia-Finland.)  Additionally,  footnotes  in  5.2.5  and  9.2.2  add  proof  
about  regional  democratization  in  the  Finnish  Lappland  County,  and  on  watershed  management  
from  below  in  Tana  and  Utsjoki  municipalities   
 Geographical  issues:  Firstly,  in  Chapter  3,  the  conceptualisation  of  the  approach  has  been  
further  specified  with  several  long  footnotes  and  a  few  tiny  revisions  in  parts  3.3.1-3.4.0.  Secondly,  
in  Chapters  12-14,  the  theoretical  discussion  has  gained  several  footnotes,  which  specify  the  pro-­
duction  of  scale  (12.1.2,  12.3.4,  13.3.5),  and  finally,  specify  the  theoretical  and  practical  conclu-­
sions  (Chpt.  14).  These  geographical  issues  deal  with  methods  of  non-violent  action  (Sharp  1973);;  
theories  of  spatial  politics  (incl.  "space",  "place",  "scale"  and  "spatial  imaginaries",  see  Wolford  
2004);;  relevant  studies  of  territory  and  jurisdiction  (Agnew  &  Oslender  2010,  Keck  &  Sikkink  
1998);;  and  finally,  general  theory  development  (McAdam,  Tarrow  &  Tilley  2001;;  Nicholls,  Miller  
&  Beaumont  2013). 
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NOTE  ON  SPELLING 
 
In  this  thesis,  there  are  many  place-names  and  other  words  from  Sámi  (primarily  Northern  Sámi)  
and  Scandinavian  (primarily  Norwegian).  Some  names  in  Finnish  and  Kvänish  are  also  found.  Here  
is  a  list  of  the  special  characters  found  in  such  names,  and  how  they  are  pronounced. 
 
Norwegian 
Æ  æ between  normal  a  and  e 
Ø  ø very  open  o-sound 
Å  å normal  o-sound 
O  o normal  u-sound 
U  u between  normal  u  and  y 
 
Northern  Sámi 
Á  á “a  with  accent”,  a  very  long  a-sound 
C  c “tse”  as  German  or  Italian  z-sound 
Č  č “tch”,  as  tch  in  English  “sketch” 
Z  z “eds” 
Ž  ž “edch” 
Š  š “ech”,  as  sh  in  English  “shark” 
Đ  đ “đe”,  as  th  in  English  “father” 
Ŧ  ŧ “ŧe”,  as  th  in  English  “think” 
Ŋ  ŋ “eng”,  similar  to  ng  in  “English” 
 
Finnish  and  Kvänish 
Ä  ä between  a  and  e,  like  Norwegian  Æ 
Ö  ö   very  open  o-sound,  like  Norwegian  Ø 
O  o   normal  o-sound,  as  in  German  “Gott” 
U  u normal  u-sound,  as  in  German  “gut” 
Y  y rounded  y-sound,  like  Norwegian  u 
The  emphasis  is  always  in  the  first  syllable 
 
Icelandic 
Þ  þ as  the  th  in  English  “think” 
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LIST  OF  ACHRONYMES 
 
ANT  Actor-network  theory 
BEAC  Barents  Euro-Arctic  Council 
BRIC  Brazil,  Russia,  India  and  China 
CES  Common  Economic  Space  (Eurasian  Economic  Community) 
COE  Council  of  Europe 
CSTO  Collective  Security  Treaty  Organisation  (Russian-led  military  alliance) 
ČSV  Symbol  (not  an  acronym)  of  the  Sámi  cultural  revival  movement 
ECPR  European  Consortium  of  Political  Research 
ECRML European  Charter  for  Regional  or  Minority  Languages 
EEA  European  Economic  Area 
EEA  European  Environmental  Agency 
ERDF    European  Regional  Development  Fund 
EU  European  Union 
EU-FRA EU  Fundamental  Rights  Agency 
EU-WFD EU  Water  Framework  Directive 
EUSBSR EU  Strategy  for  the  Baltic  Sea  Region 
EZLN  Zapatista  Army  of  National  Liberation 
FCNM  The  Framework  Convention  for  the  Protection  of  National  Minorities 
FEFO  The  Finnmark  Estate 
FIVH  The  Future  in  Our  Hand  (NGO  for  environmentalism  and  social  justice) 
GDP  Gross  national  product 
HDI  Human  Development  Index  (used  by  UNDP) 
ICCPR   International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights 
ICECSR International  Covenant  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights 
IGO  International  Governmental  Organization  (e.g.  COE,  UNWGIP) 
ILO  International  Labor  Organisation 
ILO  169 ILO-convention  169  on  tribal  and  indigenous  peoples 
INGO  International  non-governmental  organisation  (e.g.  WWF,  IWGIA) 
INTERREG “Inter-regional”  ERDF  program  for  regions  across  state  borders 
IR  International  Relations  (as  sub-field  of  political  science) 
IWGIA International  Work  Group  for  Indigenous  Affairs 
IWRM  Integrated  Water  Resources  Management 
LO  Landsorganisasjonen  (Norwegian  Federation  of  Trade  Unions) 
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NAFTA North  America  Free  Trade  Area 
NASCO North  Atlantic  Salmon  Conservation  Organisation 
NATO  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organisation  (USA-led  military  alliance) 
NGO  Non-governmental  organization 
NNF  Norges  Naturvernforbund  (Friends  of  the  Earth  Norway) 
NOU  Norsk  Offentig  Utredning,  a  “white  paper”  in  the  Norwegian  state  policy  process 
NRL  Norske  reindriftssamers  landsforbund  (Sámi  Reindeer  Herders'  Assocc.  of  Norw.) 
NSR  Norske  samers  riksforbund  (Norwegian  Sámi  Association) 
NVE  Norwegian  Water  Resources  and  Energy  Directorate 
OSCE  Organisation  for  Security  and  Co-operation  in  Europe 
SES  The  Social-Ecological  System  framework 
SLF  Samenes  landsforbund  (alternative  organisation  to  NSR) 
SMO  Social  movement  organization  (e.g.  deep  ecologists,  ČSV) 
TSMO  Transnational  social  movement  organisation  (e.g.  deep  ecologists) 
UN  United  Nations 
UN-WGIP United  Nations  Working  Group  on  Indigenous  Populations 
UNEP  United  Nations  Environmental  Programme 
UNEP-GRID Global  Resource  Information  Database  of  the  UNEP 
UNDP  United  Nations  Development  Programme 
UNIFIL United  Nations  Interim  Forces  in  Lebanon 
WTO  World  Trade  Organization 
WWF  World  Wide  Found  for  Nature 
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The  truth  is... 
 
The  truth  is  I  wrote  this  song 
after  I  saw  a  television  program 
from  South  Africa 
some  years  back. 
 
And  there  was,  this 
white  man 
he  was  so  upset 
because  of  the  changes 
that  were  coming 
to  this  country. 
 
He  was  upset  because 
the  ones  who  were 
earlier  under  him  were  now 
supposed  to  be  his  equals. 
 
I  felt  sorry  for  the  man,  so  I 
wrote  him  a  song 
‘cause  I  thought  it  must  be  hard 
when  you  the  whole  life  you  heard, 
you  learned,  you  believed 
that  some  people  are  under  other  people, 
some  people  have  more  value  than  other  people, 
 
and  then  the  world  changes 
and  you  have  to  realize 
 
we  are 
all  the  same. 
It  must  be  hard. 
 
–  Mari  Boine 
“Mun  da  han  lean  oaivámus  (Phono  remix)” 
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1.1.0  General  theme:  Internal  Decolonisation  in  the  EU 
 
1.1.1  The  politics  of  political  science 
This is a study in the art and science of state transformation. To transform a state is a political 
practice, and therefore an art. However, that art needs evidence-based knowledge, which is a 
political science. Political science gets its research questions, its funding and its political legitimacy 
from its ability to serve political practice. On the other hand, political practice needs realistic 
mapping of practical opportunity structures, and possible pathways to empowerment. This study is 
an evidence-based contribution to the art and science of state transformation. I have posed research 
questions that are relevant for social movements for restorative justice. I have built on data that is 
the property of indigenous local communities in the High North. This research is relevant if I have 
succeeded in bringing proof that can be useful for movements for restorative justice: indigenous 
rights movements in particular, environmental justice movements in general. According to the 
situation, such movements may find themselves in opposition, in government, or they may seek to 
evade state politics. However, within any of those positions, I hope those movements might find my 
research to be a useful contribution in the joint struggle for rights and proofs. 
 I have tried to identify some of the many possible paths that may exist for such movements to 
empower themselves and to transform their political environment. This also implies a need to fend 
off violent suppression, and therefore I have tried to demonstrate that (at least in some cases) it may 
be possible to produce fundamental systems transformation through strictly non-violent means. This 
is what I investigate in the empirical parts of this study. However, in a final theoretical discussion I 
also discuss rival explanations from state-centred realists, in an attempt to balance (control for) the 
potential bias of wishful thinking. In her article  “covenants  with  or  without  a  sword”,  Elinor  Ostrom  
discusses  her  own  “new  theory”  to  explain  political  collectives,  against  the  “old  theory”  from  
Hobbes and Hardin.1 The  “old  theory”  zooms  in  on  mechanisms  of  domination  and  coercive  force.  
The  “new  theory”  zooms  in  on  mechanisms  that  consist  of  customary  praxes  and  knowledge  praxes.  
Through my research design, I attempt to demonstrate that reductionist (mis)use of the old theory is 
misleading, though I am not in favour of reductionist use of the new theory either. 
 This  research  deals  with  selected  cases  of  environmental  justice  struggles  in  Sápmi,  the  
                                                 
1  Ostrom,  Walker  &  Gardner  1992 
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homeland  of  the  Sámi,  the  only  people  within  the  EU  that  has  so  far  been  recognised  by  the  UN  as  
an  “indigenous  people”.  In  1997  and  2007  the  Norwegian  Ministry  of  Justice  and  the  Police  
published  two  reports  that  provided  new  proof  about  the  legal  history  in  some  of  the  areas  where  the  
territory  of  the  Norwegian  nation-state  overlaps  with  the  territory  of  the  Sámi  cultural  homeland.  
This  was  part  of  a  veritable  paradigm  shift  in  legal  history  and  jurisprudence.  In  spite  of  what  had  
been  official  policy  from  the  state,  and  in  spite  of  what  we  had  learned  at  school,  there  had  never  
been  established  any  actual  jurisdictional  monopoly  in  areas  where  Norway  and  Sápmi  overlap.  
Many  such  communities  have  remained  in  a  state  of  de  facto  legal  and  jurisdictional  pluralism  –  
even  though  no-one  contested  the  state's  monopoly  of  violence.2  The  Nordic  states  are  small,  and  
few  people  reside  in  the  Sámi  cultural  area.  However,  the  decolonisation  of  Sápmi  has  relevance  
beyond  its  geographical  location.  In  West-European  political  science,  the  Nordic  states  have  been  
taken  as  model examples of unified nation-states, socially homogeneous and politically self-
determined. This image was promoted among others by Stein Rokkan. He built his historical-
sociological analysis on yesterday's national history.3 But yesterday's national historiography is 
today's nationalist myth, as a result of the above mentioned progress in knowledge about the past.4 
It has become clear that the Nordic states were not socially homogeneous, and neither were they 
self-determined. The indigenous cultural area Sápmi is subject to four states in the northernmost 
part of Europe: Norway, Sweden, Finland and the north-western provinces of the Russian 
Federation. Sápmi is a vulnerable socio-ecological region of the Arctic. The local population have 
experienced a history of systematic ethnic and cultural discrimination, combined with systematic 
extraction of resources, where cultural assimilation was the condition for gaining investments in 
return. Of those four states, Russia and Finland never pretended to be anything else than pluri-
national. However, if Norway and Sweden ever appeared to have been socially homogeneous, it 
was because the indigenous people was not only suppressed but also silenced. In those states, 
parliamentarian democracy was introduced by the liberal nationalist movement, but those also 
brought more explicitly racist policies to the colonial administration of Sápmi. The so-called golden 
age of social democracy came to an end in the late 1970s, which was the time when the 
decolonisation of Sápmi began. Moreover, one can hardly say that the Norwegian National 
Parliament enjoys national self-determination in matters of foreign policy.5 In contrast to Sweden, 
which at least in principle is neutral, Norway possesses large coastal areas, which are the source of 
its prosperity. In order to secure the control over those waters, Norway has chosen to support its 
allies at war in Afghanistan and Libya. In fact, the only period when this small state was 
                                                 
2  The  Norwegian  Official  Report  1997a  (NOU  1997:4);;  1997b  (NOU  1997:5);;  2001  (NOU  2001:31);;  Pedersen  2012 
3  Slagstad  2001  (1998):  240 
4  Jensen  2013 
5  Østerud  and  Matlary  2007 
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independent of military alliances was from 1905 until 1940, which also was one of the most 
intensive periods of assimilation policy towards the Sámi, Kvän and Finnish minorities. The era of 
liberal nationalism and social democracy, from the late 1800s until the late 1900s, were portrayed 
by Rokkan as a period of steady progress towards inclusion of everyone into a consensual nation-
state. This fitted with the ideal model of the Parsonian  “grand  theory”,  the  official  ideology  of  the  
US foreign policy during the Cold War.6 Empirically, it was based on the historian Halvtan Koht, 
who had been a minister in the first social democratic government in 1936. However, with the new 
developments in legal history, we now know that this optimistic narrative must be strongly modified. 
Minister-Professor Koht was a visionary nation-builder who contributed to the development of 
rights and proofs – but his specific synthesis of Nationalist and Marxist historiography fed the 
development of rights and proofs in a highly uneven way. 
 During the latter thirty years, Sápmi has had an effective social movement for indigenous 
human rights. The movement appears to have had relative success in its efforts to influence the 
course of state transformation in the area. The mentioned reports, published by the Norwegian 
Ministry of Justice and Police, were no mild gifts from the government. Only through social 
struggle it became possible to fund research in order to find proofs. The struggle for rights and 
proofs continues, with minorities-within-the-minority demanding inquiries into their own legal 
history. The Coastal Sámi have become better organised in the latter decade, and consequently, the 
legal history of this group is now better researched (or less under-researched).7 The Kvän 
organisations still lack the organisational and financial resources for research, and their legal history 
remains entirely under-researched.8 The uneven development of rights and proofs was introduced 
by nationalist nation-builders, but it is carried further by a new generation of nation re-builders. The 
new organic intellectuals of nation re-building try to succeed better – or to fail less dramatically – 
than the old organic intellectuals of nation-building. 
 With this study I contribute to the struggle for proofs. The ongoing struggle for rights and 
proofs is so contentious that whatever scientific research is done on this process is bound to be 
utilised as proofs in the process itself. The act of observing is not independent from the object of 
observation. By doing this research I am an organic intellectual of nation-re-building, and thus one 
of the many committed contributors to the ongoing transformation of the Nordic states. I hope to 
identify some opportunities that may exit for some social movements to transform states. The Sámi 
rights movement is an example of indigenous rights movements, which in turn may be seen within 
the even wider category of environmental justice movements. The study may potentially have 
                                                 
6  Hulme  and  Turner  1990 
7  Pedersen  2012 
8  Interview  with  Aronsen,  Terje  (Frogner  Church,  04.03.2012) 
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transfer value to other such movements, at other unique locations. The findings may also have 
potential transfer value within other “universes of cases”,  such  as  processes  of  nation  re-building. 
European states, within the framework of a two competing trade unions (one Western-European and 
one Eurasian) strive to come to terms with political claims from regions that claim to have been 
colonies, internally or externally: Brittany and Kabylia, India and Northern Ireland, are only a few 
examples. Transnational social movements connect movements from former colonies with 
movements from former colonial states. Their joint impact may be a process of nation-re-building. I 
cannot talk on behalf of the Sámi, but I can talk as a Norwegian, and those two peoples are 
intertwined. Under international law, we are obliged to sort out both indigenous self-determination 
and state sovereignty in areas where the territories of Norway and Sápmi overlap. Thus, I can talk 
as a participant in the Norwegian nation re-building. In the past I have been involved through 
journalism and history teaching. Now I am involved through political and social science. For me, all 
science is applied science. 
 For the indigenous rights movement in Sápmi, there has been a struggle for rights, but also a 
struggle for proof. Therefore, under each of the four states, the effort to decolonize the body politics 
has also been an effort to decolonize its associated body of law, and its associated body of 
knowledge. There has been a struggle for rights and proofs. Scientific research has been an integral 
part of that process. What may political science learn from the experience in Sápmi? How may 
political participants in Sápmi utilise progress in political science? The art of state transformation 
and the science of state transformation enlighten each other and co-evolve. This is the politics of 
political science. In the West-European macro-region, the political system and the political science 
are both in a state of transition. The art and science of state transformation are feeding each other. 
Political systems shape the opportunities for political research. Political science provides resources 
for political actors. 
 
 
1.1.2  Political  science:  transformation  of  the  discipline  in  Western  Europe 
For West-European Political Science, changes in the object of study lead to re-thinking of the basic 
categories for the discipline.9 Transformation of the political system feeds transformation of the 
discipline of political science. Signs  of  change  are  seen  at  several  levels  in  the  organisation  of  the  
discipline.  At  the  European  level  the  ECPR  has  re-opened  the  discipline  for  research  in  political  
sociology.10  At  the  level  of  particular  states,  some  national  disciplines  are  being  transformed.  
                                                 
9  Olsen  2012;;  Kauppi  2013 
10  Kauppi  2013. 
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Norwegian  statsvitenskap is going through an identity crisis, while a competing cluster of 
international relations studies re-orientates the research towards transnational issues.11 
Transformations within the discipline respond to a series of transformations in the object of study.12 
One such change is ongoing europeanization, with the emergence of intergovernmental institutions, 
geographical expansion of the EU, trans-governmental policy networks, and trans-national civil 
society groups. Academics make sense of the new situation, developing various models to trace 
inter-governmental relations or trans-state governance.13 While the European political geography is 
changing, the forms of participation within this space have multiplied. Interactions between 
mobilization and institutionalization have produced new channels of political influence, beyond 
political parties and corporatist organizations. Formal and informal institutions for participatory and 
discursive democracy emerge.14 While the European political space is being reconfigured internally, 
it is also affected by political transformations beyond the European space. Such changes include the 
globalization of financial and security politics, interdependencies with post-socialist and post-
colonial areas, and the rise of the BRIC countries. Global changes include transformation of 
international law and norms.15 Some such norms include WTO regulations in favor of free trade, 
defining the opportunity structure for economic policies. Such norms also include the UN Security 
Council using individual human rights as a pretext for military interventions in post-colonies.16 On 
the other hand, UN norms on collective human rights are product of input from postcolonial states 
and indigenous movements.17 All human beings have a right to freedom from systematic cultural 
and ethnic discrimination, according to §27 in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR).18 As a result of the systematic discrimination under the existing states, as well as 
the continous cultrural resistance to that discrimination, population groups like native Americans, 
aboriginal Australians, and the indigenous groups in Sápmi, have become socially relatively 
bounded "peoples". Consequently, the UN suggests that indigenous peoples, as also state-building 
peoples, enjoy the right to popular self-determination in accordance with §1 of the ICCPR, and also 
in accordance with §1 of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR).19 Many indigenous homelands are shared between several states, and thus, there is some 
ambiguity in international law between the state right to sovereignty and the indigenous right to 
                                                 
11  Olsen  2012;;  Friedrich  2012 
12  Olsen,  2012. 
13  Kauppi  2013  ibidem;;  Polack  2010. 
14  Della  Porta  2011;;  Dryzek  2006 
15  Neumann  &  Sending  2010 
16  Semb  2000 
17  Rosas  &  Scheinin  1999:  p.  52;;  Riedel, Giacca & Golay 2014: p. 6-8; Cismas 2014: 452-453. For an elaboration of the 
argument, see part 2.1.1, in particular, the long footnote regarding the decolonisation of human rights law. 
18  UN  1966a,  Scheinin  2000 
19  UN  1066a,  UN  1966b,  Anaya  2004 
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self-determination.20 Additionally, the ICESCR has left a tension between free trade norms and the 
economic rights of subaltern groups.21 The global normative order is ambiguous, and a field of 
discursive contention. Liberal constitutionalists in the tradition after Kant hope that international 
norms may overcome the so-called “anarchy” between states.22 Others point at the unresolved 
relations between norms and war in global politics.23 On the European level, external relations may 
be exemplified by the Frontex police force and the military intervention in Libya, while internally, 
Europe has a tendency towards cosmopolitain constitutionalism: The EU Fundamental Rights 
Agency (FRA) monitors human rights breaches in the member states. Ethnic minorities enjoy 
increased protection against persecution with the European Commission's Framework Convention 
on the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM). Additionally, ecological livelihoods across state 
boundaries enjoy increased protection with the EU Water Framework Framework Directive (WFD). 
To sum up: within Europe, the nation-states have given away their exclusive right to represent and 
protect their populations, and that changes the forms of political participation, but also those of 
democratic deficit. First the new forms of participation: Policy making takes place at multiple 
social-ecological levels of aggregation.24 Thus, political participation finds additional pathways 
locally and transnationally.25 Constitutional norms are instituted at various scales.26 Thus, legal 
controversies are addressed at multiple scales as well, both locally and transnationally.27 Then the 
new forms of democratic deficit: In a system of nation-states, issues that were considered pivotal for 
the existence of the sovereign body politic were exempted from open public deliberation or direct 
democratic control. Now, however, the EU-FRA, FCNM and EU-WFD all give increased protection 
to transnational minorities and livelihoods, previously divided by state borders.  In the new Europe, 
financial and security policies are determined by WTO and NATO, where the agenda is being set by 
the dominant economic and military partners. Tasks of the police and the military are being 
amalgamated, and it is unclear what political actions should be defined as threatening to the 
integrity of entangled sovereignties.28 
 Political scientists respond to the changed political environment in various ways. For some, 
renewed empowerment of national sovereignty is the most viable way to defend popular self-
determination.29 Thus, European political scientists still study national party systems, perceived as 
                                                 
20  Anaya  2004:  p.  7 
21  Riedel, Giacca & Golay 2014 
22  Held  2004;;  Held  &  McGrew  2007 
23  Dryzek  2006,  final  chapter 
24  Ostrom  2007;;  Ostrom  &  Cox  2010 
25  Della  Porta  2011;;  Dryzek  2006 
26  Held  2004 
27  Bailey  &  Mattei  2012 
28  Buazan,  Wæver  &  Wilde  1998 
29  Bickerton,  Cunliffe  &  Gourevich  2007 
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the more relevant channels of democratic power.30 Others, however, claim that sovereignty is not 
under threat, but has been transformed into a complex geographical patchwork, enabling popular 
self-determination at diverse geographical levels, and especially in sub-state regions.31 Thus, 
European political scientists also synthesise political-sociological studies on state transformation 
and new forms of political power.32 Both research fronts contribute to the further development of 
the discipline. Comparative studies of voting operate within clear assumptions of conceptual 
validity, but within that framework they deduce hypotheses, and test patterns of regularity with 
methods of increased internal validity. Within the limitations of assumed conceptual validity, they 
contribute to quantitative accumulation of knowledge within the discipline. Contemporary political 
sociologists venture beyond those assumptions of conceptual validity, and utilise a mélange of 
methods to identify possibilities and develop new hypotheses. Within the limitations of weak 
internal validity, they contribute to the qualitative transformation of the discipline. Those may be 
seen as two complimentary efforts in the further development of the discipline. Organisations like 
the ECPR provides infrastructure for those who contribute to the quantitative refinement of the 
already constituted discipline, as well as those who contribute to the qualitative re-forming of the 
discipline.  Thus, while the discipline increases its internal validity within the premises that have 
been constituted, the discipline re-constitutes its basic premises by research regarding conceptual 
validity. The boat is being re-built in open sea. 
 
 
1.1.3  Political  practice:  state  transformation  in  areas  where  Norway  and  Sápmi  overlap 
Particularly challenging for the established analytical framework of European  political  science  is  
the  issue  of  indigenous self-determination. Peoples that are recognised as indigenous people by the 
UN enjoy the right to collective self-determination according to the human rights declarations 
ECCPR (§27 and §1), and ICESCR (§1).33 Academics have claimed that these convenants are not 
relevant for any regional movement in Europe to claim self-determination.34 That claim is incorrect. 
One may discuss whether Sápmi is an exception to the rule, but nevertheless, this case proves the 
possibility that the ECCPR/ICESCR are very much relevant to claim self-determination in a region 
of Europe. The Sámi are the only indigenous people in the EU, but Europe also include the Inuits of 
Greenland and the Nenets of North-West Russia. There are several smaller ethnic groups in the 
Nordic area and in European Russian who claim status as indigenous peoples. Whether they deserve 
                                                 
30  Mair  &  Bartolini  2007 
31  Ilgen  2003 
32  Kauppi  2013 
33  UN  1966a,  UN  1966b,  see  also  Anaya  2004,  Scheinin  2000,  Scheinin  2004 
34  Kymlicka  2006 
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UN recognition as indigenous peoples is an empirical question. The same is the case for the Basque. 
We cannot rule out of the picture that the struggle for rights and proofs may lead to more peoples in 
Europe gaining status as indigenous. Even within Sápmi, the homeland of the Sámi, it is unclear 
exactly which kinship groups should be defined within the category of indigenous people. It is a 
basic truism that one person can be ethnically and culturally part of both the indigenous community 
and also a state-building nation. What is contentious is the status of several smaller linguistic groups, 
such as the Coastal Sámi, the Skolt Sámi, the Kväns, the Lappalainen... Social boundaries between 
different ethnic groups are seldom clearly defined.35 It may also be difficult to distinguish between 
discrimination on the grounds of race and class, respectively. In this research, I have tried to use the 
expression  “indigenous  peoples  of  Sápmi”  rather  than  specity  which kinship groups are indigenous 
and not. I do make a case for the Coastal Sámi in this thesis, but I have not had the capacity to do 
any research on the Kväns, the Lappalainen, or other minorities-within-the-minority. 
 The constitutional power of the Sámi indigenous rights struggle has been quite literal with 
regard to areas where Sápmi overlaps with Norway, the state that hosts the largest portion of the 
Sámi population. A constitutional amendment from 1988 declares that the host state is obliged to 
enable the Sámi people to protect and develop their own language, culture and society. With this 
constitutional amendment, the Norwegian political entity has changed. It is no longer a nation-state, 
at least not a  “uni-national”  state.36 But whatever it has become is something yet unknown. 
 An inaccurate interpretation is that the state has been funded upon the territory of two peoples. 
Firstly, there is only a partial geographic overlap between the territory of the Norwegian state and 
the  extension  of  the  Sápmi  homeland.  Other  parts  of  Sápmi  are  under  three  other  “host  states”.  
Secondly, ethnicity in the area is complex: many persons have multiple ethnical belongings, each of 
the peoples contains a rich internal diversity, and there are many hybrid cultural forms. Thus, there 
are no clear-cut boundaries between the different peoples, in spite of some languages being 
mutually unintelligible. Thus,  it  is  not  easy  to  delimit  any  specific  demos, or a people with the right 
to self-determination. 
 The  UN  interprets  its  own  human  rights  covenants  ICCPR  and  ICESCR  as  recognising  both a 
state sovereignty and indigenous self-determination in the areas where Sápmi and the states 
overlap.37 It is crucial that in international law, political self-determination does no longer imply 
state sovereignty. This calls for political experiments with territorially overlapping forms of political 
self-determination. In any case, Sápmi is linguistically and culturally rich, and even though the 
Northern Sámi are the majority in Inner Sápmi, the rest of the territory includes a number of 
                                                 
35  Eriksen  2010b 
36 The  term  “uni-national  state”  is  a  critical  term  to  describe  the  “one  nation,  one  state”  norm.  The  term  was  developed  
by political theorist Wayne Norman (2006). Thanks to Rainer Bauböck for this reference.  
37  Anaya  2004:  p.  7 
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minorities and minorities-within-the-minority, for example Coastal Sámis and Kväns. Even the 
concept of indigenous people, according to the UN, implies that different peoples are woven into 
each  other.  “Indigenous  peoples”,  according  to  the  UN,  are  peoples  who  lived  in  the  area  before  the  
establishment of the existing states, but still have been subject to systematic discrimination under 
the existing states.38 This means that a process of internal colonisation and ethnic discrimination is 
what  makes  a  population  group  qualify  as  “indigenous  people”.  The  purpose  of  indigenous rights is 
to heal the harm made by such historic racism. However, the implementation of such rights is still at 
an experimental stage. 
 
 
1.1.4  Transfer  value:  the  co-evolution  of  political  practice  and  political  science 
The art and science of state transformation are feeding each other. Political systems shape the 
opportunities for political research. Political science provides resources for political actors. Some 
political scientists have observed that changes in the object of study have caused political scientists 
to re-think basic analytical categories such as sovereignty and citizenship.39 The attempted 
decolonisation in Sápmi is taking place in the present. Still, progress in historical research has led to 
revised knowledge about the past. Likewise, changes in jurisprudence have led to new prescriptions 
for the future. If the Nordic states once appeared as successful examples of national democracy, it 
has now become evident that liberal nationalism not only facilitated democratisation, but also 
internal colonisation.40 When  the  ICCPR  and  ICESCR  now  prescribe  both  state  sovereignty  and  
indigenous  self-determination,  then  it  might  be  seen  as  an  attempt  to  push  democratisation  beyond  
the  ethnocentric biases of the uni-national state form.41 
 What kind of transfer value may experiences from Sápmi have? That may depend on which 
aspects we emphasise, and how we define the context. The  experience  from  Sápmi  shows  that  
claims  that  appeared  as  extreme  one  generation  ago  might  prove  to  have  been  quite  justified.  In  
struggles  for  rights  and  proofs,  it  is  may  be  difficult  to  predict  who  might  turn  out  as  the  moral  
winner.  There  are  several  relevant  examples  within  Europe.  Some  regionalist  movements  take  place  
at  European  soil:  Basques  make  claims  against  France  and  Spain,  Northern  Irish  against  Great  
Britain.  In  Greenland,  Inuits  make  claims  against  Denmark,  and  in  to  the  northwest  of  the  Ural  
Mountains,  various  Finno-Ugric  peoples  make  claims  against  Russia.  Independentists  in  Brittany  
                                                 
38Anaya  2004 
39  Kauppi  2013;;  Olsen  2012 
40  Pedersen  2010 
41  Anaya  2004:  p.  7 
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protest  against  French  policies  that  they  frame  as  “internal  colonisation”.42  Peasants  in  Eastern  
Europe,  in  the  Balkans,  and  in  Southern  Italy  claim  to  protect  local  commons  and  local  
communities  against  “land  grabbing”.43  Macroregional  political  arrangements  may  be  facilitative  to  
microregional  movements.  In  Europe,  there  are  two  such  macroregional  arrangements.  One  is  West-
European,  with  the  European  Union,  its  inner  market  EEA  and  the  military  alliance  NATO.  The  
other  is  Eur-Asian,  led  by  the  Russian  Federation,  the  trade  union  CES  and  the  military  alliance  
CSTO.  For  microregional  movements,  the  macroregional  arrangements  may  provide  pull-factors,  in  
the  form  of  multi-level  politics,  and  push-factors,  in  the  form  of  resource  extraction.  The  Basque  
Country  and  Northern  Ireland  are  regions  that  may  experience  less  trouble  with  the  emergence  of  
macro-reginalism.  Sápmi  and  Crimea  are  regions  located  at  the  boundaries  between  macro-regions,  
but  in  two  highly  different  situations.  Regionalist  movements  are  sometimes  accused  of  a  “not-in-
my-backyard”  (NIMBY)  syndrome,  a  lack  of  solidarity  with  wider  population  groups.44  But  such  
accusations  may  be  turned  around  in  cases  where  the  region  has  experienced  underdevelopment  as  a  
direct  result  of  resource  extraction  by  businesses  based  in  more  prosperous  locations.  Some  
regionalist  movements  also  go  beyond  the  localist  focus  by  joining  forces  with  similar  movements,  
on  the  basis  of  global  justice  claims.45  Transnational  alliances  are  built  in  European  and  Global  
Social  Forums,  and  with  INGOs  such  as  Via  Campestina  and  FIAN.46  Thus,  a  transnational  
“movement  for  the  commons”  has  emerged.47 
 This  universe  of  phenomena  may  be  framed  in  various  ways.  One  common  denominator  
could  be  that  they  all  are  cases  of  environmental  justice  struggles.  Alternatively,  one  may  see  them  
all  as  cases  of  processes  of  nation-rebuilding.  They  may  also  be  seen  as  efforts  at  restorative  justice.  
Each  of  those  partly  overlapping  framings  refers  to  rather  wide  categories  of  cases,  and  within  their  
field  of  overlap  we  find  the  much  more  specific  category  indigenous  rights  movement.  However,  it  
may  also  be  hard  to  predict  whether  the  Kväns,  the  Karels  or  the  Basques  will  gain  recognition  as  
indigenous,  since  this  in  principle  is  supposed  to  be  an  empirical  question.  In  practice  it  is  the  
unpredictable  possible  outcome  of  a  struggle  for  rights  and  proofs.  Still,  regardless  of  who  
eventually  will  become  included  in  the  narrower  category  of  indigenous  rights  struggle,  experiences  
from  Sápmi  may  nevertheless  have  some  transfer  value  to  other  unique  locations  that  are  defined  
within  the  wider  universe  of  cases. 
 Political  research  on  such  movements  is  not  simply  an  academic  exercise.  It  also  involves  
profound  epistemological  and  ethical  challenges.  Firstly,  yesterday’s  scientific  truth  may  become  
                                                 
42  Lafont  1969 
43  Briganti  2014;;  Pokret  za  Slobodu  2013.  Thanks  to  Milenko  Srećković  for  this  reference.   
44  Della  Porta  &  Piazza  2008 
45  Della  Porta  &  Piazza  2008 
46  FIAN  2012;;  Borras  &  Franco  2012;;  della  Porta  2009;;  Berlingeur  &  Trotta  2005 
47  Mattei  2011  (See  also  Negri  2012  for  a  different  conceptualisation  of  the  common(s).) 
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tomorrow’s  ideological  myth.  The  intimate  connection  between  public  memory  and  democratic  
transition  has  been  observed  by  specialists  in  Spanish  and  Latin  American  politics.48  In  Sápmi,  the  
struggle  for  rights  is  also  a  struggle  for  proof,  for  example  with  the  Norwegian  Sámi  Rights  
Commission  publishing  new  proofs  about  legal  history.49  Thus,  political  research  has  political  
consequences.  How  should  the  political  researcher  handle  that?  It  poses  and  epistemological  and  
methodological  challenge.  Secondly,  terms  like  “colonisation”  and  “land  grabbing”  are  challenging  
because  many  anti-colonial  struggles  become  rather  violent.  In  Franz  Fanon's  bold  generalisation,  
“la  décolonisation  est  toujours  un  phénomène  violent.”50  If  that  is  so,  it  is  because  colonisation  is  a  
violent  process.  In  the  Chiapas  region  in  Mexico,  some  indigenous  people  have  formed  in  the  
EZLN  guerrilla  group,  while  in  Sápmi,  the  indigenous  people  have  been  reluctant  to  answer  
violence  with  violence.  However,  in  both  cases,  states  use  coercive  force  to  police  state  laws.  The  
coercive  capacity  of  states  is  not  unproblematic,  especially  not  in  cases  when  it  remains  contested  
how  internationally  law  actually  applies  regarding  use  of  land  and  water.  The  struggle  for  rights  and  
proof  may  imply  a  struggle  about  how  to  apply  institutional  violence.  How  can  a  political  researcher  
relate  to  that?  This  poses  an  ethical  and  strategical  challenge.  To  sum  up,  it  is  challenging  for  the  
political  researcher,  both  ethically  and  epistemologically,  to  contribute  to  proof-finding  and  to  use  
value-laden  terms,  when  the  struggle  for  rights  is  also  a  struggle  about  how  states  should  direct  their  
coercive  force,  and  even  is  a  struggle  to  find  proofs.  Simple  answers  may  be  hard  to  find.  The  
experience  from  Sápmi  shows  that  what  might  be  stigmatised  as  extremist  activism  in  one  historical  
situation  may  prove,  one  generation  later,  to  have  been  both  justified  and  moderate.  It  is  hard  to  
know  when  this  experience  has  transfer  value.  Today,  indigenous  peoples  in  Sápmi,  Siberia  and  
Canada  protest  against  the  oil  and  gas  industries,  industrial  mining,  and  industrial  fisheries.  All  are  
framed  as  threats  to  local  livelihoods  in  the  vulnerable  Arctic  ecosystems  and  livelihoods.  Such  
activism  is  often  labelled  as  “radicalisation”,  “hooliganism”  or  even  as  potential  terrorism.51  But  it  
may  be  hard  to  predict  how  those  movements  will  be  perceived  one  generation  from  now.  This  is  
what  the  political  researcher  should  be  cautious  about,  ethically  and  epistemologically,  at  least  if  the  
purpose  is  to  contribute  to  restorative  justice. 
 This  is  a  study  on  the  art  and  science  of  state  transformation.  I  observe  a  struggle  for  rights  
and  proofs,  and  since  this  observation  results  in  some  proof,  my  research  is  bound  to  become  
applied  as  a  resource  in  the  struggle  for  rights  and  proofs  that  I  observe.  Instead  of  pretending  to  be  
detached,  I  try  instead  to  take  full  responsibility  for  how  my  research  may  be  (mis)used.  Data  have  
                                                 
48  De  Brito,  Enriques  &  Aguilar  2001.  (Thanks  to  Mariana  Mendes  for  the  reference.) 
49  Norwegian  Official  Report  1997a  (NOU  1997:4);;  1997b  (NOU  1997:5);;  Norwegian  Official  Report  2007a  (NOU  
2007:13);;  2007b  (NOU  2007:14) 
50  Fanon  2002  (1961) 
51  Ahmhed  2014;;  Ballovara  2014 
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been  gathered  from  local  communities  through  participant  observation.  Writing  is  payback  time,  
and  this  text  feeds  back  into  the  local  communities.  Thus,  by  writing  up  the  thesis,  my  role  as  
researcher  goes  from  that  of  participant  observer,  to  that  of  observant  participant.  That  is  why  I  
choose  to  inquire  research  some  of  the  many  questions  that  I  hope  are  relevant  for  specific  social  
movements  for  restorative  justice,  who  need  to  empower  themselves  for  potent  political  action,  
while  at  the  same  time  avoid  attracting  violent  suppression. 
 Political  science  in  Western  Europe  has  a  rich  literature  on  state  formation,  though  this  
research  was  discontinued  after  the  neo-positivist  and  post-structuralist  critiques.  That  is  because  
such  research  deals  with  macro-historical  processes,  and  since  change  at  the  macro  level  cannot  be  
observed  directly,  such  research  tends  to  be  (even)  more  model-dependent  than  other  political  
research.  Some  applied  bold  hypotheses  about  the  course  of  history,  what  Popper  calls  
“historicism”.52  During  the  period  of  bi-polar  geopolitics,  both  superpowers  justified  their  meddling  
in  foreign  affairs  with  historistic  “grand  theories”.  Messianic  hope  was  used  to  justify  revolutionary  
violence,  either  in  the  name  of  liberalism,  or  socialism.  The  ideological  bias  of  such  grand  
assumptions  was  the  main  target  of  the  neo-positivist  and  the  post-structuralist  critiques.53  Even  
though  the  ideologies  were  dead,  this  did  not  prevent  neoconservatives  of  letting  it  live  as  a  
zombie.54  But  the  left,  however,  “chastened  by  the  disasters  of  the  20th  century,  has  largely  moved  
away  from  its  older  celebration  of  revolutionary  violence”55  There  are  some  good  reasons  why  the  
political  science  of  state  formation  was  discontinued.  On  the  other  hand,  the  state  builders  still  
apply  the  science  of  yesterday  in  their  efforts  of  today.56  This  is  particularly  problematic  in  a  
globalised  and  postcolonial  world,  because  of  the  old  theory  is  based  on  a  specific  spatial  selection  
bias.  The  endogenous  national  history  of  former  colonial  nations  (which  defines  away  the  
exogenous  ties  to  the  former  colony)  is  used  to  generalise  also  regarding  areas  which  are  not  former  
colonial  states  (including  the  former  colonies).57  The  rest  of  the  world  remained  systematically  
under-researched  (and  so  do  colonial  interdependencies).  The  collective  effort  to  overcome  this  
gigantic  selection  bias  requires  much  labor,  and  is  not  done  overnight.58  Thus,  the  spatial  selection  
bias  is  temporally  path  dependent.  In  less  technical  terms:  the  discipline  is  encumbered  with  a  
colonial  heritage.  Some  colonial  subjects  were  defined  into  presumably  inferior  civilisations.  This  is  
                                                 
52  While  Karl  Popper  is  known  as  an  anti-communist,  he  was  in  fact  opposed  to  ideological  dogmaticism  at  both  sides  
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criticism  of  the  historical  method  of  Marxism.  But  in  fact  it  does  not  confine  itself  to  that  economic  variant  of  
historicism  which  characterizes  Marxism,  for  it  aims  at  criticising  the  historicist  doctrine  in  general.”  Original  
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what  Edward  Saïd  found  among  the  earlier  generation  of  orientalists.59  But  some  other  colonial  
subjects  were  defined  as  not  even  cultivated:  they  were  seen  as  living  in  a  “state  of  nature”,  as  
peoples  “without  history”.60  Consequently,  it  was  also  assumed  that  they  had  no  laws  and  that  their  
homeland  could  and  should  be  conquered  and  cultivated.  They  were  “peoples  without  geography”.61  
In  legal  theory,  this  justification  for  colonisation  is  called  the  Terra  Nullius  doctrine,  and  it  was  
rejected  by  the  Haag  Court  in  the  1970s.62  It  has  been  used  to  justify  the  acquisition  of  land  and  
water  from  the  Sámi.63  Norway  and  Sweden  adopted  this  argument  from  West-European  colonial  
states,  while  the  Russian  Federation  and  Finland  used  less  nationalistic  forms  of  the  same  argument.  
This  means  that  Sápmi  is  an  inter-boundary  region  where  the  history  of  the  EU  area  overlaps  with  
the  history  of  the  post-socialist  area,  while  both  overlap  with  the  history  of  the  postcolonial  world.  
That  is  sufficient  to  blow  one's  mind  regarding  the  conceptual  validity  of  basic  analytical  concepts  
in  West-European  political  science.  Already  before  the  fall  of  “grand  theories”,  some  West-
European  political  scientists  tried  to  inquire  about  issues  of  internal  colonialism,  and  hence,  they  
were  forced  to  stretch  their  respective  grand  theories.  Gramsci  diverted  from  the  orthodox  Leninism  
of  the  Third  International  when  he  observed  the  subaltern  peasants  of  Southern  Italy  as  “colonised”  
under  the  state  formation.64  Rokkan  had  to  amend  the  orthodox  Parsonism  of  the  Marshall  Aid  
program  when  he  and  Urwin,  as  a  direct  response  to  the  debate  on  “internal  colonialism”  started  to  
inquire  about  centre-periphery  cleavages  within  Western  Europe.65  Rokkan  came  from  “a  periphery  
of  a  periphery”,  the  Lofoten  islands  in  Norway.66  This  is  an  ethnically  Norwegian  community  close  
to  the  South-Sámi  cultural  area,  and  in  some  of  his  very  last  writings,  Rokkan  raised  the  question  
that  “Lappish”  society  might  actually  have  survived,  in  spite  of  apparent  assimilation  into  the  
majority  language.67  But  after  the  collapse  of  “grand  theories”  such  research  may  seem  even  more  
challenging,  if  not  impossible.  It  is  a  tremendous  task  to  overcome  the  colonial  heritage  of  the  
discipline.  The  spatial  selection  bias  is  gigantic,  and  to  overcome  it  will  require  so  much  time  that  it  
is  bound  to  remain  temporally  path  dependent.  In  other  research  I  have  tried  to  delve  into  those  
issues  regarding  areas  where  Norway  and  Sápmi  overlap.68  But  in  the  present  study,  I  keep  a  more  
local  and  particular  focus.  I  limit  the  scope  to  some  of  the  particular  ways  whereby  social  
                                                 
59  Saïd  1978 
60  Wolf  2010 (1982) 
61  Howitt  2003 
62  Halonen  1981  (citing  International  Court  of  Justice  Reports  1975) 
63  Pedersen  1999 
64  Laclau  &  Mouffe  2001  (1985):  66,  54-55,  59.  For  more  on  the  Gramscian  alternative,  see  Gramsci  1919;;  Gramsci  
1930; Spivak 1988; Ekers,  Hart,  Kipfer  &  Lofthus  2013.  For  an  attempt  to  further  decolonise  the  Italian  reception  of  
Gramsci,  see  Capuzzo & Mezzadra 2012. For  critical  appraisals  of  orthodox  marxist-leninism,  see  Wolf  2010  
(1982). 
65  Rokkan  and  Urwin  (eds)  1982:  1-2 
66  Caramani  2011 
67  Rokkan1983,  excerpt  re-printed  in:  Rokkan  &  Flora  1999:  196,  208 
68  Jensen  2013 
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movements  may  have  impact  on  ongoing  state  transformation. 
 In  order  to  provide  a  reliable,  evidence-based  contribution  to  the  art  and  science  of  state  
transformation,  I  have  engaged  with  the  political  and  social  sciences.  From  there  I  have  mobilised  
conceptual  and  methodological  resources.  This  thesis  is  my  payback  to  the  discipline,  like  it  is  also  
my  payback  to  the  local  communities  that  have  shared  their  own  food  and  information  with  me.  
Thus,  I  also  try  to  provide  a  particular  contribution  to  our  collective  effort  of  further  developing  the  
scientific  discipline.  But  that  contribution  is  no  goal  in  itself.  To  participate  in  political  science  is  
relevant  only  to  the  degree  that  it  is  useful  for  political  practice,  the  struggle  for  rights  and  proof. 
 More  precisely  how  I  try  to  involve  the  development  of  political  science  in  the  struggle  for  




1.2.0  Specific  Puzzle:  paths  of  constituent  power  in  Sápmi 
 
1.2.1  The  object  of  observation 
The  object  of  study  for  this  dissertation  is  titled  “State  Transformation  in  the  High  North”.  The  
spatial  and  temporal  delimitations  of  the  object  are,  however,  more  specific. 
 The  study  deals  with  state  transformation  in  some  areas  in  the  Arctic  periphery  of  Europe,  in  
a  period  where  one  regional  indigenous  rights  movement  has  had  some  success  in  compelling  their  
host  states  to  implement  indigenous  human  rights. 
 The  selected  geographical  area  consists  of  two  particular  watersheds,  Alta  and  Deatnu,  both  
found  in  Sápmi,  the  traditional  homeland  of  the  Sápmi  people,  which  is  the  only  cultural  group  in  
the  EU  that  has  been  recognised  as  “indigenous  people”  according  to  the  UN  law. 
 The  selected  historical  period  is  four  particular  decades  1970-2012,  which  includes  the  
latest  political  mobilisation  of  the  Sámi,  and  the  start  of  effort  being  made  to  bring  state  laws  in  line  
with  recent  international  norms,  by  sorting  out  which  local  customs  had  been  unrightfully  
criminalised  by  the  host  states. 
 The  two  selected  watersheds,  Alta  and  Deatnu,  are  bioregions.  They  are  relevant  for  the  
management  of  particular  natural  resource  systems  that  are  spatially  distributed  in  watersheds,  such  
as  fishing.  The  two  selected  watersheds  have  an  increasing  significance  for  state-codified  natural  
resources  management,  as  a  result  of  recent  multi-level  legislation  on  environmental  protection  and  
indigenous  rights.  The  selected  watersheds  also  used  to  coincide  with  some  boundaries  in  the  
ancient  tribal  confederacy  of  the  indigenous  Sámi  people,  and  recent  proof  shows  that  the  ancient  
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customs  inherited  from  this  political  order  has  been  continuously  maintained  as  actual,  informal  
natural  resources  management  “in  the  shadow”  of  the  states.69  The  two  selected  watersheds  connect  
some  of  the  core  areas  of  the  Sámi  traditional  homeland,  Sápmi,  with  some  of  the  Barents  Coast,  
where  culture  has  been  rather  more  shaped  by  state-led  nation-building  and  market  capitalism.  The  
extension  of  Alta  and  Deatnu  Rivers  roughly  coincide  with  the  extension  of  six  municipalities;;  four  
under  Norwegian  control,  and  two  under  Finnish  control.  The  emergence  of  municipal  democracy  
has  been  central  topic  in  the  political  history  of  both  states.  In  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  water  areas,  the  
municipal  boundaries  coincided  to  some  extent  with  the  boundaries  of  the  ancient  tribal  
confederacy,  and  some  of  the  local  politics  is  channeled  through  the  municipal  democracy.  
However,  to  some  extent,  the  municipal  borders  were  also  drawn  in  a  way  that  divided  and  
conquered  the  ancient  spatial  order.  For  example,  the  ancient  Ohcejohka  siida  was  divided  between  
the  municipalities  Utsjoki  and  Tana,  the  one  Finnish,  the  other  Norwegian.70  Nation  building  led  to  
the  accommodation  of  local  customs  in  the  cultural  core  areas  of  the  Norwegian  and  Finnish  
peasantry.71  But  in  the  cultural  core  areas  of  the  transnational  Sámi  nation,  the  policy  was  
criminalisation,  not  accommodation  of  ancient  local  customs  (Pedersen  1999,  2012).  In  the  history  
of  Norway,  a  golden  age  of  parliamentarian  and  corporatist  democracy  started  with  the  adaptation  
of  parliamentarianism  in  the  1880s,  and  ended  with  the  fall  of  the  social  democratic  consensus  in  
the  1980s.  That  very  century,  however,  was  also  a  dark  age  of  eugenic  assimilation.  Thus,  
nationalism  was  a  premise  of  democratic  solidarity  as  well  as  for  ethnic  chauvinism.72 
 The  Alta  watershed  from  1970  until  1980  is  a  relevant  area  and  period  to  exemplify  the  
emergence  of  the  state  transformation  being  examined.  The  latest  wave  of  indigenous  mobilisation  
in  the  Sámi  homeland  emerged  among  the  post  Warld  War  Two  generation,  and  got  a  boost  from  
1970,  with  a  conflict  about  hydropower  development  in  Alta  River.  The  Alta  dam  conflict  was  an  
event  that  lasted  from  1970  until  1982.  It  coincided  with  the  beginning  of  a  political  process  at  
multiple  levels,  whereby  indigenous  human  rights  were  enacted  by  the  UN,  and  adapted  by  some  
“host  states”  in  Sápmi.  Thus,  each  “host  state”  recognised  its  duty  to  protect  peoples  that  were  
systematically  marginalised  during  the  establishment  of  the  state.73  This  implies  that  it  is  the  duty  of  
the  states  to  protect  the  right  of  those  peoples  and  to  preserve  and  develop  culture  and  ways  of  life,  
                                                 
69  Norwegian  ministry  of  Justice  and  Police  1997;;  Norwegian  ministry  of  Justice  and  Police  2007 
70  On  the  map  (de  jure)  if  not  in  practice  (de  facto),  most  of  Ohcejohka  siida  was  divided  between  two  kingdoms  in  
1751,  with  a  border  drawn  as  far  north  as  Lake  Buolbmát  in  the  Deatnu  River  valley.  The  border  was  drawn  further  
in  1826.  From  1751  until  1852  the  states  would  still  accept  that  the  local  indigenous  people  had  longstanding  rights  
to  use  the  land  and  resources  across  the  border,  and  local  trade  with  peoples  at  the  Russian  side  would  continue  until  
1917.  However,  such  boundary  making  did  not  automatically  translate  from  theoretically  claimed  authority,  to  obe-­
dience  in  actual  practice.  For  a  more  detailed  historical  geography,  see  part  5.2.5,  and  for  a  map,  see  Figure  5-5.   
71  Sandvik  1998 
72  Jensen  2013 
73  Anaya  2004 
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the  very  cultural  forms  that  that  those  very  states  had  been  suppressing  during  the  attempt  to  foster  
homogeneous  national  cultures.  Translating  such  norms  to  practice  may  at  some  times  and  places  be  
a  complicated  and  contentious  process. 
 The  Deatnu  watershed  from  1980  until  now  is  a  relevant  area  and  period  to  exemplify  the  
preliminary  results  of  the  state  transformation  under  study.  During  the  latter  three  decades,  several  
Sápmi  has  had  several  test  areas  for  such  political  transformations.  The  Deatnu  watershed  is  a  
particularly  relevant  example,  because  of  its  specific  geographical  location,  and  its  specific  bio-
cultural  richness.  Firstly,  Deatnu  has  a  great  biological  diversity,  as  one  of  the  largest  spawning  
rivers  for  North  Atlantic  salmon  (Salmon  Salar).  Secondly,  Deatnu  has  a  great  cultural  diversity.  It  is  
located  in  the  core  area  of  Sápmi,  but  is  also  divided  between  the  Norwegian  and  Finnish  host  
states.  Therefore,  in  practice  the  river  is  shared  between  two  states,  butalso  between  three  (or  more)  
nations.  Most  inhabitants  are  bi-  or  trilingual,  speaking  Sámi,  Norwegian  and/or  Finnish.  Since  
times  longstanding,  the  local  population  have  utilised  the  local  salmon  stock,  resulting  in  a  rich  
heritage  of  unique  local  lore  and  local  customs.  The  culture  of  natural  resource  usage  is  central  to  
the  debate  on  indigenous  rights.  It  touches  the  issue  of  territorial  self  determination,  as  well  as  the  
question  of  how  state-funded  science  relate  to  other  forms  of  knowledge  practices. 
 
 
1.2.2  The  act  of  observing 
The  issue  at  stake  with  the  chosen  object  of  research  is  not  as  “strong”  as  the  right  to  form  a  nation-
state,  but  neither  is  it  only  the  “weaker”  right  to  speak  a  particular  language.  The  most  controversial  
issue  at  stake  is  the  collective  right  to  use  natural  resources.  Recent  human  rights  legislation  has  
expanded  the  right  to  self-determination  from  state-building  peoples,  to  also  include  those  «tribal  
and  indigenous»  peoples  who  have  been  systematically  marginalised  during  the  establishment  of  the  
existing  states.  In  fact  it  is  misleading  to  place  this  in-between  a  “weak”  right  to  culture  and  a  
“strong”  right  to  statehood,  because  the  emergence  of  collective  human  rights  provides  an  entirely  
new  legal  basis  for  the  right  to  self-determination.  Since  the  reality  is,  that  different  demoi  live  side  
by  side,  especially  in  post-colonial  areas,  the  old  notion  of  “one  state,  one  nation”  easily  leads  to  
ethnic  cleansing,  segregation,  or  assimilation.  By  contrast,  the  new  notion  of  geographically  
overlapping  systems  of  self-determination  is  an  effort  to  democratise  nominal  democracy,  towards  
an  even  stronger  notion  of  democratic  self-rule.  As  the  Sámi  have  been  recognised  by  the  UN  and  
the  ILO  as  an  “indigenous  people”,  the  interesting  question  is  not  who  came  “first”  (which  may  be  a  
meaningless  question,  because  all  communities  change  over  time),  but  who  has  been  subject  to  
systematic  discrimination  under  the  existing  state  formations.  Indigenous  human  rights  regard  the  
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right  to  language,  but  also  the  right  to  heal  the  harm  done  by  economic  resource  grabbing.  This  is  
the  most  contentious  part.  It  includes  asymmetrical  socio-economic  conflict.  It  even  includes  
asymmetrical  conflicts  to  define  hegemonic  norms,  to  disseminate  knowledge,  and  even  struggles  to  
set  the  agenda  for  empirical  scientific  research.  There  is  a  struggle  for  the  right  to  control  natural  
resources,  a  form  of  economic  real  goods.  There  is  also  a  struggle  for  the  capacity  to  collect  and  
spread  knowledge  about  the  real.  Competing  interest  groups  push  for  competing  research  interests.  
Science  itself  becomes  politicised  because  in  this  political  struggle,  proofs  and  rights  are  at  stake.  In  
the  process  of  state  formation  in  the  far  north,  the  demand  for  proofs  is  so  eager  among  the  involved  
political  participants  that  it  may  be  practically  impossible  to  prevent  that  research  at  PhD  level  is  
being  instrumentalised.  In  such  a  situation,  all  science  is  bound  to  be  applied  science,  while  all  
application  is  bound  to  be  political.  Thus,  politically  detached  science  is  an  unrealistic  utopia.  For  
me  as  a  researcher,  the  unavoidable  instrumentalisation  of  science  is  an  ethnical  challenge,  even  an  
existentialist  dilemma.74  The  dilemma  was  not  solved  until  I  read  Law  &  Singleton's  response  to  
Donna  Haraway's  radical-feminist  critique  of  relativistic  forms  of  science  studies.75  Like  her,  they  
argue  that  one  should  “stay  with  the  trouble”,  and  search  for  the  unexpected  forms  of  power  and  
empowerment.  Inspired  by  this  advice,  I  chose  as  my  guiding  imperative  the  proverb  “take  the  bull  
by  its  horns“.    Instead  of  beating  around  the  bush,  I  wished  to  identify  the  core  of  the  problem,  and  
to  confront  it  head  on.  I  wanted  to  hunt  down  the  very  most  challenging  issue.  I'm  out  for  big  game;;  
the  Minotaurus  of  the  labyrinth.  The  collective  right  to  use  natural  resources  emerged  as  the  
seemingly  most  controversial  issue.  It  may  also  be  formulated  in  alternative  and  even  more  pointed  
ways.  Through  my  fieldwork  in  water  areas  Alta  and  Deatnu  and  beyond,  I  learned  of  some  issues  
of  contention  that  I  had  not  been  aware  of  during  my  life  in  the  capital  city.  Gradually,  I  got  access  
to  private  conversations,  after  I  had  switched  research  technique,  from  qualitative  interviews  to  
participant  observation.    In  such  situations,  away  from  public  eye,  I  could  hear  even  some  of  the  
most  state-loyal  political  entrepreneurs  among  the  indigenous  people  whisper:  “actually,  it  is  still  a  
colony”.  There  are  no  systematic  data  on  the  prevalence  of  such  secret  whispers,  and  by  its  very  
discretion,  such  a  secret  whispers  evade  the  scrutiny  of  surveys.  However,  this  isolated  example  
sharpened  my  sensitivity  for  similar  messages.  Some  more  examples  will  be  given  in  my  thesis.  
After  being  in  the  field  I  feel  rather  confident  that  other  ethnographers  will  find  many  more  similar  
examples.  Without  quantitative  data  on  the  exact  prevalence  of  such  views,  I  still  think  there  is  
reason  to  expect  that  they  might  be  rather  widespread  in  certain  areas.  In  any  case,  the  very  
existence  of  such  views  is  in  itself  relevant. 
                                                 
74  In  order  to  write  up  my  research  I  had  to  make  ethical  choices.  For  being  able  to  do  so  I  owe  thanks  to  my  clinical  
philosopher  /  psychiatrist,  professor  Giovanni  Stanghellini  –  as  well  as  to  the  existentialist  philosophical  tradition:  
Østerberg  1993;;  Moi  2000;;  Fanon  2002  (1961);;  De  Beavioir  2000  (1949);;  Sartre  1996  (1946). 
75  Law  &  Singleton  2012 
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 Now  I  have  raised  several  issues  about  the  basic  assumptions  of  the  political  and  social  
sciences.  Similar  issues  were  discussed  by  the  “Gulbekian  Commission  on  the  Future  of  the  Social  
Sciences”  in  their  report.76  Three  of  the  four  points  they  made  were  the  following:  (a)  using  the  
nation-state  to  define  analytical  systems  boundaries  is  empirically  misleading;;  (b)  the  division  of  
labor  between  social,  natural  and  human  sciences  is  empirically  misleading;;  and  (c)  assuming  a  
separation  between  the  object  and  act  of  observation  is  empirically  misleading.  Such  issues  are  
being  addressed  in  the  metatheoratical  and  methodological  debates  of  recent  approaches  to  political  
and  social  sciences.  (Three  examples  will  be  discussed  in  Chapter  3:  the  SES  framework.  the  ANT  
approach  and  the  postmodern  Machiavelli.)  The  necessity  to  overcome  “methodological  
nationalism  and  statism”  (issue  a),  and  the  need  to  transgress  the  boundary  between  natural,  human  
and  social  sciences  (issue  b)  are  challenging  enough.  However,  what  is  much  more  challenging  is  to  
take  into  account  the  relation  between  the  object  and  the  act  of  observation.  Empirical  inquiry  
includes  (i)  the  object  of  observation  and  (ii)  the  act  of  observing,  and  the  relation  between  them  is  
not  only  i  (in)forming  ii,  but  simultaneously,  ii  (in)forms  i.  This  has  nothing  to  do  with  “cultural  
relativism”,  which  is  the  dogmatic  assumption  that  each  culture  is  internally  coherent  and  externally  
incommensurable.77  But  it  has  a  lot  to  do  with  what  the  nuclear  physicist  Niels  Bohr  called  
“complimentarity”,78  and  also  with  what  the  human  scientist  Donna  Haraway  calls  “positionality”.79  
It  is  enlightening  that  Bohr  refused  to  serve  the  nuclear  program  during  the  cold  war,  and  instead  
engaged  in  peace  activism  with  other  nuclear  scientists  from  the  antagonistic  political  bloc.80  In-
between  the  physical  and  the  political  sciences,  Norbert  Wiener,  a  founder  of  cybernetics,  also  
deserted  from  the  cold  war.81  The  political  and  social  sciences  may  be  less  obviously  instrumental  
than  cybernetics  or  nuclear  physics,  but  the  affinity  between  political  strategy  and  political  analysis  
may  be  even  closer.  It  does  not  matter  whether  the  political  and  social  scientist  chooses  the  neo-
positivist  or  the  post-structuralist  paths,  or  both,  and  they  may  be  complimentary.82  However,  what  
does  matters  is  whether  or  not  political  and  social  scientists  try  to  cultivate  awareness  of  the  actual  
symbiosis  between  the  act  of  observing  and  the  object  of  observation:  the  politics  of  political  
science.  Trying  to  be  explicitly  aware  of  the  interdependency  of  political  practice  and  political  
science  is  to  strive  to  avoid  concealing  this  relationship,  and  thus,  to  strive  to  avoid  reducing  science  
to  mere  propaganda. 
 Because  of  ethical  reasons,  I  choose  this  as  the  first  and  major  principle  guiding  my  research  
                                                 
76  Wallestein  1996 
77  Eriksen  1993 
78  Bohr  1938;;  Brock  2000 
79  Haraway  1991.  In  my  view,  Haraway  (1991)  and  Bohr  (1938)  both  give  refined  responses  to  the  relativism-realism  
debate.  Thus,  neither  of  them  would  be  acceptable  for  a  naïve  realist. 
80  Brock  2000 
81  Wiener  1983  (1946) 
82  Jensen  2000 
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design.  In  this  study  I  have  tried  to  observe  and  present  the  political  positionally  and  residual  
colonial  bias  in  my  own  observations,  and  at  the  same  time,  I  have  tried  to  observe  how  progress  in  
state-certified  sciences  has  co-evolved  with  the  process  of  state  transformation. 
 
 
1.2.3  Specifying  the  purpose  with  this  research  project 
When  I  presented  the  general  theme  for  this  research,  I  started  arguing  that  the  purpose  was  to  
contribute  to  the  art  and  science  of  state  transformation.  I  would  do  this  by  tracing  some  possible  
paths  to  transformative  power,  and  also,  some  ways  to  avoid  violent  suppression.  This  I  would  do  to  
serve  practical  needs  of  the  indigenous  rights  movements  in  particular,  the  environmental  justice  
movements  in  general.  Let  me  specify  this.  This  is  a  study  in  the  art  and  science  of  constituent  
power.  This  is  a  term  from  constitutional  theory,  referring  to  how  constitutional  order  is  being  
made,  maintained  and  re-made.  The  art  of  constituent  power  includes  all  the  strategies  pursued  by  
social  actors  when  they  empower  themselves  to  re-constitute  some  political  opportunity  structure.  
The  science  of  constituent  power  is  to  observe  all  such  strategies  systematically.  There  is  a  
symbiosis  between  those  two,  the  art  and  the  science.  For  the  science  of  constituent  power  there  
would  be  no  research  questions,  and  no  research  funding,  without  the  art.  For  the  art  of  constituent  
power,  there  the  actual  opportunities  would  appear  even  more  obscure,  unpredictable  and  uncertain  
without  the  science.  The  science  is  a  means  for  the  art.  In  the  uneven  development  of  rights  and  
proof,  the  already  constituted  body  of  law  may  be  biased,  but  the  already  constituted  body  of  
knowledge  may  be  biased  as  well.  Since  knowledge  always  remains  limited,  we  never  have  any  
guarantee  that  our  knowledge  is  not  biased.  To  do  scientific  inquiry  is  to  do  discover  facts  that  were  
unknown;;  it  is  an  endless  effort  to  overcome  prejudice,  to  become  slightly  less  prejudiced.  
Therefore,  scientific  proof-finding  is  in  itself  one  of  the  paths  of  constituent  power.  It  is  a  way  of  
getting  involved  in  the  struggle  for  rights  and  proofs.  Proofs  emerge  from  knowledge  praxes.  Rights  
emerge  from  customary  praxis.  Both  categories  refer  to  various  paths  whereby  constituent  praxes  
are  executed,  maintaining  or  transforming  constituted  order.  However,  if  a  movement  succeeds  in  
re-constituting  the  official  norms  and  knowledge  of  a  state,  this  also  has  consequences  for  how  the  
state  uses  coercive  force.  The  uneven  development  of  norms  and  proofs  is  being  translated  into  an  
uneven  application  of  coercive  force.  This  category  refers  to  a  third  path  of  constituted  praxes  and  
constituted  order.  What  is  challenging  for  the  political  scientist  is  that  customary  praxes  do  not  
constitute  the  one  only  path  to  constituent  power.  The  constituent  power  of  knowledge  praxes  is  
epistemologically  challenging,  because  it  implies  that  scientific  proof-finding  feeds  into  the  struggle  
for  rights  and  proofs.  The  constituent  power  of  coercive  force  is  ethically  challenging  because  the  
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state's  (uneven)  application  of  coercive  power  is  informed  by  the  (uneven)  development  of  rights  
and  proofs,  to  which  the  scientist  herself  is  contributing.  I  will  return  to  the  practice  of  those  
entangled  paths  in  2.4.1,  then  to  the  science  of  the  same  paths  in  3.4.1,  and  these  discussions  decide  
the  parameters  for  the  methods  chapter  (4.0.0).  When  I  study  the  art  and  practice  of  constituent  
power,  I  not  only  provide  proof  that  feed  the  ongoing  struggle  for  rights  and  proofs.  Additionally,  I  
also  mobilise  conceptual  and  methodological  resources  from  the  discipline  of  political  and  social  
science.  I  also  try  to  contribute  to  the  discipline,  to  the  degree  that  such  a  contribution  seems  
relevant  for  the  practical  purpose.  To  trace  constituent  power  is  a  focus  that  allows  the  political  
researcher  to  trace  the  “sinews  of  power”,  the  relations  that  connect  collective  action  with  ongoing  
state  transformation.  On  the  one  hand,  collective  action  is  conditioned  by  the  already  constituted  
“opportunity  structure”,  including  state  laws,  international  norms,  indigenous  customs,  etc.  On  the  
other  hand  collective  action  feeds  back  into  the  environment,  and  may  potentially  provide  input  into  
the  ongoing  development  of  state  laws,  international  norms,  indigenous  customs,  etc.  On  an  
individual  level,  there  is  not  much  each  person  can  do  alone  to  influence  the  political  environment.  
However,  singular  persons  are  seldom  totally  individualised.  Virtually  everybody  is  part  of  some  
family,  some  circle  of  friends,  kinship-network,  neighbourhood,  economic  enterprise,  church  
congregation,  party  organisation,  social  movement,  etc.  Through  collective  action,  individual  
persons  may  (or  may  not)  congregate  in  rather  wide  coalitions,  and  empower  themselves  together,  
so  that  they  can  obtain  the  capacity  to  define  the  policy  agenda,  or  the  research  agenda.  When  
acting  in  concert,  the  struggle  for  rights  and  proofs  may  (or  may  not)  ultimately  lead  to  re-
constitution  of  a  given  body  of  law  (or  norms),  and  a  given  body  of  knowledge  (or  lore).  Then,  it  
has  profound  consequences  for  the  ongoing  (but  uneven)  development  of  rights  and  laws  in  a  
political  system,  and  thus,  for  the  (uneven)  application  of  coercive  force  in  that  political  system.  
That  is  the  art  of  state  transformation,  and  the  constituent  power  of  social  movements.  While  the  
research  on  state  formation  was  discontinued  (see  1.1.4),  research  on  social  movement  action  
blossomed.  Around  1989,  the  post-marxist  researchers  from  Western  Europe  congregated  with  
resource  mobilisation  theorists  from  North  America,  and  constituted  a  North-Atlantic  network  of  
social  movement  research.  This  particular  community  of  social  movement  researchers  became  
established  in  the  institutions  of  Western-European  political  science,  such  as  the  ECPR.  But  the  
constituent  power  of  social  movements  was  an  issue  that  became  as  discontinued  as  the  research  on  
state  formation.  This  topic  has  only  recently  returned  to  the  research  agenda.83  I  will  return  to  this  
debate  in  much  more  detail  in  2.3.0,  and  continue  it  in  2.4.0,  and  in  3.4.0.  This  will  become  a  main  
red  thread  through  this  inquiry.  For  now,  only  one  general  observation  is  sufficient.  Most  of  the  
                                                 
83  Bailey  &  Mattei  2012 
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writers  in  this  field  limit  their  interest  to  reformist  movements  that  are  neatly  contained  within  the  
confinement  of  already  constituted  power.  For  example,  when  Tilly,  Tarrow  and  McAdam  
attempted  a  synthesis  of  social  movement  theory,  their  main  dualism  is  the  one  between  “insiders”  
and  “outsiders”  to  already  finished  political  systems.84  But  how  is  the  distinction  between  insiders  
and  outsiders  being  constituted  or  re-constituted,  how  is  it  maintained  or  transformed?  The  already  
constituted  political  system  is  not  a  finished  entity,  if  we  trace  the  constituent  power  of  social  
movements.  Then,  the  main  duality  is  the  one  between  constituent  praxes  and  constituted  order,  not  
the  one  between  insiders  and  outsiders.  This  topic  goes  beyond  the  research  interest  in  reformist  
movements  and  beyond  revolutionary  movements  as  well.  The  research  interest  then  becomes  
transformative  movements  that  produce  constituent  power.   
As  I  mentioned  above,  constituent  power  is  an  issue  that  is  epistemologically  and  ethically  
challenging  for  the  political  researcher.  I  will  now  face  those  issues,  before  presenting  the  research  
design.  Now  I  will  discuss  the  art  and  science  of  constituent  power:  first  one  chapter  on  the  practice  
or  the  art,  then  one  chapter  on  the  theory  or  science.     
 
 
1.2.4  The  structure  of  the  thesis 
The  thesis  has  three  main  parts:  (A)  First  is  conceptual  and  methodological  scaffolding,  in  the  three  
following  chapters.  Here  the  reader  will  get  a  little  taste  of  the  data  to  come,  because  it  addresses  
the  relation  between  science  and  practice.  (B)  Second  follows  the  empirical  part,  with  seven  
chapters.  After  a  geographical  overview  chapter  (based  on  aggregate  data)  the  text  zooms  in  on  the  
two  selected  watersheds  during  the  two  selected  periods  (based  on  qualitative  data).  (C)  Finally,  the  
two  last  chapters  give  a  theoretical  discussion,  where  the  various  explanations  observed  in  the  
empirical  part  are  discussed  against  a  rival  theory.  I  will  go  more  in  detail  regarding  each  of  the  
three  parts.   
 (Ad.  A)  The  following  chapter  turns  to  practical  aspects,  or  the  art  of  constituent  power  
(2.0.0).  I  will  include  some  glimpses  into  my  empirical  data,  in  order  to  be  cognisant  of  the  
relationship  between  science  and  practice.  Then,  I  will  discuss  the  theoretical  aspects,  or  the  science  
of  constituent  power  (3.0.0).  Here  I  will  operationalise  the  research  question  in  terms  of  scientific  
concepts  and  methods,  and  negotiate  between  different  alternative  approaches.  Finally,  I  lay  out  the  
entire  research  design,  research  techniques,  and  present  the  selected  data  sources  and  coding  
categories  (4.0.0).   
 (Ad.  B)  Once  the  scaffolding  is  in  place,  the  reader  is  invited  into  the  empirical  part  of  the  
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thesis.  This  starts  with  one  geographical  introduction,  which  is  aimed  at  mapping  the  terrains  of  
constituted  order  in  Sápmi,  with  focus  on  two  selected  watersheds  or  bio-regions.  The  chapter  is  
based  on  qualitative  interpretation  of  quantitative  data,  presented  in  the  form  of  maps  and  tables  
(5.0.0).  Thereafter,  I  proceed  to  the  first  empirical  case  study,  a  historical  description  of  the  
dynamics  of  contention  during  the  Alta-dam  conflict.  This  is  widely  seen  as  the  take  off  point  of  the  
environmental  movement  and  the  indigenous  rights  movement  in  the  area.  The  case  study  is  based  
on  secondary  literature,  archival  documents,  and  some  oral  history.  It  concludes  with  suggesting  
some  hypotheses  regarding  the  possible  paths  to  constituent  power  that  were  observed  in  the  case  
study  (6.0.0).  Then  I  proceed  to  the  second  and  third  case  studies.  The  second  one  contains  the  third  
one.  The  second  case  study  is  a  policy  of  natural  resources  management  in  Deatnu  River,  which  is  
located  in  the  heart-land  of  Sápmi,  but  on  the  border  between  Norway  and  Finland.  Here  I  describe  
some  recent  attempts  to  establish  locally  based,  ecosystems-oriented  and  trans-boundary  natural  
resource  management  regimes.  I  trace  some  of  the  causal  links  whereby  the  environmentalist  and  
indigenous  rights  activism  during  the  Alta-dam  conflict  has  had  consequences  for  contemporary  
natural  resources  management  in  Deatnu  River.  This  case  study  also  concludes  by  suggesting  some  
possible  explanatory  mechanisms.  (7.0.0).  Finally,  I  zoom  in  on  one  particular  area  within  the  
Deatnu  watershed:  the  Deatnu  fjord.  In  fine-grained  detail  I  describe  some  of  the  customary  praxes  
and  knowledge  praxes  that  maintain  and  transform  the  constituted  order.  I  follow  local  fisher-
peasants  during  operational  routines  and  political  deliberation.  The  focus  on  particular  action  
situations  allows  to  me  to  observe  how  norms  may  function  in  practice.  The  case  study  concludes  
by  suggesting  some  possible  explanatory  mechanisms  (8.0.0).   
 (Ad.  C)  Finally,  after  all  the  empirical  chapters,  the  thesis  concludes  with  a  theoretical  
discussion.  Here  I  address  all  the  possible  explanatory  mechanisms  that  were  observed  in  the  case  
studies,  and  I  discuss  them  in  contrast  to  a  rival  theory.  The  rival  theory  is  state-centred  realism,  and  
some  earlier  research  in  that  tradition  has  already  suggested  some  of  the  pathways  whereby  the  
Sámi  rights  movement  succeeded  to  make  norms  affect  policy  (and  polity).  This  is  in  line  with  what  
Ostrom  calls  the  “old  theory”.  However,  my  own  focus  was  on  customary  praxes  and  knowledge  
praxes,  issues  typical  to  political  institutionalism  and  constructivism.  Here  I  have  applied  what  
Ostrom  calls  the  “new  theory”.  In  this  final  discussion  I  conclude  that  it  might  be  unwise  to  apply  
the  new  theory  in  isolation,  because  we  need  to  “control  for”  the  potential  bias  of  wishful  thinking.  
More  importantly,  however,  I  also  conclude  that  one-sided  use  of  the  old  theory  will  give  
misleading  and  biased  explanations  regarding  state  transformation  in  Sámi  areas.  This  probably  has  
transfer  value  to  other  indigenous  rights  struggles,  and  possibly  also  to  other  struggles  for  nation-re-
building,  environmental  justice  or  restorative  justice.  
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2.1.0  Chapter  introduction 
 
2.1.1  Postcolonial  human  rights  law  –  consequences  for  political  science? 
In  Sápmi,  international  human  rights  law  demand  that  the  four  host  states  sort  out  both  indigenous  
self-determination  and  state  sovereignty.  The  sociolinguistic  and  ethnic  conditions  are  diverse  in  
Sápmi,  and  the  cultural  hybrids  are  rich.  Within  this  pluralism,  the  distinctiveness  of  the  Sámi  
people  was  firmly  established  through  systematic  ethnic  discrimination  under  state-building  elites,  
and  only  thereafter,  this  distinctiveness  has  been  legally  recognised,  in  an  attempt  at  restorative  
justice.  According  to  the  shared  §1  in  the  UN's  two  covenants  on  human  rights,  ICCPR  and  
ICESCR,  all  distinct  peoples  have  the  right  to  self-determination.  Norway,  Sweden,  Finland  and  
Russia  recognise  the  Sámi  as  a  distinct  people.  All  four  have  ratified  the  ICESCR  and  the  ICCPR. 
 The  reason  why  the  ICECSR  demands  economic,  social  and  cultural  rights  for  communities  is  
that  some  communities  already  have  been  subject  to  systematic  discrimination,  economically,  
socially  and  culturally.85  Collective  human  rights  become  a  norm,  because  collective  discrimination  
was  a  reality.  In  1966,  the  UN  General  Assembly  confirmed  individual  human  rights,  in  the  
ICCPR,86  while  at  the  same  time  adding  collective  human  rights,  in  the  ICECR.87  This  was  a  result  
of  former  colonies  having  become  sovereign  states,  with  representation  in  the  General  Assembly.88  
                                                 
85  The  same  is  the  same  for  §27  in  the  ICCPR,  but  this  only  deals  with  freedom  from  cultural  discrimination,  not  eco-­
nomic  or  social  discrimination. 
86 UN 1966a 
87  UN  1966b 
88  The  decolonisation  of  human  rights  law:  The  history  of  decolonisation  within  international  law  remains  under-
researched  and  under-communicated.  Law  professor  Ciarán  Burke,  my  language  corrector,  has  challenged  me  to  
better  justify  my  statement,  and  for  this  purpose  I  have  sought  in  recent  legal  research.  Firstly, it must be clear that 
human rights, if truly universal, have not been invented by any particular cultural or legal system. "In the most 
general sense human rights are understood as rights which belong to any individual as a consequence of being 
human, independently of acts of law" (Piechowiak 1999: 3). Thus, a true universalism must distinguish between 
"human rights", as a category of moral philosophy, and "human rights law", as a category of legal theory. 
"Awareness of the existence of this type of rights finds its expression in the output (especially in literature) of 
various cultures at various times. However, the 'real career' of the category of human rights started only after the 
Second World War" (ibidem). From the latter half of the 20th century, human rights "provided a language for 
political claims making and counter-claims, liberal-democratic, but also socialist and postcolonialist" (Hoffman 
2010: 2, cited in Wikipedia 2015b). Secondly, the history of human rights law may be divided into three stages 
(Vasek 1977). The first wave was the first wave of liberal revolutions, introducing the civil and political rights. 
Already then, women and people of color claimed universal human rights. 1792 demarcates the start of The Haitian 
Revolution against slavery, as well as the Declaration of the Rights of Woman. The second wave came with the UN 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which confirmed the first-wave rights, and added economic, social, 
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Reforms  brought  about  by  postcolonial  states  opened  up  new  opportunities  for  another  wave  of  
decolonisation:  the  transnational  indigenous  rights  movement,  which  was  active  in  UN  from  the  
1970s.89  Let  me  cite  James  Anaya,  the  UN  Special  Rapporteur  on  the  Rights  of  Indigenous  Peoples: 
 
[I]international  law,  although  once  an  instrument  of  colonialism,  has  developed  to  support  the  resilient  
efforts  of  indigenous  groups  worldwide  to  survive  and  flourish  as  distinct  peoples  on  their  ancestral  or  
traditional  lands.  This  movement  in  international  law  has  been  grudging  and  imperfect,  falling  short  of  
indigenous  people’s  full  aspirations:  yet  it  is  in  marked  contrast  with  legal  and  policy  regimes  
originating  in  the  past  that  sought  to  do  away  with  or  suppress  indigenous  identities.90 
 
The  ongoing  decolonisation  of  international  law  has  profound  consequences.  For  the  UN,  an  
“indigenous  people”  is  a  distinctive  ethnic  group  that  lived  on  the  area  when  the  exiting  states  were  
established,  and  was  subjected  to  systematic  collective  marginalization  under  those  states.  The  
question  for  the  UN  is  not  whatever  people  may  have  come  first,  but  what  have  been  the  policies  of  
the  existing  states.  Indigenous  peoples,  in  the  legal  sense,  are  those  people  that  have  been  subject  to  
internal  colonisation  and  ethnic  discrimination  under  the  existing  states.  Colonialism  was  the  actual  
political  context  of  the  old  international  law:  there  were  norms  of  state  sovereignty  and  individual  
human  rights,  but  in  practice,  some  were  more  equal  than  others.  In  an  attempt  to  heal  the  harm,  
collective  human  rights  emerged,  including  the  right  of  indigenous  peoples  to  enjoy  political  self-
determination  within  the  framework  of  the  existing  states.  The  decolonisation  of  international  law  
actualises  the  question  if  we  should  not  also  decolonize  the  basic  concepts  of  political  and  social  
scientists.  With  decolonisation,  the  real,  historical  entanglement  between  different  states,  societies  
                                                                                                                                                                  
and cultural rights. 1966 was the year they crystalized in two legally binding covenants, the ICCPR and the ICECR 
(UN 1966a, 1966b). The process was shaped by the Cold War, but also by the national liberation of former colonies, 
as "the so-called Eastern block as well as many non-aligned states supported and demanded equal treatment for 
[economic, cultural, and social] rights" (Riedel, Giacca & Golay 2014: 6-8), but "Western states insisted on division 
in two covenants" (Rosas & Scheinin 1999: 52).  However, the western states voted with Egypt, India, Mexico and 
Uruguay, while the eastern states had copied their proposal from Franklin Roosvelt, and finally, the "communist 
states were among the most fervent opponents of a treaty regime of implementation [for economic, cultural, and 
social rights], least of all one involving individual communications" (Cismas 2014: 452-453). Both blocks of the 
Cold War contributed to the relatively weaker implementation of economic, social and cultural rights. Most of the 
newly liberated former colonies, together with a few social liberal politicians from the Global North, pushed for full 
integration of economic, social and cultural rights with the civil and political rights. The relative weight of these two 
sets of human rights remains a contentious issue, as does also the degree to which the World Bank, the IMF and the 
WTO would have to confirm with human rights standards (Rosas & Scheinin 1999: 59). The third wave is an 
ongoing social mobilisation for recognition of "solidarity rights": the right to development, the right to healthy 
environment, and so on (Vasek 1977:29). This movement "for the commons" remains a constituent process (Bailey 
& Mattei 2012). However, the UN recognition of indigenous people's rights implies a fundamental re-interpretation 
of existing human rights law (Anaya 2004). 2007 was the year when this crystalized into the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, demarking a new constituted order. Ever since the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1949, human rights have been a universal language of claims making, for various liberal, socialist, 
democratic and post-colonial movements. This has been possible because human rights law (the legally right "für 
uns", to say it with Kant) is an unfinished effort to proceed toward human rights proper (the ethically good "an sich", 
in Kantian terms). The gradual decolonisation of international human rights law includes the push from postcolonial 
states to implement economic, cultural and social rights (with the ICESCR in 1966), as well as the push from 
indigenous movements to recognize their right to land and water (with a UN declaration in 2007). 
89  Minde,  Eide  &  Åhrén  2007 
90  Anaya  2004:  vii,  my  emphasizes 
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and  cultures  has  become  so  obvious  that  it  destabilises  the  conventional  definitions  of  citizenship  
and  sovereignty,  individual  and  collective,  methodological  individualism  and  methodological  
nationalism.  The  ideals  of  open  markets  and  civic  nationalism  remained  just  that:  ideals  –  not  
realities.  In  practice,  markets,  states  and  societies  are  woven  together  by  phenomena  such  as  social  
capital,  corruption,  familism,  colonialism,  and  socio-ecological  interdependency.  Thus,  the  
decolonisation  of  international  law  has  implications  for  how  political  and  social  scientists  
conceptualise  structure.  It  also  has  consequences  for  our  understandings  of  change.  Some  anti-
colonial  demands  that  were  criminalised  one  generation  ago  have  now  been  institutionalised  in  
international  norms,  which,  in  turn  have  been  ratified  by  the  host  states.  Demands  that  were  
stigmatised  as  extreme  in  the  past  have  proven  to  be  justified  and  even  moderate. 
 
Figure  2-1:  Map  of  Sápmi,  by  Hans  Ragnar  Mathisen,  1975. 
Hans  Ragnar  Mathisen's  classical  map  from  1975,  showing  the  topography  of  the  Sámi  cultural  territory,  
without  state  borders,  but  with  Sámi  place  names.  Copyright  by  the  artist. 
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 To  sum  up,  when  the  UN  has  recognised  the  existence  of  an  indigenous  people  within  the  EU  
(as  well  as  other  indigenous  peoples  north-west  of  the  Ural  mountains  and  on  the  Greenland  island),  
then  it  has  two  profound  consequences  for  the  conceptual  validity  of  commonly  held  assumptions  
within  West-European  political  science: 
1. Even  though  a  regime  may  appear  to  have  been  a  consolidated  democracy,  it  may  prove  to  
have  been  a  colonial  power. 
2. Even  though  a  regionalist  movements  may  initially  appear  to  held  extreme  opinions,  it  may  
prove  to  have  been  justified  and  even  moderate. 
If  this  argument  is  correct,  then  experience  from  Sápmi  might  have  profound  consequences  for  the  
ongoing  re-thinking  of  basic  categories  in  the  discipline,  such  as  “sovereignty”  and  “citizenship”.  
This  might  also  open  up  a  Pandora  box  of  highly  controversial  questions,  which  should  be  
approached  cautiously.  This  implies  profound  metatheoratical,  epistemological  and  ethical  
challenges  for  political  research. 
 The  main  metatheoretical  challenge  is  how  to  address  entangled  collectives,  such  as  the  
Norwegian  nation-state  and  the  Sámi  indigenous  people. 
 The  main  epistemological  challenge  is  how  political  science  may  research  its  own  political  
function,  when  nation-builders  and  indigenous  political  entrepreneurs  struggle  for  rights  and  proof. 
 Finally,  the  main  ethical  challenge  is  how  political  scientists  may  approach  the  use  of  coercive  
force  in  situations  where  it  is  de  facto  contested  what  coercive  sanctions,  if  any,  are  legitimate. 
 Those  are  big  questions,  regarding  the  conceptual  validity  of  the  most  basic  concepts  for  the  
discipline.  The  present  study  deals  only  with  a  much  more  particular  puzzle,  namely  to  identify  
some  of  the  paths  whereby  environmental  justice  movements  in  Sápmi  succeed  to  re-constitute  the  
states.  In  order  to  research  this  issue,  I  wish  to  apply  concepts  and  methods  that  are  as  free  of  
colonial  bias  as  possible. 
 
 
2.1.2  Proofs  and  rights  after  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission 
When international law now demands protection of indigenous human rights, the decision was 
informed by proof from legal history and legal anthropology.91 The policy process in the UN was 
informed by the transnational indigenous movement, and the policy process in this central node was 
coordinated with other policy processes in more local nodes. In areas where Sápmi and Norway 
overlap, many the indigenous rights organisations interacted with the Norwegian Sámi Rights 
Commission. This had been appointed by the government in 1970, in order to end an embarrassing 
                                                 
91  Anaya  2005 
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hunger strike in front of the parliament building.92 Working in-between local pressure and 
international institutions, the Commission opened up to a new generation of Sámi knowledge 
entrepreneurs. Those had already established the the Nordic Sámi Institute, affiliated with the 
Nordic  NGO  Sámeráđđi  and  funded  by  the  inter-governmental organisations Nordic Council. With 
the Norwegian Sámi Rights Commission they obtained funding to carry out more systematic search 
for proofs. 
 New proof in legal history, provided by the Sámi Rights Commission, indicate that local 
customs and local knowledge were continuously maintained and developed in Sámi areas, as part of 
the actual usage of natural resources, regardless of whether those practices were codified, 
criminalised, or ignored by the states.93 For this reason, there was a continuous presence of de facto 
legal and jurisdictional pluralism,94 in spite of state law de jure claiming jurisdictional monopoly. 
Some  local customs had been codified in state laws, while other local customs had either been 
ignored  or  criminalised  by  the  states.  According  to  the  “formalist”  definition  of  customary  law,  only  
those that  have  been  codified  in  state  law  matter,  but  with  a  “substantivist”  definition,  what  matters  
is the actual practice and perception among the population.95 With a state-centred concept of 
jurisprudence, only the formalist definition of customary law is relevant – but in the actual life of 
actual people in the actual land, state-centred jurisprudence was irrelevant. Ancient customs were 
continuously kept and developed since time longstanding through the actual use and management 
of natural resources in Sápmi, at least in Inner Sápmi. This process maintained and developed both 
customary praxes and knowledge praxes. Local lore had been stigmatised as witchcraft by the 
Lutheran state/church in early modern times, but had survived with ideological blessing from lay 
evangelist movements.96 Today, shelter is provided by the UN Biodiversity Convention, defining 
local lore as a form of bio-cultural diversity, and thus, as an asset for sustainable development.97 
Such lore is mostly tacit knowledge, and to build up databases is technically challenging.98 Finally, 
issues of copyright arise from the fact that local knowledge is a vital economic asset for those who 
live off the nature.99 For the indigenous rights movement, local lore is an asset in the locally based 
natural resource management, and thus also for local customs – and for the right to self-
determination. This legal approach to local lore, like the substantivist definition of local customs, is 
challenging for those who take the authority of the state for granted. The colonial state is no neutral 
                                                 
92  Hjorthol  2006 
93  Norwegian  Official  Report  1997a  (NOU  1997:4);;  1997b  (NOU  1997:5);;  Norwegian  Official  Report  2007a  (NOU  
2007:13);;  2007b  (NOU  2007:14) 
94  Pedersen  2012 
95  Jebens  2010:  p.  22 
96  Myrvoll  2011 
97  UN  1992b:  CBD 
98  Joks  2009;;  Holm  2003 
99  Solbakk  J.T.  2007 
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arbiter of norms and knowledge in areas where Sámi and Norway overlap. For these new 
developments in legal history and legal anthropology, one crucial issue is that social order does not 
originate with the state: Already in 1979, the Haag court had rejected the so-called Terra Nullius 
doctrine, the assumption that without state, there could be no law, and consequently, that stateless 
peoples could be freely colonised.100 In early modern times, Sápmi became increasingly integrated 
with three competing regional empires, and during the age of nationalism, two of the empires would 
break up in nation-states. Neither regional empires, nor nation-states ever had the capacity to 
reinforce their claimed authority over all of Sápmi. Instead, local people practiced social institutions 
that had been continuously kept and developed from their ancient stateless political system, a form 
of  “tribal  confederacy”, known in the literature as the siida-system. On paper, the siida-system was 
replaced by a state-system on most of Sápmi in 1751, when two kingdoms agreed on their mutual 
border – only drawn on a map. In northeastern Sápmi, competing states would disagree on their 
borders until 1945.101 Paper-laws have limited currency if they are not translated into actual custom. 
That is how legal and jurisdictional pluralism could remain the reality on the ground, even though 
the state sorted out monopolies of violence amongst themselves. The indigenous people of Sápmi 
always were a stateless nation, practicing a stateless political system, policed and defended by non-
violent sanctions.  In fact, the siida-system never fully disappeared, while the state-system never was 
fully consolidated. 
 In my view, the actual presence of legal and jurisdictional pluralism in Sápmi is sufficient to 
falsify the hypothesis that colonisation did not take place in Sápmi. This we may say with a high 
degree of certainty, even though much remains uncertain about the particular form colonisation may 
have taken at the various parts and periods in the history of Sápmi. In Sápmi, the entire process of 
nation-building may be seen as an uneven development of rights and proofs. Under the two western 
states in Sápmi, the liberal nationalist movement brought democratisation to citizens with 
Norwegian or Swedish ethnicity, while citizens with Sámi or Kvän ethnicity were subject to 
                                                 
100  Halonen  1981  (citing  International  Court  of  Justice  Reports  1975) 
101  The  present  state  borders  in  Sápmi  were  established  de  jure  from  1751  until  1945.  Firstly,  in  1751,  the  present  Swe-­
dish-Norwegian  border  was  drawn  as  far  north  as  Lake  Buolbmát  in  the  Deatnu  River  valley.  Secondly,  in  1809,  the  
present  Swedish-Finnish  border  was  established.  Thirdly,  in  1826,  Norway's  present  border  towards  Finland  and  
Russia  was  drawn,  continuing  from  Lake  Buolbmát  (the  place  where  the  1751-border  had  ended).  Fourthly,  the  pre-­
sent  border  between  Northern  Finland  and  Russia  was  drawn  in  1945,  after  Finland  had  lost  its  terriotires  with  
shores  in  the  Barents  Sea.  For  a  more  detailed  historical  geography,  see  part  5.2.5,  and  for  a  map,  see  Figure  5-5.    
Additionally,  the  1751  border  treaty  included  an  appendix  that  secured  free  border  crossing  for  the  Sápmi  people,  the  
"Lappiske  Nation"  (Pedersen  1998),  however,  the  northernmost  part  of  this  border  (together  with  the  1826  border)  
became  closed  for  a  period  from  1852,  as  a  result  of  hostile  relations  between  Sweden-Norway  and  Russia-Finnland  
(Zorgdrager  1998),  and  the  northernmost  Russian-Norwegian  border  was  closed  after  the  1817  revolution.  Finally,  it  
should  be  noted  that  borders  drawn  on  maps  (de  jure)  do  is  not  necessarily  implemented  or  adapted  in  the  actual  use  
of  land  and  water  resources  (de  facto),  nor  into  the  local  customs  (see  also  Jebens  2010:  22).  In  the  Deatnu  River  
valley,  the  local  people  at  each  side  of  the  border  are  part  of  the  same  multi-ethnic  indigenous  kinship  system,  and  
speak  the  same  dialect  of  Northern  Sámi. 
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discrimination.102 At the same time, the government also funded the establishment of national 
history and other social sciences that could serve their needs.103 But the later attempts to implement 
indigenous human rights were also uneven. The Norwegian Sámi Rights Commission concentrated 
on documenting rights in Inner Sápmi.104 Only thereafter, the Coastal Fisheries Commission 
extended to the Coastal Sámi areas.105 The history of the Kvän minority remains even more under-
researched.106 The  uneven  development  of  rights  and  proofs,  which  was  started  by  nation-building,  
is  carried  further  in  the  ongoing  nation-rebuilding.  Some  of  the  colonial  and  nationalist  biases  have  
been  beaten,  others  remain  to  be  beaten.  As  the  postcolonial  historian  Dipesh  Chakrabarty  has  
observed  of  the  Indian  Subcontinent:  it  is  a  laborious  process  to  inquire  all  the  questions  that  were  
left  systematically  under-researched  by  colonial  historians.107  Restorative  justice  is  not  only  a  
struggle for rights, but also a struggle for proofs. Such processes are well known from other 
contexts: historical research during the democratic transitions in Spain and Latin America.108 Even 
the quantitative revolution in political science, with the emergence of election studies, was a direct 
result of democratisation, with wide social strata becoming participants in state politics.109 
Therefore,  a  body of knowledge, as well as a body of law, and a body politic, may undergo 
democratisation and decolonisation. 
 
 
2.1.3  Implications  for  political  science 
A  struggle  for  rights  and  proofs  is  taking  place  in  Sápmi.  This  is  an  ongoing  constitutional  process,  
whereby  the  political  system  is  being  transformed.  It  is  may  be  challenging  to  trace  an  on-going  
process  of  state  transformation.  However,  this  is  made  even  more  difficult  because  the  struggle  for  
rights  and  proofs  have  had  profound  impact  on  ongoing  paradigm  shifts  in  the  disciplines  of  history  
and  jurisprudence.  With  new  historical  proof,  our  collective  perception  of  the  past  is  no  longer  what  
it  used  to  be:  what  we  used  to  think  of  as  the  most  democratic  states  in  the  world  turn  out  to  have  
been  colonial  powers.  Likewise,  with  the  ratification  of  new  international  law,  our  collective  
perception  of  the  future  is  also  changing:  what  we  used  to  think  of  as  a  continuation  of  steady,  linear  
progress,  becomes  instead  an  effort  to  come  to  terms  with  a  troublesome  past,  a  path  towards  
restorative  justice.  However,  the  developments  in  historical  knowledge,  and  the  corresponding  
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changes  in  jurisprudence,  remain  badly  disseminated  outside  the  Sámi  population,  and  the  majority  
of  citizens  in  the  Nordic  countries  remain  under-informed  about  the  fall  of  nationalistic  
historiography.  Therefore,  it  is  still  utterly  controversial  when  I  claim  that  the  Nordic  states  have  a  
colonial  history  and  thus  a  need  for  restorative  justice.  This  remains  largely  unknown  outside  the  
circles  of  human  rights  scholars,  legal  historians  and  indigenous  people. 
 To  do  political  research  is  to  make  a  particular  contribution  to  the  development  of  proofs.  
Thus,  the  researcher  gets  involved  in  an  already  ongoing  process:  the  uneven  development  of  proofs  
and  the  uneven  development  of  rights.  Those  two,  in  turn,  inform  the  uneven  application  of  coercive  
force  by  the  states.  Consequently,  there  can  hardly  be  any  such  thing  as  actively  non-violent  
political  research.  This  is  because  we  will  never  suddenly  find  ourselves  in  an  anarchist  utopia,  but  
instead,  decolonisation  and  democratisation  is  a  gradual,  open-ended  effort:  the  gradual  
decolonisation  of  a  body  politic  therefore  implies  a  gradual  decolonisation  of  some  associated  body  
of  law,  and  an  effort  to  overcome  biases  in  some  associated  body  of  knowledge.  There is no clear-
cut dialectical break between one colonial and another anti-colonial body of knowledge. As Fanon 
warned about and Spivak observed, colonial silencing and repression may easily be reproduced 
during decolonisation. 
 To  conceptualise  political  order  and  political  change  is  no  straightforward  matter.  I  have  
argued  that  new  proof  in  legal  history,  provided  by  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission,  demonstrate  that  
the siida-system never fully disappeared, while the state-system was never fully consolidated. In my 
opinion, this statement is totally in line with the empirical facts. Still, it is not in line with so-called 
“realist”  political  theory,  according  to  which, jurisdiction is a function of sovereignty, which in turn, 
is a function of monopoly of violence. The facts do not fit the predictions of so-called realism. 
Instead they show that customary praxes and knowledge praxes can be maintained and developed in 
relative autonomy from the monopolies of violence, to such a degree as to maintain jurisdictional 
pluralism even in a territory with clear-cut borders between sovereignties. This means that 
customary praxes and knowledge praxes are independent explanatory variables, and cannot be 
reduced to being functions of coercive force. This renders so-called  “realism”  unrealistic,  but might 
perhaps be more in line with the predictions provided by so-called  “institutionalist”  or  
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2.2.0  Spatial  Dimension:  Sápmi,  a  socio-ecological  region  divided 
 
2.2.1  Postcolonial  human  rights  law  and  nation-building 
For  the  UN,  an  indigenous  people  is  a  distinctive  ethnic  group  who  lived  on  the  area  when  the  
exiting  states  were  established,  and  were  subjected  to  systematic  ethnically  based  marginalization  
under  those  states.  Thus,  for  a  population  group  to  enjoy  the  right  to  indigenous  self-determination,  
this  group  must  have  been  subject  to  internal  colonisation  under  the  existing  state.  With  the  UN's  
recogniton  of  the  right  of  indigenous  peoples  to  freedom  from  discrimination  and  colonisation,  the  
right  to  popular  self-determination  gained  a  new  legal  justification,  not  in  state's  right  to  
sovereignty,  and  not  in  individual  human  rights,  but  in  collective  human  rights.110  The  state-centred  
concept  of  a  people's  self-determination  failed  to  prevent  internal  colonialism.  The  community-
centred  concept  of  a  people's  self-determination  is  aimed  at  healing  that  harm,  by  opening  up  for  
political  experiments  with  territorially  overlapping  forms  of  popular  self-determination,  within  the  
framework  of  the  existing  states.  Self-determination  no  longer  equals  “statehood”.  As  the  UN  
special  rapporteur  writes: 
 
Indigenous  peoples  have  been  deprived  of  vast  landholdings  and  access  to  life-sustaining  resources,  and  
they  have  suffered  historical  forces  that  have  actively  suppressed  their  political  and  cultural  institutions.  
[….]  In  both  industrial  and  less-developed  countries  in  which  indigenous  people  live,  the  indigenous  
sectors  almost  invariably  are  on  the  lowest  rung  of  the  socioeconomic  ladder,  and  they  exist  in  the  
margins  of  power.111 
 
Western-European  political  scientists  often  see  European  integration  as  peace  building.112  This  may  
also  be  the  case  for  the  new  international  law  on  self-determination.  Since  the  Sámi  have  been  
recognised  as  an  indigenous  people,  this  implies  that  the  traditional  homeland  Sápmi  has  been  an  
internal  colony  under  four  states.  Because  the  Sámi  are  an  indigenous  people  in  Europe,  this  implies  
that  the  Sápmi  are  has  been  an  internal  colony  within  Europe.  Therefore,  it  is  incorrect,  as  Will  
Kymlica  has  claimed,  that  the  ICCPR/ICESCR  are  somehow  not  relevant  to  demand  self-
determination  in  any  European  region.113  His  general  statement  is  refuted  by  the  fact  that  the  Sámi  
have  been  recognised  as  an  indigenous  people.  Sápmi  may  be  the  exception  to  the  rule,  but  we  
cannot  rule  of  of  the  picture  that  other  regionalist  movements  in  Europe  might  succeed  to  make  the  
ICCPR/ICESCR  relevant  in  the  future.  The  experience  in  Sápmi  is  relevant  both  because  it  forces  
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us  to  fundamentally  revise  the  nationalist  framing  of  Nordic  states,  and  also,  because  it  may  
potentially  have  transfer  value  to  other  regions  in  Europe. 
 
 
2.2.2  An  ethnographic  glimpse  of  areas  where  Norway  and  Sápmi  overlap 
Public  contention  in  the  present  is  the  context  where  the  historian  gets  research  questions  for  the  
investigation  of  the  past.  In  turn,  progress  in  historical  research  gets  its  public  relevance  and  
political  legitimacy  for  how  it  may  inform  present  public  contention  and  policy.  Let  us  take  an  
ethnographic  sample. 
 At  the  indigenous  rights  festival  Riddu  Riđđu  2012,  I  found  myself  in  the  eternal  day  of  the  
Arctic  summer.  The  topic  was  activism.  One  year  earlier,  the  festival  had  been  interrupted  when  the  
daughter  of  the  organiser  had  been  murdered  during  a  massacre  of  political  youths  at  a  summer  
camp  with  the  Norwegian  Labor  Party.  This  is  by  large  the  most  popular  party  in  the  ethnically  
heterogeneous  area  where  Riddu  Riđđu  takes  place.  The  party  was  represented  at  the  festival.  Its  
vice  president  Helga  Pedersen  was  there  for  a  panel  debate  about  the  dumping  of  poisonous  mining  
waste  in  the  fjords.  She  is  Coastal  Sámi.  Only  one  week  before,  I  had  been  camping  on  the  property  
of  her  family,  when  I  did  fieldwork  in  Deanuvuotna.  I  had  been  hanging  around  at  the  quay,  with  
fisher-peasants  who  were  tired  of  competing  against  seals  and  struggling  with  the  government.  
Helga  Pedersen,  however,  as  a  party  official  in  a  panel  debate,  was  obliged  to  defend  the  
government's  policies.  One  old  woman  from  the  local  community  interrupted  the  political  leader,  
using  the  authority  that  comes  with  age.  She  described  a  life  of  poverty,  and  claimed  that  the  
politician  was  talking  “like  silk”,  implying  that  the  rhetoric  was  smooth,  but  avoiding  spiky  issues.  
The  next  day  I  read  in  the  local  newspaper  how  this  old  woman  had  held  the  politician  accountable.  
At  the  newspaper's  internet  archive  I  found  other  voices.  One  party-comrade  of  Pedersen,  Olav  
Gunnar  Ballo  had  accused  the  mainstream  Sámi  interest  organisation  (NSR)  of  being  “nazis”  and  
speculated  that  they  might  actually  be  militant  separatists.114  He  was  answered  by  the  retired  leader  
of  the  national  trade  union  federation,  Yngve  Hågensen,  who  asked  rhetorically:  “who  are  the  
actual  'ruling  people  [herrefolk]  and  extreme  nationalists'  in  the  County?”.115 
 Pedersen  and  Ballo  are  active  in  the  same  party.  They  both  adhere  to  the  same  political  
program,  and  they  share  basic  norms  about  equality  and  freedom.  However,  the  two  are  leaders  of  
two  competing  tendencies  within  the  party.  The  anti-Sámi  and  pro-Spami  blocs  take  conflicting  
stances  to  freedom  and  equality  because  they  disagree  on  whether  or  not  colonisation  has  taken  
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place.  Ballo  argues  with  individual  human  rights,  assuming  that  there  had  been  real  equality  before  
the  law  prior  to  the  indigenous  rights  movement.  Pedersen  refers  to  collective  human  rights,  and  the  
premise  that  we  must  heal  the  harm  done  through  policies  of  systematic  discrimination.  When  Ballo  
and  Pedersen  offer  competing  prescriptions  for  the  future,  it  appears  to  be  because  they  held  
competing  descriptions  of  the  past.  The  social  scientist  can  hardly  be  quite  neutral.  Much  remains  
under-researched  in  the  legal  history  of  Sápmi.  Still,  I  argued  above,  we  have  nevertheless  refuted  
the  hypothesis  that  colonisation  did  not  take  place.116  Therefore,  from  a  scientific  point  of  view,  I  
would  claim  that  Ballo  is  wrong,  even  though  we  cannot  know  if  Pedersen  is  right.  When  she  is  
held  accountable  by  subaltern  fisher-peasants,  this  may  indicate  that  here  there  are  details  in  
colonial  history  that  remain  under-researched. 
 Because  the  development  of  rights  and  proof  remains  uneven,  it  is  hard  to  judge  particular  
political  statements  harshly,  even  the  colonial  myths  recycled  by  Ballo.  During  my  fieldwork  along  
the  frozen  Deatnu  River,  at  a  local  party  at  the  Finnish  side,  I  met  a  local  musician  who  told  me  he  
votes  Progress  Party  for  the  Norwegian  Sámi  Parliament.  The  party  is  in  favour  or  abolishing  this  
institution.  Other  voices  have  opposed  it  from  the  opposite  direction.  At  both  sides  of  the  river  I  had  
met  activists  from  the  ČSV  movement,  who  expressed  discontent  that  local  ecosystem  resources  
and  local  kinship  structures  are  being  divided  and  conquered  by  the  separatist  policies  of  the  two  
states  that  have  divided  the  river  between  themselves.  The  relationship  between  the  ČSV  and  the  
Progress  Party  might  appear  even  more  polarised  than  that  between  Ballo  and  Pedersen:  My  new  
friends  who  are  active  in  ČSV  or  voted  Progress  Party  appeared  to  have  an  even  stronger  
commitment  to  the  conflicting  framings  of  human  rights.  That  also  means  that  they  have  an  even  
stronger  commitment  to  human  rights.  When  I  returned  one  year  later,  rumour  had  it  that  my  friend  
who  had  voted  Progress  Party  for  the  Sámi  Parliament  had  learned  more  about  the  colonial  history  
and  now  worked  with  ČSV-people.  Such  a  particular  political  biography  may  reveal  surprising  
political  practices,  which  remain  obscure  for  the  more  generalising  gaze.117 
 
 
2.2.3  Beyond  methodological  nationalism  and  statism 
The  struggle  for  rights  and  proofs  in  Sápmi  feed  into  ongoing  state  transformation,  and  also,  the  
ongoing  paradigmatic  change  in  the  political  and  social  sciences.  The  basic  units  of  analysis  are  
being  re-evaluated.118  What  is  a  state  or  a  nation?  What  is  a  citizenship  or  ethnicity? 
 The  politics  of  environmental  protection  and  indigenous  rights  are  realities  that  have  rendered  
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the  normative  concept  of  “sovereignty”  having  limited  descriptive  value.119  Similarly,  
decolonisation  and  globalisation  have  made  interdependency  so  visible  that  it  has  become  
impossible  to  keep  the  “holocultural”  model  of  colonised  cultures  or  colonised  nations.120  Thus,  the  
conventional  assumptions  of  sovereign  states  and  holocultural  nations  have  dubious  conceptual  
validity,  but  they  are  still  being  used  as  heuristic  devices.  This  is  particularly  problematic  in  so-
called  “minority  research”.  The  political  philosopher  Rainer  Bauböck  has  pointed  at  a  tendency  in  
Western-European  minority  research  to  problematise  minorities  while  at  the  same  time  applying  
reified  assumptions  about  presumedly  coherent  majority  nations,  with  presumedly  equal  citizen  
rights.121  These  biases  he  calls  “culturalism  and  statism”.  With  reference  to  the  areas  where  Norway  
and  Sápmi  overlap,  the  social  anthropologists  Thomas  Hylland  Eriksen  and  Ingjerd  Hoëm  point  at  
similar  tendencies:  some  researchers  define  minorities  as  scientifically  problematic,  with  the  
implication  that  the  majority  is  defined  as  scientifically  unproblematic.122  On  one  hand,  for  the  
minority  the  way  is  short  from  being  seen  as  scientifically  problematic  to  being  labelled  as  a  social  
problem.123  On  the  other  hand,  the  actual  plurality  within  the  majority  culture  remains  hidden  and  
under-researched.  The  ethnographic  glimpse  above  illustrates  such  concepts  in  in  action.  Along  the  
Deatnu  River,  the  local  community  in  the  local  ecosystem  is  divided  by  a  theoretical  state  border,  
but  whenever  the  two  states  adapt  unilateral  policies,  the  local  population  experience  division  and  
conquering.  This  is  a  concrete,  practical  problem  for  local  fishers  who  wish  to  manage  their  
livelihood  in  a  sustainable  manner.124  This  highlights  the  phenomena  of  ecological  complexity,  
cultural  complexity  and  political  entanglement. 
 Structurally  similar  phenomena  are  not  unknown  to  Norwegian  political  research.  Iver  B.  
Neumann  has  researched  political  entanglement  in  the  form  of  multilateral  institutions,125  Thomas  
Hylland  Eriksen  led  a  large  research  project  on  cultural  complexity,  with  emphasis  on  new  
minorities  in  the  capital  city  area.126  Both  have  contributed  to  a  recent  governmental  report  on  how  
Norway  is  institutionally  entangled  with  the  EU.127  But  I  have  seen  few  efforts  to  apply  the  
Neumann/Eriksen  approach  to  study  complexity  in  areas  where  Norway  and  Sápmi  overlap.  On  the  
contrary,  I  have  seen  several  attempts  to  study  the  political  effects  of  struggle  for  rights  and  proof,  
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2007. 
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by  applying  conceptual  assumptions  from  before  the  struggle  for  proofs  and  rights. 
 This  has  been  particularly  evident  when  state  scientists  (statsvitere)  who  have  not  yet  
followed  Johan  P.  Olsen's  suggestion  to  re-think  the  conception  of  the  state,128  do  research  on  the  
Finnmark  Act.  This  law,  enacted  in  2005,  was  one  of  the  first  experiments  with  indigenous  
territorial  rights.  Thus  it  was  an  effort  to  sort  out  the  partly  overlapping  rights  to  indigenous  self-
determination  and  state  sovereignty.  The  process  started  in  the  northernmost  county  of  the  
Norwegian  political  entity.  This  was  the  easiest  area  to  start,  because,  to  put  it  simply,  the  land  and  
water  expropriated  from  the  local  Sámi  had  not  been  redistributed  to  new  owners.  However,  the  
county  has  clearly  defined  boundaries,  that  are  not  are  not  politically  neutral.  The  de  jure  state  
borders  delimitate  Finnmark  County  from  the  adjacent  areas  further  south  and  east  in  Sápmi,  and  
further  south  in  the  Norwegian  entity.  In  the  ethnographic  example  above,  I  mentioned  how  local  
communities  and  local  ecosystems  become  split  when  Norway  and  Finland  adapt  unilateral  policies  
in  the  management  of  shared  natural  resources.  Such  facts  appear  to  be  unknown  for  the  state  
scientists  Anne-Julie  Semb129  and  Hans-Kristian  Hernes.130  Both  of  them  have  interpreted  the  
politics  of  the  Finnmark  Act,  but  both  of  them  take  the  existing  state  boundaries  for  granted,  as  if  
those  were  given  by  nature.  Thus,  Hernes  uncritically  adapts  the  official  Norwegian  term  for  public  
and  common  interest  (allmennhetens  interesse),  without  ever  questioning  which  community  or  
demos  may  or  may  not  constitute  common  interest.131  Along  the  Deatnu  River,  it  is  evident  that  
nation-state  interests  are  particular  interests,  not  the  common  good.  Semb  discusses  the  highly  
hypothetical  scenario  of  Sámi  separatism,132  but  never  addresses  the  actually  existing  separatism,  
which  is  Norwegian  and  Finnish  unilateralism  in  the  management  of  shared  natural  and  cultural  
heritage.  Hernes  claims  that  indigenous  “identity  politics”  may  potentially  lead  to  split  amongst  the  
population  (oppsplitting  av  befolkningen),133  but  he  does  not  deal  with  the  actually  existing  divide  
imposed  by  the  state  border  upon  local  communities.  Similarly,  the  cultural  and  ethnic  pluralism  of  
the  area  is  interpreted  by  Semb  as  being  proof  against  Sámi  identity  politics,134  as  if  it  was  not  
Norwegian  nation-building  that  suppressed  pluralism  and  marginalised  the  Sámi  to  begin  with.135  
Similarly  to  Hernes  and  Semb,  the  social  anthropologists  Bjørn  Bjerkli  and  Trond  Thuen  portray  the  
diverging  claims  of  rights:  One  political  bloc  they  define  as  “Sámi”,  and  claim  it  justifies  itself  with  
reference  to  ILO  convention  169  and  constitutional  §110a.  Another  bloc  they  call  “Norwegian”,  
arguing  that  this  one  is  based  on  “the  democratic  principle  of  equality”  and  “everybody's  common  
                                                 
128  Olsen  2012 
129  Semb  2005 
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131  Hernes  2008:  23,  29 
132  Semb  2005:  532,  536 
133  Hernes  2008:  18 
134  Semb  2005:  533,  540 
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and  individual  rights  as  Norwegian  citizens”.136  Such  distinction  between  legal  paragraphs  and  
political  equality  is  plainly  wrong.  In  fact,  both  sides  justify  themselves  with  norms  of  freedom  and  
equality,  but  one  party  emphasises  collective  human  rights,  the  other  individual  human  rights,  and  
this  is  because  they  disagree  over  whether  or  not  there  has  been  a  systematic  discrimination  that  
needs  to  be  healed.  How  can  it  be  that  Bjerkli,  Thuen,  Semb  and  Hernes  ignore  that  Norway  has  
treated  some  citizens  as  more  equal  than  others  prior  to  the  indigenous  rights  movement,  and  that  
Sápmi  is  a  trans-boundary  region?  The  honest  explanation  is  given  by  Semb  when  she  admits  that  
she  has  chosen  to  define  historical  context  outside  her  research.137  But  this  does  not  mean  that  she  is  
free  from  assumptions.  It  means  that  she  assumes  what  her  profession  used  to  assume  prior  to  the  
paradigm  shifts  in  legal  history  and  jurisprudence.  Thus,  she  operates  as  if  the  actual  jurisdictional  
pluralism  in  Sápmi  had  never  been  proven,  and  thus,  as  if  collective  human  rights  did  not  exist.  
Though  Semb  is  more  explicit  than  Hernes,  Bjerkli  and  Thuen,  they  operate  within  exactly  the  same  
limitations.  Scientifically,  this  is  exactly  the  kind  of  habitual  nationalist  bias  that  was  addressed  by  
Bauböck  as  well  as  by  Eriksen  and  Hoëm.138  Ideologically  it  is  exactly  the  same  kind  of  argument  
as  put  forward  by  Olav  Gunnar  Ballo  and  the  Progress  Party.  In  the  ethnographic  sketch  I  argued  the  
researcher  should  not  be  indifferent  to  the  rhetoric  of  Ballo  and  the  Progress  Party,  because  they  
base  their  argument  on  a  historical  explanation  that  has  been  refuted.  However,  I  also  tried  to  show  
that  those  who  vote  Progress  Party  are  not  necessarily  chauvinists,  by  showing  the  biography  of  my  
friend  who  got  enlightened  about  the  colonial  history,  and  started  to  work  with  ČSV.  In  a  similar  
manner,  there  is  hope  that  Semb,  Hernes  and  Bjerkli  might  leave  their  colonial  blinkers  behind.139 
 It  is  easy  to  criticise,  but  what  positive  alternatives  are  there  if  we  cannot  assume  that  the  state  
is  “sovereign”  or  the  nation  “holocultural”?140  The  ethnographic  glimpse  above  provided  some  
particular  views  on  a  geographical  terrain  where  the  state  border  is  shown  to  be  an  impractical  
limitation  to  sustainable  use  of  common  pool  resources.  However,  I  do  not  suggest  that  we  should  
all  become  ethnographers.  That  would  give  a  precise  zoom  on  various  possible  particularities,  but  
no  panorama  over  probabilistic  patterns.  Instead  I  propose  that  we  should  all  become  geographers.  
Thus,  I  argue  that  all  political  researchers  should  follow  the  historians,  in  the  “spatial  turn”  they  
                                                 
136  Bjerkli  &  Thuen  1999:  118 
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138  Bauböck  2008;;  Eriksen  &  Hoëm  1999 
139    Regarding such issues, it may be enlightening to have a look at some of the judgments by the EU Human Rights 
Committee. In one case, it rejected complains from a citizen in New Caledonia who felt marginalised during the de-
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scendant, are supposed to enjoy protection under indigenous human rights. For further details, and a discussion, see 
Scheinin (2004: 14, 17). 
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undertook  at  the  moment  when  nationalistic  national  history  lost  its  relevance.141  But  geographers  
also  change  their  orientation.  The  decreasing  relevance  of  the  nation-state  has  lead  political  
geographers  to  venture  beyond  inter-state  politics,  and  to  take  renewed  interest  in  the  historical-
geographical  becoming  of  states.142  In  my  opinion,  the  turn  to  historical  geography  is  a  way  to  
operationalise  the  insights  that  Neumann,  Eriksen  and  Bauböck  address  in  the  abstract:    
“methodological  nationalism  and  statism”,  as  a  descriptive  premise,  has  proven  irrelevant  and  
ideological,  while  political  and  cultural  complexity  appears  to  be  the  rule,  not  the  exception.  In  the  
abstract,  Bauböck  argues  that  diversity  should  be  seen  both  as  the  “background  condition”  and  at  
the  same  time  as  an  “outcome”  of  social  action.143  To  operationalise  that  for  empirical  research  I  
think  it  may  be  smart  to  turn  to  the  material,  tangible  praxes  and  formations  that  exist  in  space  and  
time.  Geographers  apply  a  plurality  of  methods  to  observe  macro  formations  in  the  concrete,  as  
spatial  and  material  phenomena,  and  thus,  they  are  also  attentive  to  the  interdependency  between  
natural  and  cultural  landscapes.144  In  the  context  of  the  ongoing  decolonisation  of  human  rights  law,  
it  is  worth  to  note  that  constitutional  law  is  changing,  in  particular  in  the  Latin  American  context,  
where  500  years  of  anti-colonial  resistance  has  resulted  in  transformation  of  the  state  form  as  such,  
leading  to  a  situation  of  "overlapping  sovereignty".145  In  the  Sápmi  case,  however,  the  indigenous  
peoples  have  refrained  from  answering  violence  with  violence,  but  still,  they  have  maintained  
longastandig  customs  in  spite  of  attempted  criminalisation  from  the  states.146  This  situation  will  be  
addressed  in  this  thesis  with  the  (maybe  akward)  formulation  that  there  are  overlapping  
jurisdictions  (defined  as  sources  of  law  in  a  terrtory),  cut  uncontested  sovreignties  (defined  as  
monopolies  in  an  area),  see  also  Figure  4-2,  in  part  4.3.6.147 
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147  How  do  I  define  "jusisdiction"  and  "sovereignty"?  Jurisdiction  (from  Latin  ius,  "law"  and  dicere,  "to  speak"),  or  the  
authority  to  make  pronouncements  in  legal  matters  within  a  defined  topic  or  a  bounded  territory,  is,  in  part,  regulated  
by  the  mutual  recognition  between  states  (public  international  law),  but  it  is  also  party  regulated  by  ongoing  efforts  
to  sort  out  conflicts  of  law  (private  international  law)  and  finally,  by  ongoing  developments  in  the  rules  about  the  
making  of  rules  (constitutional  law)  (Wikipedia  2015d).  Whereas  public  international  law  remains  fixed  on  the  terri-­
torial  state,  this  is  not  the  case  for  recent  developments  in  constitutional  legal  theory.  Particularly  in  Latin  America,  
ongoing  constitutional  transformations  imply  a  more  complex  territorial  arrangement  –  mostly  as  a  result  of  efforts  
to  overcome  500  years  of  conflict  between  longstanding  indigenous  customs  and  intrusive  state  laws  (Bailey  &  
Mattei  2012,  Neves  2013).  "What  is  at  stake  for  many  of  the  place-based  social  movements  in  Latin  America  is  
more  than  mere  land  rights  that  provide  them  with  a  space  to  be.  It  is  in  fact  a  radical  redefinition  of  the  nature  of  the  
state  itself"  (Agnew  &  Oslender  2010:209,  Agnew  &  Oslender  2013:136,  thanks  to  Paul  Routledge  for  this  refer-­
ence).  Instead  of  claiming  statehood  for  the  indigenous  nations,  indigenous  political  entrepreneurs  transform  the  
state  form  as  such.  Thus,  the  right  of  indigenous  peoples  to  be  free  from  resource  grabbing  has  been  put  forward  as  a  
collective  human  right  (Anaya  2004).  Consequently,  there  is  some  lack  of  clarity  within  international  law,  regarding  
territorial  sovereignty  as  a  state  right  and  indigenous  self-determination  as  a  collective  human  right  (Anaya  2004:  
7).  The  mutual  recognition  between  states  (international  public  law)  still  is  a  sole  principle  for  international  law,  but  
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 For  my  own  purpose,  which  is  to  trace  some  of  the  paths  whereby  social  movements  may  
influence  state-transformation,  I  think  it  is  useful  to  frame  this  as  the  relation  between  localised  
micro-interaction  and  historical-geographical  macro-formations.  The  geographers  Paul  Routledge  
and  David  Slater  study  how  social  movements  respond  to  complex  environments,  while  at  the  same  
time  influencing  those  environments.148  One  useful  concept  was  coined  by  Paul  Routledge:  
“terrains  of  hegemony  of  resistance”.  By  choosing  the  terms  hegemony  and  resistance,  he  anchors  
himself  in  the  Marxian  tradition  after  Gramsci.  One  could  equally  well  use  the  terms  centre  and  
periphery,  in  order  to  take  part  in  the  Functionalist  tradition  after  Rokkan.  For  me,  that  is  more  or  
less  the  same.  What  matters  more,  however,  and  makes  this  concept  more  empirical  than  Gramsci  or  
Rokkan,  is  the  word  terrain.  There  is  a  debate  about  metaphorical  verticality  in  geography:  no-one  
has  ever  observed  any  administrative  pyramid  among  the  material  mountains  and  valleys.  Some  
argue  that  hierarchy  is  the  same  as  centrality  in  spatially  distributed  networks.  Some  choose  the  
awkward  metaphor  “keeping  the  social  flat”.149  But  it  is  not  flat,  because  geography  does  not  
describe  the  map,  which  is  2D,  but  the  terrain,  which  is  3D.  In  order  to  avoid  a  metaphysical  debate  
about  metaphorical  “verticality”  and  “flatness”,  one  should  turn  to  empirical  observation  of  the  
material  terrains  of  hegemony  and  resistance.  How  is  the  dynamics  between  hegemony  and  
resistance,  centre  and  periphery?  This  brings  us  over  to  the  temporal  dimension. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
nevertheless,  the  states  have  given  up  some  of  their  (claimed)  authority  to  international  bodies  that  oversee  interna-­
tional  treaties,  such  as  the  UN  Human  Rights  Committee,  which  can  make  its  own  advice  on  the  basis  of  complains  
from  non-state  actors.  "International  human  rights  regimes  are  in  several  cases  "nested"  within  more  comprehensive  
and  overlapping  regional  agreements,  These  regional  regimes  can  be  seen  as  relatively  independently  coherent  hu-­
man  rights  sub-regimes"  (Donnelly  2013:  138,  cited  in  Wikipedia  2015c).  The  emergence  of  nested  human  rights  re-­
gimes,  and  the  transformations  of  constitutional  legal  theory,  correspond  with  recent  progress  in  the  social  scientific  
research  on  state  (trans)formation.  The  political  science  of  natural  resources  management  observes  cross-border  in-­
terdependencies  (Conca  2005,  Ostrom  2005).  The  political  anthropology  of  former  colonies  observes  political  sys-­
tems  interwoven  with  the  politics  of  former  colonial  states  and  the  politics  of  kinship  (Nustad  &  Krohn-Hansen  
2005,  Das  &  Poole  2004).  The  historical  sociology  of  nation  building  observes  forced  homogenization  and  persis-­
tent  plurality  in  postcolonial  settings  (Chatterjee  1993,  Jensen  2013).  Max  Weber  (1919)  ignored  the  colonies,  when  
he  declared:  "Heute  dagegen  werden  wir  sagen  müssen:  Staat  ist  diejenige  menschliche  Gemeinschaft,  welche  in-­
nerhalb  eines  bestimmten  Gebietes  –  dies:  das  »Gebiet«  gehört  zum  Merkmal  –  das  Monopol  legitimer  physischer  
Gewaltsamkeit  für  sich  (mit  Erfolg)  beansprucht"  [my  emphases].  This  is  a  classical  definition  of  statehood,  and  
three  of  its  defining  characteristics  are  (a)  territory  (Gebiet),  (b)  authority  (legitimer)  and  (c)  coercion  (physischer  
Gewaltsamkeit).  It’s  assumed  relation  between,  on  the  one  hand  (a)  territory,  and  on  the  other  hand  (b)  and  (c),  is  
being  unsettled  by  the  recent  progress  in  constitutional  legal  theory,  political  science,  political  geography  and  politi-­
cal  anthropology.  Regarding  the  case  of  Sápmi,  however,  we  also  have  to  unsettle  the  assumed  interdependency  be-­
tween  (b)  authority  and  (c)  coercion.  In  the  case  of  Sápmi,  persistent  resistance  from  subaltern  groups  have  had  
some  success  in  transforming  the  state  apparatus  (including  its  application  of  violence),  even  though  the  resistance  
has  refrained  from  answering  violence  with  violence  (it  has  been  non-violent).  The  decolonisation  of  Sápmi  is  a  case  
where  we  can  keep  coercive  power  constant,  while  observing  the  capacity  of  social  action  to  transform  social  au-­
thority.  This  is  the  condition  that  I  try  to  describe  with  my  (maybe  awkward)  definitions  of  "sovereignty"  as  a  mo-­
nopoly  of  violence,  and  "jurisdiction"  as  legally  binding  sources  of  law.  (Thanks  to  my  language  corrector,  the  Irish  
law  professor  Ciarán  Burke,  for  pointing  out  that  this  issue  had  to  be  clarified.) 
148  Routledge  1993;;  Slater  1997 
149  Latour  2004 
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2.3.0  Temporal  Dimension:  the  Sámi  Rights  Movement  as  transformative  power 
 
2.3.1  Postcolonial  Human  Rights  law  and  State  Transformation 
Some  anti-colonial  demands  that  were  criminalised  one  generation  ago  have  been  institutionalised  
in  international  norms,  which,  in  turn  have  been  ratified  by  the  host  states.  The  UN  Special  
Rapporteur  writes: 
 
[For  indigenous  peoples,]  [a]rmed  resistance,  diplomacy,  and  law  have  been  tools  in  the  quest  for  
survival.  Over  the  last  several  years  especially,  in  conjunction  with  effort  through  domestic  or  municipal  
arenas  of  decision  making,  indigenous  peoples  have  appealed  to  the  international  community  and  
looked  to  international  laws  as  a  means  to  advance  their  cause.150 
 
Demands  that  were  radical  yesterday  are  mainstream  today.  The  struggle  for  rights  and  proofs  has  
led  to  fundamental  transformation  of  states,  and  also,  fundamental  revisions  of  knowledge.  Western-
European  political  scientists  tended  to  see  social  mobilisation  for  democratisation  as  a  finalised  
process  in  three  of  the  states  in  Sápmi:  Norway,  Sweden  and  Finland.  That  perception  of  history  has  
to  be  fundamentally  revised.  For  example,  it  is  still  true  that  in  Norway  the  parliamentarian  channel  
was  established  in  1884  and  the  corporatist  channel  in  1936,  but  it  also  turned  out  to  be  true  that  the  
state's  Sámi  citizens  were  subject  to  eugenic  administration  from  the  1880s,  while  Sámi  political  
resistance  collapsed  in  the  1930s.151  When  the  Sámi  rights  movement  re-appeared  in  the  1960s,  it  
was  sometimes  stigmatised  as  a  threat  to  public  security.152  But  is  succeeded  in  producing  
fundamental  systems  transformation,  and  no  system  breakdown  ever  occurred.  Thus,  even  within  
apparently  consolidated  democracies,  it  might  be  possible  that  a  movement  for  fundamental  
systems  transformation  can  be  capable,  can  be  relevant,  and  in  the  end  may  turn  out  to  have  been  
justified. 
 
2.3.2  A  historical  glimpse  from  the  co-evolution  of  Norway  and  Sápmi 
When  there  is  a  struggle  for  rights  and  proof,  then  proof-finding  becomes  a  way  of  getting  involved  
in  the  struggle,  either  unwillingly,  or  deliberately.  When there is progress in law making, then there 
is no retroactive force. However, when there is progress in legal history, then this implies that  the 
past is no longer what it used to be. This is a rather confusing difference between the two struggles 
for rights and for proofs. How are we then to judge the legality of actions in the past? This question 
                                                 
150  Anaya  2004:  4,  my  emphasises 
151  Jensen  2013 
152  Hjorthol  2006 
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becomes particularly relevant in those situations where it is de-facto contested what use of coercive 
force might have been authoritative, if any at all. 
 The Alta-dam conflict one generation ago is a challenging case for legal sociology and legal 
anthropology. The government of the Norwegian state had initiated hydroelectric development in 
Inner Sápmi, without prior consultations with the indigenous subsistence practitioners in the area. 
Environmentalists and indigenous rights activists sued the government. In order to prevent their 
livelihoods being destroyed before the court had reached a decision, they used non-violent civil 
disobedience. The local sheriff (lensmann) was hesitant to act, but after some pro-dam activists had 
taken the law in their own hands, the police were ordered to carry away the anti-dam activists. The 
details of the story are to be told in one of the case studies in this thesis. The Supreme Court made 
its decisions in 1982 and 1983, judging that the planning process had been legal, and that the civil 
disobedience activists had to be punished with fines and prison. Thus, the Supreme Court also 
disciplined an unruly profession of judges, who had been split over these contentious issues. Only 
with a series of constitutional amendments, in 1988, 1992 and 1994 would the law demand 
consultations for the indigenous people, protection of natural heritage, and respect for human 
rights.153 It has become unconstitutional to disrespect local customs and international treaties. This 
has of not retroactive force of course. However, this is where it becomes relevant that with progress 
in legal history, the past is no longer what it used to be.154 One of the important reasons for the 
constitutional amendments was the new proofs on legal history, presented by the Sámi Rights 
Commission. It shows that legal pluralism and jurisdictional pluralism had been in place on the 
ground since times longstanding, in spite of attempted criminalisation from the states. This means 
that when Norwegian law makers adapted indigenous rights it was an attempt to come to terms with   
the actually existing legal pluralism. Indigenous rights in Sápmi do not originate in state law. They 
originate in the ancient Siida-system, and were maintained and developed as customary norms for 
several centuries, before they gained a blessing in international law, which in turn was ratified by 
the states. During the Alta-dam conflict, the actual legal pluralism was so well known that the 
Norwegian legal profession was split, and the local sheriff (lensmann) was hesitant to intervene. 
Those politicians who happened to be in government meant that civil disobedience was illegal, and 
had to be met by police force. But in Inner Sápmi, some local communities framed the police action 
as illegal colonial force. Similarly, there is disagreement about how to interpret the only action from 
anti-dam activists that might be framed as violent. As a response to the Supreme Court decision, an 
                                                 
153  See  the  Norwegian  Constitution  (Norwegian  Parliament  2013) 
154  In  retrospect,  the  human  righs  lawyer  Martin  Sceinin  (2000:  paragraph  4.5)  has  the  following  view  on  the  Supreme  
Court  judgement  regarding  the  Alta-dam  case:  "Read  today,  the  ruling  appears  to  fail  to  address  the  close  interrela-­
tionship  of  culture  and  the  economic  activities  of  indigenous  peoples"  (my  emphasis),  thus,  "the  reasoning  by  the  
supreme  court  appears  today  as  simply  erroneous."   
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independent cell attempted to sabotage a bridge, with dynamite. According to the government, this 
was an act of terrorism, insurgent political violence. This was the only view I knew until I started to 
do participant observation in Inner Sápmi. Then I learned that for the action group and their 
sympathisers, this was presented as an act of social defence against colonial occupation. There is a 
lack of public and scholarly debate about this issue. In Sápmi there is and has been a de-facto 
situation of legal pluralism and jurisdictional pluralism since times longstanding, regardless of 
whatever paper-laws might have been invented in the capital cities. This legal pluralism does 
contain some contradictory perceptions of law, and those are not always easy to reconcile. 
Therefore, it is understandable that the local sheriff (lensmann) was hesitant to get involved. 
Likewise, it is understandable that the Sámi people have been reluctant to answer violence with 
violence. Some may claim that such non-violence, either from the sheriff or the population does 
more harm than good. I have no right to judge, because I belong to the colonial nation, without also 
being part of the colonised one. But I think the sheriff, by his hesitation, showed a caution that 
provides a good example for political researchers. 
 I think it is time to let the suppressed and silenced minor voices through. Those issues must be 
approached with utter caution, because they are rather sensitive. Firstly, data access depends on 
trust, and this is the case for state archives as well as for indigenous communities. Secondly, 
concepts handed down from the old tradition needs re-thinking, in particular, a one-sided  “realist”  
theory would lead to unrealistic interpretations. This is all the more challenging because political 
researchers, by finding proofs, provide input into the uneven development of rights and proofs, 
which, in turn informs the uneven application of institutional violence. Therefore, there is hardly 
any such thing as actively non-violent political and social science. 
 
 
2.3.3  Social  movements  as  constituent  power 
The  experience  from  Sápmi  indicates  that  social  movements  may  sometimes  be  capable  of  
influencing  a  system  transformation,  including  constitutional  amendments.  As  addressed  above,  
transformation  society  may  go  hand  in  hand  with  transformation  of  knowledge:  Claims  that  are  now  
put  forward  by  moderate  politicians  may  have  been  framed  as  extremist  activism  only  one  
generation  ago.  What  was  intended  as  coercive  law  enforcement  one  generation  ago,  may  be  
revealed  as  having  been  unlawful  suppression.  Experiences  from  Sápmi  show  that  even  within  
apparently  consolidated  democracies  a  movement  for  fundamental  systems  transformation  may  
more  or  less  succeed,  and  also,  they  may  succeed  in  proving  that  the  initial  situation  was  not  so  
democratic  after  all. 
 How  do  social  movements  respond  to  their  political  environment,  and  how  may  they  
 64  
 
empower  themselves  to  transform  it?155  In  social  movement  studies,  there  has  been  a  strange  
disappearance  of  certain  relevant  issues:  of  capitalism  as  background  variable,156  and  of  
fundamental  systems  transformation  as  an  outcome  variable.157  At  least  this  is  the  case  within  what  
we  might  call  “mainstream  social  movement  studies  in  the  North  Atlantic  area”.  If  we  are  to  put  
back  in  such  structural  background  and  outcome  variables,  however,  then  it  will  give  us  some  
challenges:  Then  we  must  also  address  the  relationships  between  a  movement's  framings,  the  
scientist's  description,  and  the  material  realities.  That  is  no  easy  task,  especially  not  when  one  
person's  law  enforcement  still  might  be  another  person's  unlawful  suppression.  That  is  the  case  
when,  as  in  Sápmi,  there  is  an  uneven  development  in  the  implementation  of  human  rights,  and  that  
includes  uneven  development  in  proof  finding.  The  challenge  for  social  movement  research  is  
conceptual,  methodological  and  ethical. 
 In  order  to  communicate  about  such  issues,  one  possible  way  is  to  use  terms  from  
constitutional  theory.  The  popular  power  to  create  a  legal  order  (formal  or  informal)  is  called  
constituent  power.  The  capacity  of  the  legal  order  (formal  or  informal)  to  enable  or  limit  people's  
power  is  called  constituted  power.  The  relationship  between  constituent  and  constituted  power  has  
been  much  debated  after  the  breakup  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  emergence  of  the  European  
Union.  The  legal  scholar  Joseph  Weiler  observes  that  “[i]n  many  instances,  constitutional  doctrine  
presupposes  the  existence  of  that  which  it  creates:  the  demos  which  is  called  upon  to  accept  the  
constitution  is  constituted,  legally,  by  that  very  constitution.”158  Thus,  there  is  a  circular  or  spiralling  
relationship  between  the  effect  of  the  constituted  order  on  popular  power,  and  the  effect  of  popular  
power  on  the  constituted  order.159  Such  mutual  re-constitution  may  be  sudden,  as  in  the  Velvet  
Revolution,  or  slow,  as  in  the  emergence  of  the  European  Union.  Such  transformative  processes  
involve  the  re-definition  of  various  demoi,  whose  territories  are  partly  overlapping.  Related  issues  
such  as  imperialism,  separatism  and  minorities-within-the-minority  are  being  researched  by  legal  
scholars  such  as  the  Kosovo-based  Zoran  Oklopcic.160  Within  geographically  entangled  nations,  the  
relationship  between  constituent  and  constituted  power  may  be  seen  as  an  open-ended  multi-level  
constitutional  process.  Saki  Bailey  and  Ugo  Mattei  claim  that  within  such  complex,  dynamic  
systems,  social  movements  constitute  channels  of  constituent  power.161  The  geographical  
complexities  I  have  already  addressed,  in  my  discussion  of  research  on  nation-building.  The  
historical  dynamism  is  an  equally  relevant  dimension  for  social  movements.  In  the  political  history  
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of  Norway  a  liberal-nationalist  movement  vanguard  succeeded  in  creating  the  1814-constitution,  
while  this,  in  turn,  helped  them  to  cultivate  national  solidarity  among  common  folk,  through  a  
process  of  nation-building.162  Nation-building  included  systematic  ethnical  discrimination  against  
Sámi  people,  and  colonial  administration  of  Sámi  areas,  and  this  systematic  discrimination  is  the  
reason  why  Sámi  indigenous  rights  activists  could  use  the  ICCPR  and  the  ICESCR  to  transform  the  
host  states.163  Thus,  peoples  and  states  may  be  seen  as  two  complex  adaptive  systems,  and  two  of  
the  processes  that  mediate  between  them  are  top-down  nation-building  and  bottom-up  social  
movements. 
 For  social  movement  research  in  the  North  Atlantic  area,  the  co-evolution  of  constituent  
power  and  constituted  power  allow  us  to  return  to  the  two  issues  mentioned  above:  structural  
conditions  as  background  variable,  systems  transformation  as  an  outcome  variable.  On  the  one  
hand,  some  colleagues  are  worried  that  corporate  capitalism  has  disappeared  from  the  attention  of  
social  movement  researchers,  while  this  was  the  main  concern  for  their  object  of  study;;  the  global  
justice  movement.164  Thus,  the  researchers  threw  the  baby  out  with  the  bath  water:  When  they  rid  
themselves  of  Marxian  prejudice,  they  suddenly  had  no  tools  to  address  Capitalist  prejudices.  On  
the  other  hand,  some  other  colleagues  were  interested  in  researching  the  transformative  effects  of  
social  movements,  but  succeeded  only  in  addressing  how  movements  may  influence  mainstream  
policy,  thus  failing  to  inquire  how  movements  may  change  the  polity  per  se.165  Thus,  mainstream  
social  movement  research  in  the  North-Atlantic  region  has  concentrated  on  reformist  movements  
within  the  North  Atlantic  region,  while  the  radical  transnational  movements  against  global  
capitalism  was  left  to  their  colleagues  and  competitors,  the  de-radicalisation  researchers.  Their  
concept  of  “radicalisation”,  however,  is  a  source  of  confusion,166  and  who  is  “radical”  depends  on  
the  point  of  view:  for  the  NAFTA,  the  EZLN  are  radical  terrorists  who  violate  state  laws,  but  for  the  
EZLN,  the  NAFTA  is  a  Jacobin  intervention  in  violation  of  ancient  customary  law.  Either  party  can  
claim  to  defend  against  violent  violations  of  existing  laws.  In  either  case,  constituent  power  is  at  
stake.  The  twin  concepts  constituent  and  constituted  power  are  what  we  should  put  back  in  to  
mainstream  social  movement  research  in  the  North  Atlantic  area.  That  would  allow  us  to  research  
structural  strain  as  a  background  variable,  as  well  as  transformative  power  as  an  effect  variable.  
Thus,  the  mainstream  of  social  movement  research  in  the  North  Atlantic  region  may  overcome  the  
specific  limitations  now  described  –  that  are  also  specific  political  biases.  One  is  obviously  
politically  positioned  if  one  accuses  NAFTA  of  being  a  Jacobin  project.  If  one  accuses  the  EZLN  of  
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being  radicals,  one  is  just  less  obviously  politically  positioned.  Since  1989,  the  mainstream  social  
movement  research  in  the  North  Atlantic  area  has  spent  its  energy  on  proving  that  reformist  
movements  are  civilised  citizens,  while  movements  that  are  being  stigmatised  as  radical  are  being  
left,  or  given  away  to  de-radicalisation  research.  With  this  move,  however,  mainstream  social  
movement  research  in  the  North  Atlantic  area  not  only  failed  to  be  useful  for  the  Global  Justice  
Movement.  Additionally,  it  also  failed  to  develop  a  really  strong  alternative  to  the  competing  
explanation  it  was  made  to  confront:  the  so-called  “breakdown  theories”.   
Now  I  will  have  a  look  at  “breakdown  theories”,  and  then  at  the  positive  alternatives.  In  
political  practice,  such  explanations  are  being  used  to  suppress  opposition:  In  the  Arctic  area,  
environmental  justice  movements  mobilise  against  oil  and  gas  industry,  mining,  intensive  forestry,  
and  industrial  fishery.  Sometimes  and  in  some  places,  claims  of  indigenous  self-determination  
challenge  state-certified  property  rights.  The  former  may  be  in  accordance  with  ICESR  §1,  but  the  
latter  are  policed  by  NATO  and  CSTO.  Anti-fracking  activists  in  Canada  are  being  labelled  as  
“radicals”  and  “potential  terrorists”,  while  anti-Gazprom  activists  in  Russia  are  stigmatised  as  
“hooligans”  and  “foreign  agents”.  These  seem  to  me  as  two  versions  of  the  same  argument,  both  
implying  that  the  monopoly  of  violence  is  the  only  valid  source  of  law,  that  the  constituted  order  
must  be  static,  and  that  popular  power  will  lead  to  violence.  Such  framings  are  a  heritage  from  the  
cold  war.  During  that  period,  Seymor  Lipset  argued  that  the  Western,  Structure-Functionalist  
“consensus  theory”  actually  was  more  sensitive  to  conflict  than  the  Eastern,  Marxist-Leninist  
“conflict  theory”,  because,  he  claimed,  it  was  more  hobbesian.167  That  is  probably  true  if  he  
compared  to  Western  Marxism.  However,  in  the  Eastern  Bloc,  where  Marxist-Leninists  were  in  a  
hegemonic  position,  they  were  hardly  less  hobbesian.  In  fact,  the  perceived  need  among  the  
political  class  to  maintain  hegemony  against  perceived  internal  threats,  might  explain  
authoritarianism  in  the  Eastern  Bloc.168  In  the  Western  Bloc,  both  Lipset  and  Kornhauser  insisted  
that  all  political  attitudes  they  themselves  happened  to  see  as  “extreme”  would  also  be  politically  
pathological.  Both  claimed  that  one  necessary  outcome  of  modernisation  was  “moderation”,  and  
that  this,  in  turn,  was  a  necessary  precondition  for  social  stability.169  Radicalism,  they  claimed,  
would  threaten  social  stability,  and  thus  lead  to  authoritarianism.  Concern  for  potential  systems  
breakdown,  and  lack  of  interest  in  systems  transformation,  were  two  premises  in  Parson's  structure-
functionalism  (before  Merton  reformed  the  theory).170  The  Afro-American  civil  rights  movement,  
the  Native  American  movement,  the  radical  feminists  and  the  anti-war  movement  were  all  radicals.  
Therefore,  breakdown  theory  was  for  McCarthyism  what  hegemony  theory  was  for  Stalinism.  
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Against  both  models,  the  Structure-Functionalist  and  the  Marxist-Leninist,  the  sociologist  Barry  
Barnes  argues:  “As  social  theorists,  if  not  as  moralists,  orthodox  functionalists  and  Marxists  have  an  
identity  of  interest.  They  are  alike  interested  in  the  conditions  of  stability  and  change”.171  He  argues  
that  the  two  theories  have  similar  assumptions  regarding  stability  and  change,  structure  and  
dynamics.  System  equilibrium  is  defined  as  static,  while  system  change  is  defined  as  sudden  and  
dramatic.  The  idea  of  revolution  is  a  strong  political  myth  among  liberalists  and  socialists.172  For  
the  “founding  fathers”  of  sociology,  social  change  had  been  conceptualised  as  dialectic  between  
static  equilibria  and  revolutionary  breaks.  Such  was  the  “moral  passion”  of  Marx  and  Durkheim,  as  
well  as  the  realpolitik  of  Michels  and  Weber.173  During  the  Cold  War,  this  myth  was  used  by  both  
superpowers  to  justify  suppression  of  internal  opposition,  and  funding  of  armed  insurrections  
abroad.  The  same  may  have  been  the  case  for  the  policies  of  grand  powers  in  the  later  uni-polar  and  
multi-polar  world  orders.  David  Graeber,  an  organic  intellectual  of  the  Occupy  Wall  Street  
movement,  ridicules  the  political  myth  saying  that  everything  has  now  become  perfect  in  nominal  
democracies,  and  therefore  internal  opposition  should  be  suppressed,  while  other  countries  need  
revolution,  and  therefore  their  opposition  should  be  armed  with  weapons.174  In  fact,  what  is  
breakdown  theory  regarding  domestic  policy  is  Jacobinism  regarding  foreign  policy. 
 But  there  have  been  changes  in  how  sociology  conceptualises  social  change.  This  correlates  
with  new  strategies  among  the  newest  social  movements,  such  as  Occupy  Wall  Street,  Democracia  
Real  Ya,  and  the  Global  Justice  Movement,  where  “[c]onstituent  power  has  reappeared,  and  in  an  
imaginative,  radical  and  remarkably  non-violent  form”.175  New  theories  of  social  change  have  been  
developed  by  a  recent  generation  of  sociologists,  most  prominently  Giddens  and  Bourdieu.  Those  
theoretical  developments  have  co-evolved  with  empirical  developments  in  history  and  
anthropology.176  They  all  inquired  plural  power-relations  in  everyday  socio-economic  and  socio-
cultural  praxes.  Social  historians  did  time  series  analysis  of  long-term  conjunctures  at  the  macro  
level.177  Social  anthropologists  did  close-up  snapshots  of  everyday  practice  at  the  micro  level.178  
The  relation  between  micro  and  macro  came  to  be  seen  as  one  of  continuous  reciprocal  causation:  
tangible  praxes  at  the  micro  level  were  seen  as  conditioned  by  invisible  patterns  at  the  macro  level,  
but  at  the  same  time,  the  dynamic  equilibria  at  the  macro  level  were  seen  as  aggregates  continuously  
emerging  from  the  micro  level.  Sociologists  in  the  generation  of  Weber  had  based  themselves  on  
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national  histories  tracing  the  actions  of  elites,  using  data  left  by  those  elites.179  But  colleagues  in  the  
generation  of  Giddens  could  base  their  findings  on  much  richer  historical  data,  on  quantitative  
conjectural  waves  and  concrete  everyday  praxes.  Sociological  theory  had  become  less  elite-centric,  
because  democratisation  had  brought  new  data  and  new  research  questions:  what  had  once  been  re-
defined  as  private  was  now  re-defined  as  political.180  This  veritable  paradigm  shift  may  be  seen  as  a  
response  to  the  feminist  slogan  “the  private  is  political”.  Braudel,  Bourdieu,  Giddens,  Collins  and  
others  suggested  various  theoretical  syntheses  of  this  micro-macro  relation.181  For  his  own  version,  
Giddens  chose  the  label  structuration  theory,  to  emphasize  that  for  a  praxis-theory  of  social  
reproduction,  structure  =  change.  Though  structuration  is  general  sociology,  and  not  specifically  
political  sociology,  The  Constitution  of  Society  was  nevertheless  the  title  of  the  book  presenting  the  
theory.182  The  constitution  of  political  constitutions  is  a  more  limited  category  than  the  constitution  
of  society.  However,  that  difference  may  be  small,  depending  on  what  school  of  legal  theory  one  
applies.  For  some,  and  especially  with  regard  to  indigenous  peoples,  constitutional  law  may  include  
informal  customs  and  social  norms.183  Thus,  structuration  theory,  and  similar  sociological  theories  
of  the  micro-macro  relation,  are  all  relevant  for  a  political  sociology  of  constituent  power.  Nick  
Crossley  has  argued  that  Bourdieu's  variety  of  “structuration”  theory  could  be  useful  to  research  
structural  strain  as  a  background  variable.184  I  think  he  underestimates  the  potential  of  his  own  
suggestion,  since  he  does  not  mention  system  transformation  as  an  outcome  variable.  However,  one  
colleague  of  his  who  does  try  to  be  attentive  to  both  sides  of  the  mutual  causation  between  micro  
and  macro  is  Donatella  della  Porta.  She  uses  the  term  “emergent  causation”  to  describe  mutual  
causal  influence  between  different  variables.  Della  Porta's  “emergent  causation”  contains  the  
common  denominator  of  all  the  recent  sociological  syntheses:  social  action  and  social  structure  as  
emergent  phenomena.  Her  term  could  potentially  also  contain  Joseph  Weiler's  circular  model  of  
constituent  popular  power  and  constituted  political  order.  The  main  difference  between  models  of  
emergent  causation  on  the  one  hand,  and  breakdown  theories  on  the  other,  is  that  the  former  
portrays  human  behaviour  as  complex  adaptive  systems,  while  the  latter  is  focused  on  static  order  
and  sudden  change.  Both  agree  that  a  system  may  be  rather  static  and  change  may  be  rather  abrupt,  
but  only  the  latter  assumes  that  this  is  the  only  alternative.  Complex  adaptive  systems  are  not  
always  in  social  “harmony”.  Interdependencies  may  include  forced  resource  extraction,  low-
intensity  warfare  and  imperial  manipulations.  Transnational  social  movements  are  not  contained  
within  a  nicely  delimited  civil  society,  but  are  political  actors  in  complex  geopolitical  games. 
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 Now  I  have  suggested  solutions  to  a  number  of  issues  for  social  movement  studies  in  the  
North  Atlantic  region:  the  strange  disappearance  of  capitalism  as  a  background  variable,  addressed  
by  Hetland  and  Goodwin,  the  failure  to  trace  systems  transformation  as  an  outcome  variable,  
lamented  by  Giugni,  the  irrelevance  for  transnational  movements  that  are  being  stigmatised  as  
“radical”,  and  the  impotence  to  develop  a  strong  alternative  to  so-called  breakdown  theories.  My  
suggestion  was  to  turn  to  recent  sociological  theory  about  the  constitution  of  society.  More  
specifically,  I  suggested  that  Donatella  della  Porta's  model  of  emergent  causality  should  be  married  
to  Joseph  Weiler's  concept  of  circular  causation  between  constituent  popular  power  and  constituted  
political  order.  Thus,  we  may  address  the  constituent  power  of  social  movements  as  an  outcome  
variable,  on  the  background  of  the  already  constituted  order,  as  a  background  variable.  In  order  to  
be  relevant  for  social  movements,  we  should  apply  constitutional  legal  theory  in  the  widest  sense.  
Thus,  the  constituent  power  of  social  movement  may  or  may  not  be  channelled  through  the  already  
constituted  system,185  and  they  may  be  aimed  at  shaping  “constitutional  practices”  rather  than  
written  constitutions.186 
 Movements  may  pursue  various  paths  to  fundamental  systems  transformation.  In  the  past,  
the  concept  of  “armed  revolution”  was  part  of  the  liberalist  and  socialist  ideologies.  Within  the  
North-Atlantic  region,  the  myth  of  the  armed  revolution  is  strong  among  those  liberal  and  
conservative  governments  who  armed  revolutions  abroad,  in  Libya  and  Syria.187  But  within  the  
North-Atlantic  region,  the  radical  left,  “chastened  by  the  disasters  of  the  20th  century,  has  largely  
moved  away  from  its  older  celebration  of  revolutionary  violence”188  The  radical  feminists  and  
environmentalists,  the  anti-war  movement,  the  Global  Justice  Movement,  Occupy  Wall  Street  and  
Democracia  Real  Ya  and  the  Native  American  organisations,  all  aim  at  fundamental  systems  
transformation,  which  is  is  radical  change.  They  pursue  a  plurality  of  paths  to  “build  the  new  
society  within  the  shell  of  the  old”.189  At  least  at  an  ideological  level,  those  paths  are  supposed  to  be  
neither  reformist  nor  revolutionary,  because  the  strategical  goal  is  not  to  change  society  via  
government  position,  but  to  transform  society  directly.190  Such  is  the  way  whereby  most  of  the  
newest  social  movements  in  the  North-Atlantic  area  pursue  constituent  power.  This  is  a  reality  that  
social  movement  researchers  in  the  North-Atlantic  area  will  have  to  relate  to,  conceptually,  ethically  
and  epistemologically,  in  order  to  become  relevant  for  those  movements,  and  to  develop  a  stronger  
theoretical  alternative  to  breakdown  theories. 
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2.4.0  In  Summary:  Socio-Material  (Re)production  of  Geopolitical  Order 
 
Now  I  have  discussed  some  ways  whereby  political  research  may  take  the  consequence  of  the  
paradigm  shift  in  jurisprudence  and  legal  history:  on  the  one  hand  the  right  of  indigenous  self-
determination,  on  the  other  hand  the  new  proof  in  legal  history  that  was  provided  by  the  Sámi  
Rights  Commission.  The  past  is  no  longer  what  it  used  to  be,  and  I  summed  up  the  new  knowledge  
as  this:  In  Sápmi,  the  siida-system  never  fully  disappeared,  while  the  state-system  was  never  fully  
consolidated.  There  has  been  a  de  facto  legal  and  jurisdictional  pluralism  since  time  longstanding,  
even  though  sovereignty,  understood  as  monopoly  of  violence  in  a  territory,  has  been  sorted  out.  I  
have  discussed  two  dimensions:  the  spatial  and  the  temporal,  or  structure  and  change. 
 Regarding  spatiality  or  structure,  I  followed  a  number  of  colleagues  who  have  concerns  
about  the  political  bias  of  “methodological  nationalism  and  statism”:  political  scientists  such  as  
Bauböck  and  Neumann,191  social  anthropologists  such  as  Eriksen  and  Hoëm.192  But  as  a  positive  
alternative  I  proposed  to  follow  historians  in  their  spatial  turn  and  geographers  in  their  turn  to  
historical-geographical  process193.  In  particular  I  followed  the  suggestion  of  David  Slater  and  Paul  
Routledge,  to  trace  mutual  causal  impact  between  social  movements  and  political  environments,194  
what  Routledge  calls  “terrains  of  hegemony  and  resistance”.  That  brought  me  over  to  the  temporal  
dimension. 
 Regarding  temporality  or  process,  I  followed  some  social  movement  researchers  who  wish  
to  put  political-economic  structure  back  into  social  movement  research,  both  as  a  background  
variable  (to  explain  activism)  and  as  an  outcome  variable  (explained  by  activism).195  I  started  by  
addressing  the  limitations  of  “breakdown  theorists”,  such  as  Lipset  and  Kornhauser.196  Following  
Barry  Barnes,  I  suggested  that  they  are  too  fixed  on  the  myth  of  revolution,  which  is  central  to  the  
liberal  and  socialist  traditions.  The  progress  in  social  history197  and  social  anthropology198  has  led  to  
new  praxis  theories  of  social  (re)production  for  example  by  Bourdieu  and  Giddens.199  This  progress  
in  sociological  theory  has  informed  constitutional  lawyers,  such  as  Joseph  Weiler,200  but  also  social  
movement  scholars,  such  as  Donatella  della  Porta.201  Some  have  bridged  those  two  literatures,  
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addressing  the  constituent  power  of  social  movements.202  In  my  opinion,  such  concepts  do  make  
sense  of  the  strategies  pursued  by  transformative  social  movements  that  are  neither  reformist  nor  
revolutionary,  but  prefigurative,  striving  to  “build  the  new  society  in  the  shell  of  the  old”.203 
 Consequently,  I  suggested  that  we  may  address  the  mutual  causation  between  constituted  
power  and  constituent  power,  which  is  the  processual  dimension  of  the  “terrains  of  hegemony  and  
resistance”.  It  does  not  matter  if  we  use  Gramsci's  Marxian  terms  “hegemony  and  resistance”,  or  if  
instead  we  use  Rokkan's  Functionalist  categories  “centre  and  periphery”.  Either  conceptual  duality  
may  serve  well,  as  long  as  we  do  not  lapse  back  into  the  dogmatic  “grand  theories”  of  Marxist-
Leninism  or  Structure-Functionalism,  but  instead  keep  an  empirical  sensitivity  to  tangible  practices  
located  in  tangible  terrains  –  the  socio-material  field  of  action.204 
 Now  that  the  general  conceptual  layout  has  been  decided,  let  us  zoom  in  on  the  most  
important  issue  for  this  thesis:  the  art  and  science  of  constituent  power. 
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3.1.0  Chapter  Introduction 
 
3.1.1  (Re)production  of  Geopolitical  Order:  challenges  for  political  science  and  practice 
Finally,  I  have  arrived  at  discussing  the  main  issue  for  my  research:  state  transformation.  With  terms  
defined  in  the  previous  chapter,  this  is  a  question  of  how  (concrete)  human  bodies,  situated  in  
(concrete)  terrains,  may  bond  together  and  empower  themselves  by  building  (virtual)  capacity  to  
transform  the  (virtual)  historical-geographical  formations  that  condition  their  situation  in  the  
(concrete)  terrain.  This  is  the  art  and  science  of  constituent  power.  Scientific  knowledge  is  a  tool  of  
empowerment.  The  science  of  constituent  (and  constituted)  power  gains  legitimacy  and  funds  from  
its  capability  to  be  practically  applicable  for  the  art  of  constituent  (and  constituted)  power. 
 
3.1.2  The  art  of  constituent  power:  three  pathways 
The  art  of  constituent  power  is  all  the  strategies  pursued  by  social  movements  when  they  empower  
themselves  to  re-constitute  some  political  opportunity  structure.  When  such  strategies  and  pathways  
are  being  observed  systematically,  it  is  the  science  of  constituent  power.  There  is  a  close  symbiosis  
between  the  art  and  science  of  constituent  power.  The  practical  questions  of  the  art  inform  the  
research  questions  of  the  science,  and  empower  some  research  agendas  financially.  The  science  
informs  the  art,  and  empowers  it  to  discover  opportunities  for  action.  There  are  several  paths  to  
empowerment,  and  some  of  them  are  more  challenging  than  others,  either  conceptually,  
epistemologically,  or  ethically. 
 Conceptually  and  theoretically,  political  science  has  to  grasp  how  movements  try  and  at  
times  succeed  in  re-building  society.  From  my  own  experience  with  those  movements,  I  would  say  
that  the  main  strategy  is  to  create  new  ways  of  doing  things,  to  build  new  institutions.  It  includes  
development  of  alternative  practices,  and  trials  with  alternative  technologies.  It  may  include  self-
empowerment  through  barter  or  micro-credit,  and  it  may  include  confrontations  in  the  form  of  civil  
disobedience.  In  the  Global  Justice  Movement,  as  I  know  from  inside,  this  form  of  constituent  
power  would  be  called  “non-violent  direct  action”,  and  its  aim  is  to  create  the  potential  society  
within  the  shell  of  the  old  by  practicing  or  instituting  new  socio-material  institutions.  More  
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analytically,  we  may  call  it  prefigurative  satyagraha,  mixing  terms  from  Gramsci  and  Gandhi.  For  
this  conceptual  development,  I  hope  it  would  be  useful  to  use  my  discussion  about  nation-building  
and  social  movements,  the  spatial  and  temporal  dimensions  of  state  transformation. 
 Ethically  and  strategically,  political  scientists  also  must  choose  between  various  ways  to  
frame  political  violence,  used  either  by  hegemonic  or  oppositional  groups.  In  the  movement  we  
characterise  such  action  repertoires  as  “violent  direct  action”,  as  distinct  from  non-violent  direct  
action.  More  analytically,  such  practices  may  be  called  prefigurative  war-of-position,  using  two  
terms  from  Gramsci.  Within  the  Western  world,  the  latter  issue  may  be  especially  challenging  in  
areas  with  de  facto  jurisdictional  complexity,  such  as  the  homelands  of  Native  Americans,  
Aboriginal  Australians,  and  Arctic  Sámi.  In  such  areas,  it  may  be  ethically  and  strategically  
challenging  to  choose  the  right  research  question  and  contextualisation,  not  only  if  we  observe  
insurgent  political  violence,  but  also  if  we  observe  the  institutional  violence  of  the  states.  In  
indigenous  homelands,  different  social  communities  may  hold  different  intersubjective  perceptions  
of  what  is  legitimate  or  legitimate  means  to  sanction  norms.  This  plurality  of  opinion  is  part  of  the  
actual  political  environment.  Therefore,  it  is  biased  if  the  political  researcher  casually  takes  for  
granted  that  there  automatically  is  correspondence  between  what  forms  of  coercion  he  happens  to  
feel  is  legitimate,  and  what  forms  of  coercion  may  or  may  not  enjoy  actual  legitimacy  among  the  
population. 
 Epistemologically  and  methodologically,  the  most  challenging  issue  is  how  the  scientific  
search  for  proof  serves  the  pursuit  of  rights.  The  indigenous  rights  struggle  –  similarly  to  historical  
research  in  postcolonial  India  and  post-dictatorship  Spain  –  includes  efforts  to  find  proof  and  spread  
knowledge.  Those  are  scientific  and  didactic  activities.  These  involve  an  element  of  agitation  and  
strategic  information,  what  we  would  call  “symbolic  action”  in  the  Global  Justice  Movement.  
However,  proof-finding  is  a  specific  form  of  semiotic  practice  that  cannot  be  reduced  to  rhetoric,  
because  it  involves  empirical  proof  and  rational  argument.  Knowledge  is  empowering  because  it  
may  help  us  to  gain  more  reliable  framings  of  the  actual  opportunity  structure.  This  cannot  be  
reduced  to  political  rhetoric,  but  neither  can  it  be  reduced  to  politically  detached  observation.  
Perhaps  the  empowering  function  of  knowledge  could  be  characterised  as  prefigurative  
enlightenment.  This  actualises  the  whole  contentious  debate  about  knowledge  and  prejudice,  
episteme  and  doxa,  conjectures  and  refutations.  To  practice  political  science  is  in  itself  an  act  of  
constituent  power. 
 Now  I  have  drawn  a  distinction  between  three  different  paths  to  constituent  power.  Those  are  
also  paths  whereby  constituted  power  is  being  executed.  This  is  because  the  maintenance  of  social  
order  always  implies  slight  transformation  of  that  social  order,  by  adapting  to  whatever  changes  
might  take  place  in  the  environment.  Thus,  one  might  say  that  the  paths  of  constituent  power  are  the  
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paths  whereby  constituted  power  is  being  both  maintained  and  transformed. 
 
Table  3-1:  three  paths  of  constituent  praxes  and  constituted  order 
Forms  of  action Repertoires  of  constituent  power Approaches  to  political  research 
Customary  praxes Prefigurative  satyagraha Political  institutionalism 
Knowledge  praxes Prefigurative  war-of-position So-called  political  “realism” 
Coercive  force Prefigurative  enlightenment Political  constructivism 
 
 
3.1.3  The  Science  of  Constituent  Power:  three  approaches 
The  science  of  constituent  power  is  the  systematic  inquiry  into  of  the  art  of  constituent  power,  and  
such  inquiry,  unavoidably,  provides  more  or  less  reliable  resources  for  one  of  the  pathways  of  
constituent  and  constituted  order,  the  one  I  have  called  “prefigurative  enlightenment”.  To  discover  
new  proofs,  and  to  revise  old  knowledge,  are  transformative  or  constituent  praxes:  they  contribute  
to  transforming  the  already  established  or  constituted  body  of  knowledge.  With  all  empirical  
sciences,  the  constituted  body  of  knowledge  is  constantly  revised  by  the  impact  of  constituent  
empirical  proofs.  This  is  a  process  of  prefigurative  enlightenment,  though  it  may  proceed  in  fits  and  
starts,  and  pose  questions  of  relevance  to  some  political  interests  while  silencing  under-researched  
issues  that  would  have  been  of  relevance  to  some  other  political  interests.  Some  political  scientists  
take  interest  in  the  politics  of  perceptions,  including  the  political  consequences  of  political  science  
itself:  the  pathway  I  have  called  “prefigurative  enlightenment”.  But  most  political  scientists  observe  
other  forms  of  constituent  praxes  and  constituted  order:  the  pathways  I  have  called  “prefigurative  
satyagraha”  and  “prefigurative  war-of-position”.  I  think  those  different  research  interests  roughly  
correspond  with  different  approaches  to  political  science.  The  different  approaches  or  schools  of  
political  science  are  sometimes  divided  in  three:  institutionalism,  constructivism,  and  so-called  
realism.205   
I  would  suggest  that  when  social  movements  pursue  the  path  of  prefigurative  satyagraha  
then  they  try  to  do  the  things  that  political  institutionalists  describe.  This,  in  my  experience,  is  the  
case  for  most  radical  movements  in  the  contemporary  period  and  within  the  North-Atlantic  area.   
Other  radical  oppositional  movements,  or  Jacobin  movements  in  government,  may  pursue  
the  path  of  prefigurative  war-of-position,  and  then  they  try  to  do  the  things  that  are  described  by  
those  who  call  themselves  political  “realists”.  This  may  be  relevant  for  all  indigenous  rights  
movements,  including  the  non-violent  ones,  because  they  relate  to  the  institutional  violence  of  their  
                                                 
205  E.g.:  Neumann  &  Waever  1997:15 
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“host”  states.   
Finally,  some  transformative  movements  pursue  the  path  of  prefigurative  enlightenment,  
through  scientific  fact-finding,  didactic  dissemination,  or  at  times,  even  agitation.  Thus,  they  strive  
to  do  the  things  described  by  political  constructivism.  This  is  obviously  relevant  for  the  
transnational  indigenous  rights  movement,  where  proof-finding  in  legal  history  and  legal  
anthropology  has  co-evolved  with  legal  reforms  in  international  human  rights  norms. 
 If  I  am  correct  to  draw  this  analogy  between  the  three  paths  to  prefiguration  and  the  three  
schools  of  political  science,  then  one  might  argue  that  research  on  the  constituent  power  of  
environmental  justice  movements  would  need  to  integrate  all  three  schools  of  political  science.  The  
different  approaches  to  political  science  offer  highly  different  methodological  and  theoretical  tools.  
This  difference  may  be  seen  as  a  conflict  or  competition  between  the  approaches,  or  as  a  
complimentary  division  of  labor.  This  might  help  us  to  tackle  some  of  the  challenges  posed  by  each  
of  the  three  paths  to  constituent  power. 
 Prefigurative  satyagraha,  I  have  argued,  is  the  most  widely  pursued  path  to  constituent  
power  chosen  among  transformative  movements  in  the  North  Atlantic  region.  However,  it  is  also  a  
conceptually  and  theoretically  challenging  one.  I  think  political  institutionalism  may  be  relevant  to  
observe  oppositional  cultural  practices,  alternative  socio-technical  standards,  and  emerging  
moralities. 
 Prefigurative  enlightenment,  in  addition,  is  rather  widely  pursued,  and  especially  among  
indigenous  rights  movements  and  other  environmental  justice  movements.  This  is  epistemologically  
and  methodologically  challenging,  because  the  object  of  observation  and  the  act  of  observing  are  
interdependent.  I  think  political  constructivism  (at  least  in  some  of  its  forms)  may  provide  helpful  
tools  to  observe  the  political  power  of  science,  including  the  political  power  of  political  science  
itself. 
 Prefigurative  war-of-position,  finally,  is  also  highly  relevant  for  indigenous  rights  
movements  and  environmental  justice  movements,  because  they  may  often  be  met  with  coercive  
power  from  state  governments,  even  though  this  coercion  might  contest  social  legitimacy.  How  to  
frame  political  violence  (hegemonic  or  oppositional)  is  an  ethical  and  strategic  challenge,  and  here  I  





 77  
 
3.2.0  Rights  and  Proofs  VS  Brute  Force 
 
3.2.1  Experiences  from  areas  where  Norway  and  Sápmi  overlap 
There  appears  to  be  two  rival  explanations  regarding  the  ongoing  state  transformation  in  areas  
where  Sápmi  and  Norway  overlap.  One  might  come  across  the  rival  theories  as  discursive  
formations  in  the  published  political  research.  My  own  discovery  of  those  rival  theories  was  
through  multi-sited  fieldwork,  including  nodes  of  knowledge  production  as  well  as  localities  within  
the  water  areas  that  I  study.  First  I  will  bring  the  reader  with  me  to  my  discovery  of  the  explanatory  
framework  that  I  have  used  myself.  This  is  what  I  call  the  new  school.  Thereafter  I  will  address  the  
relation  between  this  new  old  school  and  another  new  school.  Finally,  I  will  show  how  I  discovered  
that  the  old  school,  in  spite  of  being  generally  outdated,  nevertheless  offers  some  wisdom  that  we  
from  the  new  school  should  not  forget. 
 Finding  the  new  school:  Through  my  travels,  I  came  across  fellow  travellers:  political  
researchers  who  build  further  on  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission  and  its  new  proof  on  the  legal  
history.  I  read  the  political  sociologist  Audun  Sandberg,  who  recognises  that  legal  pluralism  is  a  fact  
on  the  ground,  and  has  been  since  times  longstanding,  even  this  was  ignored  by  Norwegian  
historians  until  the  1990s.  Sandberg  has  taken  his  concept  and  methods  from  a  rather  strong  
alternative  to  methodological  nationalism  and  statism:  Elinor  Ostrom's  Social-Ecological  Systems  
(SES)  framework.  This  form  of  political  institutionalism  has  a  materialistic,  empirical  and  
stochastic  grounding,  in  studies  of  how  rational  actors  solve  common  pool  problems  in  their  use  of  
natural  resources.  The  framework  was  applied  to  trace  the  policy  process  that  brought  about  the  
Finnmark  Act,  one  of  the  first  attempts  to  sort  out  the  right  to  land  and  water  in  some  of  the  areas  
where  Norway  and  Sápmi  overlap.206  SES  has  been  adapted  to  study  decision  making  in  
“polycentric  settings”,  with  both  “formal”  and  “informal”  norms,  and  consequently207,  it  is  capable  
of  taking  into  account  that  longstanding  customs  have  been  continuously  maintained  and  developed  
in  Sápmi,  in  spite  of  attempted  criminalisation  from  the  states.208  Sandberg,  following  Ostrom's  neo-
institutionalist  approach,  focused  on  the  politics  of  norms,  or  the  struggle  to  define  rights.  He  did  
not  focus  on  the  politics  of  science,  or  the  struggle  for  proofs.  At  my  fieldwork,  however,  I  came  
over  traces  of  the  legal  anthropologist  Gro  Ween,  and  when  I  tracked  them  back  to  her  university,  I  
found  that  she  took  part  in  a  research  project  that  applied  John  Law's  version  of  Actor-Network  
Theory  (ANT)  to  observe  knowledge  and  power  in  the  Norwegian  management  of  the  salmon  
                                                 
206  Sandberg  2006;;  Sandberg  2008a:       
207  Guha-Khasnobis,  Kahbur  &  Ostrom  2006;;  Hart  2006;;  Keohane  &  Ostrom  1995;;  Christensen  2006 
208  Berge  &  Stenseth  1998 
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stocks.209  Since  I  knew  Ween's  mentor,  the  economic  anthropologist  Marianne  Lien,210  I  was  
accepted  as  a  visiting  scholar  on  their  project,  and  become  Ween's  apprentice.  The  form  of  ANT  
practiced  by  Law,  Lien  and  Ween,  with  Asdal,211  might  be  seen  as  a  form  of  political  “neo-
constructivism”,  because  it  is  a  constructivism  that  avoids  idealist  speculations,  by  choosing  a  
materialistic,  empirical  and  possibilistic  grounding.  Unlike  SES,  it  is  not  probabilistic,  or  interested  
in  general  patterns,  but  ideographic,  and  interested  in  discovering  “surprising  forms  of  power”.212  
Ethnographic  fieldwork  brought  Law  and  Lien  to  salmon  farming  facilities.213  Ween  studied  the  
management  of  wild  salmon  in  the  Deatnu  River,  between  state-certified  science  under  each  state,  
and  traditional  knowledge  in  the  local  Sámi  community.214  ANT  is  interested  in  the  open-ended  and  
unfinished  nature  of  epistemic  knowledge,  and  therefore  it  is  open  to  trace  interactions  with  tacit  
knowledge,  of  the  type  that  has  been  kept  and  developed  through  the  actual  usage  of  nature  in  Sámi  
communities.  For  the  ANT  researcher  Gro  Ween,  the  main  focus  was  knowledge  practices,  the  
struggle  for  proof.  For  me,  her  contribution  appeared  to  be  complimentary  to  that  of  the  SES  scholar  
Audun  Sandberg,  whose  focus  was  customary  practices,  the  struggle  for  rights.  Additionally,  they  
appeared  complimentary  because  the  one  used  possibilisitic  methods  to  develop  hypotheses  about  
surprising  forms  of  power,  while  the  other  used  probabilistic  methods  to  develop  hypotheses  about  
general  patterns.  During  fieldwork,  I  had  gradually  started  to  use  SES  and  ANT,  through  several  
rounds  of  iteration  between  formation  of  coding  categories  (that  appeared  to  make  sense  of  the  data  
material)  and  collection  of  data  material  (that  could  give  information  about  the  coding  categories.)  
The  complimentary  character  of  SES  and  ANT  emerged  as  an  appropriate  way  for  political  research  
to  follow  up  the  research  from  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission,  and  to  take  into  account  its  findings  
about  longstanding  customs  and  traditional  knowledge.  The  final  output  emerged  as  I  wrote  up  my  
thesis,  as  a  specific  set  of  explanatory  mechanisms. 
 The  old  and  the  new  schools:  However,  as  I  wrote  up  my  thesis,  it  gradually  also  became  
clear  that  there  exists  a  rival  theory.  Some  political  researchers  inquire  the  consequences  of  the  
Sámi  Rights  Commission,  such  as  the  Finnmark  Act,  while  at  the  same  time  looking  away  from  the  
new  proof  that  was  brought  by  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission.  In  my  opinion,  these  colleagues  use  
the  science  of  the  old  state  to  research  the  transformation  to  the  new  state.  When  I  came  across  their  
writings  during  my  fieldwork,  I  had  considered  these  “old  school”  researchers  as  totally  outdated,  
                                                 
209  Law  &  Singleton  2012.  ANT-grounders  Law,  Latour  and  Callon  sometimes  express  discontent  with  the  name  that  
was  once  chosen  for  the  approach,  and  then  they  got  stuck  with  it.  Latour  (2004)  suggested  that  better  terms  might  
have  been  “the  sociology  of  associations”  or  even  “associology”.  However,  for  the  sake  of  convenience,  the  label  
ANT  is  still  being  used. 
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but  as  I  wrote  up  my  own  research,  I  realised  that  they  might  have  some  points  that  the  “new  
school”  should  not  forget.  I  have  now  made  some  strong  statements  about  an  old  and  a  new  school,  
but  such  statements  are  contentious,  and  thus  they  need  justification.  Norwegian  political  
researchers,  according  to  my  experience,  tend  to  draw  a  distinction  between  two  different  ways  of  
doing  things,  two  paradigmatic  alternatives.  In  the  1990s,  the  established  state  scientists  (statsvitere)  
called  themselves  “realists”,  while  they  were  challenged  by  young  scholars  who  called  themselves  
“critical  theorists”215.  The  young  researchers  got  jobs  at  various  research  institutes  and  university  
departments,  for  example  in  anthropology  and  development  studies,  and  they  are  now  kept  together  
by  a  pan-Nordic  network  of  I.R.  scholars.216  At  the  same  time,  the  empirical  transformation  of  the  
states  has  led  the  old  school  state  scientists  to  discussing  whether  they  should  revise  their  basic  
categories,  such  as  sovereignty  and  citizenship217.  Thus,  we  now  have  two  competing  schools  of  
state-certified  political  research  in  the  Norwegian  political  entity.  Both  respond  to  the  same  political  
transformations.  From  the  old  school,  Østerud  and  Matlary  zoom  in  on  the  “denationalisation  of  
defence”,  and  frame  this  pessimistically,  as  a  loss  of  parliamentarian  sovereignty218.  From  the  new  
school,  Neumann  and  Sending  zoom  in  on  multilateral  institutions,  and  frame  this  optimistically,  as  
further  democratisation  beyond  nationalistic  particularism219.  The  two  schools  emphasise  quite  
different  things,  one  providing  a  perspective  from  state-centred  “realism”,  the  other  a  mix  of  
institutionalism  and  constructivism.  The  new  school  researcher  Iver  B.  Neumann  has  close  affinities  
with  the  approaches  that  I  had  come  across  and  adapted  to  during  my  own  fieldwork:  on  one  hand  
he  is  interested  in  multilateral  institutions220,  as  with  Sandberg,  and  Ostrom's  SES,  on  the  other  hand  
he  is  an  also  an  anthropologist,  who  has  published  with  Ween,  the  latter  using  Law's  ANT.221  With  
my  own  affinity  to  ANT  and  SES,  my  own  research  was  clearly  new  school.  In  fact  I  had  been  
rather  antagonistic  to  the  so-called  “realist”  state  science,  ever  since  the  controversies  in  the  1990s. 
 Return  to  the  old  school?  It was not until I returned from fieldwork, and engaged more 
actively with the literature, that I realised that state-centred realism is not entirely unrealistic, if it is 
used as a supplement to other approaches. As  I  sat  down  to  write  up  my  research,  I  decided  to  
confront  the  old  school,  from  within  the  new  school.  Only  then  had  I  really  to  consider  the  rival  
theory  thoroughly.  Some  of  their  assumptions  are  totally  outdated,  and  I  have  addressed  some  of  
them  above,  in  the  discussion  about  nation-building  in  a  trans-boundary  region  (2.2.0-2.3.0).  
However,  I  found  that  they  might  also  remind  us  in  the  new  school  about  some  wisdom  that  we  
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might  have  forgotten.  The  so-called  “realist”  view  on  the  loss  of  parliamentarian  power  may  
actually  be  fatalistic,  but  the  institutionalist-constructivist  view  on  emerging  transnational  
democracy  might  be  too  optimistic.  Like  the  attempt  to  implement  democracy  within  a  national  
framework  was  partly  a  failure,  the  attempt  to  implement  indigenous  rights  on  top  of  that  might  also  
not  have  been  fully  successful.  Anne  Julie  Semb,  one  of  the  state  scientists  (statsvitere)  that  I  
discussed  as  an  example  of  “methodological  nationalism  and  statism”  (2.2.3)  has  also  done  another  
study  on  Sámi  rights,  that  has  more  focus  on  the  temporal  dimension.  She  operationalises  this  as  a  
question  of  how  norms  affect  policy.222  Implicitly,  this  is  also  a  question  of  how  norms  affect  polity,  
because  the  policies  in  question  include  a  constitutional  amendment.  Thus,  I  realised  that  this  is,  
implicitly,  a  study  on  the  constituent  power  of  social  movements.  This  is  the  very  topic  that  I  myself  
had  been  researching,  though  with  totally  differing  data  and  concepts.  Therefore,  there  was  good  
reason  for  me  to  see  what  she  had  done,  and  to  relate  to  that.  There  are  two  arguments  in  her  article  
that  I  find  particularly  interesting:  (1)  Firstly,  she  argued  that  when  the  UN  had  enacted  new  human  
rights  norms,  then  the  Norwegian  state  would  have  to  ratify  them  in  order  to  save  face.  Her  
argument  is  that  this  state  is  so  small,  that  one  of  its  few  assets  in  international  politics  is  its  moral  
reputation.  (2)  Secondly,  she  argued  that  policy  makers  in  the  Norwegian  state  administration  
assessed  that  there  was  a  risk  for  oppositional  political  violence  could.  She  found  documentation  
that  such  a  perception  existed,  by  doing  archival  research  in  police  archives.  With  the  proofs  and  
arguments  presented  in  the  article,  she  does  convinces  me  that  she  has  found  two  of  the  (many)  
relevant  mechanisms  to  explain  the  constituent  power  of  the  indigenous  rights  movement,  in  areas  
where  Sápmi  and  Norway  interact.  However,  what  other  relevant  mechanisms  might  exist?  What  
would  be  the  relative  impact  of  each  mechanism?  As  with  all  empirical  causal  analysis,  we  need  
both  empirical  data  and  causal  models.  Regarding  the  data,  Semb  has  had  obtained  access  to  
valuable  data  from  the  police  archive,  but  she  has  not  done  participant  observation  among  
indigenous  rights  activists.  Regarding  the  models,  she  belongs  to  a  specific  paradigm:  the  so-called  
state-centred  realism.  This  is  the  dominant  school  at  her  workplace,  the  Department  of  State  Science  
at  the  University  of  Oslo.  As  with  all  qualitative  historical  research,  her  selection  of  data  sources  is  
partly  dependent  on  the  initial  causal  model,  while  her  resulting  historiographical  explanation  is  
partly  dependent  on  the  selection  of  data.223  This  is  not  particularly  biased,  because  this  is  how  the  
historical  method  works.  Though  this  is  not  particularly  biased,  it  is  bound  to  be  positioned.  This  is  
because  history  is  partly  model-dependent,  while  the  model  is  partly  dependent  on  values  and  
interests.224  I  think  this  research  is  an  interesting  and  relevant  contribution.  Thus,  I  am  not  at  all  as  
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critical  of  Semb's  research  on  constituent  power,  or  the  processual  dimension  (discussed  here),  as  I  
am  of  her  research  on  self-determination,  or  the  spatial  dimension  (discussed  in  2.2.3  above).  When  
she  dealt  with  political  geography,  her  state-centered  realism  was  a  set  of  blinkers  that  made  her  
ignorant  of  the  actual  legal  and  jurisdictional  complexity  in  Sápmi,  which  had  already  been  proven  
by  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission.  However,  when  she  deals  with  political  history,  her  state-centred  
realism  enables  her  to  zoom  in  on  some  of  the  particular  mechanisms  that  I,  as  a  new  school  
political  scientist,  had  not  traced.  She  assumes  that  coercive  force  and  strategical  interests  do  matter  
for  state  formation,  maintenance  of  public  order,  and  regime  change.  Then  it  is  highly  relevant  to  
select  police  archives  as  a  main  source  of  historical  data.  She  has  selected  a  particular  causal  model,  
of  relevance  for  particular  policy  interests,  and  this  enables  her  to  discover  some  particular  facts.  If  
she  had  selected  another  causal  model,  relevant  to  other  policy  interests,  she  might  very  well  have  
discovered  some  other  particular  facts.  My  own  research  identifies  different  particular  facts  on  the  
basis  of  different  data  sources.  My  data  selection  was  guided  by  different  causal  models,  which  are  
relevant  to  serve  different  policy  interests,  and  also,  implies  a  need  to  build  trust  and  gain  access  
among  different  social  groups.  As  political  and  social  scientists,  the  two  of  us  reveal  and  highlight  
different  aspects  of  the  reality,  made  visible  by  diverging  research  interests,  serving  diverging  
practical  interests.  To  what  degree  our  explanations  are  complimentary,  and  to  what  extent  they  are  
competing,  is  something  I  will  discuss  in  the  final  chapter  of  this  thesis.  Semb's  article  on  how  
norms  affect  policy  (and  polity)  is  a  relevant  contribution,  but  still  I  think  there  are  very  good  
reasons  to  supplement  this  with  other  empirical  studies  informed  by  other  causal  models.  Taken  in  
isolation,  her  article  may  lead  the  reader  to  exaggerate  the  significance  of  coercive  force,  strategy,  
and  public  security,  but  taken  as  one  of  several  complimentary  perspectives,  her  article  may  provide  
valuable  insights  into  some  of  the  pathways  that  might  matter.  I had regarded state-centred realism 
as the rival theory, which had to be refuted. But if I can refute anything, then it is the reductionistic 
or fatalistic use of so-called realism. What I cannot refute is moderate and sound application of 
some realist tools, among other tools. 
 
 
3.2.2  Revisiting  the  Science  of  Constituent  Power:  three  or  two  approaches? 
Earlier  I  discussed  Semb's  so-called  “realist”  approach  to  research  how  norms  affect  policy  (and  
polity),  versus  my  own  “institutionalist”  and  “constructivist”  approach  to  the  same  issue  (in  3.2.1  
above).  The  explanations  we  offer  are  competing  or  complimentary,  because  we  both  deal  with  the  
art  and  science  of  constituent  power.  This  is  closely  related  to  the  typology  of  constituent  and  
constituted  power  that  I  presented  above  (in  3.1.2  above).  The  various  paths  of  constitutent  and  
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constituted  power  were  sorted  into  three  types  (table  3.1):    (a)  prefigurative  satyagraha  or  
maintenance  of  norms;;  (b)  prefigurative  enlightenment  or  maintenance  of  knowledge;;  and  (c)  
prefigurative  war-of-position  or  maintenance  of  monopoly-of-violence.  Each  of  those  paths  deal  
with  phenomena  that  are  the  specialty  of  three  different  approaches  to  political  research,  zooming  in  
on  three  different  explanatory  variables:  (a)  institutionalists  on  customary  praxes,  (b)  constructivists  
on  knowledge  praxes,  and  (c)  so-called  realists  on  coercive  force.  These  distinctions  correlate  with  
the  cleavage  between  old  school  and  new  school  of  Norwegian  political  science  (table  3.2).  The  old  
school  adheres  to  so-called  realism  (c  above),  while  the  new  school  started  as  constructivist,  but  
over  time  it  also  incorporated  institutionalism  (a  and  b  above). 
 
  Table  3-2:  Three  paths  of  constituent  praxes  and  constituted  order 
Approaches  to  political  research Schools  in  the  Norway/Sápmi  overlap Scholars  in  the  Norway/Sápmi  overlap 
Institutionalism New  school Sandberg,  Nustad,  Neumann,  SES 
Constructivism New  school Ween,  Asdal,  Neumann,  ANT 
So-called  “realism” Old  school Semb,  Østerud  &  Matlary,  military  science 
 
During  my  fieldwork  on  state  transformation  in  the  high  north,  I  came  across  three  specific  forms  of  
political  institutionalism,  constructivism  and  so-called  realism  (table  3.2).  Areas  where  Norway  and  
Sápmi  overlap  have  specific  natural  and  cultural  conditions  that  actualize  the  relevance  of  specific  
approaches  to  political  research. 
When  Audun  Sandberg  studies  institutional  change  by  applying  Elinor  Ostrom's  SES  
framework,  then  he  does  a  specific  form  of  institutionalist  research  which  is  specialized  on  social  
rules  embedded  in  natural  resource  use.  This  is  a  materialist  form  of  institutionalism,  because  it  is  
informed  by  economic  “substantivism”  and  consequently  it  sees  norms  as  practices  developing  in  
the  use  of  material  goods.  When  Gro  Ween  inquires  the  politics  of  knowledge  by  using  Law  &  
Singleton's  ANT  approach,  then  she  does  a  specific  form  of  constructivist  research  which  is  
specialized  on  the  politics  of  those  forms  of  knowledges  (traditional  or  epistemic)  that  are  based  on  
practical  observation  of  nature.  This  a  materialist  form  of  constructivism,  because  natural  
phenomena  are  not  put  in  brackets;;  it  is  a  “materialist  semiotics”  as  Law  calls  it.225  Therefore,  both  
ANT  and  SES  are  specifically  materialistic  forms  of  the  two  respective  approaches  they  belong  to:  
materialist  constructivism  and  materialist  institutionalism.  This  fits  well  in  areas  where  Norway  and  
Sápmi  overlap,  because  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission  published  proof  that  traditional  subsistence  
practices  (fishing,  hunting,  gathering  and  herding)  was  the  practice  whereby  customary  norms  and  
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traditional  knowledge  had  been  continuously  maintained  and  developed  in  Sámi  areas,  ever  since  
the  ancient  tribal  confederacy  disappeared.  But  it  is  also  relevant  with  the  third  materialistic  
approach,  which  is  the  state-centred  “realism”  of  Østerud  and  Matlary.  The  Sápmi  territory,  the  
Barents  Sea  Basin,  and  the  entire  circumpolar  Arctic  are  divided  by  the  boundary  between  two  
grand  military  alliances.  Also  this  is  a  factor  that  forms  the  political  opportunities  for  local  political  
actors.  The  so-called  realism  of  the  old  school  is  unrealistic  in  the  way  that  it  is  helpless  to  make  
sense  of  existingcustomary  laws  and  traditional  knowledge  that  are  not  sanctioned  by  any  state.  
That  is  the  where  the  new  school  has  proven  useful,  especially  with  its  application  of  SES  and  ANT.  
However,  the  new  school  may  be  insensitive  to  the  actual  geo-strategical  game  in  the  area,  which  is  
the  specialty  of  the  old  school. 
 The  old  school  runs  the  risk  of  a  too  one-sided  focus  on  one  explanatory  variable,  thus  
turning  realism  into  fatalism.  The  new  school  is  strong  on  those  variables  where  the  old  one  is  
weak,  but  runs  the  risk  of  overlooking  actual  violence,  thus  being  over-optimistic.  For  the  art  and  
science  of  constituent  power,  fatalism  may  lead  to  unnecessary  escalation  of  suppressive  violence,  
while  over-optimism  may  lead  to  unwise  tactics,  and  that  may  attract  suppressive  violence  as  well.  
The  rivalry  which  exists  between  the  old  and  new  theories  is  relevant  for  Sámi  research  as  well  as  
for  social  movement  research  (see  tables  3.3  and  3.4). 
 
 
3.2.3  Relevance  for  Sámi  research 
Regarding  Sámi  research,  it  is  necessary  to  find  handy  ways  to  conceptualise  the  new  insight  that  in  
jurisdictional  pluralism  goes  hand  in  hand  with  clear-cut  state  sovereignties  in  Sápmi:  new  proofs  in  
legal  history  have  re-constituted  collective  knowledge  that  refers  to  the  the  actual  constituted  order.  
In  a  nutshell,  I  formulated  this  constituted  order  as  the  siida-system  never  fully  disappearing,  the  
state-system  never  being  fully  consolidated.  For  the  state-centred  realism,  this  might  sound  
dangerous,  like  system  breakdown  or  civil  war,  but  it  is  actually  not  (even  though  the  states  have  
used  institutional  violence  against  an  indigenous  people  who  refrained  from  answering  violence  
with  violence).  Some  of  the  research  on  customary  norms  and  traditional  knowledge  render  the  
state-centred  perspective  unrealistic  (table  2.2,  the  right  column).  However,  for  the  SES  framework  
and  the  ANT  approach,  this  makes  total  sense,  because  informal  norms  and  tacit  knowledge  are  
seen  as  no  less  relevant  than  codified  norms  or  scholarly  knowledge.  When  the  map  drawn  by  state-
centred  realists  no  longer  corresponds  with  the  terrain,  then  SES  and  ANT  produce  better  maps.  
However,  the  maps  drawn  by  SES  and  ANT  can  hardly  trace  coercive  force  when  it  actually  takes  
place  (table  2.2,  the  bottom  line).  Even  though  the  Sámi  have  been  reluctant  to  answer  violence  
 84  
 
with  violence,  they  have  nevertheless  been  subject  to  violence,  and  the  struggle  for  rights  implies  a  
re-programming  of  the  apparatus  of  institutional  violence,  not  its  abolition.  This  dimension  should  
not  be  forgotten  in  a  struggle  striving  towards  the  ideal  restorative  justice. 
 
Table  3-3:  Sámi  research226  which  fits  within  state-centred  “realism”,  and  which  renders  it  unrealistic 
Sámi  research Compatible  with  state-centred  realism Renders  state-centrism  unrealistic227 
Customary  praxes228 Formalist  conceptualisation Substantivist  conceptualisation 
Knowledge  praxes229 Technical  methodology230 Ethical-legal  methodology231 
Coercive  force Structural  violence232 --- 
 
 
3.2.4  Relevance  for  Social  Movement  Research 
Regarding  social  movement  research,  (especially  within  mainstream  social  movement  research  in  
the  North-Atlantic  region)  some  are  content  to  follow  reformist  protest  movements,  that  are  
contained  within  the  civil  society  of  finished  state  formations233  –  social  movements  contained  by  
constituted  power.  Others  wish  to  follow  the  indigenous,  regionalist,  environmentalist  and  feminist  
movements,  in  order  to  trace  their  efforts  to  “build  the  new  society  within  the  shell  of  the  old”234  –  
social  movements  as  constituent  power.  Some  researchers  with  special  interest  in  environmentalism,  
gender  politics,  or  media  activism  have  done  research  on  the  transformative  power  of  cultural  and  
organisational  praxes  (table  2.3,  right  column).  Susanne  Staggenborg  has  applied  general  theory  
from  Randall  Collins  to  trace  the  generative  power  of  organisations  and  culture,  while  Alice  
Mattoni  has  specialised  on  the  generative  power  of  culture,  Donatella  della  Porta  and  Ugo  Mattei  on  
the  generative  power  of  organisations.235  The  research  on  organisation  and  culture  has  been  largely  
separate.236  Della  Porta  and  Staggenborg  have  brought  those  together  within  micro-interactionist  
sociological  frameworks.  However,  the  microinteractionist  alternative  is  less  sensitive  to  the  
material  dimension  than  SES  and  ANT,  which  specialise  on  the  socio-material.  Mattoni  has  applied  
                                                 
226  More  precisely:  Sámi  research  with  main  focus  on  areas  where  Norway  and  Sápmi  overlap  (my  access  to  Sámi  
research  is  limited  to  that  published  either  in  English  or  in  Scandinavian  (Norwegian,  Swedish),  excluding  
everything  published  in  Finnish,  Russian  and  even  in  the  Sámi  languages.) 
227  Porsanger  2004;;  Thuen  2004.  See  also:  Falk  2012;;  Bauböck  2008;;    Eriksen  &  Hoëm  1999;;    Gingrich  &  Fox  2002. 
228  Jebens  2010:  22 
229  Joks  2009 
230  Holm  2003 
231  Solbakk  2007 
232  Otnes  2005;;  Minde  2005a;;  Langlais  1999 
233  Tilly,  Tarrow,  McCarthy  2001;;  Tilly  1981 
234  Graeber  2009;;  Bailey  &  Mattei  2012;;  Adams,  Clemens  and  Orloff  2003  (Thanks  to  David  Pretel  for  the  latter  
reference.) 
235  Bailey  &  Mattei  2012;;  Della  Porta  &  Piazza  2008;;  Mattoni  2012;;  Staggenborg  2002 
236  Snow  2004;;  Zald  &  McCarthy  1987 
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ANT  to  study  media  praxes,  while  Mattei  has  suggested  that  SES  is  relevant  to  explain  how  social  
movements  obtain  collective  action.237  In  my  opinion,  the  micro-interactionist  syntheses  provide  
even  stronger  explanations  if  we  make  them  more  materialistic,  importing  SES  and  ANT.  When  I  
research  terrains  of  hegemony  of  resistance  in  Sápmi,  I  can  hardly  ignore  the  ecological  dimension  
of  the  political-ecological  conflicts.  In  these  terrains,  the  micro-interaction  clearly  involve  “resource  
units”  (SES)  and  “non-humans”  (ANT).  Such  a  package  of  materialist  institutionalism  and  
materialist  constructivism  can  help  us  trace  how  customary  praxes  and  knowledge  praxes  might  
constitute  channels  whereby  constituent  power  and  constituted  order  are  executed  in  real  terrains.  
Thus  we  can  address  the  realities  that  della  Porta  refers  to  with  her  model  of  mutual  causality  
between  democratisation  and  mobilisation.238  However,  we  will  serve  movements  for  
environmental  justice  badly  if  we  ignore  violence  as  a  real  factor  of  politics.  Movements  need  to  
know  how  to  avoid  attracting  violent  suppression.  One  of  the  few  mainstream  social  movement  
scholars  who  take  interest  in  coercive  force  is  della  Porta,  and  also  this  phenomenon  she  describes  
with  a  model  of  mutual  causality  between  political  violence  and  protest  policing.239  (Table  2.3,  the  
bottom  line.)   
 
Table  3-4:  Social  Movement  Research240  which  fits  state-centred  “realism”,  and  which  renders  it  unrealistic 
Social  movement  research Compatible  with  state-centred  realism241 Renders  state-centrism  unrealistic242 
Resource  mobilisation243 Network  as  civil  society  organisation244 Network  as  social  capital245 
Framing  &  media  practices246 Culture  as  social  psychology247 Culture  as  prefigurative  praxes248 
Coercive  force Political  violence  /  protest  policing249 --- 
 
To  understand  the  struggle  for  rights  and  proofs  in  Sápmi,  one  should  trace  how  everyday  resistance  
and  social  mobilisation  may  function  as  social  defence  against  repressive  violence,  and  also,  how  
the  uneven  attempt  to  implement  rights  implies  an  uneven  reform  of  repressive  violence. 
                                                 
237  Mattoni  2012;;  Mattei  2011;;  Bailey  &  Mattei  2012 
238  Della  Porta  2014:  14-22 
239  Della  Porta  2013:  20-1 
240  More  precisely:  mainstream  social  movement  research  in  the  North-Atlantic  region  (this  is  one  particular  “discursive  
formation”  or  “family”  within  the  vast  jungle  of  publications  about  or  of  social  movements,  for  example,  this  field  
does  not  include  Escobar,  Negri,  or  Klein,  who  would  be  central  references  in  closely  related  discourses) 
241  Tilly,  Tarrow,  McCarthy  2001;;  Tilly  1981 
242  Graeber  2009;;  Bailey  &  Mattei  2012;;  Adams,  Clemens  &  Orloff  2003  (Thanks  to  David  Pretel  for  the  latter  
reference.) 
243    Zald  &  McCarthy  1987 
244  Diani  2004 
245  Mattei  2011;;  Della  Porta  &  Piazza  2008;;  Staggenborg  2002 
246  Snow  2004;;  Mattoni  2012 
247  Snow  2004;;  Klandermans  2004 
248  Mattoni  2012;;  Earl  2004;;  Whittier  2004;;  Staggenborg  2002 
249  Della  Porta  2013 
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 Thus,  for  both  Sámi  research  and  social  movement  research,  it  is  relevant  to  set  the  
predictions  of  old  school,  with  its  state-centred  “realism”,  against  the  predictions  of  the  new  school  
with  its  institutionalism  and  constructivism.  On  the  one  hand,  a  moderate  use  of  old  school  concepts  
and  methods  may  help  us  avoid  over-optimistic  political  strategies  (Tables  2.2  and  2.3,  the  bottom  
line).  On  the  other  hand,  the  new  school  provides  concepts  and  methods  that  may  help  us  avoiding  
fatalistic  strategies  (Tables  2.2  and  2.3,  the  right  column).  That  is  how  the  old  and  new  schools  may  




3.2.5  Rival  theories:  cooperation  VS  command 
 
La  [...]  ultima  opposizione 
  è  quella  della 
cooperazione 
contro  il  comando.250 
 
Let  us  turn  to  the  more  particular  pathways  or  mechanisms  of  the  constituent  and  constituted  
powers.  Elinor  Ostrom  is  especially  interested  in  the  distinction  between  two  different  ways  of  
“solving”  common  pool  problems, 
1. either  self-organisation  through  collective  action, 
2. or  imposition  of  rules  by  central  command. 
The  former  alternative  is  described  by  her  own  “new  theory”  of  natural  resources  management,  
which  gained  her  the  Nobel  memorial  prize  in  economics.  The  latter  alternative  is  described  in  the  
“old  theory”  inherited  from  Hardin  and  Hobbes.251  In  other  words,  Ostrom's  main  research  interest  
is  the  contrast  between  the  different  predictions  made  by  her  own  neo-institutionalsit  theory,  versus  
the  predictions  made  by  old  school  state-centred  realism:  the  rival  explanation.  She  does  not  claim  
that  her  own  theory  always  applies.  Her  point  is  that  it  sometimes  does  apply.  Therefore  Ostrom  
does  not  argue  that  the  rival  theory  is  always  wrong.  However,  she  has  proven  that  it  is  not  always  
correct.  This  is  her  main  contribution,  for  which  she  gained  the  Nobel  memorial  prize. 
 On  the  one  hand,  “If users can engage in face-to-face bargaining and have autonomy to 
change their rules, they may well attempt to organize themselves. Whether they organize depend on 
attributes  of  the  resource  system  and  the  users  themselves”252 
                                                 
250  “The  ultimate  opposition  is  the  one  of  cooperation  against  command”  (my  translation),  Negri,  A.  2002  (1992):  409 
251  Ostrom, Walker & Gardner 1992 
252  Potete,  Janssen  and  Ostrom  2010:  245 
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 On the other hand, “When  users  cannot  communicate  and  have  no  way of gaining trust 
through their own efforts or with the help of the macroinstitutional system within which they are 
embedded, the prediction of the earlier theory is supported. Ocean fisheries, the stratosphere and 
other global commons are closest to the appropriate empirical referents.253 
 However,  this  does  not  imply  that  either  there  is  only  cooperation  and  harmony,  or  there  is  
only  competition  and  conflict.  There  might  very  well  be  both,  for  example  collective  action  
internally  within  a  coalition  of  participants,  but  external  competition  against  another  coalition.  To  
define  the  rules,  informally  or  formally,  can  be  a  struggle  to  obtain  some  hegemony  in  some  social  
arena:  “When a winning coalition of users concludes that the expected benefits from creating and 
following their own rules (as well as modifying them over time) exceed the immediate and long-
term  costs,  they  are  likely  to  reformulate  these  rules.”254 Finally,  it  is  not  necessarily  easy  to  
distinguish  changes  to  formal  rules  from  changes  to  informal  rules.  “The dynamic of political 
competition and coalition formation can alter political priorities and influence policy 
implementation  and  enforcement,  even  in  the  absence  of  changes  in  government  or  policy.”255 
 Such processes actualise both elements from “the  old”  as  well  as  “the  new”  theories,  and  
thus, we make a hybrid of two concepts to describe the data. That is logically consistent, because 
Ostrom's law-like formulations are nothing else than stochastic models anyway – she has made a 
praxis theory, not a metaphysical theory. Because of this pragmatism, it is quite consistent to 
combine the old and the new theory, SES and so-called realism, to see which one might be more 
applicable in which situations.   
Because of the same pragmatism, it is also quite consistent to supplement the competing 
stochastic generalisations with a drive towards increased specification, in order to discover 




3.3.0  Conceptualisation:  a  composite  materialist  approach 
 
3.3.1  Terrains  of  hegemony  and  resistance:  the  old  theory  VS  the  new  theory 
After  having  observed  the  two  competing  theories  (in  the  present  chapter),  let  us  now  return  to  the  
observed  decolonization  of  international  human  rights  law  (in  Chapter  2).  In  that  chapter  I  drew  
                                                 
253  ibidem 
254  ibidem 
255  Potete,  Janssen  and  Ostrom  2010:  244 
256  Law  &  Singleton  2012:  11 
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some  conclusions  regarding  the  spatial  and  the  temporal,  structure  and  change.  Regarding  the  
spatial,  I  argued  that  indigenous  self-determination,  as  a  collective  human  right,  renders  
“methodological  nationalism  and  statism”  irrelevant,  and  instead  I  suggested  that  political  science  
should  turn  to  empirical  historical  geography.  Regarding  the  temporal,  I  argued  that  the  continuous  
strugle  to  define  international  human  rights,  as  a  constituent  practice,  renders  the  transformative  
social  movements  as  being  too  important  to  be  left  to  national  security  studies,  and  instead  I  
suggested  that  social  movement  researchers  should  turn  to  constitutional  theory  about  the  social  
(re)production  of  constituent  praxes  and  constituted  order.  Both  issues  were  contained  in  Paul  
Routledge's  term  “terrains  of  hegemony  and  resistance”,  while  the  casual  relation  between  
constituted  order  and  constituent  praxes  were  described  in  terms  by  Joseph  Weiler  and  Donatella  
della  Porta.  Those  suggestions  are  geographical,  because  constituted  order  is  seen  as  historical-
geographical  formations,  and  they  are  praxiological,  because  constituent  praxes  are  seen,  as  by  
Bourdieu  (and  the  Norwegian  sociologists  Østerberg  and  Otnes),  as  socio-material  (re)production  
(through  “praxis”)  of  socio-material  structures  (so-called  “facticity”).257 
 How  do  such  geographical  and  praxiological  premises  fit  with  the  distinction  between  the  
“new  school”  and  the  “old  school”  that  I  have  observed  in  the  present  chapter?  Those  two  schools  
offer  two  different  sets  of  concepts  and  methods  to  operationalise  and  observe  geographical  
structure  and  praxiological  process.  In  the  empirical  research  for  this  thesis,  I  have  operated  within  
the  new  school  (institutionalism  and  constructivism)  to  which  I  belong.  However,  in  order  to  
“control  for”  the  potential  bias  of  wishful  thinking,  I  supplement  this  with  the  old  school  (so-called  
realism)  in  the  final  theoretical  discussion. 
1. When  I  operate  within  the  new  school  (which  I  prefer),  I  operationalise  “constituted  order”  
as  landscape  ecology,  and  articulate  “constitutuent  praxes”  as  a  mélange  of  SES  and  ANT. 
                                                 
257  The  praxiological  materialism,  as  a  theoretical  approach  in  general  sociology,  was  developed  within  the  existentialist  
philosophy  of  Merleau-Ponty  (1945),  de  Beavoir  (2000  [1949])  and  Fanon  (2002  [1961]),  though  these  concepts  are  
often  attributed  to  Sartre  (1996  [1946]).  Theirs  was  a  materialist  phenomenology,  something  that  might  sound  like  a  
contradiction  in  terms  for  social  scientists  who  are  trained  within  the  Anglophone  tradition,  where  idealist  phenome-­
nology  is  often  seen  as  a  particular  theoretical  approach  in  general  sociology  (see  e.g.  Collins  1988).  While  idealist  
phenomenology  emphasizes  social  relations  and  social  construction  of  reality,  materialist  phenomenology,  by  con-­
trast,  emphasizes  the  sensing  and  acting  body,  and  the  structural  strains  in  the  environment  (called  facticity).  Bour-­
dieu  (1977)  builds  on  this  this  theoretical  tradition,  and  into  the  Scandinavian  context,  it  has  been  translated  by  Dag  
Østerberg  (1993,  1998,  2011).  The  same  tradition  has  also  had  some  influence  on  poststructuralist  free-thinkers  such  
as  Spivak  (1988),  Haraway  (1996)  and  Deleuze  &  Guattari  (1980).  The  latter  strand  has  also  been  translated  into  the  
Scandinavian  context,  for  example  by  Per  Otnes  (1997).  The  phenomenological  and  the  poststructuralist  strands  
strands  of  praxiological  materialism  articulate  the  shared  theme  in  philosophically  dissimilar  ways.  On  the  one  hand,  
the  phenomenologists  chose  a  way  of  argumentation  that  I  would  characterise  as  is  logically  coherent,  but  discur-­
sively  closed  (e.g.  Østerberg  2011  and  Bourdieu  1977).  By  contrast,  the  poststructuralists  tend  to  argue  in  ways  that  I  
would  characteise  as  logically  unfinished,  but  discursively  dialogical  (e.g.  Otnes  1997  and  Haraway  1996).  During  
my  own  sociological  formation,  my  supervisor  was  the  same  Otnes,  while  I  received  other  strong  influences  from  
the  mentioned  Østerberg.  While  I  remain  deeply  indepted  to  these  teachers  of  mine,  my  own  position  has  neverthe-­
less  developed  in  accordance  with  Bhaskar's  (1983)  elaboration  of  praxiological  materialism,  towards  a  combination  
of  neopositivst  and  poststructuralist  tendencies  (Jensen  2000,  2002,  2013).  For  the  present  work,  its  final  theoretical  
discussion  will  find  its  philosophical  grounding  in  the  nuclear  physicist  Niels  Bohr  (1938).     
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2. When  I  become  old  school  (as  taking  on  a  role),  “constituent  power”  is  operationalised  as  
neoclassical  geopolitics,  while  “constituent  praxes”  is  articulated  as  by  Machiavelli. 
Tables  3.5  and  3.6  illustrate  how  the  two  rival  theories  are  being  used  to  explain  the  pathways  of  
constituent  and  constituted  powers.  Table  3.5  gives  a  summary  of  the  various  ways  to  operationalise  
constituted  order  geographically.  The  two  upper  lines  show  the  new  theory,  the  bottom  line  the  old  
theory.  Table  3.6  summarizes  the  different  ways  to  operationalize  constituent  praxes  in  praxiological  
terms.  Also  here,  the  two  upper  lines  show  the  new  theory,  the  lower  line  showing  the  old  theory. 
 
Table  3-5:  The  geographical  view  on  constituted  order  (spatial  dimension  /  structure) 
Approach Geography  of  constituted  order 
Institutionalism Environmental  landscape  geography  (resource  geography)258 
Constructivism Humanistic  landscape  geography  (humanistic  geography)259 
So-called  “realism” Classical  geopolitics  and  critical  geopolitics  (geopolitik  as  realpolitik)260 
 
Table  3-6:  The  praxiological  view  on  constituent  praxes  (temporal  dimension  /  process) 
Approach Praxiology  of  constituent  praxes 
Institutionalism SES:  Collective  choice  games  in  bounded  action  situations261 
Constructivism ANT:  Temporary  nodes  of  intersubjectivity  in  nets  of  socio-material  change262 
So-called  “realism” Machiavelli:  Capability  (Virtù)  to  know  opportunities  (Fortuna),  and  act  upon  them263 
 
These  are  various  ways  to  operationalise  the  terrains  of  hegemony  of  resistance  (or  to  say  the  same  
in  less  Marxian  and  more  Functionalist  terms:  terrains  of  centre  and  periphery).  However,  a  
common  denominator  is  that  all  the  options  shown  here  are  materialistic. 
 Above  I  argued  that  SES  and  ANT  should  be  seen  as  two  specifically  materialistic  forms  of  
institutionalism  and  constructivism.  Both  deal  with  practical  interactions  between  nature  and  
culture,  but  one  focuses  on  customary  praxes,  the  other  on  knowledge  praxes  (Tab.  3-6).  Likewise,  
landscape  geography  puts  focus  on  the  interactions  between  nature  and  culture,  either  emphasizing  
ecology  and  economy,  or  perception  and  semiology  (Tab.  3-5).  Also  strategical  geopolitics  and  
Machavellian  “realism”  are  materialistic,  with  their  focus  on  coercive  force.  With  all  these  
approaches,  the  (concrete)  terrain  becomes  a  mediator  between  (concrete)  human  bodies  and  
                                                 
258  Klemsdal  2000;;  Evans  &  Manson  2007;;  Ekiba  &  Evans  2009;;  Manson  2007 
259  Ingold  1986;;  Makhzoumi  &  Pungetti  1999;;  Olwig  2002;;  Oliwg  &  Jones  2008;;  Jensen  2002 
260  Chauprade  2007;;  Ó  Tuathail,  Dalby  &  Routledge  2006 
261  Ostrom  2005:  15 
262  Latour  2004:  191-218,  237 
263  Althusser 1998: 91 
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(virtual)  historical-geographical  formations.  The  terrain  is  the  context  and  outcome  of  socio-
material  praxis  networks.  The  terrain  is  the  sensuous,  observable  interface  between  practical  action  
(constituent  praxes)  and  its  socio-material  environment  (constituted  order). 
 This  materialism  is  a  break  with  certain  tendencies  within  mainstream  social  movement  
research  in  the  North  Atlantic  area.  Framing  processes  were  observed  in  terms  of  micro-
interactionist  phenomenology.264  Resource  mobilization  was  observed  in  terms  of  rational  choice,  
but  in  the  abstract,  away  from  socio-ecological  situations.265  Susanne  Staggenborg  has  woven  those  
tendencies  neatly  together.  Following  Randall  Collins,266  she  suggests  that  collective  action  at  the  
micro  level  leads  to  the  emergence  of  practice  networks  at  the  meso  level,  which  eventually  may  
upscale  to  transform  social  formations  at  the  macro  level.  This  is  very  good,  but  in  my  opinion  it  
still  is  bounded  by  the  limitations  of  interactionist  phenomenology  and  abstract  rational  choice,  
neither  of  which  is  materialistic.  However,  materialistic  alternatives  do  exist.  Materialistic  
phenomenology  was  developed  by  de  Beavoir  and  Fanon.267  Materialistic  rational  choice  theory  
was  adapted  by  Elinor  Ostrom  in  her  SES  framework.268  Materialistic  network  theory  is  found  in  
Law  &  Singleton's  ANT  approach.269  Michael  McGinnis  has  pushed  also  SES  in  the  direction  of  a  
materialistic  network  theory.270    When  I  now  try  to  conceptualise  the  terrains  of  hegemony  and  
resistance,  it  can  be  seen  as  an  attempt  to  ground  Staggenborg's  meso-theory  in  material  human  
bodies,  and  material  historical-geographical  formations,  which  both  meet  in  material  tactical  
terrains.271 
                                                 
264  Snow  2004 
265  Zald  &  McCarthy  1987 
266  Staggenborg  2002;;  Collins  1988 
267  de  Beavoir  2000  (1949);;  Fanon  2002  (1961) 
268  Potete,  Jansen  &  Ostrom  2010 
269  Law  &  Singleton  2012 
270  McGinnis  2011a 
271  How  can  this  materialism  account  for  causal  links  between  geographical  scale  and  bodily  practice?  The  "new  
school"  approaches  SES  and  ANT,  but  also  the  "old  school"  Machiavellism,  all  suggest  some  possible  explanations  
for  how  collective  action  at  the  micro  level  lead  to  the  emergence  of  practice  networks  at  the  meso  level,  which  
eventually  may  upscale  to  transform  socio-material  formations  at  the  macro  level.  Thus,  all  three  approaches  take  
interest  in  how  human  agency  (Virtù)  might  transform  its  own  opportunity  structure  (Fortuna),  at  multiple  geograph-­
ical  levels.  Geographers  have  applied  concepts  and  methods  from  SES  and  ANT  to  study  allocation  and  perceptions  
of  natural  resources  (e.g.  Evans  &  Manson  2007;;  Ekiba  &  Evans  2009;;  Thrift  1999;;  Metzger  2014).  In  a  parallel  
process,  the  theoreticians  of  SES  and  ANT  have  taken  interest  in  how  customary  praxes  and  knowledge  praxes  may  
upscale  to  constitute  socio-economic  institutions  (e.g.  social  capital  and  watershed  governance)  and  shared  bodies  of  
knowledge  (e.g.  data  registers  and  standardised  measures)  at  multiple  geographical  scales  (Ostrom  2005;;  Latour  
2004).  However  SES  and  ANT  both  take  interest  in  landscape  ecology,  the  two  approaches  nevertheless  approach  
the  shared  subject  matter  in  two  rather  different  ways.  On  the  one  hand,  SES  deals  with  stochastic  generalisation,  
about  individual  units,  but  aggregated  at  an  ecological  level,  where  the  analytical  system  boundaries  varying  from  
particular  action  situations  to  soci-ecological  systems  at  multiple  levels  (Potete,  Jansen  &  Ostrom  2010).  On  the  oth-­
er  hand,  ANT  deals  with  specification  of  possibilities,  revealing  particular  practical  realities,  which  might  have  been  
silenced  by  more  generalising  statements,  thus,  disaggregating  organizations  and  ecosystems  into  constituent  parts,  
in  the  form  of  heterogeneous  networks  of  socio-material  productive  relations  (Latour  1993  (1991),  2004).  The  dif-­
ferences  between  SES  and  ANT  indicate  the  limitations  of  each  approach.  Maybe  of  that  reason,  there  appears  to  be  
more  cross-fertilizing  among  scholars  committed  to  further  development  of  each  approach.  On  the  one  hand,  SES  
scholars  who  research  institutional  change  take  interest  in  how  collective  action  in  one  particular  action  situation,  for  
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 This  materialism  is  not  dialectical  materialism,  and  neither  is  it  mechanical  materialism.  The  
new  theory  is  concerned  with  mutual  adaptations  between  nature  and  culture.  That  is  too  
functionalist  to  be  mechanical  materialism,  and  too  sensitive  to  nature  and  culture  to  be  dialectical  
materialism.272  The  old  theory  could  have  been  mechanical  materialism  (Hobbes)  or  dialectical  
materialism  (Gramsci),  but  instead  I  will  choose  one  more  form  of  materialism,  in  postmodern  
readings  of  Machiavelli.  Now,  I  will  proceed  to  elaborate  how  the  suggested  composite  materialist  
approach  may  deal  with  the  two  dimensions  that  were  discussed  in  the  Chapter  2:  the  spatial  and  the  
temporal.  Since  my  research  interest  is  the  transformative  capacity  of  social  movements,  the  
argument  will  relate  to  the  state  of  the  art  within  social  movement  research.  Regarding  the  spatial  
dimension  (3.3.2),  the  argument  will  be  related  to  the  recent  anthology  Spaces  of  Contention.273  For  
the  temporal  dimension  (3.3.3),  the  text  will  relate  to  the  modern  classic  Dynamics  of  Contention.274   
 
 
3.3.2  Spatial  Dimension:  The  geography  of  constituted  power 
In  the  previous  chapter  I  argued  that  a  geographical  turn  would  be  a  positive  alternative  to  
“methodological  nationalism  and  statism”.  Firstly,  geography  is  sensitive  to  spatial  complexes,  for  
example  when  there  is  jurisdictional  pluralism  (referring  to  sources  of  law)  together  with  
monopolised  sovereignty  (referring  to  institutional  violence).275  Secondly,  geography  is  also  
                                                                                                                                                                  
example  an  assembly,  may  shape  the  rules  that  regulate  the  action  in  another  particular  action  situation,  for  example  
a  fishing  place  (Ostrom  2005:  58-64,  290-291),  and  therefore,  in  a  suggested  amendment  to  the  SES  approach,  
McGinnis  (2011a)  has  suggested  that  each  social  institution  can  be  dissected  into  "networks  of  adjacent  action  situa-­
tions",  including  both  customary  praxes  and  knowledge  praxes.  On  the  other  hand,  the  ANT  scholars,  in  response  to  
feminist  studies  of  technology  and  society,  have  suggested  that  “...a  'structure'  is  simply  an  actor-network  on  which  
there  is  scant  information”  (Latour  2004:  202,  see  also  154,  169,  171),  and  that  it  ethically/strategically  virtuous  to  
take  take  such  context  into  regard  (Law  &  Singleton  2012).  The  conciliation  between  SES  and  ANT  is  a  clear  ten-­
dency  in  on-going  efforts  to  overcome  the  limitations  of  each  approach.    If  we  draw  an  analogy  the  software  indus-­
try,  the  latest  "official  releases"  of  SES  and  ANT  are  incompatible,  whereas  the  "beta  versions"  for  software  devel-­
opers  open  up  a  shared  field  of  trial  and  error.  This  is  where  I  have  operated  with  the  empirical  parts  of  this  thesis,  
which  explain  state  transformation  in  terms  of  landscape  ecology.  However,  in  the  final  theoretical  discussion  try  to  
control  for  the  possible  bias  of  wishful  thinking,  by  turning  to  competing  explanations  from  the  "old  school",  in  the  
form  of  geostrategic  analysis  and  contemporary  re-readings  of  Machiavelli.  When  responding  to  the  post-
structuralist  and  neo-postitivist  critiques,  Althusser  (1998,  2003)  left  his  former  Marxism  behind,  and  instead  he  de-­
veloped  a  re-reading  of  Machiavelli,  as  a  network  theory  of  physical  forces  known  and  unknown.  As  a  doctrine  for  
the  production  of  political  scales,  the  Machiavellian  network  theory  has  been  theorized  by  Deleuze  &  Guattari  
(1980:  Chpt.  XII-XIII)  and  is  being  practiced  in  contemporary  warfare  (Weizman  2007,  Subcomandante  Marcos  
1997,  RAND  1998).  This  "old  school"  theory,  if  taken  in  isolation,  may  provide  reductionist  explanations  and  fatal-­
istic  predictions,  but  if  the  "new  school"  theories  ANT  and  SES  are  taken  in  isolation,  they  may  also  provide  reduc-­
tionist  explanations,  combined  with  over-optimistic  predictions.  Chapter  4  will  discuss  how  to  combine  these  three  
materialist  approaches  in  a  manner  that  can  be  ethically  and  strategically  responsible.   
272  For  a  materialist  critique  of  mechanical  materialism  as  well  as  dialectical  materialism,  see  Bhaskar  (1983).  See  also  
Bohr  (1938).  
273  Nicholls,  Miller  &  Beaumont  2013 
274  Tilley,  Tarrow  &  McAdam  2001 
275  For  a  study  of  overlapping  sovereignties  in  postcolonial  Latin  America,  see  Agnew  &  Oslender  (2010,  2013).  Thanks  
to  Paul  Routledge  for  this  reference.  In  Sápmi,  by  contrast,  only  the  states  have  applied  institutional  violence,  
whereas  the  indigenous  peoples  have  refrained  from  answering  violence  with  violence.  The  customary  laws  of  the  
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sensitive  to  the  interactions  between  humans  and  nature,  for  example  the  politics  of  natural  
resources  management.276  Geography  allows  us  to  map  the  actual  terrains  of  ecological  complexity,  
cultural  complexity  and  political  complexity.  This  may  potentially  be  an  empirical  and  concrete  
alternative  to  generalising  assumptions  about  “holocultural”  nations  or  “sovereign”  states.  In  other  
words:  geography  is  an  empirical  alternative  to  “methodological  nationalism  and  statism”.  Thus  I  
decided  to  follow  David  Slater  and  Paul  Routledges,  who  study  how  social  movements  are  
conditioned  by  political-geographical  environments,  but  also  contribute  to  transforming  such  
environments. 
 How  are  we  to  operationalise  a  term  like  Routledge's  “terrains  of  hegemony  and  
resistance”?277  The  indigenous  rights  movement  in  Sápmi  is  an  environmental  justice  movement  in  
an  area  where  traditional  subsistence  practices  have  maintained  and  developed  local  customs  and  
local  norms  since  times  longstanding,  and  thus,  there  is  an  existing  situation  of  jurisdictional  
                                                                                                                                                                  
indigenous  peoples  in  Sápmi  (Jebens  2010:  22)  have  been  continously  maintained  and  defended  by  non-violent  
sanctions. 
276  E.g.  Klemsdal  2000;;  Makhzoumi  &  Pungetti  1999 
277  Defining  "space"  and  "place":  How  does  the  suggested  composite  materialist  approach  relate  to  various  definitions  
of  "space"  and  "place"  among  political  geographers?  Paul  Routledge,  as  a  member  of  the  jury  for  this  thesis,  has  
challenged  me  to  provide  a  more  nuanced  understanding  and  analysis  of  spatial  politics.  In  particular,  he  empha-­
sized  that  geographical  space  is,  simultaneously,  the  context  and  outcome  of  myriads  of  processes,  and  thus,  he  ques-­
tioned  my  statement  (in  the  draft  version  of  this  thesis),  that  that  the  "container"  of  materialist  political  geography  
"is  not  objective  'space'  nor  subjective  'place',  but  tactical  terrains."  The  problem  is  that  the  concept  of  a  universal  
geometric  "container"  for  particular  geographic  formations  itself  is  part  of  the  crudest  form  of  spatial  objectivism,  a  
form  of  naive  realism  or  old-school  positivism  (Gregory  2000a,  Duncan  2000),  often  associated  with  "brutalistic"  
spatial  planning  (Gregory  2000b,  Routledge  1993:  139)  or  with  ultra-conservative  geopolitical  analyses  (Smith  
2000).  This  old  school  form  of  political  geography,  similarly  to  what  I  have  characterised  as  old  school  political  sci-­
ence,  is  a  dangerously  naive  realism.  Such  over-objectivist  conceptions  of  "geometrical  space"  in  geography  is  fre-­
quently  found  among  scholars  who  have  specialised  on  refined  interpretations  of  inter-subjective  "phenomonologi-­
cal  place"  (Agnew  2011),  and  this  might  perhaps  be  the  case  for  the  geographical  research  that  I  committed  more  
than  ten  years  ago  (Jensen  2002).  Back  then,  I  assumed  a  dichotomy  between  "objectivist  space"  and  "subjectivist  
place",  but  contemporary  human  geography,  however,  has  left  this  dichotomy  behind.  On  the  one  hand,  the  experts  
on  inter-subjective  "senses  of  place"  now  combine  the  study  of  semiotic  or  phenomenological  processes  with  data  
about  political-economic  conditions,  such  as  location  and  locality  (Agnew  2011),  in  a  direct  response  to  radical  fem-­
inist  critique  (Massey  1991,  1994).  On  the  other  hand,  the  experts  on  objectivistic  "spatial  science"  now  see  geome-­
try  merely  as  a  practical  tool  (Johnston  et  al.  2014),  while  acknowledging  the  significance  of  normative  "evaluating  
models"  during  the  act  of  observing  (Evans  &  Manson  2007),  as  well  as  place-specific  "regimes  of  information"  as  
an  object  of  observation  (Ekiba  &  Evans  2009).  In  sum,  there  has  been  a  mutual  adaptation  between  the  objectivistic  
spatial  analysts  and  the  subjectivistic  place  interpreters,  and  both  groups  now  participate  in  debates  about  self-
critical  planning  practice  as  a  "technology  of  care",  e.g.  in  the  journal  Environment  and  Planning  (Metzger  2014a,  
Evans  &  Mansion  2007,  Jessop,  Brenner  &  Jones  2008).  In  my  opinion,  this  transversal  and  practically  oriented  de-­
bate  is  nicely  compatible  with  the  concept  "terrains  of  hegemony  and  resistance".  This  in  spite  of  Routledge  (1993:  
25-29,  138-143)  himself  chose  to  elaborate  the  concept  with  reference  to  Agnew  (2011)  and  other  contemporary  
"place  interpreters"  rather  than  the  contemporary  "spatial  analysts".  When  the  term  "terrain  of  hegemony  and  re-­
sistance"  is  being  translated  into  the  context  of  my  thesis,  it  gains  a  slightly  different  meaning.  Theoretically,  this  
thesis  leans  towards  a  praxis  materialism  that  has  a  preference  for  the  critical  realists  Bhaskar  (1983)  and  Bohr  
(1938)  rather  than  the  left-hegelian  Lefebvre  (1974,  cited  in  Routledge  1993:  27).  Practically,  this  thesis  observes  
the  "terrains"  in  combination  with  two  other  geographical  terms,  both  of  which  may  be  either  objectivist  or  subjec-­
tivist.  In  the  empirical  chapters,  the  terrains  are  being  approach  according  to  the  "new  school",  in  terms  of  collective  
action  that  is  shaped  by  and  gives  shape  to  landscape  geography.    In  the  final  theoretical  discussion,  the  terrains  will  
be  approached  in  terms  of  the  "old  school",  in  terms  of  coercive  force  that  is  shaped  by  and  gives  shape  to  theatres  
of  operation.  Both  "landscape"  and  "theatre  (of  operation)"  are  practical  terms,  referring  to  the  sensual,  empirical,  
experienced  "surface"  of  the  material  environment,  and  thus,  both  terms  are  compatible  with  spatial  analysis  as  well  
as  place  interpretation. 
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pluralism.  This  we  can  learn  from  the  reports  from  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission.  However,  those  
learnings  imply  that  the  de  facto  constituted  order  includes  much  more  than  only  the  state  
apparatus.  The  siida-system  never  fully  disappeared,  while  the  state-system  was  never  fully  
consolidated.  There  is  partial  spatial  overlap  between  those  two  orders,  but  only  the  states  police  
their  norms  with  coercive  force.  The  indigenous  community,  by  contrast,  uses  non-violent  sanctions  
and  social  defence.  Traditional  political  geographers  dealt  with  states  and  empires,  but  never  with  
peoples  that  practice  non-violent  forms  of  jurisdiction.278  Therefore,  when  I  research  terrains  of  
hegemony  and  resistance  in  Sápmi,  I  must  look  beyond  traditional  political  geography.  In  the  
empirical  chapters,  I  use  SES  and  ANT  to  trace  constituent  praxes,  and  in  the  geographical  
introduction  to  the  case  studies,  I  introduce  the  constituted  order  in  a  geographical  introduction,  
emphasising  nature  and  culture,  similarly  to  SES  and  ANT  (Table  3.5,  the  two  upper  rows).  In  the  
final  theoretical  discussion  I  compare  my  findings  to  the  rival  theory:  Semb  traced  some  paths  to  
constituent  power  in  terms  of  state-centred  realist  approach.  Here  I  re-introduce  the  constituted  
order,  but  this  time  in  terms  strategically  oriented  geopolitics  (Table  3.5,  the  bottom  row). 
 The  new  school,  geography  of  land  tenure  management:  As  a  geographical  equivalent  to  
SES  and  ANT,  I  have  found  landscape  geography,  with  two  different  specialisations.  Two  branches  
have  evolved  from  the  practical  problems  of  tenure  management.279  One  branch  of  landscape  
geography  is  now  found  within  departments  of  natural  sciences,  and  has  specialised  on  resource  
economy,  landscape  ecology,  hydrology,  forestry  and  agronomy.280  Let  us  call  them  
“environmental”  landscape  geographers.  Another  branch  of  landscape  geography  is  found  in  
departments  for  humanistic  sciences,  and  this  has  specialised  on  issues  of  interpretation,  perception,  
and  symbolic  meaning.281  Let  us  call  them  them  “humanistic”  landscape  geographers.  Thus,  
landscape  ecology  has  evolved  in  two  very  different  directions.  Topics  like  soil  quality  and  place  
identity  do  not  have  much  in  common.  However,  the  duality  of  culture  and  nature  has  been  part  of  
landscape  ecology  since  its  origin,  in  the  art  and  science  of  tenure  management.  Practical  disciplines  
like  landscape  design  and  agricultural  development  still  involve  highly  different  theoretical  
disciplines.  The  politics  of  natural  resources  management  is  also  an  interdisciplinary  practice,  
which  actualises  the  need  for  the  “hardest”  natural  sciences  and  the  “softest”  human  sciences.  
Exactly  like  landscape  geography  has  its  “environmental”  and  its  “humanist”  branch,  political  
ecology  can  make  use  of  the  SES  framework  and  the  ANT  approach.  In  the  geographical  overview  
chapter  (5.0.0),  I  combine  elements  from  both  forms  of  landscape  geography.  This  is  done  by  using  
the  simplest  possible  form  of  Geographical  Information  Systems  (GIS),  which  is  to  show  a  series  of  
                                                 
278  Howitt  2003 
279  Holt-Jensen  2007:  44 
280  Klemsdal  2000;;  Johnston  et.  al  2014 
281  Olwig  2002;;  Makhzoumi  &  Pungetti  2004;;  Ingold  1986;;  Olwig  &  Jones  2008;;  Jensen  2002 
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maps.  Thus,  spatial  descriptive  statistics  is  represented  visually,  and  can  be  interpreted  qualitatively.  
In  the  empirical  chapters,  the  terrains  are  being  approach  according  to  the  "new  school",  in  terms  of  
collective  action  that  is  shaped  by  and  gives  shape  to  landscape  geography.     
 The  old  school,  geography  of  geo-strategy:  As  a  geographical  equivalent  of  Machiavellism,  
I  have  found  geopolitics.  Classical  geopolitics  correspond  with  high  modern  re-readings  of  
Machiavelli:  both  give  prime  importance  to  the  constituent  power  of  brute  force,  and  neither  take  
any  particular  interest  in  the  constituent  power  of  knowledge.282  But  a  more  recent  tradition,  critical  
geopolitics,  may  be  closer  to  the  postmodern  re-readings  of  Machiavelli,  which  combines  an  
instrumentalist  epistemology  with  study  of  instrumental  application  of  force.283  Critical  geopolitics  
is  so  reflexive  that  it  may  perhaps  be  more  constructivist  than  so-called  “realist”,  and  thus  it  may  be  
even  closer  to  the  Copenhagen  school  of  security  studies.284  In  my  opinion,  The  Critical  Geopolitics  
Reader  is  so  concerned  about  reflexivity  that  it  might  become  more  critical  of  the  imperial  
traditions  of  the  anglophone  world  than  to  those  of  other  language  areas.  The  authors  are  correct  to  
be  critical  towards  the  states  where  they  pay  taxes  and  vote.  However,  the  one-sided  self-critique  
may  also  be  read  as  an  underestimation  of  the  level  of  development  among  competing  geopolitical  
actors.  For  example,  Russia  has  been  a  perfectly  capable  colonial  power  in  its  own  right,  even  
though  Britain  may  have  seen  itself  as  bigger.  This  is  being  recognised  in  the  neoclassical  
geopolitics  of  Aymaric  Chauprade,  though  he  lacks  reflexivity.  I  try  to  take  the  best  from  both  in  the  
final  chapter  of  this  thesis,  when  I  discuss  my  own  findings  in  contrast  to  the  rival  theory,  state-
centred  realism.  There  I  give  a  geopolitical  view  on  the  constituted  order,  striving  to  treat  the  power  
and  knowledge  held  by  NATO  and  CSTO  on  equal  terms.  In  the  final  theoretical  discussion,  the  
terrains  will  be  approached  in  terms  of  the  "old  school",  in  terms  of  coercive  force  that  is  shaped  by  
and  gives  shape  to  theatres  of  operation. 
 In  sum,  how  does  this  operationalisation  relate  to  the  state  of  the  art  for  social  movement  
research  within  the  discipline  of  political  geography?  My  particular  operationalisation  of  
Routledge's  term  "terrains  of  hegemony  or  resistance"285  has  similarities  with  the  suggestions  put  
forward  in  the  edited  volume  Spaces  of  Contention,286  and  particularly  in  its  conclusion.  As  a  
common  denominator  between  the  various  contribution  to  the  volume,  Miller  emphasizes  empirical  
interest  for  generative  networks  and  conceptual  priority  to  material  conditions,  and  for  this  purpose  
he  suggests  two  approaches:  one  slightly  neo-positivist,  another  rather  post-structuralist.287  My  
                                                 
282  Chauprade  2007 
283  Ó  Tuathail,  Dalby  &  Routledge  2006;;  Althusser  1998;;  Althusser  2003 
284  Buzan,  Wæver  &  Wilde  1998 
285  Routledge  1993 
286  Nicholls,  Miller  &  Beaumont  2013 
287  As  a  conclusion  to  Spaces  of  Contention  (Nicholls,  Miller  &  Beaumont  2013),  Miller  (2013)  suggests  two  alterna-­
tives,  one  slightly  neo-postivist,  another  post-strucuralist.  His  slightly  neo-positivist  alternative  has  resemblances  
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selection  of  approaches  has  so  close  resemblances  with  the  conclusion  in  Spaces  of  Contention  that  
I  could  have  referred  this  in  order  to  justify  my  choices.  Nevertheless,  I  still  see  some  significant  
shortcomings  with  the  volume.  (1)  Firstly,  as  I  have  argued  in  this  chapter,  it  is  misleading  to  
assume  that  coercive  power  plays  any  privileged  role  in  the  constitution  of  political  order,  especially  
in  Sápmi,  where  longstanding  norms  have  been  continuously  policed  and  defended  by  the  power  of  
non-violent  sanctions  alone.  I  will  return  to  this  at  the  end  of  this  chapter,  but  in  larger  detail  in  the  
following  chapter.288  (2)  Secondly,  in  a  review  article  in  the  journal  Antipode,  it  was  argued  that  
Spaces  of  Contention  lacks  awareness  methodology,  in  particular  the  "positionality"  of  the  
researcher  and  the  virtue  of  "researching  with"  rather  than  "on"  vulnerable  social  groups  (Halvorsen  
2013).  Also  this  point  will  be  touched  upon  at  the  end  of  the  present  chapter,  but  in  more  detail  in  
the  following  chapter.289 
                                                                                                                                                                  
with  my  preference  for  the  SES  framework  (Potete,  Jansen  &  Ostrom  2010),  in  particular  how  SES  has  been  appro-­
priated  within  the  spatial  science  of  natural  resources  management  (Evans  &  Manson  2007).  Miller's  post-structural  
alternative  is  explicitly  "deleuzian",  and  this  theoretical  tradition  is  in  fact  pluralistic  enough  to  encompass  what  I  
have  distinguished  as  two  separate  approaches:  ANT  and  the  post-modern  Machiavelli.  On  the  one  hand,  the  ANT-
founder  Latour  1993  (1991)  frequently  cites  Deleuze  &  Guattari  (1980),  whose  chapters  III-IV  deal  with  socio-
linguistic  patterns  might  be  dissected  into  their  constituent  networks  of  material-semiotic  practice.  On  the  other  
hand,  the  postmodern  Machiavelli,  developed  by  Althusser  (1998,  2003),  was  applied  by  Deleuze  &  Guatari  (1980)  
in  their  chapters  XII-XIII,  where  they  theorize  how  vectors  of  coercive  force  may  adjust  each  other,  form  dynamic  
networks,  and  constitute  political  order.  In  sum,  my  selection  of  approaches  has  so  close  resemblances  with  Miller  
(2013)  that  I  could  have  referred  to  his  conclusions  in  order  to  justify  my  choice. 
288  Notes  on  Gramsci:  The  division  between  "old  school"  and  "new  school"  explanations  of  constituent  power  differs  
from  how  Gramsci  originally  explained  the  (re)production  of  hegemony.  Though  he  was  perceptive  to  the  signifi-­
cance  of  knowledge  praxes  and  customary  praxes,  he  still  assumed  that  coercive  force  played  a  privileged  role  in  the  
making  and  maintenance  of  any  political  hegemony.  More  technically,  Gramsci  did  take  into  account  mass  media  as  
a  component  of  cultural  hegemony,  and  also,  that  real  estate  is  a  component  of  economic  hegemony  (Gramsci  1919,  
1930),  similarly  to  the  research  interest  of  contemporary  constructivists  and  institutionalists,  but  nevertheless,  he  
still  assumed  that  all  political  systems,  by  necessity,  are  products  of  coercive  force,  or  military  hegemony  (Gramsci  
2012  (1932-4),  Selby  (undated),  Cini  2012:  31-33,  Routledge  1993:  29).  Thus,  in  spite  of  his  broad  field  of  interest,  
Gramsci  remained  strictly  "old  school"  with  regard  to  his  explanations,  predictions  and  prescriptions  for  the  consti-­
tution  of  political  systems.  His  assumption  may  have  been  fit  to  serve  the  historical  struggle  of  the  Italian  Com-­
munist  Party  (PCI).  However,  such  an  assumption  is  unfit  in  the  case  of  in  Sápmi,  where  the  indigenous  people  have  
refrained  from  answering  violence  with  violence,  but  nevertheless,  have  had  some  success  in  their  effort  to  maintain  
and  defend  a  longstanding  normative  system  against  intrusive  states,  and  eventually,  to  influence  the  transformation  
of  intrusive  states.  Notably,  the  PCI  strived  to  implement  a  potential  Marxist-Leninist  republic,  whereas  the  para-­
digmatic  Marxist  Leninist  geopolitical  project,  the  USSR,  has  been  among  the  four  intrusive  states  in  Sápmi,  against  
which  the  indigenous  peoples  of  Sápmi  have  resisted  non-violently.  (Similarly,  also  the  NATO  member  Norway  
counts  among  the  four  intrusive  states  in  Sápmi,  and  at  that  side,  Structure-Functionalism  was  used  in  ways  that  si-­
lenced  the  indigenous  peoples  in  Sápmi.  Rokkan  classified  centre-periphery  tensions  into  a  cultural,  an  economic  
and  one  political-military  dimension  [Rokkan  &  Flora  1999:  end  note  1],  and  also,  until  his  very  last  years  he  as-­
sumed  that  indigenous  peoples  of  Sápmi  had  become  fully  assimilated  [Rokkan  1983,  excerpt  re-printed  in:  Rokkan  
&  Flora  1999:  196,  208].)  When  I  draw  a  categorical  distinction  between  "old  school"  and  "new  school"  explana-­
tions,  then  I  break  with  the  tradition  from  Gramsci  (as  also  from  Rokkan).  The  consequences  are  seen  for  example  in  
part  7.2.2  of  this  thesis,  in  the  discussion  about  "hydrological  hegemony".  However,  it  is  not  always  simple  to  draw  
a  clear  distinction  between  violent  and  non-violent  forms  of  contentious  action  (see  the  discussion  in  part  2.3.2).  A  
road  bloc,  for  example,  might  be  classified  together  with  various  instances  with  "coercive  force"  or  may  be  classi-­
fied  together  with  various  examples  of  "nonviolent  action".  The  interpretation  may  depend  on  particular  context  or  
situation,  on  the  viewer's  position  or  situatedness,  and  finally  on  the  theoretical  approach.  (For  more  on  this  issue,  
see  part  14.3.2,  in  particular  the  footnote  with  reflections  on  non-violence.  See  also  part  14.4.1,  in  paricular  the  foot-­
note  with  reflections  on  structural  violence.) 
289  Thirdly,  I  will  add  a  critical  note  about  how  Spaces  of  Contention  (Nicholls,  Miller  &  Beaumont  2013)  was  material-­
ly  dissemination,  as  a  mode  of  knowledge-production.  When  one  member  of  my  jury,  Paul  Routledge,  had  suggested  
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3.3.3  Temporal  Dimension:  The  praxiology  of  constituent  power 
In  Chapter  2  I  suggested  that  a  turn  to  praxiology  or  social  (re)production  is  necessary  in  order  to  
investigate  the  constituent  power  of  social  movements.  In  the  present  chapter  I  have  drawn  a  
distinction  between  three  different  paths  to  constituent  power,  corresponding  with  three  approaches  
to  political  science.  Thus,  I  have  also  observed  that  there  appears  to  be  two  competing  explanations:  
state-centred  “realism”  on  the  one  hand,  institutionalism  (SES)  and  constructivism  (ANT)  on  the  
other  hand.  Those  two  competing  explanations  provide  different  concepts  and  methods  to  study  the  
praxiology  of  constituent  praxes  and  constituted  order. 
 The  old  and  the  new  theories  can  both  be  represented  with  two  causal  models  suggested  by  
the  social  movement  researcher  Donatella  della  Porta.  She  is  among  the  few  mainstream  social  
movement  researchers  in  the  North-Atlantic  area  who  takes  interest  in  the  prefigurative  potential  of  
social  movements,  and  also,  in  the  problems  of  coercive  force.  On the one hand she has done 
research on the mutual causality  between  (A)  political  democratisation  and  (B)  social  mobilisation  
(Fig.  3.1,  left  side).290  On  the  other  hand  della  Porta  has  also  done  research  on  the  mutual  causality  
between  (A)  protest  policing  and  (B)  insurgent  political  violence  (Fig.  3.1,  right  side).291 
 For  social  movement  studies,  the  models  are  helpful  to  venture  beyond  reformist  movements  
that  are  contained  by  already  constituted  power,  and  also  follow  prefigurative  movements  that  
generate  constituent  power.  Model  number  2  corresponds  with  “old  school”  studies  of  state   
 
 
Figure  3-1:  Constituted  structure  and  constituent  action 
Two  models  of  (constituted)  opportunity  structure  and  (constituent)  social  movement  action292 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
that  I  have  a  look  at  the  book,  I  realized  that  it  is  too  expensive  for  individuals,  while  few  libraries  have  bought  it,  
and  in  too  few  copies  to  supply  the  demand.  In  the  end  I  had  to  obtain  a  digital  copy  by  hacking  into  a  university  li-­
brary  in  Britain,  illegally  borrowing  the  password  of  a  friend.  This  experience  indicates  that  this  book,  though  being  
a  practical  tool  for  potential  empowerment,  nevertheless  is  difficult  to  access  for  members  of  social  movements  out-­
side  hegemonic  position.  This  is  a  result  of  the  publishers  having  chosen  to  use  a  capitalistic  property  right  regime,  
in  strict  contrast  to  some  environmental  landscape  geographers,  who  argue  in  favor  of  open  source  and  open  content  
for  data,  software  and  publishing  (Schweik,  Evans,  and  Grove  2005).  This  third  issue  will  not  be  further  discussed  
within  this  thesis,  but  for  its  material  dissemination  I  have  chosen  the  latter  property  rights  regime. 
290  Della  Porta  2014:  14-22 
291  Della  Porta  2013:  18-21 
292  Della  Porta  2014:  14-22;;  della  Porta  2013:  18-21 
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formation,  such  as  Tilly's  sociological  analysis  of  military  history.293  Model  number  1,  by  
contrast,implies  “new  school”  re-thinking  of  the  same  phenomenon.  This  model  incorporates  
Mattei's  use  of  SES  to  study  constitutional  change,  Mattoni's  application  of  ANT  to  trace  social  
movement  media  praxes,  Staggenborg's  use  of  Randall  Collins  to  synthesize  organisation  and  
framing,  and  Graeber's  description  of  strategies  to  build  the  new  society  within  the  shell  of  the  
old.294 
 For  studies  of  areas  where  Sápmi  and  Norway  overlap,  the  models  are  also  applicable.  
Model  number  2  corresponds  with  Anne-Jule  Semb's  “old  school”  research  on  how  norms  affect  
policy  (and  polity)  in  Sápmi.295  Her  research  was  contained  by  the  already  constituted  paradigm  of  
Norwegian  state  science  (statsvitenskap).  Model  number  1,  by  contrast,  is  in  line  with  the  “new  
school”  contributions  of  Audun  Sandberg  and  Gro  Ween,  who  use  SES  and  ANT  to  research  Sámi  
customs  and  lore.296  They  find  new  proofs  that  contribute  to  the  on-going  re-constitution  of  
Norwegian  legal  history  and  jurisprudence,  pioneered  by  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission. 
 This  specific  adaptation  of  della  Porta's  two  causal  models  is  a  contribution  towards  
prefiguration  of  a  positive  alternative  to  Tilly,  Tarrow  and  McAdam's  suggested  synthesis  of  social  
movement  theory.  In  their  Dynamics  of  Contention,  the  main  conceptual  dualism  is  between  
insiders  and  outsiders  to  already  constituted  political  systems.297  This  is  fit  to  observe  the  actions  of  
reformist  movements  that  are  contained  by  already  constituted  power.  However,  their  dualism  
becomes  dysfunctional  when  the  purpose  is  to  observe  transformative  movements  that  generate  new  
constituent  power.  Then  we  need  to  address  the  process  that  maintains  and  creates  the  very  
boundary  between  those  collective  actors  that  were  defined  as  insiders  and  outsiders.  Furthermore,  
such  a  research  interest  requires  caution  and  care.  To  search  new  proof  about  an  uneven  
development  of  rights  and  proof  is  a  way  of  getting  involved  in  the  very  same  uneven  development  
of  rights  and  proofs,  which  in  turn  has  consequences  for  the  uneven  application  of  institutional  
violence.  The  art  and  science  of  constituent  power  implies  some  profound  ethical  and  





                                                 
293  Tilly  1980 
294  Mattei  2011;;  Bailey  &  Mattei  2012;;  Mattoni  2011;;  Staggenborg  2002;;  Graeber  2009 
295  Semb  2001;;  Semb  2003 
296  Sandberg  2006;;  Sandberg  2008a;;  Sandberg  2008b;;  Ween  2010;;  Ween  2012a;;  Ween  2012b;;  Ween  (in  prep.) 
297  Tilly,  Tarrow  and  McAdam  2001 
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3.4.0  Chapter  conclusion:  the  art  and  science  of  constituent  power 
 
This  chapter  has  suggested  a  composite  materialist  approach,  as  a  way  to  conceptualize  the  art  and  
science  of  constituent  power.  Firstly,  (3.1.1-3.1.3)  the  chapter  described  various  approaches  to  
constituent  power:  from  published  literature,  I  defined  three  approaches  to  the  science  of  constituent  
power  (institutionalism,  constructivism,  and  so-called  "realism"),298  while  on  the  basis  of  practical  
activist  experience,  I  suggested  three  approaches  to  the  art  of  constituent  power  (prefigurative  
satyagraha,  prefigurative  enligthenment,  and  prefigurative  war-of-position.  I  suggested  that  each  of  
the  three  academic  approaches  has  been  developed  to  shed  light  on  one  of  the  three  practical  
approaches,  while  remaining  somewhat  ignorant  of  the  other  two.  Secondly,  (3.2.1-3.2.5)  the  
chapter  turned  to  participant  observation  from  amongst  the  organic  intellectuals  with  interest  for  
state  transformation  within  the  contexts  of  Sámi  research  and  social  movement  research,  and  on  this  
basis  I  observed  a  cleavage  between  an  "old  school"  of  so-called  "realists"  and  a  "new  school"  of  
institutionalists  and  constructivists,  which  I  identified  with  Elinor  Ostrom's  distinction  between  two  
rival  theories:  her  own  "new  theory"  on  cooperation  from  consent,  and  a  rival  "old  theory"  on  
cooperation  from  coercion,  inherited  from  Hobbes  and  Hardin.299  Finally,  (3.3.1-3.3.3)  the  chapter  
suggested  how  a  composite  materialist  approach  might  resolve  the  tensions  observed  in  its  previous  
parts.  This  harked  back  to  Chapter  2,  which  concluded  that  observation  of  "terrains  of  hegemony  
and  resistance"300  might  allow  us  to  replace  methodological  nationalism  with  geographical  
sensitivity,301  and  to  reject  dogmatic  breakdown  theory  for  praxiological  constitutional  and  
sociological  theory.302  In  order  to  address  the  tensions  observed  previously  in  the  present  chapter,  I  
suggested  to  specify  "terrains  of  hegemony  and  resistance"  in  various  ways:  one  the  one  hand  in  
terms  of  landscape  geography  with  SES  and  ANT,  on  the  other  hand  in  terms  of  geostrategical  
theatres  with  recent  re-readings  of  Machiavelli.  This  builds  further  on  earlier  theoretical  
developments  from  social  movement  research,  in  order  to  give  these  a  broader  relevance.  The  
praxiologies  of  SES,  ANT  and  Machiavelli  break  with  the  attempted  synthesis  Dynamics  of  
Contention,303  because  does  not  limit  itself  to  study  "insiders"  and  "outsiders"  of  already  constituted  
political  order,  but  additionally,  how  such  order  is  made,  maintained  and  transformed,  by  the  
continuous  impact  of  socio-material  networks  in  various  configurations.  My  suggested  focus  on  
socio-material  networks,  and  the  combination  of  diverse  approaches,  both  fit  with  the  conclusion  in  
                                                 
298  Neumann  &  Waever  1997:  15 
299  Ostrom,  Walker  &  Gardner  1992 
300  The  concept  is  taken  from  Routledge  1993 
301  See  e.g.  Agnew  &  Oslender  2010;;  Chauprade  2003;;  Slater  1997;;  Routledge  ibidem 
302  See  e.g.  Weiler  2001:194;;  Bailey  &  Mattei  2012;;  della  Porta  2013;;  della  Porta  2014 
303  Tilly,  Tarrow  &  McAdam  2001 
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the  more  recent  work  Spaces  of  Contention.304  However,  the  latter  volume  has  been  criticized  for  its  
lack  of  attention  to  the  positionality  of  the  researcher  and  how  to  tackle  this,  ethically  and  
methodologically.305  Above,  I  presented  a  similar  argument  regarding  the  Dynamics  of  Contention,  
particularly  when  focus  is  turned  from  reformist  movements  contained  within  already  constituted  
power,  to  transformative  movements,  that  generate  constituent  power  (in  part  3.3.3).  Such  a  
research  interest  requires  caution  and  care,  firstly,  because  the  research  itself  is  a  practical  
intervention  along  the  path  of  prefigurative  enlightenment,306  and  secondly,  because  some  
movements  (hegemonic  or  oppositional)  may  choose  to  tackle  each  other  by  pursuing  the  path  of  
prefigurative  war-of-position.  Chapter  4  will  turn  to  the  profound  ethical  and  epistemological  
challenges  implied  in  the  art  and  science  of  constituent  power.   
                                                 
304  Nicholls,  Miller  &  Beaumont  2013,  in  particular  Miller  2013 
305  Halvorsen  2013 
306  Localised  practical  realities:  For  the  art  and  science  of  state  transformation,  the  act  of  observing  provides  
knowledge,  whereas  knowledge  also  is  part  of  the  object  of  observation.  On  the  one  hand,  the  political  and  social  
scientists  search  for  scientific  knowledge  about  political  life.  On  the  other  hand,  all  political  agents  navigate  in  
political  life  by  mobilizing  various  knowledge-resources.  Political  science  and  political  practice  inform  each  other  
and  feed  each  other  reciprocally.  As  a  member  of  my  jury,  the  geographer  Paul  Routledge  has  challenged  me  to  
elaborate  on  how  transformative  social  movements  make  use  of  spatial  imaginaries.  This  term,  coined  by  Wolford  
(2004)  refers  to  popular  knowledge  about  the  land,  a  sort  of  "etno-geography",  among  participants  in  the  Brazilian  
Landless  Workers'  Movement  (MST).  The  concept  may  be  seen  as  a  further  development  of  phenomenological  
concept  "senses-of-place",  which,  in  response  to  the  critique  from  Massey  (1991,  1994),  has  been  grounded  in  the  
more  physical  concept  of  "location",  as  well  as  the  more  socio-ecological  concept  of  milieu  or  "locale"  (Agnew  
2011,  Routledge  1993:  28).  In  my  own  earlier  geographical  research,  I  attempted  to  respond  to  Massey  (1991)  by  
adopting  a  "deleuzian"  approach  to  senses-of-place  (Jensen  2002).  For  the  present  research,  however,  I  have  
altogether  skipped  the  concept  senses-of-place,  and  instead  tried  to  observe  popular  knowledge  about  the  land,  and  I  
now  realize  that  Wolford  (2004)  has  done  much  the  same.  I  approach  popular  knowledge  by  applying  the  
epistemologies  that  come  with  each  of  the  three  selected  approaches:  SES,  ANT  and  Machiavelli.  The  first  is  
probabilistic,  nomothetic  and  neo-positivist,  the  second  is  possibilistic,  ideographic  and  post-structuralist,  whereas  
the  latter  subscribes  to  "the  effective  truth",  a  form  of  epistemological  instrumentalism.  These  epistemologies  guide  
my  act  of  observing  (see  Chapter  4),  but  also  how  I  define  the  object  of  observation  (in  particular  Explanans  2,  see  
Chapter  4).  Regarding  the  ANT  approach,  this  is  well  known  for  having  been  developed  to  study  knowledge  praxes  
(Latour  &  Woolgar  1979),  and  geographers  apply  it  to  observe  the  political  function  of  academic  and  popular  forms  
of  geographical  knowledge  (e.g.  Thrift  1999,  Metzger  2014b).  According  to  Law  &  Singleton  (2012),  the  approach  
is  useful  as  a  critique  of  every  ideology,  in  order  to  give  voice  to  minor  perceptions  and  standpoints.  Regarding  the  
SES  framework,  its  theoreticians  discuss  how  to  include  knowledge  praxes  into  the  framework  (McGinnes  2011a),  
and  also,  how  to  explain  the  emergence  of  interdisciplinary  cooperation  (Potete,  Jansen  &  Ostrom  2010).  Spatial  
scientists  have  used  SES  to  address  localized  "regimes  of  information"  as  an  object  of  observation  (Ekiba  &  Evans  
2009)  and  how  to  apply  "evaluating  models"  during  the  act  of  observing  (Manson  2007).  Regarding  recent  re-
readings  of  Machiavelli,  these  acknowledge  the  neo-positivist  principle  that  some  propositions  are  more  
instrumentally  applicable  than  others,  but  also  the  post-structuralist  doctrine  that  different  viewpoints  are  
pragmatically  valuable  with  different  context  or  standpoints  (Althusser  1998,  2003).  All  three  approaches,  in  my  
opinion,  can  be  seen  as  different  ways  to  operationalize  the  standpoint  theories  of  localized  knowledge,  which  have  
been  developed  by  the  radical  feminist  critique  of  scientific  institutions  (Stengers  1999  (1997),  Haraway  1991,  
Spivak  1988,  Massey  1994).  On  the  one  hand,  similarly  to  contemporary  epistemologists  (Popper  2002  (1963),  
Derrida  1993)  they  recognize  that  all  scientific  knowledge  always  remains  provisional.  On  the  other  hand,  similarly  
to  agronomical  action  researchers  (Chambers  2008),  they  acknowledge  that  popular  knowledge  may  include  
empirical  experience  with  the  real  environment.  Consequently,  in  practice,  there  is  no  watertight  distinction  between  
scientific  and  popular  forms  of  knowledge.  The  three  selected  approaches  may  help  the  standpoint  theorist  to  
venture  into  the  rich  diversity  of  localized  practical  realities,  and  to  critically  examine  how  the  various  localized  
practical  realities  may  have  been  developed  empirically  in  order  to  serve  different  vested  interests.   
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4.1.0  Chapter  introduction 
 
In  the  previous  two  chapters  I  have  tried  to  map  some  contemporary  tendencies  in  political  science  
and  practice.  Chapter  2  dealt  with  the  decolonisation  of  international  human  rights  law,  and  the  
consequences  for  political  science  and  practice  in  Sápmi.  Chapter  3  dealt  with  the  various  pathways  
to  constituent  power,  as  those  are  pursued  by  transformative  movements  and  conceptualised  by  
political  scientists.  Chapters  2  and  3  may  have  been  too  much  for  a  literature  review,  but  they  were  
something  more.  The  argument  (deductive  moment)  was  interwoven  with  selected  examples  from  
participant  observation,  and  from  observant  participation  (inductive  moment),  and  thus  I  suggested  
some  hypotheses  about  the  ongoing  decolonisation  of  political  science  and  practice  (abductions).  
Chapters  2  and  3  are  tactical  ways  of  positioning  this  empirical  intervention  within  the  political  
field.  They  are  participatory  action  research. 
 It  is  now  time  to  translate  this  discursive-political  positioning  into  concrete  guidelines  for  
practical  action.  Empirical  research  is  not  only  discursive  intervention,  because  it  deals  with  
practical  experience,  and  therefore  it  is  practical  intervention  as  well.  The  present  chapter  will  
elaborate  how  I  have  proceeded  to  gain  information  from  political  fieldwork,  to  analyse  and  
synthesize  this,  and  produce  an  output  that  feeds  back  and  serves  political  praxis.  First,  I  will  
discuss  premises  for  the  research  design,  by  addressing  ethical,  epistemological  and  conceptual  
challenges  for  the  art  and  science  of  constituent  power  (4.2.0).  Thereafter  I  will  translate  those  
premises  into  a  concrete  research  design,  with  defined  spatial  boundaries,  defined  research  tasks,  
and  a  defined  causal  model  to  be  empirically  specified  (4.3.0).  From  there  I  will  proceed  to  present  
the  technique  of  data  gathering,  methods  in  the  strict  meaning  of  the  word  (4.4.0).  The  choice  of  
method  is  the  premise  for  the  next  issue:  case  selection  and  for  selection  of  data  (4.5.0).  Finally,  I  
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4.2.0  Premises  for  research  design 
 
4.2.1  Revisiting  the  three  pathways  to  constituent  power 
 
L'existence  précède  l'essence.307 
–  J.P.  Sartre 
 
In  the  introduction  to  this  chapter,  I  drew  a  conceptual  distinction  between  three  pathways  of  
constituent  and  constituted  power.  Let  me  recapitulate. 
 One  pathway  I  called  prefigurative  satyagraha.  The  label  refers  to  the  power  of  customary  
praxes,  the  matter  of  interest  for  political  institutionalism.  This  one  I  argued  is  the  most  widely  
pursued  path  to  constituent  power  among  transformative  social  movements,  and  for  this  reason  it  is  
also  the  conceptually  most  challenging  one. 
 Another  pathway  I  called  prefigurative  enlightenment.  This  label  refers  to  the  power  of  
knowledge  praxes,  the  phenomena  observed  by  political  constructivists.  This  path  is  also  rather  
widely  pursued,  especially  among  indigenous  human  rights  movements.  Because  it  deals  with  
knowledge  it  also  poses  methodological  challenges  for  political  research. 
 The  third  pathway  was  called  prefigurative  war-of-position.  This  refers  to  the  power  of  
coercive  force,  an  issue  of  interest  for  so-called  “realist”  political  scientists.  This  is  the  least  widely  
pursued  path  for  transformative  movements.  However,  also  when  indigenous  human  rights  
movements  do  not  answer  violence  with  violence,  they  nevertheless  need  to  be  aware  of  the  
violence  that  they  do  not  respond  to.  In  situations  where  one  person's  law  enforcement  might  be  
another  person's  colonial  resource  grabbing,  the  political  scientist  is  confronted  with  the  choice  of  
framing  as  an  ethical  dilemma. 
 Time  is  ripe  to  address  the  conceptual,  methodological  and  ethical  challenges  that  those  
practices  pose  for  the  political  researcher.  By  tackling  each  of  those  issues,  I  make  a  series  of  
choices  for  the  research  design.  I  take  full  responsibility  for  the  possible  (mis)use  of  my  research  
practice,  and  hence,  those  choices  are  also  existential  choices.  Therefore  I  will  start  with  the  ethical  
choices,  and  articulate  the  practical  consequences  for  research  design.  Thereafter  I  will  proceed  to  
methodological  challenges,  and  in  the  end  to  conceptual  challenges,  and  for  both  I  will  articulate  
the  practical  consequences  for  research  design. 
 
                                                 
307  Sartre  1996  (1946):  26 
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4.2.2  Ethical  issues:  the  pathway  of  coercive  force 
Ethical issues, in my opinion, have priority before methodological and conceptual ones. In the 
introduction to the present chapter I drew a distinction between three paths to constituent power, 
that all might be pursued by transformative social movements. I argued that prefigurative 
satyagraha is the most widely pursued path, with prefigurative enlightenment being the second most 
important. For the political researcher, those paths pose conceptual and epistemological challenges, 
respectively. However, there is a third and much less widely followed path that poses the main 
ethical challenge for the political researcher: prefigurative war-of-position. I am responsible for 
what normative framing I choose when I write about the use of coercive force, regardless of whether 
it is being used to defend and police a social order, or to transform it. Indigenous human rights 
movements may or may not answer violence with violence. Still, they do have to tackle states that 
do apply coercive force. This is not the same as one person's terrorist being another person's 
freedom fighter. Instead it is something equally difficult: It is one person's law enforcement being 
another person's colonial resource grabbing. How can I as a political researcher choose my words 
wisely in such situations? 
 While the variable of coercive power is studied only by few researches within the mainstream 
of North-Atlantic social movement research,308 this issue is not being ignored by a competing group 
of social movement researchers: the so-called de-radicalization researchers.309 In order to develop a 
strong scientific alternative to their explanations, it is not sufficient to demonstrate that the 
sociology  of  social  (re)production  renders  “breakdown  theory”  nothing  more  than  a  political  myth  
(see 2.4.0). It is necessary to demonstrate that constituent power may be not only undramatic, but 
that it also may be non-violent. Recent political anthropology has observed both possibilities.310 
Additionally, it is necessary not only to demonstrate that jurisdictional pluralism is not the same as 
competition to monopolise violence (see 2.3.0), but additionally, it is also necessary to demonstrate 
that in some situations, one person's law enforcement may be another person's colonial occupation. 
 This means that one should have no double standard regarding the application of coercive 
force: violence is violence, even though the researcher may happen to feel that it is ethically 
justified. As empirical phenomena, violence and justification should therefore be kept analytically 
separate: One should be defined as coercive power. The other should be defined as customary 
praxes and/or knowledge praxes. Each of those labels refer to different possible paths whereby 
constituent and constituted power are exercised (see 2.4.1, 3.4.1). The analytical separation between 
violence and justification is something I learned from two Western critiques of the Vietnam War, 
                                                 
308  One  of  the  exceptions  is  della  Porta  2013 
309  Bjørgo  &  Horgan  2008  (thanks  to  Tronsmo  book  shop,  Oslo,  for  this  reference);;  Sedgwick  2010  (thanks  to  Stephan  
Malthaner  for  the  latter  reference) 
310  Nustad  &  Krohn-Hansen  2005 
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one conservative, another radical. From one side, Hans Morgenthau accused the liberals of being so 
fanatic that they engaged militarily even when it was strategically counter-productive.311 From the 
opposite  side,  Noam  Chomsky  accused  liberal  scholars  of  being  technocrats  or  “mandarins”  who  
fabricated justifications for wars, instead of seeking objective knowledge about the resulting 
neocolonial cruelties.312 
 Following Morgenthau and Chomsky, I think it is strategically and ethically virtuous to try 
and isolate the explanatory variable called coercive force, and observe it separately from the two 
explanatory variables called customary praxes and knowledge praxes. The purpose of such a quasi-
experimental design is not to highlight the theoretical distinction between realist versus 
constructivist and institutionalist forms of reductionism. Instead, the purpose is to apply the ethical 
distinction between coercive domination and non-violent empowerment. 
 What I cannot use, then, is the so-called  “neo-neo-synthesis”  between  neorealist  and  
neoliberal approaches to political research.313 Confusion of realism and liberalism is exactly the 
kind of argument that Morgenthau and Chomsky saw as an unrealistic justification of war. This also 
applies to contemporary research on human rights research by the Norwegian state scientist Anne-
Jule Semb: On the one hand, she argues that the NATO intervention in Kosovo was a special and 
moral form of violence.314 On the other hand, in her study of indigenous self-determination in 
Sápmi, she explicitly chose to look away from the new proof in legal history – which is the reason 
why the ICESCR implies Sámi self-determination – and instead she just assumed that de jure 
individual rights and state sovereignty would automatically corresponded with de facto equal 
opportunities and jurisdictional monopoly on the ground.315 This is no clear-cut state-centred 
realism. It is a smear of Hegelian idealism and Hobbesian cynicism. If we are serious in the 
ambition to utilise cynical realpolitik as a means to control for the bias of wishful thinking, then we 
are better doing it thoroughly. 
 If landscape geography did not matter to explain state transformation in the hight North, while 
strategical geopolitics still did, then socio-ecological functionalism would be superfluous, and 
instead we would only need the stochastic mechanics of blind, unpredictable, nonlinear physics: the 
ruthless geomorphology of physical forces known and unknown; the ruthless and unpredictable 
competition  that  Clausewitz  called  “the  fog  of  war”. 
 Such are the postmodern readings of Machiavelli. After the neo-positivist and post-
structuralist  critiques  of  “grand  theory”,  the  mature  Althusser  left  Marxist-Leninist doctrine behind. 
                                                 
311  Morgenthau  1970 
312  Chomsky  1969;;  see  also  Gordon  2007:  78-108  for  an  argument  against  euphemisms 
313  Weaver  &  Neumann  1997:  17-22 
314  Semb  2000 
315  Semb  2005 
 105  
 
What he kept from his former Leninist stance was the affinity to Clausewitz. What he kept from his 
former Marxist stance was an interest in re-reading Machiavelli. Gramsci had written a strategy for 
how, through a social war-of-position, the political party  might  constitute  a  “modern  Prince”.316 But 
after the collapse of ideological certainty, it turns out that the actually unified class, party and state 
are  nowhere  to  be  found  empirically.  The  “postmodern  Prince”  is  a  heterogeneous,  poly-centric 
meshwork. Policy nets do include the police and the military. Issue nets might include insurgent 
violence. When actual experience is so heterogeneous and poly-centric that it is no longer possible 
to ignore heterogeneity and poly-centricity, then it also becomes hard to assume that there are any 
unifying principles that keep the class, the party or the state together.317 By re-reading Machiavelli, 
the mature Althusser coined a materialism of uncertain, blind, causality: aleatory materialism.318 
 Epistemologically, aleatory materialism leaves behind the assumed dialectical opposition 
between capitalist and proletarian forms of knowledge, and instead it embraces instrumental 
practicality as the only arbiter of truth. In other words, aleatory materialism assumes that 
knowledge praxes and customary praxes can be reduced to ice-cold instrumentalism. 
 Meta-theoretically, aleatory materialism leaves behind the assumption of dialectical 
opposition between static order and sudden breaks, or between a closed hegemonic system and an 
equally closed counter-hegemonic system. Instead it embraces a form of network theory: constituent 
power is seen as a material web of causation, which may be traced etiologically, as complex, 
aleatory and hardly predictable flows of information and matter-energy.319 This has influenced new 
strategies of warfare: There has been mutual exchanges of ideas between the coercive constituent 
power  of  EZLN,  with  their  “social  netwar”,  and  the  coercive  constituted  power  of  NATO,  with  its  
“network-centred  warfare”.320 Saudi princes ally with al-Quaida as well as the US army. There is no 
dialectical opposition between those enemies. In global network warfare, enemies are entangled. 
 In summary, aleatory materialism is a state-centred realism for the late modern age, the era 
after the fall of virtual sovereignty and virtual certainty. Network theory is the meta-theoretical 
alternative to virtual sovereignty. Ice-cold instrumentalism is an epistemological alternative to 
virtual certainty. The  early  modern,  not-yet-sovereign  Prince  of  Machiavelli  meets  the  late  modern,  
no-longer-sovereign  network  centred  warfare.  The  virtual sovereignty  and  virtual certainty  of  
Hobbes  and  Bodin  has  risen  and  fallen.  However,  military  doctrine  is  still  state-centred,  in  the  sense  
that  coercive  capacity  is  seen  as  the  ultimate  means  to  police  laws,  and  the  primary  force  of  
constituent  power.  The  postmodern  Machiavelli  is  useful  to  trace  the  cause  and  effect  of  violence  in  
                                                 
316  Gramsci  2012 (1932-4) 
317  Derrida  1967 
318  Althusser  1998;;  Althusser  2003 
319  This  aleatory  materialism  was  pirate-copied  and  re-named  “rhizomatics”  by  Deleuze  and  Guattari  1980 
320  Weizmann  2007;;  RAND  1998;;  Subcomandante  Marcos  1997 
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contemporary  times.  This  is  a  specific  use-value,  but  also  a  limitation.  In  practice,  transformative  
social  movements  need  to  identify  whatever  pathways  of  constituent  and  constituted  power  that  
cannot  be  reduced  to  coercive  physical  force. 
 This clear-cut form of state-centred realism is what I use as a competing explanation, in order 
to isolate the variable of coercive force, and keep it under control. I  reject  reductionist  (mis)use  of  
so-called  realism,  because  it  is  too  state-centred.  I  feel  rather  confident  that  even  though  cynical  
realpolitik  and  military  geo-strategy  do  matter  to  explain  state  transformation  in  the  high  North,  we  
also  have  to  take  into  account  the  impact  of  collective  action  and  socio-ecological  complexity.  We  
need  to  consider  both  factors:  what  Ostrom  called  the  “new  theory”  and  the  “old  theory”. 
 Following  the  advice  from  Morgenthau  and  Chomsky,  I  think  it  is  worthwile  keeping  those  
explanatory  frameworks  separate,  in  order  to  isolate  the  explanatory  force  of  coercive  force,  to  keep  
it  under  control.  This  reason  for  this  choice  is  neither  methodological  nor  conceptual,  but  ethical. 
 On  one  hand,  political  cynicism  is  done  better  by  the  former  Leninist  Althusser,  than  by  a  
liberal.  On  the  other  hand,  liberal  norms  are  approached  in  more  refined  ways  through  SES  and  
ANT  than  through  so-called  realism. Thus I reject  the  “neo-neo-smear”  of  realism  and  liberalism,  
and instead I erect a conceptual wall of separation between a clear-cut state-centred realism on the 
one side, and a synthesis of institutionalism and constructivism on the other. All the empirical parts 
of this thesis take the institutionalist-constructivist approach to observing the struggle for rights and 
proofs in Sápmi. In the final theoretical discussion, however, I discuss my own empirical findings in 
contrast to what one might find by applying clear-cut state-centred realism. Thus I hope to identify 
some of the possibilities that might exist for furthering cooperation and overcoming domination, but 
also, for “controlling for” the possible bias of wishful thinking. 
 
 
4.2.3  Methodological  issues:  the  pathway  of  knowledge  praxes 
Methodological  issues,  next  after  the  ethical  ones,  are  also  rather  challenging  for  the  art  and  science  
of  constituent  power.  When  there  is  a  struggle  to  define  the  truth,  there  is  not  only  a  struggle  to  
control  the  means  of  strategical  communication.  There  is  also  a  struggle  to  define  the  research  
agenda,  in  order  to  gain  reliable  knowledge  about  practical  and  technical  issues  that  serves  one's  
own  invested  interests.  This  is  how  the  science  of  constituent  power  not  only  observes,  but  also  
serves,  the  art  of  constituent  power. 
 This  is  all  the  more  relevant  when  we  deal  with  environmental  justice  movements  in  general,  
and  indigenous  human  rights  movements  in  particular.  They  seek  to  prove  claimed  rights  with  
evidence  from  the  political  and  social  sciences,  and  they  seek  to  investigate  environmental  impact  
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by  mobilizing  the  physical  and  bio-chemical  sciences.  When  observing  with  such  conflict,  the  
political  scientist  (or  the  natural  scientist  for  that  matter)  is  bound  to  serve  the  practical  interests  of  
one  party  or  another.  The  act  of  observing  influences  the  object  of  observation.  As  a  scientist  I  am  
responsible  for  whose  research  question  I  choose  to  investigate,  whose  information  I  choose  to  use,  
and  ultimately,  whose  political  or  technical  interest  I  wish  to  serve. 
 Prefigurative  enlightenment  is  the  label  I  have  chosen  to  describe  the  constituent  power  of  
empirical  knowledge,  the  intersection  between  the  art  and  science  of  constituent  power.  An  iconic  
figure  of  enlightenment  is  Immanuel  Kant,  who  presented  critical  inquiry  as  a  means  of  
emancipation  from  possibly  false  conventional  dogmas.  In  recent  years,  the  enlightenment  tradition  
has  been  an  intellectual  sub-stream  below  the  philosophically  shallow  science  wars.  On  the  one  
hand,  Karl  Popper  and  other  neo-positivists  have  developed  critical  rationalism.321  On  the  other  
hand,  Jaques  Derrida  and  other  post-structuralists  have  articulated  critique  of  rationality.322  In  spite  
of  all  differences,  their  common  denominator  is  critical  inquiry.323  But  unlike  earlier  approaches  to  
the  critique  of  ideology,  neo-positivism  and  post-structuralism  are  skeptical  of  “grand  theories”  
made  to  explain  everything. 
 On  the  one  hand,  post-structuralists  went  beyond  the  old-school  structural  determinism  of  
Marxist-Leninism.  Marxists  questioned  some  dogmas  by  taking  other  dogmas  for  granted.324  Theirs  
was  an  ideological  critique  of  ideology.  The  post-structuralists  turned  the  critique  of  ideology  
against  the  Marxist  ideology  itself.325  They  went  beyond  Marxism  by  turning  it  against  itself.326 
 On  the  other  hand,  neo-positivists  turned  against  the  old-school  inductivism  of  structure-
functionalism.  In  the  anglophone  world,  “empiricism”  conventionally  refers  to  inductive  
observation  and  commonsensical  analytical  terms:  the  positively  given.  However,  neo-positivists  
sought  ways  to  distinguish  conventional  assumptions  (doxa)  from  reliable  knowledge  (episteme).327 
 In  summary,  both  neo-positivists  and  post-structuralists  emerged  through  critical  inquiry  of  
two  different  forms  of  “grand  theory”:  structure-functionalism  and  Marxist-Leninism.  Both  were  
political  ideologies  of  the  cold  war.328  Popper  criticized  both  of  them  (not  only  Marxism),  because  
he  opposed  all  forms  of  “historicism”,  that  is,  grand  assumptions  about  the  direction  of  macro-
                                                 
321  Popper  1945;;  Popper  2002  (1963) 
322  Derrida  1967;;  Longino  1989 
323  Jensen  2000 
324  For  examples  of  ideologically  based  critique  of  ideology,  see  Mao  Tse-tung  1968  (1937).  For  a  less  striking  example,  
see  also  Marx & Engels 1969 (1932 (1845)). 
325  Roland  Barthes  (1951)  started  out  with  Marxian  critique  of  ideology.  However,  he  turned  the  critical  tools  against  
Marxian  doctrine  itself  (Barthes  1971,  Barthes  1994).  Thus,  the  dissolved  the  ideological  basis  for  his  earlier  
critique  of  ideology,  and  ended  up  embracing  aesthetic  practice  instead  (Barthes  1973).  Such  quietism  would  
probably  be  seen  by  Harvey  (1989)  as  silent  consent  in  support  of  corporate  capitalist  ideology.  However,  from  the  
view  point  of  the  mature  Barthes,  it  is  hard  to  keep  any  strong  belief  in  Harvey's  Marxian  alternative. 
326  Derrida  1993 
327  Popper,  K.  2002  (1963):  “Introduction”,  §  IX,  and  “Chapter  1”,  §  IV;;  in  Danish  translation:  Popper  1973:  20,  52 
328  Hulme  &  Turner  1999:  pp.  34-43  (on  structure-functionalist  ideology)  and  pp.  43-53  (on  marxist-leninist  ideology) 
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historical  change.329  For  historicism,  progress  is  inevitable,  and  has  epistemological  implications.330  
Some  saw  the  ideology  of  the  “proletarian”  state-party  as  more  progressive;;  others  saw  the  ideology  
of  the  “democratic”  capitalist  state  as  being  the  end  of  history.  They  were  messianic  ideologies  of  
enlightenment.331  But  the  critical  rationalists  and  the  critiques  of  rationality,  such  as  Popper  and  
Derrida,  are  all  anti-metaphysical:  they  free  the  enlightenment  project  from  messianic  beliefs.  (Or  
more  precisely,  they  inspire  more  self-critical  messianism,  as  with  Walter  Benjamin.)  There  is  no  
inevitable  progress  that  can  possibly  guarantee  any  epistemic  superiority.  There  is  no  
commonsensical  inductivism  capable  to  free  itself  of  prejudice.  There  is  no  ideological  viewpoint  
from  where  one  can  safely  dissolve  hegemonic  ideology.  This  loss  should  not  be  lamented.  
However,  if  the  apparent  death  of  ideology  becomes  a  pretext  to  murder  the  critique  of  ideology,  
then  one  would  indeed  reify  the  apparent  death  of  ideology  as  an  ideology  in  its  own  terms.  For  
reformist  social  movements  that  are  contained  by  the  already  constituted  order,  the  critique  of  
ideology  might  perhaps  seem  to  be  unnecessary.  However,  for  transformative  social  movements  that  
generate  constituent  praxes,  one  of  the  pathways  pursued  is  prefigurative  enlightenment.  Then  the  
critique  of  ideology  is  of  essential  strategical  importance.  The  theme  for  my  research  is  
decolonization  of  political  science  and  practice,  and  this  theme  indeed  is  about  the  critique  of  
ideology. 
 Critical  inquiry  is  a  necessary  choice  for  the  political  researcher  who  does  not  with  to  
suppress  and  silence  transformative  social  movements,  but  rather  to  serve  their  scramble  for  
prefigurative  enlightenment.  What  research  strategy  should  then  be  chosen?  Earlier  I  have  sketched  
how  the  post-structuralists  challenged  the  deductivism  of  the  ideological  critique  of  ideology.  
Likewise,  I  have  sketched  how  the  neo-positivists  challenged  the  inductivism  of  anglophone  
“empiricism”.  I  am  skeptical  about  either  of  those  extremes. 
 
1. If  a  purely  inductivist  research  strategy  is  chosen,  then  we  run  the  risk  of  ignoring  or  
reifying  commonsensical  prejudices  (doxa). 
                                                 
329  The  analysis  of  “historicism”  in  fact  “does  not  confine  itself  to  that  economic  variant  of  historicism  which  
characterizes  Marxism,  for  it  aims  at  criticising  the  historicist  doctrine  in  general.”  (Popper  2002  (1967):  452;;  
translation  to  Danish:  Popper  1973:  80).  There  is  also  a  conceptual  distinction  between  “historicism”  as  an  ideology,  
and  the  more  general  “historism”  as  a  method.  (Popper  1945:  202;;  translation  to  Danish:  Popper  1973:  108). 
330  Bauman  1991,  p.  142:  “What  is  untenable  is  the  concept  of  our  –  European  –  history  as  the  rise  of  humanity  over  the  
animal  in  man,  as  the  triumph  of  rational  organization  over  the  cruelty  of  life  that  is  nasty,  brutish,  and  short.  What  is  
also  untanable  is  the  concept  of  modern  society  as  an  unambiguously  moralizing  force,  of  its  institutions  as  
civilizing  powers,  of  its  coercive  controls  as  a  dam  defending  brittle  humanity  against  the  torrents  of  animal  
passions.” 
331  Bauman  1991,  p.  148:  “God  was  dethroned,  but  the  throne  was  still  in  place.  The  emptiness  of  that  throne  was  
throughout  the  modern  era  a  standing,  and  tempting,  invitation  to  visionaries  and  adventurers.  The  dream  of  an  all-
embracing  order  and  harmony  ramained  [...]  The  classless  society,  the  race-pure  society,  the  Great  Society  were  now  
the  tasks  of  Man.  [...]  The  clarity  of  the  world  and  human  vocation,  once  guaranteed  by  God  and  now  lost,  had  to  be  
fast  restored,  this  time  by  humen  acumen  and  on  human  responsibility  (or  is  it  irresponsibility?)  alone.” 
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2. If  a  purely  deductivist  research  strategy  is  chosen,  then  we  run  the  risk  of  reifying  some  
dogmatic  doctrine. 
 
If  mainstream  social  movement  research  is  to  become  relevant  for  transformative  social  movements  
that  generate  constituent  power  (and  not  only  for  the  reformist  movements  that  are  contained  by  
already  constituted  power),  then  it  is  necessary  to  bring  the  critique  of  ideology  back  in  to  the  
research  practice.  It  has  been  suggested  that  the  apparent  end  of  ideologies  in  reality  is  a  
monopolization  of  corporate-capitalist  ideology  (doxa).332  This  poses  a  challenge  to  
commonsensical  inductivism.  Some  have  suggested  that  the  alternative  should  be  to  adopt  a  more  
explicitly  ideological  counter-hegemonic  research  program.333  But  such  a  deductive  strategy  may  
merely  replace  an  implicit  ideology  with  an  explicit  ideology. 
 During  this  research,  I  have  chosen  the  middle  ground  between  induction  and  deduction:  
Trough  travelling  through  various  environments,  my  trajectory  has  brought  me  in  contact  with  
various  bits  of  data,  from  various  data  sources,  but  at  the  same  tim,  it  has  also  brought  me  in  contact  
with  various  theoretical  resources,  and  those  are  being  mobilized  by  organic  intellectuals  in  the  
various  locations.  I  have  tried  to  cultivate  awareness  of  how  theoretical  concepts  and  empirical  
experience  are  related,  by  following  three  rules: 
 §  1  Be  aware  of  the  selection  of  items  of  data  (inductive  moment). 
 §  2  Be  aware  of  the  selection  of  coding  categories  (deductive  moment). 
 §  3  Be  aware  of  how  the  various  theories  are  being  used  in  various  empirical  situations. 
By  seeking  theories  that  are  at  home  in  particular  practical  realities,  I  pursued  a  form  of  participant  
action  research  (PAR)  or  participatory  learning  and  action  (PLA).  I  am  a  reflexive  practitioner,  or  a  
political  and  social  scientist  doing  fieldwork  among  reflexive  practitioners  of  fjord  fishing,  tourist  
business,  human  rights  law,  and  fishery  biology.  As  a  researcher  I  have  had  my  own  trajectory  of  
learning  and  action.  Each  of  the  informants  has  also  had  their  own  trajectory  of  learning  and  action.  
The  informants  taught  the  ethnographers  about  human  rights,  salmon  biology,  fishing  techniques,  
and  various  other  forms  of  skills,  lore,  art  and  science. 
 Of  the  three  rules  above,  §  3  is  typical  for  participatory  research  such  as  PAR  and  PLA,334  
and  for  reflexive  research  such  as  ANT,  feminist  research,  and  Bourdieu's  sociology.335  PLA  
originated  in  agronomy,  which  combines  hard  science  and  anthropology.  In  my  view  §  3  is  equally  
                                                 
332  Harvey  1989 
333  Burawoy  1998;;  Hetland  &  Goodwin  2013 
334  For  introductions  to  participatory  methods,  see:  Chambers  1983;;  Chambers  1997;;  Chambers  2008;;  Reason  &  
Bradbury  2006.  For  critical  discussion  about  participatory  methods  as  domination  and  empowerment,  see:  Gaventa  
&  Cornwall  2006;;  Cooke  &  Kothari  2001;;  Hickey  &  Mohan  2004. 
335  Madden  2010:  20-3;;  Law  &  Singleton  2012,  which  responds  to  response  to  Haraway  1996 
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at  home  with  neo-positivist  and  post-structural  epistemology.  It  depends  on  what  one  chooses  to  
observe  and  to  look  away  from.  It  does  not  depend  on  how  one  chooses  to  observe.  Since  the  term  
“reflexive”  may  trigger  reflexes  of  prejudice,  I  will  call  this  the  participatory  strategy. 
 The  two  first  rules  above,  §  1  and  2,  imply  that  I  combined  inductive  moments  with  
deductive  moments.  There  are  several  ways  to  combine  both.  One  way  is  the  hypothetical-deductive  
method  for  hypothesis-testing.  Another  way  is  hypothesis-development  through  iterations  between  
specific  observations  and  suggestion  of  concepts.  Charles  Pierce,  a  methodologist  of  the  abductive  
method  wrote:  “Hypothesis  is  where  we  find  some  very  curious  circumstance,  which  would  be  
explained  by  the  supposition  that  it  was  a  case  of  a  certain  general  rule,  and  thereupon  adopt  that  
supposition.”336  This  process  involves  an  inductive  moment  (curious  circumstance)  and  a  deductive  
moment  (would  be  explained  by  the  supposition),  which  together  lead  to  hypothesis-development  
(adopt  that  supposition).  This  combination  if  induction  and  deduction  is  the  abductibe  strategy. 
 Both  those  research  strategies,  the  participatory  and  the  abductive,  are  ways  to  pursue  
critical  inquiry.  Both  can  be  seen  as  techniques  to  overcome  some  of  the  prejudice  that  may  hamper  
scientific  research.  The  relation  between  prejudice  (doxa)  and  knowledge  (episteme)  is  often  
discussed  within  the  tradition  of  critical  inquiry.  Bourdieu  put  focus  on  the  social  consequences  of  
doxa,  how  it  may  function  as  ideologically  biased  prejudice,  or  “symbolic  violence”.337  Popper  put  
focus  on  how  hypotheses,  originating  from  doxa,  might  be  subject  to  strict  testing,  and  thus  become  
episteme.338  Hypotheses  may  or  may  not  be  tested  in  stringent  ways,  which  is  a  discussion  about  
reliability.  However,  according  to  Popper,  our  ability  to  imagine  relevant  hypotheses  is  limited  by  
doxa  to  begin  with.  This  is  an  issue  of  conceptual  validity.  When  scientists  have  developed  a  
general  theory  or  a  technical  solution  in  one  environment,  this  does  not  automatically  translate  well  
to  another  environment.  Participatory  Learning  and  Action  (PLA)  developed  when  agronomical  
consultants  tried  to  adapt  to  particular  local  ecological  and  sociological  conditions,  including  the  
local  bio-cultural  knowledge  of  local  people.  It  was  an  attempt  to  overcome  ideological  bias  in  
agronomy.  Similarly,  the  abductive  research  strategy  is  an  attempt  to  expand  our  capability  to  
imagine  the  possible,  and  thus,  to  help  us  identify  unknown  opportunities  for  empowerment. 
 My  choice  of  research  strategies  is  part  of  a  tradition  or  a  specific  way  of  doing  things:  
critical  inquiry  as  a  pathway  to  prefigurative  enlightenment.  The  choice  is  methodological,  but  it  is  
not  dependent  on  any  specific  stance  regarding  the  philosophy  of  knowledge,  epistemology.  In  any  
case,  epistemology  is  an  open-ended  debate,  a  research  front  in  its  own  rights.  Different  
epistemological  orientations  are  also  included  in  the  three  approaches  to  political  science  that  have  
                                                 
336  Pierce  1986:  326;;  cited  in  Mindré  2009 
337  Bourdieu  1977;;  Bourdieu  and  Passeron  1970 
338  Popper,  K.  2002  (1963):  “Introduction”,  §  IX,  and  “Chapter  1”,  §  IV;;  in  Danish  translation:  Popper  1973:  20,  52 
 111  
 
been  discussed:  the  SES  framework,  the  ANT  approach  and  the  postmodern  Machiavelli.  In  my  
own  research  project,  I  combine  all  the  three  approaches,  including  all  their  different  
epistemological  orientations.  Difference  in  doctrine,  however,  does  not  matter.  What  does  matter  is  
that  I  have  chosen  to  pursue  critical  inquiry,  and  therefore  I  have  adopted  two  research  strategies:  
the  participatory  and  the  abductive. 
 Chapter  1  defined  the  theme  and  the  puzzle  of  the  present  research  project.  The  theme  was  
defined  as  internal  decolonization  of  political  science  and  practice.  This  is  critique  of  ideology.  I  
have  adapted  two  research  strategies:  the  participatory  and  the  abductive.  Those  are  forms  of  critical  
inquiry,  used  in  an  attempt  to  overcome  (some  of)  the  ideological  biases  that  hampers  political  
research.  I  suggest  that  this  might  be  an  appropriate  way  for  social  movement  research  to  re-
introduce  the  critique  of  ideology,  and  thus  to  avoid  re-producing  the  silencing  and  suppression  of  
transformative  social  movements.  The  purpose  is  to  contribute  to  prefigurative  enlightenment  as  a  
pathway  to  constituent  power. 
 In  fact,  the  abductive  approach  has  been  used  in  this  thesis  already  to  define  the  research  
project.  Chapter  2  combined  historical  and  ethnographical  glimpses  (inductive)  with  discussion  of  
literature  (deductive),  and  thus  it  suggested  some  abductions  regarding  the  consequences  of  
postcolonial  human  rights  law.  Chapter  3,  the  present  one,  combined  activist  experience  and  a  
summary  of  my  travels  at  field  work  (inductive)  with  discussion  of  literature  (deductive).  My  
present  argument  in  favour  of  abduction  is  in  itself  one  of  the  abductions  in  the  present  chapter.  The  
empirical  chapters  in  this  thesis  will  present  several  abductions,  suggesting  explanatory  mechanisms  
regarding  state  transformation  in  the  high  north. 
 
 
4.2.4  Conceptual  issues:  the  pathway  of  customary  praxes 
Conceptual  issues  should  also  be  addressed,  now  that  the  ethical  and  methodological  issues  have  
been  tacked.  How  can  we  conceptualise  state  transformation?  A  state  is  a  large  thing:  a  macro-
historical  entity.  Therefore,  it  involves  myriads  of  causal  chains,  from  within  or  outside  its  territory,  
and  from  within  or  outside  the  state  apparatus.  It  is  impossible  to  trace  all  the  paths  through  such  a  
wide  and  complex  web  of  causation.  We  may  select  some  causal  paths  for  process  tracing,  or  we  
may  select  some  categories  of  causal  paths  (explanans)  for  causal  analysis,  but  in  either  case,  we  
cannot  select  everything.  Consequently,  research  on  state  transformation  remains  model  dependent. 
 If  only  the  “old  theory”  applied,  then  it  might  have  been  possible  to  adapt  a  relatively  
simple  causal  model  regarding  constituted  geo-strategical  theatres  and  constituent  Machiavellian  
strategies.  Then  we  could  have  used  military  history  for  a  historical-sociological  analysis,  tracing  a  
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chain  of  clearly  defined  events.  Tilly  did  this  in  his  old  school  research  on  the  “sinews  of  war”.339 
 But  also  “new  theory”  does  apply,  and  therefore  we  also  have  to  take  into  account  the  
complexity  of  constituted  order  in  landscape  ecology,  as  well  as  the  multiple  pathways  of  
constituent  collective  action.  I  have  argued  that  for  contemporary  transformative  movements,  at  
least  within  the  North-Atlantic  region,  the  most  widely  pursued  pathway  to  constituent  power  goes  
through  cultural  change,  development  of  alternative  socio-technical  systems,  and  development  of  
new  customary  praxes:  what  I  have  called  prefigurative  satyagraha.  Let  us  first  have  a  look  at  what  
the  neo-institutionalist  SES  framework  may  have  to  tell  us  about  the  pathway  of  prefigurative  
satyagraha.  Thereafter  we  will  briefly  have  a  look  at  the  pathways  of  prefigurative  enlightenment  
and  prefigurative  war-of-position.  The  two  latter  paths  I  see  as  being  of  special  ethical  and  
methodological  importance,  and  that  was  discussed  above.  But  for  conceptualisation  we  should  put  
the  main  emphasis  on  the  most  widely  pursued  path:  prefigurative  satyagraha.  Within  the  SES  
framework,  institutional  change,  including  constitutional  change,  has  been  conceptualized  as  a  
combination  of  organization  learning  at  multiple  levels,  plus  ecological  change. 
 
[L]earning  can  occur  in  multiple  time  scales.  [....]  At  the  organizational  level,  new  understandings  can  
be  incorporated  within  the  set  of  decision  procedures  being  implemented  by  members  of  that  
organization.  Societies can also be said to learn, in the sense that traditions change over time, through a 
complex process of adaptation to new circumstances. In addition, information can be lost over time [....] 
Ecologists and others who study systems that exhibit complex dynamics are particularly sensitive to the 
concurrent operation of dynamic processes operating at different time scales.340 
 
When  I  introduced  the  praxiology  of  social  (re)production  (in  Chapter  2),  then  I  argued  that  this  
development  in  sociological  theory  based  on  empirical  progress  in  social  anthropology  and  social  
history.  That  includes  quantitative  history  about  long-term  conjunctures.341  Praxiology  may  describe  
organizational  learning,  but  not  ecological  change.  The  SES  framework  adds  further  complexity  
because  it  deals  with  causal  interactions  between  social  (re)production  and  ecological  homoeostasis.  
Ostrom  conceptualises  institutional  change  as  socio-ecological  change  that  is  the  product  of  
different  aggregate  effects,  both  sociological  and  ecological.342  On  the  one  hand  “[t]he 
characteristics of the resource users and the government system evolve over time owing to 
technological  development,  deriving  new  knowledge,  and  changing  norms  and  knowledge.”  On  the  
other  hand  “[e]cological  systems  evolve  and  adapt  continuously  at  different temporal and spatial 
scales [….]”,  and  therefore, [i]f  effective  and  durable  institutional  arrangements  are  to  be  crafted,  
                                                 
339  Tilly  1980 
340  McGinnis  &  Ostrom  2012:  19 
341  Burke  1992  (1990):  81-90,  105-110,  149-153 
342  McGinnis  &  Ostrom  2012:  19;;    Potete,  Janssen  &  Ostrom  2010:  244 
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these  temporal  and  spatial  dynamics  need  to  be  taken  into  account.”343  Ostrom  &co  here  refer  to  
aggregate  changes  in  the  ecological  and  sociological  environment.  The  actual  interaction  between  
ecological  and  sociological  conditions  adds  complexity  to  the  causal  model.  If  we  put  the  impact  of  
ecological  change  in  brackets,  and  stick  to  a  “sociologigistic”  explanatory  model,  then  we  will  
ignore  some  actual  causal  factors,  but  we  will  not  gain  much  precision.  Even  when  social  
(re)production  is  seen  in  isolation  from  its  ecological  context,  it  still  is  too  complex  to  be  traced  in  
its  entirety.  Let  us  have  a  look  at  what  Bourdieu  and  James  Scott  have  to  say  about  the  sociological  
factor,  seen  in  isolation  from  the  ecological  factor.  In  Outline  of  a  Theory  of  Praxis,  Bourdieu  
argues  that  collective  action  (for  example  revolutions)  should  be  explained  as  the  sum  of  two  
factors:  “on  the  one  hand,  a  habitus,  understood  as  a  system  of  lasting,  transposable  dispositions”,  
and  “on  the  other  hand,  an  objective  event,  which  exerts  its  action  of  conditional  stimulation  calling  
for  or  demanding  determinate  response”.  Those  two  factors,  the  dispositions  and  the  situations,  
cannot  be  totally  coordinated,  “since  they  are  the  product  of  ‘causal  series’  characterized  by  
different  structural  durations”.  Still,  “the  dispositions  and  the  situations  which  combine  
synchronically  to  constitute  a  determinate  conjuncture  are  never  wholly  independent,  since  they  are  
engendered  by  the  objective  structures”344  Bourdieu's  interest  in  dispositions  for  collective  action  
(habitus)  may  look  like  Gramsci's  didactic  concern  for  cultivation  of  counter-hegemonic  culture.  
However,  the  disposition  for  collective  action  may  also  emerge  from  within  the  subaltern  classes  
themselves.  In  his  early  work  James  Scott  noted  that  “  peasant  rebellions,  let  alone  peasant  
«revolutions»  are  few  and  far  between”,  and  therefore  “it  seems  far  more  important  to  understand  
what  we  might  call  everyday  forms  of  peasant  resistance  –  the  prosaic  but  constant  struggle  between  
the  peasantry  and  those  who  seek  to  extract  labor,  food,  taxes,  rents,  and  interest  from  them.”345  
Therefore,  only  in  particular  occasions  resistance  “has  become  active,  even  violent.  More  often,  
however,  it  takes  the  form  of  passive  noncompliance,  subtle  sabotage,  evasion,  and  deception.”346  
Scott  and  Bourdieu  here  show  attention  to  the  structure  of  everyday  life,  the  object  of  study  for  
social  history  and  social  anthropology,  which  may  be  invisible  if  one  traces  the  history  of  dramatic  
events.  The  everyday  forms  of  peasant  resistance  may  very  well  be  studied  through  ethnography,  as  
Bourdieu  did  in  Kabylia  and  Scott  in  Zomia.  However,  the  aggregate  effect  cannot  be  observed  
ethnographically.347  That  actualises  the  need  for  quantitative  social  history.  Even  without  the  
ecological  factor,  the  sociological  factor  still  is  so  complex  that  we  cannot  possibly  trace  every  
chain  of  particular  events,  and  therefore  it  would  be  necessary  to  estimate  aggregate  conjunctures  
                                                 
343  Potete,  Janssen  &  Ostrom  2010:  244.  See  also  McGinnis  &  Ostrom  2012:  19  for  a  slightly  more  updated  version. 
344  Bourdieu  1977:  82-3 
345  Scott  1985:2  9 
346  Scott  1985:  31 
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with  quantitative  indicators.  Therefore  I  would  not  gain  much  precision  by  keeping  focus  on  the  
sociological  factor,  but  I  would  loose  realism  by  keeping  the  ecological  factor  out.  Studies  of  
ecologic  change  and  social  history  both  use  quantitative  methods.  Both  forms  of  causal  analysis  
meet  in  political  geography,  where  aggregate  data  about  nature  and  culture  are  used  to  map  unique  
configurations  in  space  and  time.348  The  necessary  quantitative  methods  exist,  and  are  to  be  found  
in  geography,  ecology  and  history.  However,  it  is  not  clear  which  indicators  one  should  have  
chosen.  This  is  simply  because  the  issue  of  change  remains  conceptually  underdeveloped  within  the  
SES  framework.  In  2010,  Ostrom  &co  concluded  that  “[s]tudying the dynamics of SESs is a major 
priority  for  future  work”,349 and  the  same  was  repeated  in  2012,  with  the  latest  “official  release”  of  
the SES framework.350  In  the  ongoing  development  of  the  SES  framework,  the  dynamics  of  
constituent  and  constituted  power  is  an  unfinished  topic.  It  is  at  the  research  front.  There  is  a  need  to  
develop  hypotheses  about  possible  causal  mechanisms.  That  would  facilitate  the  hypothesis-
development  regarding  aggregate  dynamics,  and  ultimately  testing  of  the  hypotheses  as  well.  Some  
hypothetical  causal  pathways  (abductions)  were  suggested  by  Michael  McGinnis  in  a  series  of  
proposed  amendments  to  the  SES  framework.  351  In  order  to  identify  some  possible  causal  pathways  
he  turns  the  focus  to  a  more  particular  level  of  analysis:  the  particular  “action  situation”.  This  term  
refers  to  socio-material  settings  where  individual  rational  actors  interact  and  make  choices  about  
common  pool  problems.  Each  individual  makes  choices  through  interaction  with  the  other  
participants  (micro),  and  the  whole  action  situation  is  constrained  by  a  series  of  environmental  
factors,  both  sociological  and  ecological  (macro).  However,  the  collective  choices  in  the  particular  
action  situation  (micro)  also  feed  back  on  the  general  environment  (macro).352  This  is  a  theory  of  
bounded  rationality,  but  it  describes  the  same  processes  as  della  Porta  and  Bourdieu  do  with  their  
praxiological  theories.  In  either  case  we  deal  with  the  mutual  causal  influence  between  constituted  
order  (macro)  and  constituent  praxes  (micro).  What  McGinnis  does  is  to  turn  the  attention  towards  
how  decisions  in  one  particular  action  situation  might  have  consequences  for  collective  choice  in  
another  action  situation.  By  tracing  a  series  of  influences  across  a  series  of  action  situations,  
McGinnis  suggests  that  we  might  trace  a  “network  of  adjacent  action  situations”.353  This  suggested  
concept  was  not  included  in  the  latest  official  release  of  the  SES  framework,  since  the  concept  
remains  empirically  and  theoretically  underdeveloped.  Consequently,  there  is  a  need  for  close  
ideographic  observation  of  particular  praxes  (inductive  moment),  combined  with  theoretical  
discussion  (deductive  moment),  in  order  to  further  develop  a  hypothesis  about  possible,  particular  
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causal  pathways  (abduction).  Further  development  of  the  suggested  concept  of  “network  of  adjacent  
action  situations”  would  be  one  relevant  way  of  contributing  to  the  further  development  of  SES  as  a  
theory  of  “rule  evolution”.354  That  is:  a  theory  about  constituent  and  constituted  power.  We  can  
expect  to  find  both  formal  rules  and  informal  rules  that  are  being  maintained  and  developed  
through  the  actual  use  of  natural  resources.  This  is  not  only  something  we  can  expect  on  the  basis  
of  the  reports  from  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission.  It  is  also  something  we  can  expect  on  the  basis  of  
proof  that  the  SES  scholars  have  gathered  from  many  ethnographic  and  laboratory-based  studies.  
Firstly,  states  use  formal  rules,  and  there  are  specific  rules  that  regulate  the  changes  of  other  rules,  
from  the  operational  level,  to  the  constitutional  level.355  Secondly,  many  local  communities  have  
their  own  informal  rules,  in  particular  indigenous  peoples  and  small-scale  fisheries.  Here  there  is  
not  procedural  hierarchy.  Operational  situations  are  regulated  by  customs,  and  the  revision  of  
customs  happens  through  deliberation  in  many  situations  throughout  the  local  community,  not  by  
any  formal  procedures.356  Thirdly,  there  is  no  strict  division  between  the  formal  and  the  informal:  
state  bureaucracy  might  have  informal  cliques  and  rules;;  indigenous  communities  may  get  some  
customs  codified  in  state  law.357  These  are  the  conceptual  developments  that  McGinnis  sought  to  
develop  further  with  his  suggested  concept  “network  of  adjacent  action  situations”.  This  is  fitted  to  
trace  the  evolution  of  norms  within  poly-centric  policy  networks,  and  those  networks  might  be  
entangled  with  traditional  kinship  networks,  as  well  as  transformative  issue  networks.  This  is  
compatible  with  recent  developments  in  empirically  based  social  movement  theory.  Della  Porta  and  
Staggenborg  have  both  turned  attention  to  the  generative  potential  of  networked  social  action  at  the  
“meso”  level.358  In  the  empirical  chapters  of  this  thesis,  I  have  mobilized  the  conceptual  resources  
developed  by  McGinnis  and  della  Porta  (deductive  moment),  and  on  the  basis  of  empirical  findings  
(inductive  moment)  I  suggest  some  further  amendments,  in  the  form  of  hypothetical  explanatory  
mechanisms  (abductions). 
 Holistic  explanations?  In  spite  of  its  rich  scope,  the  SES  framework  may  nevertheless  miss  
some  of  the  casual  variables  that  are  relevant  to  explain  state  transformation.  It  is  a  most  refined  
institutionalist  approach,  but  it  remains  a  specifically  institutionalist  approach.  It  is  specialized  on  
the  same  type  of  processes  as  those  I  have  categorized  as  prefigurative  satyagraha.  However,  it  does  
not  factor  in  prefigurative  war-of-position,  or  prefigurative  enlightenment.  The  three  selected  
approaches  address  different  partial  truths  (different  explanatory  factors),  and  they  do  this  by  
enabling  uncertain  observations  (they  are  probabilistic  or  possibilistic,  but  not  deterministic).  Even  
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though  we  include  them  together,  as  a  composite  approach,  this  does  not  imply  that  we  have  gained  
any  holistic  overview  of  the  process  of  state  transformation.  The  neo-positivst  and  post-structural  
critiques  have  discredited  “grand  theories”.359  In  particular,  the  critiques  have  been  ruthless  against  
what  Popper  called  “historicism”:360  grand  assumptions  about  the  inevitable  and  universally  valid  
patterns  of  development  for  all  humankind.  Such  grand  assumptions  were  found  in  Marxist-
Leninism  as  well  as  Structure-Functionalism.361  Both  were  historicist  grand  theories.  Both  were  
used  to  justify  the  involvement  of  Cold  War  superpowers  in  the  postcolonial  world.362  Those  two  
competing  holistic  explanations  were  integral  parts  of  the  ideological  apparatus  of  two  grand  
geopolitical  powers:  they  justified  suppression  of  dissent  at  home,  and  funding  of  violent  
insurgencies  abroad.  This  was  discussed  in  Chapter  2.  The  fall  of  “grand  theories”  is  a  paradigm  
shift,  but  as  with  all  outbursts  of  constituent  power,  there  is  continuity  as  well  as  break  in  the  
historical  process.  Two  interesting  liminal  figures  are  Rokkan  and  Gramsci,  not  because  of  their  
location  in  time,  but  because  they  were  heretics  within  the  Functionalist  and  Marxist  grand  
theories.363   
 Partial  explanations?  Practitioners  of  the  SES  framework  are  explicit  about  its  limitations.  
McGinnis  has  already  attempted  to  combine  the  framework  with  state-centred  realism,364  and  has  
also  suggested  that  it  might  be  fruitful  to  look  further  into  knowledge  praxes  as  well.365 
1. The  most  important  explanatory  factor  is:  customary  praxes  (in  the  context  of  natural  
resources),  what  I  have  called  prefigurative  satyagraha.  This  is  the  specialty  of  SES. 
2. Another  relevant  explanatory  factor  is:  knowledge  praxes  (in  the  context  of  natural  
phenomena),  what  I  have  called  prefigurative  enlightenment.  This  is  a  focus  of  ANT. 
3. A  third  relevant  explanatory  factor  is:  coercive  force  (in  the  context  of  physical  location).  I  
called  it  prefigurative  war-of-position.  This  is  the  focus  of  the  postmodern  Machiavelli. 
Consequently,  it  is  my  opinion  that  SES,  ANT  and  the  postmodern  Machiavelli  are  three  approaches  
that  offer  three  different  reductionist  explanations.  SES,  as  a  form  of  political  institutionalism,  may  
over  emphasise  the  political-economic  dimension,  especially  customary  praxes.  It  is  relevant  for  
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prefigurative  satyagraha,  but  may  shed  less  light  on  the  other  paths  to  constituent  power.  ANT,  
alternatively,  reduces  state  formation  to  knowledge  praxes,  or  the  political-cultural  dimension.  That  
is  relevant  to  trace  the  practical  path  I  have  called  prefigurative  enlightenement,  but  may  be  less  
relevant  regarding  the  two  other  paths.  The  postmodern  Machiavelli  reduces  state  formation  to  brute  
force  and  ice-cold  instrumentality,  or  the  political-military  dimension.  It  is  relevant  to  trace  
prefigurative  war-of-position,  but  says  little  about  the  two  other  pathways.  If  this  argument  is  
proven  correct,  then  it  implies  that  each  of  the  three  approaches  keeps  focus  on  one  explanatory  
factor,  thus  ignoreing  the  other  two  factors,  and  thus,  these  other  two  factors  become  confounders. 
1. Thenrefore,  if  I  apply  the  SES  framework  alone,  I  will  gain  information  about  the  pathway  
of  prefigurative  satyagraha,  while  the  two  other  pathways  remain  in  obscurity. 
2. However,  if  I  supplement  SES  with  ANT,  I  could  trace  some  of  the  impact  of  prefigurative  
enlightenment  as  well,  but  other  pathways  still  remain  obscure. 
3. Finally,  in  order  to  control  for  the  possible  bias  of  wishful  thinking,  I  could  add  the  
postmodern  Machiavelli  as  well,  to  address  prefigurative  war-of-position  as  well.  However,  
all  explanatory  models  remain  hypothetical.  I  can  still  expect  that  still  other  pathways  still  
remain  in  obscurity,  even  though  I  am  unable  to  imagine  them. 
These  three  bullet-points  describe  exactly  what  I  have  done  in  the  present  research  project.  
However,  I  keep  the  normatively  informed  distinction  between  the  power  of  brute  force  (the  
postmodern  Machiavelli),  and  the  power  of  rights  and  proofs  (SES  and  ANT). 
 The  empirical  chapters  are  products  of  a  research  project  where  I  found  items  of  data  in  the  
field,  including  theoretical  resources  used  by  the  social  actors.  There  I  found  resources  from  ANT  
and  SES,  and  I  have  adapted  them  to  trace  some  of  the  possible  ways  whereby  prefigurative  
satyagraha  and  prefigurative  enlightenment  may  transform  a  state. 
 The  final  theoretical  chapter  is  an  attempt  to  control  for  the  potential  bias,  by  seeing  what  
the  clear-cut  state-centred  realism  may  offer,  when  taken  as  a  supplement  to  the  other  approaches.  
Here  I  discuss  empirical  findings  from  a  colleague  in  the  realist  camp,  and  discuss  those  in  terms  of  
the  postmodern  Machiavelli. 
 Models  remain  models.  They  are  supposed  to  be  simplifications.  For  this  reason  they  can  be  
helpful,  but  of  this  same  reason  their  use  remains  limited:  they  may  function  ideologically.  Mono-
causal  models  may  be  useful  to  treat  one  and  one  explanatory  factor  in  isolation.  However,  for  
practical  purposes  one  may  need  to  take  a  plurality  of  factors  into  account.  The  concern  for  
practical  applicability  led  Elinor  Ostrom  to  present  her  theoretical  developments  as  an  unfinished  
diagnostic  framework.  Evidence-based  medicine  relies  on  multiple  explanations,  to  map  a  wide  
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“web  of  causation”366  Since  models  are  just  models,  we  can  safely  assume  that  there  always  is  a  
residual  of  pathways  that  remain  in  obscurity.  However,  it  might  very  well  be  that  some  of  the  
pathways  that  remain  unknown  would  have  been  practically  relevant  for  some  practical  interests. 
 One  thing  that  is  certain  is  that  my  conceptual  distinction  between  three  paths  to  constituent  
power  is  a  sketchy  abduction,  which  could  be  further  developed.  The  very  distinction  between  
customary  praxes,  knowledge  praxes,  and  coercive  force,  is  merely  a  social  convention.  However,  it  
is  a  social  convention  with  ethical  and  practical  relevance.  It  is  on  this  pragmatical  ground  I  have  
chosen  to  define  SES  and  ANT  as  two  complimentary  explanatory  frameworks  within  the  “new  
theory”,  while  the  postmodern  Machiavelli  is  defined  as  a  rival  explanatory  framework,  and  an  
updated  version  of  the  “old  theory”. 
 
4.2.5  Summing  up 
Here  I  have  made  a  series  of  choices  regarding  ethical,  methodological  and  conceptual  issues.  This  
in  order  to  take  full  responsibility  for  how  my  research  might  be  (mis)used  to  empower  the  various  
paths  of  constituent  and  constituted  power. 
 The  ethical  discussion  led  me  to  adopt  a  teaching  from  the  critical  realists  Morgenthau  and  
Chomsky:  One  should  be  observant  of  the  impact  of  violent  force,  but  also  of  the  power  of  norms  
and  knowledge,  but  most  importantly:  the  two  should  be  kept  separate,  to  avoid  misusing  liberal  
norms  to  justify  actual  cruelties.  For  this  reason  I  devised  a  conceptual  wall  of  separation  between  
ANT  and  SES  on  the  one  hand,  and  a  clear-cut  state-centred  realism  on  the  other.  The  former  tools  
are  used  in  the  empirical  parts  of  my  thesis,  in  order  to  identify  some  of  the  positive  opportunities  
that  the  Sámi  indigenous  rights  movement  found  to  empower  themselves.  The  latter  tools  are  used  
in  the  final  theoretical  discussion,  to  control  for  the  possible  bias  of  wishful  thinking. 
 The  epistemological  discussion  led  me  to  adopt  certain  research  strategies  for  critical  
inquiry,  in  the  tradition  of  Kant.  Thus  I  hope  to  bring  critique  of  ideologies  back  into  social  
movement  research,  and  thus,  to  contribute  to  prefigurative  enlightenment.  The  two  research  
strategies  I  adopted  were  the  participatory  and  the  abductive.  The  first  is  based  on  participatory  
learning  and  action  (PLA),  but  also  inspired  by  ANT.  The  latter  is  based  on  Charles  Pierce's  critical  
realism.  These  are  research  strategies  that  I  have  already  applied  in  Chapters  2  and  3.  The  same  
research  strategies  have  been  used  in  all  the  empirical  chapters. 
 The  conceptual  discussion  led  me  to  distinguish  between  different  approaches,  each  of  them  
zooming  in  on  one  particular  explanatory  factor,  while  leaving  all  others  explanations  in  obscurity.  
Thus,  each  of  the  approaches  may  provide  a  partial  explanation  of  state  transformation.  On  
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pragmatical  grounds  I  have  drawn  a  conceptual  distinction  between  three  pathways  of  constituent  
and  constituted  power.  In  the  empirical  chapters  I  will  mostly  mobilize  conceptual  resources  from  
SES,  which  zooms  in  on  the  most  widely  pursued  path  towards  transformation:  prefigurative  
satyagraha.  However,  I  will  also  mobilize  ANT,  to  focus  on  prefigurative  enlightenment  as  well.  
Only  in  the  final  theoretical  discussion  I  will  mobilize  a  clear-cut  state-centred  realism,  in  order  to  
control  for  the  potential  bias  of  wishful  thinking.  However,  I  am  certain  that  there  still  exists  some  




4.3.0  Research  plan 
 
4.3.1  Overview 
The research plan takes the practical consequences of the discussed premises for research design. 
The ethical, epistemological and conceptual choices above have informed the choices that follow: 
 Initially, I will present the chosen geographical boundaries for the study (4.4.2). The 
conceptual choice of a turn to landscape geography has determined the choice of geographical 
boundaries. 
 I will then continue to the issues of explanatory mechanisms (positive findings) and 
estimation of measurement error (negative findings) (4.4.3). I will also discuss how some possible 
mechanisms may be identified with an abductive approach (4.4.4). Methodological choices have 
determined the preference for an abductive approach to mechanisms, but also the intention to seek a 
qualitative equivalent to estimation of measurement bias. 
 Finally, I will present the explanatory model that has been adapted in order to identify 
possible mechanisms (4.4.5 – 4.6.7). Ethical choices have determined the division between the 
preferred explanatory model and the rival explanation. Conceptual choices have determined the 
preference for praxis networks as a meso-phenomenon that mediates between constituted macro 
order and constituent micro action. 
 
 
4.3.2  Analytical  systems  boundaries:  the  bioregionalist  alternative 
Even  though  this  is  a  study  of  state  transformation  in  Sápmi,  the  chosen  analytical  system  
boundaries  do  not  coincide  with  the  boundaries  of  any  particular  state.  Because  Sápmi  is  a  trans-
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boundary  socio-ecological  region,  it  would  be  misleading  and  biased  to  define  the  analytical  system  
boundaries  according  to  the  specific  set  of  conventions  that  Bauböck  described  as  “methodological  
nationalism  and  statism”.  Previously,  in  2.2.0,  I  discussed  Implications  for  the  art  (or  practice)  of  
constituent  power,  and  in  3.2.0,  I  presented  a  positive  alternative  for  the  science  (or  theory)  of  
constituent  power.  I  suggested  turning  to  geography  as  an  empirical  discipline,  instead  of  boldly  
assuming  that  states  really  are  “sovereign”  and  nations  really  “holocultural”.  In  particular,  one  
should  not  assume  that  actual  jurisdiction  is  a  function  of  monopoly  of  violence.  Since  the  aim  of  
this  study  is  to  observe  some  paths  to  constituent  power  that  might  be  possible  for  indigenous  rights  
movements  (and  other  environmental  justice  movements),  I  chose  to  follow  political  geographers  
with  interest  in  the  mutual  causal  impact  between  social  movement  action  and  historical-
geographical  formations.367  Thus,  I  ended  up  specifying  the  abstract  term  of  “constituted  order”  as  
concrete  terrains  of  practices  of  power,  to  be  mapped  geographically.   
The  ongoing  state  transformation  in  Sápmi  involves  changing  boundaries:  Firstly,  the  spatial  
boundaries  between  states  get  a  different  function,  for  example  as  a  result  of  multilateral  
agreements  or  unilateral  policies.  Secondly,  the  states  have  continuously  co-evolved  with  other  
geographical  entities:  the  natural  resource  systems  and  the  indigenous  cultural  area.  States  are  not  
formed  in  a  vacuum,  or  Terra  Nullius,  or  “state  of  nature”  but  their  formation  relate  to  pre-existing  
sociological  and  ecological  patterns.  The  empirical  part  of  this  thesis  starts  with  a  geographical  
introduction,  which  gives  a  panorama  over  the  constituted  order,  combining  local  history  with  
descriptive  statistics  in  the  form  of  maps.  Here  I  use  data  of  relevance  for  landscape  geography.  
The  final  theoretical  discussion  sketches  an  alternative  panorama,  to  serve  the  rival  explanation.  
Here  I  use  data  of  relevance  for  strategical  geopolitics. 
 
1. Firstly,  the  analytical  systems  boundary  selected  for  this  study  is  constituted  by  the  two  
selected  watersheds,  Alta  and  Deatnu.  Both  watersheds  connect  upstream  areas  in  Inner  
Sápmi  with  downstream  areas  that  were  previously  known  as  having  been  assimilated  into  
the  standardised  nation-state  culture.  Upstream  areas  of  the  Deatnu  watershed  are  located  in  
the  heart  of  Inner  Sápmi  but  at  the  border  between  Norway  and  Finland.  The  Deatnu  River  
belongs  to  two  states,  but  to  three  or  more  nations.  Thus,  when  state  transformation  is  
exemplified  with  those  two  water  areas,  then  it  includes  transformation  of  two  states,  plus  
inter-state  relations  witin  one  local  social-ecological  region. 
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2. Secondly,  the  environment  of  the  system  is  also  seen  in  geographical  terms,  as  a  totality  of  
ecological  and  cultural  conditions.  The  geographical  introduction  provides  a  panorama  at  
such  a  general  level  that  I  provide  a  tentative  mapping  of  the  environment  within  two  grand  
macro-regions  that  are  partially  overlapping:  the  Circumpolar  and  the  Western-European.  
Thus,  I  research  state  transformation  in  the  context  of  macro-regional  institutional  
development,  which  sometimes  is  aimed  at  overcoming  the  unilateral  policies  of  the  states,  
and  adapting  the  state  system  to  the  actual  geography  ecosystems  and  cultural  regions. 
 
All  those  factors  are  mapped  differently  from  the  landscape  ecology  view  (in  the  geographical  
intro)  and  the  strategical  geopolitics  view  (in  the  final  discussion).  Each  of  the  views  may  be  
reductionistic  in  its  own  right.  Old  school  political  science  (as  I  have  discussed  in  2.4.3  and  3.4.3)  
had  a  tendency  to  over-emphasise  military  history  as  an  explanation  of  state  (trans)formation,368  
thus  taking  a  strategical  geopolitics  view  that  was  one-sided.  My  preferred  landscape  ecology  view  
is  a  bioregionalist  alternative  to  methodological  nationalism  and  statism.  This  alternative  view  is  
functional  in  order  to  highlight  realities  that  tend  to  be  overlooked  by  so-called  realists.  However,  
one  should  be  careful  not  to  let  this  new  view  become  equally  reductionistic  as  the  old  one. 
 
 
4.3.3  Causal  mechanisms  and  measurement  errors 
State  transformation  is  a  socio-ecological  process  at  the  macro  level,  even  though  one  might  zoom  
in  on  more  particular  geographical  localities,  to  trace  more  particular  causal  chains.  With  
quantitative  causal  analysis  one  might  gain  a  rough  sketch  of  a  wide  panorama,  by  using  data  about  
a  few  selected  variables,  but  across  a  high  number  of  units.  With  quantitative  process  tracing  one  
zooms  in  on  a  few  units,  in  their  complex  environment,  and  may  myopically  trace  particular  chains  
of  causation.  Those  are  two  options  for  research  design,  and  there  is  a  trade-off  in  choosing.  
Qualitative  process  tracing  gives  gained  specificity,  but  at  the  cost  of  weak  generality.  Quantitative  
causal  analysis  gives  gained  generality,  but  at  the  cost  of  lost  specificity.  Either  way  may  be  used  to  
test  hypotheses:  With  quantitative  data  analysis  one  may  test  prepositions  about  probability.  With  
qualitative  process  tracing  one  may  test  prepositions  about  possibility.  Either  way  might  also  be  
used  to  develop  hypotheses:  either  through  inductive  use  of  quantitative  data,  or  by  abductive  use  of  
qualitative  data.  Each  option  is  a  way  to  gain  insight  into  institutional  change.  Each  option  would  be  
relevant  for  the  SES  approach.  There  are  several  reasons  why  I  choose  to  use  the  SES  framework  
for  a  specific  purpose:  hypothesis-development  through  abductive  use  of  qualitative  data. 
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 I  choose  the  abductive,  qualitative  approach  because  SES  approach  remains  under-
developed  with  regard  to  studies  of  change  or  dynamics.  As  I  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter:  
SES-research  on  institutional  change  still  is  in  an  abductive  change.  Qualitative  process  tracing  can  
be  used  to  inquire  into  some  of  the  possible  pathways  of  norm  change,  through  “networks  of  
adjacent  action  situations”,  all  at  the  micro-situational  level.  There  are  other  reasons  as  well  for  my  
choice  of  the  abductive,  qualitative  approach.  One  additional  reason  is  simply  that  I  did  not  know  
much  about  Sámi  politics  before  starting  this  research,  and  therefore  I  could  not  make  any  relevant  
quantitative  research  question.  Another  reason  is,  as  I  have  argued  in  the  previous  chapter,  that  the  
abductive  approach  may  be  a  way  to  try  to  overcome  some  ideological  bias,  and  work  towards  
scientific  knowledge  with  increased  reliability  (or  decreased  lack  of  reliability).   
Of  those  reasons  I  choose  to  focus  on  few  cases  in  their  complex  environment,  and  to  do  a  
myopic  tracing  of  selected,  particular  processes.  I  loose  generality  but  gain  specificity.  However,  
one  must  have  in  mind  that  correlation  is  not  causation.  If  we  have  little  clue  about  the  particular  
causal  processes  at  play,  there  is  limited  usage  of  correlation.  If  the  causal  model  is  conceptually  
invalid,  then  it  would  not  help  if  we  adapt  reliable  analytical  techniques,  because  the  interpretation  
would  be  conceptually  invalid  anyway.  In  order  to  develop  good  causal  models,  we  need  to  identify  
some  of  the  possible  causal  pathways  that  might  actually  be  possible,  in  practical  reality.  A  
preposition  about  such  a  pathway  is  what  I  will  call  a  “mechanism”. 
 By  zooming  in  on  some  particular  causal  chains,  I  have  chosen  to  specify  some  mechanisms,  
which  may  be  further  investigated  in  future  studies  with  stochastic  design.  When  I  use  the  term  
“mechanism”  I  hope  it  will  not  be  misinterpreted  as  any  deterministic  form  of  causal  explanation.  I  
am  not  in  favour  of  ideological  explanations,  neither  on  the  basis  of  commonsensical  induction  
(doxa)  nor  on  the  basis  of  dogmatic  deduction  (though  I  acknowledge  that  we  may  never  rid  us  fully  
of  ideological  bias).  I  hope  to  stick  the  label  “non-deterministic”  to  the  term  mechanism,  and  thus  I  
choose  the  term  possible  stochastic  mechanism.  Quantitative  causal  analysis  informs  stochastic  
hypotheses.  Qualitative  process  tracing  informs  possibilistic  hypotheses.  In  either  case,  however,  all  
explanations  remain  hypothetical.  Uncertainty  is  the  condition  of  knowledge,  and  science  is  
systematic  doubt. 
 In  order  to  study  such  mechanisms,  I  have  gathered  historical  and  ethnographical  data,  
presented  in  two  single-case  studies.  For  both  these  studies  I  observe  and  identify  some  possible  
pathways  of  constituent  power.  Thus,  I  observe  some  possible  mechanisms,  and  they  appear  to  have  
been  in  force,  but  their  relative  impact  when  compared  to  other  mechanisms  remains  open  for  
discussion.  In  principle,  that  question  may  be  further  investigated  in  future  studies  with  standardised  
data  and  statistical  methods.  That  is  the  reason  why  I  characterise  my  account  for  the  observed  
processes  as  a  set  of  possible  and  stochastic  mechanisms.  How  can  I  handle  uncertainty?  If  my  
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research  design  had  been  a  quantitative  one,  then  I  would  have  done  statistical  significance  testing  
in  order  to  estimate  the  hypothetical  measurement  bias.  However,  it  is  obviously  impossible  to  
apply  statistical  techniques  with  a  non-statistical  research  design.  Quantitative  researchers  try  to  
estimate  measurement  biases.  In  a  similar  fashion,  I  have  tried  to  observe  the  limits  of  my  own  
observations.  I  have  tried  to  observe  the  issues  that  remain  under-researched,  in  spite  of  some  social  
groups  having  had  an  interest  in  those  issues  having  been  inquired.  When  some  question  remains  
chronically  under-researched,  even  though  it  is  perceived  as  being  of  great  importance  for  some  
interest  group,  then  we  might  have  to  do  with  a  bias  that  remains  unchallenged.  The  purpose  of  my  
study  is  to  contribute  to  a  collective  effort  of  gradually  overcoming  biases,  and  therefore,  I  try  also  
to  observe  some  ways  whereby  my  own  study  may  remain  biased. 
 In  summary,  I  make  two  kinds  of  observations  in  each  of  the  empirical  chapters.  On  the  one  
hand,  I  observe  some  possible  mechanisms.  This  is  what  I  call  positive  findings.  On  the  other  hand,  I  
observe  some  issues  that  remain  under-researched,  in  order  to  estimate  the  residual  of  colonial  bias.  
This  is  what  I  call  negative  findings.  In  principle,  positive  findings  should  not  be  interpreted  in  
isolation  from  negative  findings.  Correlations  should  not  be  interpreted  independently  of  the  
significance  test,  and  observations  of  possible  mechanisms  should  not  be  interpreted  independently  
of  observations  of  residual  bias. 
 
 
4.3.4  The  art  of  science:  a  dialogue  of  conjectures  and  refutations 
In  all  the  single-case  studies,  I  have  tried  to  observe  some  possible  stochastic  mechanisms,  and  at  
the  same  time,  to  estimate  the  measurement  biases.  When  doing  this,  I  have  not  searched  for  every  
kind  of  causal  factor.  Neither  have  I  searched  for  a  few  pre-defined  causal  factors.  Consequently,  
my  inquiry  has  not  been  purely  observation-driven,  nor  has  it  been  purely  theory-driven:  neither  
inductivist  nor  deductivist.  Inductivist social scientists, such as Barney Glaser, strive at being open 
to whatever the data may have to tell. That is laudable and useful for many purposes. Deductivist 
social scientists, such as Michael Burawoy, strive towards accountability in the logical argument, by 
applying a chosen theoretical approach. That is also laudable and useful for many purposes. 
However, neither of those extremes would be fruitful when the goal is inquire issues that appear to 
be systematically under-researched, in order to give one particular contribution to the joint effort of 
overcoming colonial bias.  In the previous chapter I discussed what Charles Pierce called abduction: 
swift iterations between inductive and deductive moments, together forming some hypotheses about 
possible causal pathways. I argued that this was a way to try to overcome popular prejudice (doxa), 
stretching out towards increased reliability (episteme). At least it may potentially provide a 
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contribution to decreased lack of reliability, and thus, to decreased ideological bias. 
 For postcolonial political science, I think abduction is a useful way to develop hypotheses 
regarding possible stochastic mechanisms. By suggesting this, I slightly deviate from the view of 
James Mahoney, who discussed two ways of inquire mechanisms:369 One possibility is to search for 
“intervening  variables” by seeking more fine-grained information about some process that has been 
“black  boxed”  at  a  less  detailed level of observation. This is the inductive alternative, the one 
pursued by Barney Glaser. Another possibility is to seek information in formation of what is going 
on with regard to one pre-selected variable, and thus, to seek information about whatever the 
selected theoretical approach defines, in Mahoney,s words, as  “ultimate  causes”.  This  is  the  
deductive alternative, which is practiced by Michael Burawoy. I think two good representatives of 
each of those alternatives are Latour and James Coleman. 
 At the inductivist side,  Bruno  Latour  assumes  that  all  imaginable  “constituent  parts”  actually  
consist of even smaller parts. Therefore, he always seeks more specific information, in order to 
discover unexpected processes, and thus  to  crack  open  any  “black  boxed”  concept.  As  Mahoney  
correctly points out in his paper, this is an open-ended effort. Unlike Mahoney, I do not see that as 
problematic. However, the ethics of opening all black boxes may become a metaphysical dogma: it 
may become a black-box in its own right. Latour's qualitative inductivism is so total that, unlike his 
ANT colleagues Law & Singleton, it disables him from saying anything about macro patterns, 
environmental factors, asymmetrical power/knowledge, or collective ignorance. 
 At the deductivist side, James  Coleman  argues  in  favour  of  faithful  application  of  rational  
choice  individualism.  He  insists  that  if  we  are  to  explain  state  transformation,  such  as  a  revolution,  
then  the  explanation  is  invalid  unless  we  can  trace  a  particular  causal  relation  at  the  level  of  
individual  rational  choice.370  But  methodological  individualism  is  only  one  sociological  model  
amongst  others;;  it  is  not  the  only  one.  This  is  where  Coleman  differs  from  another  methodological  
individualist,  Elinor  Ostrom,  for  whom  individualism  is  merely  an  empirical  and  practical  tool. 
 Between  both  extremes,  the  abductive  alternative  is  found.  This  middle  position  might  not  be  
acceptable  for  purists  such  as  Latour  and  Coleman,  but  it  appears  to  me  as  being  more  compatible  
with  their  more  pragmatic  colleagues,  such  as  Law  &  Singleton  and  Ostrom.  For  my  purpose,  it  
would  be  inappropriate  to  choose  between  either “interventing  variables”  (inductive  approach)  or 
“ultimate  causes”  (deductive  approach). Instead my research has proceeded through a dialogue 
between inductive and deductive moments, what Charles Pierce called abduction: I tried  to  be  
aware  of  how  the  data material is selected because of its relevance for the coding categories 
(deductive moment), while at the same time, how the coding categories are adapted to fit the actual 
                                                 
369  Mahoney  2003 
370  Hedström  &  Ylikoski  2010;;  Coleman  1998,  fig.  1.3 
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data material (inductive moment). Abduction is the way whereby I have attempted to observe 




4.3.5  The  explanatory  model  to  be  specified 
This  research  project  is  a  study  of  state  transformation  in  the  High  North.  State  transformation  is  
the  phenomenon  I  aim  to  explain,  what  we  call  explanandum.  In  order  to  explain  this  phenomenon,  
I  will  focus  on  some  selected  explanatory  factors  (while  this  implies  that  I  focus  away  from  other  
possible  explanatory  factors).  Selected  explanatory  factors  are  what  we  call  explanans.  The  main  
focus  is  on  the  struggle  for  rights  and  proofs,  or  in  other  words,  the  two  pathways  of  prefigurative  
satyagraha  and  prefigurative  enlightenment.  However,  in  order  to  control  for  the  potential  bias  of  
wishful  thinking,  I  will  also  have  a  look  at  the  (mis)use  of  coercive  force,  the  pathway  of  
prefigurative  war-of-position. 
 Explanans  1  and  2,  respectively,  refer  to  institutional  change  and  decrease  in  collective  
ignorance  –  the  struggle  for  rights  and  for  proofs.  To  put  it  simply,  I  have  so  far  implied  that  SES  
and  ANT  have  been  used  to  identify  two  different  explanatory  factors.  In  fact,  however,  my  research  
combines  both  SES  and  ANT  to  explore  both  explanans  1  and  2.  Both  are  sensitive  to  the  
interaction  between  nature  and  culture,  but  one  main  difference  is  that  ANT  pushes  towards  
possibilistic  specification,  while  Ostrom's  SES  pushes  towards  stochastic  generalization.   
 Institutional  change  (explanans  1)  is  conceptualized  as  the  impact  of  customary  praxes  (in  
the  context  of  natural  resources),  on  the  body  politic  (understood  as  a  codified  body  of  law).  
This  includes  impact  on  policy  networks  that  make  codified  laws,  from  issue  networks  
committed  to  the  struggle  for  rights.  However,  it  also  includes  co-evolution  between  policy  
networks  that  make  codified  laws,  and  kinship  networks  that  maintain  and  develop  
longstanding  indigenous  customs.   
 Decrease  in  collective  ignorance  (explanans  2)  is  conceptualised  as  the  impact  of  knowledge  
praxes  (in  the  context  of  natural  phenomena),  in  the  body  politic  (understood  as  a  certified  
body  of  knowledge).  This  includes  impact  on  policy  networks  that  make  certified  science,  
from  issue  networks  committed  to  the  struggle  for  proofs.  However,  it  also  includes  co-
evolution  between  policy  networks  that  make  certified  science,  and  kinship  networks  that  
maintain  and  develop  indigenous  traditional  knowledge.   
In  conflict-theoretical  terms,  both  processes  may  be  seen  as  different  components  of  the  struggle  to  
define  the  premises  for  socio-material  (re)production  of  hegemonic  social  power  within  an  existing  
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historical-geographical  formation.  This  is  the  explanatory  framework  I  use  in  the  empirical  parts  of  
the  thesis  (Figure  4-1).  Thus  I  hope  to  identify  some  of  the  positive  alternatives  that  might  exist  for  
environmental  justice  movements  in  general,  and  for  indigenous  rights  movements  in  particular. 
 In  the  final,  theoretical  discussion,  I  will  revew  competing  explanations  from  the  "old  
school".  Here  I  mobilize  conceptual  tools  from  the  postmodern  Machiavelli,  a  clear-cut  state-
centred  “realism”.  This  may  be  seen  as  a  process  whereby  geo-strategical  theatres  (Fortuna)  are  
being  stabilized  and  transformed.  In  that  context,  Explanans  2  is  re-defined,  from  landscape  ecology  
to  geostrategical  theatres,  which  is  a  most  different  way  of  approaching  the  management  of  land  and  
water  resources.  (See  3.2.5  for  Elinor  Ostrom's  account  for  the  two  rival  theories.)  With  such  a  one-
sided  and  reductionistic  perspective,  political  conflict  is  reduced  to  struggle  to  define  the  premises  
for  socio-material  (re)production  of  hegemonic  coercive  force  within  an  existing  historical-
geographical  formation.  This  is  conceptualised  as  the  impact  of  coercive  force  (Virtù,  in  the  context  
of  spatial  location),  on  the  body  politic  (understood  as  a  virtual monopoly  of  violence).  The  ice-cold  
instrumentalism  of  the  postmodern  Machiavelli  is  also  a  specific  epistemological  stand  point,  and  
this  it  implies  an  alternative  view  also  on  Explanans  2.  This  perspective  is  being  applied  in  the  final  
theoretical  discussion.  Thus,  I  hope  to  “control  for”  the  potential  bias  of  wishful  thinking. 
 Explanans  N  is  an  empty  category.  It  refers  to  everything  that  remains  ignored  in  my  own  
model.  It  refers  to  whatever  residual  explanatory  factors  that  are  not  contained  within  the  
conceptual  tools  I  have  mobilized.  It  refers  to  the  unknown,  irreducible  error. 
 
 
Figure  4-1:  The  general  causal  model,  made  to  be  specified  empirically 
 
Political research provides proofs, and thus, it is one of the knowledge practices that empower 
constituted order and constituent power. This issue should not be ignored in my own research 
method (and this issue I have addressed as estimation of measurement error), but it should also not 
be ignored in the causal model (which I addressed as Explanans 2). For the art and science of 
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constituent power, the object of observation and the act of observing are interdependent phenomena. 
 When I searched for possible stochastic mechanisms in my data material, I sought to specify 
some of the ways whereby the pathways may actually (empirically) work, in the chosen (theoretical) 
causal model. Paths i, ii and iii emerged as the practically relevant factors when I developed 
hypotheses about possible stochastic mechanisms. Since I have chosen the abductive approach, the 
research includes both inductive and deductive moments. The inductive moment approaches 
mechanisms through selected data bits. This is analogous to what the causal analyst does when 
suggesting  mechanisms  in  the  meaning  “intervening  variable”. The deductive moment approaches 
mechanisms through selected coding categories. This is analogous to Mahoney's definition of 
mechanisms  as  “ultimate  causes”.371 The abductive research strategy is a dialogue between 
inductive and deductive moments. The purpose is to avoid reification of commonsensical induction 
(doxa), while also avoiding reification of deductive dogmaticism. 
 Each of the possible stochastic mechanisms that were observed in the research has to be seen 
as hypothetical specifications of the general causal model of political-geographical change. The 
causal model is made to highlight specific causal relations. It is a derivation from della Porta's 
model of mutual causation between (constituted) macro order and (constituent) micro praxes. There 
has been little research on the structural strains of social movements, the impact of macro on micro. 
There has been even less research on the outcomes of social movements, the impact of micro on 
macro. Similarly, in the SES framework, there is solid knowledge on how micro choices may be 
bound or conditioned by macro factors, but the research on how macro order emerge from micro 
praxes remains an unfinished research front. I recognise the already accumulated knowledge on 
how macro order may co-determine micro action, and apply this in my own process tracing. What I 
try to investigate is the under-researched side, how micro action may produce macro order. 
Therefore, my aim is to specify causal pathways, at a more microscopical level of analysis. 
 If I had emphasised the temporal dimension, then the causal model would have shown 
(constituent) micro action as explanans, and (constituted) macro order as explanandum – still with a 
feedback loop back again to the explanans. However, I do not emphasize the temporal dimension. 
 What I do emphasize is the spatial dimension. The chosen model shows (constituent) micro 
praxes as the pathways. The nodes in the model (which are linked throuigh the pathways) are not 
the state at two different moments in time. The  nodes  called  “explanans”  refer  to  macro-
environmental factors. They describe various attributes of the socio-material environment in which 
the state system is embedded. Explanans 1 refers to the environment of actual customary praxes (in 
the context of natural resources) that are outside the body politic (outside its sanctioned body of 
                                                 
371  Mahoney  2003 
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law). Explanans 2 refers to the environment of actual knowledge praxes (in the context of natural 
phenomena) that are outside the body politic (outside its certified body of knowledge). Explanans 3 
refers to geo-strategical theatres (in the context of spatial location) that are outside the body politic 
(outside the virtually sovereign monopoly of violence). Thus, the nodes that are labelled as 
“explanans”  refer  to  general  background  conditions or environmental conditions with which the 
state co-evolves. 
 The nodes in the causal model (Explanans 1-3, N and Explanandum) all refer to various 
forms of constituted order at the macro level. Those entities are virtual spatio-temporal formations 
located in concrete, three-dimensional terrains. 
 The paths of the causal model (i, ii, iii) refer to various forms of constituent praxes at the 
micro level, located in particular situations in concrete terrains. However, the pathways also include 
how micro-interaction might create ties and exchanges across dispersed action situations: 
networked action at the meso level. 
 
 
4.3.6  The  nodes  of  constituted  power 
The first empirical chapter introduces Explanans and Explanandum in terms of landscape 
geography. Explanandum is the state formation as a social fact: a codified body of law plus a 
certified body of knowledge. Explanans 1 is the environmental landscape geography, consisting of 
customary praxes (informal rules in the governance system) and natural resources (the resource 
system). This is what remains of the Social-Ecological System when I define away the state 
formation (formal rules in the governance system). Explanans 2 is the humanistic landscape 
geography: various local perceptions of place, various local practical realities. This definition of the 
nodes in the causal model is kept throughout all the empirical chapters, in which I seek to specify 
the pathways (i, ii and iii) between those nodes. Explanans 1 and 2 put focus on customary praxes 
and knowledge praxes outside the state, two phenomena of interest for the Sámi Rights Commission. 
 The theoretical discussion turns to the rival theory: The introduction of Explanans 3 implies 
another definition of the Explanandum. For the clear-cut state-centred  “realism”,  the  state  is  a  
virtual monopoly of violence (Explanandum), embedded in virtual geo-strategical theatres 
(Explanans 3). The introduction of clear-cut political cynicism also implies that knowledge praxes 
are understood in purely instrumentalist terms: valid practical realities are whatever intersubjective 
perceptions that serve some technical purpose. Explanans 3 puts focus on coercive force, an issue of 
interest for security in the Barens Sea Basin. It is relevant regardless of whether one has a 
preference for balance of terror, or disarmament. 
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Figure  4-2:  Overlapping  political  systems:  jurisdictions  vs.  sovereignties 
Left:  overlapping  jurisdictions  (meaning  sorces  of  legally  valid  norms)372   
Right:  entangled  sovereignties  (meaning  monopololies  of  violent  force)  373 
A  =  UN  recognition  of  state  sovreingty,  since  1945 
B  =  UN  ignoring  indigenous  peoples  until  1990s,  then  recognising  indigenous  self-determaination 
C  =  States  criminalising  local  customs  until  1990s,  then  ratifying  new  UN  norms,  decriminalising  local  customs 
I  =  Military  alliances  enforcing  the  norm  of  state  sovereingty     
II  =  Military  alliances  stigmatising  non-recognised  human  rights  activists  (strategic  securitisation) 
III  =  Institutional  violence  suppressing  non-recognised  customs,  while  enforcing  the  recognised  ones 
 
 The two rival theories provide two rival framings of the Explanandum, state transformation. 
Among those who observe state transformation in the High North, some focus on the military and 
the denationalisation of defence,374 others focus on institutions and knowledge, and the emerging 
multi-level institutions.375 The old theory and the new theory take interest in different aspects of the 
same contemporary reality. One  common  theme  is  that  there  is  an  increasingly  visible  gap  between  
prescriptions  of  ideal  state  unity  and  descriptions  of  actual  interdependency.  The  increasing  
visibility  of  this  gap  may  indicate  either  that  the  gap  itself  is  new,  or  alternatively,  that  what  is  new  
is  its  visibility.  It  is  also  debated  whether  the  states  are  loosing  sovereign  power,  or  if  sovereignties  
are  becoming  more  entangled.  In  either  case,  some  forms  of  democratic  self-rule  are  loosing  power,  
                                                 
372  The  diagram  to  the  left  is  loosely  based  on  another  figure,  in  Skogvang  2009:  36.  One  difference  is  that  the  circle  
“States:  positive  law”  in  her  version  was  called  “norsk  rett”  (Norwegian  law),  thus  zooming  in  on  one  of  the  four  
states  that  have  established  presence  in  Sápmi.  One  should  also  add  that  she  describes  the  interplay  between  various  
sources  of  law  as  “legal  pluralism”,  and  does  not  use  the  term  “jurisdiction”  in  this  context.  My  main  innovation  is  
to  add  the  diagram  to  the  right  –  a  similar  figure  that  describes  an  analoguous  relation  between  entangled  sovereign-­
ties.  It  is  the  relative  utonomy  of  normative  order  (left  side  diagram)  from  coercive  power  (right  side  diagram)  justi-­
fy  the  distinction  between  sovereignty  (meaning  monopoly  of  coercive  force)  and  jurisdiction  (meaning  sources  of  
legally  valid  norms). 
373  My  definitions  of  "sovereignty"  and  "jurisdiction"  might  be  akward,  but  are  a  way  to  refer  to  a  situati,  which  
resembles  the  "overlapping  sovereingties"  in  Latin  America,  but  with  the  difference  that  in  the  case  of  Sápmi,  the  
indigenous  peoples  have  refrained  from  answering  violence  with  violence.  This,  in  the  case  of  state  transformation  
in  Sápmi,  we  might  keep  constant  the  explanatory  force  of  coercive  force  constant,  while  observing  the  constituent  
power  of  non-violent  collective  action.  See  also  part  2.2.2,  in  particular  the  long  footnote  on  how  to  define  
"sovereignty"  and  "jurisdiction". 
374  Østerud  &  Matlary  2007 
375  Neumann  &  Sending  2010 
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while  other  forms  are  being  established.  I  would  describe  this  as  entangled  sovereignties. 
 There  are  various  ways  to  look  at  entangled  sovereignties  in  the  high  north.  Figure  4-2  
suggests  two  different  models,  one  of  entangled  jurisdictions,  another  of  entangled  institutional  
violence.  The  former  looks  at  social  norms  with  various  degrees  of  legality,  while  the  latter  draws  
attention  to  systems  of  coercive  enforcement.  In  either  case,  the  states  (upper  left  circle)  are  not  
autonomous  of  international  organizations  (lower  circle),  nor  are  they  autonomous  of  the  more  
ancient  social  institutions  of  the  indigenous  homeland  (upper  right  circle). 
 With  regard  to  entangled  jurisdictions,  the  states  are  sources  of  so-called  positive  law,  while  
in  the  indigenous  homeland,  local  subsistence  practices  tend  to  be  regulated  according  to  various  
local  customs.  The  states  have  recognized  the  legal  validity  of  some  of  these  ancient  customs,  while  
others  have  been  criminalized.  Nevertheless,  the  local  indigenous  people  have  continuously  kept  
and  developed  their  local  customs,  regardless  of  attempted  criminalization.  Such  relations  were  of  
no  interest  to  international  norms  in  the  first  decades  after  the  Second  World  War,  when  the  prime  
goal  of  the  UN  was  to  secure  state  sovereignty  (see  A  in  figure  4.2).  However,  after  a  successful  
fourth  world  movement  in  the  1990s,  the  UN  now  recognises  indigenous  self-determination,  in  the  
form  of  a  collective  human  right  (see  B  in  figure  4.2).  Some  of  the  host  states  of  Sápmi  had  
previously  ratified  the  norms  of  collective  human  rights,  and  as  a  result  of  the  UN  recognition  of  
indigenous  self-determination,  some  host  states  of  Sápmi  have  now  started  an  attempt  to  
decriminalize,  register  and  codify  the  indigenous  customary  norms  (see  C  in  figure  4.2).  This  is  
often  seen  as  an  act  of  recognition  from  the  state.  However,  some  indigenous  rights  activists,  such  
as  the  ČSV  movement,  could  possibly  see  this  codification  as  consolidation  of  state  power  in  areas  
where  the  states  never  enjoyed  authority  among  the  population.  Indeed,  the  fact  that  ancient  norms  
have  been  continuously  kept  and  developed  in  spite  of  attempted  criminalization,  does  indicate  that  
the  ancient  tribal  confederacy  never  quite  disappeared,  while  the  system  of  sovereign  states  was  
never  quite  consolidated.  Thus,  in  spite  of  de  jure  claims  of  jurisdictional  monopoly  from  the  states,  
there  has  been  a  de  facto  jurisdictional  complexity.  This  includes  «post-siidas»  together  with  the  
«proto-states»,  as  well  as  various  intergovernmental  organizations,  prefiguring  a  potential  world  
society.  In  this  complex  normative  environment,  the  social  fact  is  that  local  customs  and  
international  norms  do  matter,  in  addition  to  the  so-called  positive  law  of  the  states. 
 With  regard  to  institutional  violence  the  situation  is  no  less  complex.  In  spite  of  the  
Weberian  definition  of  states  as  territorial  monopolies  of  power,  each  of  the  states  in  Sápmi  is  in  
fact  not  free  to  determine  its  own  security  strategy.  What  must  be  clear  from  the  beginning  is  that  
local  customs  in  Sápmi  are  not  enforced  with  coercive  means,  but  also,  that  pacifism  does  not  
render  the  population  impotent  to  defend  itself.  Everyday  social  sanctions  and  everyday  resistance  
funcion  as  what  Gene  Sharp  call  “social  defense”.  In  recorded  history,  there  have  only  been  one  or  
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two  instances  where  the  Sámi  have  responded  to  colonial  violence  with  violence.  So  there  is  co-
existence  between  an  indigenous  homeland,  with  systems  of  social  defense,  and  four  host  states,  
with  four  systems  of  institutional  violence.  Additionally,  the  relationship  between  the  four  host  
states  is  not  a  simple  one.  While  two  of  the  host  states  generally  maintain  a  policy  of  neutrality,  the  
eastern  and  western  host  states  are  members  of  two  different  military  alliances:  NATO  and  CSTO.  
The  purpose  of  those  alliances  is  to  defend  the  soverignty  of  their  member  states  (see  I  in  figure  
4.2).  Norway,  as  a  minor  member  of  NATO,  is  dependent  on  the  larger  allies,  and  thus,  its  national  
parliament  has  no  de  facto  sovereignty  in  matters  of  foreign  policy.  During  the  cold  war,  there  was  a  
rather  strong  miltiary  presence  on  both  sides  of  the  Norwegian-Russian  border,  which  divided  the  
Sápmi  homeland.  Even  though  the  Nordic  states  are  known  for  their  relative  stability,  the  
northeastern  part  of  the  region  remained  rather  turbulent  after  1751,  and  the  history  was  bloody  
until  1945.  Only  after  Glasnost  did  the  demilitarization  of  this  zone  begin.  The  latter  period  
coincides  with  the  period  when  the  host  states  have  made  some  attempts  to  institutionalize  norms  of  
indigenous  self-determination.  The  institutional  violence  of  the  states  is  in  a  rather  ambiguous  
relationship  with  indigenous  local  customs,  as  well  as  with  international  norms  on  collective  human  
rights.  State  coercion  is  being  used  to  suppress  local  customs  and  human  rights  claims  in  instances  
where  those  remain  criminalized.  Simultaneously,  state  coercion  is  also  used  to  enforce  the  local  
customs  and  human  rights  that  have  been  recognized  by  the  states  (see  III  in  figure  4.2).  The  
military  alliances  NATO  and  CSTO  may  sometimes  pose  as  champions  of  human  rights  or  other  
international  norms,  but  when  it  comes  to  those  indigenous  rights  claims  that  are  still  not  
recognized,  such  claims  are  being  stigmatized  as  “radicalism”,  and  thus,  as  potential  threats  to  state  
security  (see  II  in  figure  4.2). 
 Those two models describe conditions of interest to different schools of political science. 
Legal pluralism (including plural jurisdictions, meaning sources of law) is a condition of interest to 
institutionalist and constructivist political science. Entangled sovereignties (meaning monopolies of 
violence) would be the focus for neorealist political science. One-sided focus on coercive force, 
however, would be rather unrealistic, because it would overlook the actual force of ancient local 
customs that are being enforced and defended with non-violent means. However, it would also be 
unrealistic with a too one-sided focus on normative order, because we should not overlook the 
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4.3.7  The  paths  of  constituent  empowerment 
The  empirical  part  of  this  thesis  leads  to  formulation  of  a  series  of  hypothesis  about  particular  
mechanisms.  Each  and  every  mechanism  is  specified  with  regard  to  the  consequences  that  each  
particular  mechanism  appears  to  have  for  all  three  pathways  i,  ii  and  iii  (Table  4.1).  In  the  final  
discussion  of  findings  I  discuss  the  mechanisms  I  have  observed  against  the  causal  pathways  
observed  by  the  rival  theory.  In  order  to  make  the  findings  comparable,  I  force  the  rival  findings  
into  the  standardized  mould  that  I  used  to  describe  the  effects  of  the  mechanisms  I  had  observed  
myself. 
 
Table  4-1:  Standardised  mould  for  describing  the  effect  of  each  of  the  mechanisms  observed 
Name  of  mechanism  (macro,  meso  or  micro  level) 
i.  effect  on  two-way  causal  link  between  Explanans  1  and  the  Explanandum 
ii.  effect  on  two-way  link  between  Explanans  1  and  Explanans  2  (causal  interaction  between  explanatory  factors) 
iii.  effect  on  two-way  link  between  Explanans  2  and  the  Explanandum 
 
The  geographical  overview  chapter  (5.0.0)  concludes  with  a  very  sketchy  tracing  of  a  general  macro  
process  of  functional  adaptation.  I  have  chosen  to  call  this  a  “macro-mechanism”  even  though  I  
agree  with  Coleman  that  it  is  actually  better  to  specify  mechanisms  at  the  most  particular  level  
conceptualised  by  one's  theory  (Figure  4.4  below).  If  this  kind  of  “macro-mechanism”  was  
everithing  I  had  to  offer,  then  it  would  have  been  an  “ecological  fallacy”.  However,  the  whole  
purpose  is  to  “unpack”  this  general  and  sketchy  explanation  by  specifying  some  of  the  more  
particular  causal  processes  it  contains. 
 In  each  of  the  following  empirical  chapter  (6.0.0-11.0.0)  I  trace  some  of  the  possible  
pathways  that  are  contained  within  the  macro-process  that  was  presented  in  the  geographical  
introduction.  Two  case  studies  provide  data  on  a  sociological  micro  level,  and  social  action  in  one  
localised  situation  feeds  into  social  action  in  other  localised  situations.  One  action  situation  is  folded  
(merged)  into  the  next,  constituting  long  chains  of  socio-ecologically  interrelated  local  situations.  
By  tracing  some  of  those  ties  between  different  situations,  I  attempt  to  observe  how  micro-
interaction  may  constitute  emergent,  networked  social  action,  a  sociological  meso-level.  Thus,  I  
zoom  in  on  the  micro-meso  link.  This  is  he  analytical  level  where  the  observed  explanatory  
mechanisms  are  being  described. 
 Finally  (12.0.0),  in  order  to  obtain  a  logically  consistent  explanation,  I  have  mobilised  
general  micro-sociological  theory  to  explain  how  the  observed  meso  relations  are  made  and  
maintained  by  social  action. 
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Figure  4-3:  Practice  networks:  the  path  that  links  each  Explanans  with  the  Explanandum 
This  model  would  apply  to  paths  ii  and  iii  in  Figure  4-1. 
 
Figure  4-4:  Coleman’s  “bathtub”  for  explanatory  mechanisms 
The  original  title  of  this  figure  is:  “Micro-  and  macro-level  propositions:  effects  of  improved  social  conditions  
on  potential  for  revolution”376 
 
 Consequently,  this  is  a  study  of  some  of  the  many  particular  pathways  whereby  the  meso  
level  emerges  from  the  micro  level.  Some  networks  are  traced  all  the  way  into  geographically  
central  locations  of  power  (nodes  of  power),  such  as  internal  negotiation-situations  within  the  
government  during  the  Alta-dam  struggle.  By  following  the  meso  networks  into  some  central  loci  of  
power,  the  study  also  traces  some  of  the  many  particular  pathways  whereby  the  macro  level  
emerges  from  meso  level.  It  must  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  actual  “web  of  causation”  is  so  
immensely  complex  that  all  explanations  are  selective,377  regardless  of  whether  the  method  is  
nomothetic  or  ideographic,  inductive  or  deductive.  My  approach  is  ideographic,  and  combines  
ideographic  moments  with  deductive  ones:  abduction.  This  approach  is  sensitive  to  specification  of  
some  possible  paths,  but  it  renders  all  generalisations  sketchy  and  tentative. 
 
 
                                                 
376  Coleman:  1998,  fig.  1.3  (see  also  Hedström  and  Ylikovski  2010:  59 
377  Krieger  2004 
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 The  pragmatic  analytical  concept  used  is  the  loosely  defined  term  “practice  network”.  This  
is  a  generic  term,  and  does  not  refer  to  any  specific  theory  of  social  networks.  Practice  networks  
may  in  practice  be  specified  in  terms  of  various  theories. 
1. Practice  networks  are  called  “adjacant  action  situations”  in  the  SES  framework.378 
2. Practice  networks  are  called  “actor-networks”  in  the  ANT  approach.379 
3. Practice  networks  are  also  a  focal  issue  for  the  postmodern  readings  of  Machiavelli.380 
This  research  has  led  me  to  perceive  the  SES  version  as  the  most  useful  one,  but  to  increase  the  
sensitivity  to  the  silenced  phenomena  that  Law  &  Singleton  refer  to  as  “surprising  forms  of  power”,  
I  have  supplemented  it  with  ANT.  Finally,  in  order  to  “control  for”  the  potential  bias  of  wishful  
thinking,  I  have  used  the  postmodern  Machiavelli.  The  various  ways  of  naming  the  observed  
practice  networks  are  not  useful  in  and  for  themselves.   
The  purpose  of  the  generic  term  “practice  network”  is  its  potential  practical  applicability.  
Practice  networks  are  integral  parts  of  a  range  of  politically  relevant  phenomena,  both  empowering  
praxes,  such  as  social  capital  and  network  governance,381  and  dis-empowering  praxes  such  as  
political  corruption382  and  network  centred  warfare.383  In  an  indigenous  homeland,  there  may  be  
complex  policy  networks,  kinship  networks  and  issue  networks,  all  entangled,  with  hybrid  zones  
between  them.  The  networked  approach  empowers  us  to  trace  those  phenomena  that  might  have  
appeared  as  irrational  anomalies  if  one  assumed  that  state  and  society  are  two  mutually  exclusive,  
internally  coherent  systems.  The  practical  applicable  point  is  that  observation  of  network  practices  
is  not  only  relevant  to  the  art  and  science  of  policy  making,  but  also  for  the  art  and  science  of  
making  polities:  practice  networks  are  the  pathways  whereby  constituent  empowerment  maintains  




4.4.0  Research  techniques:  the  production  line 
 
Abductive  research  emerges  through  the  mutual  influence  between  selected  coding  categories  (that  
also  guide  data  selection),  and  the  selected  empirical  data  (that  also  guide  category  selection).  In  
                                                 
378  McGinnis  2010;;  McGinnis  2011a 
379  Latour  2004;;  Law  &  Singleton  2012 
380  Althusser  1998;;  Althusser  2003;;  Deleuze  &  Guattari  1980;;  Delueuze  2006;;  Negri  2002  (1992);;  Negri  2006  (1981).  
The  latter  has  been  translated  to  Norwegian,  as  Negri  2003  (1981). 
381  Ostrom  &  Ahn  2003;;  Jordan  &  O'Riordan  2000 
382  Della  Porta  &  Vannucci  1999 
383  Weizman  2007 
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order  to  increase  my  sensitivity  to  political-economic  conditions,  I  refer  to  this  process  as  a  
production  line.  This  is  a  material  and  semiotic  process.  I  divide  the  process  in  four  logic  stages: 
 1.  Input  (data  registration,  in  various  media) 
 2.  Analysis  (sorting  and  coding  of  registered  data)   
 3.  Synthesis  (comparison  of  coded  data  segments) 
 4.  Output  (techne  rhetorike:  composing  the  presentation) 
At  each  stage,  there  is  an  abductive  process  taking  place,  a  dialogue  between  an  empirical  or  
inductive  moment,  and  a  speculative  or  deductive  moment. 
 Already  at  stage  1,  data  registration  is  guided  by  the  physical  limitations  of  the  registration  
medium  and  the  situation,  as  well  as  by  the  observer's  perceptions  about  what  is  relevant  as  data  and  
what  is  not.  The  dialogue  between  the  empirical  reality  and  the  conditions  of  observation  produce  
the  registered  data.  In  my  case  this  data  was  in  the  form  of  photocopies  or  notes  from  historical  
archives,  photos  and  notes  from  participant  observation,  audio  recordings  and  notes  from  
interviews,  and  various  reports,  newspapers  and  literature  collected  in  the  field.  All  those  data  are  
being  “recorded”  in  some  form  or  another:  notes,  photos,  audio  recordings,  etc.384  With  regard  to  
interviews,  data  gathering  is  dialogical  in  a  literal  sense:  one  asks,  another  answers.385  The  outcome  
of  stage  1  was  recorded  data,  and  this  was  the  raw  material  for  stage  2. 
 Also  at  stage  2  there  is  a  dialogue  between  data  and  concepts.  The  raw  material  at  this  stage  
is  the  «recorded»  data  from  the  previous  stage:  notes,  photos,  audio,  or  artifacts  taken  out  of  their  
original  context.  The  analysis  starts  with  sorting  the  recorded  data  according  to  some  theoretically  
relevant  categorization.  The  analysis  continues  with  “coding”  the  recorded,  sorted  data,  by  
identifying  particular  segments  of  data,  and  describing  those  with  a  theoretically  relevant  
category.386  For  my  own  research  I  sorted  data  on  mixed  media  into  various  archive  boxes,  one  for  
sub-case  1,  other  boxes  for  each  geographical  segment  within  sub-case  2,  including  one  box  for  the  
fjord  area,  sub-case  3.  There  were  also  boxes  for  regional  and  transnational  contexts.  Field  notes  
and  interview  transcripts  were  coded  by  being  underlined  in  various  colours,  identifying  particular  
text  segments,  and  small  paper  tabs  in  the  same  colour  at  the  top  of  the  page,  indicating  that  there  
was  something  about  this  topic  on  this  page.  The  coding  colours  corresponded  with  specific  
categories  in  a  standardized  code  book,  but  this  had  to  be  revised  each  time  the  map  (theory)  did  not  
fit  the  terrain  (data).  Newspaper  articles  and  books  were  coded  with  categories  fitted  to  each  
particular  text.  Digital  photos  were  sorted  into  digital  folders.  Most  of  the  data  for  sub-case  1  were  
punched  into  a  digital  text  document.  The  data  about  particular  events  were  coded  according  to  
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what  issues  were  at  stake,  and  what  networks  of  collective  actors  were  involved.  Accordingly,  it  was  
possible  to  trace  some  possible  pathways  in  the  formation  of  political  coalitions.  The  outcome  of  
stage  2  was  a  remix  of  the  recorded  data.  They  were  disassembled,  and  reassembled.  For  example,  
chronological  field  notes  were  cut  up  and  sorted  by  geographical  area.  The  outcome  of  stage  2  was  
a  sorted  and  coded  version  of  the  recorded  data,  which  would  be  the  raw  material  for  stage  3. 
 At  stage  3,  the  dialogue  between  data  and  concepts  was  continued.  The  input  was  a  set  of  
coded,  recorded  data.  The  processing  was  a  form  of  comparison,  where  I  tried  to  follow  each  
colored  tab,  representing  a  coding  category,  across  the  various  segments  of  data  that  had  been  
underlined  with  a  coding  color  similar  to  that  of  the  tab.  For  example,  I  found  the  green  tab  
referring  to  the  politics  of  everyday  life,  and  followed  this  throughout  all  documents  in  all  archive  
boxes,  finding  observed  examples  from  each  of  the  selected  geographical  areas  within  the  
watershed.  Regarding  sub-case  1,  I  first  used  the  coded  chronology  to  write  a  historiographical  
account  (stage  4).  I  then  returned  to  stage  3,  by  making  a  historical-sociological  comparison  
between  two  emerging  political  block,  in  a  series  of  tables  that  compared  the  two  with  regard  to  a  
series  of  theoretically  relevant  variables.  The  outcome  of  stage  3  was  the  synthesis  of  the  empirical  
findings,  where  common  denominators  and  patterns  in  the  registered  data  could  be  identified.  This  
was  the  raw  material  for  stage  4. 
 Finally,  stage  4  carried  on  the  dialogue  between  data  and  concepts.  The  input  was  a  
collection  of  compared,  coded,  recorded  data.  Since  the  comparison  had  enabled  me  to  identify  
patterns  and  possibly  central  topics,  this  enabled  me  identify  some  possibly  relevant  topics  and  
“plots”  for  the  narrative.  Thus,  the  input  of  processed  empirical  information  interacted  with  the  
concern  for  communication  or  rhetorical  technique. 
 Empiricism:  Those  four  stages  constitute  one  production  line  for  information  processing.  
The  data  that  is  being  recorded  at  stage  1  is  later  being  coded  or  remixed  at  stage  2  and  then  again  
compared  across  codes  at  stage  3,  before,  in  the  end,  the  recorded,  coded,  compared  data  is  being  
used  at  stage  4  to  compose  a  written  presentation.  At  each  and  every  stage,  the  information  input  is  
being  re-contextualized.387  This  re-contextualized  information  provides  input  to  the  following  stage.  
Through  each  process  of  de-contextualization  and  re-contextualization,  the  meaning  is  being  
slightly  transformed:  information  is  being  translated  from  one  context  to  another.  Therefore,  the  
recorded,  coded,  compared  data  is  not  identical  with  the  historical  documents  or  social  interactions  
that  were  original  encountered  in  archives  or  in  the  field.  The  only  thing  that  guarantees  empirical  
reliability  is  the  continuity  of  the  production  chain  whereby  information  is  being  processed.  In  
semiotic  terms,  the  continuity  from  one  stage  to  the  other  is  indexical  signification.  Index  is  a  sign  
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that  is  being  read  as  a  trace  of  something  else,  like  smoke  may  indicate  fire.  Thus,  as  with  
empiricism,  the  observation  is  interpreted  as  product  of  a  cause,  and  thus,  as  and  indicator  of  that  
cause.  Thus,  the  production  line  has  indexical  moment,  which  is  empiricist  signification. 
 Conventionalism:  Even  if  there  is  continuity  throughout  the  whole  production  line,  there  are  
also  several  moments  were  information  is  being  processed,  and  at  each  moment  there  is  selectivity  
involved.  Already  at  stage  1  some  observations  are  being  registered  as  data  out  of  the  total  flow  of  
perception.  At  stage  2,  the  coding  selects  what  data  should  be  considered  as  having  this  or  that  
attribute.  At  stage  3,  the  comparison  selects  what  similarities  or  differences  accross  coding  
categories  should  be  seen  as  significant.  At  stage  4,  it  is  being  assessed,  almost  as  a  journalist  does,  
as  to  what  particular  plot  or  priorities  that  might  constitute  a  good  “story”  for  the  intended  public.  
All  those  selective  choices  are  guided  by  theoretical  concepts.  For  inductive  researchers,  such  
concepts  are  implicit,  flexible,  and  free  from  the  rigidity  of  specific  theoretical  approaches.  For  
those  who  apply  some  research  programs,  for  example  Marxism  or  Parsonism,  the  theoretical  
concepts  are  explicit,  rather  rigid,  but  quite  accountable.  The  abductive  researcher  may  try  to  
combine  the  flexibility  of  the  inductive  approach  with  the  accountability  of  the  deductive  approach,  
thus  selecting  from  various  theoretical  approaches,  but  being  explicit  about  from  where  the  concepts  
have  been  borrowed.  Each  of  those  three  strategies,  the  inductive,  the  deductive,  or  the  abductive,  is  
different  ways  to  try  to  ensure  conceptual  validity  in  the  production  chain.  In  semiotic  terms,  
selection  implies  that  something  is  considered  as  a  part  of  a  whole,  which  is  called  metonymical  
signification.  Metonymy  is  when  a  part  is  used  to  represent  the  whole,  for  example  when  “the  
crown”  is  being  used  wityh  reference  to  the  administrative  apparatus  of  a  kingdom.  With  
metonymical  signification,  the  relation  between  signifier  and  signifier  is  more  “arbitrary”,  or  
conventional,  than  it  is  in  the  case  of  indexical  signification.  Thus,  the  production  line  has  a  
metonymical  moment,  which  is  conventionalist  signification. 
 Those  two  functions  of  the  production  line,  the  empirical  and  the  conventional,  together  
ensure  that  data  is  being  processed,  and  findings  are  being  found.  “To  use  a  manufacturing  phrase,  I  
think  data  organization  and  analysis  is  not  crunching  or  reducing,  but  'value  adding'.  I  like  to  see  the  
process  as  the  beginning  of  'fatting  up'  the  story”.388 
The  path  from  input  to  output  is  not  always  straightforward.  Sometimes,  the  abductive  
process  at  stage  2  or  3  led  me  to  find  new  theoretical  categories  to  make  sense  of  the  actual  data,  but  
then  I  found  that  the  data  I  had  gathered  were  not  sufficient,  and  returned  to  stage  1.  The  process  
has  been  largely  separate  with  regard  to  sub-cases  1  and  2,  while  sub-case  2  and  3  became  two  
different  cases  only  during  stage  4.  During  the  process  of  writing,  I  also  found  that  there  was  a  need  
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for  a  geographical  overiview  chapter  (5.0.0),  for  which  I  decided  to  gather  quantitative  tables  and  
maps  through  the  internet  (stage  1).  Finally,  after  having  drafted  the  entire  thesis,  I  decided  to  turn  
the  abductive  gaze  towards  studying  my  own  research  process.  For  this  final  abductive  process,  the  
data  (stage  1)  was  the  drafted  thesis,  my  notes  on  the  research  process,  and  the  code  books  I  had  
discarded.  The  analysis  (stage  2)  took  place  as  an  attempt  to  find  relevant  methodological  literature  
that  could  describe  what  I  had  actually  done.  The  synthesis  (stage  3)  was  the  process  when  the  
actual  methodology,  design,  research  technique,  causal  model,  positive  findings  and  negative  
findings  were  made  clearly  explicit.  Thus,  the  thesis  manuscript  was  revised  (stage  4). 
Only  during  the  latter  two  stages,  were  the  positive  findings  and  negative  findings  from  each  
chapter  clearly  formulated,  because  it  was  only  at  this  stage  that  explicit  definition  of  methodology,  
design,  techniques  and  models  emerged.  It  was  also  at  this  stage  that  I  found  it  was  necessary  to  
“control  for”  some  potential  biases  of  my  own,  social-ecological  explanations  (and  the  biases  of  the  
canonical  indigenous  rights  literature)  by  discussing  competing,  state-centric  explanations  (and  the  




4.5.0  Selection  of  data  –  emerging  empirical  knowledge 
 
4.5.1  The  bits  and  pieces  of  data  gathering 
The  outcome  of  this  research  is  formulation  of  some  hypotheses  mechanisms,  and  those  are  
formulated  on  the  basis  of  specific  empirical  information.  The  selection  of  data,  as  also  the  selection  
of  terms,  is  the result of a gradual, abductive dialogue, between data material and coding concepts. 
Guided by general concepts about participation and movements, I started data gathering with a 
document search at the Norwegian folk Museum. From there I ventured into new terrains, and 
found different data types. When the map (code book) did not fit the terrain (data material), it was 
the map that had to be revised. However, the revised codebook actualised the need for different data 
material. The most important shift was when I realised that qualitative interviews had given scant 
access  to  the  “social  backstage”  of  those terrains that were my focus of interest. As a result, I 
returned to do participant observation, among the seemingly mundane everyday practices of local 
fisher-peasants. Participation enabled closer observation of actual customary praxes and knowledge 
praxes. Such praxes in the present also involve conflicting oral histories about the past. The struggle 
for proof became evident, and local fishers expressed concern about whose data was being used to 
investigate whose research questions. I have asked my own questions, but I wish to return and do 
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further research in those terrains. That will be possible if local fisher-peasants find that my 
observations  are  relevant  for  their  own  struggle  for  proofs.  That  is  how  I  wish  to  test  the  relevance  
of  my  inquiry. 
 
 
4.5.2  Selection  of  cases 
In  order  to  trace  some  of  the  particular  pathways  whereby  the  host  states  in  Sápmi  have  been  
transformed  during  the  latter  four  decades,  I  have  chosen  to  limit  my  research  to  three  more  
particular  areas  and  periods.  The  spatial  and  temporal  scope  is  much  more  limited  for  each  of  those  
three  indicator  examples.  In  terms  of  qualitative  methodology,  this  research  design  deals  with  one  
large,  historical-geographical  “case”  study,  within  which  three  more  particular  “sub-cases”  have  
been  selected.  The  sub-cases  have  been  selected  on  the  basis  of  theoretical  relevance,  but  not  if  this  
term  is  understood  in  purely  academic  terms.  The  selection  is  ultimately  about  public  relevance  for  
the  ongoing  deliberative  process  about  rights  and  proofs,  which  is  integral  to  the  ongoing  process  of  
state  transformation. 
 1)  Case  I:  the  Alta-dam  conflict,  ca.  1970-1982:  Initially,  the  attention  is  directed  to  the  
beginning  of  the  selected  four  decades,  and  the  watershed  located  to  the  west.  This  case  study  traces  
the  public  conflict  over  hydroelectric  development  in  the  Alta  River,  between  1970  and  1982.  This  
is  largely  seen  as  the  beginning  of  the  indigenous  rights  struggle  in  Sápmi,  and  a  crucial  event  for  
the  environmental  movement  in  the  Norwegian  host  state.  Case  I  has  been  chosen  for  its  perceived  
historical  significance. 
 2)  Case  II:  the  Laboratory  Deatnu,  ca.  1980-2012:  The  attention  then  turns  to  the  other  
watershed,  during  the  preceding  years.  Here  I  have  attempted  to  trace  some  long  term  effects  of  the  
Alta-dam  conflict  in  its  neighbouring  watershed,  at  a  local  and  particular  level.  Partly  as  a  result  of  
this,  partly  because  of  other  historical  processes,  the  Deatnu  River  has  become  a  test  area  for  
various  policies  of  bioregional  biodiversity  management.  Here  I  map  some  effects  of  
institutionalized  polities  for  indigenous  rights  and  environmental  protection,  issues  that  used  to  be  
more  marginal  during  the  Alta-dam  conflict.  Deatnu  Water  Area  is  particularly  interesting  in  this  
regard  because  it  is  shared  between  two  host  states,  but  also  located  in  the  heart  of  the  indigenous  
homeland.  Case  II  has  been  chosen  for  its  perceived  geographical  significance. 
 3)  Sub-case  within  Case  II:  the  Deanuvuotna  fishery  conflict  ca.  1980-2012:  Finally,  the  
attention  zooms  in  on  a  more  particular  geographical  scale  within  the  Dertnu  Water  Area,  
specifically  on  the  Deatnu  Fjord,  where  the  Deatnu  River  empties  into  the  Barents  Sea.  This  
particular  fjord,  called  Deanuvuotna  in  the  main  local  language,  includes  the  home  places  of  some  
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of  the  most  vocal  voices  in  the  controversy  about  indigenous  rights  for  the  Coastal  Sámi  minority.  
This  is  one  of  several  minorities  in  Sápmi,  some  of  whom  claim  that  they  are  indigenous  people  
according  to  the  UN-definition,  while  the  host  states  (still)  deny  this.  The  Coastal  Sámis  are  only  
one  of  several  such  groups,  and  Deanuvuota  is  only  one  of  several  typical  Coastal  Sámi  areas.  This  
sub-case  has  been  chosen  because  of  its  centrality  within  the  Coastal  Sámi  Rebellion,  but  also  
because  the  Coastal  Sámi  of  the  Deatnu  Water  Area  appear  to  be  one  of  the  more  vulnerable  
subaltern  classes  within  that  watershed,  and  finally,  because  of  the  bias  of  my  own  education:  I  
speak  the  language  of  the  host  state  in  this  area,  but  not  at  the  Finnish  side  of  upstream  area,  where  I  
met  other  subaltern  classes.  The  sub-case  within  Case  II  has  been  chosen  because  of  my  own  
access,  and  because  of  its  perceived  political  significance. 
 
Table  4-2:  Selected  cases:  two  adjacent  geographical  areas,  two  adjacent  historical  periods 
 Water  area  Alta Water  area  Deatnu 
Period  1970-1980 Case  I --- 
Period  1980-2010 --- Case  II 
 
Those  cases  deal  with  limited  areas  and  periods  within  a  larger  supra-case,  which  were  defined  as  
two  watersheds  and  four  decades  (Table  4.2): 
1. The  awakening  of  the  indigenous  rights  movement  between  1970  and  1980  is  traced  in  
relatively  fine-grained  detail  in  the  Alta  water  area  (river  and  fjord),  but  much  more  scarcely  
in  the  Deatnu  water  area. 
2. By  contrast,  the  institutionalization  of  indigenous  rights  and  environmental  protection  from  
1980  until  2012  is  described  in  relatively  fine  detail  in  Deatnu  area,  but  not  at  all  in  the  Alta  
watershed.  Finally,  the  study  does  zoom  in  on  the  politics  of  everyday  life  in  the  Deatnu  
Fjord,  but  not  in  the  Alta  Fjord. 
What  is  being  researched  with  regard  to  one  watershed,  remains  under-researched  with  regard  to  
the  other  one. 
 Is  this  selection  bias?  That  is  open  for  discussion.  With  regard  to  Case  I  and  Case  II  the  
selection  may  be  well  justified  by  the  fact  that  one  of  the  cases  is  historically  significant,  the  other  
geographically  significant.  Since  we  deal  with  a  process  of  decolonization,  geographical  and  
historical  significance  is  actually  no  less  political  than  what  political  significance  is.  (Historical  and  
geographical  significance  is  just  less  obviously  political.)  The  cost  of  the  case  selection  still  is  that  
the  study  remains  under-informed  about  the  past  along  Deatnu  and  about  the  present  along  Alta.  The  
benifit  of  the  same  selection  is  that  the  two  cases  provide  different  types  of  information  with  
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relevance  to  understanding  the  larger  historical-geographical  supra-case.  To  my  knowledge,  this  is  a  
good  balance  of  cost  and  benefit,  because  I  do  not  know  (maybe  I  ignore)  how  it  would  be  publicly  
controversial.  With  regard  to  the  sub-case  within  Case  II,  my  selection  may  be  more  problematic.  
The  various  areas  along  the  Barents  Coast  have  very  rich  bio-cultural  diversity,  ecologically,  
linguistically,  ethnically  –  and  politically.  By  turning  attention  to  one  fjord,  even  some  selected  
fjord-arms  within  one  fjord,  one  may  be  accused  of  silencing  the  voice  of  subalterns  inhabiting  
another  fjord  or  fjord-arm.  This  issue  will  be  discussed  when  I  assess  negative  findings  from  the  
sub-case.  In  short,  I  cannot  do  a  paired  comparison  between  indigenous  rights  politics  in  Alta  Fjord  
and  Deatnu  Fjord,  because  I  have  not  (yet)  obtained  the  trust  that  would  be  necessary  to  investigate  
a  case  where  sedentary  Sámi  stand  against  nomadic  Sámi,  which  is  the  case  in  Alta  Fjord.  Research  
is  practical  intervention,  and  getting  involved  in  such  a  way  before  trust  has  been  obtained  would  
make  me  run  the  risk  of  serving  divide  et  impera.  Instead,  of  that  comparison  I  have  done  a  
triangulation  with  the  indigenous  rights  movement  in  a  third  fjord,  Kåfjord.  In  that  area,  local  
subalterns  have  found  so-called  “integrating  issue  areas”389.  I  would  rather  call  it  joint  struggle.  The  
experience  from  Kåfjord  will  fuel  the  discussion  about  negative  findings  in  sub-case  3. 
 
Figure  4-5:  The  dynamics  of  contention  as  a  cycle  of  constituent  power  and  constituted  power 
The  figure  shows  mutual  causation  of  (constituted)  opportunities  and  (constituent)  mobilisation.390 
 
 What  do  the  cases  indicate?  Keeping  the  possibility  of  selection  bias  in  mind,  we  may  ask  in  
each  sub-case:  what  it  is  a  case  of,  or  what  are  they  supposed  to  indicate  regarding  the  object  of  
study.  Each  sub-case  has  been  selected  because  it  is  perceived  as  a  significant  example  of  various  
sides  of  the  larger  historical-geographical  transformation.  If  we  emphasize  the  historical  or  temporal  
dimension,  we  may  define  the  sub-cases  as  examples  of  different  historical  processes.  These  may  be  
classified  according  to  a  general  model  of  social  change,  shown  in  Figure  4.4.  The  figure  shows  the  
interplay  between  action  and  structure.  In  sociology,  this  theme  is  supposedly  so  general  that  the  
figure  can  be  seen  as  being  agnostic  with  regard  to  the  selection  of  theoretical  approach.  Still,  it  
does  emphasize  conflict:  action  in  the  form  of  contention  (resistance),  and  structure  in  the  form  of  
                                                 
389  Pedersen  &  Høgmo  2012 
390  Similar  models  of  mutual  causality  is  found  in  della  Porta  2013:  18-21  and  della  Porta  2014:  14-22 
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institutionalization  (hegemony).  As  such  it  is  supposed  to  be  an  alternative  and  a  corrective  to  an  
already  existing  model  describing  “the  dynamics  of  contention”.391  That  model  traces  dynamics  
between  “insiders”  and  “outsiders”  to  political  systems,  but  such  a  model  takes  the  political  system  
itself  as  being  a  constant.  For  research  on  state  transformation  the  political  system  is  not  constant,  
and  therefore  I  prefer  the  terms  “institutionalization”  and  “contention”  to  describe  the  poles  in  the  
dynamics  of  contention.  (Still,  the  model  is  theoretically  agnostic.)  The  selected  sub-cases  
exemplify  various  moments  in  the  open-ended  and  unfinished  dynamics  of  contention. 
 
Figure  4-6:  Cases  I  and  II  as  indicators  of  the  dynamics  of  contention  in  the  object  of  study 
 
Figure  4.6  starts  in  1970,  with  the  institutional  situation  and  (A1),  and  the  contention  it  provoked  
(B1).  Both  are  exemplified  with  Case  I,  about  the  Alta-dam  conflict.  This  case  traces  one  well-
known  example  of  that  dynamic,  but  it  largely  ignores  how  the  tension  was  played  out  in  the  Deatnu  
watershed,  especially  at  the  Finnish  side  of  the  state  border.  The  figure  continues  with  indicating  
how  the  contention,  in  turn,  shaped  the  emerging  institutional  situation  in  the  2000s  (A2),  and  how  
this,  in  turn,  shapes  contemporary  contentions  (B2).  The  emergence  of  a  new  institutional  situation,  
(the  one  called  A2)  is  being  exemplified  in  Case  II.  This  case  maps  the  policy  process  in  one  
watershed  that  is  relevant  to  demonstrate  the  consequences  for  a  stateless,  transnational  nation,  
which  had  previously  been  divided  under  the  former  institutional  situation  (the  one  called  A1).  Still,  
the  case  largely  ignores  how  institutionalization  has  taken  place  in  the  neighbouring  Alta  watershed,  
which  is  not  divided  by  state  boundaries,  though  is  still  located  in  the  spatial  intersection  between  a  
host  state  and  an  indigenous  homeland.  Finally,  the  contemporary  contention  (the  one  called  B2)  is  
being  exemplified  in  the  sub-case  within  Case  II.  This  sub-case  zooms  in  to  explore  everyday  
resistance  and  political  mobilization  among  the  Coastal  Sámi  in  Deatnu  Fjord.  This  may  be  taken  as  
one  of  several  examples  of  social  groups  who  consider  themselves  indigenous,  but  (still)  are  being  
denied  such  rights  by  the  host  states.  Other  such  groups  include  Eastern  Sámis,  Kväns  and  
                                                 
391  McAdam,  Tarrow,  Tilly  2001 
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Lappalainen.  As  mentioned  above,  I  am  aware  that  my  choice  of  focus  for  the  selected  sub-case  
might  be  contested,  and  this  issue  will  be  handled  in  that  case  study.  In  sum,  the  selectd  (sub)  cases  
are  examples  of  two  proceeding  institutional  situations  (A1,  A2),  that  provoked  proceeding  cycles  
of  contention  (B1,  B2).  This  is  not  to  say  that  A1  is  the  only  relevant  cause  of  B1,  and  likewise,  it  is  
not  to  say  that  B1  is  the  only  relevant  cause  of  A2,  and  so  on.  For  the  particular  genealogical  line  
that  I  have  chosen  to  trace,  there  are  also  lots  of  exogenous  factors.  Also,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  
A1  situation  had  been  formed  by  earlier  rounds  of  contention,  which  had  taken  place  prior  to  the  
temporal  limitation  chosen  for  my  present  research.  Likewise,  B2  is  not  the  end  of  history,  and  will  
probably  have  some  impact  on  future  rounds  of  institutionalization.  In  another  research,  I  have  
inquired  the  political  sociology  of  the  500  years  of  colonial  history  that  took  place  under  the  
Norwegian  host  state  before  the  Alta-dam  conflict.392  The  present  research  has  a  more  particular  
focus,  specifying  some  of  the  causal  paths  during  the  latter  four  decades,  in  two  watersheds.  
However,  as  all  other  social  or  ecological  research  on  this  contentious  issue,  mine  will  also  be  used,  




4.5.3  Selection  of  data 
Since  the  chosen  research  strategy  is  ideographic  and  abductive,  the  methods  have  to  be  sensitive  to  
specificity  (more  than  generality)  and  it  has  to  be  hypothesis-developing  (rather  than  hypothesis-
testing).  Thus,  the  methods  can  be  used  to  specify  some  possible  causes  (rather  than  to  generalize  
about  some  probable  causes).  At  the  continuum  between  ideographic  and  nomothetical  methods,  I  
have  chosen  to  operate  close  to  the  ideographic  pole.  Since  I  study  a  process  of  spatial  political  
transformation,  the  research  can  be  characterized  as  regional  geography  (rather  than  analytical  
geography). 
 Little  quantitative  data  has  been  used  for  this  research.  The  geographical  overview  chapter  
(5.0.0)  uses  some  descriptive  statistics  to  present  the  object  of  study  at  large.  These  are  published  
data  accessible  via  the  internet.  Municipal  election  statistics  were  found  at  Statistics  Norway  and  
Statistics  Finland.  Maps  representing  Geographical  Information  Systems  (GIS)  were  accessible  
from  UN-GRID  and  the  EU  Environmental  Agency.  These  are  credible  sources,  and  I  assume  that  
the  (quantitative)  analysis  is  reliable.  I  therefore  have  proceeded  directly  to  the  (qualitative)  
interpretation  of  the  tables  and  maps.  It  should  be  mentioned  that  I  searched  for  relevant  
information  in  the  European  Social  Survey,  without  finding  anything.  I  ran  some  simple  regressions  
                                                 
392  Jensen  2013 
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on  socio-economic  data,  but  the  number  of  respondents  in  the  relevant  municipalities  was  too  small  
to  give  any  significant  correlations. 
 Much  qualitative  data  was  used  for  the  three  (sub)  cases.  Those  are  more  specific  than  the  
object  of  study  at  large,  and  were  chosen  to  enable  increased  specification  of  possible  causal  
factors.  For  Cases  I  and  II,  I  have  combined  historiography  and  ethnography,  two  methods  that  
traditionally  tend  to  be  most  ideographic.  Historiography  and  ethnography  have  co-evolved  with  
topography,  and  are  therefore  close  to  regional  geography.  The  justification  for  this  methodological  
choice  is  the  need  for  specification,  but  the  actual  reason  is  that  those  are  the  methods  that  I  am  
capable  to  using  more  efficiently.  Throughout  the  research,  the  two  methods  have  been  blended  to  
varying  degrees,  as  a  method  of  historical  ethnography.  The  primary  sources  are  archive  studies,  
qualitative  interviews,  participant  observation,  newspaper  debates,  official  documents,  photography,  
and  visits  to  collections  of  cultural  artefacts.  The  secondary  sources  are  much  of  the  relevant  
scholarly  literature  on  each  of  the  threem  (sub)  cases;;  at  least  most  of  what  is  published  in  
languages  I  can  access.  See  Table  4.3  for  a  summary  of  the  variosu  forms  of  data  sources  used  for  
this  study. 
 
Table  4-3:  Forms  of  data  sources  for  this  study 





official  policy  documents 
photography 
museum  collections  of  artefacts 
Relevant  scholarly  literature 
(only  in  English  or  Scandinavian  
languages,not  Northern  Sámi,   
Southern  Sámi,  Eastern  Sámi,   




European  Environment  Agency 
European  Social  Survey 
 
The  data  was  sorted  and  analysed  in  different  ways  for  each  of  the  empirical  chapters.  The  different  
chapters  use  data  according  to  the  norms  and  habits  of  different  disciplines.  Two  chapters  are  
geographical.  Two  chapters  are  sociological.  One  is  historical.  One  is  anthropological.  One  chapter  
deals  with  political  science  in  the  traditional  sense.  All  the  disciplines  belong  to  European  political  
and  social  science  at  large.  However,  chapters  that  are  disciplined  according  to  different  traditions  
use  the  data  and  present  the  result  in  slightly  different  ways. 
 Chapter  5,  the  geographical  introduction,  is  based  on  interpretation  of  aggregate  data:  the  
GIS  maps  and  the  municipal  statistics.  They  are  interpreted  in  terms  of  landscape  ecology. 
 Chapter  6  is  the  first  part  of  Case  I,  and  is  a  social  history.  Here  I  include  much  data  from  
secondary  sources,  which  has  been  accumulated  through  the  existing  historiography  in  the  field.  
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However,  in  order  to  fill  some  gaps,  I  have  researched  some  primary  sources.  In  particular,  I  wished  
to  include  more  social  history.  The  data  was  sorted  and  presented  by  implicit  use  of  sociological  
concepts,  as  is  the  norm  in  social  history.393 
 Chapter  7  is  the  second  part  of  Case  I,  and  this  is  a  historical  sociology.  It  is  based  on  
exactly  the  same  data  as  the  previous  chapter,  but  here  the  focus  changes  from  description  to  
analysis.  Thus,  the  sociological  concepts  are  no  longer  used  implicitly  to  sort  the  bits  of  
information,  but  explicitly,  to  analyse  the  structure  and  process  that  was  contained  in  the  historical  
narrative. 
 Chapter  8  is  a  geographical  bridge,  which  traces  some  links  between  Case  I  and  Case  II.  
This  is  based  on  historical  and  ethnographical  data,  gathered  for  Cases  I  and  II,  but  they  are  also  
combined  with  secondary  sources  regarding  institutionalisation  in  the  two  states  that  are  present  in  
the  chosen  water  areas. 
 Chapter  9  is  the  first  part  of  Case  I,  and  this  is  political  science  in  the  traditional  sense.  The  
sources  are  policy  documents,  and  those  are  used  to  trace  the  genealogy  of  some  specific  policy  
processes.  The  data  gives  information  about  the  emergence  of  a  bioregional  regime  for  natural  
resources  management,  even  though  this  bio-region  has  been  divided  by  the  actually  existing  
separatism:  the  unilateral  policies  of  the  existing  uni-national  states.  The  data  is  limited  to  formal  
rules,  but  with  this  strict  topical  limitation,  it  is  possible  to  map  institutions  with  a  wide  
topographical  scope. 
 Chapter  10  is  the  second  part  of  Case  II,  and  it  is  political  sociology.  The  data  includes  
qualitative  interviews  and  local  newspapers,  combined  with  some  observational  data.  This  data  
allows  the  analysis  to  venture  beyond  the  formal  rules  and  the  policy  networks,  and  also  include  
some  informal  rules  and  some  issue  networks.  This  is  topically  wider  than  Chapter  9,  and  therefore  
this  chapter  turns  to  a  topographically  more  limited  scope:  the  Deatnu  fjord. 
 Chapter  11  is  the  third  part  of  Case  II,  and  this  is  political  anthropology.  The  data  includes  
field  notes  and  photographs  from  participant  observation.  This  data  gathering  technique  allowed  me  
to  access  social  interaction  in  some  situations  at  the  social  “back  stage”.  Thus  I  gathered  some  
examples  of  the  politics  of  everyday  life.  This  allowed  me  to  go  beyond  civil  society  activism  that  
make  claims  vis  a  vis  states.  It  also  allowed  me  to  discuss  various  issues  regarding  constituent  
praxes  that  maintain  and  develop  state  law  and/or  indigenous  law  in  Coastal  Sápmi. 
 This  multi-disciplinary  method  has  been  fruitful.  Case  I  is  based  on  a  combination  of  social  
history  and  historical  sociology.  In  this  way  I  seek  to  keep  the  sociological  analysis  informed  by  the  
challenges  of  the  historical  method,  while  at  the  same  time,  being  explicit  about  what  sociological  
                                                 
393  Burke  1993 
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terms  that  have  been  used  to  sort  bits  of  data  in  the  historical  narrative.  Case  II  is  based  on  three  
different  approaches  to  political  fieldwork,  traditionally  at  home  in  political  science,  political  
sociology  and  political  anthropology.  Each  approach  has  its  strengths  and  weaknesses  regarding  
data  access  and  analysis.  Participant  observation  allowed  me  to  study  the  politics  of  everyday  life  in  
more  detail,  but  the  bits  of  information  are  very  selective  and  fragmented.  Analysis  of  policy  
documents  allowed  me  to  trace  the  emergence  of  bioregional  management  regimes  at  large,  but  
topically  limited  to  state-certified  rules.  The  qualitative  interviews  and  newspaper  debates  typical  to  
political  sociology  help  identify  contentious  issues,  but  give  limited  access  to  the  social  “back  
stage”.  Taken  together,  both  Case  I  and  Case  II  are  based  on  relatively  rich  data.  They  are  sewn  
together  with  two  geographical  chapters,  one  based  on  myopic  qualitative  data  from  the  two  case  
studies,  another  based  on  panoramic  descriptive  statistics  from  official  databanks. 
 The  selection  of  methods,  together  with  the  selection  of  indicator  cases,  was  meant  to  
contribute  to  a  slight  decrease  in  our  collective  ignorance  regarding  some  particular  issues  of  
relevance  to  the  larger  historical-geographical  transformation.  These  ideographic  methods  are  
sensitive  to  specification  of  possible  causal  factors.  However,  they  are  useless  for  generalization  
about  probable  causes.  I  pursue  the  path  trodden  by  Elinor  Ostrom:  first,  specify  some  possibilities  
ethnographically,  then,  test  some  probabilities  in  the  lab. 
 
 
4.5.4  Reproduction  of  colonial  bias? 
My  intention  to  break  with  colonial  biases  is  not  enough  to  really  do  it.  For  each  of  the  three  sub-
cases,  I  identify  some  issues  that  remain  under-researched.  This  collective  ignorance  may  be  a  
colonial  bias.  I  observe  such  biases  in  my  own  research  as  well  as  in  the  research  of  others. 
 I  will  now  shortly  review  how  biases  are  being  reproduced  in  my  own  research,  and  how  I  
attempt  to  partially  overcome  some  of  it. 
 All  those  data  sources  imply  selective  filtering  already  at  the  moment  when  they  arrive  to  
me  as  “primary”  data.  I  have  had  better  access  to  some  data  sources  than  to  others,  and  I  have  
judged  the  relevance  of  each  source  there  and  then  in  the  act  of  gathering  data.  All  collected  data  
has  been  sorted  and  coded,  what  I  call  analysis.  Thereafter,  the  coded  segments  of  data  have  been  
compared  in  order  to  identify  patterns,  what  I  call  synthesis.  In  the  end  the  synthesized,  coded  data  
has  been  used  compose  written  presentations  of  the  findings.  Through  each  of  those  stages,  there  
was  a  selective  filtering  of  the  empirical  input. 
 The  criteria  for  filtering  were  by  concepts  and  habits  that  I  acquired  as  a  result  of  other  input  
from  various  experiences.  Examples  may  be  the  coding  concepts  “anti-dam  coalition”  and  
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“reciprocities”,  both  of  which  are  taken  from  the  existing  literature  on  the  same  or  similar  cases.  
Another  example  may  be  my  own  formation,  which  include  and  exclude  specific  language  skills  
and  specific  national  historiographies. 
 Therefore,  there  is  a  strong  degree  of  continuity  between  the  existing  scholarly  literature  in  
the  field,  and  the  opportunity  structure  I  possess  to  make  new  findings  in  the  same  field.  There  is  
historical  path  dependency,  a  scholastic  tradition  that  has  been  kept  alive  through  its  practical  
symbiosis  with  specific  political  traditions.  The  path  dependency  is  the  already  accumulated  
empirical  information,  and  the  already  established  theoretical  models,  both  implying  an  
accumulation  of  some  priorities  over  others.  One  strong  but  minor  tendency  is  the  established  
scholarship  produced  by  the  Sámi  human  rights  movement.  Another,  stronger  and  major  tendency  is  
the  reified  nationalist  assumptions  of  much  Nordic  social  science.  Some  subalterns  may  find  
themselves  silenced  by  both,  for  example  those  Coastal  Sámi  fjord  fishers  who  have  Kvän  ethnicity  
and  do  not  speak  Sámi. 
 Such  is  the  reproduction  of  colonial  bias  in  the  social  sciences.  This  reproduction  is  likely  to  
be  among  the  unobserved  determinants  of  selection  bias  in  all  scientific  studies  dealing  with  the  
Sápmi  region,  and  my  own  study  is  no  exception.  However,  inspired  by  Bourdieu  (1977),  I  strive  to  
observe  the  limitations  of  my  own  observation.  This  is  what  I  have  called  «residual»  in  my  own  
causal  model.  As  in  quantitative  studies,  the  residual  can  be  merely  estimated,  never  truly  measured:  
there  is  no  way  to  measure  the  difference  between  the  observed  value  and  the  unobserved,  real  
value,  because  the  unobserved  value  remains  unobserved.394  Therefore,  quantitative  analysts  strive  
to  measure  their  own  measurement  error  through  estimates.  I  try  to  do  a  qualitative  equivalant  to  
that,  and  consequently,  I  have  adapted  critical  realism  as  epistemological  stance.  By  discussing  the  




4.6.0  Selection  of  coding  concepts  –  emerging  explanatory  model 
 
The hypothetical mechanisms that are the outcome of this research are formulated in specific 
theoretical terms. The selection of terms and of data is the result of a gradual, abductive dialogue, 
between coding concepts and data material. My first tentative data gathering for this study, at the 
Norwegian Folk Museum, was guided by concepts that were quite different from those I finally 
chose, to formulate the mechanisms. When the data I had gathered did not fit the code book, it was 
                                                 
394  Skog  1998:  130,  140,  158 
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the map that did not fit the terrain. Consequently, I had revised the map, not the terrain, or the code 
book, not the data material. However, with the revised codebook I also started to search for other 
kinds of observations. 
 Some of this abductive process has already been described in Chapter 2, as an introduction 
to the practical background for the thesis. Constituent power is a phenomenon where art and science, 
practice and theory are closely integrated. Chapter 2 presents my actual reasons why I ended up 
with combining concepts and methods from three particular approaches: the SES framework, the 
ANT approach, and a moderate dosage of the postmodern Machiavelli. To make this particular 
combination researchable, Chapter 3 specified them in geographical and praxiological terms. That 
was actually how I adapted the approaches when out in the field: geography and praxis came first, 
the concepts and methods later. The process resulted in an emerging theoretical approach. A 




4.7.0  Main  findings 
 
4.7.1  From  generalizability  to  transferability 
This  study  has,  strictly  speaking,  no  “universe  of  generality”  at  all,  to  again  use  a  term  from  
probabilisrtic  methodology.  Such  a  qualitative  study  says  nothing  about  probability,  but  it  probably  
says  something  about  possibility. 
 For  a  quantitative  causal  analysis,  the  universe  of  generality  would  be  the  particular,  
spatially  and  temporally  bounded  population  of  units  from  where  a  statistically  representative  
sample  of  units  had  been  drawn.  For  qualitative,  historiographical  narratives,  a  universe  of  
generalizatio  may  be  a  specific  instance  of  something  taking  place.395  In  the  former  case,  one  may  
have  not  falsified  that  all  swans  of  the  population  probably  are  white;;  in  the  latter  case,  one  may  
verify  that  a  black  swan  is  possible.  The  presence  of  a  black  swan  was  proven  when  Steinar  
Pedersen  found  documentation  at  least  in  some  areas  and  periods,  the  word  “Colonie”  was  used  
explicitly  in  the  administration  of  Sápmi.396  Such  black  swans  do  not  exist  in  my  dissertation.  The  
design  has  given  the  opportunity  to  specify  some  possible  causal  factors.  For  me,  it  is  probable  that  
each  particular  observation  is  rather  reliable,  but  that  does  not  imply  anything  about  the  relative  
weight  of  each  causal  variable.  The  particular  bits  and  pieces  of  data  are  not  selected  according  to  
                                                 
395  Hellevik  1991:48 
396  That  is,  at  least  in  Finnmark  County,  and  at  least  from  the  1820s  and  for  an  undefined  period,  see:  Pedersen  1999 
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probabilistic  procedures.  Therefore,  the  data  cannot  be  used  to  generalize  about  anything.  Strictly  
speaking,  we  cannot  even  generalize  within  the  three  selected  sub-cases.  Data  from  historical  
archives  provide  information  about  specific  junctures  in  specific  causal  processes  –  but  other  parts  
of  the  actual  web  of  causation  remain  hidden  in  obscurity.  Data  from  participant  observation  
provide  a  few  samples  from  actual  everyday  resistance  –  but  there  is  no  way  of  knowing  how  
typical  they  are,  neither  is  there  any  way  to  delimitate  the  population  they  may  or  may  not  be  
typical  of.  (Such  issues  may  be  equally  problematic  for  biological  fieldworks  as  for  anthropological  
fieldworks.) 
 When  Ostrom  states  that  “(s)tudying the dynamics of SESs is a mayor priority for future 
work”, she also suggests that this should be done at multiple temporal and spatial scales.397 This is 
relevant for the object of my study. State transformation in the two watersheds Alta and Deatnu 
during the four decades 1970-2010 is actually a result of many causal chains, effective at various 
spatial scales and in various temporal speeds. Therefore, the way forward may be to supplement 
historical ethnography with a blend of spatial analysis and quantitative history. That would be 
methodologically challenging, and include both time series and cluster sampling. So far, that is far 
too ambitious, even with to the two selected watersheds during the four selected decades. 
 The  present  study  specifies  assorted  possibilities  for  action  (positive  findings)  and  assorted  
limitations  to  knowledge  (negative  findings).  Unlike  the  “hard”  scientist,  I  have  not  analyzed  any  
universe  of  generalization,  but  like  the  early  modern  natural  historian  I  have  collected  a  curiosa  
cabinet  of  exceptional  wonders,  in  order  to  expand  what  we  acknowledge  as  possible.  Those  
findings  could  potentially  be  further  investigated  in  future  expeditions.  Maybe  some  lone  outfield  
practitioner  might  wish  to  venture  into  the  plains  to  further  develop  some  of  the  hypotheses  here  
suggested.  Maybe  some  indigenous  rights  institution  might  wish  to  do  a  nomothetical  study  about  
the  probability  or  prevalence  of  some  selected  causal  factors. 
 There  may  very  well  be  replicability  or  transferability,  even  if  there  is  no  generalizability,  
and  this  is  crucial.  For  ethnographic  fieldwork,  the  ultimate  test  of  internal  validity  is  if  the  findings  
can  be  replicated  by  others  doing  participant  observation  in  the  same  field.  For  historiographic  
narratives,  other  historians  working  on  the  same  documents  may  find  another  explanation.  In  either  
case,  the  test  is  rather  limited,  and  may  remain  bounded  by  the  disciplinary  tradition,  with  all  its  
biases.  However,  that  is  no  different  from  causal  analysis,  where  the  explanatory  model  is  deduced,  
nor  from  inductive,  quantitative  grounded  theory,  where  the  data  have  been  selected  beforehand. 
 
 
                                                 
397  Potete,  Janssen  &  Ostrom  2010:  244 
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4.7.2  Summary  of  the  findings 
The  negative  findings  on  possible  measurement  biases  may  be  interesting  in  themselves,  because  
they  suggest  what  might  be  some  of  our  collective  biases  yet  to  be  overcome. 
 The  positive  findings  on  possible  causal  factors  (table  4.7),  however,  are  not  interesting  in  
themselves,  because  they  should  not  be  interpreted  in  isolation  from  the  negative  findings. 
 Causal  analysis  should  not  be  interpreted  in  isolation  from  the  estimation  of  measurement  
errors.  The  same  is  the  case  for  specification  of  possible  causal  factors  and  possible  biases. 
 
Table  4-4:  The  mechanisms  discussed  in  this  study 
 Mechanisms  from  empirical  chapters Mechanisms  from  theoretical  discussion 
Macro:  structure 1.  Ecological  adaptation  of  state 
2.  Maintaining  parallel  order 
I.  Geo-strategical  fortunes  (stabilized  Fortuna) 
Meso:  praxis  nets 3.  Ambiguous  adaptations 
4.  Struggle  to  define  present  hegemony 
5.  Struggle  for  future  agenda-setting 
6.  Resources  decide  * 
II.  Asymmetrical  interactive  (de)escalation 
III.  Diplomatic  face  saving 
IV.  Strategical  securitisation  * 
Micro:  action 7.  Mobilize  resources  and  frames V.  Realize  the  potentials  (creative  Virtù) 
        *)  Note:  these  two  mechanisms  need  special  caution  and  care  from  transformative  movements 
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5.1.0  Chapter  introduction 
 
This  is  the  first  empirical  chapter  in  this  inquiry  of  state  transformation  in  the  Hight  North.  Here  I  
will  interpret  aggregate  data  that  indicate  some  general  features  of  this  historical-geographical  
process  at  large.  This  first  chapter  zooms  out,  giving  an  overview  in  low  resolution.  The  following  
empirical  chapters  will  zoom  in,  to  trace  some  particular  causal  links  in  high  resolution.  This  first  
chapter  presents  the  general  landscape  geography  of  the  selected  cases.  It  operates  at  the  level  of  
social-ecological  systems  in  the  SES  framework.  Consequently,  the  actual  constituted  order  is  being  
mapped  in  terms  of  social-ecological  systems  or  landscape  geography.  The  other  empirical  chapters  
will  deal  with  the  specific  pathways  of  collective  action  within  the  selected  cases.  They  will  turn  to  
the  level  of  particular  action  situations  in  the  SES  framework.  They  trace  some  actual  constituent  
praxes  in  the  form  of  socio-material  knowledge  praxes  and  customary  praxes  as  constituent  
practices.  Thus  the  other  empirical  chapters  will  zoom  in  the  focus  on  some  of  the  particular  nuts  
and  bolts  that  constitute  the  more  general  process  dealt  with  in  the  present  chapter.  After  all  the  
empirical  chapters,  in  the  final  theoretical  discussion,  I  will  leave  this  explanatory  framework,  and  
discuss  the  relative  usefulness  of  a  competing  theory.  There  I  will  discuss  macro  process  and  micro  
mechanisms  in  terms  of  clear-cut  state-centered  “realism”.  In  that  chapter  I  will  map  some  aspects  
of  the  constituted  order  that  the  present  chapter  looks  away  from:  military  history  and  geostrategical  
theatres.  There  I  will  also  discuss  some  explanatory  mechanisms  of  constituent  praxes  as  coercive  
force,  which  I  have  not  taken  into  account  in  my  empirical  chapters.  That  final  discussion  is  
intended  to  “control  for”  the  potential  bias  of  wishful  thinking  in  this  first  empirical  chapter.  
However,  this  first  empirical  chapter  is  meant  to  demonstrate  that  landscape  ecology  does  matter,  
and  the  other  empirical  chapters  are  meant  to  demonstrate  that  cooperative  action  does  matter,  and  
together  they  are  meant  to  refute  reductionistic  misuse  of  state-centered  realism. 
 The  present  chapter  is  empirical,  even  though  it  merely  sketches  an  overview  at  low  
resolution.  It  also  makes  use  of  implicit  causal  models  that  have  guided  the  selection  of  data. 
For  historical  geography,  as  also  for  history  or  causal  analysis,  all  selection  of  data  has  to  be  guided  
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by  some  theoretical  interest,398  which  in  turn,  is  guided  by  practical  use  values.399 
 The  empirical  basis  for  this  chapter  is  very  basic  interpretation  of  GIS  (geographical  
information  systems),  visually  represented  in  maps,  and  combined  with  very  basic  descriptive  
statistics  about  municipal  election  results.  This  data  is  freely  accessible  on  the  internet.  The  use  of  
election  statistics  is  inspired  by  the  tradition  of  comparative  electoral  research,  which  was  funded  
by  Rokkan's  early  work.  I  have  also  tried  to  use  socio-economic  data,  from  the  European  Social  
Survey,  about  the  municipalities  that  are  formally  defined  as  the  Sámi  administrative  area,  but  the  
respondents  in  those  municipalities  were  too  few  to  give  any  significant  correlations.  The  maps  give  
visual  representations  spatial  data,  thus  they  are  a  form  of  geographical  information  systems  (GIS).  
The  maps  were  selected  intuitively,  as  a  seemingly  inductive  exploration  of  descriptive  statistics.  In  
fact,  however,  my  selection  was  guided  by  habits  I  had  learned  (habitus)  from  previous  work  on  
landscape  geography.400  I  selected  data  of  relevance  to  resource  geography  and  cultural  geography;;  
two  main  directions  in  the  landscape  geography  tradition.401  The  maps  are  products  of  systematic  
data  gathering  and  analysis,  and  the  maps  all  come  from  trustworthy  sources,  mostly  from  UN-
GRID.    My  own  use  of  the  GIS  data  is  very  simple:  I  assumed  that  the  (quantitative)  analysis  was  
reliable,  and  I  proceeded  directly  to  the  (qualitative)  interpretation.  In  addition  to  register  data  in  the  
form  of  GIS  and  election  results,  I  also  tried  to  ascertain  whether  the  European  Social  Survey  
indicate  anything  about  socio-economic  conditions.  However,  the  number  of  respondents  in  the  
selected  municipalities  was  too  small  to  give  significant  results.  Also,  it  would  have  been  difficult  to  
measure  actual  socio-economic  conditions  in  an  area  where  many  people  rely  on  a  component  of  
subsistence  economy  and  traditional  reciprocity  systems.  Some  might  miss  socio-cultural  data  about  
the  relative  number  of  indigenous  and  non-indigenous  citizens  in  the  area,  but  this  is  even  more  
difficult  to  measure.  When  most  people  have  more  or  less  mixed  ethnic  and  cultural  belongings,  
then    subjective  or  situational  factors  will  easily  determine  who  present  themselves  as  indigenous  or  
not.402  The  fishery  researcher  Einar  Eithorsson  has  used  registered  voters  in  the  Sámi  parliament  as  
an  indicator,  and  he  also  discusses  the  limitations  and  validity  problems  with  this  indicator.403 
 At  the  end  of  the  day,  all  selection  of  data  about  macro  conditions  has  to  be  guided  by  
theoretical  interest,  which  in  turn,  is  guided  by  practical  use  values.  This  is  the  case  for  my  
unsuccessful  attempt  to  measure  socio-economic  and  socio-ecological  variables,  as  well  as  my  more  
successful  discussion  of  local  electoral  preferences,  and  indeed  the  GIS-overview  over  particular  
environmental  conditions.  Even  when  I  thought  I  worked  inductively,  the  choices  were  guided  by  
                                                 
398  Carr  1987  (1961);;  Holt-Jensen  2006:31 
399  Klemsdal  2000;;  Carr  1987  (1961):  Appendix:  “Notes  towards  a  second  edition  of  What  is  History?” 
400  Jensen  2002 
401  Holt-Jensen  2007:82 
402  Eriksen  2010 
403  Eyþórsson  2008:  Chpt.  1  (see  in  particular  Tables  1  and  2  at  pp.  21  and  23) 
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habitually  learned  preferences  for  particular  aspects  of  the  geographical  environment.  In  retrospect,  
I  realized  that  my  selection  of  GIS  sources  was  informed  by  my  earlier  formation.  In  particular,  I  
had  been  more  interested  in  landscape  geography  than  in  other  forms  of  geographical  information.  
The  most  conspicuous  omission  may  be  the  lack  of  information  about  geo-strategical  theatres.  My  
panorama  highlights  some  particular  features  of  the  geographical  environment,  but  not  others.  The  
features  that  are  highlighted  are  those  of  particular  direct  relevance  to  the  indigenous  human  rights  
movement  and  other  environmental  justice  movements.  There  is,  for  example,  an  affinity  between  
my  own  empirical  orientation  and  that  of  the  Sámi  Righs  Commission:  in  both  cases,  traditional  use  
of  natural  resources  is  highlighted.  In  retrospect  I  have  found  a  similar  orientation  in  Elinor  
Ostrom's  research,  and  consequently,  I  have  adapted  her  SES  framework  as  an  explanatory  model.  
Landscape  geography  is  a  way  to  observe  the  “social-ecological  systems”  and  its  various  
components.  What  Osrom  calls  “resource  system”  corresponds  with  resource  geography.  What  she  
calls  “governance  system”  includes  both  informal  and  formal  rules,  and  therefore  it  includes  both  
cultural  geography  as  well  as  the  geography  of  state  formation.  What  I  attempt  to  explain  is  state  
transformation.  Thus,  the  phenomena  that  I  define  as  Explanandum  are  only  some  of  the  
phenomena  that  Ostrom  defines  as  governance  system,  which,  in  turn,  is  only  one  component  of  the  
social-ecological  system.  In  this  chapter,  I  try  to  explain  state  transformation,  which  can  be  defined  
as  “changes  in  the  formal  rules  within  the  governance  system  of  a  socio-ecological  system”.  Those  
changes  are  traced  at  a  general  macro-level,  as  the  preliminary  outcome  of  progressive  or  
evolutionary  adaptation  to  the  state's  environment  within  the  socio-ecological  system.  Since  I  have  
defined  the  analytical  system  boundaries  in  a  way  that  delimitated  the  formal  rules,  as  
Explanandum,  all  the  other  components  of  the  socio-ecological  system  appear  as  the  environment  of  
the  defined  system.  This  environment  then  consists  of  the  following  two  components:  cultural  
geography,  which  refers  to  the  informal  rules  of  the  actual  governance  system,  and  resource  
geography,  which  refers  to  the  resource  system. 
 Whether  or  not  it  is  epistemologically  valid  or  pragmatically  beneficial  to  apply  a  causal  
model  of  gradual,  progressive  adaptation  at  a  macro-level,  is  no  easy  question.  Such  causal  models  
are  used  in  progressivist  ideologies  of  reform,  but  also  in  colonialist  ideologies  of  superiority.  The  
indigenous  peoples  of  Sápmi  have  had  enough  of  developmental  thinking  being  misused  to  justify  
racial  suppression  and  colonial  resource  grabbing.  At  the  end  of  the  present  chapter  I  will  discuss  
the  limitations  of  the  evolutionary  causal  model  that  is  implicit  in  the  present  chapter. 
 Whether  or  not  it  is  valid  or  beneficial  to  limit  the  historical-geographical  explanation  to  
resource  geography  and  cultural  geography,  and  particularly  whether  it  is  valid  or  beneficial  to  
ignore  military  history  and  geo-strategical  theatres,  is  also  not  an  easy  question.  The  benefit  with  
my  chosen  perspective  is  that  it  shows  an  actual  constituted  order  as  not  merely  a  state  formation.  
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The  state  also  co-exists  with  ecological  and  cultural  formations  whose  dynamic  is  only  in  part  
determined  by  the  dynamics  of  state  formation.  Consequently,  the  actual  constituted  praxes  are  also  
much  more  than  only  coercive  force;;  they  also  include  knowledge  praxes  and  customary  praxes,  
which  are  embedded  in  the  practical  use  of  natural  resources.  These  are  the  causal  pathways  that  
will  be  roughly  sketched  in  the  geographical  overview  chapter,  and  thereby  specified  in  each  of  the  
other  empirical  chapters.  Such  perspectives  have  already  proven  useful  for  movements  that  
advocate  environmental  justice,  particularly  in  the  official  reports  from  the  Norwegian  Sámi  Rights  
Commission.  However,  the  movements  not  only  need  to  identify  possibilities  for  action.  They  also  
need  to  identify  strategical  limitations.  In  order  to  avoid  the  potential  bias  of  wishful  thinking,  the  
final  theoretical  discussion  will  address  coercive  power  as  another  pathway  whereby  constituted  and  




5.2.0  Cases:  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  water  systems 
 
5.2.1  The  two  cases  and  their  relevance 
Alta  and  Deatnu  are  two  grand  rivers  in  the  sub-Arctic  fringe  of  the  Nordic  region.  Both  rivers  are  
the  sites  of  rich  biological  and  bio-cultural  diversity.  Their  natural  and  cultural  heritage  has  become  
protected  by  international  treaties,  and  both  rivers  are  symbolic  for  the  ongoing  geopolitical  
transformation  in  the  region.  Alta  River  is  primarily  known  as  the  site  of  the  Alta-dam  conflict  
between  1970  and  1982.  This  period  of  eventful  protest  was  instrumental  in  effirts  directed  towards  
implementation  of  environmental  protection  and  indigenous  rights.404  Deatnu  River  is  a  relevant  
place  to  investigate  the  contemporary  consequences  of  those  political  reforms.  It  is  a  border  river  
between  Finland  and  Norway,  and  attracts  sports  anglers  from  all  over  these  states.  However,  
Deatnu  also  is  the  site  of  traditional  Sámi  and  Kvän  fisheries,  as  it  runs  through  the  heart  land  of  the  
Sápmi  homeland,  and  has  a  considerable  minority  of  Kväns.  The  Deatnu  River  is  interesting  as  a  
geographic  case.  It  demonstrates  actual  ecological  and  cultural  systems  that  were  divided  by  a  state  
border,  and  therefore  actual  socio-ecologic  complexity  between  two  polities.  However,  the  case  also  
shows  how  the  existing  policies  and  polities  are  being  transformed  in  relation  to  the  actual  socio-
ecological  complexity.  The  Alta  River  is  interesting  as  a  historical  case.  I  present  a  particularly  
                                                 
404  Dalland  1997:  41-42 
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Figure  5-1:  Topography  of  two  river  regions:  Alta  and  Deatnu  river  areas 
Alta  River  (red)  and  Deatnu  River  (blue)  with  main  tributaries.  The  river  basins  Alta  and  Deatnu  consist  of  all  
waters  that  drain  into  each  of  the  main  rivers.  The  bundaries  of  the  two  water  areas  are  not  shown  here.405 
              
Figure  5-2:  Topographical  contexts:  the  European  Area  and  the  Circumpolar  Arctic  Area 
Left:  Topographic  map  of  the  Western  part  of  the  Eurasian  landmass.  Alta  and  Deatnu  Rivers  are  found  close  
to  the  middle  of  the  upper  edge  of  the  map  at  the  northern  fringe  of  the  Scandinavian  Peninsula,  and  the  
Baltic  Shield  (see  the  black  circle).406 
Right:  Topographic  map  of  the  Arctic  Ocean.  The  Scandinavian  Peninsula  and  the  Baltic  Shield  –  with  Alta  
and  Deatnu  Rivers  –  are  located  close  to  the  middle  of  the  bottom  edge  of  the  map.407  
                                                 
405  Self-made  map  based  on  topographic  map  from  Wikimedia,  in  the  public  domain  (usage  is  free). 
406  Map  source:  map  of  Europe,  Wikimedia,  retrieved  February  2013,  in  the  public  domain  (usage  is  free) 
407  Artist:  Hugo  Ahlenius  ©  UNEP/GRID  Arendal  2006.  http://www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/arctic-conservation-
area-caff-topographic-map_e781  (accessed  09.04.2015) 
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eventful  period  and  place  in  the  process  of  geopolitical  transformation.  Together,  those  two  cases  




5.2.2  Alta  and  Deatnu  Water  Areas,  a  social-ecological  overview 
The  Rivers  Deatnu  and  Alta  could  be  iconic  of  transformations  in  political  geography  because  of  
their  specific  bio-geographical  and  cultural-geographical  features.  Both  include  ecological  habitats  
of  migrating  wild  salmon.  Both  include  subsistence  livelihoods  of  the  Sámi  cultural  area.  Those  are  
natural  and  cultural  heritages  that  have  become  protected  by  international  treaties  on  the  protection  
of  biological  diversity  and  indigenous  self-determination.  As  those  treaties  become  ratified  by  
states,  the  states  recognize  an  actual  jurisdictional  pluralism.  Thus,  the  actual  bio-geographical  and  
cultural-geographical  complexities  produce  actual  jurisdictional  complexity.  Therefore,  a  
geographic  introduction  to  the  case  studies  is  useful.  Let  us  begin  as  geographers  have  traditionally  
done,  first  describing  “abiotic”  factors  (landform,  hydrology,  geology),  then  the  “biotic”  factors  
(biology,  ecology)  and  finally  the  “human”  factors  (economy,  culture,  politics).  After  having  
introduced  those,  we  will  problematise  the  co-evolution  of  nature  and  culture,  and  introduce  the  
phenomenon  of  bio-cultural  diversity. 
 
 
5.2.3  Resource  geography  (resource  systems) 
Physio-geographically,  Alta  and  Deatnu  Rivers  are  both  located  in  an  area  with  sub-arctic  climate,  
located  north  of  the  Scandinavian  Peninsula  and  west  of  the  Baltic  Peninsula.  They  are  both  at  the  
northern  side  of  the  watershed  between  the  Arctic  Ocean  basin  in  the  north  and  the  Baltic  Sea  basin  
in  the  south.  Alta  and  Deatnu  Rivers  run  from  the  south  towards  the  north.  The  two  river  systems  
gather  most  of  the  water  from  a  rather  wide,  flat  inland  area  known  as  the  Finnmark  Plateau.  The  
plateau  has  many  tiny  lakes  and  streams.  With  all  its  marshlands  and  snow,  land  and  water  are  not  
kept  quite  separate  in  the  Finnmark  Plateau.  Through  the  river  systems,  water  is  drained  towards  the  
                                                 
408    The  main  spatial  unit  of  focus  in  this  study  is  the  river  basin,  also  called  a  river  area  or  the  watershed  of  that  river.  
The  river  basins  Alta  and  Deatnu  consist  of  all  waters  that  drain  into  each  of  these  two  main  rivers,  including  tributary  
rivers,  streams,  lakes  and  groundwater.  Both  river  systems  empty  into  deep  fjords  with  salt  water,  called  Alta  Fjord  and  
Deatnu  Fjord.  The  fjords  basins  include  several  smaller  rivers  and  streams  that  empty  directly  into  each  fjord.  The  
fjords  open  into  the  Barents  Sea  basin,  which  is  part  of  the  Arctic  Ocean  basin. 
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Figure  5-3:  Physical  geography 
Left:  Permafrost  in  the  Barents  area.  Rivers  Alta  and  Deatnu  have  discontinuous  and  sporadic  permafrost  
(light  blue  and  turquoise).  The  boundary  of  the  Arctic  climate  zone  (purple  line)  is  defined  so  that  it  includes  
the  coastline  and  the  outer  part  of  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  Fjords.  Most  of  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  water  areas  have  
sub-arctic  climate.409 
Right:  Geology  of  the  Baltic  Shield.  Green  area  is  the  Caledonic  Mountain  Range.  Red  and  crimson  areas  
are  ancient  bedrock.410 
 
northern  coastline,  into  relatively  deeper  valleys  between  relatively  higher  mountains.  As  the  water  
runs  towards  the  Finnmark  Coast,  land  and  water  are  being  more  clearly  separated,  with  deep  fjords  
and  canyons  between  small  mountains.  Alta  and  Deatnu  Rivers  empty  into  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  
Fjords.  These  are  deep  fjords,  with  small  communities  and  towns  protected  by  mountains.  Outside  
the  fjords,  the  coastline  opens  directly  out  into  the  ice-cold  Barents  Sea,  which  is  a  part  of  the  Arctic  
Ocean.  Geomorphologically,  the  small  mountains  along  the  Finnmark  Coast  are  the  northern  tip  the  
Caledonian  Mountain  Range,  which  starts  in  Scotland  and  runs  through  the  western  side  of  the  
Scandinavian  Peninsula.  These  are  geologically  old  and  stable  mountains.  The  inland  and  upstream  
Finnmark  Plateau  rests  directly  on  the  bedrock  itself,  which  is  older.  Compared  to  the  geological  
age  of  the  inland  plateau  and  the  coastal  mountains,  the  rivers  are  modern  inventions.  They  are  
products  of  ice  melting  at  the  end  of  the  last  ice  age,  10.000  years  ago.  The  ice  melting  has  left  
many  eskers  along  the  lower  Deatnu  River,  and  a  majestic  canyon  around  the  Alta  River.  The  area  
has  limited  potential  for  hydropower  production,  compared  to  the  steeper  terrains  further  south  in  
the  Scandinavian  Peninsula.  But  the  northern  part  of  the  Baltic  Shield  contains  rich  mineral  
                                                 
409  Artist:  UNEP  GRID  Warsawa  ©  European  Environment  Agency  (EEA).  Retrieved:  http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-
and-maps/figures/permafrost-and-tree-line,  09.06.2015.  Re-use  policy:  http://www.eea.europa.eu/legal/copyright. 
410  Map  source:  ©  Uppsala  universitet:  www.geofys.uu.se/eprobe/Projects/svekal/Svekalap.htm,  retrieved  Febr.  2013. 
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resources,  and  the  seabed  in  the  Barents  Ocean  contains  rich  oil  and  gas  reserves.  These  are  
geological  resources  which  play  an  active  role  in  economy  and  politics  of  the  area  in  which  Alta  and  
Deatnu  Rivers  are  located.  The  accumulation  of  scientific  knowledge  of  physio-geography  in  the  
area  is  driven  by  practical  needs  to  utilize  the  resources.  During  the  Alta-dam  conflict,  the  state-
employed  engineers  were  accused  of  analysing  abiotic  and  financial  facts  in  isolation  from  the  
“softer”  data  about  biogeography  and  cultural  geography.  The  practices  have  changed  since  then.  In  
the  contemporary  controversies  about  the  Deatnu  River,  the  technocracy  has  become  more  holistic,  
including  both  abiotic  and  biotic  factors.  Still  it  is  debatable  whether  they  ignore  the  socio-
ecological  interaction  between  nature  geography  and  human  geography.  If  physio-geographical  
knowledge  production  is  seen  in  isolation  from  those  interactions,  it  is  not  in  itself  contested.  Some  
research  climatologists  assess  the  impact  of  climate  change  on  precipitation  and  snowmelt.411  Local  
people  in  favour  of  the  oil  industry  tend  to  be  climate  skeptics,  but  that  debate  is  outside  the  scope  
of  the  present  study. 
 Bio-geographically,  the  rivers  systems  Alta  and  Deatnu  are  reservoirs  of  rich  biodiversity.  
We  will  now  focus  on  the  issue  that  receives  most  attention:  Both  river  systems  include  many  
natural  mating  grounds  for  wild  Atlantic  Salmon  (Salmo  Salar).  It  is  a  migrating  species  of  
salmoids,  with  a  peculiar  life  cycle.  After  spending  their  first  years  in  running  freshwater,  they  then  
follow  the  river  to  the  ocean.  They  then  may  spend  several  winters  migrating  throughout  the  ocean,  
before  they  return  to  mate  at  the  same  place  where  they  started  their  life:  the  same  river,  the  same  
side  stream.  Therefore,  large  river  systems  may  contain  several  distinct  stocks  of  salmon,  each  of  
them  adapted  to  the  specific  environmental  features  in  the  specific  side-stream  where  they  mate.  
The  Alta  and  especially  The  Deatnu  are  large  river  systems.  They  contain  many  stocks  of  wild  
Atlantic  Salmon,  and  several  other  salmonid  fishes  as  well.  This  makes  Alta  and  Deatnu  comparable  
to  the  largest  river  systems  at  the  Kola  Peninsula.  These  large  rivers  receive  international  attention  
from  the  international  epistemic  community  on  salmon  biology.  During  the  time  of  the  Alta-dam  
controversy,  this  epistemic  community  was  in  opposition  to  state  technocrats.  Today,  many  salmon  
biologists  have  been  employed  by  the  states,  and  their  international  epistemic  community  is  
organized  in  bodies  such  as  NASCO,  the  North  Atlantic  Salmon  Conservation  Organization.  There  
has  been  some  tension  between  competing  sets  of  state-certified  salmon  biologists,  from  the  
Norwegian  Ministry  of  the  Environment  and  the  Finnish  Ministry  of  Forestry,  but  some  of  those  
issues  appear  to  have  been  sorted  out  through  scientific  deliberation  and  quality  proofing.412    
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Figure  5-4:  Bio-geography 
Upper  map:  The  natural  habitat  of  wild  Atlantic  Salmon  (Salmo  Salar)413 
Lower  map:  Partner  states  in  NASCO  (North  Atlantic  Salmon  Conversation  Organization)414 
 
 
 With  statistical  uncertainty  of  the  size  of  the  salmon  stock,  Norwegian  policy  makers  pushed  
for  strict  regulation,  prioritizing  ecological  concerns,  while  Finnish  policy  makers  pushed  to  protect  
angling  culture,  prioritizing  socio-economic  concerns.  A  relevant  context  is  that  this  border  river  has  
more  importance  for  Finnish  anglers  than  for  the  Norwegian  ones.  According  to  the  NASCO  
classification,  Norway  has  480  salmon  rivers,  while  Finland  has  two.415  The  tension  led  to  funding  
for  biological  research,  and  resulted  in  better  biological  data  and  more  precise  regulations  (or  less  
unreliable  data  and  less  arbitrary  regulations).  Thus,  the  biogeographical  research  questions,  quality  
proofing,  and  accumulation  of  knowledge  is  co-determined  by  contextual  human  factors.  Interests  
that  were  institutionalized  in  the  Norwegian  and  Finnish  nation-states  had  much  impact  on  the  
priorities.  However,  the  interests  that  are  institutionalized  in  the  Sámi  Parliaments  of  those  states  
                                                 
413  Map  source:  Wikimedia  (Wikipedia:  "Atlantic  Salmon",  retrieved  February  2013),  ©  in  the  public  domain  (free  to  
use). 
414  Map  source:  Wikimedia:  (Wikipedia:  "NASCO",  retrieved  February  2013),  ©  in  the  public  domain  (free  to  use). 
415  Source:  NASCO  river  database  http://www.nasco.int/RiversDatabase.aspx  retrieved  February  2013 
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had  fewer  resources  to  influence  the  priorities  of  biogeographical  research.  The  latter  are  concerned  
about  various  subsistence  practices,  defined  as  the  natural  basis  of  traditional  indigenous  culture.  
These  livelihoods  are  protected  under  international  human  rights  law,  while  the  salmon  habitat  is  
protected  under  international  environmental  treaties.  Sámi  organizations  accuse  the  eco-tehnocrats  
of  weak  holistic  analysis  of  the  co-evolution  of  nature  and  culture,  including  the  role  of  traditional  
skills,  lore  and  norms  for  the  sustainable  use  of  natural  resources.  What  is  contested  is  not  bio-




5.2.4  Cultural  geography  (governance  system,  informal  component) 
The  river  systems  Alta  and  Deatnu  are  livelihoods  for  unique  cultural  diversity,  like  they  also  are  
reservoirs  of  unique  biodiversity.  Since  before  recorded  history,  the  indigenous  people  of  this  area  
have  developed  livelihood  practices  that  were  fitted  to  the  specific  ecological  environments.  The  
Alta  and  Deatnu  Rivers  connect  some  cultural  areas  along  the  Barents  coast,  with  other  cultural  
areas  at  the  inland  plateau.  These  two  rivers  drain  most  of  the  waters  from  the  plateau.  This  plateau  
is  a  core  area  for  traditional  Sámi  culture,  and  has  been  so  since  time  longstanding.  The  coastline,  
by  contrast,  is  experiencing  a  cultural  revival  for  indigenous  culture,  after  having  been  virtually 
totally  assimilated  into  the  official  culture  of  the  nation  state.  Alta  River  connects  cultural  areas  that  
are  often  referred  to  as  clearly  distinct  and  relatively  homogeneous.  In  downstream  areas  there  is  a  
virtual hegemony  of  standardized  Norwegian  culture.  In  and  around  the  town  Alta  most  locals  are  
descendants  of  “norwegianized”  Sámis  or  immigrants  from  Norwegian  core  areas.  In  upstream  
areas,  by  contrast,  there  is  a  virtual hegemony  of  standardized  Sámi  culture.  In  the  local  centre  
Guovdageaidnu  (Kautokeino),  there  are  some  relatively  prosperous  reindeer  owning  families.  Ever  
since  the  19th  century,  reindeer  nomadism  was  the  icon  of  Sámi-ness,  like  mountain  farmers  were  
icons  of  Norwegian-ness,  and  forest  life  was  iconic  of  Finnish-ness.  During  the  time  of  the  Alta-
dam  controversy,  indigenous  rights  activists  in  upstream  areas  joined  forces  with  environmentalists  
in  downstream  areas.  Coastal  Sámi  tended  to  support  the  pro-dam  bloc,  but  at  the  same  time  they  
started  a  less  publicly  known  ethnic  mobilization  for  pro-poor  economic  development  along  the  
coast.416  During  the  previous  century,  Sámi  culture  and  ethnicity  had  been  made  into  a  social  
stigma,  but  after  the  Alta-dam  struggle  it  gradually  turned  into  a  political  marker.  During  my  
fieldwork  this  issue  was  still  highly  contested,  especially  because  Coastal  Sámi  culture  fits  badly  
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with  the  collective  imagination  of  standardized  Sámi  and  Norwegian  cultures.  Most  families  are  
ethnically  mixed,  and  many  individuals  have  ambiguous  ethnic  belonging.  The  mix  includes  a  
considerable  minority  of  Kväns,  who  constitute  an  ethnic  minority  in  relation  to  both  Sápmis  and  
Norwegians.  In  the  Alta  watershed,  with  its  relatively  standardized  cultural  areas,  such  cultural  
hybridization  might  appear  as  anomalies.  When  we  turn  the  attention  to  Deatnu  River  the  diversity  
of  local  indigenous  culture  is  so  evident  that  it  cannot  be  overlooked.  Upstream  Deatnu  has  some  
relatively  prosperous  reindeer  owning  families,  and  the  Deatnu  Fjord  has  some  communities  with  
strong  and  vital  Coastal  Sámi  culture.  However,  in  the  Deatnu  watershed  there  is  also  a  vital  “River  
Sámi”  culture.417  Each  of  these  cultural  forms  is  sustained  throguh  the  maintenance  of  specific  
cultural  praxes,  or  “traditions”:  specific  forms  of  collectively  used  tools,  norms,  and  lores.  Local  
historians  have  documented  that  the  River  Sámi  culture  as  we  now  know  it  is  a  product  of  cultural  
exchange.418  Sámi  hunter-gatherers  adopted  agricultural  praxes  from  Kvän  immigrants,  while  the  
Kvän  became  assimilated  into  the  North  Sámi  language  environment.  The  tendency  towards  a  
sedentary  life  was  amplified  by  targeted  legislation  from  the  government  “Norwegian”  side  of  the  
river.  At  the  “Finnish”  side  of  the  river,  the  government  would  enact  laws  on  private  property,  
motivated  by  a  similar  agriculturalist  ideology.419  More  ancient  norms  of  collective  kin-group  
ownership  would  survive  in  actual  use  and  popular  perception.420  The  river  Sámi  culture  is  highly  
diverse,  after  centuries  of  intermarriage  with  Kvän  and  Finnish  peasants,  and  tense  interactions  with  
the  state-building  political  class  in  Finland  and  Norway.  The  River  Sámi  ways  of  life  maintain  a  
local  bio-cultural  diversity  that  seems  to  be  specific  to  Deatnu  River.  This  is  beacuse  the  specific  
cultural  forms  that  constitute  River  Sámi  culture  seem  to  be  virtually extinct  in  the  other  rivers  of  
the  Barents  Coast,  apart  from  some  few  cultural  traits  along  Neiden  and  Pasvik  Rivers.  If  we  
compare  upstream  Deatnu  to  upstream  Alta,  the  former  is  influenced  by  a  history  of  Finnish  and  
North-West  Russian  multicultural  policies,  while  the  latter  is  shaped  by  another  history  of  Swedish  
and  Norwegian  eugenic  policies.  In  the  Scandinavian  Peninsula,  reindeer  husbandry  became  
ethnically  purified  as  a  result  of  Norwegian  assimilation  and  Swedish  segregation.421  At  the  Kola  
Peninsula  and  is  surroundings,  there  are  reindeer  herding  families  of  many  ethnicities.  In  those  
areas,  cultural  complexity  is  high. 
 Knowledge  of  cultural  geography  has  become  highly  politicized.  One  reason  is  that  local  
states  have  ratified  some  international  laws  on  indigenous  rights,  implying  that  the  states  are  
obliged  to  protect  the  preservation  and  development  of  indigenous  culture.  Another  reason  is  that  
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the  states  became  parliamentarian  democracies  by  nation  builders  who  used  specific  ethnic  and  
cultural  as  political  markers  to  constitute  a  demos.  In  most  places  in  the  Sápmi  area,  cultural  
pluralism  is  so  high  that  it  cannot  be  silenced  by  efforts  to  maintain  virtual cultural  standardization  
and  virtual cultural  boundaries.  As  anthropologists  have  pointed  out  since  the  1970s:  ethnic  
boundaries  are  symbolically  made  and  maintained.  Thus,  many  individuals  belonging  to  several  
ethnic  groups,  and  there  are  no  agreed-upon  criteria  to  distinguish  clearly  between  an  in-group  and  
an  out-group.422  This  might  be  politically  challenging,  not  so  much  for  indigenous  peoples  as  for  
those  who  are  nostalgic  about  “methodological  nationalism”  as  a  mode  of  research  and  policy  
making.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  ideology  of  a  homogeneous  and  bounded  demos  cannot  be  
maintained  in  the  Nordic  countries  without  continuous  silencing  and  suppressing  the  actual  overlaps  
and  complexities  between  those  cultural  forms  that  were  ascribed  the  role  of  “official”  national  
culture  and  those  cultural  forms  that  were  ascribed  the  role  of  “anomalies”  in  that  ideology.  The  
Sámi  culture  in  Guovdageaidnu  (Kautokeino)  is  the  most  well-known  cultural  area  that  was  
suppressed,  because  it  is  relatively  homogeneous  and  divided  by  state  boundaries.  However,  the  
pluralities  of  indigenous  culture  in  Sápmi  show  even  richer  cultural  complexity.  The  Sámi  demos  is  
one  that  overlaps  with  the  demoi  of  the  nation-states,  and  also  with  the  even  more  marginalized  
demos  of  the  Kvän  people.  The  Nordic  area  is  de  facto  one  of  overlapping  demoi,  as  also  the  
European  community  after  minority  rights.423  Sámi  culture  is  a  challenge  to  the  “island-conception”  
of  culture.424  One  form  of  that  ideology  is  the  “methodological  nationalism”  used  as  a  model  to  
write  national  histories.  Another  form  of  that  ideology  is  the  model  of  static  cultural  systems,  used  
to  describe  colonized  areas.  During  the  Alta  dam  conflict,  those  models  were  hegemonic  in  the  
social  sciences  of  the  region.  So-called  “Lappologists”,  mass  media  and  schoolbooks  portrayed  
Sámi  culture  as  static,  while  modernization  was  portrayed  as  non-Sámi.425  “The  Norwegian  
historical  school”  by  contrast,  portrayed  Norwegian  culture  as  dynamic,  progressive,  and  driven  by  
a  mystical  Volksgeist.  A  similar  pattern  existed  in  exhibition  praxes  at  the  Norwegian  Folk  Museum,  
where  “traditional”  agricultural  culture  was  classified  geographically  (synchronically)  while  
“modern”  urban  culture  was  classified  in  epochs  (diachronically).426  Though  those  models  were  still  
hegemonic  during  the  Alta  dam  conflict,  paradigmatic  change  was  underway.  The  most  empirical  
researchers  of  Sámi  culture  registered  that  social  change  had  been  a  component  of  traditional  Sámi  
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culture  (diachrony).427  Thus,  Sámi  culture  was  no  longer  labelled  with  the  colonial  framing  “people  
without  history”  (synchrony).428  During  my  fieldwork  in  the  Deatnu  watershed,  much  knowledge  
has  been  accumulated  since  the  lappology,  and  thus,  the  less  colonialist  models  have  become  
hegemonic.  Anthropologists  take  interest  in  social  change,  cultural  exchange  and  hybrid  
modernities  as  integral  to  Sámi  cultural  tradition.429  They  also  subject  “modern”  institutions  to  
ethnographic  inquiry,  including  bio-science,  bureaucracy,  marketing,  and  the  ongoing  re-building  of  
the  Norwegian  nation.430  Still,  old  myths  on  tradition  and  modernity  still  circulate  in  public  debate,  
and  in  some  “expert”  reports  written  by  non-anthropologists  hired  by  bureaucracies  that  are  
skeptical  of  Sámi  rights.  Colonial  heritage  is  reproduced  as  bias  that  remains  to  be  beaten,  within  
the  sciences  themselves.  Some  such  biases  were  discussed  in  Chapter  2.  The  discussion  will  
continue  in  Chapter  12.  Those  colonial  models  have  been  falsified  a  generation  ago,  but  their  use  is  
still  funded  by  political  interests.  This  political  struggle  is  one  between  those  who  dream  of  
restoring  a  utopia  of  a  unified  and  bonded  demos,  and  those  who  want  to  adjust  to  actual  cultural  
complexity  and  ecological  complexity  by  maintaining  overlapping  demoi.  With  the  gradual  
decolonization  of  international  law,  the  ICESCR  §1  now  demands  that  the  four  states  in  Sápmi  end  
their  unilateral  approach  to  longstanding  customary  laws  in  the  indigenous  territory,  and,  that  they  
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5.2.5  Political  geography  (governance  system,  formal  component) 
In  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  valleys,  natural  resources  are  the  main  economic  assets,  and  subsistence  
practices  have  strong  cultural  and  political  significance.  Political  controversies  in  those  watersheds  
mostly  deal  with  the  management  of  natural  resources.  This  political  game  not  only  deals  with  
policy  making  but  also  with  making  polities.  The  following  is  a  political  geography  of  the  river  
systems  Alta  and  Deatnu.  For  the  moment  I  will  leave  aside  the  refined  interactions  of  nature  and  
culture  that  can  be  traced  with  a  science  studies  approach.  Instead  I  will  resort  to  the  simpler  
interactions  of  nature  and  culture  that  can  be  mapped  when  resource  geography  is  taken  into  
consideration. 
 Political-economic  geography:  Since  political  borders  are  socially  made  and  maintained,  
they  are  cultural  artefacts,  and  as  such  are  objects  of  study  for  anthropology  and  cultural  history.431  
The  same  is  the  case  for  economic  institutions,  since  social  capital  is  being  invested.432  One  of  the  
factors  that  can  explain  the  present  cultural  diversity  of  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  watersheds  is  the  
complicated  history  of  political  borders.  When  the  kingdoms  based  in  Stockholm,  Copenhagen  and  
Moscow  started  to  dispatch  tax  collecting  expeditions  to  the  area,  they  reported  about  the  existence  
of  a  local  political  system.  Historians  generally  call  it  the  Siida  system,  with  a  northern  Sámi  term.  
It  is  described  as  a  tribal  confederacy  organized  in  small  territorial  units  around  the  main  
waterways.  In  1751,  the  border  between  the  Danish  and  Swedish  kingdom  was  defined  as  far  north  
as  to  Lake  Buolbmát,  in  the  Deatnu  watershed.  The  Alta  river  system  was  within  the  Danish  side  of  
the  border.  The  despotic  kingdoms  promised  to  protect  each  of  the  “nations”  within  their  dominion,  
as  long  as  they  paid  loyalty  to  the  king.  On  the  one  hand  the  treaty  included  an  appendix  that  
confirmed  the  ancient  right  of  the  “Lappiske  Nation”  (the  Sámi  nation)  to  practice  traditional  
livelihoods  across  the  border,  and  to  remain  neutral  in  case  of  war  between  the  kingdoms.  On  the  
other  hand,  the  ancient  jurisdiction  was  de  jure  replaced  by  a  new,  though  the  local  people  de  facto  
maintained  their  ancient  customary  norms.  To  the  northeast  of  Lake  Buolbmát,  the  three  regional  
empires  would  still  compete  about  the  rights  to  taxing  and  trade,  until  they  agreed  on  a  border  in  
1826.  By  then,  the  Finnish  province  was  no  longer  under  Sweden,  but  under  Russia,  while  the  
Norwegian  province  had  been  given  from  Denmark  to  Sweden.  Thus,  the  treaty  from  1751  no  
longer  referred  to  a  border  between  Denmark-Norway  and  Sweden-Finland,  but  instead  to  a  border  
between  Sweden-Norway  and  Russia-Finland.  The  Swedish  Crown  decided  that  the  treaty  was  still  
valid  regarding  the  border  between  the  “brother  nations”  Norway  and  Sweden.  The  kingdom  
became  more  eager  to  guard  its  northeastern  border  to  Russia  and  Finland,  and  in  1852  it  closed.  As  
                                                 
431  Das  &  Poole  2004:  “Introduction” 
432  Guha-Khasnobis,  Kahbur  and  Ostrom  2006  (in  particular  the  contribution  by  Keith  Hart  2006). 
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nationalism  and  eugenics  had  become  the  new  policies  of  the  state  builders,  these  Scandinavian  
“brother  nations”  had  limited  room  for  Sámis,  Kväns  and  Finns.  The  northernmost  Finnmark  
County  had  been  re-defined  as  “Colonie”  in  the  1820s,  with  the  argument  that  only  nomads  lived  
there,  and  that  therefore,  it  had  been  an  unoccupied  terra  nullius  when  the  kingdoms  had  been  
established.433  This  was  a  legal  invention.  By  redefining  the  past  in  terms  of  terra  nullius,  the  state-
certified  national  builders  nullified  the  “Lappiske  Nation”  as  it  had  previously  been  defined  in  1751.  
The  northernmost  county  would  now  be  administered  as  a  “Coloinie”  that  could  be  opened  up  for  
settlers  and  for  extraction  of  natural  resources.  When  the  Crown  chose  to  respect  the  1751  treaty  
with  regard  to  reindeer  nomadism  in  the  Scandinavian  Peninsula,  this  was  also  economically  
profitable  for  the  two  Scandinavian  “brother  nations”.  To  summarise,  the  Scandinavian  national  
strategists  had  taken  control  of  the  state  apparatuses,  and  as  a  result,  colonial  administration  and  
strict  border  control  were  the  policies  used  to  tackle  the  geographically  overlapping  Finno-Ugric  
nations.  The  closing  of  the  northeastern  border  to  Finland-Russia  caused  economic  loss  for  local  
reindeer  owners  in  the  trans-boundary  area.  In  1852  an  insurgency  took  place  in  Guovdageaidnu  
(Kautokeino),  in  the  upstream  Alta  river  system.434  Recent  historical  research  has  shown  that  the  
border  closing  caused  economic  hardship  for  other  local  groups  as  well.  The  historical  documents  
show  that  until  the  mid  1800s  the  right  to  border  crossing  had  applied  to  all  Sámi.  The  sources  even  
indicate  that  all  local  people  in  Finnish  Sápmi  had  been  crossing  the  border  freely.  Since  time  
longstanding,  fishing  in  nearby  parts  of  the  Barents  Coast  had  been  an  important  source  of  
livelihood  for  the  local  people  along  Deatnu,  Neiden  and  Pasvik  Rivers.  It  should  also  be  
remembered  that  before  roads  were  build,  these  rivers  had  been  the  main  means  of  transportation,  
providing  access  to  market  places,  short-distance  barter  and  long-distance  trade.  In  practice,  not  
only  Sámi  people  had  enjoyed  access  to  the  river  and  the  coast,  but  also  Kväns  and  Finns  living  in  
the  Sámi  homeland.435  Therefore,  the  closing  of  the  border  caused  economic  hardship  for  the  local  
people  living  in  a  transnational  kinship  system,  reminiscent  of  the  Sámi  ancient  tribal  confederation.  
It  also  caused  economic  hardship  for  all  people  in  Northern  Finland.  Consequently,  the  border  
closing  was  a  blow  to  Finnish  national  economy  as  well  as  to  Sámi  regional  and  local  economies.  
The  nationalisation  of  the  states  was  a  cultural  revolution.  It  implied  Scandinavian  colonisation  of  
sub-arctic  territories,  which  had  been  shared  with  Finno-Ugric  nations.  Also  the  coastal  waters  were  
nationalised  during  this  period,  as  large  vessels  from  the  more  central  areas  further  south  started  to  
fish  with  mobile  gear  along  the  Barents  coast.436  After  the  historical  struggle  for  the  Alta  River,  a  
decolonization  process  has  started.  The  Finnmark  Act  is  an  attempt  of  reconciliation  between  
                                                 
433  Pedersen  1999 
434  Zorgdrager  1998 
435  Pedersen  2008 
436  Eyþórsson  2008 
 166  
 
 
Figure  5-5:  Human  geography 
Top:  Borders  treaties  within  Sápmi  from  1751  until  1944  (The  word  «grense»  means  border).  Both  Alta  and  
Deatnu  are  located  to  the  west  of  the  complicated  Norwegian-Finnish-Russian  border  area.  The  Alta  River  is  
now  “Norwegian”,  while  the  Deatnu  River  is  “Norwegian”  and  “Finnish”.  But  both  are  at  the  same  time  “Sámi”,  
with  a  considerable  minority  of  Kväns.437 
Bottom  left:  Sámi  language  areas.  Alta  and  Deatnu  Rivers  are  in  the  area  of  the  North  Sámi  language  (olive  
green),  whereas  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  fjords  are  classified  within  the  Coastal  Sámi  dialect  (dark  green).438439 
Bottom  right:  Nation  states  and  Sámi  areas:  Administrative  provinces  managed  with  special  policies  for  Sámi  
issues.440 
                 
                                                 
437  Artist:  ©  Johan  Aslak  Siri,  printed  in:  Pedersen  2008. 
438  Some  might  mis-read  such  maps  as  an  implicit  statement  of  separatist  ambitions,  if  the  reader  has  a  one-sided  
nationalist  mind-set.  (For  an  example  of  such  methodological  nationalism,  see  Semb  2001;;  Semb  2003).  Such  a  
reading  might  seem  logical  if  one  assumes  that  uni-national  states  is  the  only  possible  state  form,  but  such  an  
assumption  is  un-empirical,  dogmatic,  and  ideologically  biased.  Thus,  Norwegian  methodological  nationalism  
imposes  a  utopian  Norwegian  separatism  on  an  actual  social  ecology  that  is  much  more  rich  and  complex. 
439  Map  source:  The  Encyclopaedia  of  Saami  Culture,  online  version  (beta).  ©  University  of  Helsinki.  Retrieved:  
www.helsinki.fi/~sugl_smi/senc/english/graphics.htm,  February  2013.  Re-use  policy:  
http://www.helsinki.fi/yliopisto/oikeudet.htm.  (Also  printed  (with  a  few  revisions)  in  Kulonen,  Seurujävri-Kari  &  
Pulkkinen  2005:  177.) 
440  Map  source:  ibidem.  (Also  printed  in  Kulonen,  Seurujävri-Kari  &  Pulkkinen  2005:  295.) 
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national  Norwegian  interests,  local  Sámi  interests  and  other  regional  interests  in  Finnmark  County.  
However,  this  attempt  is  geographically  limited  to  the  inland  plateau,  and  to  the  Norwegian  side  of  
the  border.  The  parts  of  the  Sápmi  Plateau  that  are  outside  Norwegian  occupation  is  outside  the  
reform,  and  the  parts  of  Finnmark  County  that  are  outside  the  plateau  are  also  outside  the  reform.  
Accordingly,  my  fieldwork  in  the  Deatnu  river  system  enabled  me  to  meet  contentious  social  
mobilization  for  indigenous  rights  among  Coastal  Sámi  in  the  culturally  “norwegianized”  Deatnu  
fjord,  as  well  as  among  River  Sámi  in  the  politically  “Finnish”  tributaries  to  the  Deatnu  River.  With  
the  European  Economic  Area  (EEA),  local  people  in  Finnish  Sápmi  have  regained  some  rights  to  
freshwater  fishing  and  wage  labor  on  the  Norwegian  side,  but  those  new  right  also  apply  to  people  
from  all  over  Finland,  and  all  over  the  EEA  macro-region.  Controversies  about  fishing  rights  in  the  
Deatnu  River  and  Fjord  actualize  socio-cultural  conflicts  that  are  also  socio-economic.  People  from  
all  over  the  Finnish  and  Norwegian  nations  are  angered  by  the  prospects  of  loosing  a  privileged  
access  that  has  become  ideologically  naturalized.  Decolonisation  implies  political-economic  
conflict.  It  remains  contested  whether  the  local  fish  resources  should  be  a  national  commons  to  be  
exploited  by  fishermen  from  the  national  centre  areas,  or  local  regional  commons  to  be  used  by  the  
local  population,  or  subject  to  the  European  common  market.441  The  Alta  and  Deatnu  watersheds,  
and  the  whole  Sápmi  area,  are  rich  of  natural  resources.  Stll,  there  are  few  processing  industries  in  
the  region.  Local  people  use  the  natural  resources  for  subsistence  and  barter,  and  may  also  make  
some  money  when  people  from  outside  extract  the  local  natural  resources.  As  with  post-colonies  in  
the  global  south,  the  role  as  provider  of  raw  materials  to  industrial  nodes,  institutes  a  path  
dependency  of  economic  underdevelopment.  The  entrepreneurs  of  state  formation  and  nation  
building  created  national  economies  that  facilitated  a  specific  form  of  centralized  accumulation,  
exploitation  and  redistribution.  The  emergence  of  macro-regional  market  integration  facilitates  a  
merging  of  the  national  economies.  The  territorial  order  has  changed,  though  the  peripheries  still  
interact  with  various  centres  of  accumulation,  exploitation  and  redistribution.  The  local  population  
in  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  watersheds  are  generally  skeptical  of  the  EU.  Still,  some  social  entrepreneurs  
mobilize  resources  from  the  EU  INTEREG  program.  For  example,  it  has  funded  shared  resources  to  
a  school  for  North  Sámi  children  at  both  sides  of  the  Deatnu  River.  Macro-regional  clusters  have  
opened  up  some  opportunities  for  local  regionalisation  across  the  old  state  boundaries.  Regional  
                                                 
441  As  Mattei  (2011)  points  out,  the  common  good  is  not  identical  with  the  public  good,  understood  as  state  
responsibility.  This  is  because  particular  states  take  responsiblility  of  the  particularist  national  interest  of  their  state.  
Aditionally,  in  many  cases  they  interpret  this  as  privatisation,  taking  care  of  the  particularism  of  private  property.  
Still,  “The  Common”  can  hardly  be  a  global  universal.  As  David  Harvey  (2009)  points  out  in  his  critique  of  Michael  
Hardt  &  Antonio  Negri  (2011),  common  natural  resources  are  always  located  somewhere  in  space,  in  some  
particular  ecological  and  sociological  environment.  He  explicitly  mentions  indigenous  rights  to  freedom  from  
colonization.  Thus,  “commons”  in  plural  are  somehow  particular,  and  may  be  framed  in  competing  ways,  while  
“The  Common”  in  singular  remains  an  abstract  utopia  and  ideal.  Hardt  and  Negri  deal  with  utopia,  Matti  with  
reality. 
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innovation  clusters  are  used  in  attempts  to  heal  some  of  the  harm  done  by  nationalist  corporatism.  
The  lands  and  waters  of  Alta  and  Deatnu  were  colonized  by  a  liberal-nationalist  political  class,  and  
are  being  decolonized  under  a  global  neoliberal  political  class. 
 Jurisdictional  geography:  When  Norway-Sweden  closed  the  border  to  Finland-Russia  in  
1852,  it  was  motivated  by  geo-strategical  as  well  as  eugenic  concerns.442  Myths  about  invasions  
from  the  East  were  combined  with  the  new  (and  fabricated)  ethnologic  theory,  which  inferred  that  
Sámi  and  Kväns  were  descendants  of  Mongolian  invaders,  not  natives.443  Since  the  1820s,  the  term  
“Colonie”  had  been  adopted  by  the  administration  of  Finnmark.  In  1902  the  state  started  to  sell  
annexed  soil  but  only  to  those  who  spoke  Norwegian.  Assimilation  of  Sámi  and  Kván  peoples  were  
legitimized  by  myths  about  military  strategy,  civilizing  colonization,  and  racial  hygiene.  In  the  
upstream  areas  of  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  river  systems,  the  assimilation  policies  never  succeeded,  
instead  they  provoked  resistance  from  local  school  teachers.444  In  the  tension  between  suppression  
and  resistance,  the  state  builders  were  impotent  to  obtain  de  facto  legitimacy  for  the  de  jure  claim  of  
jurisdictional  monopoly.  During  the  Alta-dam  controversy,  this  tension  would  be  tested  not  only  de  
jure  in  the  state  court  system,  but  also  de  facto  through  public  deliberation,  including  supranational  
legislation  at  the  UN  level.  The  Alta-controversy  triggered  a  controversy  that  lead  to  legal  reforms  
at  multiple  levels.  During  my  fieldwork  along  Deatnu  River,  people  in  some  parts  of  the  watershed  
had  experienced  that  state  legislators  had  acknowledged  the  actual  jurisdictional  pluralism  in  their  
local  areas,  though  how  this  principle  should  be  implemented  was  an  issue  of  contention.  Those  are  
mainly  the  parts  of  the  river  system  that  are  located  at  the  inland  plateau,  and  at  the  “Norwegian”  
side.  In  other  areas  of  the  Deatnu  watershed,  the  (colonial)  states  have  not  yet  acknowledged  the  de  
facto  jurisdictional  pluralism.  This  is  the  situation  in  the  Deatnu  Fjord,  as  in  other  Coastal  Sámi  
communities,  and  also  in  the  south-eastern  parts  of  the  Deatnu  River,  as  in  other  parts  of  “Finnish”  
Sápmi.  In  all  these  areas,  small  minorities  such  as  the  Kväns,  who  have  cultural  and  linguistic  
similarities  with  both  Sámis  and  Finns,  strive  to  mobilize  resources  to  create  their  own  indigenous  
rights  movement.  Similar  controversies  take  place  in  all  Sámi  areas. 
 Local  electoral  geography:  Some  micro-political  attitudes  in  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  
watersheds  may  be  indicated  by  having  a  look  at  the  municipal  election  results.  These  statistics  are  
published  by  state  agencies  for  official  statistics  in  Finland  and  Norway.  They  have  been  chosen  
from  six  municipalities:  Alta  and  Datnu  (Tana)  are  municipalities  at  the  downstream  area  of  the  Alta  
River  and  the  Deatnu  River.  In  the  upstream  parts,  we  find  Guovdageainnu  (Kautokeino)  and  
Karašjohka  (Karasjok).  The  south-eastern  tributaries  of  the  Deatnu  River  drain  water  from  the  lands  
                                                 
442  Niemi  2004 
443  Pareli  2004 
444  Solbakk  &  Solbakk  1999 
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Table  5-1:  Finnish  municipal  elections  2008  and  2008  (percentiles) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 5.1: FINNISH MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS 2008 AND 2012 (PERCENTILES) 
======================================================================== 
    2008   2008   2012   2012 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Inari  Utsjoki  Inari  Utsjoki 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Centre Party  28,7  47,7   26,4  35,9 
Conservatives    15,7  16,1    36,4  26,8 
Left Alliance  16,0  5,0   12,7  5,9 
Socal Democrats   8,8  5,7   10,3  8,0 
True Finns   2,5  -   6,0   11,2 
Green League  5,3  -   4,9  - 
Swedish People's Party -  -   2,0  12,1 
Christian Democrats 0,4  -   -  - 
Local Sámi Lists  22,6  25,5   1,2  - 
Total    100,0  100,0   100,0  100,0 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
No. of votes   5616  1113   5612  1076 
Turnout in %  66,1  82,8   62,2   82,7 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: Statistics Finland: www.stat.fi 
 
 
Table  5-2:  Norwegian  municipal  election  2013  (percentiles) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 5.2: NORWEGIAN MUNICIPAL ELECTION 2013 (PERCENTILES) 
======================================================================== 
    Alta  Deatnu    Guovdageainnu        Karašjohka 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Social Democrats  29,0  39,0  8,0   43,6 
Conservatives   26,9  20,6  7,6   3,3 
Center Party   1,8  12,7  2,9   10 
Liberal Left Party 7,5  5,2  11,3   5,3 
Socialist Left Party 7,6  3,7  -   - 
Progress Party   11,5  5,2  3,5   - 
Coastal Party   10,2  -  -   - 
Christian Democrats  4,1  -  -   3,7 
Norwegian Sámi Assoc.* -  6,0   -   - 
Sámi People's Party* 1,4  -  26,9   12,5 
The Joint List**  -  7,6  -   - 
Árja*    -  -  -   7,3 
Nomadic Sámi Lists* -  -  25,8   6,0 
Karašjohka  sedetary* -  -  14,0   - 
The karasjok List *** -  -  -   15,6 
Others    0,0  0,0  0,0   0,0 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
No. of votes  8341  1491   1534   1421 
Turnout in %  59,9  64,5  64,2   59,5 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
* Sámi lists that are also represented in the Norwegian Sámi parliament 
** Joint list is Norwegian Sámi Association with the Sámi People's Party 
*** Local list, not specifically Sámi 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: Statistics Norway: www.ssb.no  
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of  Utsjoki  and  Inari  municipalities  at  the  Finnish  side  of  the  border  (Tables  5.1  and  5.2),  still  only  
some  parts  of  Inari  are  within  the  Detanu  watershed.  Some  general  trends  should  be  noted.  The  
social  democratic  Labor  Party  is  generally  the  largest  one  in  municipalities  at  the  Norwegian  side  of  
the  border,  while  the  agrarian  Centre  Party  tends  to  be  the  largest  at  the  Finnish  side.  One  
explanation  may  be  the  role  taken  by  these  two  parties  as  catch-all  parties  in  the  two  nation-states.  
Another  explanation  may  be  found  in  regional  history,  and  the  conflicting  local  experiences  with  the  
Red  Army  between  1941  and  1945.  These  and  several  other  parties  represented  in  those  elections  
are  nationally  organized,  on  ideological  models  that  are  typical  of  West  European  parties.  However,  
those  elections  also  include  various  Sámi  lists.  Some  of  those  are  represented  in  the  Sámi  
Parliaments,  and  internationally  they  are  affiliated  with  the  indigenous  rights  movements.  In  the  
coastal  municipalities  of  Alta  and  Deatnu  (Tana)  the  Sámi  lists  gain  relatively  scarce  support.  By  
contrast,  they  gain  strong  support  in  inland  municipalities  at  the  Norwegian  side  of  the  border.  They  
are  particularly  strong  in  Guovdageainnu  (Kautokeino),  where  the  two  largest  parties  are  Sámi  lists.  
Largest  in  that  municipality  is  the  Sámi  People's  Party,  which  is  in  favour  of  local  commons  and  
decolonization.  The  second  largest  is  the  local  Sámi  Nomad  List,  which  attracts  relatively  
prosperous  reindeer  owners.  Both  lists  are  represented  in  the  Norwegian  Sámi  Parliament.  Local  
Sámi  lists  used  to  be  strong  at  the  Finnish  side  as  well.  During  my  fieldwork  I  was  told  that  the  
Center  Party  and  the  Sámi  List  used  to  compete  for  the  leading  position  in  the  Utsjoki  municipality.  
However,  there  has  been  a  sudden  change  between  the  municipal  elections  in  2008  and  2012.  In  
Utsjoki,  the  Sámi  list  has  totally  disappeared,  and  the  Centre  Party  has  been  losing  votes.  Similar  
tendencies  are  seen  in  the  Inari  municipality,  though  this  is  mostly  located  outside  the  Deatnu  
watershed.  The  weakening  of  the  Sámi  lists  at  the  Finnish  side  coincides  with  the  strengthening  of  
the  True  Finns.  This  right-wing  populist  party  is  sometimes  compared  to  the  Norwegian  Progress  
Party.  Both  have  gained  political  strength  at  the  nation-state  level.  Both  are  skeptical  of  
multiculturalism.  They  frame  indigenous  rights  as  particular  privileges  for  chosen  segments  of  a  
population  where  they  suppose  everyone  previously  had  equal  chances.  At  the  Norwegian  side,  the  
right-wing  populist  tendency  has  made  relatively  little  impact  on  municipal  politics  in  our  chosen  
watersheds.  Still  they  are  a  force  to  be  reckoned  with  in  the  coastal  Alta  and  Deatnu  (Tana)  
municipalities,  where  Sámi  ethnic  belonging  is  controversial.  This  is  a  pattern,  and  it  is  stronger  in  
the  upstream  municipalities  at  the  Finnish  side  of  the  border.  It  is  relevant  that  the  rise  of  the  True  
Finns  in  the  Utsjoki  municipality  coincides  with  the  disappearance  of  the  local  Sámi  list.  It  is  also  
relevant  that  the  Swedish  People's  Party  is  now  found  here.  This  is  an  all-Finnish  party  for  the  
Swedish-speaking  part  of  the  population.  In  Utjoki  virtually no  one  speaks  more  Swedish  than  what  
they  learned  at  the  Finnish  school,  or  from  dealing  with  Scandinavian-speakers  at  the  Norwegian  
side  of  the  Deatnu  River.  Local  Sámi  activists  have  told  me  that  they  support  the  Swedish  People's  
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Party  for  strategic  reasons,  so  that  the  linguistic  minorities  can  stand  together  in  Finnish  politics.  
Accordingly,  it  is  not  incorrect  to  see  the  local  presence  of  the  Swedish  People's  Party  as  a  response  
to  the  sudden  force  of  the  True  Finns  all  over  Finland.  The  results  of  right-wing  populist  parties  may  
or  may  not  reflect  widespread  opposition  to  indigenous  issues.  On  the  Norwegian  side,  that  I  know  
better,  the  catch-all  Labor  Party  is  also  a  bone  of  contention  between  the  pro-Sámi  Helga  Pedersen  
and  the  anti-Sámi  Olav  Gunnar  Ballo.  At  the  pub  in  Utsjoki  I  was  drinking  with  a  Sámi  from  the  
Norwegian  side  who  even  voted  Progress  Party  for  the  Sámi  Parliament,  to  demonstrate  his  belief  in  
liberty  for  all,  and  contempt  of  centralized  power.  (When  I  returned  one  and  half  year  later,  I  
learned  that  he  had  started  to  work  with  “Sámi  activists”  in  the  ČSV  movement  who  also  believe  in  
liberty  for  all  and  are  skeptical  of  centralized  power,  but  focus  on  collective  human  rights  as  a  
means  to  heal  the  harm  of  a  colonial  past.)  Other  lists  in  the  local  voting  statistics  are  the  Karasjok  
List,  a  local  list  that  is  not  specifically  Sámi,  and  the  Coastal  Party,  an  anti-centralization  party  that  
is  active  along  the  Norwegian  coastline. 
 Local  democratization:  The  Alta  and  Deatnu  Rivers  are  located  in  areas  with  vibrant  local  
democracy.  The  democratic  systems  at  municipal  level  are  the  result  of  a  specific  social  movement  
in  the  19th  century.445  This  historical  legacy  should  be  taken  into  account  in  order  to  understand  the  
dynamics  between  state  builders  and  indigenous  rights  movements.  The  municipal  movement  was  
especially  strong  among  peasants  and  small  holding  farmers,  and  it  gradually  was  accommodated  
by  nation-building  elites.  Thus,  state  laws  for  municipal  democracy  were  enacted.  Consequently,  a  
tacit  social  contract  emerged  between  nation-builders  and  the  municipal  movement.  However,  after  
the  fall  of  nationalist  historiographies,  we  should  not  reduce  the  municipal  movement  to  a  form  of  
nationalist  mobilisation,  because  it  was  not.  “Municipalism”  in  the  19th  century  was  a  transnational  
grassroots  movement.  It  partly  overlapped  with  Lay  Lutheranism,  of  which  the  insurgency  in  
Guovdageaidnu  (Kautokeino)  was  part,  and  it  partly  overlapped  with  the  utopian  socialists,  of  
which  the  Thranite  rebellion  in  Southern  Norway  was  part.  Indeed  the  compromise  between  nation-
builders  and  the  municipal  movement  is  one  explanation  as  to  why  the  political  class  chose  to  
respect  local  customary  laws  among  peasants  in  Southern  Norway,  who  claimed  local  rights  to  use  
local  commons.446  This  happened  during  the  same  period  as  Finnmark  County  was  being  re-defined  
as  a  “Colonie”.  Thus,  the  political  class  chose  highly  different  ways  to  deal  with  local  customs  
among  peasants  in  the  Norwegian  core  areas,  compared  to  how  they  dealt  with  peasants,  herders  
and  fishers  in  areas  where  the  territory  of  the  nation-state  overlapped  with  the  Sápmi  homeland.  The  
process  led  to  ethnification  of  in-group  and  out-group,  and  had  the  social  function  of  dividing  the  
                                                 
445  Nærbøvik  1986;;  Johansson  1990 
446 Sandvig 1998; Stenseth 2010 
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popular  opposition  against  the  centre.447  Also  in  Finland,  the  municipal  democracy  became  
institutionalized  under  the  nation-state.  In  both  countries  decentralisation  and  local  democracy  have  
gained  a  mythical  status  in  official  political  culture.  On  the  Norwegian  side,  the  municipal  political  
tendency  also  led  to  a  democratisation  at  an  intermediate  “level  of  aggregation”  (to  use  a  term  for  
geographical  scale  taken  from  Elinor  Ostrom's  SES  framework).  The  Counties  of  Norway,  as  those  
of  Finland,  had  been  created  as  administrative  units  under  the  early  territorial  states.  In  the  1970s,  a  
reform  led  to  the  creation  of  the  “County-Municipalities”,  which  were  democratically  elected  
bodies  at  the  county  level.  This  resulted  in  institutional  competition  between  the  County  Governor  
(Fylkesmann)  on  the  one  hand  and  the  County-Municipality  (Fylkeskommune)  on  the  other.  The  
terminology  is  so  confusing  that  few  common  voters  notice  the  difference.  During  the  attempt  to  
implement  indigenous  rights  in  the  Finnmark  County,  highly  different  roles  were  played  by  the  
County-Municipality  (Finnmark  fylkeskommune)  and  the  County  Governor  (Fylkesmannen  i  
Finnmark).448  Such  double  institutions  do  not  exist  in  the  Counties  at  the  Finnish  side  (Lääni),  but  
after  pressure  from  the  EU,  the  Finnish  state  allowed  for  an  inter-municipal  council  that  is  called  a  
Regional  Council  (of  Municipalities)  (Maakuntien  liitot).449  On  the  Swedish  side,  the  Counties  are  
supplemented  with  a  criss-crossing  territorial  order  called  “Landskap”,  which  is  a  regional  form  of  
cultural  belonging  with  history  back  to  the  middle  ages.450  To  conclude,  a  system  of  multi-level  
democracy  already  existed  in  the  Nordic  states  before  the  indigenous  rights  movement  returned  to  
the  stage  during  the  Alta-dam  struggle.  The  claims  put  forward  by  the  indigenous  rights  movement  
were  not  very  different  from  those  that  were  advocated  by  the  historical  municipal  movement:  local  
rights  to  local  commons,  regional  rights  to  regional  commons.  For  many  indigenous  rights  activists,  
                                                 
447  Jensen  2013 
448  Sandberg  2006;;  Sandberg  2008a 
449  Whereas  Finland,  like  Norway,  has  a  strong  tradition  for  municipal  democracy,  it  was  nevertheless  comparatively  
late  in  implementing  municipal  democratic  principles  at  the  "regional"  level,  that  is,  at  the  territorial  level  of  the  
County,  or  regional  state  administration.  At  the  Norwegian  side,  the  County  Municipality  (Fylkeskommunen)  was  
established  in  the  1970s,  as  a  directly  elected  counterpart  to  the  state  administration  in  the  County  (Fylkesmannen).  
At  the  Finnish  side,  similar  institutions  were  not  established  until  the  1990s,  as  a  response  to  EU  policies  (Regional  
Council  of  Lapland  2011a,  Regional  Council  of  Lapland  2011b,  Associations  of  Finnish  Local  and  Regional  
Authorities  2011,  interview  with  Aimo  Guttorm  3.  March  2011).  This  is  relevant  for  the  second  implementation  of  
the  EU-WFD,  when  the  EU  Commission  demanded  further  democratisation  of  each  of  the  water  regions.  Thus,  in  
the  Deatnu  Water  Area,  some  formal  authority  was  transferred  from  Norway's  and  Finland's  regional  state  
administration  in  Finnmark  and  Lappland,  to  the  Finnmark  County  Municipality  and  the  Regional  Council  of  
Lappland.  Both  are  regional  democratic  bodies,  but  still,  they  are  organised  differently,  as  a  result  of  the  different  
trajectories  of  democratisation  under  the  two  states.  At  the  Finnish  side,  the  regional  council  in  each  County  (Län)  is  
a  confederal  coordination  council  for  municipalities,  each  of  which  has  a  democratically  elected  leadership.  At  the  
Norwegian  side,  the  county  municipality  in  each  County  (Fylke)  has  its  own  democratically  elected  political  
leadership,  though  it  has  no  "supra-municipal"  authority,  but  is  a  parallel  arrangement  subordinated  to  the  same  
state.  Under  both  states,  the  various  forms  of  "municipalism"  is  subordinated  to  the  state  government,  which,  in  turn,  
has  ratified  various  treaties  on  cross  border  cooperation.  Thus,  Norwegian  and  Finnish  "municipalism"  is  a  field  of  
negotiation  between  political  agency  from  the  local  communities,  from  the  national  states,  and  from  transnational  
regimes.  These  also  represent  various  forms  of  popular  self-determination,  with  partial  territorial  overlap,  and  
various  ethno-political  solidarities. 
450  Olwig  &  Jones  2008 
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their  claim  is  no  more  radical  than  to  demand  an  end  to  the  double  standard  that  was  instituted  in  
the  19th  century,  when  the  political  class  codified  the  local  customs  regarding  local  commons  in  
some  local  communities,  while  at  the  same  time  declaring  another  province  to  be  a  “Colonie”.  
Interestingly,  in  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  watersheds,  there  are  some  similarities  between  the  present  
municipal  boundaries  and  the  ancient  siida  boundaries.  This  is  not  to  say  that  the  municipalities  
have  taken  over  the  function  of  the  siidas,  but  it  may  indicate  that  the  actual  municipalities  emerged  
through  interaction  between  the  state  and  a  local  society  whose  way  of  social  organisation  was  
reminiscent  of  the  ancient  siida  system.  If  so,  then  the  municipalities  emerged  from  the  de  facto  
jurisdictional  pluralism,  where  the  hegemonic  nation  states  interacted  with  the  vital  reminiscent  of  
an  ancient  stateless  political  system.  Historians  describe  the  siida  system  as  a  locally  based,  
confederal  order.451  This  description  resembles  the  prescriptions  of  radical  communalism.452  In  the  
North-Atlantic  macroregion,  indigenous  peoples  have  provided  inspiration  for  confederalist  
political  theories,  while  the  theoretical  concept  of  the  “noble  savage”  has  inspired  hypotheses  for  
empirical  testing  by  cultural  historians.  Thus,  there  is  a  symbiosis  between  the  empirical  exploration  
of  traditional  indigenous  culture  and  the  practical  prefiguration  of  future  political  praxes.   
 In  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  watersheds,  radical  municipalism  guide  social  movements  which  take  
part  in  deliberative  participatory  democracy,  while  a  co-opted  form  of  municipalism  had  become  
well  institutionalized  as  an  arena  of  representative  democracy.  A  similar  dialectic  between  
democratic  centralism  and  radical  democracy  may  have  been  going  on  since  the  communalist  
movement  in  the  1800s,  maybe  even  since  the  siida  system  was  de  jure  criminalized  in  1751.  The  
modern  municipalities  Inari  and  Utsjoki  and  Kautokeino  are  named  after  the  ancient  siida-names  
Anár,  Ohcejohka  and  Goudegiadnu.  The  local  people  of  Ohcejohka  Siida  have  suffered  much,  
particularly  when  the  state  border  was  constituted  and  consolidated,  because  the  northern  part  of  the  
siida  was  cut  off  from  the  rest.  The  main  part  of  the  siida  became  the  Utsjok  municipality,  while  the  
northern  part  was  called  Polmak  Anneks  and  is  today  part  of  the  Deatnu  (Tana)  municipality.  But  
local  people  at  each  side  of  the  border  are  still  kinfolk,  and  still  communicate  together  in  the  same  
dialect  of  North  Sámi,  and  there  is  still  a  continuous  practice  of  subsistance  practices,  were  ancient  
norms  and  lore  are  kept  and  developed.  The  norms,  lores  and  social  organization  that  are  being  
maintained  through  livelihood  practices  constitute  a  natural  resource  management  system  in  
themselves.  The  community  is  also  organized  as  interests  groups.  Some  village  councils  call  
themselves  “siida”,  with  reference  to  the  ancient  tribal  confederacy.  Others  call  themselves  “gilli  
saervi”,  which  is  a  Sámi  translation  of  the  Norwegian  “bygdelag”,  a  traditional  concept  of  
traditional  pasture  management  that  has  become  widely  known  throughout  the  Nordic  communalist  
                                                 
451  Solbakk  2007b 
452  Bookchin  1971;;  Bookchin  1982;;  Bookchin  &  Biehl  1996;;  Bookchin  &  Eiglad  2007 
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movement.  The  states  have  not  consolidated  de  facto  jurisdictional  authority  in  this  border  area.  The  
local  movement  for  decolonization  claims  that  according  to  international  laws  and  longstanding  
customs  local  people  have  the  right  to  local  commons.  This  is  the  same  right  as  the  states  
recognized  for  peasant  areas  further  south,  but  were  denied  in  indigenous  areas  that  were  
administered  as  a  “Colonie”.453 
        
Figure  5-6:  Municipal  geography:  between  the  ancient  siida  system  and  modern  state  system 
Left:  Reconstruction  of  siida  boundaries  around  Deatnu  and  Alta  watersheds,  before  1751.454 
Right  Municipal  and  state  borders  around  Deatnu  and  Alta  watersheds  after  1964.455 
 
 Overlapping  political  systems?  The  complex  political  geography  of  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  
Rivers  is  as  rich  as  the  natural  and  cultural  heritage  of  the  area.  This  pluralism  includes  a  variety  of  
conflict  lines,  and  the  dynamics  of  changing  alignments  and  divisions.  Local  Sámi  politics  have  
evolved  since  time  longstanding.  State  politics  has  been  more  or  less  present  for  about  five  hundred  
years.  At  some  locations  and  periods,  local  Sámi  politics  have  evolved  through  accommodation  
with  state  politics.  An  example  is  the  1751  treaty,  whereby  the  state  legislators  acknowledged  the  
existence  of  some  of  the  Sámi  longstadning  rights.  At  other  locations  and  periods,  local  Sámi  
politics  have  evolved  in  relative  autonomy  from  state  politics,  keeping  a  parallel  system  of  norms,  
lore  and  techniques.  Contradictions  between  local  custom  and  state  law  have  been  amplified  by  the  
fact  that  nationalist  state-builders  chose  to  recognize  ancient  customs  in  core  areas  of  the  nation-
states,  while  subjecting  northern  peripheries  to  colonial  and  eugenic  policies.  There  has  been  an  
ambiguous  co-evolution  between  the  nation-states  and  the  reminiscence  of  the  siida  system.  This  
has  been  the  de  facto  situation  in  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  water  areas,  as  well  as  several  neighbouring  
                                                 
453  The  explicit  administration  of  Sámi  areas  as  colony  was  a  policy  that  applied  at  least  to  Finnmark  County,  and  at  
least  from  the  1820s  onwards,  for  an  undefined  period  of  time  (Pedersen  1999). 
454  Map  source:  cut  from  "Sámi  siidas",  The  Encyclopaedia  of  Saami  Culture,  online  version  (beta).  ©  University  of  
Helsinki.  Retrieved:  www.helsinki.fi/~sugl_smi/senc/english/graphics.htm,  February  2013.  Re-use  policy:  
http://www.helsinki.fi/yliopisto/oikeudet.htm.  (Also  printed  in  Kulonen,  Seurujävri-Kari  &  Pulkkinen  2005:  186.) 
455  Map  source:  cut  from  "Sámi  municipalities",  ibidem.  (Not  reprinted  in  Kulonen,  Seurujävri-Kari  &  Pulkkinen  2005). 
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water  areas.  Consequently,  there  is  actual  jurisdictional  complexity  and  ambiguity  in  the  area.  This  
actual  jurisdictional  complexity  has  been  acknowledged  by  state  legislators  after  the  ratification  of  
international  indigenous  rights  norms.  Before  that  ratification,  state  builders  insisted  on  an  
unrealistic  claim  of  jurisdictional  monopoly.  Thus,  it  was  politically  impossible  to  discuss  these  
issues  during  the  Alta  dam  conflict.  Indeed  the  suppression  and  silencing  of  this  discussion  was  one  
cause  of  the  conflict.  During  the  Alta-dam  conflict,  the  interaction  between  states  and  Sámi  
institutions  had  been  shaped  by  a  series  of  movements  for  democratisation.  The  nation-builders  had  
been  one  branch  of  that  family,  the  communalists;;  the  Lay  Lutherans  and  the  labor  movement  had  
been  other  branches.  The  official  political  system  had  been  shaped  through  compromises  between  
nationalists,  communalists  and  socialists,  while  new  visions  for  democratization  emerged  among  
new  social  movements  at  the  time.  Movements  for  environmental  protection  and  indigenous  rights  
would  reforme  the  heritage  from  communalist  and  socialist  movements.  This  was  an  informal  
democratic  practice  that  re-negotiated  the  premises  of  codified  democratic  practice.  Analytically,  
this  is  a  form  of  meta-democracy,  because  informal  democratic  practices  maintain  and  transform  
codified  democratic  systems.  At  this  analytical  level,  the  nation-states  never  enjoyed  de  facto  
sovereignty  in  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  watersheds.  There  was  always  a  pluralistic  and  ambiguous  
overlap  of  different  political  systems:  the  institutions  of  modern  states  coexisted  with  the  
institutions  inherited  from  an  ancient  stateless  political  system.  When  the  states  ratified  
international  indigenous  rights  norms,  they  recognized  the  existence  of  actual  jurisdictional  
pluralism,  and  attempts  are  being  made  to  determine  the  ambiguities  of  that  relationship.  However,  
the  evocation  of  the  Siida  system  is  kept  as  oral  culture  and  practical  knowledge,  and  it  may  be  
impossible  to  codify  that  in  a  way  that  gets  rid  of  all  ambiguities.  That  challenge  will  probably  give  
rise  to  future  controversies,  but  that  may  or  may  not  be  considered  a  problem.  Taking  the  existence  
of  informal  meta-democracy  into  consideration,  such  conflicts  may  be  opportunities  to  further  
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5.3.0  Context:  the  West-European  and  Circumpolar  macro-regions 
 
5.3.1  The  context:  view-point  for  the  panorama 
Now  I  will  briefly  describe  the  larger  socio-ecosystems  into  which  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  watersheds  
are  embedded.  Ecological  and  cultural  geographies  will  be  emphasized  and  the  presentation  will  
gradually  introduce  some  terms  from  Stein  Rokkan's  “conceptual  map  of  Europe”.   
First,  I  will  sketch  the  emerging  policy  networks  in  the  European  and  Circumpolar  macro-
regions.    When  our  historical  case  from  the  Alta  River  took  place,  only  few  institutions  had  been  
developed  at  the  macro-regional  level.  Still,  maps  of  the  European  and  Circumpolar  macroregions  
will  be  used  to  present  the  rich  natural  and  cultural  heritage. 
 After  having  mapped  those  socio-ecological  conditions,  we  will  return  to  Stein  Rokkan's  
“conceptual  map  of  Europe”.  He  traced  the  state  formation  in  retrospect  from  the  point  of  view  of  
what  was  conventional  knowledge  during  the  Alta-dam  controversy.  At  that  time,  the  Nordic  states  
could  be  seen  as  models  states  with  territorial  integrity,  cultural  unity  and  military  sovereignty,  
because  the  political  class  denied  the  existence  of  ecological  interdependencies,  they  silenced  the  
indigenous  people  and  other  national  minorities,  and  they  were  granted  a  virtual military  
sovereignty  because  of  their  strategic  location  between  the  superpowers.  Today,  the  geopolitical  
context  has  changed,  and  this  change  includes  new  knowledge  about  past  geopolitical  conditions  
that  were  either  denied,  silenced  or  taken  for  granted  during  Rokkan's  time.  Indeed,  some  historians  
of  globalization  in  the  circumpolar  area  regard  the  rise  and  fall  of  the  nation-states  as  one  particular  
stage  in  the  longue  duree  of  globalization. 
 By  focusing  on  socio-ecological  complexities,  this  chapter  maps  the  context  in  terms  of  
landscape  geography,  similarly  to  how  it  described  the  two  selected  watersheds.  The  final  chapter  
(12.0.0),  however,  will  sketch  an  alternative  view-point  on  the  same  geographical  context.  There  the  
focus  will  change  from  nature  and  culture,  to  geostrategical  theatres.  When  this  is  being  kept  
separate,  it  is  not  because  military  security  is  supposed  to  have  any  special  significance  for  state  
(trans)formation.  The  purpose  is  to  describe  military  activities  in  relative  autonomy  from  political  
praxes,  in  order  to  enable  a  description  of  policy,  politics  and  polity  in  relative  autonomy  from  the  
military.  The  distinction  between  violent  and  non-violent  systems  is  practically  relevant  for  
transformative  social  movements,  because  those  need  to  identify  actual  opportunities  to  take  
effective  collective  action,  while  at  the  same  time  fending  off  criminalization,  securitization,  and  
violent  suppression  of  dissent. 
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5.3.2  Macro-regional  integration:  Western  Europe  and  the  Circumpolar  Arctic 
The  Alta  and  Deatnu  Rivers  have  geographically  complex  ecological  habitats  and  cultural  
livelihoods.  These  overlapping  socio-ecosystems  are  embedded  in  other  socio-ecosystems  that  may  
be  mapped  at  a  macro-regional  scale.  Some  institutions  at  this  level  had  been  developed  already  
during  the  time  of  my  historical  case  study  from  the  Alta  River,  but  they  would  become  more  tightly  
integrated  during  the  time  of  my  ethnographic  case  study  from  the  Deatnu  River.  Still,  we  will  use  
maps  of  the  Circumpolar  and  European  spaces  to  present  the  rich  ecological  and  cultural  heritage  
that  has  existed  here  since  long  before  macro-regional  integration.  With  regard  to  the  historical  
Alta-dam  case,  it  may  be  anachronistic  or  teleological  to  map  the  biological  and  cultural  diversity  of  
that  time  in  macro-regional  terms,  when  methodological  nationalism  was  the  hegemonic  paradigm  
of  that  time.  The  process  was  teleological  only  to  the  degree  that  it  was  the  result  of  intentional  
action  from  individuals.  On  the  other  hand,  the  recent  macro-regional  integration  has  allowed  us  to  
re-write  the  history,  and  to  expose  the  ecologic  and  cultural  complexity  that  is  easily  overlooked  or  
silenced  by  the  mapping  practices  of  the  nation  states. 
 Macro  regional  development:  The  locally  adapted  salmon  stocks  of  Alta  and  Deatnu  Rivers  
migrate  widely  in  the  North  Atlantic  area.  The  indigenous  peoples  of  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  Rivers  
have  found  cultural  affinities  and  make  organizational  bonds  with  other  indigenous  peoples  and  
other  national  minorities  all  over  the  world.  Some  issues  have  led  to  transnational  movements  
mobilizing  to  influence  global  institutions  such  as  the  UN.  Other  issues  have  led  to  transnational  
mobilization  aimed  at  shaping  the  ongoing  macro-regional  integration  in  Western  Europe  or  in  the  
Circumpolar  Arctic.  With  regard  to  Western  Europe,  such  integration  is  institutionalized  in  the  EU,  
the  Council  of  Europe,  and  the  European  Economic  Agreement  (EEA).  In  the  Circumpolar  Arctic,  
there  is  collaboration  on  more  particular  issues,  either  among  NATO-countries,  or  within  the  
emerging  Barents  Sea  region. 
 
 
5.3.3  Complex  ecological  systems 
The  management  of  natural  heritage  is  facilitated  by  macro-regional  integration.  For  environmental  
movements,  the  EU  has  sometimes  provided  a  useful  alternative  to  nation-states,  because  some  
local  ecosystems  are  found  in  trans-boundary  areas,  and  some  within  peripheries  of  nation-states.  
The  European  Parliament  has  become  a  prioritized  arena  for  the  European  Green  Parties,  though  the  
Council  of  Ministers  at  times  has  been  resistant.  The  Circumpolar  Arctic  is  an  ecologically  
vulnerable  environment.  States  and  intergovernmental  organizations  have  defined  several  areas  of  
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Figure  5-7:  Macro-regional  integration  in  Western  Europe  and  in  the  Circumpolar  Arctic 
Left:  The  European  Economic  Agreement  (EEA)  integrates  Norway,  Iceland  and  Lichtenstein  (green)  into  the  
EU  common  market  (blue).456 
Right:  State  formations  in  the  Circumpolar  Arctic:  The  Russian  Federation,  Canada,  Denmark  (Greenland),  
USA  (Alaska),  Norway,  Finland  and  Sweden.457 
                                
Figure  5-8:  Vulnerable  natural  heritage  in  Western  Europe  and  the  Circumpolar  Arctic 
Left:  Areas  of  the  EU  with  relatively  little  influence  of  urbanization,  infrastructures,  or  intensive  agriculture.  
Data  from  Finland  and  Norway  are  missing.458 
Right:  Vulnerable  environments  in  the  Circumpolar  Arctic:  Protected  areas  under  state  law  and  international  
treaties  (dark  green)  and  wilderness  areas  registered  by  the  states  and  the  UN  (light  green).459  
                                                 
456  Map  source:  Wikimedia  (Wikipedia:  "EEA",  retrieved  February  2013),  ©  in  the  public  domain  (free  to  use). 
457  Artist:  Hugo  Ahlenius  ©  UNEP/GRID  Arendal  2006.  http://www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/arctic-map-
political_365d  (accessed  09.04.2015). 
458  Artist:  UNEP  GRID  Warszawa,  ©  European  Environment  Agency  (EEA).  Retrieved:  http://www.gridw.pl,  February  
2013.  Terms  of  use:  http://www.eea.europa.eu/legal/copyright 
459  Artist:  Hugo  Ahlenius  ©  UNEP/GRID  Arendal  2006.  http://www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/protected-areas-and-
wilderness_60e9    (accessed  09.04.2015). 
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Figure  5-9:  Vulnerable  cultural  heritage  in  Western  Europe  and  the  Circumpolar  Arctic 
Left:  Indigenous  peoples  in  the  Circumpolar  Arctic.460 
Right:  Signatory  parties  of  the  European  Charter  for  Regional  or  Minority  Languages  (countries  in  dark  green  
have  signed  and  ratified,  countries  in  light  green  have  signed  but  not  ratified,  countries  in  white  have  neither  
signed  nor  ratified,  though  they  are  parts  of  the  Council  of  Europe).461 
                                
  Figure  5-10:  Infrastructure  development  in  Western  Europe  and  the  Circumpolar  Arctic 
Left:  Communication  infrastructures  in  the  Circumpolar  Arctic:  main  roads  (red),  pipelines  (purple),  sea  
routes  (blue)  and  railways  (gray).462 
Right:  Access  to  the  large  markets  in  the  EU,  from  red  (least  access)  to  blue  (most  access).463 
  
                                                 
460  Artist:  Hugo  Ahlenius  ©  UNEP/GRID  Arendal  2006.  http://www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/demography-of-
indigenous-peoples-of-the-arctic-based-on-linguistic-groups_b4c8  (accessed  09.04.2015). 
461  Map  source:  Wikimedia  Commons  (Wikipedia:  "ECRM"),  retrieved  February  2013,  in  public  domain  (free  usage) 
462  Artist:  Hugo  Ahlenius  ©  UNEP/GRID  Arendal  2006.  http://www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/arctic-transportation-
routes-roads-shipping-and-pipelines_c0ee  (accessed  09.04.2015). 
463  Source:  EU  Commission  2007:  21  (see  bibliography),  from  www.interregnord.com  retrieved  February  2013. 
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special  value  for  biodiversity  around  the  Arctic.  During  the  Alta-dam  struggle,  international  treaties  
on  shared  natural  commons  were  scarce,  but  local  environmental  organizations  exchanged  letters  
with  similar  groups  all  over  Europe  and  even  globally.464 
 
 
5.3.4  Complex  cultural  systems 
The  protection  of  a  diverse  cultural  heritage  has  also  been  facilitated  by  regional  integration.  The  
EU  has  institutions  where  the  states  help  each  other  policing  general  human  rights  issues,  but  the  
Council  of  Europe  has  more  specifically  a  European  Charter  for  Regional  and  Minority  Rights.  This  
had  not  yet  happened  during  the  Alta-dam  struggle.  In  the  Circumpolar  Arctic,  many  linguistic  and  
cultural  minorities  have  been  recognized  by  the  UN  as  being  indigenous.  Those  peoples  are  related  
through  cultural  and  linguistic  family  resemblances.  During  the  Alta-dam  struggle,  the  local  
indigenous  rights  organizations  had  close  contact  with  similar  organizations  among  other  
indigenous  peoples  on  the  same  side  of  the  iron  curtain.  Since  the  late  1980s,  the  indigenous  
peoples  in  the  North-Atlantic  region  have  experienced  some  Glasnost  at  home,  while  developing  
their  organizational  ties  with  Siberian  indigenous  peoples.  The  global  indigenous  movement  has  
succeeded  in  shaping  UN  human  rights  norms,  and  now  mobilizes  to  make  the  states  ratify  and  
implement  the  norms. 
 
 
5.3.5  Centre-periphery  relations 
So,  the  European  and  Circumpolar  macro-regions  are  rich  in  ecological  and  cultural  diversity.  Those  
are  complex  and  multilayered  socio-ecosystems,  with  several  centers  of  capital  accumulation,  
cultural  standardization,  political  centralization,  and  scientific  calculation.  Centralisation  of  some  
areas  implies  provincialisation  of  other  areas.  These  are  the  kind  of  relations  that  Stein  Rokkan  
referred  to  as  center-periphery  cleavages.  Some  economic  transactions  between  center  and  
periphery  are  one-sided  extraction  of  resources.  Other  transactions  may  provide  mutual  gain  and  
advantages  for  both  center  and  periphery.  The  Circumpolar  Arctic  is  not  only  the  habitats  of  
valuable  biodiversity,  and  the  homelands  of  indigenous  peoples.  Areas  in  the  Circumpolar  Arctic  are  
also  peripheries  in  relation  to  centers  of  capital  accumulation,  cultural  standardization,  political  
centralization  and  scientific  calculation.  The  European  Internal  Market  grants  economic  liberties  for  
                                                 
464  Source:  The  National  Archives  of  Norway:  the  archive  box  “Folkeaksjonen  mot  utbygging  av  Alta-
Kautokeinovassdraget,  Oslo-avdelingen  1977-1983”  (RA-P-0868  PA  868) 
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everyone,  but  those  who  have  better  market  access  enjoy  more  liberty  than  others.  The  northern  
provinces  of  the  Nordic  countries  are  among  the  areas  with  leastt  access  to  those  markest.  However,  
as  the  circumpolar  map  of  infrastructure  development  shows,  those  northern  provinces  of  the  
Nordic  countries  are  better  connected  to  Arctic  sea  routes  and  Russian  pipelines.  Together,  these  
two  maps  can  be  used  as  indicators  of  integration  of  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  watersheds  into  two  
macro-regions:  the  Circumpolar  Arctic  and  Western  Europe.  In  terms  of  Social  Network  Analysis,  
these  maps  not  only  show  infrastructure  development  and  market  access,  they  are  also  qualitative  
indicators  of  the  strength  and  shape  of  cybernetic  ties.  However,  such  mapping  of  cybernetic  ties  
say  nothing  about  what  natural  resources  might  exist  in  provincial  locations  such  as  the  Alta  and  
Deatnu  Rivers. 
 Development  or  colonization?  Infrastructure  development  and  market  access  facilitate  
integration  into  centers  of  capital  accumulation,  political  centralization,  cultural  standardization,  
and  scientific  calculation.  Such  access  may  give  local  communities  the  opportunity  to  develop  
themselves,  but  also  gives  political-economic  actors  in  more  central  nodes  of  power  an  opportunity  
to  extract  natural  resources.  The  potential  for  hydropower  development  in  the  Alta  River  is  only  one  
example.  Another  is  the  rich  fish  resources  of  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  Rivers  and  Fjords.  Sápmi  has  fish  
and  mineral  resources  of  interest  for  investors  from  more  central  areas,  and  the  Barents  Sea  has  fish,  
oil  and  gas.  Gas  pipelines  across  the  Kola  Peninsula  and  tar  sands  extraction  in  Canada  are  now  
iconic  of  how  extraction  of  resources  may  threaten  vulnerable  biotopes  and  indigenous  homelands.  
Local  people  in  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  Fjords  see  large  fishing  boats  as  a  threat  to  local  livelihoods.  
They  discuss  whether  the  emerging  mining  and  oil  industry  represent  opportunities  for  new  jobs,  or  
threats  to  coastal  livelihoods.  Along  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  Rivers,  local  people  discuss  whether  
angling  tourists  represent  an  opportunity  to  live  from  tourism  or  a  threat  to  local  bio-cultural  
diversity.  On  the  plateau,  people  discuss  whether  centralization  of  reindeer  husbandry  is  necessary  
for  economic  sustainability,  or  a  threat  against  ecological  sustainability.  Those  areas  provide  natural  
resources  for  relatively  more  central  nodes  in  the  accumulation  of  capital  and  centralization  of  
power,  exactly  like  peripheral  areas  in  the  Southern  post-colonies.  On  the  one  hand,  exporting  raw  
materials  to  central  areas  give  access  to  markets,  and  thus,  to  financial  capital.  On  the  other  hand,  
such  exports  create  (institute)  path  dependency,  hampering  the  development  of  local  industries,  and  
thus,  of  real  capital.  Therefore,  it  is  open  for  discussion  whether  such  relations  produce  regional  
development  or  internal  colonization. 
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5.3.6  Political  complexity:  after  the  utopia  of  unitary  nation-states 
This  overview  indicates  a  geographical  opportunity  structure  for  democratic  practice  along  the  
Deatnu  and  Alta  Rivers,  and  beyond.  The  viewpoint  for  this  overview  has  been  a  chosen  interest  in  
social-ecological  systems,  thus  in  landscape  ecology  in  its  environmental  and  humanistic  forms.  
Accordingly,  this  overview  has  included  socio-ecological  resource  geography  and  socio-ecological  
cultural  geography.  This  particular  viewpoint  provides  much  information  that  may  traditionally  not  
have  been  the  focus  for  the  political  science  of  state  formation.  However,  my  chosen  viewpoint  also  
looks  away  from  what  the  traditional  political  science  of  state  formation  used  to  focus  on,  namely  
geo-strategical  theatres.  In  my  empirical  case  studies  I  try  to  observe  the  significance  of  non-violent  
paths  of  constituent  and  constituted  power,  and  therefore  to  observe  those  in  relative  isolation  from  
the  impact  of  coercive  force.  This  is  not  because  such  factors  are  not  entangled  in  practical  reality,  
because  they  are,  but  it  is  because  of  the  normative  virtue  of  keeping  the  military  separate  from  (and  
subjugated  to)  the  political.  Thus,  in  the  final  theoretical  discussion,  I  will  return  to  the  dimension  
of  coercion.  There  I  will  apply  a  clear-cut  realpolitik/geopolitik  view  in  order  to  control  for  the  
potential  bias  of  wishful  thinking  in  my  own  perspective.  Consequently,  I  will  admit  that  
reductionistic  use  of  the  social-ecological  perspective  may  be  misleading,  but  I  will  at  the  same  time  
demonstrate  that  reductionistic  use  of  so-called  “realism”  is  directly  unrealistic. 
 In  the  present  chapter  I  have  indicated  how  the  emerging  regional  development  systems  
respond  to  actual  ecological  and  cultural  interdependence.  It  was  also  indicated  how  geo-strategical  
alliances  respond  to  actual  military  interdependence.  These  observations  may  be  used  to  expose  the  
utopian  nature  of  some  normative  political  theories.  Political  theories  after  Max  Weber,  from  the  
republican  ones  to  the  nationalist  ones,  have  presumed  (a)  the  territorial  sovereignty  of  the  polity,  
(b)  the  cultural  cohesion  of  the  demos  and  (c)  the  military  capacity  of  those  to  defend  the  self-
determination  of  a  people.  The  Nordic  nation-states  have  been  used  as  exemplars  of  successful  
states  according  to  such  premises.  Therefore  it  is  relevant  that  those  theoretical  premises  in  fact  do  
not  correspond  with  the  actual  empirical  geographical  context  of  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  watersheds.  
Regarding  (a),  territorial  integrity,  the  actual  ecological  interdependence  suggests  that  territorial  
integrity  is  an  ideal  at  best.  Ecosystems  are  nested,  complex,  and  dynamic;;  they  are  never  neatly  
nested  in  any  finished  order.  Regarding  (c),  cultural  unity,  the  existence  of  national  minorities  and  
indigenous  populations  indicate  that  social  belonging  to  several  collectives  is  no  exception  from  the  
rule.  Consequently,  a  coherent  and  socially  bonded  demos  is  utopian,  there  are  always  several,  
overlapping  demoi.  Regarding  (c),  the  capacity  to  defend  oneself,  the  realpolitik  of  NATO  and  
CSTO  indicate  that  small  states  like  Finland  and  Norway  have  few  opportunities  to  determine  their  
own  security  policies.  For  that  reason,  the  notion  of  military  sovereignty  lacks  descriptive  value,  but  
 183  
 
is  a  rhetoric  device  for  an  ideological  apparatus.  During  the  Alta-dam  controversy,  the  Nordic  states  
denied  the  existence  ecological  interdependencies,  they  silenced  the  indigenous  people  and  other  
national  minorities,  and  they  were  granted  a  virtual military  sovereignty  because  of  their  strategic  
location  between  the  superpowers.  As  a  result,  the  building  of  national  democracies  appeared  to  
have  been  completed.  Today,  the  geopolitical  context  has  changed  so  much  that  socio-ecological  
complexity  no  longer  can  be  denied  or  silenced.  Not  only  is  the  present  geopolitical  situation  
another  than  what  it  was  thirty  years  ago,  additionally  the  knowledge  has  changed  about  what  the  
geopolitical  situation  was  back  then. 
 The  Conceptual  Map  of  Europe:  Let  us  return  to  the  center-periphery  relations  that  were  
mapped  above.  In  Arctic  peripheries  such  as  the  river  systems  Alta  and  Deatnu,  there  is  large  degree  
of  continuity  from  the  age  of  state  formation  and  nation  building,  to  the  present  day  macro-regional  
development  programs.  Indeed,  some  historians  of  globalization  in  the  circumpolar  area  regard  the  
establishment  of  nation-states  as  one  particular  stage  in  the  longue  duree  of  globalization.465  In  his  
now  classic  “conceptual  map  of  Europe”,  Stein  Rokkan  traced  interactions  between  centers  and  
peripheries  throughout  the  establishment  of  territorial  states  and  their  transformation  into  nation  
states  and  welfare  states.  He  traced  that  process  in  retrospect  from  the  point  of  view  of  conventional  
knowledge  during  the  Alta-dam  controversy.  The  contemporary  geopolitical  reality  is  more  
pluralistic.  From  this  point  of  view  we  might  revise  the  way  in  which  the  process  was  traced,  but  
also  trace  its  further  unfolding.  For  Rokkan's  Structure-Functionalism,  the  center-periphery  
relationship  was  a  cleavage  in  general  attributes  among  the  population  of  an  area.  In  more  
networked  or  cybernetic  terms,  center-periphery  relations  are  a  question  of  connectivity.  In  such  an  
arrangement,  both  negative  and  positive  reciprocities  are  possible,  and  relatively  central  nodes  may  
exist  at  many  levels  of  accumulation.  Thus,  the  tension  is  not  one  between  center  and  periphery  but  
a  tension  between  different  ways  in  which  centers  and  peripheries  may  interact:  These  possibilities  
may  be  described  by  using  categories  such  as  level  of  aggregation,  positive  and  negative  reciprocity,  
regional  development  and  internal  colonization.  The  more  pluralistic  times  call  for  a  more  
pluralistic  concept  of  power,  which  can  be  used  to  discover  more  pluralism  in  the  past,  including  
economic,  semiotic  and  political  empowerment  in  the  periphery,  as  well  as  the  force  of  non-violent  
power.  One  should  recognize  that  despotic  regional  empires  based  in  Copenhagen  and  Stockholm  
never  invaded  any  “Terra  Nullius”,  but  criminalized  a  pre-existing  stateless  political  system,  while  
also  admitting  some  of  the  ancient  rights  of  minorities  such  as  Sámi  and  Finns.  One  should  also  
trace  how  the  European  Union  and  similar  projects  not  only  threaten  the  imagined  sovereignty  of  
nation-states  but  also  open  up  new  opportunities  for  democratization  among  entangled  democratic  
                                                 
465 Heininen  &  Southcott  2010 
 184  
 
demoi  in  overlapping  socio-ecological  habitats. 
 Symbolic  violence?  The  present  ethno-political  controversies  are  sometimes  simplified  in  
terms  of  opposing  social  groups,  even  though  multiple  group  membership  is  the  rule  rather  than  the  
exception.  For  the  indigenous  rights  movement,  “stratetic  essentialism”  may  sometimes  seem  
necessary  to  counter  the  neutralized  “methodological  nationalism”  of  the  hegemonic  culture.  But  
the  simplifications  of  strategic  essentialism  will  be  criticised  more  readily  than  the  simplifications  
of  methodological  nationalism,  because  the  latter  is  more  institutionalized  as  collective  
perception.466  That  collective  perception  is  based  in  selective  schooling,  and  thus,  it  is  not  only  
collective  knowledge,  but  also  collective  ignorance.  It  is  “symbolic  violence”  in  the  terminology  of  
Pierre  Bourdieu.467  Such  symbolic  violence  is  reproduced  by  the  Progress  Party,  the  True  Finns  and  
by  social  scientists  who  are  ignorant  of  the  progress  in  cultural  research.  Much  of  the  rhetoric  
against  indigenous  rights  is  based  on  the  false  presumption  that  colonization  never  took  place,  and  
that  the  nation-states  provided  equal  chances  for  all.  Those  rhetorical  forms  constitute  a  nationalist  
and  colonialist  doxa.  Confronted  with  this  doxa,  it  may  or  may  not  produce  misunderstandings  
when  the  Sámi  people  are  characterized  as  a  “stateless  nation”.  The  treaty  from  1751  that  
guarantees  the  Sámi  right  to  border  crossing  rightfully  used  the  term  “Lappiske  Nation”,  which  at  
the  time  was  used  to  refer  to  each  of  the  population  groups  within  the  same  state.  The  exhibition  
about  the  Alta-dam  struggle  at  the  Tromsø  Museum  rightfully  use  the  title  “Becoming  a  Nation”,  
referring  to  the  process  whereby  Sámi  belonging  was  turned  from  social  stigma  to  political  
resource,  allowing  for  the  Sámi  people  to  become  a  democratic  fellowship,  not  a  suppressed  
minority  in  their  own  land.468  Therefore,  Per  Otnes  is  correct  not  to  regret  469  that  he  called  his  
classic  book  “Den  samiske  nasjon”  (The  Sámi  Nation).470  All  this  may  be  difficult  to  grasp  for  
readers  whose  interpretative  schemata  have  been  formatted  by  nationalist  doxa.  For  such  readers,  
“nation”  means  “aspirations  to  statehood”.  However,  the  Sámi  people  have  been  forced  by  necessity  
to  invent  forms  of  democratization  that  overcome  the  suppressive  limitations  of  the  nation-state.  
Sámi  culture  is  highly  heterogeneous,  and  the  political  culture  of  Sápmi  has  been  in  an  ambiguous  
relationship  with  the  states  for  500  years.  Thus,  the  Sámi  experience  shows  that  nation-states  always  
were  utopian,  and  that  a  virtually coherent,  bounded  national  culture  could  not  be  maintained  
without  silencing  and  suppressing  the  geographically  overlapping  nations.  The  condition  of  cultural  
and  ecological  complexity  would  not  have  been  easier  to  contain  within  a  hypothetical  Sámi  nation  
state.  That  may  be  the  reason  why  such  an  alternative  never  emerged  as  a  political  option.  However,  
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if  the  bearers  of  nationalist  and  colonialist  doxa  continue  to  misinterpret  indigenous  rights  as  
“aspirations  of  statehood”,  and  continue  to  bloc  the  implementation  of  indigenous  rights,  then  they  
might  force  a  separatist  movement  to  emerge  as  the  only  viable  form  of  defence. 
 Centre-periphery  tensions:  Another  way  to  simplify  the  controversies  may  be  in  terms  of  
centre-periphery  cleavages.  On  the  one  hand,  the  three  Sámi  parliaments  may  sometimes  function  
as  state-certified  promoters  of  standardized  Sámi  culture.  That  is  an  emulation  of  the  state-certified  
nation-building  of  the  past.  Thus,  there  is  a  state-certified  multiculturalism  from  the  centres.  On  the  
other  hand,  Radical  indigenous  rights  movements  such  as  the  Riđđu  Riddu  festival  foster  cultural  
exchange  among  cultural  practitioners  and  common  folk.  They  mobilize  social  movement  coalitions  
that  are  culturally  pluralistic,  with  conflict  issues  that  are  locally  integrating.471  Consequently,  there  
is  oppositional  cultural  pluralism  from  the  provinces.  In  the  tension  between  state-certified  
multiculturalism  and  popular  cultural  pluralism,  there  is  a  field  of  professionals  working  with  
indigenous  rights  issues:  social  researchers,  politicians,  and  activists. 
 Such  concerns  are  relevant  when  I  as  a  Norwegian  deal  with  the  ethno-culturally  pluralist  
Sámi  areas  in  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  water  systems.  Contentions  regarding  indigenous  belonging  are  
lively  in  Coastal  Sámi  communities  in  downstream  areas,  as  well  as  in  upstream  areas  in  Finnish  
Sápmi.  A  useful  theory  has  been  developed  in  Kåfjord,  a  Coastal  Sámi  area  with  strong  elements  of  
Norwegian  and  Kvän  ethnicity  and  culture.  Indigenous  rights  activists  and  committed  social  
scientists  in  that  area  came  up  with  a  distinction  between  «divisive  issues»  versus  «integrating  
issues».472  Since  this  is  a  political  study,  we  could  translate  those  distinctions  into  more  
Machiavellian  terms:  The  concept  “divisive  issues”  can  be  translated  as:  “the  elites  in  central  areas  
dividing  and  conquering  the  population  of  a  colonized  periphery”,  while  the  concept  “integrating  




5.4.0  Negative  and  positive  findings  in  the  overview  chapter 
 
5.4.1  Negative  findings:  some  possible  errors  in  the  geographical  overview 
This  geographical  introduction  chapter  is  selective,  but  it  is  not  supposed  to  be  anything  else.  It  
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merely  sketches  a  very  general  macro  process  of  gradualist  progressive  reforms,  which  is  to  be  
unpacked  in  the  empirical  chapters  that  follow.  What  form  of  political  bias  or  position  does  this  
selectivity  imply?  For  historical  geography,  as  for  all  history  and  all  causal  analysis,  data  selection  
is  model  dependent.473  Those  models,  in  turn  are  selected  for  their  practical  relevance.474  This  
historical-geographical  chapter  is  no  exception. 
 The  selected  data  for  the  present  chapter  was  register  data  in  two  forms:  mostly  GIS  
(geographical  information  systems)  presented  in  maps,  and  also  statistics  of  election  results  in  each  
municipality.  Those  data  are  freely  accessible  on  the  internet.  I  did  the  most  basic,  descriptive  
analysis  of  the  election  results,  and  proceeded  directly  to  interpretation  of  those  and  the  GIS  maps.  
(The  European  Social  Survey  turned  out  to  be  useless  because  the  number  of  respondents  in  the  
selected  municipality  was  too  small  to  give  significant  results.)  GIS-data  has  been  selected  to  
provide  data  about  landscape  ecology.  Election  statistics  were  used  as  an  indicator  of  political  
preferences.  Both  were  used  to  describe  a  socio-ecological  environment,  and  to  trace  how  state  
transformation  appears  to  take  place  as  a  response  to  those  environmental  conditions. 
 The  analytical  unit  of  interest  is  two  adjacent  watersheds.  The  choice  of  unit  is  dictated  by  
research  interest.  I  do  not  believe  that  bioregions  are  the  only  relevant  units  for  political  geography.  
I  chose  to  trace  the  evolution  of  bioregional  management,  in  a  similar  way  to  how  Rokkan  in  his  
Conceptual  Map  of  Europe  chose  to  trace  the  formation  of  national  democracies.475  Rokkan  gave  a  
general  overview  over  how  nation-builders  succeeded  in  creating  more  or  less  uni-national  states.  
Ostrom,  by  contrast,  has  suggested  some  general  mechanisms  to  describe  institutional  change  at  
multiple  levels,  under  conditions  of  ecological  and  sociological  complexity.  The  present  chapter  has  
given  a  general  overview  over  how  some  formerly  uni-national  states  have  become  further  
democratized,  by  progressive  adaptation  to  the  actual  ecological  and  sociological  complexity  in  a  
trans-boundary  region.  One  may  discuss  exactly  which  unit  is  relevant  for  human  purposes. 
 The  causal  model  selected  is  one  of  gradual,  progressive  adaptation.  Rokkan  applied  such  a  
causal  model  when  he  asked  whether  nation-builders  “succeeded”  in  creating  virtually unified  
national  democracies.476  Ostrom  also  applied  a  model  of  gradual  adaptation  when  she  discussed  
“organizational  learning”  at  multiple  levels  of  aggregation.477  They  both  apply  causal  models  of  
gradual  progressive  adaptation,  and  both  address  both  micro  and  macro  levels.  Both  belong  to  a  
broad  functionalist  tradition.  In  the  present  chapter  I  have  also  applied  a  causal  model  of  gradual  
adaptation,  like  Rokkan  and  Ostrom.  Similarly  to  them,  the  present  chapter  has  explained  state  
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transformation  as  a  process  of  functional  adaptation  to  the  actual  complexity  of  the  actual  resource  
geography  and  the  actual  cultural  geography  in  a  trans-boundary  region.  Functional  adaptation  is  a  
process  of  functional  optimization  within  given  environmental  conditions.  One  might  discuss  what  
function  is  more  relevant  for  human  purposes.  I  have  chosen  to  emphasise  landscape  ecology,  and  
this  choice  was  informed  by  the  practical  purpose  of  the  research. 
 The  practical  purpose  guides  the  choice  of  analytical  unit  and  causal  model.  Rokkan's  
question  about  how  nation-builders  “succeed”  was  of  relevance  to  the  development  of  (uni)national  
democracies.  Ostrom's  question  about  “organizational  learning”  at  multiple  levels  is  of  relevance  to  
the  development  of  multi-level  democracy.  Like  Ostrom,  this  chapter  discussed  how  one  might  
overcome  the  particularist  bias  of  national  democracy,  and  proceed  towards  multi-level  bioregional  
democracy.  Rokkan  argued  that  progress  towards  more  democratic  political  practice  had  led  to  
progress  towards  a  more  democratic  political  science  as  well.478  Ostrom's  contribution  may  be  seen  
as  a  further  democratization.  I  radicalise  her  effort  at  democratization  by  seeking  to  contribute  to  a  
decolonised  political  science.  My  work  should  not  only  be  seen  as  a  continuation  of  Rokkan's  study  
of  gradual  progress,  but  also  as  a  break  with  his  normative  nationalism.  Rokkan  framed  the  history  
of  political  science  and  political  practice  optimistically,  as  one  of  continuous,  gradual  progress.  
However,  as  I  pointed  out  in  Chapter  2,  the  liberal  nationalism  that  brought  democratization  to  the  
Norwegian  minority  also  brought  eugenics  and  colonization  to  the  indigenous  people  in  areas  where  
Norway  and  Sápmi  overlap.479  I  see  paradox  where  Rokkan  saw  progress.  I  am  much  more  reserved  
in  my  enthusiasm  for  the  co-evolution  of  political  science  and  political  practice. 
 Causal  models  of  gradual,  progressive  adaptation  at  a  macro-level  are  double-edged  swords.  
They  may  be  used  to  enlighten  and  liberate,  but  also  to  obscure  and  suppress.  Such  models  are  an  
ingredient  in  progressivist  ideologies  of  reform,  but  also  in  colonialist  ideologies  of  superiority.  
Similarly,  there  are  two  reasons  why  in  this  chapter  I  have  used  the  causal  model  of  gradual,  
progressive  adaptation.  One  purpose  is  to  document  actual  socio-ecological  processes.  Another  
purpose  is  to  invite  the  reader  into  my  research  without  confronting  hegemonic,  optimistic  
narratives  about  European  integration.  However,  we  should  not  be  uncritically  optimistic  about  
regionalisation,  europeanisation  and  globalisation  in  the  present  generation,  like  we  should  also  not  
be  uncritically  optimistic  about  nation  building  in  the  previous  generation.  The  actually  existing  
Sámi  Parliaments  have  met  resistance  from  various  minorities-within-the-minority,  such  as  the  
Coastal  Sámi  and  the  Kväns,  in  a  similar  way  to  how  the  nationalistic  bias  of  the  uni-national  
democracies  was  resisted  by  the  Sámi  awakening.  Subaltern  voices  have  been  silenced.  This  poses  a  
practical  challenge  for  political  practice  and  science.  The  problems  are  well  known  within  the  
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sociology  of  development.  During  the  Cold  War,  both  superpowers  justified  imperial  tutelage  in  
third  world  countries  by  pushing  two  competing  “unilineal”  models  of  development,  Structure-
Functionalism  and  Marxist-Leninism.480  Such  sociologies/ideologies  were  particularly  harmful  for  
indigenous  peoples,  who  were  stigmatized  as  uncultured,  lawless  and  without  property  rights.481  
The  problem  is  not  evolutionary  ecology,  which  is  neo-Darwinist.  The  problem  is  ethnocentric  
sociologies  of  development,  which  may  be  Social-Darwinist,  Structure-Functionalist  or  Marxist-
Leninist.  While  evolutionary  ecology  assumes  that  evolution  is  blind  and  history  has  no  direction,  
the  ethnocentric  sociologies  of  development  prescribe  one-size-fits-all  standards  for  development.  
Those  standards  have  been  used  to  justify  colonial  resource  grabbing,  and  therefore  they  have  
produced  the  underdevelopment  they  have  claimed  to  fix.  Sámi  under  the  Soviet  Union  were  
subjugated  to  Marxist-Leninist  civilizing  missions.  Sámi  under  Norway/NATO  were  subjugated  to  
civilizing  missions  as  well,  justified  by  Structure-Functionalist  sociologists  such  as  Stein  Rokkan.  
The  indigenous  peoples  of  Sápmi  have  had  enough  of  developmental  thinking  being  misused  to  
justify  racial  suppression  and  colonial  resource  grabbing.  For  indigenous  human  rights  movements,  
as  well  as  for  other  environmental  justice  movements,  ecological  issues  matter,  and  resource  
grabbing  matters  as  well.  Therefore,  it  is  positive  that  some  political  scientists  show  interest  in  
evolutionary  ecology,482  but  such  attempts  have  to  address  the  historical  and  contemporary  misuse  
of  evolutionary  theories  as  tools  of  colonial  domination.483  Environmental  justice  movements  need  
to  bring  evolutionary  ecology  back  in,  but  also  to  need  to  kick  out  ethnocentric  sociologies  of  
development.  The  present  chapter  has  contributed  to  the  former  task,  but  not  to  the  latter.  In  order  to  
overcome  this  potential  bias,  I  will  do  two  things: 
 The  first  thing  I  will  do  is  to  “unpack”  the  grand  narrative  that  was  provided  in  the  present  
chapter.  I  have  now  provided  a  very  sketchy  overview  of  state  transformation  as  a  process  of  
functional  adaptation  in  two  particular  watersheds  in  Sápmi.  However,  in  the  remaining  empirical  
chapters  I  will  zoom  in  on  and  trace  some  of  the  particular  pathways  whereby  this  process  has  
actually  taken  place.  I  will  do  what  Coleman  suggests  with  his  famous  “bath  tub”  model:  if  I  want  
to  explain  how  some  macro  phenomena  (Explanans  1  and  2)  influence  another  phenomenon  
(Explanandum),  then  I  have  to  take  the  detour  of  tracing  how  the  particular  causal  pathways  (paths  
i,  ii  and  iii)  actually  operate  at  a  more  microscopic  level  of  analysis.  For  Coleman,  it  is  only  at  the  
micro  level  one  can  specify  valid  mechanisms,  and  if  one  does  not  make  the  detour  through  the  
micro  level,  he  would  call  it  “ecological  fallacy”.  The  present  chapter  has  only  sketched  a  general  
overview  over  paths  i,  ii  and  iii  at  macro  level.  It  is  therefore  an  ecological  fallacy  for  Coleman  
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when  I  will  conclude  this  chapter  by  suggesting  a  hypothetical  explanatory  “macro  mechanism”.  
But  the  other  empirical  chapters  are  dedicated  to  unpacking  this  macro  mechanism,  by  unpacking  
particular  paths  at  micro-meso  level.  Thus  I  try  to  overcome  ecological  fallacy. 
 The  second  thing  I  will  do  is  to  confront  the  causal  model  of  functional  adaptation  with  
another  causal  model  of  aleatory  blind  causality.  After  all  the  empirical  chapters  have  specified  the  
functionalist  model,  I  will  turn  to  a  theoretical  discussion  of  the  competing  theory,  the  clear-cut  
“realpolitik”  perspective.  Thus  I  try  to  control  for  the  potential  bias  of  wishful  thinking. 
 
 
5.4.2  Positive  findings:  “ecological  adaptation  of  state”,  a  possible  macro-mechanism 
Correlation  is  not  causation.  This  chapter  has  interpreted  aggregate  data:  GIS  and  election  statistics.  
We  have  observed  large-scale  “correlations”  between  some  properties  in  the  explanatory  factors  
(Explanans  1  and  2)  and  changes  in  the  state  formation  (Explanandum).  However,  this  does  not  say  
much  about  causation.  Correlation  is  not  causation.  This  is  why  we  need  concepts,  hypotheses,  or  
models  about  what  causal  pathways  might  be  possible. 
 
Explanandum   =  state  transformation,  formal  rules  in  the  governance  system  in  a  social-ecological  system 
Explanans  1   =  landscape  geography,  the  resource  system  within  a  social-ecological  system 
           +  cultural  geography,  informal  rules  in  governance  system  of  a  social-ecological  system 
Explanans  2     =  decrease  in  collective  ignorance,  increased  knowledge  of  landscape  and  cultural  geography 
 
The  Explanandum  appears  to  be  gradually  fitted  to  Explanans  1,  both  through  a  direct  path  (i),  and  
through  an  indirect  path  (ii.  iii),  via  an  interacting  explanatory  factor,  Explanans  2.  Those  three  
paths  may  be  summarized  as  follows: 
 Path  i):  The  direct  path  (i)  appears  as  a  process  of  progressive  adaptation,  where  state-
certified  laws  and  science  regarding  nature  management  function  better  and  better  in  relation  to  the  
actual  socio-ecological  environment. 
 Path  iii):  The  progress  in  scientific  knowledge  implies  gradual  decrease  in  collective  
ignorance  within  scientific  knowledge  (iii). 
 Path  ii):  Since  we  also  observe  close  interaction  between  science  and  society,  it  appears  to  be  
a  gradual  decrease  in  ignorance  also  within  the  folk's  lore  (ii). 
 In  summary,  we  observe  a  gradual  accumulation  of  knowledge  and  a  gradual  progress  of  
more  suitable  laws.  This  process  of  functional  adaptation  may  be  characterized  as  organizational  
learning  at  multiple  levels.  This  term  is  used  by  Elinor  Ostrom  to  describe  institutional  change.484  
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At  the  very  basis  of  this  model  is  the  concept  of  two-way  causation,  or  “emergence”,  including  
ecological  and  sociological  feedback  effects,  or  «homeostasis».  Such  an  explanatory  model  is  
«functional»,  in  a  systems  theory  sense.  Mathematically,  this  process  could  be  represented  by  
defining  the  Explanandum  as  a  function  of  Explanans  1  and  2,  while  Explanans  1  and  2  are  
functions  of  the  Explanandum.  This  could  describe  a  process  of  mutual  causation  or  co-evolution. 
 In  this  chapter  a  historical-geographical  process  of  functional  adaptation  appears  as  a  
process  approaching  towards  perfection  or  equilibrium,  as  a  mathematical  “limit  value”.  This  is  a  
rather  optimistic  view.  It  may  or  may  not  be  over-optimistic. 
 
Table  5-3:  An  observed  macro-mechanism:  ecological  adaptation  of  state 
Ecological  (or  progressive)  adaptation  of  state  (macro-mechanism) 
i:  progressive  adaptation  (of  state-certified  a.  norms  &  b.  science)  (lim) 
ii:  gradual  decrease  in  ignorance  within  the  folk's  lore  (lim) 
iii:  gradual  decrease  in  ignorance  within  scientific  knowledge  (lim) 
 
 
What  appears  as  a  process  of  progressive  adaptation  on  the  macro  level  is  to  be  further  unpacked  in  
the  further  empirical  chapters.  There,  some  more  particular  mechanisms  are  found.  We  will  zoom  in  
and  trace  particular  causal  links  in  high  resolution.  This  chapter  describes  the  pathways  (i-iii)  at  the  
systems  level  (macro),  thus  we  “blackbox”  the  mechanisms  at  an  aggregate  level.  For  now,  I  assume  
that  the  system  possesses  emergent  properties  that  are  irreducible  to  lower  levels  of  aggregation  
(micro).  I  adopt  a  causal  model  of  gradual  progressive  adaptation.  However,  as  I  observed  under  
“negative  finding”  above:  such  models  may  be  rather  problematic,  especially  when  they  are  being  
used  in  postcolonial  settings.  Causal  models  of  gradual  progressive  adaptation  are  found  in  
ethnocentric  one-size-fit-all  models  of  development,  which  have  been  used  to  justify  resource  
grabbing  and  imposed  underdevelopment  in  Sápmi  and  other  indigenous  homelands.  Recent  
attempts  to  build  regional  and  multi-level  forms  of  democracy,  such  as  the  Sámi  parliaments  or  the  
EU  environmental  policy,  make  it  easier  to  address  the  particularism  of  earlier,  nationalist  models  of  
democracy.  However,  the  Sámi  parliament  has  been  met  with  criticism  from  various  minorities-
within-the-minority,  similarly  to  how  the  Sámi  activists  earlier  criticized  the  national(ist)  
parliamentarian  democracies  in  Norway,  Sweden  and  Finland.     
 We  will  now  unpack  the  “blackboxed”  progressive  adaptation  of  state,  and  reveal  some  of  
the  more  particular  processes  (or  subaltern  struggles)  that  are  being  concealed  (or  silenced)  within  
the  macro-historical  narrative.  
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6.0.0 ALTA-DAM  CONFLICT  1968-1983:  A  SOCIAL  HISTORY 
 
 
6.1.0  Case  I:  the  Alta-dam  conflict  1968-1983 
 
The  Alta-dam  conflict  was  a  social  struggle  for  and  against  hydropower  development  in  the  Alta-
Kautokeino  River,  in  “Norwegian”  Sápmi.  It  started  discreetly  in  1968,  became  public  in  1970,  
reached  a  formal  legal  decision  in  1982,  and  went  on  until  opposition  was  suppressed  in  1983.  This  
peak  of  eventful  protest  gave  a  boost  to  the  Sámi  human  rights  struggle.  It  also  was  a  key  event  for  
the  environmental  movement  in  the  Nordic  area.  The  controversy  started  as  a  localized  conflict  
within  the  Alta  watershed:  Some  local  community  networks  pushed  for  industrial  development.  
Some  other  local  communities  and  networks  pushed  for  protection  of  the  natural  and  cultural  
heritage.  However,  the  conflict  scaled  up  to  become  a  constitutional  crisis  in  the  entire  state  that  
was  in  control  of  this  river,  and  this  historical  event  contributed  to  the  re-constitution  of  the  state.  In  
the  narrow  meaning  of  the  term,  a  constitutional  process  was  started  when  indigenous  rights  
activists  in  the  anti-dam  coalition  succeeded  in  making  the  government  appoint  the  Sámi  Rights  
Commission,  in  1970.  After  several  new  but  less  spectacular  cycles  of  contention,  the  reports  from  
the  commission  would  eventually  lead  to  an  amendment  of  the  Norwegian  Constitution  in  1988.485  
That  was  half  a  decade  after  the  end  of  the  Alta-dam  conflict.  However,  this  dramatic  event  gave  the  
process  a  flying  start.  The  Alta-dam  conflict  also  contributed  to  a  constitutional  process  in  the  broad  
meaning  of  the  term.  It  might  be  seen  as  a  nonlinear  break  in  the  gradual  adaptation  of  policies  for  
environmental  protection  and  indigenous  rights.  Prior  to  the  conflict,  state  policies  were  directed  
towards  industrial  progress,  while  the  sustainability  of  the  natural  and  cultural  heritage  was  a  more  
marginal  concern.  After  that  conflict,  various  international  treaties  and  local  struggles  would  lead  to  
the  gradual  accommodation  or  co-optation  of  some  policies  for  environmental  protection  and  
indigenous  rights. 
 The  constituent  power  of  the  Alta-dam  conflict  is  the  issue  of  interest  when  I  approach  this  
event  through  a  historical-sociological  single-case  study.  The  present  chapter  is  a  historical  
description.  The  next  chapter  is  a  sociological  interpretation.  The  empirical  data  is  mainly  selected  
from  the  already  accumulated  archival  and  interview  research,  by  Øystein  Dalland  and  Lars  Martin  
Hjorthol.486  The  historiography  of  the  Alta-dam  conflict,  as  all  historical  research,  is  bound  to  
                                                 
485  Norwegian  constitution  http://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1814-05-17/KAPITTEL_1-5#KAPITTEL_1-5  Last  
accessed  5.  May  2014.  By  17  May  2014,  paragraph  110  had  become  further  revised. 
486  Dalland  1994;;    Hjorthol  2006 
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remain  preliminary.  I  have  filled  some  small  gaps  in  the  documented  knowledge,  by  doing  my  own  
archival  research.  However,  it  is  not  as  a  historian  that  I  make  the  main  contribution  (with  this  
project).  Some  explanatory  concepts  are  also  needed  for  the  political  historian  to  sort  her  data,  
identify  possible  causal  linkages,  and  present  this  hypothetical  explanation  in  the  form  of  a  
narrative.  This  basic  methodological  insight,  from  Benedetto  Croce,  via  E.H.  Carr  and  Fernand  
Braudel,  to  Peter  Burke,  blurs  the  distinction  between  history  and  sociology.487  There  are  merely  
differences  in  degree  between  pure  history,  social  history,  historical  sociology,  and  pure  sociology. 
 The  present  chapter  leans  slightly  towards  the  historical  pole  of  that  continuum.  To  sort  
data,  identify  a  process,  and  present  this,  I  have  used  concepts  about  coalition  formation,  resource  
mobilisation  and  collective  framing.488  But  those  concepts  remain  implicit  in  the  present  chapter. 
 The  following  chapter,  however,  will  address  the  explanatory  concepts  explicitly.  That  
chapter  veers  more  towards  the  sociological  pole  of  the  mentioned  continuum.  There  I  will  theorize  
about  the  constituent  power  of  the  two  pro-dam  and  anti-dam  coalitions.  I  will  trace  the  emergence  
of  socio-material  practice  networks,  their  dynamics,  their  interactions,  and  eventually,  how  they  




6.2.0  Introduction  to  first  chapter  of  case  I 
 
The  literature  on  the  Alta-campaign  is  large,  but  most  of  it  is  polemics,  published  during  the  years  
of  contestation.  Systematical  historical  studies  are  scarce.  Twelve  years  after  the  conflict,  a  
chronology  was  published.490  Twelve  years  after  that  came  a  journalistic  narrative,  built  on  
newspaper  articles,  de-classified  documents,  extensive  interviews,  and  participant  observation.491  
Both  authors  gathered  data  from  archives  and  interviews.  The  second  study  added  to  the  knowledge  
that  had  been  gathered  by  the  first  one.  The  two  authors,  Øystein  Dalland  and  Hans-Martin  
Hjorthol,  together  accumulated  a  body  of  knowledge  that  we  may  call  the  historiography  of  the  
Alta-dam  conflict.  Both  have  written  a  history  of  this  struggle,  but  the  definite  history  does  not  
exist.  As  with  all  scientific  inquiry,  the  historiography  of  the  Alta-dam  conflict  remains  provisional.  
Furthermore,  this  is  also  one  of  these  historical  topics  that  remain  notoriously  controversial,  because  
of  its  significance  for  contemporary  social  conflicts.  Both  Dalland  and  Hjorthol  knew  the  anti-dam  
                                                 
487  Carr  1987  (1961):  21;;  White  1973;;  Burke  1991 
488  The  concepts  are  taken  from  Della  Porta  &  Piazza  (2008),  but  could  also  have  been  taken  from  Staggenborg  (2002). 
489  There  will  be  added  some  concepts  from  Latour  (2004)  and  from  Laclau  and  Mouffe  (1985). 
490  Dalland  1994 
491  Hjorthol  2006 
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campaign  from  inside.  Both  were  participant  observer,  and  also,  observant  participants.  The  
sociologist  of  law  Thomas  Mathiesen,  another  participant  in  the  same  controversy,  might  have  
called  them  action  researchers.492  Both  Dalland  and  Hjorthol  have  asked  research  questions  of  
relevance  to  some  of  the  specific  political  participants  which  were  involved.  The  most  interesting  
one  for  me  is  the  more  recent  one  of  those  two  authors,  because  he  has  accumulated  more  
information  than  the  former.  Hjorthol  is  frank  about  his  own  stand  point  and  perspective  in  relation  
to  the  events  he  describe.493  He  was  involved  in  the  conflict  as  journalist  for  the  newspaper  
Klassekampen  (The  Class  Struggle),  and  was  active  in  the  Maoist  party  AKP(ml).  He  focuses  on  the  
anti-dam  bloc  rather  than  the  pro-dam  movement,  and  within  this  limitation,  he  puts  all  natural-
scientific  issues  in  brackets  and  zooms  in  on  the  indigenous  rights  struggle.  There  is  nothing  wrong  
with  his  research  method.  However,  he  has  chosen  to  inquire  about  issues  of  practical  relevance  to  
his  specific  part  of  the  movement.  There  is  nothing  wrong  with  this.  It  is  laudable  that  he  is  explicit  
about  his  own  perspective,  so  that  others  can  assess  it,  and  choose  to  approach  the  same  data  from  
different  angles.  He  suggests  bold  generalizations  about  the  general  will  of  the  people,  and  also,  of  
the  unity  of  central  power.  I  am  more  interested  in  unravelling  some  of  the  actual  ambiguities  and  
pluralities  that  may  be  hidden  within  those  broad  terms,  and  instead  tracing  particular  alliances,  
networks,  coalitions,  cleavages  and  blocs  of  power. 
 The  following  historical  narrative  builds  on  the  data  that  has  already  been  accumulated  
through  Dalland  and  Hjorthol.  Where  I  found  this  already  constituted  body  of  body  of  knowledge  to  
contain  gaps  and  holes  regarding  the  processes  I  wished  to  explain,  then  I  turned  to  the  primary  
sources  in  order  to  fill  in  some  of  the  gaps.  As  a  result  I  ended  up  with  data  which  indicates  a  
slightly  different  version  of  the  story  than  the  one  presented  by  Hjorthol.  He  frames  the  main  
conflict  line  as  one  between  a  monolithic  political  system  and  a  plural  popular  resistance.494  That  
does  not  correspond  too  well  with  his  data,  which  indicate  a  considerable  cleavage  within  the  local  
population,  and  also,  a  similar  rift  within  the  executive  power.  The  conflicts  within  the  state  and  
within  the  people  are  not  what  he  chose  to  focus  on.  However,  those  are  issues  that  I  wished  to  
investigate  further. 
 Through  archives  and  interviews,  Hjorthol  managed  to  gain  some  access  to  the  closed  
internal  mechanisms  of  the  Norwegian  Labor  Party.  He  documented  profound  internal  struggles  
within  the  party  apparatus,  even  within  the  government  itself.  Similarly,  he  also  presents  actual  
splits  within  the  judiciary,  within  the  national  public  media,  and  within  academic  elites.  The  internal  
ambiguities  of  the  state  apparatus  and  the  social  elites  are  evident  already  in  Hjorthol's  own  book.  
                                                 
492  Mathiesen  1993 
493  Hjorthol  2006:  14,  38 
494  Hjorthol  2006:  11,13 
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What  is  less  evident  in  his  work  is  that  both  the  pro-dam  and  the  anti-dam  blocs  had  a  social  basis  
among  subaltern  groups  in  the  local  human  ecology  within  the  Alta-Kautokeino  river  basin.  I  have  
found  a  few  indications  of  those  actualities,  by  building  on  some  ethnographical  descriptions  
produced  around  the  same  time  as  the  Alta-dam  struggle.495  These  sources  provide  bits  and  pieces  
of  a  potential  historical  anthropology  of  the  Alta-dam  struggle.  What  is  clear  is  that  not  all  local  
subalterns,  not  even  all  indigenous  Sámi,  were  committed  to  the  anti-dam  cause.  Some  were  even  
active  supporters  of  the  pro-dam  cause.  It  is  also  clear  that  not  all  social  elites  were  in  the  pro-dam  
camp.  Also  the  anti-dam  camp  included  some  very  resourceful  elements.  The  details  I  have  found  
will  be  revealed  in  the  present  chapter.  However,  further  research  in  the  same  direction  would  be  
useful.  Additionally,  I  have  also  completed  a  discourse  analysis  of  some  of  the  most  central  
documents  for  the  final  Supreme  Court  decision  in  the  Alta-dam  case.496  Here  I  try  to  inquire  how  
the  judge  argues  in  his  judgment  of  the  proofs  that  were  put  forward  by  social  anthropologists  and  
salmon  ecologists.  Thus  I  try  to  delve  into  the  politics  knowledge,  in  order  to  search  for  cleavage  
structures  in  the  struggle  for  proofs.  In  particular,  I  address  the  political  use  or  misuse  of  competing  
natural  sciences,  an  issue  that  was  totally  omitted  by  Hjorthol.  The  present  chapter  will  reveal  what  
I  have  found  regarding  this  issue  as  well.  Also  regarding  the  politics  of  knowledge,  it  would  have  
been  useful  to  carry  out  further  historical  research  on  the  Alta-dam  conflict.  My  own  contribution  
remains  provisional,  like  each  specific  contribution  to  every  specific  historiographical  discourse.  
My  small  contribution  is  to  try  pushing  beyond  political  history  in  the  narrow  sense,  towards  social  
and  cultural  history.  With  the  emerging  social  movements  in  the  1970s,  historians  took  a  renewed  
interest  in  the  sociological  and  ecological  basis  of  history.  Famous  examples  are  Cipolla,  Le  Roy  
Ladurie  and  Zemon  Davis.497  The  feminists  coined  the  slogan  “the  private  is  political”,  and  if  that  is  
true,  then  social  and  cultural  history  is  actually  an  expanded  form  of  political  history.  There  was  a  
wide  socio-cultural  transformation,  re-constituting  both  the  arrangements  of  power  and  the  
disciplines  of  knowledge,  and  the  Alta-dam  conflict  was  one  particular  constituent  part  of  this  wide  
process.  I  look  back  in  this  process  from  a  standpoint  within  social  and  cultural  history.  I  observe  
the  past  in  terms  of  the  present,  but  this  past  has  also  produced  the  situation  from  where  I  observe  
this  past.  All  history  is  contemporary  history.  I  have  searched  traces  left  behind  by  the  past.  Some  
such  traces  I  found  in  the  library  and  archives  at  the  Norwegian  Folk  Museum,  at  the  Norwegian  
National  Archives,  and  at  the  municipal  archives  of  Tromsø  (Romsa,  Tromssa).  Some  further  traces  
were  found  through  brief  visits  at  the  archives  of  Alta  Museum  and  the  public  library  for  Finnmark  
                                                 
495  Fieldwork reports: On downstream areas in the Alta watershed I have used Horgen; Jan & Norddølum, Helge 1978 
(published  as  a  contributions  to  an  official  “white  paper”,  see  Norwegian  Official  Report  1978a  (NOU  1978:18A),  
pp. 181-188). On reindeer nomadism between upstream and downstream areas I have used Bjørklund, Ivar and 
Brantenborg, Terje 1981 (published book with the expert witness report given for NRF  for  the  Supreme  Court  case.) 
496  Norwegian  Supreme  Court  1982 
497  Le  Roy  Ladurie  1973;;  Davis  1976;;  Cipolla  1975 
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County,  and  an  informal  interview  with  an  employee  at  the  Norwegian  Water  Resource  and  Energy  
Directorate.  I  owe  thanks  to  Tone  Odden,  Merete  Ødegaard,  and  Inger  Helene  Waagaard;;  at  the  
Norwegian  Folk  Museum,  Alta  Museum  and  the  Norwegian  Water  Resources  and  Energy  
Directorate.  Those  institutions  and  persons  deserve  credit  for  my  findings,  while  I  remain  
responsible  for  my  errors.  I  intended  to  complete  further  research  at  the  two  latter  institutions,  and  I  
think  this  should  be  a  priority  for  future  research. 
 This  chapter  follows  the  ebbs  and  flows  of  the  tension  between  two  antagonistic  coalitions.  
This  dramaturgical  tension  will  be  traced  across  three  “acts”.  Historical  descriptions  imply  some  
dramaturgical  structure.498  Public  protest  has  a  dramaturgical  structure  as  well.  Chales  Tilly  
describes  public  protest  as  an  issue  of  doing  or  acting,  “contentious  performances”.499  Theatres  of  
protest  are  acted  out  in  real  terrains,  as  tactical  theatres.  Public  protest  is  also  being  acted  out  in  a  
similar  way  to  performance  art:  The  action  is  symbolic  and  theatrical,  but  real  human  bodies  are  
involved.500  The  actors  are  also  real  persons,  and  the  audience  may  be  provoked  to  involve  
themselves  on  stage.  Such  spectacles  are  participatory  contentious  performance  art,  similar  to  what  
Augusto  Boal  calls  “the  theatre  of  the  oppressed”.501  In  the  Alta-dam  conflict,  the  oppressed  found  
themselves  divided,  by  getting  involved  on  each  side  of  the  dramaturgical  tension.  Sámi  fisher-
peasants  in  downstream  areas  wanted  industrial  development,  and  tended  to  frame  the  anti-dam  bloc  
as  their  antagonist.  Sámi  outfield  users  in  upstream  areas  wanted  to  defend  the  local  human  ecology  
against  destructive  resource  grabbing,  and  they  framed  the  pro-dam  bloc  as  the  antagonist.  Each  
block  was  the  hero  in  its  own  version  of  the  drama.  Who  might  have  been  progressive  or  
reactionary  depended  on  one's  position  and  viewpoint  within  the  theatre  of  protest.  However,  
because  each  bloc  defined  itself  in  opposition  to  the  other,  they  both  framed  the  social  conflict  as  a  
rather  clear-cut  dramaturgical  polarization.  The  following  texts  divides  the  dramaturgy  of  the  
theatre  of  protest  into  three  “acts”,  each  following  the  build-up  of  tension  between  protagonist  and  






                                                 
498  White  1978 
499  Tilly  2008 
500  Vergine  2000 
501  Boal  &  Jackson  2002;;  Freire  1968 
 196  
 
6.3.0  Act  I,  1970-1979:  pro-dam  action  meets  local  resistance 
 
The  public  contention  about  hydropower  development  in  the  Alta-Kautokeino  River  started  
accidentally  in  1970,  in  Máze,  a  small  local  community  in  inner  Finnmark.502  The  municipal  
administration  had  obtained  a  map  of  the  area  from  the  state  administration.  It  was  a  big  surprise,  
when  the  map  showed  that  the  municipality  was  going  to  be  put  under  water  by  a  planned  dam,  
which  was  going  to  serve  a  hydroelectric  plant.  Naturally,  a  local  action  committee  was  
immediately  formed  to  put  forward  claims  for  the  protection  of  the  local  community.  That  was  the  
beginning  of  what  I  will  call  the  first  round  of  contestation  in  the  Alta-campaign.  The  contestation  
started  when  the  pro-dam  movement  met  local  resistance  in  1970,  and  would  last  through  attempts  
from  both  sides  to  influence  the  conventional  policy  process.  It  would  also  continue  through  
adaptation  of  unconventional  repertoires  of  action,  until  tension  was  temporarily  relaxed  in  1978,  
when  military  action  was  avoided.  However,  the  conflict  lines  had  emerged  two  years  earlier,  and  
the  reason  why  there  was  no  contestation  earlier,  was  that  the  Ministry  of  Industry  had  kept  the  
planning  process  secret,  which  in  itself  can  be  understood  as  a  contentious  tactic  to  handle  a  
controversial  issue. 
 In  1968,  the  planning  of  the  hydropower  plant  had  started  as  a  closed  process,503  inside  a  
tightly  integrated  and  centralized  network  of  techno-scientific  expertise,  consisting  of  the  Ministry  
of  Industry,  and  its  two  executives  NVE  and  Statskraft.  The  latter  was  to  apply  for  license  to  build  
the  hydropower  plant,  the  former  to  consider  the  application.  Both  were  organized  as  one  single  
hierarchy.504  This  was  the  actualization  of  the  ideal  of  an  activist  state.  The  central  cluster  of  
committed  professionals  who  maintained  this  organizational  structure  was  closely  aligned  to  a  
political  coalition  between  the  syndicalist  movement  and  the  nationalist  movement.  The  coalition  
had  emerged  in  1936.  Then,  the  first  viable  Labor  government  had  been  created,  by  instituting  
centralized  coordination  between  interest  organizations  for  labor,  capital  and  agriculture  -  a  
corporatist  system.  The  economic  policies  initiated  had  been  further  developed  by  the  national  
socialist  party  during  the  Nazi  occupation,  from  1939  to  1945.505  Nazi  occupation  had  also  
empowered  national-patriotic  sentiments:  Some,  like  the  Labor  movement,  had  been  sympathizing  
with  the  resistance  against  occupation,  others,  like  the  Conservative  party  newspaper,  Aftenposten,  
had  been  collaborating  with  the  national  socialists.  When  occupation  ended  in  1945,  a  unity  
government  had  been  created.  The  liberal  historian  J.A.  Seip  called  it  a  “national  unification"  -  
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ironically  using  a  phrase  similar  to  the  name  of  the  Norwegian  national  socialist  party.506  Labor  was  
the  senior  partner  in  the  coalition.  Re-construction  boosted  a  wave  of  regional  industrial  
development,  led  by  the  activist  state,  especially  in  Finnmark  County,  where  settlements  had  been  
burned  during  the  withdrawl  of  the  Nazi  occupation  army.  Finnmark  Labor  was  strong  in  the  region,  
with  traditions  of  communist  and  syndicalist  activism.  The  central  command  of  the  party  met  the  
claims  of  their  comrades  in  the  most  neglected  region  of  the  state,  in  order  to  integrate  the  nation.  A  
plan  for  the  development  of  the  Northern  peripheries  had  been  enacted  already  in  1951,  meeting  
demands  from  the  radical  Finnmark  Labor  party,  but  also  adopting  an  ideology  of  national  
integration  from  the  Marshall  Aid  programme.507  With  support  from  industry-owners,  the  Ministry  
of  Industry  started  planning  a  hydropower  plant  in  the  Alta-Kautokeino  River.  In  1968,  when  
planning  started  in  secret,  the  activists  of  the  activist  state  certainly  knew  about  a  Supreme  Court  
decision  the  same  year,  which  advanced  a  competing  way  of  framing  regional  development  and  
regional  interests.  Another  hydropower  project  –  also  in  a  northern  province  of  Norway  –  had  been  
contested  by  local  Sámi  population  working  in  nomadic  reindeer  husbandry.508  The  Supreme  Court  
had  judged  that  the  nomads  had  a  customary  right  to  use  land  and  water,  comparable  to  the  private  
property  of  the  farmers,  in  cases  where  land  and  water  was  to  be  expropriated  for  hydropower  
development.  The  decision  had  been  given  customary  legal  weight  in  a  context  of  state  law.  The  
new  juridical  practice  had  potentially  large  implications  for  the  territory  that  the  Alta-Kautokeino  
River  runs  through.  The  river  connected  the  Finnmark  coast,  traditionally  inhabited  by  sedentary  
fishers-farmers,  with  the  Finnmark  plateau,  where  nomadic  reindeer  husbandry  was  still  going  
strong.  In  the  Finnmark  plateau,  land  and  water  were  commons,  not  divided  in  private  property.  The  
authority  over  those  commons  remained  an  unresolved  issue.509  At  the  middle  of  the  18th  century,  
activists  of  the  absolute  state  had  claimed  the  land  and  water  under  The  Crown,  but  the  local  
nomads  had  practiced  their  own  political  system,  state-less  but  territorial,  since  time  longstanding  
before  the  16th  century.  The  two  events  in  1968,  the  Supreme  Court  decision  and  the  start  of  the  
planning  process,  built  up  a  strong  potential  tension,  which  was  released  when  information  
accidently  leaked  out  to  the  local  Sámi  community:  The  Labor  party  regime  planned  to  dam  a  
valley,  thus  drowning  Máze’s  entire  habitat.  After  the  Nazis  had  been  beaten  and  discredited,  
suppression  of  the  indigenous  minority  was  gradually  slacking.510  Post  war  re-construction  of  the  
nation  was  increasingly  state-activist,  under  the  control  of  a  coalition  between  industrial  and  
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syndical  interests,  and  under  the  influence  of  Marshall  Aid,  they  had  become  a  growth  machine.511 
 In  1970,  when  the  plans  for  development  of  the  Alta-Kautokeino  River  became  known,  it  
trigged  a  series  of  protests,  the  first  regarding  physical-geographical  issues.  The  first  ones  to  react,  
was  naturally  the  population  of  Máze,  who  were  supposed  to  be  displaced.  The  locals  organized  a  
popular  meeting.  The  invited  representative  of  the  government  thanked  them  for  a  clear  message.    
This  had  included  threats  of  sabotage.512  In  the  neighbouring  municipality,  Alta,  the  local  parliament  
made  a  formal  protest  (1971).  The  local  communities  of  Alta  and  Máze  are  rather  small,  the  latter  
with  predominantly  Sámi  population  and  located  at  the  Finnmark  Plateau.  But  protests  also  came  at  
an  inter-state  level,  from  Finnish  diplomats  (1972),  after  they  realized  that  the  Norwegian  activist  
state  planned  to  disturb  the  flow  of  water  from  lake  Išjávri,  that  feeds,  an  inter-state  boundary  river  
Deatnu.  The  ambitious  plans  drafted  by  the  Ministry  of  Industry  adjusted  during  the  initial  phase  of  
contestation.  The  existence  of  Máze  was  saved  by  parliamentary  decision  (1973).513  In  Alta,  local  
activists  formed  a  commission,  Altautvalget,  aimed  at  influencing  the  policy  process  by  research  
and  lobbying.  Now,  the  environmental  movement  entered  the  scene,  and  started  to  exercise  
influence  over  legislation  as  well  as  government.  Activists  from  most  parties  were  engaged,  and  the  
leader  of  Altautvalget  also  represented  the  Liberal  Party  (Venstre)  in  the  local  parliament.514  The  
issues  of  local  knowledge  and  environmental  expertise  also  entered  the  policy  process  through  the  
committed  civil  servants  of  the  new  Ministry  of  the  Environment,  established  1972.  The  two  social  
movement  coalitions  clashed  in  inter-departmental  struggle  in  1974.  An  application  for  concession  
to  build  the  hydropower  plan  had  been  delivered  by  Statskraft,  which  was  controlled  by  the  
Ministry  of  Industry.  The  planning  process  and  the  plan  itself  were  heavily  criticized  by  the  civil  
servants  of  the  Ministry  of  the  Environment,  but  the  colleagues  in  the  Ministry  of  Industry  
threatened  open  confrontation  within  the  government,  which  the  new  and  small  department  had  
nothing  to  gain  from.515  The  Ministry  of  Industry,  however,  had  to  compromise  with  the  diplomatic  
demands  of  the  Finnish  state.  Then,  the  Ministry  of  the  Environment  took  action  by  making  a  
commission  for  a  thorough  investigation  of  the  resources  of  the  Finnmark  Plateau,  including  
biological  and  cultural  aspects,  and  customary  rights  (1975).  The  government,  however  decided  to  
process  the  issue  of  the  Alta-Kautokeino  power  plant  as  an  emergency  issue,  and  took  it  out  of  the  
mandate  of  the  resource  commission.516  The  rationale  was  an  official  prognosis  -  certified  by  the  
Ministry  of  Energy  -  claiming  that  an  energy-crisis  was  imminent  in  the  northern  periphery.  Though  
internal  disagreement  from  within  the  planning  process  would  later  be  leaked,  this  information  had  
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not  been  divulged  by  the  leadership  of  the  Ministry  of  Industry.517  Finnmark  Labor  party  enjoyed  
close  ties  to  the  planning  officials,  and  the  official  prognosis  received  much  attention  in  the  target  
region.  Advocacy  groups  for  and  against  the  dam  aimed  at  influencing  the  policy  process.  The  
decisions  of  local  and  regional  parliaments  may  give  some  indicators  of  a  population  deeply  divided  
on  the  issue  of  the  planned  hydropower  plant  (Table  6.1). 
 
Table  6-1:  Indicator  of  a  split  population   
Local  and  regional  parliamentary  stances  to  development  of  the  Alta-Kautokeino  River,  1976518 
Place  and  political  
level 
votes  (percent) Attributes  of  assembly: 
Social  geography,  party  dominance 
anti-dam pro-dam total 
Kautokeino  
municipal  parliament 




30  (66,6) 15  (33,3) 45  (100) Coastal  area  in  Finnmark,  thus  




11  (32) 24  (71)       32  (100) All  areas  of  Finnmark,  mixed,  but  mainly  









 The  plan  now  mainly  involved  two  local  municipalities.  State-activism  had  been  de-
radicalized,  by  the  protection  of  Máze,  and  of  the  Deatnu  River  that  was  shared  with  Finland.  The  
plan  was  now  limited  to  a  river  that  connects  the  territory  of  two  local  municipalities:  Alta  in  the  
coastal  district,  Kautokeino  in  the  inland  district.  In  both  communities,  the  local  parliaments  took  a  
stance  against  the  plans.  Kautokeino,  a  municipality  with  predominantly  Sámi  population,  located  at  
the  inner  Finnmark  Plateau,  took  an  anti-dam  stance  with  two-thirds  and  three  quarters  majority.  
The  result  was  much  similar  in  Alta,  an  ethnically  mixed  community  situated  at  the  Finnmark  
Coast,  where  the  anti-dam  bloc  gained  two-thirds  of  the  votes  in  the  parliament,  in  spite  of  strong  
Labor  Party  traditions.  The  result  at  the  regional  level  was  opposite  to  that  at  the  local  level.  In  the  
Finnmark  district  parliament  (Finnmark  fylkesting),  the  anti-dam  bloc  was  the  minority,  while  the  
pro-dam  bloc  took  between  two-thirds  and  three  quarters  of  the  votes.  This  reflects  the  strong  
position  of  the  Finnmark  Labor  Party  and  their  unified  official  policy.  It  is  worth  to  note  that  there  
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was  no  consensus  regarding  this  issue,  not  in  the  two  local  parliaments,  nor  in  the  district  
parliament.  Though  the  district  parliament  took  a  pro-dam  stance  and  the  local  parliaments  were  
anti-dam,  each  of  those  decisions  was  taken  with  about  a  two  thirds  majority  –  against  a  minority  of  
one  third.  To  the  degree  that  political  representation  can  be  taken  as  representing  public  opinion,  
those  votes  may  be  taken  as  indicators  that  the  people  were  split  between  the  pro-dam  and  anti-dam  
camps. 
In  1978,  the  national  parliament  was  to  take  the  final  decision  regarding  the  plans  to  develop  
the  Alta-Kautokeino  River.  The  local  and  regional  parliaments  had  taken  their  stance,  so  the  
advocacy  was  now  directed  towards  the  national  legislation  process.  That  year,  the  anti-dam  
activists  upscaled  their  activity,  by  mobilizing  from  all  over  the  Norwegian  and  Sámi  nations.  
Beyond  these  overlapping  territories,  they  mobilized  transnational  activist  networks.  The  front  line  
between  the  movements  still  included  inter-departmental  struggles,  and  when  the  Ministry  of  
Industry  presented  their  plans  for  regulating  the  river  (March),  two  more  lakes  were  protected  
(Skaidi  and  Kvernangen).  Thus  they  met  the  proposition  from  the  Resource  Commission  for  the  
Finnmark  Plateau,  the  majority  of  whom  would  support  the  plans  if  moderated.519  Local  anti-dam  
activists  started  a  popular  action  for  the  protection  of  the  river:  Folkeaksjonen  for  vern  av  Alta-
Kautokeinovassdraget.  This  membership  organization  aimed  at  nation-wide  support  within  the  
Norwegian  political  entity,  but  unlike  conventional  NGOs,  its  central  executive  committee  was  not  
located  in  the  capital  city,  but  remained  seated  in  the  affected  area.520  Thus,  the  activists  inverted  an  
organizational  model  for  NGOs  that  normally  had  a  central  executive  committee  in  the  capital  city.  
Folkeaksjonen  was  aligned  with  Altautvalget,  but  would  use  other  forms  of  action,  in  order  to  gain  
wider  grass-roots  support,  and  shape  public  opinion.  Folkeaksjonen  was  created  by  a  group  of  
experienced  activists,  and  attracted  more  from  a  wide  range  of  movements.  They  started  the  
mobilization  with  a  petition  against  the  dam  construction.  From  July  to  October,  15.000  persons  
signed  the  petition.  These  included  61%  of  the  local  population,  plus  sympathizers  from  over  the  
Norwegian  political  entity.521  The  population  targeted  by  the  activism  of  Folkeaksjonen,  was  mainly  
defined  by  the  territorial  borders  of  the  Norwegian  nation-state.  The  traditional  homeland  of  the  
Sámi  people  was  less  in  focus,  and  was  under  the  jurisdiction  of  several  states.  However,  Sámi  
movements  under  various  political  entities  fought  several  battles  for  the  right  to  land  and  water  
around  1980.522  The  scope  of  Folkeaksjonen  activities  fit  with  the  conventional  policy  process,  
centred  on  the  institutions  for  majoritarian  democracy  in  the  Norwegian  nation-state.  Ironically,  the  
local  funders  of  the  action  assessed  that  Sámi  rights  to  land  and  water  were  less  appropriate  an  issue  
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for  local  mobilization,  than  for  promotion  of  the  cause  amongst  the  general  Norwegian  
population.523  The  strategy  was  to  put  main  the  focus  on  sustainable  salmon  fisheries  locally,  while  
nationally,  this  issue  was  combined  with  that  of  sustainable  reindeer  husbandry.  Locally,  salmon  
fishing  was  a  right  enjoyed  by  Norwegian  and  Sámi  small  holding  farmers,  but  also  by  visiting  
angling  tourists,  and  finally,  by  British  “salmon  lords”  who  had  bought  local  properties  along  the  
river.  Reindeer  husbandry  was  a  trade  limited  to  Sámi  nomads  of  the  inland,  who  claimed  
customary  rights  with  a  contested  status  in  state  law.524  The  SMOs  Folkeaksjonen  and  Altautvalget  
were  closely  aligned  to  nation-wide  NGOs.  One  of  those  was  NNF  (Norges  naturvernforbund),  
founded  in  1662,  when  an  older  organization  for  natural  conservation  had  been  converted  to  broader  
ecological  issues,  and  aligned  to  the  international  Friends  of  the  Earth.525  Another  affiliated  national  
NGO  was  NSR  (Norske  samers  riksforbund),  which  had  been  started  in  1968,  following  the  
establishment  of  the  Nordic  Sámi  Council  (Sámiráđđi)  in  1959.526  NNF  and  NSR  were  both  parts  of  
the  international  wave  of  new  social  movements.  Somewhat  different  was  NRF  (Norske  
reindriftssamers  forening),  which  was  a  cooperative  interest  organization  for  reindeer  husbandry,  
similar  to  the  national  agricultural  coops.  NRF  had  been  funded  back  in  1948,  when  
“Norwegianization”  policies  had  not  yet  become  slackened.  Its  establishment  had  been  assisted  by  
"Lappefogden",  a  state  institution  for  the  administration  of  “Norwegianization”.  An  agreement  
between  NSR  and  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  was  reached  in  1976,  similar  in  structure  to  the  
cooperation  between  labor,  capital  and  agriculture  that  had  been  instituted  exactly  forty  years  
earlier,  (in  1936).  Since  the  late  1800s,  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  had  been  overseeng  what  was  
defined  as  an  evolutionary  take  over  of  agriculture  at  the  expense  of  husbandry.  527  This  old  
ideological  hegemony  ideology  was  only  gradually  being  contested.  This  was  the  historical  context  
of  the  corporatist  coordination  between  state  and  husbandry,  which  took  place  in  1976. 
 Among  the  ranks  of  NNF,  NSR  and  NRF,  many  members  were  radicalised  by  the  perceived  
impotence  of  ritualized  bureaucracy  in  those  NGOs,  and  were  attracted  to  SMOs  like  
Folkeaksjonen.  More  radical  repertoires  of  action  were  already  entering  the  Norwego-phone  area.528  
Already  in  1970,  civil  disobedience  had  been  used  against  hydropower  development  in  Mørdala,  
South  Norway.  That  had  been  an  early  action  of  the  international  Deep  Ecology  Movement,  also  
starting  The  Future  in  Our  Hands,  and  NGO  framing  international  solidarity  as  a  means  of  
sustainability.  For  a  contemporary  reader,  the  latter  frame  “developing  countries”  in  patronizing  
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terms  in  their  funding  manifesto.529  Deep  Ecologists  tend  to  take  an  anti-anthropocentric  view  on  
human  population  growth  (Malthusianism).530  Neither  of  those  ideologies  had  shared  the  radical  
anti-colonial  view  of  third  world  nationalism,  which  had  gained  ground  within  the  Sámi  interest  
organizations,  as  well  as  within  the  Socialist  People's  Party.  The  latter  had  broken  out  of  the  Labor  
Party  over  the  issue  of  NATO  membership.  A  further  bifurcation  within  the  Socialist  People’s  Party  
led  to  the  establishment  of  the  Maoist  Party  AKP  (m-l).  Members  of  the  two  latter  parties  were  
active  in  Folkeaksjonen,  together  with  members  of  the  so  called  "Centre  Parties"  (Liberal,  Agrarian  
and  Christian  democrat).  Sympathizers  were  found  among  dissidents  in  the  ruling  coalition  (Labor  
and  Conservative  Parties).  In  public  debate,  Folkeaksjonen  was  accused  of  being  a  Maoist  plot,  but  
the  district-secretary  of  Finnmark  contingent  of  the  party  at  the  time  argues  that  it  was  not,  since  the  
Maoists  had  decided  for  strategical  co-operation,  not  a  take-over.531  In  retrospect,  it  is  hard  to  see  
that  the  Maoists  could  possibly  have  exercised  any  influence  alone. 
 The  liberal  internationalism  of  the  environmental  movement,  and  the  third  world  
nationalism  of  Maoists  and  the  Sámi  rights  activists,  could  both  be  regarded  as  cosmpolitical  
ideology  in  the  transnational  new  social  movements.  Though  the  conventional  policy  process  was  
nation-state-centric,  Folkeaksjonen  mobilized  transnational  alliances  from  the  very  beginning.  The  
transnational  indigenous  movement  had  put  their  claims  on  the  agenda  for  the  UN's  inter-state  
conference  on  racism  in  Genéve  (Aug.  1978),  and  the  representative  of  the  Norwegian  government  
joined  in  by  speaking  well  for  the  case  of  Native  Americans.532  At  the  same  time,  the  transnational  
environmental  movement  served  as  infrastructure  for  NNFs  mobilization  of  expertise.  They  
recruited  Scottish  salmon  zoologists  who  knew  ecology,  a  recently  developed  expertise,  relatively  
alien  to  Norwegophone  scientific  discourse.  Folkeaksjonen  mobilized  for  their  petition  from  July  to  
November,  and  managed  to  align  themselves  with  this  broad  range  of  networks  and  groups  within  
the  new  social  movements:  the  national  NGOs,  the  transnational  contacts,  and  indeed  the  counter  
culture,  whose  discourse  included  committed  professionals  in  mainstream  Norwegophone  news  
media,  publishing  houses  and  research  institutions. 
                                                 
529  Primary  source:  Damman  (1975).  When  I  characterize  the  argument  of  this  environmental  organisation  as  
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 Within  the  social  network  of  the  anti-dam  movement,  there  emerged  a  strong  momentum  of  
recruiting  and  network  expansion.  This  tendency  was  still  only  taking  off  when  the  national  
parliament  gathered  on  the  30th  of  November  1978,  to  take  a  decision  regarding  the  development  of  
the  Alta-Kautokeino  River.  The  struggle  within  had  continued,  and  the  governing  bodies  had  been  
preparing  the  case  for  the  national  parliament.  In  the  government’s  proposal  to  the  parliament,  not  
only  the  local  community  of  Máze  gained  protection,  but  also  Lake  Išjávri,  that  fed  the  inter-state  
River  Deatnu  (Tana/Teno),  and  even  the  two  local  lakes  Skaidi  and  Kvernangen.  The  ambitious  
development  plans  from  committed  state  engineers  and  politicians  had  been  considerably  de-
radicalised  during  the  process  of  preparation  for  government  proposal.  When  the  national  
parliament  took  its  pro-dam  stance,  it  was  with  a  three-quarters  majority  in  favour  of  the  
government’s  proposal  (90  against  36  votes).  The  main  argument  for  voting  in  favour  of  the  
proposal  was  the  expected  electricity  crisis  in  the  Northern  periphery,  which  according  to  the  
prognosis  would  come  within  a  few  years.533  This  was  an  objective  scientific  fact  for  the  majority  of  
responsible  parliamentarian  representatives.  The  indisputable  authority  of  this  fact  had  been  
certified  by  the  Ministry  of  Industry  itself.  That  was  a  central  power  bastion  for  the  coalition  of  
industrialists,  syndicalists  and  nationalists.  These  also  enjoyed  a  pure  majority  in  the  national  
parliament,  through  the  Labor  and  Conservative  Parties  that  were  known  for  strict  inner  discipline.  
Their  attitude  was  not  to  change  during  further  rounds  of  contestation,  which  were  to  reveal  that  
competing  prognoses  already  existed  within  the  planning  system.  This  had  been  kept  secret  by  the  
Ministry  of  Industry.  It  is  hardly  any  exaggeration  to  characterize  the  command  line  as  military,  
inherited  by  an  unbroken  chain  of  administrative  practice  since  the  age  of  despotism  between  1661  
and  1814.534  Confronted  with  the  overwhelming  authority  of  state-certified  scientific  fact,  
particularistic  local  interests  could  be  given  limited  concern  –  much  less  ethnic  demands  for  
authority  over  land  and  water,  competing  with  the  sovereignty  of  the  nation-state.  During  the  course  
of  the  controversy,  the  latter  issue  would  take  over  the  focus  for  the  pro-dam  coalition.535  When  the  
national  parliament  first  made  its  decision  in  1978,  the  public  debate  was  far  from  saturated,  quite  
the  contrary:  the  public  debate  had  just  started.  The  parliamentary  decision  did  not  enjoy  legitimacy  
among  the  anti-dam  coalitions,  which  immediately  reacted  with  a  plurality  of  tactics.  The  grass  root  
movements,  Folkeaksjonen  and  Altautvalget  were  the  most  radical  elements.  They  summoned  an  
open  popular  meeting  (Jan  1979).536  This  craved  that  the  national  parliament  met  their  demands,  or  
else,  civil  disobedience  would  be  used,  as  it  had  been  used  by  environmentalists  in  Mørdala  nine  
years  earlier.  The  local  parliaments  of  Alta  and  Kautokeino  followed  up  with  a  more  moderate  
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framing  of  similar  demands,  asking  the  national  parliament  to  re-open  the  case  for  a  renewed  policy  
process,  taking  recent  information  into  consideration  (Feb-Mar).537  This  more  moderate  version  of  
the  anti-dam  demands  was  further  voiced  within  the  national  parliament,  by  representatives  of  the  
Socialist  People's  Party,  the  Liberal  Party,  the  agrarian  Centre  Party  and  the  Christian  People’s  
Party.  However,  together  they  constituted  less  than  one-third  of  the  assembly,  and  the  large  majority  
dominated  by  Labor  and  Conservatives  rejected  the  appeal  to  re-open  the  process  (Jan).538 
 The  possibilities  in  the  legislative  channel  were  exhausted  for  now,  and  the  movement  
turned  to  litigation  through  the  court  system.  The  national  environmental  organization  NNF  sued  
NVE,  the  planning  body  of  the  Ministry  of  Industry,  for  planning  the  government  proposal  through  
an  illegal  process.  The  local  court  in  Alta  agreed  to  to  run  a  juridical  trial,  but  rejected  a  demand  to  
stop  the  construction  work  temporarily  while  its  legality  was  tried.  The  same  had  been  the  case  
during  the  Mardøla-campaign  in  1970.539  Then,  civil  disobedience  had  been  a  tactic  to  physically  
bloc  construction  while  court  litigation  tried  the  legality  of  the  whole  project.  This  tactic  was  now  
replicated  in  the  Alta-controversy,  after  the  anti-dam  coalition  had  failed  to  influence  the  
conventional  policy  process.  Folkeaksjonen  mobilized  their  large  network  of  sympathizers,  while  
the  local  police  force  had  limited  resources  to  handle  civil  disobedience.  Two  weeks  after  NNF  sued  
NVE,  thirty  activists  bloced  the  construction  of  a  construction  road,  by  a  simple  sit-down  action.  
The  local  police  did  not  react  –  as  construction  would  have  been  stopped  in  any  case  –  by  summer  
vacation.540  The  vacation  was  exploited  by  Folkeaksjonen  to  arrange  a  counter  culture  festival  at  the  
planned  construction  site.  That  attracted  participants  from  all  over  Norway  and  Sámpi,  especially  
students.  The  more  committed  participants  at  the  festival  underwent  training  in  non-violent  direct  
action,  for  which  purpose  an  additional  camp  was  set  up  (July).541  But  in  the  local  community,  there  
was  still  a  considerable  segment  of  the  population  in  favor  of  intensive  industrialization,  and  when  
the  land  had  been  inundated  by  the  strange  friends  of  the  local  anti-dam  coalition,  locals  of  the  pro-
dam  coalition  decided  to  organize  themselves.  The  construction  road  was  planned  to  pass  through  
Tverrdalen,  a  valley  with  particularly  strong  support  for  hydroelectric  development.  Tverrdalen  had  
traditions  for  syndicalist  militant  action,  centred  around  local  mining  cooperatives.  In  Tverrdalen,  
few  spoke  Sámi,  and  many  were  descendants  of  poor  smallholder  farmers  from  Southern  
Norway.542  In  the  regional  newspaper  of  the  Labor  Party,  pro-dam  militants  announced  that  they  
would  use  physical  force  against  the  demonstrators,  in  the  absence  of  a  capable  police  force.543  
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Borgervernet  ("the  militia")  was  formed.  Shortly  after,  Folkeaksjonen  showed  newspaper  
photographers  a  bullet  hole  through  one  tent  in  the  anti-dam  camp.  Police  investigation  never  
solved  the  mystery.544  August  1979  was  the  first  clash  between  local  pro-dam  and  anti-dam  blocs.  
When  activist  from  Folkeaksjonen  bloced  construction  work  by  a  sit-down  blocade,  30  men  from  
Borgervernet  showed  up,  and  removed  them  by  physical  force.  A  local  initiative  for  private  policing  
had  been  mobilized,  against  the  non-violent  direct  action  of  other  locals.  Folkeaksjonen  summoned  
an  urgent  popular  meeting,  to  discuss  further  tactics,  and  decided  on  taking  non-violent  direct  action  
to  a  larger  scale,  by  calling  in  more  people.  Again  they  began  with  a  sit-down  blocade  against  the  
construction  machines.  This  time,  certified  police  showed  up  to  clear  the  road,  but  the  local  police  
force  was  not  up  to  the  task,  and  could  not  remove  activists  faster  than  they  were  returning  
(Sept).545  The  situation  was  intolerable  for  pro-dam  activists.  The  electricity  crisis  was  understood  
to  be  imminent,  and  the  protestors  acted  against  the  will  of  the  parliament  and  the  Party.  Many  local  
people  in  Tverrdalen  knew  someone  who  knew  someone  who  knew  someone  in  the  Ministry  of  
Justice.  Finnmark  Labor  Party  was  a  powerful  social  infrastructure  connecting  the  two  locations.  
The  ministry  immediately  started  to  plan  a  massive  police  action  to  restore  law  and  order  at  the  
construction  site.  As  the  state  certified  police  force  was  hardly  capable  of  handling  massive  civil  
disobedience,  the  Ministry  of  Justice  sought  unconventional  methods.  They  gained  support  from  the  
central  army  command.546  Civil  disobedience  of  loose  networked  groups  was  understood  as  a  threat  
against  the  sovereignty  of  democratic  practices. 
 In  September  1979,  while  the  anti-dam  coalition  triumphed  in  public,  using  non-violent  
direct  action  at  the  construction  site,  the  pro-dam  coalition  prepared  in  secret  –  for  militarised  police  
action.  At  the  same  time,  the  issue  of  indigenous  rights  was  to  rise  from  subcultural  to  mainstream  
public  discourse.  As  their  advocate,  NRF  had  mobilized  Leif  Dunfjeld,  a  Sámi  with  state-certified  
professional  qualifications.  Through  him  they  got  involved  in  the  court  litigation  of  NNF  against  
NVE.547  During  this  period,  the  Sámi  movement  all  over  Fenno-Scandinavia  advocated  rights  to  
land  and  water  by  engaging  in  court  litigations  against  the  states,  but  only  in  the  NNF  vs  NVEcase  
did  they  succeeded  in  mobilising  a  Sámi  with  state-certified  competence  as  an  advocate.548  The  
Sámi  advocate  pointed  to  the  earlier  hydropower-related  case,  tried  by  the  Supreme  Court  in  1968,  
when  it  had  judged  that  the  local  reindeer  herders  further  south  in  Northern  Norway  had  customary  
rights  relevant  for  the  application  of  the  expropriation  law.  The  issue  had  not  yet  been  tried  with  
regard  to  the  Finnmark  Plateau,  which  was  to  be  affected  by  regulation  of  the  Alta-Kautokeino  
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River.  The  Ministry  of  Industry  had  consulted  their  own  hand-picked  experts  on  local  reindeer  
husbandry.  From  the  interest  organization’s  point  of  view,  that  was  a  biased  planning  process,  
violating  fundamental  rights  of  nomadic  reindeer  herders.  This  issue  had  strong  significance  for  the  
Sámi  rights  movement,  though  only  a  small  part  of  the  Sámi  population  were  involved  in  reindeer  
husbandry.  This  might  have  been  because  the  reindeer  herding  Sámi  conventionally  symbolised  the  
Sámi  in  general.  While  a  Sámi  could  have  any  kind  of  job,  reindeer  husbandry  was  an  exclusively  
Sámi  kind  of  job,  at  least  in  Norway  and  Sweden.  The  pattern  had  been  established  in  interaction  
between  self-organized  traditional  economy  on  one  hand,  and  state-activist  economic  policy  on  the  
other.549  Swedish  segregation  policy  and  Norwegian  assimilation  policy  had  had  a  similar  and  
combined  effect  on  the  transnational  population,  between  1880  and  1980.550  In  Finland,  reindeer  
husbandry  had  not  become  exclusively  Sámi,  and  the  Finnish  nation  had  not  been  defined  in  
contrast  to  Sámi,  as  the  Finnish  language  is  much  closer  to  Sámi  languages  than  to  Germanic  
languages  like  Swedish  and  Norwegian.551  Norwegian  and  Swedish  discourse  tended  to  associate  
Sámi  with  reindeer  nomadism,  and  nomadism  with  backwardness.  The  nomad  had  become  a  
discriminatory  label  as  well  as  a  national  symbol.  An  economically  small  sector  had  symbolic  
relevance  to  many.  During  the  time  of  the  Alta  action,  the  issue  of  indigenous  nomads  and  their  
customary  rights  was  on  the  agenda  also  in  Sweden,  with  a  similar  protest  campaign  and  trial  taking  
place  there.552 
 When  the  NRF  at  last  succeeded  in  getting  this  central  issue  into  the  Alta-case  court  
litigation,  related  Sámi  activist  groups  immediately  crystallized.  Sameaksjonen  was  formed,  a  group  
of  radical  activists  for  indigenous  rights.  Sameaksjonen  had  met  and  bonded  together  during  the  
counter  culture  camp  organized  by  Folkeaksjonen  –  but  their  action  methods  had  been  learned  when  
some  of  them  had  been  actively  involved  with  indigenous  groups  in  Greenland,  Canada  and  
Alaska.553  Sameaksjonen  moved  the  site  of  the  contention,  or  the  physical  frontline,  from  the  Sámi  
homeland  to  the  capital  city  –  the  heartland  of  the  Norwegian  homeland.  They  moved  to  a  public  
park,  in  front  of  the  national  parliament  building  and  set  up  a  camp,  with  a  traditional,  nomadic  
Sámi  tent  (Oct.  8).  This  was  an  icon  of  Sámi  culture,  well  known  to  Norwegians  from  school  books  
written  under  “Norwegianization”  policies.  The  next  day,  they  started  a  hunger  strike.  The  
performance  was  clear.  Strong  actions  demonstrated  urgency.  Simple  symbols  communicated  
ethnicity  in  a  way  everyone  could  grasp.  The  effect  on  public  debate  was  considerable.  Those  media  
already  influenced  by  the  counter-culture  were  especially  receptive.  The  anti-colonial  critique  
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against  grand  European  powers  was  known.  The  case  of  Native  American  had  even  been  addressed  
by  a  government  representative  at  UN  level.  Suddenly,  such  arguments  gained  a  renewed  actuality  
with  referenec  to  the  domestic  scene.  The  hunger  strike  had  influence  on  parts  of  the  establishment,  
for  example  bishops  of  the  Lutheran  state  church  who  appealed  for  humane  treatment  of  the  hunger-
strikers.554  The  pro-dam  coalition,  on  their  side,  continued  mobilization  for  police  action  at  the  
construction  site,  and  two  days  after  the  hunger  strike  had  started,  the  Minister  of  Justice  send  his  
order  to  the  district  police  chief  in  the  Alta-Kautokeino  area.  The  Labor  government  had  given  the  
green  light  for  the  plan  of  joint  action  between  the  Ministries  of  Justice  and  Defence  (Oct.  11).  Four  
days  later,  planes  from  the  Norwegian  army  landed  in  Alta,  delivering  military  equipment.  The  
same  day,  one  hundred  new  demonstrators  arrived.555  The  Army,  who  were  better  equipped  than  the   
Police,  were  to  lend  their  gear,  but  in  addition,  a  military  brigade  was  requested  to  secure  the  area,  
using  guns  with  loose  ammunition.  The  plan  did  not  involve  the  use  of  live  ammunition  against  the  
demonstrators.  However,  the  plan  has  been  compared  to  an  incident  in  1931,  when  striking  
syndicalists  where  met  by  gunfire,  ordered  by  a  minster  from  the  agrarian  Centre  Party,  who  was  
later  to  become  premier  of  the  Nazi  regime,  the  notorious  Quisling.556  Indeed,  that  was  the  last  
instance  where  the  Norwegian  army  had  been  used  against  Norwegian  citizens,  but  the  ruling  
“liberal”  nationalist  had  used  live  ammunition  against  the  revolutionary  syndicalists  in  1931,  
whereas  the  syndicalist-nationalist  government  in  1978  planned  to  use  loose  ammunition  against  the  
indigenous  movement.  One  may  also  understand  this  plan  in  the  wider  context  of  other  attempts  at  
militarising  the  social  democratic  regime,  which  included  legal  and  illegal  surveillance  of  Sámi  
activists  and  dissident  leftists,  plus  a  secret  stay-behind  group  in  the  home  guard,  connected  to  the  
European  network  Gladius.557 
 In  1978,  the  Labor  government  was  under  heavy  pressure.  Action  to  restore  law  and  order  
was  demanded,  as  was  the  execution  of  their  own  industrializing  project.  However,  they  would  be  
held  responsible  for  possible  escalation  if  the  police  and  the  army  took  action.  For  the  Labor  
government,  the  Finnmark  contingent  of  the  party  had  been  the  experts  on  local  knowledge  in  
Finnmark,  until  this  moment.  The  prime  minister  now  initiated  meetings  with  the  Sámi  
organizations,  to  make  the  internal  discussions  in  the  government  more  informed  by  a  broader  range  
of  local  knowledge.558  One  week  after  the  district  police  office  had  been  ordered  to  prepare  for  
military  action,  and  two  days  before  the  scheduled  date  for  execution  of  the  plan,  the  prime  minister  
ordered  a  temporary  delay  of  construction  work.  He  promised  that  the  national  parliament  should  
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consider  the  case  again  (Oct.  16).  The  prime  minister  was  balancing  in  the  cross-pressure  between  
two  mobilizations:  on  the  one  hand,  a  pro-dam  coalition  increasingly  focusing  on  law  and  order  
issues,  on  the  other  hand,  an  anti-dam  coalition,  increasingly  challenging  the  state's  hegemonic  
jurisdiction  over  indigenous  heart  land.  The  action  plan  drafted  in  1978  might  have  had  grave  
consequences  if  it  had  been  actualized.  In  retrospect,  the  moderate  Sámi  activist  and  leader  of  NSR  
at  the  time,  claims  that  it  would  have  ignited  escalation.559  Military  action  would  have  been  
perceived  as  un-proportional,  and  among  rank  and  file  members  of  the  Sámi  NGOs,  many  activists  
already  demanded  stronger  repertoires  of  action.  When  the  premier  hesitated  to  take  action,  the  




6.4.0  Act  II,  1979-1981:  contested  constitutional  rights 
 
The  conventional  policy  process  was  re-opened  when  when  the  prime  minister  cancelled  the  
planned  military  action,  ordered  a  preliminary  cessation  of  construction  work,  and  promised  a  new  
round  of  talks  in  the  national  parliament.  Thus,  the  Labor  government  met  the  demands  from  the  
moderates  within  the  anti-dam  movement.  The  law  and  order  demands  from  radicals  among  the  
pro-dam  activists  would  have  to  wait.  At  this  time,  what  was  considered  radical  claims  from  the  
Sámi  activists  gained  terrain  within  the  juridical  establishment.  That  was  to  shape  the  debate  during  
the  next  six  months,  until  the  national  parliament  was  to  make  a  new  decision.  Soon  after  the  prime  
minister  had  de-escalated  the  militarized  action,  the  local  court  in  Alta  judged  in  the  case  NNF  
against  NVE,  taking  NRF  as  witness  (Oct.  21).560  The  decision  was  made  by  a  board  of  judges,  a  
special  kind  of  court  for  cases  regarding  building  and  construction  regulation  (skjønnsrett).  The  
court  judged  in  favor  of  the  interest  organizations.  An  overwhelming  majority  of  the  judges  
regarded  the  previous  decision  of  the  national  parliament  invalid,  as  the  government’s  preparation  
of  its  proposition  was  judged  illegal  (147  against  3  votes). 
 Two  months  later,  the  prime  minister  gave  in  on  one  of  the  radical  demands  of  the  Sámi  
activists:  he  ordered  a  state  commission  to  investigate  the  claims  of  legal  indigenous  rights:  The  
Sámi  Rights  Commission.561  The  claims  of  the  Sámi  activists  were  supported  by  a  petition  from  
professors  of  law  and  social  science,  asking  the  government  to  consider  delaying  the  construction  of  
the  Alta  dam,  until  the  commission  had  clarified  the  legal  status  of  the  rights  to  land  and  water  in  
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Finnmark.562  The  petition  had  eighty  signatories,  which  were  not  few,  considering  the  number  of  
university  professors  in  a  country  with  only  four  million  inhabitants.  More  importantly,  their  
opinion  might  probably  be  taken  as  an  indicator  of  certain  movements  within  the  professions  in  
general.  The  court  system  would  soon  pose  a  challenge  for  the  ruling  coalition.  In  the  social  
sciences,  new  trends  became  institutionalized  during  the  Alta-campaign:  sociology  of  law,  radical  
criminology  and  action  research.  The  campaigns  of  Sameaksjonen  and  Folkeaksjonen  had  raised  
awareness  by  mobilizing  the  counter  cultures  that  devided  the  population  in  western  countries.  The  
Sámi  population  were  also  divided.  Not  every  Sámi  was  happy  with  the  play  on  ethnical  clichés  that  
young  Sámi  activists  had  staged  in  the  capital  city.  After  all,  the  reason  why  mainstream  media  
easily  cathced  symbols  like  Sámi  nomad  tents,  was  because  the  same  artefact  had  been  used  as  
symbols  of  exotic  but  inferior  primitivity,  in  the  racist  rhetoric  of  “Norwegianization”.  For  many  
people  in  the  northern  peripheries,  such  symbols  were  laden  with  connotations  formed  by  one  
hundred  years  of  imposed  “Norwegianization”,  and  in  regional  nomenclature,  "fjellfinna"  was  used  
as  a  derogatory  term.  It  means  something  like  "inland  Sámi",  presumably  a  nomad  reindeer  herder,  
presumably  primitive,  and  possibly  superstitious  or  even  a  black  magician.  Such  regional  
sociolinguistic  patterns  were  not  a  direct  result  of  state-directives,  but  an  outcome  of  cultural  
interaction  between  centre  and  periphery.  The  semiotics  of  labelling  was  part  of  the  culture,  
significant  not  only  for  Norwegians  labelling  Sámi,  but  also  for  Sámi  struggling  to  get  rid  of  
stigmatisation.  The  media-smart  young  radicals  of  Sameaksjonen  reclaimed  symbols  that  were  well  
known  exactly  because  of  the  racist  usage  of  them.  Just  like  the  indigenous  activists  of  Canada  and  
Alaska,  they  inverted  the  values  ascribed  to  the  dichotomy  indigenous-civilized.  Indigenousness  
was  no  longer  framed  as  backward  and  inferior  in  contrast  to  civilization,  but  as  sustainable,  and  
thus  superior,  to  the  imposed  civilizing.563  But  the  dichotomy  between  indigenous  and  civilized  
cultural  forms  remained,  and  might  be  a  caricature.  For  cultural  research,  it  is  therefore  very  
interesting  that  an  alternative  Sámi  interest  organization  was  created  during  1979.  SLF  (Samenes  
landsforbund)  was  critical  to  the  radicalising  mainstream  of  the  indigenous  movement,  which  not  
only  was  active  in  SMOs  like  Sameaksjonen,  but  also  gained  ground  within  the  mainstream  Sámi  
interest  organizations:  NSR  and  NRF.  The  newcomer  SLF  had  close  links  to  the  Finnmark  Labor  
Party,  which  enjoyed  larger  popularity  among  inhabitants  that  felt  Norwegian,  than  those  who  felt  
Sámi.  The  very  existence  of  SLF  indicates  that  it  was  not  impossible  to  combine  Labor  Party  
support  and  pro-dam  engagement  with  Sámi  identity.  This  particular  kind  of  hybrid  position  must  
                                                 
562  ibidem 
563  For  an  illustrative  sample  (primary  source),  see:  Tromsø  Sámi  Association  1986:  The  First  Nations.  Report  from  
Indigenous  Days  1984.  Tromsø:  Keviselie  Publisher.  See  especially  the  rhetoric  in:  Jernsletten  1986:  "The  role  of  
the  indigenous  people  in  the  world?"  (Found  in  the  library  and  archive  of  the  Sámi  collection  at  the  Norwegian  Folk  
Museum,  visited  2009) 
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have  been  marginal  in  the  polarized  constellations  of  social  movements  during  the  Alta-campaign,  
but  that  is  why  it  is  interesting.  In  retrospect,  those  years  have  been  central  to  the  national  Sámi  
history  of  Sámi  nation-building.564  As  with  other  nation-building  movements,  the  central  symbols  of  
the  Sámi  national  movement  were  contested  from  its  beginning,  implying  a  potential  for  further  
tension.  More  than  twenty  years  later,  the  relation  between  reindeer  nomads  and  other  Sámi  would  
become  and  issue  when  propositions  from  The  Sámi  Rights  Commission  were  being  enacted.565  But  
in  1979,  the  outcome  was  still  open.  The  creation  of  The  Sámi  Rights  Commission  in  1979  was  in  
itself  ambiguous  enough  to  be  interpreted  as  a  balancing  act.  On  the  one  hand  the  prime  minister  
took  perceptible  action  for  minority  rights.  On  the  other  hand  he  promised  nothing.  The  commission  
could  channel  the  activities  of  interest  organizations  into  forms  that  were  acceptable  for  the  forces  
in  power,  in  a  forum  that  worked  slowly,  and  was  to  draft  propositions  with  no  binding  authority.  It  
was  part  of  the  "research  and  development"  apparatus  that  informed  the  conventional  policy  process  
without  being  part  of  it.566  A  participatory  forum  with  that  role  would  not  necessarily  have  a  
function  very  different  from  that  of  imposed  cooperation  under  the  explicitly  racist  policies  of  the  
1920s.  However,  at  the  turn  of  the  1980s,  the  Sámi  claims  had  mobilized  the  support  of  public  
opinion,  and  the  demands  were  supported  by  the  weight  of  a  growing  discursive  formation. 
 The  decision  in  national  parliament  was  scheduled  to  May  30,  1980.  On  the  one  side  was  a  
bloc  for  radical  state-activist  industrialization.  On  the  other  hand  was  one  for  liberal  pluralism  and  
sustainable  development.  The  governing  Labor  party,  with  the  Conservative  party,  together  enjoyed  
a  clear  majority  in  the  national  parliament,  and  those  parties  were  the  strongholds  of  the  pro-dam  
coalition.  The  anti-dam  coalition  enjoyed  popularity  within  the  so-called  "center"  parties,  together  
with  the  Socialist  People’s  Party.  In  practice,  the  outcome  of  the  parliamentary  debate  would  be  
determined  before  it  started,  by  the  outcome  of  the  internal  policy  process  in  the  two  main  parties.  
In  February,  the  leader  of  the  Conservative  party  informed  his  members  about  their  unified  pro-dam  
stance.  The  occasion  was  the  annual  general  assembly  of  the  Finnmark  Conservative  Party.  Internal  
party  discipline  was  strict  in  the  Conservative  Party,  and  was  not  challenged.  Therefore,  the  political  
deliberation  to  determine  the  parliamentary  decision,  would  take  place  by  inner  struggles  within  the  
Labor  Party. 
 Since  1923,  the  party  had  been  organized  internally  according  to  Lenin's  principle  of  
democratic  centralism.567  The  party  had  split  in  1961  over  the  issue  of  NATO  membership,  but  now,  
                                                 
564  Source:  exhibition  at  Tromsø  Museum,  “Becoming  a  nation”,  visited  February  2012 
565  Ravna  2005 
566  In  the  conventional  policy  process,  the  parliament  processes  propositions  prepared  by  the  government.  Before  the  
government  prepares  its  proposition,  its  administration  makes  one  or  more  RaD  reports  or  “white  papers”.  Norsk  
Offentlig  Utredning  (NOU)  is  such  a  report.  It  may  be  sensitive  to  paradigms  within  specialist  disciplines,  rather  
than  trends  within  political  parties.  It  has  no  legal  authority  in  a  policy  process. 
567  This  largely  unknown  fact  is  presented  in  Bye  1997:47-8 
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internal  dissent  was  growing  strong  again.  Networks  within  the  party  were  aligned  to  the  indigenous  
movement.  Last  time  had  been  before  1927,  when  the  Labor  Party  had  still  been  internationalist,  
still  rejecting  “liberal”  nationalism  with  its  parliamentarian  channel.568  In  the  1970s,  
Internationalism  (or  rather  inter-statism)  had  been  back  on  the  agenda,  when  membership  in  the  
EEC  had  been  discussed.  The  renewed  parliamentary  process  of  the  Alta-project  was  to  be  decided  
on  February  18th  –  19th,  1980,  when  representatives  from  all  district  contingents  gathered  
(landsstyre).569  This  body  is  the  highest  authority  in  the  party  between  the  annual  national  
assemblies,  even  superior  to  the  central  executive  committee.  According  to  the  minutes  of  the  
meeting,  the  prime  minister  had  not  made  up  his  mind  before  the  meeting,  but  he  feared  that  lives  
could  be  lost  during  a  police  confrontation.570  The  Minister  of  Justice,  who  would  be  responsible  for  
police  action,  proposed  to  delay  construction  until  the  Sámi  rights  to  land  and  water  had  been  
clarified.571  The  party  newspaper,  Arbeiderbladet,  argued  the  same  point  of  view.  The  representative  
of  the  Finnmak  Labor  Party  objected,  stating  that  such  a  view  would  imply  that  "everyone  calling  
themselves  Sámi  could  stop  any  decided  construction  work  in  Finnmark".572  His  most  eager  allies  
were  respected  centralists.  They  argued  with  basic  principles:  democratically  elected  authorities  
should  not  be  dictated  by  “casual  pressure  groups”.  The  pro-dam  movement  won  a  large  majority  of  
the  votes  at  the  meeting.  The  outcome  of  the  following  parliamentary  debate  was  settled.  Given  the  
democratic  centralism  of  the  Labor  and  Conservative  Parties,  the  majority  of  parliamentarian  votes  
were  already  won  by  the  pro-dam  coalition.  On  the  30th  of  May,  after  a  ritual  parliamentary  debate,  
the  votes  were  cast.  Nearly  three  quarters  of  the  parliament  supported  the  swift  execution  of  the  
plan.  The  debate  was  heated,  and  the  one  one  quarter  minority  disagreed  strongly.  In  the  debate,  the  
majority  now  focused  on  the  authority  of  parliamentary  democracy,  rather  than  on  the  expected  
electricity  crisis.  The  minority,  on  their  side,  argued  less  for  environmentalist  issues,  and  more  for  
the  need  to  clarify  the  claimed  indigenous  rights  to  land  and  water.573  At  the  level  of  popular  
support,  both  coalitions  remained  diverse,  both  of  them  accommodating  a  variety  of  groups  and  
claims.  At  leadership  level,  however,  the  dominant  collective  framings  had  been  slipping,  from  one  
set  of  issues  to  another.574  The  discursive  formation  became  strongly  segmented,  divided  on  the  
issue  of  territorial  sovereignty.  Therefore,  it  had  no  impact  on  elite  politics  when  one  of  the  largest  
newspapers  in  the  country,  Bergens  Tidende,  claimed  they  could  document  that  there  had  been  
endless  internal  dissent  within  the  Ministry  of  Industry,  and  between  its  various  bodies,  regarding  
                                                 
568  Jernsletten  1999;;  Jensen  2013 
569  Hjorthol  2006:  86-91,  193 
570  Meeting  protocols  from  the  archives  of  the  Norwegian  Labour  Party  (meetings  in  sentralstyre,  landsstyre  and  stor-­
tingsgruppe),  cited  in  Hjorthol  (2006:  86-91,  193,  205). 
571  Hjorthol  2006:86 
572  Hjorthol  2006:87 
573  Hjorthol  2006 
574  Hjorthol  2006 
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an  issue  as  vital  as  expected  energy  needs  (Nov.).  By  holding  back  this  vital  information,  the  central  
administration  of  the  Ministry  of  Industry  had  manipulated  the  national  parliament.  This  grave  
accusation  was  relevant  for  a  debate  on  industrialization  and  sustainable  development,  but  it  had  
less  interest  for  a  contest  on  the  political  authority  over  land  and  water.  The  issue  would  be  later  
discussed  in  the  court,  where  the  anti-dam  movement  concentrated  most  of  their  energy.575 
 From  the  final  parliamentary  decision,  until  the  police  action  to  secure  its  execution,  there  
was  a  growing  opposition  between  the  elits  of  legislative  and  juridical  power.  Radical  activists  for  
indigenous  civil  rights  gained  support  within  the  court  system,  while  the  elite  of  the  political  parties  
regarded  opposition  from  activist  lawyers  as  a  threat  against  parliamentarian  democracy.  The  local  
court  of  Alta  freed  activists  of  Folkeaksjonen  from  accusation  by  the  state,  claiming  they  had  acted  
in  self  defence.  The  reason  given  was  that  the  first  parliamentary  decision  to  start  construction  work  
had  been  illegal,  according  to  the  earlier  judgment  of  the  local  court  at  21st  October.576  But  that  was  
with  regard  to  the  first  parliamentary  decision.  The  latest  one  was  going  to  be  tried  by  the  court  at  
the  5th  December.  In  the  meantime,  the  action  plan  for  militarized  police  action  was  taken  up  again.  
The  execution  of  parliamentary  decision  had  become  an  issue  of  principle  for  the  Labor  
government,  and  the  national  police  force  still  had  few  resources  compared  to  the  scale  of  the  
disobedient  non-violent  direct  action.  However,  the  new  minister  of  defence  was  no  enthusiast  of  
using  the  military  against  the  state's  own  citizens.  Actually,  he  was  the  same  person  as  had  talked  
ardently  about  the  rights  of  the  American  indigenous  population  at  a  UN  conference  on  racism  two  
years  earlier.  The  Minster  of  Defence  may  have  been  interested  in  saving  face  in  inter-state  
organizations.  Against  the  police  administration,  who  demanded  army  assistance,  he  mobilized  the  
Dean  of  law  studies  at  the  country's  largest  university.  That  was  an  efficient  means  to  stop  demands  
from  the  Ministry  of  Justice.577  The  police  instead  mobilized  equipment  from  the  Civil  Defence,  
which  was  under  the  control  of  the  Ministry  of  Justice,  and  rented  a  private  ferry  for  transportation  
and  housing  of  the  police  force.  A  last  obstacle  against  execution  of  police  action  was  to  be  passed  
on  21st  October,  with  the  new  court  trial  regarding  the  latest  decision  of  the  national  parliament.  
The  judgment  was  to  be  done  by  the  same  kind  of  special  court  as  last  time,  used  for  building-  and  
construction  cases  (skjønnsrett).  The  rule  for  the  composition  of  such  a  court  had  been  changed  
since  the  previous  time  it  had  been  used  with  regard  to  an  Alta-decision,  and  the  government  waited  
for  the  new  judgment  before  they  took  action,  because  they  felt  confident  of  gaining  legal  support.  
The  court  did  judge  that  the  latest  decision  of  the  national  parliament  was  legal,  in  contrast  to  the  
                                                 
575  Norwegian  Supreme  Court1982 
576  Chronology,  ibidem 
577  See  Lars  Martin  Hjorthol’s  interviews  with  Thorvald  Stoltenberg,  former  Minister  of  Defence,  May  2005  (Hjorthol  
2006:  72,  96-98205);;  and  with  Bjørn  Bruland,  former  State  Secretary  at  the  Ministry  of  Defence,  July  2005  
(Hjorthol  2006:  69,  205).  See  also  declassified  and  downgraded  documents  from  the  Ministry  of  Justice  and  the  
Norwegian  High  Command,  cited  in  Hjorthol  (2006:  68-9,  96-98,  191,  205). 
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previous  one.578  So  now,  the  local  court  had  given  the  green  light  to  start  construction  work.  
However,  there  had  been  40%  dissent  among  the  judges,  with  only  a  one  person  difference  between  
the  two  views  (four  against  three  votes).  The  NGOs  of  environmental  and  indigenous  interests  
appealed  the  decision  to  the  district  court,  next  in  the  court  system.  The  SMOs  of  the  anti-dam  
coalition  prepared  for  non-violent  direct  action  to  bloc  construction  work  in  the  meantime. 
 When  the  police  arrived,  on  the  14th  January  1981,  they  found  900  activists  who  had  
chained  themselves  to  the  ground  in  the  polar  cold.  According  to  Hjorthol,  300  of  them  were  from  
Finnmark.579  600  had  travelled  further,  mainly  from  other  places  in  Norway,  but  also  from  other  
places  in  Sápmi.  The  police  force  was  greeted  by  a  new  local  activist  group:  The  Committee  for  
Order  and  Work  in  Alta.  Their  claims  were  the  same  as  those  of  the  earlier  Borgervernet,  but  the  
means  this  time  were  not  private  policing,  but  demonstrating  support  for  the  state  police.  The  new  
SMO  was  formed  by  local  politicians  of  the  Labor  and  Conservative  Parties.580  Thus,  they  were  less  
grass  root  than  Borgervernet.  When  the  police  took  action,  a  group  of  independent  Sámi  activists  
had  made  a  camp  with  traditional  tents  in  front  of  the  Folkeaksjonen  activists  chained  to  the  ground.  
The  police  bypassed  the  tents,  and  went  directly  to  the  chained  activists,  but  the  Sámi  activists  with  
their  national  costumes  manoeuvred  themselves  in  between.  Thus  they  could  be  the  first  to  be  
carried  away,  as  a  demonstrative  performance  in  press  photographs.  The  police  action  was  carried  
out  with  none  of  the  feared  bloodshed,  but  also  with  less  effort  than  the  disobedients  had  hoped  for.  
Hjorthol  has  revealed  some  of  the  expectations,  in  interviews  conducted  with  the  district  police  
chief  who  had  the  local  responsibility  for  law  and  order  during  the  police  action,  and  two  professors  
of  criminology,  who  took  part  in  the  sit  down  blocade.581  A  secret  diplomatic  channel  was  opened  
between  them,  when  the  police  chief  asked  for  a  meeting.  His  worry  was  whether  some  of  the  
demonstrators  were  armed.  The  criminologists  declared  that  it  was  very  unlikely,  and  they  tried  to  
discourage  him  from  taking  action,  arguing  that  it  would  be  a  fiasco,  and  the  district  police  chief  
would  be  blamed.  Neither  would  turn  out  to  be  the  case.  There  was  no  direct  violence,  still,  the  
police  cut  the  iron  chains  of  the  civil  disobedience  activists,  and  carried  the  activists  away.  
Construction  work  was  started,  with  protection  by  police  assembled  from  all  over  the  country. 
 Central  SMO  leaders  confess  that  they  had  believed  in  their  capacity  to  bloc  the  work;;  at  
least  until  the  court  trial  would  be  finally  settled  in  the  Supreme  Court,  maybe  permanently.582  Now  
they  adapted  their  repertoire  of  actions.  The  cause  of  the  anti-dam  movement  was  in  a  more  
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581  See  Lars  Martin  Hjorthol’s  interviews  with  Einar  Henriksen,  former  District  Police  Chief,  in  May  2005;;  with  
Thomas  Mathiesen,  Professor  in  Legal  Sociology,  undated;;  and  with  and  Niels  Christie,  Professor  in  Criminology,  
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desperate  position,  after  the  final  parliamentary  decision  and  its  efficient  execution.  Folkeaksjonen  
left  behind  the  tactic  of  large  sit-down  blocades  with  broad  participation,  adopted  from  the  Mørdala  
campaign.  Instead,  they  switched  to  "needle  sting  actions":  small  but  sudden  blocades,  by  small,  
flexible  action  groups.583  The  Sameaksjonen,  who  had  made  a  large  impact  on  the  public  debate  
with  their  hunger  strike,  were  further  radicalised.  Before  the  police  had  taken  action  against  
Folkeaksjonen,  the  representatives  of  Sameaksjonen  had  been  granted  an  audience  by  the  king,  who,  
according  to  the  activists,  had  shown  sympathy  to  their  cause  (Jan.  13).  A  few  days  after  the  police  
action,  they  followed  up  with  a  letter  to  the  Labor  prime  minister  (Jan.  23).584  Here,  they  asked  for  a  
meeting,  to  present  their  claims:  stop  of  the  construction  work  in  Alta,  official  status  as  an  
indigenous  people  for  the  Sámi,  and  a  special  parliament  for  Sámi  issues.  Those  were  considered  
radical  claims  at  the  time.  The  premier  replied  that  he  would  talk  with  responsible  interest  
organizations,  not  with  casual  pressure  groups.  Sameaksjonen  responded  with  a  new  hunger  strike,  
by  five  people.  They  declared  that  promises  given  after  the  previous  hunger  strike  were  broken,  and  
they  were  prepared  for  fast  until  the  bitter  end.  (Thirty  days  is  supposedly  the  time  limit  of  a  hunger  
strike,  before  permanent  damage  or  death  occurs.585)  That  was  the  time  frame  offered  by  their  
controversial  action  method.  Their  assisting  medic  was  leader  of  the  Labor  party  women’s  
organization.  Another  woman  in  the  Labor  party  was  to  become  prime  minister  for  a  short  period  
from  3rd  of  February,  when  the  old  premier  had  to  quit  due  to  health  reasons.  This  was  Gro  Harlem  
Brundtland,  who  had  already  become  known  as  an  ambitions  minister  of  the  environment,  who  had  
visited  Finnmark  dressed  in  Sámi  folk  costume,  and  who  would  later  become  leader  of  the  UN  
Commission  for  Environment  and  Development.  During  the  Alta-controversy,  she  would  play  an  
ambiguous  role.  When  she  took  over  the  premier  chair,  the  anti-dam  coalition  gained  new  hope.  
Three  days  later,  a  new  action  group  showed  up  at  her  door,  and  asked  for  a  meeting:  thirteen  Sámi  
women  of  every  age.586  They  were  let  in,  but  the  premier  could  not  satisfy  their  demands,  that  were  
much  the  same  as  Sameaksjonen.  When  the  premier  left  the  office,  they  spontaneously  decided  to  
squat  the  place,  and  next  morning  they  were  carried  out  by  police.  Two  of  the  women  in  the  group  
proceeded  to  gain  an  audience  with  the  Pope,  then  a  meeting  with  the  UN.  Another  of  the  
participants  was  married  to  an  advocate  of  NRF  in  the  court  trial.  While  the  independent  Sámi  
affinity  groups  intervened  in  the  political  discourse  in  the  capital  city,  the  non-violent  guerilla  of  
Folkeaksjonen  carried  on  their  needle-stings  campaign  at  the  construction  site.  103  people  were  
arrested,  among  those  ten  Swedish  and  one  Finnish  citizen.  The  campaign  had  attracted  inhabitants  
of  both  the  overlapping  Norwegian  and  Sápmi  territories.  The  hunger  striking  activists  had  moved  
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secretly  to  Stockholm  in  Sweden,  to  avoid  being  force-fed  by  the  Norwegian  government.  On  the  
17th  February,  the  hunger  strike  had  been  going  on  for  twenty-five  days,  and  the  critical  limit  of  
thirty  days  was  getting  closer.587  Death  among  the  hunger  strikers  would  be  a  blow  to  the  reputation  
of  the  Labor  government,  and  thus  to  its  perceived  legitimacy  among  the  population.  Within  
mainstream  Sámi  interest  organizations,  strong  voices  demanded  non-cooperation  with  the  state.  In  
this  political  climate,  representatives  of  the  government  and  of  the  Sámi  organizations  met  in  secret,  
without  any  of  the  conflicting  parties  loosing  face  in  public.588  The  representatives  of  government  
asked  the  moderate  Sámi  leader  for  an  excuse  to  stop  construction  work  temporarily,  to  avoid  an  
embarrassing  incident  with  radicals  willing  to  hunger  strike  till  death.  The  NGO  leader  had  been  
working  on  Sámi  cultural  history  at  Tromsø  Museum,  and  asked  his  colleagues  if  they  had  been  
involved  in  the  planning  process  in  Alta.  Thereafter,  archeologists  from  the  museum  requested  to  
visit  the  site  with  planners  from  the  Ministry  of  Industry.  They  did  find  sites  of  relevance  to  
archeological  excavation,  and  demanded  a  temporary  delay  for  this  reason.  On  the  24th  February,  
32  days  had  elapsed  since  the  start  of  the  hunger  strike,  according  to  the  medical  assistant  of  
Sameaksjonen.  The  critical  phase  had  started.  Then  premier  Brundtland  declared  a  preliminary  
delay  in  construction  work,  referring  to  the  law  of  cultural  heritage,  which  had  been  broken.  The  
construction  road  through  Tverrdalen  would  be  finished,  but  thereafter,  archeological  excavations  
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The  start  of  archeological  excavations  at  the  construction  site  probably  saved  the  lives  of  the  hunger  
striking  activists,  and  thus  saved  face  for  the  Labor  government.  About  one  month  after  the  premier  
had  declared  preliminary  halting  in  construction  work,  the  de-escalation  was  confirmed  by  the  ship-
load  of  police  leaving  from  Alta  (Mar.  27).589  At  the  same  time,  however,  small  events  were  already  
taking  place,  that  in  retrospect  appear  as  the  emerging  build-up  of  tension  for  a  final  act  in  the  
drama.  The  state  advocate  had  applied  to  the  Supreme  Court  to  bypass  the  district  court  in  the  case  
appealed  by  the  anti-dam  advocates,  which  was  accepted  by  the  Supreme  Court  (Mar.  10).590  The  
event  in  itself  was  maybe  insignificant,  but  more  would  follow.  The  advocates  for  indigenous  rights  
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and  environmental  planning  had  gained  large  support  among  the  legal  profession,  including  several  
courts  at  local  and  district  level.  The  Supreme  Court,  by  contrast,  was  closely  aligned  to  the  
governing  elite  of  the  political  parties,  and  during  the  coming  months,  a  series  of  manoeuvres  took  
place,  designed  to  impose  a  harmonization  of  the  national  court  system  under  the  authority  of  the  
Supreme  Court.  For  the  pro-dam  coalition,  it  was  crucial  to  gain  control  over  the  legal  punishment  
of  anti-dam  activists.  For  policing  the  non-violent  direct  action  at  the  construction  site,  there  was  
limited  use  in  transporting  the  activists  away,  as  they  notoriously  returned,  or  others  replaced  them.  
Thus,  the  police  started  to  sue  activists,  in  order  to  punish  them  with  fines,  intended  to  be  large  
enough  to  prevent  further  action.  Still,  the  preventive  effect  was  limited,  because  judges  at  local  and  
regional  courts  were  free  to  judge  the  disobedients  lightly.  Many  judges  were  influenced  by  the  
human  rights  arguments  of  the  anti-dam  coalition.  However,  the  Supreme  Court  took  action,  by  
judging  a  national  standard  for  the  fines  to  be  paid  by  anti-dam  civil  disobedience  activists.  This  
action  was  coordinated  with  the  work  of  the  police,  under  the  central  command  of  the  Ministry  of  
Justice.  Not  only  was  the  anti-dam  coalition  learning  and  adapting  new  repertoires  of  action,  the  
same  was  the  case  for  the  pro-dam  coalition.  When  they  could  not  mobilize  the  army,  which  had  
been  their  first  option,  they  took  action  to  discipline  the  court  system.  Thus,  they  confirmed  or  
constructed  the  hegemony  of  state  law,  against  the  contamination  of  customary  law  and  
international  law  –  that  had  been  mobilized  by  the  environmentalist  and  the  indigenous  movements.  
The  legal  action  of  the  anti-dam  coalition  was  further  radicalised  –  when  the  government  sued  some  
leaders  of  Folkeaksjonen  for  sedition  (Jul.  21).591  This  was  no  less  historical  than  the  attempt  at  
using  the  army  against  activists  had  been.  Neither  of  those  two  forms  of  action  had  been  used  since  
the  1920s,  during  the  polarized  conflicts  between  the  Labor  Party,  with  its  revolutionary  syndicalist  
militants,  and  the  governing  Liberal  and  Centre  Parties,  who  had  been  more  or  less  “liberal”  
nationalists.  In  1981,  the  ruling  coalition  of  Labor  and  Conservative  Parties  were  mobilizing  state-
activism  to  maintain  their  relatively  recent  hegemony  against  the  challenge  from  new  social  
movements.  This  observed  dynamic  could  hardly  fit  better  with  a  Marxian  dialectical  scheme.  
Furthermore,  the  final  round  of  contestation  would  see  a  polarization  of  hegemony  versus  
rejectionism  so  total  that  it  may  even  fit  with  a  notorious  determinist  theory,  ironically  labeled  by  
Kierkegaard  as  "the  Hegelian  waltz-tact". 
 The  same  day  that  the  state  sued  Folkeaksjonen-leaders  for  sedition,  the  national  interest  
organization  of  the  Sámi  –  which  was  dominated  by  relative  moderates  –  confirmed  their  demand  
that  construction  work  be  halted  until  the  issue  of  indigenous  rights  to  land  and  water  was  
clarified.592  But  when  Tromsø  Museum  ended  their  archeological  excavations,  they  concluded  that  
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changing  the  track  of  the  construction  road  was  enough  to  protect  the  valuable  findings  they  had  
uncovered,  and  the  government  thus  immediately  ordered  the  recommencement  of  the  construction  
work  (Aug.  7).593  Folkeaksjonen  mobilized  again,  for  new  needle  sting  actions,  while  Sameaksjonen  
this  time  refrained  from  a  third  hunger  strike.  A  hunger  strike  would  have  been  of  little  utility,  as  a  
fresh  election  to  the  national  parliament  had  not  only  confirmed  that  the  Labor  hegemony  was  
broken.  It  had  also  made  the  Conservative  Party  the  largest  in  the  parliament,  and  thus,  according  to  
the  constitutional  practice  of  parliamentarism,  the  latter  was  asked  by  the  king  to  form  government.  
The  new  prime  minister  had  none  of  the  ambiguity  of  Brundtland.  Premier  Willoch  of  the  
Conservative  Party  was  known  as  a  hard-liner.  Certain  individuals  in  his  party  regarded  customary  
rights  as  a  conservative  virtue,594  but  such  persons  posed  no  challenge  to  the  statist  and  industrialist  
hegemony  within  the  party. 
 The  re-start  of  construction  was  ordered  by  the  Ministry  of  Industry,  without  informing  
those  local  stake  holders  who  were  potentially  opposed.  On  the  28th  of  September,  the  leader  of  the  
reindeer  husbandry  organization  heard  the  news  on  the  radio.595  In  a  radio-interview,  the  
representative  of  the  planning  body  frankly  stated  that  they  had  refrained  from  warning  the  local  
reindeer  herders  in  order  to  avoid  further  delay.  This  was  exactly  the  time  of  the  year  when  the  
flocks  of  reindeer  were  supposed  to  pass  through  the  area,  from  summer  grazing,  to  winter  habitat.  
The  sovereign  attitude  of  the  governing  body  enjoyed  no  legitimacy  among  indigenous  rights  
activists,  and  it  was  perceived  as  constituting  a  political  provocation.  At  the  same  time,  this  action  
from  the  planning  bureau  should  be  regarded  in  parallel  to  what  was  going  on  within  the  national  
courts  system.  Under  the  Ministry  of  Justice,  there  had  been  a  centralized  streamlining  of  the  
previously  divided  court  practice.  Under  the  Ministry  of  Industry,  a  certain  organizational  practice  
was  confirmed,  where  decision-making  procedures  were  secret  and  centralized.  It  is  no  
exaggeration  to  characterize  this  as  a  military  mode  of  operation,  an  institutional  heritage  dating  
from  the  movement  for  absolutist  government,  which  had  been  instituted  in  Denmark-Norway  by  
coup  in  1661.596  The  model  of  that  kind  of  government  had  spread  from  the  Ottoman  Janissary,597  
through  Louis  XIV  and  the  Prussian  army,  throughout  early  modern  territorial  states  in  Western  
Europe.598  During  the  Alta  campaign,  the  pro-dam  elite  in  the  political  parties  regarded  this  form  of  
government  as  necessary  to  maintain  the  absolute  sovereignty  of  the  people’s  will,  represented  
through  the  pro-dam  bloc’s  own  hegemony.  By  the  demonstrative  authoritarianism  of  the  planning  
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bureau,  combined  with  the  streamlining  of  punishment  within  the  courts  system,  the  ruling  coalition  
carried  out  two  parallel  processes  of  confirming  and  re-constructing  hegemony  within  two  different  
branches  of  government,  namely  the  judiciary  and  the  executive.  The  supremacy  of  the  legislative  
over  the  government  was  instituted  in  1884,  via  the  principle  of  parliamentarianism.  The  supremacy  
of  parliamentary  practice  over  judicial  practice  is  another  question.  The  cadres  of  the  Labor  Party  
used  populist  arguments,  against  the  authority  of  the  court  to  alter  decisions  made  by  the  will  of  the  
nation  through  its  parliament.  The  "centre"  parties  and  the  indigenous  activists  used  liberal  
arguments  concerning  the  protection  of  individuals  and  minorities  against  the  dictatorship  of  a  
majority.  There  was  a  clash  between  two  different  framings  of  what  the  existing  constitutional  
practices  were,  or  ought  to  be.  On  the  one  side,  parliamentarianism,  on  the  other  side  checks  and  
balances;;  on  the  one  side  something  similar  to  Rousseau's  Jacobism,  on  the  other  side,  
Montesquieu’s  pluralism. 
 Technicalities  aside:  the  pro-dam  coalition  had  mobilized  efficiently  during  the  buildup  of  
this  final  round  of  contestation.  A  new  confrontation  was  expected.  Folkeaksjonen  elected  a  back-up  
leadership,  to  take  over  in  case  the  functioning  leadership  would  be  jailed  (Sept.  29).599  A  new  
shipload  of  police  again  landed  in  Alta  (Oct.  4).600  Then,  400  police  officers  met  400  civil  
disobedients,  blocing  the  construction  site  (Oct.  5).601  Surprisingly,  the  leadership  of  Folkeaksjonen  
asked  their  activists  to  leave  after  this  was  demanded  by  the  police.  Only  25  stubborn  Sámi  activists  
remained  seated  and  ware  carried  away  by  police  officers.  Folkeaksjonen  had  apparently  become  
totally  converted  to  the  needle  sting  tactic,  which  disrupts  the  target  in  a  more  surprising  manner,  
rather  than  the  large  sit-down  blocade  method  they  had  learned  from  the  Mardøla  campaign.  They  
also  established  a  local  camp  for  information  and  agitation.  At  the  same  time,  others  were  
radicalising  in  other  ways.  The  same  day  that  police  and  demonstrators  met  at  the  construction  site,  
someone  tried  to  blow  up  one  of  the  bridges  on  the  construction  road.602  Police  investigation  would  
not  find  any  perpetrator,  but  it  might  have  been  an  attempted  sabotage  action  similar  another,  later  
effort.  There  were  still  20,000  reindeer  on  their  way  into  the  area,  and  NRF,  the  organization  of  
reindeer  husbandry,  sued  the  state  for  having  held  back  information  about  the  fact  that  construction  
would  begin  at  this  crucial  moment.  However,  the  local  court  judged  that  this  administrative  
procedure  was  acceptable,  and  that  the  reindeer  herders  would  be  accorded  compensation  
retrospectively,  if  their  business  were  negatively  affected  (Oct.  12).603  It  was  a  controversial  issue  
whether  or  not  the  planned  construction  work  would  interfere  with  the  human  ecology  of  local  
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reindeer  husbandry,  beyond  the  extent  to  which  the  latter  could  sustainably  adapt  to. 
 The  pro-dam  coalition  had  maintained  its  political  hegemony,  by  re-confirming  the  
centralized  harmonization  of  legislative  power  with  the  executive  and  judicial  powers.  The  anti-dam  
coalition  enjoyed  the  support  of  public  opinion  in  a  large  segment  of  national  media,  and  had  strong  
ties  with  transnational  networks  for  human  rights  and  environmental  planning.  As  the  hegemony  
was  solidified,  the  activists  became  desperate.  With  hard-liners  in  government,  hunger  strike  would  
probably  not  have  been  a  relevant  means  of  pressure.  Over  two  months,  Folkeaksjonen  carried  out  
17  needle  sting  actions  of  various  sizes.  The  police  adapted  by  jailing  the  civil  disobedience  
activists  in  remand  prisons.  The  main  interest  organization  for  the  Sámi  in  Norway,  NSR,  called  
together  an  extraordinary  national  assembly,  located  in  Alta.  The  assembly  declared  that  the  state  
had  gravely  violated  the  basic  rights  of  the  Sámi,  and  they  decided  to  adopt  a  policy  of  "diplomatic  
boycott"  in  relation  to  the  Norwegian  political  entity  (Oct.  30).604  The  interest  organization  for  
reindeer  husbandry  in  Norway,  NRL,  followed  this,  thus  breaking  a  long  tradition  of  co-operation  
with  the  state,  dating  back  to  the  age  of  “Norwegianization”  policies,  with  their  explicitly  colonial  
administration  of  reindeer  husbandry.  Radicalisation  gained  ground  amongst  the  indigenous  human  
rights  activists,  while  Folkeaksjonen  was  running  out  of  steam.  It  had  been  hard  to  keep  up  the  
intensity  of  a  non-violent  guerrill  organisationa,  under  the  increasing  pressure  of  standardized  fines  
and  remand  imprisonment.  Its  final  needle  sting  occured  on  the  8th  of  December  1981.605  After  the  
Christmas  holidays,  on  the  3rd  of  January  1982,  the  steering  board  decided  that  they  would  propose  
that  the  organization  should  shut  down.606  An  extraordinary  general  assembly  was  summoned  on  
January  24th,  and  the  day  before,  a  new  membership  organization  was  founded,  with  the  sole  
purpose  of  providing  legal  and  financial  support  for  heavily  fined  activists.  Two-thirds  of  the  
general  assembly  voted  to  shut  down  the  organization.607  So,  a  minority  wished  to  carry  on.  A  
temporary  steering  board  was  created,  to  administer  the  shutingt  down  of  the  organization,  and  to  
organize  a  national  conference  to  share  experiences  and  lessons  learned. 
 The  Supreme  Court  process  was  now  running,  and  the  judges  took  a  decision  on  the  26th  of  
February.  The  anti-dam  coalition  had  turned  their  energy  to  the  litigation.  The  Supreme  Court  would  
reject  the  issues  raised  by  the  indigenous  movements,  regarding  rights  to  land  and  water  (largely  an  
issue  about  territorialised  authority).  However,  it  opened  its  court  space  as  an  arena  for  
confrontation  between  the  two  opposing  parties  regarding  issues  raised  by  the  environmental  
movement  (largely  a  question  about  central  authority).  The  latter  question  is  overlooked  by  the  
chronicle  of  Hjorthol,  because  he,  in  spite  of  solid  journalistic  research,  concentrated  his  study  on  
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606  Chronology,  ibidem 
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the  legislative  process,  overlooking  the  documents  involved  in  the  court  litigation.  However,  the  
NGOs,  which  were  a  considerable  part  of  the  anti-dam  movement,  had  invested  everything  into  that  
forum.  Thus  I  chose  to  conduct  basic  research  on  this  issue,  and  to  present  my  discourse  analysis  
thus.608 
 The  conflict  was  staged  and  dramatized  in  court,  as  a  polarized  performance.  In  this  theatre,  
the  protagonist  was  Friends  of  the  Earth  Norway  (NNF),  supported  by  the  interest  organization  of  
reindeer  husbandry  (NRF),  and  other  NGOs.  They  had  originally  sued  NVE,  the  planning  bureau  of  
the  state.  However,  NNF’s  antagonist  in  court  was  the  State  Advocate.  He  would  defend  the  
hegemonic  bloc  in  the  Supreme  Court.  The  anti-dam  NGO  advocates  claimed  that  the  planning  
process  was  illegal,  because  biological  &  cultural  expertise  had  been  suppressed.  The  technological  
and  economic  experts  of  the  planning  bureau  had  rejected  the  claims  of  the  biological  and  cultural  
experts,  who  worried  for  the  local  biotopes  of  wild  salmon  and  domesticated  reindeer.  These  argued  
for  the  necessity  of  ecological  thinking:  that  there  are  critical  thresholds  regarding  the  level  of  
interventions  to  which  a  local  system  can  sustainably  adapt.609  The  pro-dam  state  advocate,  on  his  
side,  defended  the  validity  of  the  planning  process,  by  countering  the  human  ecology  arguments.  
According  to  my  reading,  the  State  Advocate  sought  to  counter  human  ecology  arguments  in  three  
ways:  (1)  Uncertainty:  The  fact  that  it  is  very  hard  to  estimate  a  critical  threshold  regarding  the  level  
of  interventions  to  which  a  local  system  can  sustainably  adapt,  was  an  argument  against  making  
estimates  thereof.  (2)  Utilitarianism:  Scientific  knowledge  served  no  purpose  in  itself,  and  only  
represented  a  means  "to  say  yes  or  no"  to  the  construction  of  a  dam.  (3)  Military  command  line:  The  
combination  of  uncertainty  and  utilitarianism  somehow  implied  that  that  the  Ministry  of  Industry  
was  the  supreme  arbiter  of  the  epistemic  debate.610 
 The  judges  gave  100%  support  to  the  pro-dam  State  Advocate.  In  retrospect,  this  might  
appear  strange.  The  words  used  about  zoological  expertise  in  the  judgment611  would  appear  as  
arrogant  and  un-informed,  if  viewed  in  the  light  of  the  contemporary  rules  for  hydroelectric  
planning.612  However,  it  would  be  an  anachronism  to  judge  the  1982  Supreme  Court  by  later  laws.  
The  planning  system  would  later  be  re-organized,  for  increased  impartiality.  In  1982,  the  most  
radical  challenge  to  centralized  command-and-control  came  from  anthropologists  who  testified  on  
behalf  of  NRF.  They  claimed  that  the  deliberation  process  should  have  been  informed  by  local  
                                                 
608  In  this  study,  I  have  mainly  used  historical  primary  sources:  the  minutes  and  the  judgment  from  the  Supreme  Court  
trial  (Norwegian  Supreme  Court  1982),  plus  a  report  that  was  the  testimony  of  NRF  (Bjørklund  &  Brantenberg  
1981).  Those,  I  have  contrasted  to  a  recent  official  handbook  for  planners  published  by  the  planning  bureau  NVE  
(Saltveit  2006),  plus  informal  interviews  with  some  employees 
609  Norwegian  Supreme  Court  1982 
610  Norwegian  Supreme  Court  1982 
611  Norwegian  Supreme  Court  1982:  329-331 
612  Saltveit  2006 
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knowledge,  to  protect  the  sustainability  of  local  human  ecologies.613  For  the  state  advocate,  such  
"cultural/sociological  analyses"  were  irrelevant,  because  the  parliament  had  a  "special  competence"  
to  sort  out  socio-cultural  issues.614  The  judges  implicitly  supported  that,  by  limiting  their  own  
competence  to  controlling  the  legality  of  planning  procedures,  and  defining  the  particular  questions  
being  raised  as  falling  outside  this  category.615  International  law  and  customary  law  was  judged  as  
irrelevant,  because  the  area  was  under  undisputed  Norwegian  sovereignty.616  After  2005,  the  latter  
statement  is  not  quite  correct,  after  customary  law  have  gained  some  explicit  recognition  by  state  
law.617  The  necessity  of  local  knowledge  in  deliberation  is  now  recognized  by  mainstream  textbooks  
for  students  of  physical  planning.618  Back  in  1982,  however,  those  were  still  very  contentious  
claims,  voiced  by  new  social  movements,  and  were  far  from  institutionalized  in  mainstream  
institutions.  However,  what  strikes  me  most  about  the  judgement  is  not  that  the  parliament  is  
adjudged  to  have  a  monopoly  of  competence  to  settle  disputes  of  local  knowledge  and  other  socio-
cultural  issues.  No,  what  is  even  more  striking  is  the  framing  of  natural  science.  The  research  fronts  
are  apparently  considered  as  being  beyond  dispute  –  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  natural  scientists  openly  
contest  the  rules  employed  by  engineers.  For  the  State  Advocate  and  the  judges,  a  combination  of  
uncertainty  and  utilitarianism  somehow  implied  that  the  Ministry  of  Industry  is  supreme  arbiter  of  
this  epistemic  controversy.  The  "somehow"  implied  in  this  logic  was  something  they  agreed  upon,  
and  did  not  need  to  spell  out.  Hierarchic  command-and-control  of  a  military  form  is  presumed,  with  
no  question  of  impartiality.  The  Ministry  of  Industry  was  granted  absolute  authority  to  assess  
epistemic  relevance  in  matters  of  contested  knowledge  about  nature.  That  authority  was  far  beyond  
any  stakeholder  deliberation,  but  it  was  also  beyond  parliamentarian  debate,  and  also  beyond  
scientific  peer  review.  With  regard  to  contested  natural  science,  the  argument  was  not  for  the  
absolute  authority  of  democratic  institutions.  It  was  an  argument  for  the  absolute  authority  of  
technocrats,  the  CEOs  of  state  capitalism.  Epistemologically,  the  argument  is  similar  to  that  of  the  
State  Church  under  despotism,  including  its  witchcraft  trials,  the  Lutheran  mirror  image  of  the  
                                                 
613  Bjørklund  &  Brantenberg  1981  14,  16,  20,  26-7 
614  Norwegian  Supreme  Court  1982:  275-6 
615  Norwegian  Supreme  Court  1982:  347 
616  Norwegian  Supreme  Court  1982:  241,  347 
617  Ravna  2005 
618  In  order  to  gain  an  indicator  about  central  topics  in  the  discourse  of  physical  planning,  I  selected  the  student  
textbooks  that  were  available  at  a  specialist  book  shop  for  architecture,  Pro  QM  in  Berlin,  3-7  July  2009.    On  the  
one  hand,  most  of  their  selected  text  books  presented  participatory,  deliberative  democracy  as  a  mainstream  
approach  to  urban  development:  For  example,  Wheeler  &  Beatley  (2009:”Exercises”)  described  hands-on  
techniques  of  participatory  planning,  and  included  critical  analyses  by  Andre  Gunder  Frank  and  Ebeneser  Howard.  
Even  a  radically  green  approach  was  offered,  with  Riddell  2004.  On  the  other  hand,  Pro  QM  also  offered  a  rather  
technocratic  alternative:  Roberts,  Ravetz,  George  &  Howe  2009  presented  centralized,  hiararchical  forms  of  
decision  making  as  being  more  accountable  than  participatory  deliberation.  They  express  scepticism  toward  the  
possibility  for  truly  inclusive  or  empowering  participation,  citing  Cooke  &  Khotari  2001  (but  overlooking  the  reply  
to  the  latter  from  Hickey  &  Mohan  2004).  These  observations  indicate  that  participatory,  “bottom  up”  methods  have  
become  part  of  mainstream  physical  planning,  even  though  technocratic,  “top  down”  planning  is  still  going  stroing.   
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Inquisition.  A  similar  institution  in  force  in  1982  was  Imam  Khomeini’s  Walayat-al-faqih.  All  "high  
modernist"  political  movements,  according  to  Zygmund  Bauman,  placed  some  absolute  doctrine  in  
the  "empty  throne  of  God".619  That  view  may  apply  to  our  case,  as  liberal  historians  trace  an  
institutional  continuity  from  the  bureaucracy  of  Danish  despotic  kingdom  (1661-1814),  to  that  of  
Labor  Party  hegemony  (1936-1981).620  During  the  NNF  vs  NVE  case  in  1982,  the  State  Advocate  
acted  in  the  role  as  Leviathan’s  advocate.  He  struggled  to  conserve  Leviathan’s  organic  unity  which  
was  in  danger  of  being  dissolved  via  a  process  of  ecological  adaptation  to  a  diverse  human  ecology. 
 With  a  vote  of  17  against  zero,  the  Supreme  Court  judged  that  the  last  decision  of  the  
national  parliament  had  been  legal.621  The  Supreme  Court  Advocate  that  had  assisted  NNF  against  
the  state  was  so  committed,  that  he  published  an  article  in  a  journal  of  legal  studies.  He  criticized  
the  Supreme  Court  for  defending  the  status  quo,  and  argued  that  it  is  illusory  to  regard  the  Supreme  
Court  as  an  independent  organ  for  the  purpose  of  controlling  the  other  branches  of  state  power.622  
Thus,  he  questioned  the  functionality  of  the  division  of  government  into  three  branches,  which  has  
been  prescribed  by  the  Norwegian  constitution  since  1814.  The  author  still  stands  by  his  critique,  
and  has  since  become  a  Supreme  Court  Judge  himself.623 
 About  a  month  after  the  final  Supreme  Court  decision,  there  was  another  failed  attempt  of  
blowing  up  a  construction  bridge.  This  time,  the  police  found  the  perpetrator  at  a  local  hospital,  
after  he  had  fumbled,  and  had  blown  up  his  own  arm  and  eye.624  Maoist  newspaper  Klassekampen  
had  been  informed  before  the  police,  which  cast  suspicion  upon  their  political  party,  AKP  (m-l).625  
One  of  the  activists  had  been  a  party  member,  though  he  disobeyed  party  discipline  when  he  joined  
an  independent  affinity  group.  Many  had  been  boasting  about  their  willingness  to  commit  sabotage,  
and  there  had  even  been  an  alleged  Sámi  guerilla  group  posing  with  guns  in  a  magazine.626  Though  
the  Norwegian  police  accorded  high  priority  to  investigate  the  rumours  of  Sámi  guerillas,  they  
never  found  any.  According  to  the  district  secretary  of  the  Maoist  party,  this  was  because  the  
guerrilla  never  existed.627  For  his  part,  the  former  district  secretary  claimed  to  have  interviewed  
those  who  posed  in  the  magazine,  who  allegedly  claimed  the  threat  was  never  serious.  Files  newly  
released  to  the  public,  reveal  that  the  police  had  directed  special  suspicion  against  specific  persons  
                                                 
619  Bauman  1991 
620  Seip  1963;;  Slagstad  2001  (1998) 
621  The  Finnish  human  rights  lawyer  Martin  Scheinin  (2000)  argues  that  "...the  reasoning  by  the  supreme  court  appears  
today  as  simply  erroneous",  and  that  "Read  today,  the  ruling  appears  to  fail  to  address  the  close  interrelationship  of  
culture  and  the  economic  activities  of  indigenous  peoples,  as  well  as  the  crucial  role  of  economic  sustainability  and  
proper  consultation  as  the  test  for  the  justification  for  interferences  with  the  enjoyment  of  an  indigenous  culture."  
(Scheinin  2000:  §  4.5) 
622  Hjorthol  2006 
623  Hjorthol  2006:  155 
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who  were  well  known  among  Sámi  activists  for  being  champions  of  moderate  pragmatism.  Such  
strong  suspicion  should  be  seen  in  the  context  of  the  above-mentioned  legal  and  illegal  surveillance  
of  left-wing  dissidents.628  The  new  social  movements  were  looked  upon  with  much  suspicion  by  a  
formerly  revolutionary  syndicalist  party,  guarding  the  hegemony  it  had  gained  by  taking  over  
parliamentarian  statist  practices.  There  were  between  one  and  three  attempts  at  sabotage  of  bridges.  
They  all  failed,  which  may  confirm  the  statement  that  the  perpetrators  were  isolated  cells  with  
scarce  activist  competence.  The  great  fear  was  that  separatist  nationalism  would  get  take  within  the  
Sámi  rights  movement.  However,  violence  never  became  a  popular  means  of  expression  among  the  
transnational  indigenous  movement.  They  framed  their  traditional  political  systems  as  state-less,  
whereas  kingdoms  and  states  were  defined  as  innovations  brought  by  colonial  peoples.  Separatist  
ambitions  of  setting  up  sovereign  political  entities  are  not  easily  fit  into  such  an  ideology.  Though  
violent  action  enjoyed  scarce  support  amongst  radical  Sámi  activists,  the  ranks  maintained  
solidarity  against  the  institutional  violence  of  state  sovereignty.  The  man  who  could  not  blow  up  the  
bridge  managed  to  flee  from  the  local  hospital,  with  assistance  from  Sámi  people  in  Norway,  
Sweden  and  Finland.  He  got  to  Canada,  where  he  was  sheltered  amongst  an  indigenous  tribe  –  until  
he  got  homesick  and  went  back  to  Norway  to  serve  his  prison  sentence.  The  bridge  was  re-named  in  




6.6.0  Outcomes,  1984-2005:  short  term  consolidation,  long  term  revolution 
 
The  immediate  outcome  of  the  Alta-contestation  was  a  triumph  for  the  pro-dam  coalition.  The  
political  hegemony  of  the  industrializing  bloc  was  restored,  and  the  dam  was  constructed.  At  the  
time,  the  contestation  did  not  appear  to  have  engendered  any  of  what  it  would  later  become  known  
for  in  international  literature:  “improved  environmental  regulations”  and  “the  first  parliament  for  
the  Sami  minority”.630  The  pro-dam  coalition  procured  the  desired  hydropower  plant,  though  in  
retrospect  some  have  been  surprised  that  it  was  expensive,  and  did  not  generate  many  new  jobs  in  
the  industry.631  However,  it  might  have  been  hard  to  predict  that  the  lucrative  Norwegian  aluminium  
industry  would  be  beaten  in  the  context  of  international  competition.  Others  were  surprised  that  
local  reindeer  husbandry  actually  adopted  in  a  sustainable  manner,  by  finding  new  routes  for  annual  
                                                 
628  Bye  &  Sjue  1995 
629  Hjorthol  2006 
630  Khagram  2004:  179,  citing  Usher  1997 
631  Hjorthol  2006 
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migration.632  However,  this  forced  the  nomads  of  separate  traditional  territories  to  re-negotiate  the  
boundaries  between  sovereign  units  in  their  traditional,  state-less  political  system.633  The  
anthropologists  of  NRF  had  taken  those  boundaries  for  given,  just  as  the  administrators  used  state  
boundaries  as  a  means  of  analytically  framing  the  people  and  the  land.634  The  salmon  stock  would  
be  heavily  struck  by  a  river  regulation  system,  which  was  not  suited  to  its  habitat,  though  the  stock  
was  slowly  restored  many  years  later.635 
 Ironically  the  Alta  controversy  had  started  a  series  of  bureaucratic  policy  processes  that  were  
to  set  in  train  a  slow  reform  in  natural  resources  management,  and  a  slow  revolution  for  indigenous  
self-rule.  Let  us  briefly  trace  the  coming  into  being  of  the  latter,  as  it  is  closely  related  to  the  
authority  over  land  and  water.  The  Sámi  Rights  Commission,  the  state  commission  to  investigate  
the  legal  rights  of  the  Sámi  population,  created  in  1979,  delivered  a  series  of  non-binding  reports  to  
the  national  Norwegian  parliament  (so  called  NOUs).  The  first  of  these  was  delivered  in  1984636  –  
the  year  after  the  Folkeaksjonen  leaders  had  been  judged  guilty  of  sedition.  The  Sámi  Rights  
Commission  would  propose  reforms  that  had  been  considered  revolutionary  by  the  ruling  bloc  
during  the  Alta-contestation.  The  proposed  reforms  included  a  separate  census  and  parliament  for  
Norwegian  Sámi,  and  such  reforms  were  in  fact  enacted.  In  parallel,  fundamental  reforms  would  be  
made  in  the  organization  of  the  administrative  bodies  under  the  Ministry  of  Industry.  Some  would  
be  privatized,  in  order  to  make  competition  possible,  while  others  opened  the  policy  process  for  
some  degree  of  participation  from  stakeholder  organizations.637  In  2005,  a  special  law  would  even  
be  enacted  regarding  the  ownership  of  land  and  water  in  Finnmark  County,  subjecting  it  to  the  
shared  authority  of  the  Norwegian  parliament  and  the  Norwegian  Sámi  parliament.638  This  is  an  
innovative  institutional  reform,  an  effort  to  solve  a  problem  of  territorial  sovereitgnty;;  how  it  may  
imply  violent  assimilation  or  divisions  on  particular  local  habitats.  The  new  situation  is  further  
investigated  in  Chapters  8-12.  First,  however,  Chapter  7  will  turn  to  a  sociological  analysis  of  the  




                                                 
632  ibidem 
633  Bjørklund  &  Brantenberg  1981:  maps  at  pp.  51,  53,  60 
634  For  the  siida-perspective,  see  Bjørklund  and  Brantenberg  1981:50;;  for  an  unusually  self-aware  example  of  the  state  
perspective,  see  Norwegian  Ministry  of  the  Environment  1978a:  pp.  vii,  7-23. 
635  Hjorthol  2006 
636  Aarseth  2006 
637  NVE  employees:  informal  interview  at  a  wind  power  conference,  Stiklestad,  25.-27.08.2014 
638  Ravna  2005 
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6.7.0  Preliminary  conclusion  to  first  part  of  Case  I 
 
Negative  findings:  There  might  always  be  the  possibility  that  the  future  will  bring  forth  new  proofs  
about  the  past.  As  with  all  scientific  knowledge,  historical  explanations  are  provisional.  When  I  
conducted  ethnographic  fieldwork  in  some  of  the  areas  where  Sápmi  and  Norway  overlap,  I  found  
that  the  historiography  of  the  Alta-dam  struggle  is  controversial,  and  has  been  so  from  the  very  
beginning.  At  the  municipal  archive  in  Tromsø  (Romsa,  Tromssa),  I  found  old  newspaper  articles,  
which  indicate  that  former  members  of  Folkeaksjonen  were  split  in  their  assessments  of  Øystein  
Dalland’s  first  draft  of  a  history  of  the  Alta-dam  conflict.  At  the  Riddu  Riđđu  festival  in  2012,  I  
attended  a  debate  between  veteran  indigenous  rights  activists,  where  some  ČSV  activists  questioned  
the  relative  weight  given  to  Sameaksjonen  and  Folkeaksjonen  in  the  existing  historiography.  
However,  what  I  see  as  the  most  challenging  issue  is  the  persistent  disagreement  as  to  whether  it  
was  legitimate  to  apply  coercive  force  during  the  struggle,  either  regarding  the  use  of  police  force  
against  peaceful  demonstrators,  or  regarding  the  failed  attempt  at  sabotage  of  a  bridge.  This  matter  
is  so  sensitive  that  it  requires  the  utmost  caution  and  care.  Therefore,  I  will  return  to  it  in  the  course  
of  the  theoretical  discussion,  in  Chapter  12. 
 
Positive  findings:  For  this  project,  the  priority  has  not  been  to  contribute  to  the  historiography  of  
the  Alta-dam  conflict.  Nevertheless  it  is  not  insignificant  that  I  have  identified  a  contradiction  in  the  
most  recent  contribution  to  this  theme,  which  is  Hjorthol's  book.  On  one  hand,  his  own  data  clearly  
indicate  that  the  Alta-dam  conflict  was  an  issue  that  split  the  local  population  internally,  and  split  
the  state  apparatus  as  well.  On  the  other  hand,  his  title,  as  well  as  the  overall  dramaturgy  and  tone  
of  his  narrative,  suggests  that  popular  power  rose  up  against  the  state.  There  is  a  gap  between  his  
empirical  material,  which  he  has  taken  from  archives  and  interviews,  and  his  explanatory  model,  
which  seems  to  be  inspired  by  the  ideology  of  his  own  political  party,  AKP  (ml).  Therefore,  in  his  
description,  there  is  a  dialectical  opposition  between  data  and  theory;;  between  reality  and  utopia.639  
This  tension  became  clear  through  my  own  research.  Firstly,  but  least  importantly,  I  chose  to  use  
other  explanatory  models.  These  are  informed  by  empirically-based  social  movement  research,  
instead  of  his  party  ideology.  Last,  but  not  least,  my  alternative  explanatory  models  led  me  to  search  
for  additional  information  from  alternative  primary  sources.  I  mostly  built  on  data  that  had  been  
                                                 
639  In  the  description  by  Hjorthol  (2006),  one  can  observe  a  dialectical  tension  between  data  and  theory;;  between  reality  
and  utopia.  That  kind  of  contradiction  is  like  cycling  on  water,  if  we  are  to  believe  Dag  Solstad,  another  writer  from  
the  AKP  (ml)  party.  Hjorthol’s  argument,  thus,  cycles  on  water. 
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accumulated  through  the  existing  historiography,  from  Dalland  to  Hjorthol.640  Both  made  valuable  
contributions  to  documenting  the  political  history  of  the  Alta-dam  struggle.  But  time  may  be  ripe  to  
inquire  into  its  social  and  cultural  history  as  well.  I  used  some  ethnographic  studies  that  were  
conducted  around  the  time  of  the  Alta-dam  struggle,  and  also,  some  of  the  most  important  
documents  relating  to  the  Supreme  Court  judgment.  The  ethnographic  studies  provide  historical  
snap-shots  of  some  social-ecological  conditions  at  some  local  sites  at  that  time.641  Thus,  they  
provide  thicker  information  about  the  local  subaltern  groups  that  provided  the  social  basis  of  both  
political  blocs.  Those  studies  add  some  data  concerning  the  anthropological  history  of  the  Alta-dam  
conflict.  One  of  these  studies  was  used  as  proof  during  the  Supreme  Court  decision  in  1982.  I  also  
analyzed  this  study  discursively,  together  with  the  text  of  Supreme  Court  judgement,  and  some  
political  writings  from  that  time.642  Such  sources  provide  information  about  the  history  of  ideas.  
The  few  primary  sources  I  have  added  to  the  existing  historiography  merely  constitute  a  first  step  
towards  a  social  and  cultural  history  of  the  Alta-dam  struggle.  Most  of  that  wider  history  remains  
unknown.  However,  the  added  data  may  be  used  to  provide  a  somewhat  more  realistic  description  
of  the  actual  cleavages,  coalitions  and  dynamics  of  contention  during  the  Alta-dam  conflict. 
  
                                                 
640  Dalland  1994;;  Hjorthol  2006 
641 Horgen & Norddølum 1978: 181-188;   Bjørklund  &  Brantenborg  1981 
642  Norwegian  Supreme  Court  1982;;  Næss 1974; Damman 1975; plus one manuscript found in the library and archive of 
the Sámi collection at the Norwegian Folk Museum, summer 2009: Tromsø Sámi Association 1986: The First 
Nations. Report from Indigenous Days 1984. Tromsø: Keviselie Publisher. See especially the rhetoric in: Jernsletten 
1986: "The role of the indigenous people in the world?" 
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7.1.0  Introduction  to  second  part  of  Case  I 
 
The  previous  chapter  traced  alliances,  coalitions,  networks,  emerging  political  blocs,  and  eventually  
a  struggle  for  political  hegemony:  the  capacity  to  set  the  agenda  for  policy  and  research  within  the  
process  of  state  formation.  However,  such  terms  were  hardly  mentioned  in  the  chapter.  They  were  
implicitly  applied,  to  search  for  sources,  sort  the  data,  and  structure  the  presentation,  as  is  the  habit  
of  social  historians.643  History  is  descriptive.  Sociology  is  more  analytical.  In  the  present  chapter,  
the  focus  shifts  to  an  explicit  usage  of  the  analytical  terms.  General  terms  will  no  longer  be  used  to  
observe  particular  facts.  Now,  particular  facts  will  be  used  to  suggest  the  development  of  the  
general  terms.  Thus  I  turn  from  social  history  to  historical  sociology.644 
 What  interests  me  in  this  case  study  is  a  moment  in  history  where  a  hegemonic  coalition  of  
old  social  movements  was  challenged  by  another  coalition  of  emerging  new  social  movements.  
How  was  hegemony  produced,  re-constructed  and  un-screwed?  How  did  this  happen  in  one  
particular  environment,  bounded  in  space  and  time,  where  the  nationalist  and  labor  movements  had  
established  themselves,  and  the  environmental  and  indigenous  movements  emerged?  I  trace  the  co-
evolution  of  two  opposing  social  movement  coalitions;;  one  the  pro-dam  coalition,  which  had  just  
managed  to  establish  hegemonic  control  over  land  and  water;;  the  other,  the  anti-dam  coalition,  
which  was  already  pushing  for  transformation  of  that  hegemony.  Thus,  I  study  the  dynamics  of  
contention  as  an  ongoing,  constitutional  process,  a  struggle  for  the  capacity  to  set  the  agenda  for  
policy  and  research.  The  international  literature  on  the  Alta-controversy  claims  that  it  led  to  
fundamental  reforms  being  implemented,  including:  (a)  “improved  environmental  regulations”,  and  
(b)  “the  first  parliament  for  the  Sami  ethnic  minority”.645  In  fact,  those  innovations  did  not  appear  
out  of  nowhere.  For  example,  the  Norwegian  state  already  had  a  bureaucracy  for  natural  resources  
management,646  and  the  Sámi  already  had  a  sort  of  parliament  on  the  Finnish  side.  However,  the  
Alta-dam  struggle  was  a  nonlinear  break  in  the  further  development  of  those  institutions.  In  the  
management  of  natural  heritage,  there  would  be  a  shift  from  nature  preservation  to  ecological  
                                                 
643  Burke  1993 
644  Tilly  1978  (His  point  about  theory  and  history  is  written  in  opposition  to  Burke  1993.  However,  in  my  opinion  there  
is  no  hierarchy  what  so  ever  between  sociological  theorizing  and  historical  description,  they  are  rather  
complimentar.y) 
645  Khagram  2004:  179;;  Dalland  1997  in  Usher  1997 
646  Asdal  2011 
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systems  thinking.  In  the  management  of  cultural  heritage  there  would  be  a  shift  from  cultural  
essentialism  to  indigenous  human  rights.  The  Alta-dam  struggle  was  one  particular  and  local  
component  of  a  wide  trans-national  transformation.  The  constitutional  process  at  state  level  co-
evolved  with  a  constitutional  process  at  international  level,  which  would  lead  to  new  treaties  such  as  
the  ICCPR/ICESCR  and  the  NASCO.  Socio-ecological  transformation  on  multiple  scales  and  
temporalities  would  produce  the  changes  (a)  and  (b)  mentioned  above.  Nonetheless,  the  Alta-dam  
conflict  was  one  particularly  “eventful”,  or  distinctive  or  spectacular,  component  in  this  wide  
constitutional  process. 
 I  will  now  attempt  to  unpack  this  particularly  eventful  moment  in  history,  by  identifying  
how  resource  mobilization  and  collective  framing  led  to  the  emergence  of  collective  actors;;647  and  
how  those  collective  actors  constituted  socio-material  networks  with  wide  scope  and  high  density;;  
seized  socio-material  nodes  of  power  within  the  already  constituted  political  entity;;648  and  
eventually,  how  they  congregated  into  wide  historical  blocs  that  competed  to  re-define  the  political  
hegemony:649  in  other  words:  influencing  state  transformation.  If  the  social-historical  description  in  
the  previous  chapter  were  correct,  then  it  would  be  possible  to  conduct  a  correct  historical-
sociological  analysis  as  well.  However,  as  I  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter:  all  history  is  
contemporary  history,  and  is  therefore  provisional.  There  is  no  such  thing  as  “the  history”  of  the  
Alta-dam  conflict;;  only  “a  history”  is  possible.  Historical  sociology  must  therefore  avoid  
deterministic  misreadings  of  historical  data.650  The  historical  description  in  the  previous  chapter,  as  
well  as  the  entire  historiography  of  the  Alta-dam  struggle,  has  merely  traced  some  of  the  particular  
links  within  the  immense  web  of  causation  that  is  the  real  historical  process.  For  example,  I  have  
not  traced  many  of  the  actual  exogenous  causal  links  between  different  struggles,  not  in  the  
transnational  scene,  and  not  even  within  Sápmi  or  Norway.  For  this  reason,  qualitative  historical  
sociology  is  no  less  model  dependent  than  quantitative  causal  analysis.  The  former  is  possibilistic,  
the  latter  probabilistic,  and  neither  should  be  misinterpreted  in  any  deterministic  way.  Thus,  what  I  
do  in  this  chapter  is  to  develop  hypotheses,  or  abductions.  Those  may  be  further  developed  or  tested  
in  further  studies,  with  either  qualitative  or  quantitative  designs. 
 
 
                                                 
647  Della  Porta  and  Piazza  2008;;  Staggenborg  2002 
648  Latour  2004 
649  Laclau  and  Mouffe  2001  (1985) 
650  Rueschemeyer  2003 
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7.2.0  Political  sociology 
 
7.2.1  Diagnosis:  the  struggle  to  control  definitional  power 
The  Alta-controversy  was  an  issue  of  saying  yes  or  no  to  a  dam,  as  the  wording  of  the  Supreme  
Court  decision  repeatedly  reminds  us.  Still,  it  had  become  something  more.  The  chronicler  Hjorthol  
emphasizes  that  increasingly,  constitutional  principles  were  at  stake.  Throgh  the  push  and  pull  for  
transformation  and  conservation  of  the  hegemonic  control  of  a  waterway,  the  conflict  really  became  
one  about  constituent  power.  The  ruling  bloc,  dominated  by  former  syndicalist  revolutionaries,  who  
had  turned  into  nationalist  modernizers,  feared  that  the  opposition  were  heading  for  a  separatist  
revolution.  However,  the  tactics  that  the  opposition  chose  to  use  were  of  an  entirely  different  form.  
The  constitutional  strife  was  never  military,  though  some  in  the  ruling  coalition  had  tried  to  
militarise  it.  It  was  a  struggle  about  definitional  power.  What  was  at  stake  was  the  power  to  define  
what  the  legitimate  constitutional  practices  actually  looked  like,  and  additionally,  the  power  to  
define  what  actually  constituted  epistemologically  valid  knowledge.  In  one  sense,  both  blocs  were  
counter-revolutionaries:  The  ruling  bloc  defended  their  project  of  continuous  industrialization  from  
above,  against  those  who  challenged  their  hard-fought  hegemony.  The  opposition  turned  to  the  
judiciary  to  defend  indigenous  rights  and  local  ecosystems,  like  the  French  peasants  had  resisted  the  
Jacobins.  What  had  actually  happened?  How  could  a  local  struggle  about  yes  or  no  to  hydroelectric  
development  suddenly  grow  into  a  constitutional  battle  to  define  the  political  system? 
 In  the  present  chapter  I  will  use  empirical  data  from  the  previous  chapter.  The  previous  
chapter  was  descriptive:  general  sociological  concepts  were  implicitly  applied  in  order  to  serve  a  
specific  historical  description.  The  present  chapter  will  be  analytical:  the  specific  historical  
description  will  now  be  used  for  an  explicit  discussion  of  general  sociological  concepts.  Thus,  I  turn  
from  social  history  to  historical  sociology. 
 Now  I  will  analyze  the  complex  structure  and  dynamics  of  issue  networks,  as  vehicles  of  
constituent  power,  and  of  policy  networks,  as  vehicles  of  constituted  power.  I  will  try  to  dig  into  the  
subaltern  social  basis  of  each  of  the  two  blocs,  and  to  entangle  the  social-liberal  and  social-radical  
social  elites  within  each  of  the  two  blocs.  I  will  try  to  trace  some  of  the  particular  paths  whereby  
geographically  and  socially  dispersed  interests  were  capable  of  taking  collective  action  locally,  to  
build  alliances  with  similar  action  groups  in  other  dispersed  situations,  in  order  to  upscale  their  
scope  of  joint  action,  and  eventually  constitute  “historical  blocs”  with  the  power  to  define  the  actual  
norms  for  policy-making  and  scientific  research  under  the  existing  state. 
 The  causal  links  at  the  micro-sociological  level  will  be  explained  in  terms  of  “issue  network  
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twinning”,  a  concept  that  has  been  rather  well  developed  in  empirical  social  movement  research.651  
With  a  little  help  from  our  friends  ANT  and  SES,  the  emerging  formations  at  macro-sociological  
level  will  be  explained  as  the  effect  of  social  movements  on  an  ongoing  constitutional  process  at  
multiple  levels.652  First,  however,  I  will  have  to  bolster  my  argument  against  suspicions  that  
transformative  movements  actually  constitute  a  presumed  threat  against  public  security.  Therefore  I  
will  begin  by  discussing  the  difference  between  hegemony  of  coercive  force  and  hegemony  of  
social  power.  Thus,  I  seek  to  take  the  bull  directly  by  its  horns.  This  argumentative  move  is  in  fact  a  
tactic  of  social  defense,  to  employ  a  term  originally  coined  by  Gene  Sharp.  This  does  not  imply  that  




7.2.2  Hydrological  hegemony  at  stake  in  the  Alta-contestation 
During  the  Alta-dam  conflict,  both  blocs  had  a  shared  interest  in  the  sustainable  development  of  
some  of  the  areas  where  Norway  and  Sápmi  overlap.  However,  one  bloc  emphasized  sustainability,  
the  other  emphasized  development,  and  additionally,  they  disagreed  on  whether  or  not  the  
Norwegian  state  territory  actually  co-existed  with  any  Sámi  cultural  homeland.  What  social-
ecological  community  should  be  used  to  define  the  natural  common  good:  the  nation-state  
collective,  or  the  suppressed  stateless  nation,  or  the  inhabitants  in  a  bio-regional  biotope,  or  any  
combination  of  the  above?  Competition  betweeen  various  definitions  of  the  “common”  in  the  
“common  good”  was  in  itself  a  common-pool  resource  problem. 
 Chapters  2  and  3  presented  the  tension  between  two  rival  theories  of  how  social  actors  solve  
common  pool  resources  in  the  management  of  natural  resources:  On  the  one  side  is  Elinor  Ostrom's  
“new  theory”,  centered  on  collective  action  and  voluntary  consent.  On  the  other  side,  she  defines  
the  “old  theory”  from  Hobbes  through  Hardin,  centered  on  coercive  action  and  central  command.  
These  correspond  with  two  contemporary  theories  of  water  resources  management,  both  developed  
in  the  troubled  Middle  East.  Fadi  Comair  has  been  a  proponent  of  international  “hydro-diplomacy”  
to  serve  the  solution  of  common  pool  problems  between  Syria  and  Israel.653  This  resembles  
Keohane  and  Ostrom's  hopes  for  multilateral  federating  at  multiple  levels.654  Regional  integration  
under  the  UN  has  not  yet  succeeded.  Mark  Zeitoun  observes  that  international  “hydro-hegemony”  
                                                 
651  Della  Porta  &  Piazza  2008;;  see  also  Staggenborg  2002 
652  Bailey  &  Mattei  2012 
653  Comair  2009 
654  Keohane  &  Ostrom  1995 
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represents  the  de  facto  situation  in  the  region.655  This  theory  has  been  developed  in  a  region  where  
ethno-political  conflicts  are  equally  complex,  but  very  much  more  militarized,  when  compared  to  
Sápmi.  The  Levant  is  not  Sápmi,  and  theoretical  generalizaton  on  the  basis  of  empirical  experiences  
do  not  always  travel  easily  from  one  region  to  the  other.  Military  hegemony  may  be  the  main  focus  
when  I.R.  scholars  use  the  term  “hegemony”.  However,  since  Gramsci,  there  has  been  a  conceptual  
distinction  between  the  hegemony  of  coercive  power,  what  Gramsci  called  state  society,  and  the  
hegemony  of  social  power,  so-called  civil  society.656  This  definition  of  state  society  and  civil  society  
is  open  for  discussion.  The  polity  may  also  be  a  product  of  social  processes,  as  an  explanans,  and  
the  civil  sphere  is  not  always  free  from  internal  coercive  dominance.  Still,  we  may  agree  that  
hegemony  of  social  power  could  and  should  be  kept  analytically  separate  from  hegemony  of  
coercive  force. 
 This  distinction  is  all  the  more  appropriate  when  we  deal  with  an  area  such  as  Sápmi,  where  
there  are  clear-cut  sovereignties  (meaning  monopolies  of  violence)  but  plural  jurisdictions  (meaning  
sources  of  law).  The  distinction  between  hegemony  of  coercive  force  and  hegemony  of  social  power  
is  relevant  when  we  read  Laclau  and  Mouffe.  Leaving  Marxist  orthodoxy  behind,  they  focus  
exclusively  on  civil  society,  and  how  social  movements  take  action  to  transform  hegemonies  of  
social  power  (while  transformation  in  the  hegemonies  of  coercive  power  is  being  kept  constant).  
Such  discursive  conflict  may  be  highly  contentious,  but  may  nevertheless  constitute  an  integral  part  
of  the  deliberation  and  diplomacy  theorized  by  Kehohane  and  Ostrom.  Deliberative  democracy  is  
an  attempt  to  acknowledge  and  overcome  conflicts  of  interests,  not  to  deny  them.  Restorative  justice  
is  not  an  attempt  to  suppress  dissent.  Thus,  we  can  make  sense  of  the  following  statement  from  
Elinor  Ostrom:  “When a winning coalition of users concludes that the expected benefits from 
creating and following their own rules (as well as modifying them over time) exceed the immediate 
and long-term  costs,  they  are  likely  to  reformulate  these  rules.”657 Transformative  movements  
within  the  Western  world  generally  find  themselves  in  a  situation  that  is  not  already  militarized,  and  
thus,  they  have  the  opportunity  to  pursue  transformative  power  without  resorting  to  coercion  or  
domination.  Because  of  the  absence  of  militarization,  they  may  pursue  restorative  justice  without  
having  to  resort  to  new  injustice.  This  does  not  mean  that  transformative  movements  within  the  
West  wage  the  struggle  for  constituent  power  within  the  confinement  of  “civil  society”.  On  the  
contrary,  the  presence  of  non-violent  transformative  movements,  if  effective,  should  lead  the  
political  scientist  to  question  the  distinction  between  state  society  (understood  as  hegemony  of  
                                                 
655  Zeitoun  &  Jeroen  2006 
656  Selby  (undated).  For  discussions  of  the  various  definitions  of  "hegemony",  see  part  3.3.2,  in  particular  the  footnote  
notes  on  Gramsci.  See  also  part  14.3.2,  in  particular  the  footnote  with  reflections  on  non-violence,  and  part  14.4.1,  in  
paticular  the  footnote  with  reflections  on  structural  violence.   
657  Potete,  Janssen  &  Ostrom  2010:  245 
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coercive  force)  and  civil  society  (understood  as  hegemony  of  social  power).  The  point  is  that  state  
(trans)formation  cannot  be  reduced  to  the  history  of  coercive  force,  because  transformations  of  
constituent  norms  and  constituent  knowledge  may  also  have  impact  on  state  (trans)formation.  This  
also  means  that  the  state  is  not  something  external  to  civil  society,  and  consequently,  that  the  state  
can  hardly  become  a  neutral  or  objective  arbiter  between  private  interests.  State  formations  are  
cultural  practices,  with  cultural  biases. 
 In  the  following  section,  I  will  analyze  how  the  Alta-dam  conflict  contributed  to  the  
transformation  of  the  state  in  one  of  the  watersheds  within  the  territory  where  Norway  and  Sápmi  
overlap.  What  I  seek  to  explain  is  the  re-constitution  of  formal  norms  in  the  Norwegian  state  
formation  (Explanandum).  Thus,  the  task  is  not  to  explain  the  parallel  process  whereby  indigenous  
informal  norms  in  Sápmi  continuously  maintained  and  developed  in  Sápmi.  This  other  process  is  
one  of  several  components  of  the  environmental  context  of  what  I  seek  to  explain  (and  thus  part  of  
Explanans  1).  Only  at  the  end  of  the  final  empirical  chapter  will  I  discuss  the  de  facto  co-evolution  
between  Norwegian  state  law  and  Sámi  indigenous  law,  in  spite  of  de  jure  attempts  by  state  builders  
to  deny  and  suppress  the  more  ancient  normative  system.  The  present  chapter,  nearly  without  
exception,  will  only  trace  pathways  of  social  power,  whereby  the  existing  state  was  transformed,  
through  transforming  the  hegemonic  social  power  within  it.  The  social  conflict  transformed  the  
social  constitution  of  the  state.  There  are,  however,  a  very  few  notable  exceptions  that  actualize  the  
issue  of  hegemonic  coercive  force  as  well.  The  most  significant  example  is  the  failed  attempt  from  
some  leaders  of  in  the  pro-dam  coalition  to  mobilize  the  army  against  the  protestors.  However,  the  
most  publically  known  example  is  the  failed  attempt  to  sabotage  a  bridge,  by  an  autonomous  anti-
dam  action  group.  These  are  singular  examples,  but  they  remind  us  that  even  though  it  would  be  
wrong  to  reduce  state  (trans)formation  to  coercive  force,  it  might  also  be  misleading  to  reduce  it  to  
social  power.  A  state  is  not  only  a  virtual monopoly  of  violence;;  it  is  this  as  well  as  an  arrangement  
of  social  power.  Norwegian  state  laws  are,  after  all,  policed  and  defended  with  institutional  violence  
(unlike  Sámi  indigenous  law,  which  is  policed  and  defended  by  social  sanctions  alone).  The  
publically  outspoken  Sámi  organization  NSR  was  clearly  anti-dam,  and  clearly  committed  to  
seeking  constituent  power  by  redefining  the  hegemony  of  social  power.  However,  its  less  outspoken  
sister  organization  SLF  was  pro-dam,  and  very  much  aware  of  the  existing  hegemony  of  coercive  
power  within  the  existing  state  formation.  During  the  Alta-dam  conflict  these  organizations  would  
find  themselves  on  opposide  sides  of  the  cleavage,  but  during  the  epilogue  to  that  drama,  or  its  
aftermath,  they  may  have  become  more  complimentary. 
 I  will  first  analyze  the  structure  of  the  conflict  that  was  described  in  the  previous  chapter.  
Thereafter  I  will  analyze  the  process  of  this  same  conflict.  Finally,  I  will  draw  some  conclusions  
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regarding  how  issue  networks  twinning,  as  a  micro-sociological  explanation,  may  help  us  to  
formulate  a  hypothetical  meso-mechanism  concerning  how  issue  networks  may  succeed  in  
broadening  their  scope  of  action,  and  constituent  the  power  to  re-define  the  form  of  the  constituted  
hegemony.  Thus,  I  will  propose  a  mechanism  that  serves  to  describe  a  social-ecological  pathway  to  
state  transformation. 
 Methodological  note:  For  Laclau  and  Mouffe,  discourses  are  material  praxes,  a  productive  
basis  in  their  own  right,  and  not  merely  a  superstructure  that  reflects  a  basis.658  Similarly,  Latour  
traces  communication  through  socio-material  networks  of  practices.  However,  he  zooms  in  on  the  
heterogeneities  that  might  be  uncovered  within  any  discoursive  formation.  This  attention  to  detail  
and  plurality  prevents  him  from  generalizing  about  any  hegemony.659  Latour  asks  questions  of  
relevance  to  the  practical  purpose  of  destabilising  ideological  prejudices  (of  whatever  form),  while  
Laclau  and  Mouffe  ask  questions  of  relevance  to  the  practical  purpose  of  empowering  (some  form  
of)  counter-hegemony.  Laclau  and  Mouffe  are  critical  of  dominant  ideologies,  while  Latour  is  
critical  of  ideology  per  se.  The  practical  purposes  are  different,  and  consequently,  the  theories  and  




7.3.0  The  stage:  cleavage  structures     
 
7.3.1  Local  human  ecology:  a  subaltern  social  basis  for  two  political  blocs 
Let  us  build  the  sociological  analysis  from  the  ground  up.  We  start  at  a  subaltern  level,  within  the  
affected  region  itself.  To  the  existing  historiography  of  the  Alta-dam  conflict,  I  have  added  a  few  
samples  of  the  local  human  ecology,  by  adding  some  historical  ethnographic  studies  to  the  other  
sources  that  had  been  taken  into  account  in  the  earlier  historiography.660  Thus,  I  have  found  rather  
clear  indicators  of  a  cleavage  structure  that  was  quite  different  from  how  it  is  being  presented  in  the  
existing  historiography.661 
 Before  the  Alta-dam  conflict  became  a  public  contention,  one  bloc  had  already  taken  
discrete  action  to  further  a  contentious  industrial  development  program.  The  ruling  bloc  had  already  
                                                 
658  Laclau  &  Mouffe  2001  (1985):  109 
659  Latour  2004 
660 Ethnography on downstream Alta area: Horgen & Norddølum 1987; Ethnography on reindeer nomadism along the 
entire Alta river: Bjørklund  &  Brantenborg  1981 
661  The  existing  historiography  is  constituted  by  the  works  by  Dalland  1994  and  Hjorthol  2006. 
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seized  control  over  the  state  apparatus  and  used  it  to  push  for  an  industrial  vision  of  modernization.  
This  ruling  bloc  I  call  “activists  for  the  activist  state”:  combining  more  or  less  liberal  nationalism,  
with  more  or  less  moderate  syndicalism,  they  had  reached  internal  agreement  on  the  virtue  of  
national  economic  growth.  They  consolidated  their  hegemony  by  pushing  for  a  fully  centralized  
activist  network,  with  a  state-centred  monopoly  of  legitimate  political  activities  in  a  given  territory.  
The  opposition  bloc  was  composed  of  various  new  social  movements,  which  channelled  demands  
for  environmental  protection  and  indigenous  rights.  They  were  close  to  social  liberal  parties  and  the  
new  left,  and  pushed  for  more  pluralism,  decentralization  and  grass  roots  democracy.  Both  sides  
included  both  socialists  and  liberals.  Both  sides  included  both  social  elites  and  subaltern  classes.  
This  unique  cleavage  structure  may  be  the  most  interesting  empirical  contribution  of  my  historical  
description  (see  Chapter  6).  The  actual  empirical  data  indicates  that  it  was  slightly  misleading  when  
Hjorthol  framed  the  conflict  as  one  between  the  state  and  the  people.  It  clearly  was  not.  On  the  
contrary,  the  conflict  produced  a  cleavage  within  the  state  apparatus,  as  well  as  a  split  within  the  
local  population.  Hjorthol  had  actually  found  good  data  on  the  internal  political  struggle  within  the  
government  and  the  governing  party.  I  have  supplemented  this  with  some  sources  regarding  
intellectual  history  and  historical  anthropology.  The  ethnographical  sources  improve  our  
understanding  concerning  the  subaltern  social  basis.  Hjorthol  tells  us  that  the  popular  support  for  
the  planned  dam  was  particularly  strong  in  Tverrdalen.  This  was  a  local  community  to  the  eastern  
side  of  the  Alta  fjord,  around  a  small  tributary  river  to  the  main  Alta  River.  The  ethnographers  
Horgen  and  Nordøllum  described  this  area  in  the  1970s.  Tverrdalen  was  culturally  Norwegian,  
mainly  inhabited  by  descendants  of  poor  settlers  from  Østerdalen  in  Southern  Norway.  Tile  mining  
was  the  main  source  of  income  for  the  community,  and  this  trade  was  in  the  hands  of  local  
cooperatives.  The  industry  was  controlled  by  the  workers  themselves.  The  community  had  a  history  
of  radical  left-wing  syndicalist  activism,  but  had  a  strong  loyalty  to  the  Norwegian  Labor  Party,  and  
had  followed  the  party  into  its  social  contract  with  the  national  capitalist  class.  They  were  generally  
in  favor  of  industrial  development  for  the  region.  Their  valley  was  next  to  the  chosen  path  for  the  
construction  road,  which  had  to  be  built  in  order  to  actualize  hydropower  development.  This  road  
came  in  conflict  with  migrating  reindeer  husbandry,  a  trade  that  gave  work  to  subaltern  herders,  but  
one  that  was  controlled  by  prosperous  reindeer  owners.  The  anthropologists  Bjørklund  and  
Brantenborg  knew  the  human  ecology  of  the  local  reindeer  husbandry,  and  were  hired  by  the  
reindeer  owner's  association  (NRF)  to  testify  in  court.  When  taken  together,  the  two  ethnographic  
studies  indicate  that  there  was  a  conflict  of  interest  between  subaltern  reindeer  herders,  who  were  
dependent  upon  the  reindeer  owners,  and  subaltern  tile  workers,  who  were  dependent  upon  the  party  
bosses.   
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It  is  not  unusual  that  poor  settler  communities  become  useful  instruments  for  political  elites  
that  colonize  the  lands  of  indigenous  peoples.  That  happened  with  Scandinavian  and  even  Sámi  
peasants  who  migrated  to  the  so-called  “Wild  West”,  and  it  happens  with  Russian  Jews  in  modern  
day  Palestine.  It  would  have  been  interesting  to  research  if  there  was  any  connection  between  labor  
militancy  in  Tverrdalen  and  the  pro-dam  action  group  Borgervernet.  When  the  construction  road  
became  occupied  by  so-called  “frikere”  from  the  urban  middle  class  and  so-called  “fjellfinna”  from  
Inner  Sápmi,  and  the  local  sheriff  (lensmann)  allowed  it  to  happen,  the  inhabitants  in  Tverrdalen  
would  have  been  the  geographically  closest  to  react.  This  question  has  not  been  researched  yet.   
The  polarization  between  subaltern  tile  workers  and  subaltern  reindeer  herders  becomes  
even  more  interesting,  and  more  nuanced,  when  we  also  introduce  the  Coastal  Sámi  population  into  
the  equation.  There  were  fisher-peasants  in  Alta  Fjord,  just  as  there  were  along  other  parts  of  the  
Barents  Coast,  but  they  were  superficially  assimilated  into  Norwegian  standardized  national  culture.  
Three  generations  earlier,  in  1900,  the  registered  number  of  Sámi  citizens  in  Alta  municipality  had  
been  10  %.662  However,  at  the  beginning  of  the  Alta-dam  conflict,  in  1970,  the  registered  number  
was  only  1.9  %.663  Thus,  the  downstream  municipality  seemed  to  have  become  almost  totally  
assimilated,  even  though  the  upstream  municipality  is  the  most  purely  Sámi  of  all  municipalities  in  
the  entire  Sápmi.  The  local  fisher-peasants  in  the  Alta  Fjord  were  not  particularly  active  when  
Samenes  Landsforbund  (SLF)  was  created.  However,  the  pattern  that  Coastal  Sámi  tended  to  be  in  
favor  of  the  dam  and  loyal  to  the  Labor  Party,  corresponds  with  the  pattern  in  the  Alta  Fjord.  
Gradually,  more  people  along  the  Alta  Fjord  would  also  start  to  identify  with  their  own  Sámi  
ethnicity,  rather  than  the  superficially  standardized  national  culture.  In  2005,  when  the  Sámi  
Parliament  became  established,  SLF  was  against  it,  because  they  did  not  frame  it  as  representing  
any  real  progress  for  the  minority-within-the-minority.  Nonetheless,  as  many  as  6  %  of  the  citizens  
in  Alta  municipality  chose  to  register  as  voters  for  the  Sámi  Parliament.664  That  is  a  rather  striking  
difference  from  the  1.9  %  registered  Sámi  at  the  beginning  of  the  Alta-dam  conflict.  When  that  
many  cared  to  register,  in  spite  of  the  policy  of  SLF,  it  indicates  that  the  part  of  the  population  with  
an  ambiguous  ethnic  and  cultural  sense  of  belonging  was  considerably  larger  than  the  number  of  
registered  Sámi  in  1970.  In  sum,  we  can  clearly  conclude  that  the  subaltern  social  basis  of  the  pro-
dam  bloc  included  at  least  two  especially  interesting  social  groups:  ethnically  Norwegian  tile  
workers  in  Tverrdalen,  and  ethncially  Coastal  Sámi  fisher-peasants  along  Alta  Fjord  and  other  parts  
of  the  Barents  Coast.  This  conclusion  is  based  on  data  on  the  subaltern  social  strata  in  Alta  
municipality,  the  downstream  area  of  the  Alta-Kaunokeino  River.  I  have  not  examined  the  data  
                                                 
662  Eiþorsson  2008:  Chpt.  1  (see  in  particular  Tables  1  and  2  at  pp.  21  and  23) 
663  Eiþorsson  2008,  ibidem 
664  ibidem 
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concerning  social  strata  in  the  Kautokeino  municipality,  in  the  upstream  parts  of  the  river.  The  local  
community  Mázi  and  the  larger  village  Kautokeino  housed  the  homes  of  many  subaltern  
subsistence  practitioners.  The  salmon  resources  in  the  Alta-Kautokeino  River,  unlike  those  in  the  
Deatnu  River,  had  become  largely  capitalized,  with  British  lords  and  the  local  tourist  industry  
controlling  much  of  the  fishing  rights.  However,  many  local  people  still  fished  for  subsistence,  and  
many  had  income  from  tourism.  These  practices  may  be  seen  as  modern  adaptations  of  ancient  
Sámi  subsistence  practices.  Firstly,  the  local  people  along  the  Alta-Kautokeino  had  once  been  part  
of  a  vibrant  River  Sámi  culture,  similar  to  the  one  that  still  exists  in  Deatnu  River.665  Secondly,  most  
local  people  in  Sápmi  previously  combined  angling,  hunting  and  gathering,  and  these  are  practices  
where  ancient  customs  and  traditional  knowledge  have  been  maintained  and  developed  in  Sápmi.  
Thirdly,  their  income  from  nature  tourism  may  be  seen  as  one  of  several  traditional  livelihood  
adaptations  in  the  economically  diverse  subsistence  economy  of  Sápmi.  This  view  was  presented  to  
me  by  some  local  Sámi  in  Utsjoki  along  the  Deatnu  River,  though  their  version  of  oral  history  may  
be  controversial.666  Fourthly,  the  reindeer  herders  that  were  employed  by  the  reindeer  owners  were  
a  subaltern  group  who  were  dependent  on  sustainable  reindeer  husbandry.  The  fourth  point  has  
nothing  to  do  with  sustainable  fisheries.  However,  the  construction  process  disturbed  the  annual  
migrations  of  reindeer  nomads  in  such  a  way  as  it  was  seen  as  a  threat  to  sustainable  husbandry.  
These  four  points  are  merely  indications  about  the  possible  structure  of  subaltern  groups  in  
upstream  areas. 
 
Table  7-1:  The  social  composition  of  the  two  blocs 
 Pro-dam  bloc Anti-dam  bloc 
Elite  segment Industrial  owners,  syndical  bosses 
Technocratic  elite 
Labor  Party,  Conservative  Party 
British  lords,  reindeer  owners 
Academic  elite,  media  elite 
The  centrist  parties,  the  new  left  parties 
Subaltern  segment Tile  workers  in  Tverrdalen  (Norwegian) 
Fisher-peasants  (Coastal  Sámi) 
Subsistence  practitioners  (River  Sámi) 
Reindeer  herders  (Mountain  Sámi) 
 
 The  data  are  unambiguous  about  the  fact  that  the  pro-dam  coalition  was  not  only  composed  
of  elites,  and  that  the  anti-dam  coalition  not  only  consisted  of  local  subalterns.  On  the  contrary,  
some  local  subaltern  groups  provided  a  social  basis  for  the  pro-dam  bloc,  while  some  elites  
provided  economic  and  political  capital  for  the  anti-dam  bloc  (see  Table  7.1).  The  pro-dam  bloc  
included  industrial  owners,  trade  union  centralists,  and  technocrats.  But  it  also  included  local  
Coastal  Sámis  affiliated  to  the  SLF,  and  local  tile  workers  in  syndicalist  cooperatives,  who  were  
                                                 
665  Solbakk  2007a 
666  Interview  with  Tapiola,  Aslak,  interpreted  by  Katja  Tapiola,  Utsjoki,  6th  February  2011   
 237  
 
descendants  of  ethnically  Norwegian  settlers  from  Østerdalen.  The  anti-dam  bloc  included  local  
outfield  practitioners  and  reindeer  herders,  but  it  also  included  politicians,  judges,  academics,  
prosperous  reindeer  owners,  and  rich  British  lords  who  owned  angling  rights  along  the  river. 
 
 
7.3.2  Agonistic  issue  networks:  liberal  and  radical  issue  nets  in  both  blocs 
Let  us  now  dissect  the  social  composition  of  the  two  agonistic  issue  networks.  The  two  issue  
networks  competed  against  each  in  a  social  conflict.  This  relation  is  agonistic,  implying  competition  
combined  with  recognition  of  the  right  to  compete  for  both  parties.667  On  the  one  hand,  I  will  
unpack  the  agonistic  organizational  networks  of  the  two  blocs  (Table  7.2).  On  the  other  hand,  I  will  
also  unpack  the  agonistic  political  issues  of  the  same  two  blocs  (Table  7.3).  Thus,  we  will  deal  with  
two  central  topics  of  empirically  based  social  movement  theory:  networks,  or  resource  mobilization;;  
and  issues,  or  framing  processes;;  in  sum:  issue  networks. 
 
Table  7-2:  Agonistic  organizational  networks:  organizations  (NGOs)  and  networks  (SMOs)  in  two  blocs 
 Pro-dam  block Anti-dam  block 
Social-liberal  segment Conservative  party 
Confed.  of  Norw.  Enterprise  (NHO) 
Committee  for  Work  and  Order 
Centrist  parties  (V,  KrF,  SP) 
Altautvalget 
Folkeaksjonen  (locally) 
Friends  of  the  Earth  (NNF) 
Deep  ecology  movement 
Reindeer  owner  org.  (NRF) 
Social-radical  segment Labor  party 
Norw.  Fed.  of  Trade  Unions  (LO) 
Samenes  landsforbund  (SLF) 
Borgervernet 
New  left  parties  (SF,  AKP) 
Future  in  our  Hands  (FIVH) 
Folkeaksjonen  (nationally) 
Sameaksjonen  /  ČSV  movement 
Indigenous  rights  org.  (IWGIA) 
Nors.  Samers  Riksforbund  (NSR) 
N.  Somby’s  independent  action  cell 
 
 Within  the  Alta-Kautokeino  watershed,  there  was  one  conflict  line  between  divergent  social-
liberal  interests,  and  another  conflict  line  between  divergent  social-radical  interests.  When  I  use  the  
terms  liberal-radical,  then  it  is  in  accordance  with  the  Pre-Marxist  political  spectrum.  Around  the  
tome  of  the  1848-revolutions,  radicals  wanted  freedom,  equality  and  brotherhood  during  their  own  
life  span,  while  liberals  preferred  a  gradual  path  to  the  same  goal.  Conservatives  were  skeptical,  
while  the  reactionaries  turned  to  an  imagined  past.  Radicalism  was  radically  democratic,  liberalism  
only  moderately  so.  Henrik  Ibsen  was  a  classical  radical,  and  proud  of  it.  This  Pre-Marxist  right-left  
                                                 
667  This  way  of  using  the  terms  agonistic  and  antagonistic  is  in  line  with  Laclau  Mouffe  (2013).  Her  “agonistic  
pluralism”  is  a  theory  of  democracy  that  emphasizes  tolerance  of  conflict. 
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spectrum  may  perhaps  also  fit  the  new  social  movements  during  the  Alta-dam  conflict. 
 During  the  Alta-dam  conflict,  both  blocs  contained  both  elites  and  subalterns,  and  both  
blocks  also  contained  both  liberals  and  radicals. 
 
Table  7-3:  Agonistic  political  issues  –  framings  and  discourses  in  the  two  blocs 
 Pro-dam  bloc Anti-dam  bloc 
Social-liberal  segment Industrial  development 
-  national  economic  growth 
-  internat.  competition,  red  scare 
Sustainable  development 
-  sustainable  angling  &  tourism 
-  sustainable  reindeer  husbandry 
Social-radical  segment Socio-economic  development 
-  jobs  for  all,  fighting  poverty 
-  give  to  the  poor 
-  avoid  stealing  from  the  rich 
Social-ecological  balance 
-  grass  roots  democracy 
-  indigenous  human  rights 
-  anti-colonialism  /  decentralization 
 
 Among  the  social-liberals,  there  was  a  cleavage  between  different  trades.  On  the  pro-dam  
side  was  the  aluminium  industry,  which  required  huge  amounts  of  electric  power  in  order  to  grow.  
On  the  anti-dam  side  weere  the  local  tourist  industry  and  the  local  primary  sector,  both  of  which  
having  a  shared  interest  in  sustainable  river  fisheries,  and  the  latter  also  in  sustainable  reindeer  
husbandry  (Table  7.2).  Those  different  economic  interests  were  affiliated  with  different  political  
parties.  The  industrialists  were  backed  by  the  Conservative  Party.  It  was,  in  principle,  more  market  
liberalist  than  social  liberalist.  However,  with  the  corporatist  social  contract,  it  had  taken  over  much  
of  the  liberal-nationalist  patriotism  that  had  formerly  belonged  to  the  Liberal  Party.  The  latter  party,  
together  with  the  agrarian  Centre  Party  and  the  evangelist  Christian  People's  Party,  constituted  what  
is  often  defined  as  the  “centre”  in  Norwegian  politics,  though  this  is  a  distinct  political  tendency,  
neither  socialist,  nor  capitalist.668  It  is  historically  close  to  agrarian  interests,  and  centre-periphery  
struggles.  These  so-called  “centrist”  parties  supported  the  local  tourist  industry  and  primary  sectors,  
with  their  demands  for  sustainable  river  fisheries  and  sustainable  reindeer  husbandry.  Prosperous  
reindeer  owners  at  that  time  were  less  affiliated  with  the  Conservative  Party  than  today,  following  
recent  reforms  of  the  state,  as  well  as  structural  adjustments  of  their  trade.  The  “centrist”  parties  had  
been  close  to  the  agrarian  interests  and  the  peripheries,  but  the  Liberal  Party  also  had  an  urban  
tendency,  and  this  had  been  in  favour  of  nature  preservation  on  aesthetic  grounds.  This  issue  
mutated  during  the  1960s,  with  increased  knowledge  about  ecology.  During  this  decade,  the  Friends  
of  the  Earth  (NNF)  established  a  branch  in  Norway.  Arne  Næss  and  Sigmund  Kvaløy  started  to  
develop  “deep  ecology”.  The  environmental  movement  remained  largely  liberal.  This  was  also  the  
case  for  the  non-violent  direct  action  repertoires  that  had  been  developed  in  the  actions  against  
hydropower  development  in  Mørdalen:  By  suing  the  state,  the  activists  aimed  at  testing  the  legality  
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of  the  planning  procedures,  and  in  the  meantime,  they  bloced  the  becginning  of  construction  with  
civil  disobedience.  The  justification  for  civil  disobedience  was  the  value  of  the  rule  of  law.  This  
eco-political  movement  had  a  historical  affiliation  with  the  social-liberal  centre  parties,  through  
shared  framings  and  issue  nets  (Table  7.3).  This  social-liberal  tendency  was  clearly  distinct  from  the  
other  one.  The  industrial  owners  and  the  Conservative  Party  had  developed  a  hegemonic  bloc  with  
the  Labor  Party,  starting  with  the  first  tripartite  agreement  in  1936,  and  deepening  when  the  Labor  
government  had  been  exiled  in  London  from  1940  to  1945.  For  the  Conservative  Party,  it  was  less  
important  to  conserve  natural  and  cultural  heritage,  than  to  secure  profit  and  to  bolster  against  the  
red  scare  next  door.  Industrial  development  was  the  main  issue  for  liberal  issue  nets  in  the  pro-dam  
bloc.  Sustainable  development  was  the  main  issue  for  the  liberal  issue  nets  in  the  anti-dam  bloc. 
 Among  the  social-radicals,  there  was  another  cleavage,  and  this  may  be  more  interesting  
from  a  pro-poor  perspective.  When  Borgervernet  and  Folkeaksjonen  clashed,  they  both  expressed  
radical  demands  from  subaltern  interests,  which  were  split  over  the  issue  of  hydroelectric  
development.  On  the  one  side  were  militant  syndicalist  activists,  defending  industrialization,  to  
advance  their  demands  for  social  development.  On  the  other  side  were  disobedient  indigenous  
rights  activists,  who  resisted  industrialization,  to  defend  environmental  justice.  Those  antagonistic  
SMOs  channeled  the  radical  energy  of  different  subaltern  interests:  on  the  one  side,  that  of  tile  
mining  workers,  comfortable  with  the  policy  and  ethnicity  of  the  Norwegian  nation-state,  on  the  
other  side,  that  of  reindeer  herders,  marginalized  by  the  political  economy  of  the  state,  and  by  the  
semiotic  economy  of  the  nation.  In  the  past,  the  Labor  movement  and  the  Sámi  movement  had  been  
aligned.  Martin  Tranmæl  and  Elsa  Laula  spoke  at  the  same  meeting  in  1917.669  At  that  time,  the  
more  or  less  liberal  nationalists  had  thrown  Europe  into  nationalist  war,  while  the  more  or  less  
libertarian  socialists  were  preparing  for  international  revolution.  However,  in  the  1920s,  the  
revolution  had  degenerated  into  civil  war  in  Finland  and  Spain.  During  that  decade,  the  Norwegian  
Labor  Party  changed  strategy  from  revolutionary  international  syndicalism,  to  parliamentarian  
national  corporatism.670  The  first  tripartite  agreement  in  1936  allowed  the  Norwegian  Labor  Party  to  
form  its  first  stable  government.  At  the  same  time,  the  Sámi  political  organization  on  the  Norwegian  
side  of  Sápmi  collapsed.671  The  party  had  swapped  alliances.  The  new  health  minister  Karl  Evang  
took  over  the  administration  of  eugenic  policies  against  Sámis  and  Kväns.672  The  so-called  “class  
peace”  may  have  been  necessary  in  order  to  accommodate  right-wing  corporatists,  but  the  price  
appears  to  have  been  an  ethnically  based  “class  betrayal”.673  Tranmæl  had  been  a  revolutionary  
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syndicalist.  He  had  embraced  the  inter-national  solidarity  of  the  class,  and  rejected  the  inter-class  
solidarity  of  the  nation.  Thus,  his  choice  of  “political  myth”  had  been  similar  to  that  of  Georges  
Sorel.674  But  others  amongst  Sorel's  followers  had  turned  to  their  teacher's  enemy,  namely  
nationalism,  as  the  more  potent  myth.675  They  had  invented  authoritarian  corporatism,  which  
became  a  “historical  bloc”  during  the  Spanish  and  Finnish  civil  wars.  Recent  research  indicates  that  
such  tendencies  also  challenged  labor  power  at  the  Norwegian  side.676  It  may  very  well  be  that  civil  
war  was  avoided  by  the  invention  of  parliamentarian  corporatism.  A  novel  “political  myth”  was  
invented,  which  enabled  another  “historical  bloc”  to  emerge.  Through  the  first  tripartite  agreement  
in  1936,  the  Norwegian  Labor  Party  swapped  from  revolutionary  syndicalism  to  liberal  nationalism.  
However,  the  Norwegian  liberal  nationalism  was  rather  illiberal  when  it  came  to  explicitly  eugenic  
and  colonialist  administration  of  the  Sámi  and  Sápmi.677  These  policies  were  simply  taken  over  by  
the  first  Norwegian  Labor  Party  government  in  1936.678  With  its  combination  of  racism  and  liberty,  
colonialism  and  democracy,  liberal  nationalism  led  to  opposite  political  outcomes  for  the  in-group  
and  the  out-group.  This  was  the  case  for  Sámis  and  Kväns  under  Scandinavian  states,  as  it  was  for  
Indians  and  Irish  under  Britain.  It  cannot  have  been  easy  for  the  Norwegian  Labor  Party  to  create  a  
fusion  between  liberal  nationalism  and  revolutionary  syndicalism.  It  appears  to  me  that  the  most  
central  significant  in  the  new  “political  myth”  must  have  been  GDP.  By  embracing  intensive  
industrialization,  national  capital  accumulation,  and  international  competition,  it  would  be  possible  
to  combine  private  capitalist  profit  with  public  social  security,  within  the  boundary  of  national(ist)  
solidarity.  Constant  growth  in  GDP  was  necessary  in  order  to  give  to  the  poor  without  taking  from  
the  rich.  Constant  growth  in  GDP  was  a  way  to  combine  the  issue  areas  of  industrial  development  
and  socio-economic  development  (Table  7.3).679  The  struggle  between  authoritarian  corporatism  and  
parliamentarian  corporatism  would  continue  from  1940  until  1945,  when  Norway  was  under  Nazi  
occupation.  In  Finnmark  County,  where  Alta  River  is  located,  Norwegian  and  Sámi  partisans  fought  
together,  under  command  from  Murmansk.  Stalin's  army  chased  Hitler's  forces  away  from  Finnmark  
in  1945.  The  latter  used  the  burnt  soil  tactics  and  post-war  reconstruction  started  with  traditional  
Sámi  turf  huts.  The  distance  to  the  capital  city  was  great,  both  geographically  and  politically.  
Around  the  capital  city,  resistance  had  been  coordinated  from  London,  by  the  exiled  king  and  Labor  
Party  government.680  From  there,  the  far  north  province  was  seen  as  the  “Red  County”.  In  order  to  
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accommodate  it  into  the  Western  Bloc,  a  regional  development  plan  for  Finnmark  was  adapted  in  
the  1950s,  under  the  Marshall  Aid  program.681  The  eugenic  policies  towards  Sámis  and  Kväns  had  
continued  even  after  racism  had  become  discredited  through  association  with  the  Nazis,  but  from  
the  1950s,  the  ethnic  assimilation  policies  would  be  gradually  liberalized.682  However,  in  1951,  the  
Labor  Party  also  enacted  new  laws  that  weakened  the  civil  liberties  of  pro-Soviet  dissidents  
(Beredskapslovene).683  When  the  party  elite  eventually  decided  that  the  state  should  join  NATO,  it  
led  to  a  splinter  in  the  left.  From  the  Labor  Party,  the  Socialist  People's  Party  (SF)  broke  out,  and  
from  SF,  the  Maoist  party  AKP  (ml)  broke  out.  These  parties  became  the  new  left.  The  new  left  
parties  were  hostile  to  both  blocs  of  the  Cold  War.  The  social  radical  opposition  combined  issues  of  
social  justice,  typical  of  the  social  radical  hegemony,  with  issues  about  sustainable  development  and  
de-centralization,  typical  of  the  social-liberal  opposition  (Table  7.3).  This  fusion  of  issue-areas  is  
what  I  have  called  social-ecological  balance.  This  form  of  political  issue,  framing,  or  myth  was  
potent  for  the  purpose  of  mobilization  against  the  myth  of  constant  growth  in  GDP  as  a  goal  in  
itself.  The  Socialist  People's  Party  (SF)  was  also  entangled  with  the  environmental  movement.  It  
was  concerned  about  the  limits  to  growth,  and  was  close  to  the  NGO  called  The  Future  in  Our  
Hands  (FIVH).  Attention  should  be  turned  from  GDP  to  quality  of  life,  and  the  receipe  for  this  was  
growth  for  developing  countries,  but  de-growth  in  industrialized  countries.684  However,  the  Maoist  
party  AKP  (ml)  had  a  clearer  anti-colonial  stance.  They  were  in  favour  of  counter-hegemonic  
strategies,  not  development  aid.  The  strategy  in  Norway  was  to  influence  the  strategies  of  various  
other  social  movements,  such  as  Folkeaksjonen.  While  the  new  left  parties  had  emerged,  the  Sámi  
political  organizations  had  also  re-emerged.  The  struggle  for  rights  and  for  proofs  had  resumed  with  
the  establishment  of  The  Nordic  Sámiráđđi  (regarding  rights)  and  The  Nordic  Sámi  Institute  
(regarding  proofs),  both  with  funds  from  the  Nordic  Council.  The  re-emergence  of  Sámi  
organizations  and  the  emergence  of  the  new  left  coincided  in  time,  and  both  may  be  a  result  of  
increased  pluralism  and  liberty  in  the  1960s.  Both  the  renewed  left  and  the  renewed  Sámi  
organizations  were  in  favour  of  better  conditions  for  subaltern  classes.  Both  succeeded  in  making  
themselves  relevant  for  subaltern  groups  in  the  upstream  parts  of  the  Alta-Kautokeino  river  area.  
However,  they  remained  rather  alienated  from  the  subaltern  classes  in  the  downstream  areas.  The  
subaltern  tile  workers  in  Tverrdalen  and  the  subaltern  fjord  fishers  in  Coastal  Sápmi  would  remain  
loyal  to  the  Labor  Party  and  the  pro-dam  coalition.  Some  militant  local  subalterns  would  organize  
Borgervernet  in  order  to  do  the  job  they  perceived  that  the  local  sheriff  (lensmann)  should  have  
done.  The  more  discrete  Coastal  Sámis  chose  to  establish  Samenes  Landsforbund  (SLF)  in  order  to  
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push  for  rights  within  the  democratic  centralist  framework  of  the  Labor  Party. 
 Summa  summarum,  what  is  the  most  interesting  observation  about  liberal  and  radical  issue  
networks  within  the  two  political  blocs?  I  have  mapped  two  topics  of  general  interest  to  empirically  
based  social  movement  theory:  networks,  or  resource  mobilization;;  and  issues,  or  framing  
processes.  I  have  tried  to  be  nuanced  and  empirical,  but  have  not  pretended  to  be  a  neutral.  I  was  
born  during  the  Alta-dam  conflict,  and  was  raised  within  a  cultural  environment  that  was  generally  
sympathetic  to  the  anti-dam  coalition.  I  have  been  a  member  of  some  of  the  mentioned  
organizations  (SF,  NFF,  FIVH,  LO).  However,  unlike  Hjorthol,  I  have  not  become  an  organic  
intellectual  of  the  Anti-dam  bloc.  Instead,  I  have  chosen  a  postcolonial  standpoint  close  to  the  
Subaltern  Studies  Project.685  I  have  taken  an  interest  in  how  the  new  left  and  the  Sámiráđđi  were  
alienated  from  the  practical  realities  of  some  subaltern  classes  in  downstream  areas.  Similarly,  I  
have  taken  an  interest  in  the  visionary  idealism  of  the  technocrats  in  the  Norwegian  Water  
Resources  and  Energy  Directorate  (NVE).  The  oppositional  anti-dam  bloc  was  in  favour  of  
decentralization  and  pluralism  –  but  failed  to  attract  some  subaltern  classes  that  constituted  the  local  
social  basis  of  the  hegemonic  pro-dam  bloc.  This  is  an  observation  that  is  relevant  for  indigenous  
rights  movements  and  other  environmental  justice  movements. 
 
 
7.3.3  Cleavage  structures:  the  split  subaltern  basis  and  the  divided  elite  networks 
This  analysis  was  built  from  the  ground  up,  by  starting  with  subaltern  interests  in  the  local  social  
ecology  within  the  Alta  watershed  itself.  Thus,  I  found  that  both  blocs  had  a  local  social  basis  
amongst  the  subaltern  classes.  From  there,  I  proceeded  to  dissect  the  social  composition  of  the  two  
blocs.  Within  both  block  I  found  various  elites,  which  I  sorted  in  two  categories:  social-liberal  and  
social-radical  issue  networks.  I  traced  some  of  the  network  formations  within  each  bloc,  and  
suggested  some  hypothetical  generalizations  about  collective  issue  formation.  In  particular,  I  was  
interested  in  how  the  liberal  and  radical  elites  in  both  blocs  failed  to  accommodate  the  subaltern  
social  basis  of  the  agonistic  bloc.  The  ruling  coalition  had  been  composed  of  the  old  social  
movements,  liberal  nationalism  and  radical  syndicalism,  and  this  bloc  seems  to  have  brought  
democratization  for  ethnic  Norwegians,  but  eugenic  administration  of  Sámis  and  Kväns.  Outfield  
users  and  reindeer  herders  in  Inner  Sápmi  remained  suppressed,  and  constituted  a  potential  social  
base  for  mobilization.  The  oppositional  coalition  was  composed  of  new  social  movements:  a  liberal  
pluralism  and  a  radical  “new  left”.  They  addressed  the  tensions  that  had  been  left  unresolved  by  the  
ruling  coalition.  Thus,  they  succeeded  in  gaining  support  from  the  subaltern  social  basis  in  upstream  
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parts  of  the  Alta  watershed.  However,  they  remained  alienated  from  ethnically  Coastal  Sámi  fjord  
fishers  and  ethnically  Norwegian  tile  miners  in  downstream  parts  of  the  Alta  watershed.  Those  
social  groups  remained  dependent  upon  the  ruling  coalition,  and  seem  to  have  been  its  most  ardent  
supporters.   
I  have  now  mapped  the  cleavage  structure,  the  stage,  or  the  socio-material  terrain.  It  has  
been  explained  with  reference  to  earlier  history,  but  the  cleavage  structure  itself  has  been  portrayed  
as  a  static  snapshot,  a  “synchronic”  perspective.  Let  us  now  turn  to  its  internal  dynamics:  how  




7.4.0  The  drama:  constitutional  process 
 
7.4.1  Twinning  issue  nets:  First  Act 
Let  us  now  change  focus  from  structure  to  process.  I  have  mapped  a  static  overview  of  the  stage,  
cleavage  structure  or  socio-material  terrain  (synchronic  perspective).  Now  I  will  trace  its  coming  
into  being,  how  issue  networks  unfolded,  generated  new  networks  and  ties,  and  renewed  old  ones  
(diachronic  perspective).   
Now  I  will  trace:  how  the  two  coalitions  upscaled  their  actions  from  a  local  level,  by  
twinning  networks  (act  1);;  how  they  became  two  agonistic  historical  blocs  within  a  wide  
contentious  constitutional  process  (act  2);;  and  finally,  how  the  dominant  bloc  confirmed  and  
amplified  national  hegemony  (act  3),  while  the  opposition  took  the  struggle  onto  a  global  scale  
(epilogue  or  postlude). 
Act  1  in  the  Alta-contestation  was  provoked  by  a  contentious  act:  the  secret  planning  of  a  
hydroelectric  development  project,  which  was  well  known  to  be  a  controversial  issue.  This  was  
already  a  contentious  political  action,  and  the  planning  had  been  initiated  in  1968,  by  visionary  
technocrats  in  the  ruling  political  bloc.  When  the  plan  leaked  out  in  1970,  it  immediately  provoked  
organized  political  resistance  in  the  affected  communities.  Local  issue  networks  were  formed.  
Through  joint  action  within  and  beyond  the  watershed,  they  would  twin  the  issue  nets,  and  upscale  
the  scope  of  action.   
(i)  The  river  itself  made  a  potential  community  of  fate,  but  the  tactical  framings  chosen  by  
Folkeaksjonen  facilitated  the  actualization  of  such  a  community:  a  faith-community-of-fate.  When  
the  plan  leaked  accidentally  in  1970,  it  provoked  the  formation  of  a  series  of  locally  based  SMOs.  
The  plans  to  divert  the  flow  would  affect  the  habitat  of  all  local  communities  in  the  Alta-Kautokeino  
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watershed.  The  commission  for  the  protection  of  Máze  voiced  upstream  interests,  related  to  reindeer  
husbandry  and  the  relevance  of  Sámi  customary  law.  Altauvalget  mainly  voiced  downstream  
interests,  related  to  sustainable  salmon  fishing.  Folkeaksjonen  voiced  both  kinds  of  interests:  
Locally,  they  emphasized  downstream  interests,  because  indigenous  rights  were  seen  as  a  
potentially  divisive  issue  among  the  local  population.  Nationally,  they  emphasized  upstream  
interests,  because  indigenous  people  were  perceived  as  exotic  by  capital  city  folks.  The  river  itself  
had  facilitated  the  first  instance  of  twinning  of  issue  nets  from  across  geographically  dispersed  
networks.   
(ii)  The  second  instance  of  issue  net  twinning  went  beyond  the  local  community.  
Environmental  activists  in  Altautvalget  recruited  Friends  of  the  Earth  Norway  (NNF),  with  its  head  
quarters  in  Oslo.  They  had  contacts  in  the  offices  of  the  Ministry  of  the  Environment.  They  also  
recruited  transnational  contacts,  including  a  salmon  zoologist  in  Scotland.  With  the  environmental  
movement,  a  whole  epistemic  community  was  mobilized,  both  transnationally  and  nationally.   
(iii)  However,  the  third  and  massive  popular  mobilization  was  done  by  Folkeaksjonen.  This  
organization  was  unconventional  by  seeking  a  national  scope  for  its  activities,  but  with  their  head  
quarters  established  within  the  affected  province,  and  not  in  the  capital  city.  After  having  
demonstrated  some  success,  they  organised  a  large  counter-culture  festival  at  the  site.  The  deep  
ecologists  and  civil  disobedience  veterans  from  Mardøla  action  were  there,  and  courses  were  given  
in  militant  non-violent  techniques.  Radical  human  rights  activists  from  various  places  in  Sápmi  
attended.  Activists  with  experience  from  indigenous  activism  in  Greenland  and  North  America  
came  too,  met  with  others,  and  formed  Sameaksjonen.  The  festival  created  a  temporary  centre  in  the  
periphery,  a  node  of  empowerment,  where  local  subalterns  and  fishing  rights  owners  bonded  with  
new  social  movements  and  counter-culture  freaks.  It  was  like  a  big  jazz  jam:  all  participants  
omprovised  around  a  shared  theme,  and  new  structures  emerged.  From  this  cultural  festival  new  
networks  and  new  repertoires  were  generated.   
(iv)  The  fourth,  and  perhaps  the  most  spectacular  instance  of  network  twinning  was  when  
Sameaksjonen  began  its  hunger  strike.  While  Folkeaksjonen  had  been  unconventional  in  bringing  
the  urban  middle  class  to  the  affected  site,  Sameaksjonen  was  unconventional  in  bringing  affected  
groups  to  the  centre  of  power.  The  hunger  strike  took  place  in  the  capital  city,  in  a  traditional  Sámi  
tent,  on  the  lawn  in  front  of  the  parliament  building.  Thus,  the  theatre  of  protest  was  brought  from  
the  affected  area  to  the  main  node  of  power.  This  was  a  semiotically  potent  act.  By  playing  on  easily  
recognizable  ethnic  markers,  the  indigenous  rights  activists  succeeded  drawing  attention  to  the  
national(ist)  bias  of  the  national  parliamentary  system.  Some  of  the  main  national  newspapers  
gained  sympathy  for  the  anti-dam  cause. 
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they  expanded  with  such  a  forceful  momentum  that  the  protests  continued  when  the  parliament  
closed  the  conventional  policy  process.  The  broad  protest  movement  confronted  all  three  branches  
of  state  power:  liberals  appealed  to  the  court,  moderates  asked  for  a  new  parliamentary  process,  and  
radicals  were  determined  to  bloc  the  executive  power.  While  protesting,  the  anti-dam  coalition  
gained  ground  within  the  public  sphere,  the  “fourth  branch”  of  power.  Thus  the  anti-dam  coalition  
become  more  than  a  protest  movement:  it  gained  a  potential  constituent  power. 
 Constituted  order:  The  ruling  bloc  included  various  initiatives  to  counter  the  new  challenge  
from  the  emerging  bloc.  For  local  pro-dam  activists,  the  growing  movement  for  civil  disobedience  
was  perceived  as  a  threat.  Subaltern  workers  in  Tverrdalen  and  subaltern  fisher-peasants  in  the  Alta  
fjord  may  have  been  suspicious  of  counter-culture  youth  from  the  urban  middle  class.  For  the  local  
subaltern  classes,  their  livelihood  was  at  stake.  If  I  am  correct  in  my  hypothesis,  that  subaltern  tile  
workers  and  coastal  fisher-peasantss  were  actually  economically  dependent  on  party  comrades  
within  the  capitol  building  in  the  capital  city,  then  the  anti-dam  movement  actually  would  constitute  
a  potent  potential  threat  to  their  local  livelihood.  The  new  left  had  been  impotent  in  making  itself  
relevant  for  the  subaltern  classes  in  the  downstream  areas  of  the  Alta  watershed.  Something  had  to  
be  done.  First,  some  local  people  formed  Borgervernet.  They  were  tired  of  waiting  for  the  police  to  
restore  what  they  framed  as  law  and  order,  and  decided  to  do  that  job  themselves.  Next,  some  party  
centralists  tried  to  mobilize  the  national  army.  Military  reaction  was  in  fact  their  first  preferred  
option.  However,  other  party  centralists  bloced  this  proposal.  The  prime  minister  had  to  conduct  a  
balancing  act.  This  may  be  an  indicator  of  actual  checks  and  balances  in  the  potential  power  of  the  
two  blocs.  It  may  also  be  an  indicator  of  internal  pluralism  and  adaptability  within  each  bloc.  
However,  it  is  clear  that  when  there  was  debate  about  using  such  drastic  means,  the  ruling  coalition  
must  have  feared  a  potential  loss  of  constituted  power. 
 Explaining  Act  1:  Act  1  had  started  when  a  hegemonic  coalition  had  taken  contentious  
action  through  government  channels,  thus  provoking  local  political  resistance  amongst  some  
affected  groups.  Act  1  ended  when  the  anti-dam  coalition  had  upscaled,  and  was  capable  of  
challenging  hegemonic  power.  The  ruling  coalition  had  previously  constituted  hegemony  when  old  
social  movements  had  twinned  their  nets  and  upscaled,  only  a  generation  earlier.  The  new,  emerging  
coalition  constituted  itself  when  also  new  social  movements  twinned  their  networks  and  upscaled.  
To  explain  this  process,  we  may  mobilize  empirically  informed  social  movement  theory.  In  other  
empirical  cases  it  has  been  observed  how  territorially  and  socially  dispersed  social  movements  may  
congregate,  for  mutual  self-empowerment  in  joint  action.  Through  the  process  of  working  together,  
movements  may  generate  new  organizational  and  discursive  resources.686  Firstly,  by  pooling  
                                                 
686  Della  Porta  &  Piazza  2008 
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resources,  new  social  networks  emerge  and  social  capital  is  generated.  Secondly,  by  deliberating  
over  shared  issue  areas,  new  common  causes  are  defined,  and  intellectual  capital  is  generated.  In  
terms  of  practical  action,  issues  and  networks  go  together,  and  by  twinning  old  issue  networks,  new  
and  wider  issue  networks  are  being  generated.  The  expansion  of  the  issue  network  led  to  the  re-
definition  of  the  collective  framing  of  the  issue  at  stake,  and  also,  to  capability  of  having  an  impact  
on  wider  policy  networks,  which  operate  at  a  “larger”  or  “higher”  geographical  “scale”. 
 
 
7.4.2  Definitional  power:  Second  Act 
Act  2  was  a  conflict  at  two  levels,  a  local  conflict  about  development  in  the  Alta-Kautokeino  river  
basin,  and  a  regional  conflict  to  define  the  institutions  of  the  political  system.  Both  blocs  had  
upscaled  by  twinning  various  issue  networks  across  dispersed  geographic  locations.  The  twinning  
of  networks  had  provided  the  opportunity  for  those  who  were  discontent  with  technocratic  
development,  to  form  an  oppositional  power  bloc,  pushing  for  sustainable  development.  Both  blocs  
included  both  central  and  peripheral  nodes.  Above,  I  have  mapped  the  social  composition  of  each  
bloc,  including  the  subaltern  social  basis  of  each  of  them,  and  also  the  social-liberal  and  social-
radical  traditions  within  both  blocs.  They  also  both  included  some  powerful  nodes  of  
institutionalized  power.  Both  blocs  even  included  influential  nodes  of  power  within  the  state  
apparatus.  The  hegemonic  bloc  included  a  network  of  centralists  within  the  largest  and  the  second  
largest  political  parties;;  thus,  they  also  controlled  the  parliamentarian  power,  and  consequently,  
were  in  government.  However,  the  bureaucratic  apparatus  of  the  executive  power  was  split.  The  
Ministry  of  Industry  was  the  epistemic  hegemon  in  techno-scientific  matters  within  the  state,  and  
had  eager  support  from  the  Ministry  of  Justice.  The  much  smaller  Ministry  of  the  Environment  was  
in  the  hands  of  environmental  experts,  who  were  largely  sympathetic  to  the  anti-dam  coalition.  
Between  the  two  stood  the  Ministry  of  Defence,  a  contested  terrain,  the  frontline  between  the  two  
coalitions.  Inside  the  state  apparatus,  the  anti-dam  coalition  had  their  stronghold  in  the  judiciary  
branch  of  power,  where  the  agitation  of  human  right  activists  posed  a  threat  to  the  government.  
Both  blocs  also  included  some  influential  nodes  of  power  outside  the  state  apparatus.  The  pro-dam  
coalition  had  their  stronghold  within  private  capital  and  shady  semi-private  affairs.  That  was  the  
industrial  complex,  led  by  Hydro,  a  producer  of  aluminium  and  fertilizer,  with  hydroelectric  power.  
The  anti-dam  coalition,  by  contrast,  enjoyed  an  increasingly  strong  position  within  the  discursive  
fields  of  the  mass  media,  as  well  as  specialized  public  spheres,  such  as  social  science  and  counter-
culture.  Even  a  considerable  part  of  the  Labor  press  diverted  from  party  discipline,  and  supported  
the  anti-dam  movement. 
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 Explaining  Act  2:  Act  2  in  the  Alta  conflict  may  be  interpreted  as  an  informal  constitutional  
process  on  a  wide  scale,  with  two  opposing  grand  coalitions,  both  struggling  either  to  maintain  or  to  
gain  definitional  power  over  policy  priorities  and  research  priorities.  It  was  a  struggle  for  social  
hegemony  within  the  frame  of  the  already  existing  state  formation.  To  explain  this  process,  we  
would  have  to  go  beyond  the  particular,  localized  examples  of  joint  action  within  issue  networks,  
and  try  to  trace  or  map  how  the  expansion  of  issue  networks  may  constitute  wider  formations  with  
some  degree  of  spatial  scope  and  some  degree  of  temporal  durability.  Thus,  we  will  have  to  switch  
from  the  micro-meso  link,  to  the  meso-macro  link.  This  also  implies  that  we  no  longer  deal  with  
entities  that  can  be  observed  directly,  but  with  patters  that  can  only  be  observed  through  their  
consequences.  When  I  traced  network  twinning  in  Act  1,  della  Porta's  empirically  informed  social  
movement  theory  was  useful.  I  could  have  continued  in  that  direction,  by  mobilizing  Staggenborg's  
articulation  of  a  general  sociological  theory  from  Randall  Collins.687  However,  I  wished  to  use  
resources  that  are  more  explicitly  sensitive  to  the  material  dimension  of  socio-material  action  
situations.  In  line  with  Actor  Network  Theory  (ANT),688  I  proceeded  by  tracing  how  the  emerging  
(constituent)  issue  nets  generated  new  nodes  of  social  power,  and  how  they  became  involved  with  
old  nodes  of  power  within  the  already  established  (constituted)  policy  network.  Still,  I  did  not  keep  
the  myopic  focus  on  particular  links  and  hubs.  In  order  to  get  a  grip  of  configurations  of  issue  nets  
and  policy  nets,  my  historical  description  had  to  “look  up”  from  the  specific  trails  of  specific  ties  in  
the  network,  and  instead  provide  generalizing  “overviews”  of  each  of  the  larger  configuration  I  
came  across.  When  I  analysed  the  historical  description,  I  had  not  yet  discovered  the  Social-
Ecological  Systems  (SES)  framework.  However,  I  followed  the  example  of  some  similar  research  
on  how  innovation  spreads  in  ecological  agriculture.689  From  an  SES  perspective,  the  wider  
configurations  are  conceptualized  as  “levels  of  aggregation”.  In  principle,  they  should  be  mapped  
                                                 
687  Staggenborg  2002;;  Collins  1988 
688  Callon  &  Latour  1981;;  Latour  2004 
689  The  concept  “scaling  up  and  out”,  as  I  have  used  it,  has  been  taken  from  the  literature  on  social  and  technical  
innovation  for  sustainable  development.  The  concept  arrived  to  me  from  Deak  (2008:17),  who  used  it  to  discuss  
how  community-based  technologies  may  spread  out  and  become  a  competing  standard,  without  being  co-opted  by  
central  nodes  of  power.  This  particular  usage  of  the  term  “scale  up  and  out”  has  a  particular  genealogy,  that  can  be  
traced  back  through  particular  practical  trials  with  rural  development,  led  by  particular  INGOs  for    agricultural  
development  (see  Pachico  &  Fujisaka  2004:15,  IIRR  2000:10,  and  IIRR  1999).  However,  the  INGOs  that  developed  
the  concept  are  highly  controversial.  They  are  being  criticize  by  environmental  justice  actors  (peasant’s  
organizations,  anti-corruption  organizations),  who  accuse  them  of  double  standards  (Lobbywatch  2002).  This  
actualizes  a  larger  debate  among  INGOs  regarding  the  empowering  potency  of  “participatory  methods”  versus  the  
enduring  domination  of  “donor  states”  (Williams  2004).  Practices  that  during  the  1980s  were  developed  as  a  more  
democratic  alternative  to  either  of  the  two  superpowers  (Hulme  &  Turner  1990:58-64)  were  later  adapted  the  World  
Bank,  donor  states,  and  mainstream  academia  (see  e.g.  Ostrom  &  Ahn  2003).  This  led  to  a  heated  debate  on  whether  
the  process  should  be  seen  as  empowerment  or  cooptation  of  the  subaltern  classes  (see  e.g.    Cooke  &  Khotari  2001  
on  the  one  hand,  versus  Hickey  &  Mohan  2004  on  the  other).  In  my  opinion,  one  should  not  be  over-optimistic  
about  the  opportunities  for  empowerment,  but  also  not  over-fatalistic  about  the  limitations  imposed  by  co-optation  
(Gaventa  &  Cornwall  2006).  Such  are  the  “sensitivities”  that  I  strive  to  cultivate  in  my  own  research  regarding  the  
concept  “scale  up  and  out”.  Struggle  for  hegemonies  of  social  power  may  seldom  be  isolated  from  existing  
hegemonies  of  violent  force,  see  my  discussion  of  competing  explanatory  frameworks,  Chapter  14. 
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with  probabilistic  techniques.  In  practice,  historians  and  ethnographers  may  also  have  to  suggest  
some  generalizing  statements  about  environmental  macro-patters.  This  I  also  did  in  my  historical  
description  (see  previous  chapter).  However,  in  either  case,  whether  the  method  is  ideographic  or  
nomothetic,  the  overview  will  nevertheless  be  limited  by  choice  of  causal  model  and  the  access  to  
data.  I  believe  that  one  particularly  relevant  aspect  of  the  Alta-dam  conflict  is  that  it  became  a  
struggle  for  definitional  power.  This  outcome  may  not  have  been  determined  from  the  beginning.  
Some  of  the  “old  boys”  within  the  ruling  bloc  thought  it  was  a  good  idea  to  defend  the  constituted  
power  with  coercive  force,  either  by  forming  the  extra-legal  Borgervernet,  or  by  attempting  to  use  
the  army  against  the  non-violent  civil  disobedient  activists.  They  had  experience  from  the  Second  
World  War,  and  from  revolutionary  syndicalism  before  that  (see  7.5.2).  They  may  simply  have  
misunderstood  what  kind  of  game  the  emerging  political  bloc  was  playing.  When  the  challengers  
fought  for  the  capacity  to  form  hegemonic  social  power,  some  of  the  “old  boys”  in  the  ruling  
coalition  reacted  by  defending  hegemonic  coercive  power.  The  struggle  for  hegemonic  social  power  
took  place  within  a  wide  network  of  socio-material  influence,  both  in  the  emerging  (constituent)  
issue  nets  and  also  within  the  already  established  (constituted)  policy  network.  New  nodes  of  power  
were  generated,  while  old  nodes  of  power  were  enrolled:  The  local  court  in  Alta  was  an  already  
constituted  node  of  influence,  but  interpreted  the  law  in  a  similar  way  to  the  oppositional  coalition.  
The  Borgervernet  action  group  was  assembled  as  a  new  node  of  power,  made  to  support  the  ruling  
coalition.  Each  political  bloc  mobilized  resources  in  order  to  empower  itself  to  obtain  definitional  
power,  and  to  set  the  agenda.  There  was  a  struggle  for  the  capacity  to  set  the  agenda  for  policy,  but  
also  to  set  the  agenda  for  research.  This  was  a  competition  for  the  capacity  to  constitute  the  
(socially)  hegemonic  constitutional  norms  for  policy.  It  was  also  a  competition  for  the  capacity  to  
constitute  the  (socially)  hegemonic  epistemic  norms  for  research.  In  this  struggle  for  definitional  
power,  both  blocs  insisted  that  they  were  defending  already  existing  norms,  and  consequently,  the  
internal  split  of  the  judiciary  branch  of  power  was  a  significant  frontline.  The  two  competing  social-
liberal  segments  may  both  be  characterised  as  liberal  conservative:  one  wished  to  conserve  
industrial  interests,  another  to  conserve  biological  and  cultural  diversity.  The  two  competing  social-
radical  segments  both  pushed  for  new  rights  by  redefining  the  old  ones:  Syndicalists  within  the  
ruling  party  pretended  that  the  state  had  always  desposed  of  the  right  to  build  dams  in  Inner  Sápmi,  
while  Maoists  in  the  oppositional  bloc  pretended  that  longstanding  Sámi  Customs  had  preserved  a  
classless  society.  These  interpretations  are  incompatible,  but  neither  is  totally  incorrect,  and  thus,  
neither  is  totally  correct.  Both  blocks  intervened  into  the  continuous  (re)production  of  social  norms,  
both  tried  to  influence  what  old  norms  would  mean  in  a  new  context,  and  both  changed  the  context  
for  one  another.  Thus,  the  two  blocs  co-evolved,  and  as  a  result,  nothing  could  be  the  same  as  it  
used  to  be. 
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7.4.3  Restored  national  hegemony:  Third  Act 
Act  3  was  the  moment  when  the  ruling  coalition  restored  its  hegemony,  the  pro-dam  issue  
triumphed,  and  the  associated  framing  of  constitutional  practices  was  imposed.  As  described  earlier,  
the  ruling  coalition  not  only  confirmed  hydro-hegemony,  but  also  amplified  it:  it  was  a  restauration. 
 
1. First,  they  confirmed  democratic  centralism  as  the  mode  of  operation  within  the  two  largest  
parties. 
2. Second,  they  confirmed  the  supremacy  of  the  legislative  over  the  executive,  which  was  
parliamentarian  constitutional  practice. 
3. Third,  they  extended  the  authority  of  the  executive,  by  resisting  the  separation  of  powers  
between  executive  and  judiciary. 
4. Fourth,  the  Supreme  Court  took  coordinated  action  with  the  police,  to  discipline  a  
streamlined  practice  of  fining  further  down  the  hierarchy  of  courts. 
5. Fifth,  the  Supreme  Court  judged  that  the  Ministry  of  Industry  was  the  hegemon  with  regard  
to  the  settlement  of  epistemic  disputes,  thereby  granting  technocracy  a  status  close  to  
theocracy. 
6. Sixth,  the  Supreme  Court  judged  that  Sámi  customary  law  was  irrelevant  in  the  context  of  
Norwegian  state  law,  thereby  rejecting  its  own  precedent  from  1968. 
7. Seventh,  the  central  leaders  of  Folkeaksjonen  were  found  guilty  of  sedition. 
 
Let  me  go  into  more  detail  about  each  action.   
Actions  #  1-2  were  in  defence  of  “democratic  institutions”  as  they  were  framed  by  the  ruling  
bloc:  a  combination  of  (a)  democratic  centralism  within  the  political  parties,  (b)  representative  party  
democracy  within  the  parliament,  and  (c)  parliamentary  authority  over  the  government.  The  
practices  that  we  today  might  call  “deliberative  democracy”  had  no  place  within  this  model  of  
democracy.  Instead,  the  phrase  “causal  pressure  groups”  was  used,  implying  a  potential  threat  to  
democracy.   
Actions  #  3-4  harmonize  the  three  branches  of  state  power:  the  legislative,  judiciary  and  
executive.  In  accordance  with  the  centralist-populist  model  of  democracy,  authority  over  technical  
and  normative  issues  were  concentrated  and  harmonized.  In  the  existing  separation  of  powers,  the  
three  branches  of  state  power  had  already  been  asymmetrical.  The  executive  had  been  subordinate  
to  the  legislative  ever  since  the  parliamentary  system  of  government  was  introduced  in  1884.  This  
was  supposed  to  increase  the  popular  power  of  the  nation  as  a  whole.  If  the  interpretation  in  my  
historical  chapter  is  correct,  then  the  Supreme  Court  decision  in  the  Alta  case  also  weakened  the  
autonomy  of  the  judiciary  in  relation  to  the  parliamentary  system  of  government.  If  so,  it  would  
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imply  slightly  increased  parliamentarian  power  for  the  majority,  but  decreased  rule  of  law  for  the  
protection  of  minorities.   
Actions  #  4-5  reproduced  hydro-hegemony.  Firstly  (Action  4),  power  was  re-centralized,  by  
confirming  the  absolute  authority  of  state  technocrats  as  arbiters  of  epistemic  disagreement.  If  the  
Minister  of  Industry  decided  that  ecology  was  less  relevant  than  engineering,  and  economic  
anthropology  less  relevant  than  neoclassical  economy,  then  this  would  be  the  correct  settlement  of  
an  epistemic  disagreement.  This  did  not  satisfy  any  part  of  the  environmental  movement.  Scholars  
in  ecology  or  anthropology  might  have  hoped  to  be  defined  as  authoritative  in  defining  truth.  
However,  grass  roots  democrats  like  the  deep  ecologists  and  the  Future  in  Our  Hands  (FIVH)  had  
hoped  for  more  direct  involvement  of  common  people  in  epistemic  matters.  The  expert-oriented  and  
grassroots-oriented  parts  of  the  environmental  movement  disagreed  with  each  other,  but  both  were  
dissatisfied  by  the  Supreme  Court  decision.  Secondly  (Action  5),  power  was  re-territorialized,  by  
confirming  the  absolute  sovereignty  of  Norwegian  state  law  in  the  northern  peripheries,  rejecting  
the  existence  of  Sámi  customary  law.  This  did  not  satisfy  any  part  of  the  indigenous  rights  
movement.  For  the  more  state-centric  Sámi  political  entrepreneurs,  this  might  have  been  seen  as  the  
Supreme  Court  rejecting  its  own  precedent  of  1968.  For  the  more  community-centric  Sámi  activists,  
this  judgment  definitely  represented  no  progress  towards  the  distant  goal  of  regional  self-
determination  in  Sápmi.690   
Action  #  7  confirmed  that  that  the  hegemon  must  be  obeyed,  and  that  organizing  systematic  
disobedience  was  a  rather  grave  crime.  This  was  in  stark  contrast  to  the  local  court  in  Alta,  which  
had  judged  that  non-violent  civil  disobedience  had  been  a  form  of  self-defence.  Thus,  there  was  a  
rather  wide  gap  between  the  competing  interpretations  of  the  law,  within  the  judiciary  branch  of  
power  itself.  If  we  take  the  viewpoint  of  Realpolitik,  it  is  not  strange  that  there  was  a  perceived  need  
to  discipline  the  entire  court  system  (see  Actions  3-4  above). 
 Explaining  Act  3:  Act  3  in  the  Alta-dam  conflict  was,  in  sum,  was  the  moment  when  the  
hegemonic  coalition  of  liberal  nationalists  and  leftist  syndicalists  had  restored  their  Leviathan.  They  
restored  the  absolute  supremacy  of  the  parliamentarian  system  of  government.  The  cost  for  that  gain  
was  manifold:  there  would  be  a  decreased  social  support  for  the  system  (as  a  result  of  decreased  
rule  of  law,  suppression  of  customary  law  in  Sámi  areas,  and  the  claim  that  state  technocrats  were  
supreme  guides  in  epistemic  matters).  This  judgment  reversed  a  transformation  towards  increased  
pluralism.  From  the  1950s  until  the  1970s,  a  gradual  liberalization  of  eugenic  policies  had  had  a  
liberating  effect  upon  the  Sámis.  The  Supreme  Court  decisions  in  1982  and  1983  did  not  take  any  
                                                 
690  "Read  today,  the  ruling  appears  to  fail  to  address  the  close  interrelationship  of  culture  and  the  economic  activities  of  
indigenous  peoples",  thus,  "the  reasoning  by  the  supreme  court  appears  today  as  simply  erroneous"  (Scheinin  2000:  
§  4.5). 
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step  backwards  towards  racism,  but  did  take  a  backwards  step  towards  statism.  The  political  regime  
within  government  became  slightly  more  authoritarian:  increased  de  jure  centralization  and  
territorialization  of  authority,  but  decreased  de  facto  social  legitimacy.  To  explain  this  process,  we  
would  need  to  choose  concepts  to  get  a  grasp  of  macro-conditions:  unobservable  structures  in  the  
actual  patterns  of  concrete  observation.  I  think  we  need  to  balance  two  different  conceptions  of  
power:  what  Kate  Nash  calls  pluralist  theory  and  elite  theory.691  Elite  theory  is  not  the  same  as  
elitist  theory,  because  it  may  also  be  critical  of  elitism.  If  we  apply  the  SES  framework,  we  
generalize  about  general  trends  at  an  “aggregate  level  of  accumulation”,  while  anomalies  or  
particularities  are  removed  from  our  focus.  If  we  apply  the  ANT  approach,  we  trace  particular  nodes  
and  ties  in  particular  issue  nets  and  policy  nets,  while  general  patterns  in  the  environment  or  context  
are  removed  from  our  focus.  Either  of  those  approaches  is  sensitive  to  some  of  the  pluralities  of  
power.  They  differ  from  classical  elite  theory,  which  proffers  bold  hypotheses  regarding  fatalistic  
determinism:  the  “iron  law”  of  oligarchy.  However,  contemporary  elite  theory  is  adapted  to  a  reality  
that  is  more  obviously  complex,  and  conceptualizes  elite  influence  more  as  a  series  of  elusive  
informal  networks,  similar  to  political  corruption  and  lobby  groups.692  This  makes  sense  in  terms  of  
ANT  and  SES,  since  the  former  is  a  “sociology  of  associations”,  while  the  latter  is  observant  of  an  
actual  mix  of  bureaucratic  praxes  and  informal  norms.  During  the  Alta-dam  struggle,  most  
hierarchical  organizations  with  national  scope  had  their  head  quarters  in  Oslo.  It  was  walking  
distance  between  the  hyper-modernistic  headquarters  of  the  Norwegian  Government  (with  
ornaments  by  Picasso),  the  Norwegian  Water  Resources  and  Energy  Directorate,  the  National  
Federation  of  Trade  Unions  (LO),  and  the  Confederation  of  Norwegian  Enterprise  (NHO).  State  
building  itself  has  been  conceptualized  as  the  harmonization  of  several  centralized  networks:  First,  
state-builders  cultivate  hierarchies,  as  centralized  networks  between  nodes  of  centralized  networks.  
Thereafter,  the  state-builders  bring  those  different  centres  into  resonance.693  Socio-material  power  
was  gathered  from  around  the  land,  and  focused  in  the  court,  around  the  person  of  the  sovereign.694  
Thus,  even  though  we  have  a  pluralistic  conception  of  power,  as  with  ANT  or  SES,  this  does  not  
mean  that  zones  of  relative  centralization  do  not  coagulate.  On  the  contrary,  this  happens  all  the  
time.  However,  ANT  and  SES  assume  that  such  relative  centralization  takes  place  against  a  general  
backdrop  of  social  plurality  (instead  of  any  antisocial  state  of  nature).  One  assumption  is  that  
centralized  arrangements  remain  more  or  less  unfinished,  dynamic  and  plural.  Another  assumption  
is  that  all  descriptions  are  either  probabilistic  or  possibilistic,  and  thus  fallible.  We  might  always  
discover  surprising  pluralities  if  we  have  a  closer  look.  The  Alta-dam  conflict  actualized  some  
                                                 
691  Nash  2000 
692  Bobbio  &  Revelli  2011 
693  Deleuze  &  Guattari  1988  [1980]:  Chpts.  7,  9  and  13 
694  Olwig  2002 
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internal  tensions  within  the  already  constituted  state  and  nation.  Different  elite  clusters  and  different  
subaltern  classes  soon  found  themselves  on  either  side  of  the  contentious  constitutional  process.  I  
have  interpreted  the  Supreme  Court  decisions  of  1982  and  1983  as  consolidation  on  the  part  of  the  
ruling  bloc,  but  it  may  be  equally  correct  to  see  it  as  a  futile  attempt  to  deny  the  actual  legal  
pluralism  that  had  been  revealed  by  the  conflict. 
 
 
7.4.4  Emerging  global  justice  movement:  Epilogue 
The  result  of  the  Alta-dam  conflict,  if  seen  in  isolation,  appears  identical  with  its  short-term  
outcome:  a  restored  hegemony  of  technocracy,  and  an  intensified  conflict  between  this  power  on  
one  side  and  indigenous  customs  and  lore  on  the  other.  This  is  a  story  about  how  an  already  
established  social  hegemony  over  land  and  water  is  being  amplified,  and  resisted,  but  restored.  So  
what  about  the  long-term  outcome  mentioned  in  the  literature:  (a)  improved  environmental  
regulations  and  (b)  the  first  parliament  for  the  Sámi?  Both  appear  to  have  been  instituted  during  the  
epilogue  of  the  Alta-dam  conflict,  via  the  further  interaction  of  political  forces.  In  the  history  of  the  
Norwegian  state,  the  Alta-dam  conflict  is  the  most  conspicuous  single  event  in  the  process  that  
brought  about  the  two  mentioned  changes.  However,  that  something  appears  as  a  conspicuous  event  
in  history  does  not  imply  that  it  must  necessarily  be  the  most  forceful  actual  cause  of  historical  
change.  The  aggregate  effect  of  mundane,  everyday  praxes  over  time  may  count  as  well.  Also,  we  
cannot  assume  that  the  endogenous  processes  of  a  state  are  sufficient  to  explain  state  
transformation,  because  there  are  many  exogenous  causal  factors  as  well.  So  how  did  the  changes  
(a)  and  (b)  come  about?  If  we  maintain  our  focus  on  endogenous  factors  within  the  nation-state,  
then  the  improved  environmental  regulations  appear  to  have  been  brought  about  by  gradual  
accommodation  and  co-opting  of  the  environmental  movements,695  while  first  parliament  for  the  
Sámi  was  the  result  of  a  policy  process  led  by  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission.  However,  if  we  also  
include  exogenous  processes  as  well,  then  it  is  clear  that  constitutional  change  at  state  level  co-
evolved  with  constitutional  changes  in  international  law,  and  the  persistent  maintenance  of  local  
longstnding  customs.  This  ongoing  constitutional  process  at  multiple  levels  involved  the  ratification  
of  several  treaties  of  relevance  to  the  sustainable  management  of  natural  and  cultural  heritage  in  
Sápmi:  the  ICCPR/ICESCR,  the  NASCO,  the  ILO169,  the  UN  Biodiversity  Convention,  and  so  on.  
The  Alta-dam  conflict  had  generated  organizational  ties,  resources  and  framings,  which  would  
transpire  to  be  empowering  in  the  long  run.  Organizations  from  areas  where  Sápmi  and  Norway  
overlap  would  continue  to  twin  networks  with  other  groups  from  all  around  Sápmi,  but  also  from  
                                                 
695  Dryzek,  Downes,  Hunold,  Schlosberg  &  Hernes  2003 
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other  indigenous  homelands  all  over  the  globe.  By  globalising  the  resistance,  indigenous  people  
would  bypass  the  states,  and  eventually  upscale  to  UN  level.  That  the  Alta-dam  controversy  had  the  
long-term  effect  that  it  had,  was  because  it  allowed  the  emerging  movements  to  empower  their  
resources  and  frames.  On  the  international  scene,  the  Sámi  organizations  succeeded  in  being  
recognized  amongst  other  Indigenous  rights  organizations.  The  emerging  transnational  movement  
succeeded  in  influencing  the  policy  process  at  the  UN  level.  It  was  declared  that  indigenous  people  
have  the  right  to  freedom  from  exploitation  and  freedom  from  colonization,  under  the  human  rights  
covenants  ICCPR  and  ICESCR.  Back  home  in  Sápmi,  the  four  states  had  already  ratified  this  
convention.  With  the  new  norms  on  indigenous  rights,  the  ICCPR  and  the  ICESCR  now  implied  
that  the  states  would  have  to  de-criminalize  some  of  the  longstanding  customs  that  they  had  tried  to  
criminalize  in  the  shared  cultural  region.  This  recognition  from  the  UN,  as  well  as  the  later  reports  
from  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission,  would  disclose  the  de  facto  legal  pluralism  in  Sápmi,  in  spite  of  
the  unity  of  jurisprudence  having  been  de  jure  restored  by  the  Norwegian  Supreme  Court  in  1982  
and  1983.  There  had  been  a  continuous  maintenance  and  development  of  ancient  customs  and  
traditional  knowledge,  regardless  of  state  laws.  The  movements  were  acting  locally  and  thinking  
globally.  State  transformation  was  shaped  by  the  joint  impact  of  new  international  norms,  and  the  
persistent  maintenance  of  longstanding  local  customs. 
 Explaining  new  international  norms:  Before  I  turn  to  the  local  action:  How  may  the  global  
action  be  explained?  Firstly,  I  it  may  be  essential  to  note  that  some  issue  areas  tend  to  transcend  the  
boundaries  of  specific  states.  This  is  particularly  the  case  for  environmental  protection  and  
indigenous  rights.696  Natural  and  cultural  heritage  are  examples  of  common  global  heritage,  located  
in  particular  ecological  and  cultural  regions,  and  those  geographies  are  seldom  contained  by  
arbitrary  state  borders.  The  “national  interests”  of  states  are  particularistic,  and  may  often  divide  
particular  ecological  or  cultural  regions.  This  is  indeed  the  case  for  Sápmi,  and  for  some  of  its  
natural  resources  systems.  The  research  on  water  resources  management  indicates  that  there  is  a  co-
evolution  between  inter-governmental  institutions  and  transnational  social  movement  coalitions.697  
Similarly,  the  recent  developments  of  human  rights  law  have  also  been  informed  by  a  wide  network  
of  participants,  including  movements  for  social  justice.698  The  specific  involvement  of  Sámi  
organizations  has  been  addressed  by  Henry  Minde,  an  observant  participant  in  the  international  
policy  process.699  Tracing  this  policy  process  has  been  beyond  my  capacity,  but  it  would  certainly  
be  interesting  to  do  so.  My  expectation  is  that  we  would  find  more  of  the  same  mechanisms  as  in  
                                                 
696  Falk  2014 
697  Conca  2005 
698  Riles  2001 
699  See  Minde  1980,  1984,  1993,  1996,  2001,  2007,  2003a,  2003b,  2005b.  (Thanks  to  Henry  Minde  for  sharing  copies  of  
his  artilcles.)  See  also  Anaya  2004,  as  well  as  Minde,  Eide  &  Åhrén  2007. 
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the  Alta-dam  case:  the  twinning  of  issue  networks,  and  the  broadening  of  the  scope  of  action.  Thus  
we  can  expect  to  find  particular  groups  that  do  things  together,  and  thereby  grow  new  organizational  
networks,  and  re-define  common  issues.  I  also  think  it  would  be  hard  to  make  sense  of  the  
OCCPR/ICESCR  or  NASCO  without  paying  attention  to  particular  ecological  and  sociological  
systems  in  sub-state  and  trans-boundary  regions.  If  we  include  those  conditions  in  the  picture,  and  
do  not  see  legal  and  political  change  in  isolation  from  the  ecological  and  sociological  context,  then  I  
think  one  may  easily  see  ICCPR/ICESCR  and  NASCO  as  an  effort  among  political  entrepreneurs  to  
come  to  terms  with  the  actually  existing  ecological  and  sociological  pluralism.  Conservation  of  
nature,  and  protection  against  colonization,  are  not  about  constituting  something  new,  but  about  
sustainable  development  of  a  socio-ecological  order  that  has  already  been  constituted,  by  nature  
and  culture,  but  not  by  the  state. 
 Explaining  persistent  local  customs:  During  the  Alta-dam  conflict,  the  local  sheriff  
(lensmann)  was  hesitant  to  intervene  against  civil  disobedience,  and  after  their  arrest,  the  local  court  
would  free  the  activists,  with  the  argument  that  they  acted  in  self-defence.  This  is  interesting  from  
the  perspective  of  the  sociology  and  anthropology  of  law.  The  Norwegian  Supreme  Court  decisions  
in  1982  and  1983  were  clear  that  organizing  civil  disobedience  had  constituted  sedition  and  
consequently,  that  it  had  been  right  to  use  the  police  force  against  peaceful  demonstrators.  The  
Supreme  Court  restored  the  de  jure  unity  of  jurisprudence,  but  the  local  court  and  local  police  had  
been  embedded  in  a  situation  that  we  would  later  get  to  know  as  de  facto  legal  pluralism.  After  the  
reports  from  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission,  and  after  the  UN  Declaration  on  Indigenous  Peoples,  it  
is  not  at  all  clear  how  the  legal  historian  or  legal  sociologist  should  interpret  the  Alta-dam  conflict.  
This  issue  requires  caution  and  care.  I  have  argued  that  the  emerging  international  norms,  such  as  
the  ICESCR  and  NASCO  are  best  understood  as  a  way  for  state  builders  to  try  to  come  to  terms  
with  the  undeniable  ecological  and  sociological  pluralism,  for  example  in  trans-boundary  regions,  
such  as  Sápmi.  During  the  aftermath  of  the  Alta-dam  conflict,  Norwegian  state  builders  not  only  
had  to  interact  with  Sámi  organizations  in  the  UN,  but  in  local  areas  where  Sápmi  and  Norway  
overlap,  they  also  had  to  interact  with  the  fact  that  longstanding  customs  and  traditional  knowledge  
had  been  continuously  maintained  and  developed,  regardless  of  whether  these  had  been  codified,  
criminalized,  or  simply  ignored  by  the  states.  In  Chapter  11,  I  will  provide  some  ethnographic  
samples  demonstrating  the  ambiguity  of  de  facto  legal  pluralism,  and  I  will  discuss  whether  those  
samples  should  be  interpreted  as  “social  resistance”  or  “social  defence”.700  Many  persons  in  the  
local  community  may  have  perceived  that  the  local  court  in  Alta  was  correct  when  it  adjudged  that  
those  activists  engaged  in  civil  disobedience  had  acted  in  self-defence,  even  if  the  Norwegian  
                                                 
700  See  Scott  (1985)  and  Sharp  (1990)  for  definitions  of  each  of  those  two  terms. 
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Supreme  Court  contested  this  view.  At  that  time  of  the  Alta-dam  conflict,  indigenous  people  did  not  
yet  enjoy  the  protection  in  international  law  that  they  do  after  that  struggle.  Today,  the  Supreme  
Court  of  the  state  would  not  have  been  supreme  anymore,  because,  under  the  present  human  rights  
regime,  citizens  could  probably  have  tested  the  descision  for  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  
and  even  the  UN  Human  Rights  Council.701  Collective  human  rights,  including  the  right  to  freedom  
from  colonial  subjugation,  imply  an  attempt  to  sort  out  the  relationship  between  state  law  and  
longstanding  customs  for  indigenous  people.  No  such  attempt  had  yet  been  undertaken  in  1982,  but  
this  does  not  mean  that  the  state  was  the  only  actual  source  of  norms  in  its  territory;;  instead  it  means  
that  there  was  an  unresolved  conflict  between  state  law  and  suppressed  longstanding  customs  in  
areas  where  Sápmi  and  Norway  overlap.  One  most  spectacular  symptoms  of  that  tension  came  as  an  
immediate  reaction  when  the  state's  Supreme  Court  restored  the  political  hegemony  of  the  ruling  
coalition:  this  was  when  Niilas  Somby  and  his  independent  action  group  attempted  sabotage  against  
a  bridge.  There  is  deep  disagreement  on  whether  this  action  was  strategically  intelligent,  or  ethically  
acceptable.  Somby  himself  argues  that  he  acted  in  defence  of  longstanding  customary  laws  against  
an  intrusive  colonial  state.702  One  way  of  interpreting  it  is  as  a  potential  challenge  to  the  hegemony  
of  coercive  force.  This  shall  be  discussed,  but  I  will  reserve  it  for  the  discussion  of  competing  
explanations  in  Chapter  12.  Another,  complimentary,  way  of  interpreting  it,  is  as  a  particular  way  to  
defend  the  de  facto  legal  pluralism,  a  politically  non-hegemonic  way  of  defining  the  actual  socially  
hegemonic  normative  order.  I  would  be  biased  if  I  said  that  Somby  did  the  right  thing,  but  I  would  
also  be  biased  if  I  said  that  he  did  the  wrong  thing.  For  this  reason  I  note  that  this  is  an  issue  that  
deserves  caution  and  care.  Further,  there  were  many  other  repertoires  of  social  resistance  or  social  
defence  that  were  much  more  widespread,  and  much  less  controversial  among  the  Sámi  themselves.  
Firstly,  local  subalterns  engaged  in  everyday  acts  of  non-cooperation.  Behaviour  that  appears  as  
“conflict  avoidance”  in  Sámi  communities,  especially  along  the  coast,  has  been  rephrased  in  James  
Scott's  term  “everyday  forms  of  peasant  resistance”.703  This  may  be  classified  as  a  form  of  non-
violent  direct  action.  Secondly,  the  major  interest  organization  NSR  declared  a  diplomatic  boycott  
of  the  state,  refusing  dialogue  on  unequal  terms.  Thus,  it  brought  the  tactic  of  non-cooperation  from  
everyday  resistance  to  the  public  sphere.  This  may  function  as  non-violent  direct  action  or  as  
symbolic  action.  Thirdly,  the  minor  interest  organization  SLF  channelled  its  grievances  through  the  
democratic-centralist  system  of  the  Norwegian  Labor  Party.  Thus,  it  brought  to  state  politics  the  
                                                 
701  During  the  Alta-dam  conflict,  there  was  a  failed  attempt  buy  the  anti-dam  block  to  complain  before  the  European  
Court  of  Human  Rights  (an  institution  within  the  Council  of  Europe,  not  the  EU).  The  court  rejected  to  consider  the  
Alta-case,  but  nevertheless  it  noted  that  the  article  8  in  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  was  relevant  for  
Sámi  land  rights  (Scheinin  2000:  §3.2).  Regarding  the  possibilities  under  the  contemporary  human  rights  regime,  for  
citizens  to  complain  about  its  state's  human  rights  breaches,  see  part  8.6.1,  in  particular  the  footnote  regarding  the  
right  to  appeal.   
702  Larsen  &  Kalvemo  2010;;  interview  with  Niilas  Somby 
703  Bjerkli  2000;;  Bjerkli  2010;;  Scott  1995 
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ambiguity  of  apparent  conflict  avoidance  and  covert  everyday  resistance.  This  is  mainly  symbolic  
action,  because  it  aims  at  achieving  better  living  conditions  by  mediation  through  party  and  state  
politics.  Those  three  may  not  be  a  complete  categorization,  but  they  all  describe  normal  action  
repertoires  among  the  Sámi  people,  unlike  the  exceptional  repertoire  chosen  by  Somby.  The  SLF  
path  may  have  been  sensitive  to  the  actual  presence  of  the  coercive  apparatus  of  the  state,  and  the  
need  not  to  attract  even  more  suppression.  The  NSR  path  was  sensitive  to  the  actual  legal  pluralism,  
especially  in  Inner  Sápmi,  and  the  need  to  maintain  and  develop  longstanding  customs  and  
traditional  knowledge  while  upscaling  the  political  struggle  on  the  international  scene.  Both  paths  
resisted  colonial  guardianship  under  the  state:  the  SLF  sought  to  civilize  the  state  apparatus;;  the  
NSR  focused  on  social  defence  against  colonization. 
 Explaining  the  interaction  between  local  and  global:  It  is  important  to  note  that  
longstanding  customs,  like  international  norms,  represent  so-called  “soft  law”.704  They  may  or  may  
not  be  backed  up  by  the  “hard  law”  of  states,  but  in  either  case,  they  are  maintained  in  mundane  
everyday  practice.  Only  after  the  Supreme  Court  judgments  in  1982  and  1983  it  was  documented  
that  longstanding  customs  have  been  continuously  maintained  and  developed  in  some  areas  where  
Sápmi  and  Norway  overlap,  regardless  of  whatever  status  those  customs  might  have  had  in  state  
law.705  This  is  how  it  can  be  possible  that  in  Sápmi  there  are  clear-cut  sovereignties  (meaning  
monopolies  of  violence)  but  complex  jurisdictions  (meaning  sources  of  law).  The  hegemonic  social  
power  is  not  a  function  of  the  hegemonic  coercive  force.  During  the  Alta-dam  conflict,  agonistic  
issue  nets  competed  for  the  social  capacity  to  define  the  hegemonic  social  power.  That  implied  
consequences  for  law-making,  and  thus  also  for  how  the  coercive  apparatuses  of  the  states  were  to  
be  used.  However,  that  is  an  indirect  causal  relation.  Their  hegemony  of  coercive  power  never  
became  an  object  of  violent  conflict.  Apart  from  the  three  documented  anomalies  (the  Borgervernet  
action  group,  the  attempt  to  mobilize  the  army,  and  the  attempt  to  sabotage  a  bridge),  the  Alta-dam  
conflict  remained  a  social  struggle  for  the  social  power  to  define  the  agenda.  For  the  dominant  
faction  within  the  judiciary  of  the  state,  the  “unity  of  jurisprudence”  was  the  ruling  doctrine,  
implying  that  the  state  was  the  only  source  of  law  in  its  territory.  However,  for  the  emerging  faction  
within  the  judiciary  of  the  state,  “legal  pluralism”  was  the  preferred  understanding.  The  view  of  the  
emerging  faction  was  expressed  when  the  local  court  in  Alta  freed  non-violent  activists  engaged  in  
civil  disobedience,  arguing  that  they  had  acted  in  self-defence.  However,  the  view  of  the  dominant  
faction  would  restore  its  hegemony  when  the  local  and  regional  courts  were  overruled  by  the  
Norwegian  Supreme  Court’s  decision.  This  was  before  there  was  any  possibility  to  appeal  the  
                                                 
704  Christensen  2006:  37-8 
705  Norwegian  Official  Report  1997a  (NOU  1997:4);;  1997b  (NOU  1997:5);;  Norwegian  Official  Report  2007a  (NOU  
2007:13);;  2007b  (NOU  2007:14) 
 257  
 
Supreme  Court  decision  before  any  international  human  rights  court.  Thomas  Mathiesen,  a  
sociologist  of  law,  argued  that  it  had  been  a  bad  strategy  when  the  anti-dam  coalition  gave  so  much  
emphasis  to  the  court  process.706  I  have  argued  that  the  Supreme  Court  amplified  the  claimed  
centralization  of  the  political  system,  but  at  the  cost  of  weakened  social  legitimacy.  By  restoring  the  
de  jure  unity  of  jurisprudence,  it  amplified  the  actual  tensions  within  the  de  facto  legal  pluralism.  
This  tension  would  be  played  out  by  thinking  globally,  acting  locally.  Local  communities  would  be  
persistent  in  their  continuous  maintenance  and  development  of  longstanding  customs  and  traditional  
knowledge,  regardless  of  whether  the  latter  were  codified,  criminalized,  or  simply  ignored  by  the  
state.  Global  institutions  would  enact  new  international  norms  for  environmental  protection  and  
indigenous  rights,  under  the  influence  of  transnational  social  movement  coalitions.  The  states  in  
Sápmi  would  be  transformed  as  a  result  of  international  norms  becoming  better  fitted  to  the  actual  
ecological  and  sociological  complexity  in  trans-boundary  regions,  such  as  Sápmi. 
 
 
7.4.5  Constituted  order  done  and  redone 
I  have  traced  how  the  course  of  social  conflict  transformed  the  stage  on  which  the  conflict  was  
played  out,  the  cleavage  structure  or  the  socio-material  terrain.  I  traced  how  the  two  coalitions  
upscaled  their  actions  from  a  local  level,  by  twinning  networks  (act  1);;  how  they  became  two  
agonistic  historical  blocs  within  a  contentious  constitutional  process  (act  2);;  and  finally,  how  the  
dominant  bloc  confirmed  and  amplified  national  hegemony  (act  3),  while  the  opposition  took  the  
struggle  to  a  global  scale  (epilogue).  Thus  I  traced  the  dynamics  of  contention  in  the  Alta-dam  
conflict.  However,  unlike  Tilly,  Tarrow  and  McAdam,707  I  trace  the  interplay  between  constituent  
praxes  and  constituted  order,  not  the  interplay  between  “insiders”  and  “outsiders”  as  those  might  be  
defined  according  to  an  already  constituted  political  system.  Thus,  I  traced  some  of  the  actual  ties  
and  transactions  that  criss-cross  the  conceptual  division  between  issue  networks  (civil  society)  and  
policy  networks  (state  society). 
 Empirically-based  social  movement  theory  can  be  used  to  explain  the  particular  micro-
mechanisms  in  this  process  whereby  particular  issue  networks  broaden  their  scope  of  action,  
through  joint  action,  building  new  organizational  ties,  and  developing  new  shared  understandings.  
Here  I  have  described  such  processes  as  network  twinning,  with  a  term  taken  from  Della  Porta  and  
Piazza,  and  equivalent  terms  have  been  suggested  by  Staggenborg.708  Alternatively,  we  could  have  
chosen  the  SES  framework,  to  explain  such  collective  action  in  terms  of  rational  choice.  We  could  
                                                 
706  Mathiesen  1992  (1984) 
707  Tilly,  Tarrow  &  McAdam:  2001 
708  Della  Porta  &  Piazza  2008;;    Staggenborg  2002 
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also  have  used  the  ANT  approach  to  trace  the  particular  communicative  praxes  in  network  twinning.  
Which  conceptual  toolbox  we  choose  may  not  matter.  They  all  refer  to  similar  practical  realities.  
The  mechanisms  of  how  collective  action  emerges  are  well  researched.  This  is  the  micro-meso  link. 
 
Table  7-4:  The  dynamics  of  contention  across  three  acts  in  the  Alta-dam  conflict 
 Pro-dam  coalition Anti-dam  coalition 
Act  1 Central  nodes  in  policy  net  had  adopted  the  pro-dam  
cause  from  local  (subaltern)  nodes  in  issue-net,  and  
initiated  a  secret  planning  without  consulting  stake  
holders 
Secret  state  pro-dam  action  from  the  state  provoked  
the  formation  of  anti-dam  issue  nets  in  local  (subaltern)  
nodes 
Act  2 Competition  provokes  resistance  from  within  the  ruling  
historical  bloc,  some  see  challenges  to  hegemonic  
coercion 
Scaled-out  issue  net  becomes  an  oppositional  historical  
bloc,  pushing  for  hegemonic  definitional  power 
Act  3 Ruling  historical  bloc  restores  de  jure  unity  of  
jurisprudence,  amplifying  tensions  within  de  facto  legal  
pluralism 
Opposition  dispersed,  multi-level  constitutional  process  
continues.  Local  longstanding  customs  are  maintained,  
transnational  movements  work  on  international  law. 
 
 However,  the  particular  mechanisms  at  the  micro-meso  level  may  not  say  much  about  the  
dynamics  of  larger  coalitions,  clusters,  formations,  or  systems.  Through  network  twinning,  the  issue  
networks  are  scaling  up  and  out.  There  is  not  only  a  micro-meso  link,  but  also  a  meso-macro  link.  
Processes  on  the  larger  scale  are  more  difficult  to  map  or  trace.  At  the  scale  of  face-to-face  
interaction  we  may  observe  actions  directly.  On  any  larger  scale,  we  deal  with  structural  patterns  
that  cannot  be  observed  directly.  Still,  their  practical  consequences  are  real  enough.  Here,  I  have  
addressed  the  micro-meso-macro  by  using  a  blend  of  constitutional  theory  and  social  movement  
theory.  Thus  I  follow  Ugo  Mattei,  an  expert  on  social  movements  and  constitutional  change  
regarding  management  of  natural  commons.709  But  I  have  not  approached  the  constitutional  process  
merely  in  terms  of  discursive  deliberation  about  norms.  Instead,  I  have  tried  to  observe  how  such  
discursive  practices  are  articulated  through  issue  nets  in  particular  environments,  including  both  
ecological  and  sociological  conditions.  This  has  been  a  materialist  approach,  but  not  one  that  is  
solely  interested  in  economic  exploitation  or  coercive  command.  On  the  contrary,  I  have  taken  an  
interest  in  the  social  and  ecological  embeddedness  of  resource  mobilization  and  longstanding  
customs,  of  strategical  framing  and  traditional  knowledge. 
 Strategical  framing  and  traditional  knowledge  have  a  socio-material  dimension.  ANT  can  be  
used  to  trace  socio-material  links  and  concrete,  localized  practices,  one  feeding  into  the  other,  in  
long  chains  across  the  concrete  terrain  (micro-meso).  Chains  of  concrete,  localized  practices  make,  
maintain,  and  transform  configurations  of  networks  and  nodes,  facilitating  the  flow  of  information  
across  discrete  locations  in  concrete  terrains.  Such  networks  and  nodes  constitute  more  or  less  
centralized  and  more  or  less  territorial  arrangements  (meso-macro).  Those  arrangements  always  
                                                 
709  Mattei  2011;;  Bailey  &  Mattei  2012 
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remain  more  or  less  unfinished,  but  they  may  function  well  enough  for  pragmatic  purposes.  Those  
more  or  less  centralized  and  territorial  arrangements  are  what  we  know  as  virtual “scales”  in  
political  geography.  The  ANT  perspective  zooms  in  on  social  communication  and  traces  how  it  
works  as  a  pathway  of  constituent  praxes  and  constituted  order. 
 Resource  mobilization  and  longstanding  customs  have  a  socio-material  dimension  as  well.  
SES  can  be  used  to  explain  how  alternative  practices  are  scaling  up  and  out,  to  constitute  pockets  of  
alternative  socio-technical  or  normative  systems.  Ostrom  and  McGinnis  usually  address  macro  
formations  in  a  generalizing,  statistical  way,  as  “levels  of  aggregation”.  However,  whenever  they  try  
to  trace  particular  causal  links,  or  identify  general  explanatory  mechanisms,  they  observe  how  
social  choice  in  one  action  situation  may  determine  the  norms  that  regulate  social  choice  in  another  
action  situation.  The  concept  “network  of  adjacent  action  situations”  has  been  suggested  by  
McGinnis,  as  a  preliminary  tool  to  describe  the  micro-sociological  mechanisms  that  make  and  
maintain  macro-sociological  formations.  The  SES  perspective  zooms  in  on  economic  norms,  and  
maps  how  those  seem  to  operate  in  concrete  socio-economic  choices  as  well  as  in  virtual socio-
economic  structures. 
 In  my  opinion,  SES  and  ANT  can  be  used  as  complimentary  resources,  to  focus  on  different  
issues  of  interest  for  empirically  informed  social  movement  theory.  SES  deals  mainly  with  resource  
mobilization,  from  a  neo-institutionalist  and  social-ecological  viewpoint.  ANT  zooms  in  on  framing  
strategies,  from  the  viewpoint  of  material  semiotics.  In  the  analysis  above,  I  have  used  both  SES  
and  ANT  to  describe  both  resource  mobilization  and  framing  strategies,  in  a  joint  process  whereby  
twinning  of  issue  nets  takes  place.  However,  I  have  drawn  on  SES  and  ANT  to  address  the  meso-
macro  link  in  two  different  ways.  Sometimes  I  talked  about  nodes  of  social  power,  which  were  
made,  maintained  and  transformed  within  issue  nets  and  policy  nets.  One  example  is  the  physical  
location  of  planning  offices  in  the  capital  city;;  another  is  the  way  whereby  the  river  facilitated  a  
community  of  fate  between  dispersed  local  communities.  This  was  an  ANT  view.  On  some  other  
occasions,  I  talked  about  the  aggregate  effects  of  many  small  actions.  Examples  include  the  mass  
media  effect  of  the  anti-dam  actions,  and  the  persistent  maintenance  of  local  longstanding  
knowledge  and  traditional  knowledge.  This  was  an  SES  view.  Those  are  complimentary.  The  SES  
model  empowers  the  social  movement  researcher  to  suggest  panoramas  over  structural  patterns,  
with  probabilistic  explanations.  The  ANT  approach  enables  to  zoom  in  some  of  the  particular  ties  
that  constitute  a  macro  order.  Both  can  be  applied  to  trace  the  emergence  of  social  movements  as  
constituent  power,  or  the  maintenance  of  the  already  constituted  power  of  some  other  social  
movements.  In  either  case,  we  constantly  cross  the  conceptual  distinction  between  issue  nets  and  
policy  nets,  or  between  insiders  and  outsiders  of  the  already  constituted  system.  This  is  because  the  
focus  turns  to  how  systems  transform,  in  interaction  with  social  movements. 
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 In  my  view,  it  has  proven  fruitful  to  supplement  empirically  informed  social  movement  
theory  with  conceptual  resources  from  SES  and  ANT,  in  order  to  go  beyond  the  micro-meso  link,  
and  also  study  the  meso-macro  link.  This  appears  to  me  as  being  a  fruitful  way  to  study  the  




7.5.0  Negative  and  positive  findings  in  Case  I 
 
7.5.1  Negative  findings:  some  possible  errors  in  the  Alta-dam  case 
What  remains  unknown  in  the  historiography  about  the  Alta-dam  conflict?  How  is  the  relationship  
between  the  issues  that  remain  under-researched  and  the  issues  that  are  politically  contested  in  the  
public  memory?  When  I  drafted  this  case  study  back  in  2010,  my  knowledge  was  too  scarce  to  
discuss  the  selection  of  data  within  the  “canonical"  historical  narrative.  During  my  fourth  field  trip  
to  Deatnu  River,  in  the  summer  of  2012,  I  also  travelled  via  the  Alta  River,  to  the  indigenous  rights  
festival  Riddu  Riđđu.  Contact  with  local  oral  history  and  local  historical  archives  gave  me  the  
competence  to  assess  some  of  the  issues  that  have  been  ignored  by  the  research,  as  well  as  some  of  
the  political  implications  of  this  ignorance. 
 a)  Ever  since  the  Alta-dam  struggle,  the  former  allies  in  the  anti-dam  coalition  have  
disagreed  on  the  relative  impact  of  Folkeaksjonen  and  Sameaksjonen,  the  environmentalist  
movement  and  the  indigenous  rights  movement.  At  the  end  of  Case  1,  primary  sources  charting  this  
contention  were  reviewed:  oral  history  from  the  Riddu  Riđđu  festival  in  2012,  and  newspaper  clips  
from  the  Tromsø  (Romsa,  Tromssa)  City  Archive. 
 b)  The  national  history  of  Norway  is  the  geographical  framing  chosen  in  the  “canonical  
narrative”  from  Dalland  through  Hjorthol.  That  may  be  justified  as  far  as  the  Explanandum  is  state  
transformation  in  one  particular  political  entity.  However,  few  attempts  have  been  undertaken  to  
trace  any  impact  of  causal  processes  that  appear  exogenous,  relative  to  the  state  as  an  analytical  
boundary.  The  interactions  between  the  Alta  conflict  and  other  Sámi  rights  conflicts  remain  under-
researched.  During  archival  research,  I  also  found  some  documents  indicating  that  the  two  
coalitions  induced  wide  transnational  networks.  To  ignore  such  causes  is  symptomatic  of  
Norwegian  methodological  nationalism. 
 c)  Finally,  the  accumulated  historiographical  research  has  looked  away  from  the  fact  that  
there  is  no  clear  consensus  on  what  coercive  force,  if  any,  has  social  legitimacy  among  the  local  
population  in  the  Alta  river  valley.  The  historians  have  taken  for  granted  that,  already  before  this  
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conflict  took  place,  the  state  had  consolidated  its  authority  in  those  parts  of  inner  Sápmi  where  it  
claimed  jurisdiction.  However,  my  field  observations,  discussed  at  the  end  of  Case  I  above,  indicate  
that  this  cannot  be  taken  for  granted,  but  is  rather  an  empirical  question,  particularly  in  the  upstream  
areas.  To  ignore  such  anthropological  conditions  is  methodological  statism. 
 The  existing  historical  research  on  the  Alta  dam  conflict  is  limited  by  methodological  
nationalism  and  statism.  These  are  the  same  type  of  limitations  that  Bauböck  has  identified  in  much  
research  on  European  “minorities”.710  I  find  it  worrying  when  the  same  biases  are  found  in  the  
research  on  the  Alta-dam  conflict,  especially  because  other  historians  have  found  proof  that  the  
same  areas  have  been  explicitly  administered  as  “Colonie”  during  certain  periods.711  Therefore,  it  is  
no  bold  interpretation  to  conclude  that  our  collective  lack  of  knowledge  regarding  certain  issues  in  
the  Alta-dam  conflict  does  constitute  a  residual  colonial  bias. 
 Of  the  three  issues  mentioned,  I  consider  the  latter  to  be  of  crucial  public  importance,  and  
therefore  I  choose  to  address  this  question  in  the  theoretical  discussion  at  the  end  of  this  thesis  (in  
Chapter  12.0.0). 
 Suggestions  for  further  research  regarding  the  Alta-dam  conflict:  From  what  was  
discussed  above,  it  follows  that  there  is  a  need  for  further  empirical  research  on  the  following  issues  
regarding  this  historical  case: 
 a)  Further  investigating  the  impact  of  Sameaksjonen,  and  other  ingdigenous  rights  NGOs,  
relative  to  the  impact  of  Folkeaksjonen  and  the  environmental  NGOs 
 b)  Broadening  the  geographical  scope  of  historical  knowledge  of  the  Alta-dam  conflict  by  
tracing  the  causes  and  effects  that  are  exogenous  to  the  nation-state,  firstly  by  tracing  the  particular  
transnational  links  and  alliances  of  the  actors  involved  (for  example  communication  with  other  
NGOs  or  other  governments),  secondly,  by  tracing  the  interactions  with  related  struggles  in  other  
places  in  Sápmi  and  Norden  (for  example  the  Taxed  Mountain  Case  in  Swedish  Sápmi). 
 c)  Deepening  the  sociological  density  of  historical  knowledge  on  the  Alta-dam  conflict,  by  
further  investigating  and  by  combining  the  political  history  of  this  eventful  protest  with  the  
anthropological  history  of  legal  pluralism  and  everyday  resistance  in  the  watershed.  Thus  we  could  
gain  a  “thicker”  description  of  how  the  formation  was  grounded  in  local  social  basis,  local  
subalterns,  and  local  commons.  While  we  already  have  some  knowledge  about  the  history  of  events  
in  this  case,  we  lack  knowledge  about  the  more  structural  history,  cultural,  social  and  economic,  of  
the  same  case. 
 Research  on  those  issues  may  not  be  sufficient  to  obtain  a  decolonized  knowledge  about  the  
Alta-dam  conflict.  After  all,  we  can  expect  that  there  will  remain  some  minority-within-the-
                                                 
710  Bauböck  2008;;  see  also  Eriksen  &  Hoëm  1999 
711  That  is,  at  least  in  Finnmark  County,  and  at  least  from  the  1820s  and  for  an  undefined  period,  see:  Pedersen  1999 
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minority,  whose  potential  research  interest  is  even  more  unknown.  For  example,  it  might  be  
interesting  to  apply  the  concept  of  “internal  colonialism”  to  map  the  situation  for  subalterns  within  
the  pro-dam  camp:  for  example  Coastal  Sámi  around  the  Alta  Fjord,  or  syndicalist  tile  workers  in  
Tverrdalen,  who  had  migrated  from  Østerdalen  in  Southern  Norway,  where  poor  peasants  had  been  
exploited  under  capitalism. 
 
 
7.5.2  Positive  findings:  “struggle  to  define  the  actual  hegemony”,  a  possible  meso-mechanism 
In  the  basis  of  Case  I,  and  in  spite  of  the  negtive  findings  reviewed  above,  it  is  possible  to  suggest  a  
possible  mechanism,  as  a  positive  finding.  Additionally,  the  case  studies  provided  some  empirical  
data  that  do  not  fit  with  a  state-centred  political  theory.  Now,  I  will  first  suggest  a  possible  
machanism,  and  then  bring  the  reader  on  the  track  of  the  non-state. 
 Struggle  to  define  the  actual  hegemony:  My  study  of  Case  1  indicates  that  this  this  
historical  event  was  a  struggle  for  the  social  power  to  define  what  were  the  valid  constitutional  
practices,  and  valid  epistemological  standards,  within  the  existing  state  formation.  Thus  it  was  a  
struggle  for  the  social  hegemony  to  define  how  a  political  hegemony  actually  was. 
 Unlike  the  canonical  historiographical  literature  on  the  topic,  I  did  not  assume  that  the  
conflict  was  one  between  the  state  and  the  people.  That  allowed  me  to  trace  the  formation  of  two  
antagonistic  political  blocs  that  split  the  government,  the  judiciary,  the  population  of  the  state,  and  
even  the  regional  community  along  the  river  itself.  The  pro-dam  and  anti-dam  blocs  both  included  
broad  coalitions  of  right-wing  and  left-wing  movements,  and  both  had  a  social  basis  among  some  
local  subaltern  groups.  The  anti-dam  bloc  was  stronger  in  upstream  areas,  where  the  ambiguity  
between  state  authority  and  Sámi  customs  was  relatively  outspoken.  The  pro-dam  bloc  was  stronger  
in  downstream  and  fjord  areas,  where  poor  fisher-peasants  demanded  economic  development.  In  the  
short  term,  the  struggle  ended  with  consolidation  of  the  pro-dam  bloc,  in  the  long  term,  it  led  to  
considerable  gains  for  the  anti-dam  bloc. 
 Thus,  Case  1  implies  one  short-term  and  one  long-term  impact  on  Explanans  2.  Neither  the  
short-term  nor  the  long-term  impact  was  revolutionary,  if  this  term  implies  a  military  coup.  Still,  the  
state  transformation  included  renewal  of  the  written  constitution.  Conservation  of  biological  
diversity  and  respect  for  human  rights  would  become  part  of  paragraph  110  in  the  Norwegian  
constitution.  Both  would  imply  an  obligation  to  respect  the  indigenous  rights  of  the  Sámi  people,  
and  this  issue  was  also  specifically  mentioned  in  a  specific  amendment.  Revision  of  the  written  
constitution  was  one  long-term  effect  of  the  Alta-dam  conflict.  However,  I  have  also  argued  that  the  
conflict  affected  constitutional  norms  of  an  informal  kind,  and  that  was  both  in  the  short  and  the  
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long  run.  I  have  argued  that  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission  disclosed  the  de  facto  presence  of  legal  
pluralism  in  areas  where  Sápmi  and  Norway  overlap,  regardless  of  whatever  might  have  been  the  de  
jure  opinion  of  the  state.  This  appears  to  correspond  to  the  interpretation  held  by  a  considerable  
faction  of  the  state´s  own  judiciary  branch  of  power,  already  during  the  Alta-dam  struggle.  The  
struggle  implied  that  the  legal  pluralists  challenged  the  hegemony  of  legal  statists,  those  who  
believed  in  the  unity  of  jurisprudence.  The  conflict  articulated  the  cleavage.  The  short-term  outcome  
was  a  restoration  of  the  old  hegemony,  but  since  the  cleavage  had  been  articulated,  the  restoration  
implied  the  suppression  of  the  minor  voice,  and  led  to  decreased  social  legitimacy  for  the  restored  
hegemony.  The  long-term  effect,  after  further  rounds  of  contention,  would  be  that  the  legal  
pluralists  took  over  the  hegemonic  position  within  the  state  apparatus.  Thus,  the  co-existence  
between  the  Norwegian  state  law  and  longstanding  Sámi  customs  is  no  longer  being  denied,  and  
thus,  the  actual  co-existence  has  become  less  suppressive,  but  pluralism  still  includes  tensions. 
 The  impact  of  Explanans  1,  social  ecology,  on  Explanandum,  state  transformation,  can  be  
explained  with  two  causal  links,  both  of  which  are  indicating  mutual  causality.  One  link  of  mutual  
causality  goes  directly  from  Explanans  1  to  Explanandum  (path  i).  Another  link  of  mutual  causality  
is  indirect,  because  it  passes  via  the  confounding  Explanans  2,  the  collectively  unknown  (paths  ii  
and  iii).   
 
Table  7-5:  A  meso-mechanism  observed  in  Case  I 
Struggle  to  define  present  hegemony  (meso-mechanism,  sub-case  1) 
i.  struggle  to  define  actual  hegemony  in  state  (valid  constitutional  norms  &  valid  scientific  praxes) 
ii.  diverging  pracical  realities  of  livelihoods  up-  or  downstream  (ecology,  policy  &  jurisdiction) 
iii.  diverging  scientific  disciplines  (technology  and  economy  versus  ecology  and  anthropology) 
 
 The  main  path  can  be  characterized  as  a  struggle  for  the  power  to  define  what  were  actually  
the  valid  constitutional  norms  of  the  existing  state  formation,  and  also,  what  should  be  certified  as  
valid  scientific  praxes  by  the  same  state.  The  redefinition  of  the  state  was  a  transformation  of  the  
state.  The  struggle  was  traced  as  a  struggle  for  the  social  power  to  define  the  actual  social  
hegemony  within  the  actual  state  hegemony.  I  traced  how  issue  networks  at  the  micro-meso  level  
upscaled  to  wider  formations,  through  processes  of  joint  action.  By  working  together,  new  
organizational  ties  were  generated.  By  deliberating  common  causes,  the  issues  were  re-defined.  This  
process  of  “network  twinning”,  well  known  from  some  social  movement  research,712  was  used  to  
explain  how  issue  networks  broadened  their  scope  of  action,  and  constituted  wider  historical  blocs.  
                                                 
712  Della  Porta  &  Piazza  2008 
 264  
 
However,  in  order  to  map  the  formations  that  emerged  at  meso-macro  level,  I  mobilized  resources  
from  ANT  and  SES.  Both  were  used  to  address  both  customary  praxes  and  knowledge  praxes.  ANT  
proved  useful  to  trace  particular  ties,  nodes  and  clusters,  within  particular  (and  mutually  entangled)  
issue  nets  and  policy  nets.  SES  was  used  to  address  general  trends,  structural  patterns  in  the  
environment  of  the  particular  networks  that  are  being  traced.  Thus,  with  a  little  help  from  our  
friends  ANT  and  SES,  the  concept  of  “network  twinning”  is  capable  of  explaining  the  entire  process  
whereby  locally  based  social  movements  may  broaden  to  become  issue  networks  with  constituent  
power,  becoming  entangled  with  policy  networks  within  the  constituted  order,  and  in  the  end  appear  
as  a  virtual historical  bloc,  competing  for  the  social  capacity  to  redefine  the  social  hegemony  within  
a  given  political  hegemony.  This  mechanism  provides  a  partial  explanation  of  how  Explanandum  is  
affected  by  Explanans  1  (i) 
 What  were  at  stake,  as  mentioned,  were  not  only  the  valid  constitutional  norms  of  the  state,  
but  also  what  the  state  should  define  as  valid  scientific  praxes.  In  this  conflict,  different  scientific  
disciplines  were  employed  to  serve  different  technical  and  political  interests.  Technology  and  
economy  were  used  to  serve  the  ruling  pro-dam  coalition,  while  ecology  and  anthropology  were  
mobilized  into  the  rising  anti-dam  coalition.  In  1982,  the  Norwegian  Supreme  Court  judged  that  
fishery  biology  would  be  irrelevant  because  the  Ministry  of  Industry  had  assessed  that  the  costs  of  
such  investigations  would  exceed  the  gains.  Thus,  the  Supreme  Court  judged  that  the  ecological  
facts  were  better  off  remaining  unknown  (ii). 
 The  divergent  knowledge  about  the  reality  held  by  the  scientists  of  each  bloc  found  
resonance  in  the  local  practical  realities  of  different  local  groups  in  different  parts  of  the  Alta  water  
area.  The  emerging  disciplines  of  ecology  and  anthropology  investigated  questions  that  resonated  
with  the  interests  of  upstream  subsistence  practitioners,  local  anglers  along  the  whole  river,  
prosperous  reindeer  owners  and  British  “salmon  lords”  who  used  to  angle  in  the  river.  However,  
most  people  in  the  downstream  area,  including  poor  tile  workers  and  Coastal  Sámi  fisher-peasants,  
found  more  resonance  in  the  prognosis  from  official  economists  and  technologists,  who  warned  
about  an  imminent  energy  crisis.  The  split  between  scientific  disciplines  found  resonance  in  a  split  
between  divergent  practical  realities  among  subsistence  practitioners  in  different  parts  of  the  
watershed  (iii). 
 It  should  be  observed  that  when  issue  networks  are  twinned,  broaden  their  scope  of  action,  
get  entangled  with  policy  networks,  and  generate  historical  blocs,  then  this  should  not  only  be  seen  
as  empowering  collective  action  on  a  large  scale,  but  also  as  the  formation  of  internal  relations  of  
domination  and  silencing.  Each  instance  of  network  twinning  implies  that  the  organizational  
networks  expand,  but  also  that  the  political  issues  are  re-defined.  Such  re-definition  may  be  more  or  
less  beneficial  for  the  common  good  of  all  participants.  Some  groups  may  find  themselves  relatively  
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marginalized  by  more  dominant  allies  within  a  coalition.  Such  groups  may  potentially  find  more  
attractive  alliances  other  places,  even  in  the  competing  coalition.  For  example,  SLF  was  created  by  
Coastal  Sámi  who  belonged  to  the  pro-dam  camp  and  the  hegemonic  political  bloc.  However,  they  
still  had  a  potential  common  cause  with  the  competing  Sámi  interest  organization  within  the  anti-
dam  camp,  NSR.  When  the  Alta-dam  conflict  came  to  an  end,  the  epilogue  of  the  conflict  would  
lead  to  alienation  between  issue  nets  for  environmental  protection  and  issue  nets  for  indigenous  
human  rights.  However,  at  the  same  time,  the  alienation  between  SLF  and  NSR  would  decrease. 
 This  has  potential  relevance  for  social  movement  theory.  In  my  view,  it  suggests  that  the  
“master  frame”  concept  is  generally  misleading,  because  this  concept  implies  a  general  
characteristic  about  the  issues  held  by  a  wide  issue  net.  The  cost  of  generalization  is  a  loss  of  
specificity,  and  the  “master  frame”  is  a  concept  that  may  contribute  to  further  silencing  of  the  
already  relatively  marginalized  voices  inside.  Above,  I  have  argued  that  constituent  issue  nets  may  
very  well  be  entangled  with  constituted  policy  nets.  Now  I  have  argued  that  in  neither  of  those  
entangled  networks  are  we  likely  to  find  any  homogeneous  culture,  not  even  any  homogeneous  
peripheral  community  or  any  homogeneous  central  government.  The  actual  structure  of  constituent  
issue  nets  and  constituted  policy  nets  appears  to  be  more  fractal,  similarly  to  the  ethnic  and  cultural  
pluralism  of  many  traditional  kinship  systems,  such  as  that  in  Sápmi. 
 
On  the  track  of  the  non-state:  My  research  on  the  Alta-dam  conflict  also  brought  me  onto  the  track  
of  the  non-state  in  Sápmi:  When  the  traditional  political  history  of  the  anti-dam  movement  was  
supplemented  with  ethnographic  sources  regarding  the  social-ecological  history  of  both  the  pro-dam  
and  anti-dam  blocs,  then  I  started  to  get  the  impression  that  the  state  was  not  alone  in  its  own  
territory.  When  I  later  engaged  with  my  ethnographic  research,  I  learned  that  local  people  in  some  
parts  of  Sápmi  still  maintain  and  develop  longstanding  customs  and  traditional  knowledge,  
regardless  of  whether  those  are  codified,  criminalized,  or  simply  ignored  by  the  states.  The  actual  
constituted  order  is  much  more  than  only  state-sanctioned  laws  and  state-certified  science.  It  also  
includes  informal  customs  and  lore.  However,  in  an  indigenous  homeland,  the  relationship  between  
those  different  constituted  orders  is  particularly  interesting  for  state  theory. 
 I  came  across  the  first  traces  of  the  non-state  during  my  research  on  the  Alta-dam  conflict.  
The  process  was  an  abductive  dialogue  between  the  selection  of  data  and  revision  of  concepts.  I  had  
started  out  by  seeing  the  constituted  order  as  identical  with  the  ideological  state  apparatus.  
However,  that  turned  out  to  be  a  misleading  conceptualization.  I  was  brought  on  the  track  of  the  
non-state  when  I  tried  to  apply  concepts  from  Deleuze  and  Guattari  to  describe  how  centralized  and  
territorial  power  was  confirmed  and  amplified,  and  that  fitted  well  with  their  Marxian  terms  of  state  
formation.  However,  their  terminology  no  longer  fit  when  I  tried  to  describe  the  local  social-
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ecological  conditions.  The  ethnographical  sources  I  had  used  indicated  that  human  ecologists  had  
observed  an  already  existing  socio-ecological  balance  in  the  Alta  watershed,  and  they  argued  that  
this  was  being  threatened  when  infrastructure  was  planned  without  consulting  stake  holders,  or  
documenting  ecological  conditions.713  The  local  human  ecology  was  portrayed  as  an  already  
existing  system  in  dynamic  equilibrium,  with  its  own  customary  norms  regulating  nature  use.  For  
me,  this  entails  that  Functionalist  human  ecologists  had  discovered  some  actual  local  conditions  that  
would  slip  out  of  the  gaze  with  Marxian  hegemony  theory.714 
 Further  traces  of  the  non-state  would  be  found  when  I  proceeded  to  conduct  ethnographic  
fieldwork  on  contemporary  salmon  fishery  management  in  the  Deatnu  watershed.  This  will  be  
presented  in  Chapter  11,  the  final  part  of  Case  II.  There  I  will  argue  that,  also  in  Coastal  Sápmi,  
there  are  at  least  some  areas  where  state  law  still  has  not  replaced  the  more  ancient  normative  order,  
which  appears  to  have  been  continuously  maintained  and  developed  after  the  siida  system.  
Therefore,  a  state  system  that  was  never  fully  consolidated  appears  to  co-evolve  with  a  siida  system  
that  never  fully  disappeared.  Only  at  the  end  of  Case  II,  will  it  be  possible  to  suggest  some  
mechanisms  to  explain  this  co-evolution. 
  
                                                 
713  Bjørklund  and  Brantenborg  1981 
714  For  Deleuze  and  Guattari  1988  (1980):  Chpt.  12,  all  political  order  is  hierarchical,  while  all  absence  of  hierarchy  is  
disorderly,  the  “nomadic  war  machine”.  However,  traditional  reindeer  nomadism  is  no  disorderly  practice,  but  on  the  
contrary  a  livelihood  adaptation  in  dynamic  equilibrium;;  regulated  by  customs,  adapted  to  the  environment  in  
bounded  territories. 
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8.1.0  Chapter  introduction 
 
The  present  chapter  returns  to  geography.  More  precisely,  it  engages  with  some  of  the  particular  
causal  processes  within  the  large-scale  historical-geographical  process  that  was  presented  in  the  
initial  geographical  overview  (Chapter  5.0.0).  The  present  chapter  is  intended  to  bridge  between  the  
two  case  studies:  the  Alta  water  area  from  1968  until  1983  (case  I),  and  the  Deatnu  water  area  from  
2005  until  2012  (case  II).  The  two  cases  deal  with  two  areas  that  are  different  but  adjacent,  and  two  
periods  that  are  also  different  but  adjacent.  In  order  to  trace  some  of  the  particular  processual  links  
between  the  two  cases,  a  historical-geographical  perspective  is  useful.  Thus  we  can  identify  
processual  ties  that  link  two  spatially  adjacent  areas  in  two  chronologically  adjacent  periods.  This  is  
not  only  a  crafty  way  to  link  the  two  case  studies,  but  it  is  also  a  way  to  trace  how  the  two  cases  
relate  to  the  wider  historical-geographical  process  of  transformation,  the  one  that  was  only  generally  
outlined  in  the  initial  geographical  overview. 
 The  initial  geographical  overview  zoomed  out,  to  provide  a  panorama  over  the  process  of  
state  transformation  in  the  High  North  (Chapter  5.0.0).  It  was  based  on  an  interpretation  of  
aggregate  data,  providing  a  general  overview  with  a  low  degree  of  specificity.  It  gave  a  panorama  in  
low  resolution.  The  present  chapter  will  zoom  in,  by  tracing  some  of  the  particular  causal  chains  at  
a  micro-sociological  level.  Thus,  we  will  gain  increased  specificity,  but  will  lose  generality.  It  will  
give  a  close  up  picture  in  high  resolution.  It  will  be  based  on  a  variety  of  data  sources. 
 Some  of  the  constituent  praxes,  the  micro-meso  links,  will  be  traced  on  the  basis  of  
historical  and  ethnographic  data  that  were  gathered  for  the  two  case  studies.  These  data  will  be  used  
to  trace  some  particular  praxis  networks  that  unfolded  through  particular  landscapes  at  particular  
moments  in  time.  I  will  trace  some  particular  issue  nets,  but  they  are  interwoven  with  kinship  nets  
and  policy  nets  in  the  environment.  Thus,  I  might  go  beyond  the  usual  limit  of  social  movement  
research,  but  this  wider  focus  on  praxis  networks  is  in  line  with  ANT  or  SES.  I  will  show  the  reader  
(constituent)  issue  nets  that  are  entangled  with  (constituted)  kinship  nets  and  (constituted)  policy  
nets;;  this  also  slightly  unsettles  Paul  Routlege's  Marxian  concept  “terrains  of  hegemony  and  
resistance”.  Indeed  I  will  trace  contentious  practices  that  are  being  played  out  in  concrete  terrains.  
However,  this  theatre  lacks  a  clearly  polarized  dramaturgical  structure.  The  actual  dynamic  of  
contention  observed  in  the  historical  bridge  does  not  appear  to  be  dialectical,  but  is  rather  complex  
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and  ambiguous.  This  is  what  will  be  found  when  I  zoom  in  to  trace  some  selected  causal  pathways,  
with  a  high  degree  of  specification,  the  close-up  picture  with  high  resolution.  This  is  analyzed  in  the  
chapter  conclusion. 
 Some  aspects  of  the  constituted  order,  or  meso-macro  formations,  will  be  sketched  by  using  
policy  documents  and  secondary  sources.  Those  sources  will  be  approached  in  line  with  
“comparative  politics”  in  conventional  political  science.  I  will  compare  how  some  of  the  issues  of  
the  new  social  movements  were  accommodated  and  coopted  in  the  form  of  clearly  separated  
administrative  areas,  namely:  environmental  protection  policies  and  indigenous  rights  policies.  I  
will  include  data  about  the  two  states  that  are  directly  involved  in  the  two  selected  watersheds,  
namnely:  Norway  and  Finland.  (Sweden  and  Russia  control  other  parts  of  Sápmi,  outside  the  Alta  
and  Deatnu  watersheds.)  Accommodation  of  social  movements,  as  well  as  comparisons  across  
states,  are  topics  that  were  typical  of  the  early  work  of  Rokkan.715  But  the  issue  of  cooptation  has  
more  recently  come  into  focus.716  Finally,  I  will  discuss  if  regionalization  and  europeanization  have  
opened  up  a  new  terrain  for  district  politics  across  state  boundaries.  District  politics  is  a  core  topic  
in  Nordic  political  practice.  It  may  be  a  process  of  accommodation  and  cooptation  with  regard  to  
the  centre-periphery  cleavage.  This  final  discussion  of  the  chapter  is  inspired  by  the  later,  
geopolitical  work  of  Rokkan.717  Whenever  I  follow  the  example  of  Rokkan's  late  or  early  work,  this  
latter  part  of  the  chapter  again  zooms  out  to  sketch  a  panorama  in  low  resolution.  This  part  is  
mainly  descriptive,  providing  background  for  Case  II. 
 Both  parts  of  the  chapter  are  roughly  structured  according  to  the  conceptual  divisions  in  
Elinor  Ostrom's  SES  framework.  However,  this  was  not  a  choice  that  was  given  beforehand.  The  
process  of  writing  was  in  itself  an  abductive  process,  where  data  input  led  me  to  the  revision  of  
coding  categories.  Through  this  dialogue  between  data  and  concepts,  the  SES  framework  gradually  
emerged  as  a  useful  source  of  explanatory  hypotheses.  As  also  in  the  geographical  introduction,  I  
define  Explanandum  and  Explanans  1  in  terms  of  SES:  Explanandum  is  formal  norms  in  the  actual  
governance  system  within  a  social-ecological  system.  Explanans  1  is  the  environment  of  the  formal  
norms,  that  is,  the  rest  of  the  social-ecological  system.  Thus  it  consists  of  the  informal  norms  in  the  
actual  governance  system,  but  also  the  resource  system.  Explanans  1  can  therefore  be  divided  into  
resource  geography  and  cultural  geography  (both  aspects  of  the  landscape  geography). 
 The  chapter  conclusion  ends  with  an  analysis  of  the  micro-meso  links  that  are  observed  in  
the  chapter.  Thus,  I  suggest  one  more  hypothetical  explanatory  mechanism  at  the  end  of  this  
chapter. 
                                                 
715  See  Rokkan  1970 
716  Dryzek  et.al.  2003;;  Bregnballe  2005;;  Johansson  1990 
717  See  Rokkan  &  Flora  1999 
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8.2.0 Micro-political relations: constituent praxes 
 
The  two  case  studies  deal  with  two  different  localities:  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  water  systems.  
However,  the  two  studies  also  deal  with  two  different  temporalities,  with  historical  data  from  the  
Alta  water  system,  and  ethnographic  data  from  the  Detanu  water  system.  The  historical  case  study  
from  the  Alta  River  described  a  political  conflict  over  hydropower  development,  which  was  
instrumental  to  bringing  about  the  institutionalization  of  policies  for  environmental  protection  and  
indigenous  rights.  Thus,  this  conflict  is  known  as  a  historically  significant  event.  The  ethnographic  
case  study  from  the  Deatnu  River  will  demonstrate  contemporary  contentions  over  the  
implementation  of  such  policies  in  a  water  system  that  is  located  at  the  border  between  two  state  
territories,  but  also  in  the  heartland  of  Sápmi,  the  indigenous  homeland.  Thus,  this  case  has  been  
selected  for  its  geographical  significance.  Local  vulnerable  ecosystems  and  local  indigenous  
livelihoods  had  been  administratively  split  by  the  political  geography  of  the  nation-states,  and  thus,  
the  implementation  of  policies  for  environmental  protection  and  indigenous  rights  produces  a  new  
political  geography.  Such  a  situation  is  not  unique  for  our  selected  cases,  but  is  typical  of  the  
interactions  between  states  on  the  one  hand,  and  indigenous  and  environmental  movements  on  the  
other.718  Thus,  the  impact  of  such  movements  frequently  involves  not  only  policy  implementation,  
but  also  polity  transformation.  That  is  also  the  case  for  the  particular  regional  reforms  that  are  
exemplified  with  our  two  selected  case  studies. 
 The  two  cases  exemplify  some  historical  process  and  some  geographical  extension  in  the  
transformation  of  political  geography  in  the  sub-arctic  fringe  of  the  Nordic  countries,  an  area  with  a  
particularly  rich  but  vulnerable  natural  and  cultural  heritage. 
 Thus,  the  two  cases  show  a  rather  complex  relation  between  temporal  and  spatial  
dimensions.  They  show  micro-political  action  in  particular  processes  and  particular  locations,  
which  interact  with  the  macro-political  emergence  of  formations  with  some  particular  geographical  
extension  and  some  particular  historical  durability.  Thus,  ideographic  studies  of  two  particular  
micro-political  cases  have  been  selected  to  trace  some  particular  interactions  with  some  particular  
macro-political  transformations. 
 We  will  trace  some  particular  networks  at  the  microsociological  level,  whereby  the  historical  
Alta-dam  case  is  connected  to  the  ethnographic  Deatnu  water  system  case.  We  trace  a  network  of  
particular  microsociological  processes  that  link  concrete  praxes  in  one  watershed  at  one  period  of  
time,  with  praxes  in  another  watershed  at  another  period  of  time.  Along  the  way,  we  will  not  only  
trace  how  those  networks  of  processes  connect  those  two  particular  times  and  places.  Additionally,  
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we  will  also  trace  how  they  connect  localized  praxes  within  those  watersheds  to  other  praxes  that  
are  localized  within  economic  centers  of  accumulation,  bureaucratic  centers  of  command-and-
control,  and  scientific  “centers  of  calculation”.  This,  according  to  Bruno  Latour,  is  a  way  in  which  
the  making  and  maintenance  of  geographical  scales  can  be  traced.  Or,  in  the  terminology  of  
McGinnis  and  Ostrom,  we  trace  praxes  at  various  “levels  of  accumulation”  within  an  actual  




8.3.0  Networks  of  resource  units  and  resource  systems:  resource  geography 
 
8.3.1  Physical  resource  geography 
During  the  Alta-dam  contention,  the  Deatnu  River  was  involved  at  an  early  stage.  Because  of  the  
physical  proximity  between  the  two  rivers,  the  engineers  had  included  the  lake  Iešjárvi  in  their  over-
ambitious  first  plan.719  This  lake  is  a  main  tributary  to  the  Deatnu  River,  via  the  Karašjohka  River.  
Thus,  the  initial  plan  not  only  implied  that  the  Sámi  village  Máze  would  be  put  under  water,  but  
additionally,  that  the  water  course  of  the  great  border  river  Deatnu  would  be  heavily  disturbed.  
Damming  of  the  border  river  was  unacceptable  for  the  Finnish  state,  and  caused  a  diplomatic  
protest.  That  added  force  to  the  resistance  that  had  emerged  via  the  local  protests  in  Máze.  With  
protests  from  both  local  and  diplomatic  levels,  the  Norwegian  government  decided  to  scale  down  
the  initial  ambitions.  Neither  Iešjárvi  nor  Máze  would  be  touched.  In  the  context  of  the  Deatnu  
water  area,  the  threat  to  dam  Iešjárvi  had  been  one  of  many  chapters  in  the  long  history  of  
contentious  deliberation  about  the  management  of  shared  resources  in  a  shared  river.  The  present  
contention  about  fishery  regulations  in  Deatnu  is  the  present  chapter  in  this  history. 
 The  network:  The  protests  at  local  and  diplomatic  level  implied  that  the  information  passed  
through  quite  different  socio-material  networks,  operating  at  quite  different  scales  of  accumulation.  
First,  the  most  important  link  is  the  short  physical  distance  between  the  two  river  networks,  and  also  
the  potential  energy  that  would  be  released  by  establishing  an  extra  link  from  Iešjárvi  Lake  down  to  
Alta  River.  The  protests  were  triggered  by  the  actual  dependencies  that  existed  in  physical-
biological-human  relations.  In  Máze,  the  livelihood  was  threatened  by  the  possibility  that  the  whole  
village  would  be  put  under  water.  For  anglers  in  Finland,  destruction  of  the  main  salmon  river  under  
Finnish  jurisdiction  would  be  a  heavy  loss,  and  thus,  this  immediately  became  an  issue  of  national  
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concern  for  the  Finnish  government.  Protests  in  Máze  took  place  locally,  during  a  visit  from  the  
government,  when  representatives  from  a  particular  centre  of  command-and-control  were  brought  
into  a  particular  locality  where  stake  holders  resided.  Diplomatic  protest  was  mediated  throughout  
the  cybernetic  system  of  the  Finnish  nation-state,  and  was  expressed  through  the  embassy  located  in  




8.3.2  Biogeographical  resource  geography 
During  the  Alta-dam  contention,  sustainable  management  of  the  local  salmon  stocks  was  one  of  the  
issues  at  stake.  This  is  also  the  main  issue  in  contemporary  controversies  on  bioregional  
management  in  the  Deatnu  River.  But  the  political  coalitions  differ  between  those  two  periods  and  
areas.  In  the  Alta-conflict,  salmon  biologists  and  Sámi  activists  were  aligned  with  the  oppositional  
anti-dam  bloc.  Their  views  were  rejected  by  the  hegemonic  pro-dam  bloc.  The  state  engineers  had  
initially  employed  a  young  salmon  biologist  to  map  potential  impacts  on  the  salmon  stock,  but  
when  his  report  was  overlooked  by  the  policy-makers,  he  was  angered  and  joined  the  anti-dam  
movement.720  The  anti-dam  movement  had  regular  correspondence  with  a  wide  network  of  
environmental  organizations  around  the  globe.721  This  included  a  renowned  salmon  biologist  from  
Scotland,  who  was  summoned  as  a  witness  in  the  final  Supreme  Court  trial.  The  Supreme  Court  
decision  from  1982  presented  arguments  from  witnesses  on  both  sides.  The  representative  for  the  
Ministry  of  Industry  argued  that  any  assessment  of  biological  impact  would  demand  an  immense  
data-gathering  task  for  field  biologists.  Thus,  the  cost  of  mapping  such  data  would  be  much  higher  
than  their  utility,  the  Ministry  argued.722  At  this  time,  ecology  was  a  new  discipline,  and  ecological  
monitoring  systems  had  not  been  established.  More  thatn  two  decades  later,  in  2006,  the  directorate  
that  was  responsible  for  the  damming  of  Alta  river  published  a  handbook  whose  title  gives  a  
summary  of  its  content:  “Ecological  Conditions  in  Waterways:  consequences  of  changes  in  the  flow  
of  water,  a  collection  of  current  knowledge”.723  This  is  a  popularization  of  the  knowledge  now  held  
by  the  directorate  on  the  ecological  issues  that  were  controversial  back  in  1982.  In  the  meantime,  
ecological  monitoring  systems  have  been  established,  and  environmental  impact  assessments  have  
become  standard  in  the  planning  process.  Thus,  in  contemporary  contentions  on  bioregional  
management  of  Deatnu  River,  the  fishery  biologists,  and  their  “epistemic  community”,  have  
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become  accommodated,  within  the  Directorate  for  Nature  Management.  At  the  same  time,  the  Sámi  
rights  movement  has  been  accommodated  in  the  three  state-certified  Sámi  Parliaments.  During  the  
Alta-dam  struggle,  sports  anglers  and  indigenous  rights  activisst  were  allied;;  in  the  present  
controversies  concerning  the  Deatnu  River  they  are  adversaries.  During  my  fieldwork  along  the  
Deatnu  River  and  in  other  related  sites,  I  met  with  legal  anthropologists  and  salmon  biologists  with  
close  ties  to  those  institutions.  From  my  fieldwork,  I  have  the  impression  that  it  is  commonly  held  
knowledge  in  “the  field”  that  these  two  institutions  have  different  stances  vis-a-vis  fundamental  
issues:  Regarding  the  question  of  what  biodiversity  protection  actually  entails,  one  camp  tend  to  see  
this  as  nature  conservation,  another  as  sustainable  usage.  Regarding  the  question  of  what  the  
relevant  norms  actually  are,  one  camp  seems  to  subscribe  only  to  individual  and  state  rights,  while  
the  other  camp  additionally  also  adheres  to  collective  human  rights,  including  indigenous  rights.  
However,  when  those  state  institutions  take  diverging  stances  to  certain  issues,  then  this  can  be  seen  
as  local  hegemonies  within  two  administratively  separated  policy  areas.  The  official  stances  of  
those  state  institutions  conceal  the  actual  plurality  of  stances  and  the  actual  unfinished  debates  
within  the  fields  of  environmental  protection  and  indigenous  rights.  In  fact,  those  two  issues  have  
actually  been  integrated  in  several  treaties  and  laws.724  Those  treaties  and  laws  may  also  be  made  
relevant  for  the  interpretation  of  the  more  specialized  treaties  and  laws.725  Therefore,  what  have  
been  administratively  separated  as  different  policy  areas  could  equally  well  be  interpreted  as  two  
sides  of  the  same  coin:  sustainable  management  of  the  world's  natural  and  cultural  heritage.  Such  
an  integrated  policy  is  exemplified  by  a  recent  set  of  guidelines  for  biodiversity  protection  in  Sámi  
territories,  enacted  by  the  Sámi  Parliament  of  Norway.726 
 Micropolitical  links:  The  structural  changes  described  above  may  be  exemplified  with  
selected  samples  of  particular  praxis  nets  that  link  the  cases  two  cases,  at  the  level  of  tangible  
sensual  experience  and  concrete  inter-personal  relations.  One  such  sample  is  Master  of  Science  
thesis  that  I  learned  to  know  at  the  municipal  library  in  Tana  Bru.  Kjell  Moen  was  a  salmon  
biologist  who  undertook  his  Master  of  Science  on  the  salmon  of  the  Alta  River  during  the  
controversy.727  Thus,  his  research  was  of  direct  relevance  for  the  controversy  at  the  time.  Through  
the  observational  methods  of  the  field  biologist,  he  studied  the  web  of  nutrition  in  the  river.  In  
popular  terms,  the  question  was  how  many  young  salmon  the  ducks  of  the  river  were  eating.  This  is  
an  issue  of  relevance  for  human  fishers,  who  are  a  competing  predator  species. 
 In  2010  the  archive  of  Kjell  Moen  could  be  found  at  the  public  library  in  Deatnu  (Tana)  
                                                 
724  See  also  the  UN  Agenda  21  (1992a),  the  UN  Biodiversity  Convention  (UN  1992b),  and  finally,  the  Norwegian  
Biodiversity  Act:  Norwegian  Parliament  2009 
725  The  North  Atlantic  wild  salmon  conservation  convention  (NASCO  1984),  the  EU  Water  Framework  Directive  (EU  
Parliament  2000) 
726  Sámediggi  Norway  2005  (thanks  to  Gro  Ween  for  sharing  the  document) 
727  Moen  1983 
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Municipality.  After  he  had  finished  his  master’s  thesis,  he  continued  his  career  as  an  expert  
employed  by  the  County  Governor.  His  office  had  been  in  the  town  of  Vadsø,  a  day's  travel  to  the  
east  of  Deatnu  River.  However,  as  a  passionate  field  biologist,  he  had  been  well  known  by  the  local  
population  along  Deatnu  River.  He  had  travelled  up  and  down  the  river  to  do  observations  on  
salmon  biotopes  and  fishermen's  techniques.  Thus,  this  field  biologist  had  established  a  special  
connection  to  this  socio-ecosystem.  Therefore,  when  he  died,  his  wife  chose  to  donate  his  personal  
archive  to  the  local  population.  He  had  left  an  unfinished  book  about  salmon  and  salmon  fisheries  
on  the  Deatnu  River.  This  manuscript  I  had  the  opportunity  to  read  in  2011,  during  one  of  my  visits  
to  the  local  salmon  biologist  Kjell  Magne  Johnsen,  then  an  employee  at  the  local  cooperative  for  
traditional  salmon  fisheries  (LBT).  He  expressed  nostalgia  for  the  good  old  times  when  the  experts  
from  the  County  Governor  still  prioritized  field  biological  observations.  After  Moen,  they  spent  
more  time  doing  office  work,  and  less  time  on  field  biology.  One  year  later,  I  met  the  biologist  again  
when  I  was  on  a  fishing  trip  in  the  forest.  We  were  both  on  fieldwork.  The  local  biologist  found  time  
to  do  field  biology  in  between  his  office  tasks.  His  hiking  and  angling  gear  are  stored  together  with  
the  accountant’s  folders  and  copy  machine.  With  my  two  selected  specimen  of  field  biologists,  there  
appears  to  be  a  correlation  between  prioritizing  fieldwork  and  being  close  to  the  local  social  field.  
Johnsen  is  a  native,  but  Moen  was  not.  However,  in  his  archive,  I  found  much  literature  on  
sustainable  development  from  the  1990s,  with  an  emphasis  on  Local  Agenda  21  and  active  popular  
participation.728 
 This  is  the  kind  of  attitude  that  the  local  indigenous  rights  activists  miss  when  they  deal  with  
contemporary  state  agencies  for  environmental  management.  The  activists  have  found  support  in  
the  Sámi  Parliament,  which  emphasises  that  the  active  participation  of  local  and  indigenous  peoples  
is  demanded  by  the  UN  Convention  on  Biological  Diversity.729  Not  only  does  the  Directorate  of  
Nature  Management  allow  little  time  for  field  biological  observation  in  the  Deatnu  River,  but  it  also  
allows  little  room  for  biologists  participating  in  the  local  community,  and  even  less  for  local  people  
actively  participating  in  the  policy  process.  Local  subsistence  fishers  conduct  field  observations  
during  their  everyday  work,  and  they  discuss  various  hypotheses  about  competing  predator  species  
eating  their  salmons.  However,  no  field  biologists  are  free  to  investigate  hypotheses  proposed  by  the  
local  fishermen's  agenda,  since  no-one  would  or  could  pay  for  it.     
 The  network:  These  are  particular  lines  traced  throughout  a  particular  network  of  bio-
scientific  practice.  First  and  foremost,  the  salmon  biologists  have  gathered  information  from  the  
actual  but  invisible  ecological  web  of  energy  distribution.  These  webs  include  the  accumulated  
transfer  of  nutrition  from  preys  to  preditors;;  the  fish  migration  routes  hidden  under  the  water  
                                                 
728  Private  archive  of  fishery  biologist  Kjell  Moen,  at  the  municipal  public  library  in  Tana  Bru  (Tana  folkebibliotek) 
729  UN  1992b;;  Sámediggi  Norway  2005  (thanks  to  Gro  Ween  for  sharing  the  document) 
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surface;;  or  genealogies  of  phenotypes,  that  can  be  read  by  analyzing  genetic  samples.  Accumulating  
and  systematizing  such  information  has  been  a  laborious  and  time-consuming  process.  Acts  of  data  
gathering  and  data  processing  feed  into  each  other,  as  a  praxis  network.  This  has  unfolded  over  time  
and  constituted  particular  cybernetic  systems  of  organization.  During  the  Alta-dam  struggle,  salmon  
biologists  were  only  briefly  involved  with  the  state  bureaucracy,  but  soon  they  were  enrolled  into  
the  emergent,  decentralized  and  flexible  cybernetic  system  that  was  the  anti-dam  movement.  The  
transnational  epistemic  community  empowered  itself  through  interaction  between  bureaucracies  and  
movements.  The  biography  of  Moen  is  one  particular  link  between  our  two  case  studies,  and  one  
that  is  particularly  rich  in  information  and  connections.  He  not  only  directed  his  attention  from  the  
one  river  system  to  the  other,  but  he  also  ascended  from  a  scientific  practice  closer  to  the  social  
movements  to  a  scientific  practice  that  became  institutionalized  at  the  offices  of  the  County  
Governor.  This  exemplifies  the  emergence  of  a  polycentric  and  flexible  cybernetic  system  with  
which  one  can  become  involved  today.  How  it  functions  in  the  Deatnu  area  is  exemplified  by  the  
contemporary  activities  of  Johnsen  and  other  salmon  biologists  studying  this  water  area.  Thus,  it  
constitutes  a  specific  formation  within  the  socio-ecosystem.  During  my  fieldwork,  the  fieldworker  
became  one  particular  agent  within  this  network  formation.  When  I  met  Johnsen  on  my  fishing  trip,  
or  visited  the  biologist  Länsmann  at  her  office  in  the  Finnish  research  station  RKTL,  they  informed  
me  with  data  from  their  own  research  community,  while  my  input  to  tjhe  conversation  was  
questions  guided  by  social  theory.  The  network  of  bioscientific  praxes  that  I  have  observed  in  the  
field  is  not  only  one  of  practically  guided  research  and  instrumental  policy  implementation.  It  is  
also  one  of  struggle  for  research  priorities  and  contentious  policy  development.  There  is  a  struggle  





In  the  case  of  the  Deatnu  River,  the  institutionalization  of  ecological  assessment  created  an  eco-
technocracy.  This  technocracy  is  busy  with  office  work  and  becomes  alienated  from  the  local  social-
ecological  field.  The  eco-technocracy  has  close  ties  to  the  Angler's  Association,  but  has  become  
alienated  from  the  movements  for  bio-cultural  diversity  and  environmental  justice.  From  a  long-
term  historical  perspective,  the  contemporary  eco-technocracy  can  be  seen  as  a  minor  reform  of  the  
technocracy  that  existed  at  the  time  of  the  Alta-dam  struggle.  In  the  Nordic  countries,  technocratic  
environmental  management  was  instituted  during  the  “green  revolution”  in  agriculture,  by  
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reformers  who  promoted  scientifically  informed  decision-making.730  At  the  same  time,  landscape  
protection  based  on  aesthetic  criteria  was  instituted  by  a  national  romanticist  urban  bourgeoisie.  
During  the  Alta-dam  conflict,  this  notion  of  nature  preservation  had  been  challenged  by  the  more  
radical  concepts  of  ecological  balance  and  social  justice.  In  the  Norwegian  policy,  the  
environmental  technocracy  opened  itself  up  to  the  institutionalization  of  “ecocentric”  concerns.  In  
the  Finnish  polity,  by  contrast,  the  management  of  Deatnu  salmon  is  still  more  influenced  by  the  
agricultural  technocracy.  Thus,  during  the  1990s,  the  two  governments  disagreed  over  whether  or  
not  statistical  uncertainty  was  a  reason  to  show  precaution  withregard  to  overconsumption  of  the  
fish,  or  instead,  a  reason  to  show  precaution  vis-à-vis  oversteering  the  fisheries.731  Disagreement  
and  deliberation  led  to  funding  of  more  biological  research,  better  data,  and  more  targeted  
regulations.  This  allocation  of  resources  to  bio-science  was  not  steered  by  scientific  concerns  alone,  
but  was  influenced  by  political  choices  and  particular  economic  interests.  The  Finnish  Anglers'  
Association  is  in  favor  of  selling  licenses  at  a  price  that  is  affordable  for  common  people.  Angling  is  
popular  as  sport  and  subsistence  all  over  Finland.  The  Norwegian  Anglers'  Association  is  more  
favorable  toward  expensive  licenses.  This  national  association  is  more  dominated  by  persons  from  
the  national  romantic  urban  bourgeoisie.  However,  it  is  also  relevant  to  consider  that  the  Deatnu  is  
more  important  for  Finnish  anglers  than  for  the  Norwegian  ones.  According  to  NASCO  statistics,  
Norway  has  480  salmon  rivers,  while  Finland  has  only  two.732  This  number  says  nothing  about  the  
size  of  the  fish  stocks  and  the  biomass  caught  in  each  river,  but  the  difference  is  so  striking  that  it  
may  nevertheless  give  an  indication.  Those  are  the  economic  interests  that  influence  the  political  
choices  that  define  the  opportunity  structures  for  bio-scientific  research.  With  regard  to  the  
mentioned  economic  interests,  the  deliberations  between  the  two  governments  may  have  sorted  out  
the  research  priorities  that  are  relevant  to  maintain  sustainable  fisheries.  However,  this  organization  
of  knowledge  has  not  only  channelled  certain  research  agendas  associated  with  some  economic  
interests.  It  has  also  silenced  and  suppressed  cartain  other  research  agendas,  associated  with  other  
economic  interests.  Those  are  the  various  fisheries  that  contribute  to  maintenance  of  traditional  
Sámi  culture:  net  fishing  in  the  river,  net  fishing  in  the  fjord,  and  oaggun,  a  form  of  angling.  The  
Norwegian  Sámi  Parliament  frames  those  interests  according  to  two  lines  of  argument:  indigenous  
human  rights  become  an  argument  about  environmental  justice;;  while  bio-cultural  diversity  is  an  
argument  about  sustainable  biodiversity;;  and  both  are  legitimized  with  reference  to  UN  treaties. 
 
 
                                                 
730  Asdal  2011 
731  Ween  (in  prep.) 
732  NASCO  river  database  http://www.nasco.int/RiversDatabase.aspx  retrieved  February  2013 
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8.3.4  Agenda  setting  in  environmental  sciences 
Such  interactions  between  bio-science,  politics  and  economy  are  researched  in  the  interdisciplinary  
field  called  “environmental  science”.  Some  scholars  study  politics  in  terms  of  “policy  networks”,  
which  include  social  movements,  scientists,  and  policy  makers.  Powerful  constellations  within  the  
policy  networks  are  sometimes  referred  to  as  “iron  triangles”,  composed  of  particular  economic  
interests,  particular  political  priorities,  and  particular  scientific  groups.733  With  regard  to  the  Deatnu  
River,  those  concepts  apply  to  the  bio-scientific  priorities  of  the  Norwegian  eco-technocracy  and  the  
Finnish  agricultural-technocracy.  In  Deatnu  River,  two  iron  triangles  each  enjoy  political  hegemony  
at  each  side  of  the  state-border,  and  so  far  they  have  not  merged  into  one  constellation  of  interests.  
In  the  Deatnu  water  area  as  a  whole,  this  situation  of  unresolved  inter-state  competition  should  be  
seen  as  constituting  the  actual  social  hegemony.  (If  unresolved  inter-state  competition  is  called  
“anarchy”,  then  this  social  hegemony  is  “the  reign  of  anarchy”.)  On  the  oppositional  side  are  the  
local  and  Sámi  subsistence  practices,  their  interest  organizations,  the  municipal  democracies  and  the  
Sámi  parliaments.  This  coalition  is  based  in  the  local  communities,  in  spite  of  the  divisive  state  
border,  and  togeryher  they  mobilise  for  the  maintenance  and  development  of  community-based  
management  of  common  natural  resources.  (If  community  control  over  common  resources  is  “the  
common  good”,  then  the  counter-hegemonic  force  defends  “The  Common”.) 
The  strategic  position  of  the  various  interests  within  the  policy  network  is  an  issue  about  
agenda  setting.  This  is  an  issue  of  inclusion  and  exclusion  in  the  state-codified  policy  processes.  
However,  it  is  also  an  issue  of  informal  deliberative  democracy  in  the  public  sphere.  The  relatively  
subaltern  fishery  interests  use  those  informal  channels  in  order  to  empower  their  own  capacity  for  
agenda  setting.  “Democratization  of  the  sciences”  is  an  issue  for  the  chemist  Isabelle  Stengers,  who  
turned  to  “Science  and  Technology  Studies”.  In  her  study  of  medical  research  and  drug  addicts,  she  
shows  how  research  priorities  are  being  steered  by  political  processes  that  exclude  and  suppress  the  
agendas  of  subaltern  persons  who  are  supposed  to  enjoy  the  fruits  of  the  medical  research.734  A  
democratization  of  science  would  constitute  a  counter-power  to  the  iron-triangle  within  a  scientific  
discipline.  For  political  sociology,  the  concept  of  the  “iron  triangle”  should  be  seen  as  a  variety  of  
“critical  elite  theory”.735  The  discrete  ties  between  leaders  of  political  parties,  influential  interest  
groups,  and  scientific  experts,  are  instances  of  policy  making  with  little  transparency,  what  has  been  
called  democrazia  e  segreto,  or  “democracy  and  secrecy”.736  But  contemporary  political  
sociologists  also  search  for  actual  self-empowerment  among  subaltern  groups  within  the  policy  
                                                 
733 Jordan & O'Riordan 2000 
734  Stengers  1999  (1997) 
735  Nash  2000 
736  Bobbio  &  Rivelli  2011 
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networks.737  Those  constellations  of  interests  may  be  seen  as  “social  movement  networks”  
committed  to  an  informal  form  of  “participatory  discursive  democratization”.738  Those  terms,  when  
applied  to  the  realm  of  science  and  technology,  describe  the  effort  to  “democratise  the  sciences”.   
In  our  case,  the  oppositional  or  emerging  camp  (the  movement  in  defence  of  “The  
Common”)  has  found  some  degree  of  support  in  the  environmental  policy  of  the  Sámi  Parliaments,  
but  so  far,  the  latter  are  not  powerful  enough  to  compete  with  the  agenda  setting  of  the  particular  
interests  that  have  been  constituted  as  “national  interests”  in  the  policies  of  the  Norwegian  and  
Finnish  governments  (The  Reign  of  “Anarchy”).  As  long  as  the  Sámi  parliament  is  allied  to  local  
subaltern  interests,  the  push  to  empower  a  specifically  Sámi  environmental  politics  is  also  a  push  




8.4.0  Networks  of  human  actors  and  informal  rules:  cultural  geography 
 
8.4.1  Self-reflexive  cultural  geography 
During  the  Alta-dam  contention,  Norwegian  public  opinion  became  aware  of  grievances  among  the  
Sámi  population.  With  regard  to  the  Sápmi  homeland,  it  became  politically  possible  to  publicly  
discuss  the  indigenous  demands  of  self-determination.  In  the  final  Supreme  Court  trial,  the  
association  of  reindeer  herders  hired  a  Sámi  lawyer,  Leif  Dunfjeld,  to  advocate  their  cause.  They  
called  two  anthropologists  as  witnesses  to  describe  the  ecological  and  economic  vulnerability  of  
reindeer  nomadism  along  the  Alta  River.739  The  Supreme  Court  rejected  their  expertise  and  chose  
instead  to  accept  the  expertise  of  an  agronomist  that  had  been  appointed  by  the  Ministry  of  Industry.  
At  that  moment,  the  Alta-dam  issue  had  grown  from  being  an  issue  of  environmental  and  minority  
polices  of  the  state,  to  an  issue  about  the  legitimacy  of  the  polity  itself.  Large-scale  civil  
disobedience  was  a  new  and  unorthodox  form  of  public  participation,  and  the  issue  of  indigenous  
rights  for  a  trans-boundary  population  had  made  the  police  paranoid  of  the  hypothetical  possibility  
of  a  separatist  guerilla  movement.740  The  concept  of  “legal  pluralism”  was  still  controversial.741  
Claims  of  overlapping  jurisdictions  were  re-defined  by  the  political  class  as  a  potential  threat  to  the  
polity.  What  was  a  challenge  against  a  particular  governing  coalition  was  translated  by  this  coalition  
                                                 
737  Nash  2000 
738  Della  Porta  &  Diani  2009;;  della  Porta  2011:  17 
739  Bjørklund  &  Brantenborg  1981 
740  Hjorthol  2006 
741  Mathiesen  1992  (1984) 
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as  being  a  threat  to  state  security.  Thus,  the  Supreme  Court  chose  to  discipline  the  anti-dam  
coalition.  In  1982,  it  strictly  rejected  the  claims  of  the  anti-dam  party.  Thereafter  in  1983,  it  
confirmed  the  fines  that  had  been  given  for  civil  disobedience.  Those  moves  not  only  disciplined  
the  protestors,  but  also  the  national  court  systems,  where  many  local  and  regional  courts  had  ruled  
in  the  favor  of  the  protestors.  However,  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission,  which  had  been  set  up  in  
order  to  put  an  immediate  end  to  a  hunger  strike,  was  allowed  to  conduct  its  investigations.  As  the  
transnational  indigenous  rights  movement  succeeded  in  influencing  human  rights  legislation  at  the  
UN  level,  it  was  possible  for  the  Commission  at  least  to  take  a  conciliatory  approach.  Already  
during  the  Alta-dam  struggle,  persons  from  the  Deatnu  River  valley  were  actively  involved  in  
Folkeaksjonen  and  Sameaksjonen.  Then,  as  now,  there  were  many  issues  of  shared  concern  for  the  
local  populations  of  those  two  rivers.  Today,  the  contentions  about  natural  resource  management  in  
the  Deatnu  water  area  exemplify  contemporary  attempts  to  implement  the  proposals  that  were  given  
by  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission.  The  states  have  accepted  the  actual  jurisdictional  pluralism,  where  
international  norms  and  local  customs  have  a  legal  status.  However,  centuries  of  political  conflict  
have  produced  contradictions,  and  to  sort  those  out  neatly  in  codified  manner  be  as  utopian  as  it  was  
to  impose  the  utopia  of  jurisdictional  unity.742 
 Micropolitical  links:  There  were  several  personal  links  between  the  indigenous  rights  
movement  along  the  Deatnu  and  the  anti-dam  bloc  during  the  Alta-dam  contention.  The  traditional  
social  structure  of  those  valleys  was  a  flexible  network  of  kinship-  and  affinity  (verdde)  relations.  
This  network  functions  as  a  social  capital  for  economic  activity,  and  it  could  potentially  be  activated  
as  civil  society  by  social  movement  activists.  Many  young  Sámi  people  in  the  Deatnu  were  
mobilized  politically  in  response  to  the  Alta-dam  struggle.  Some  formed  interest  organizations  
(NGOs)  and  affinity  groups  (SMOs)  within  the  wide  anti-dam  movement.  Others  kept  a  distance  
from  civil  disobedience,  but  started  to  work  politically  within  the  established  political  parties. 
 The  most  publicly  known  person  is  Niilas  Somby  from  Sirbma,  who  lost  his  arm  in  a  failed  
sabotage  action  against  a  bridge.  He  was  a  descendant  of  the  legendary  Mons  Aslaksen  Somby  who  
                                                 
742  Four  relevant  multilateral  treaties  were  adapted  and  ratified  by  the  states  in  Sápmi,  from  1966  until  2000: 
A)  The  ICCPR  and  ICESCR  were  created  1966  (UN  1966a,  1966b).  Both  coventants  were  ratified  by  Sweden  in  1971,  
Norway  1972,  Russia  1973  and  Finland  1975  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Covenant_on_Economic,_Social_and_Cultural_Rights  (accessed  
06.04.2015)  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Covenant_on_Civil_and_Political_Rights  (accessed  
06.04.2015) 
B)  The  UN  Biodiversity  Convention  was  created  1992  (UN  1992b),  and  was  ratified  by  Norway  and  Sweden  in  1993,  
Finland  in  1994  and  Russia  in  1995.  http://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml  (accessed  06.04.2015) 
C)  European  Council  FCNM  created  1995  (Council  of  Europe  1995);;  ratified  by  Finland  in  1997,  Russia  1998,  Norway  
1999,  and  Sweden  2000  (http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/1_AtGlance/PDF_MapMinorities_bil.pdf)  
(accessed  06.04.2015) 
D)  The  ILO  convention  169  was  created  1989  (ILO  1989),  and  it  was  ratified  by  Norway  in  1990  (Sweden,  Finland  and  
Russia  have  not  ratified  the  convention.)  
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indigenous_and_Tribal_Peoples_Convention,_1989)  (accessed  06.04.2015) 
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had  been  beheaded  in  1854  for  his  participation  during  the  insurgency  in  Goudegiadnu  
(Kautokeino).  Niilas  was  affiliated  with  the  Maoist  party,  and  had  participated  in  Sameaksjonen's  
hunger  strike.  However,  the  sabotage  action  group  was  an  independent  affinity  group  that  disobeyed  
the  discipline  of  the  other  organizations.743  After  the  attempted  sabotage  action,  he  got  political  
asylum  among  Canadian  indigenous  people.  The  biography  of  Niilas  is  spectacular,  but  atypical. 
 Less  publicly  known  are  the  Solbakk  brothers  from  Buolbmát,  who  were  much  involved  in  
organizational  work  and  raising  awareness.  They  were  descendants  of  local  Sámi  activists  who  had  
published  newspapers  and  founded  associations  for  Northern  Sámi  people,  at  the  same  time  as  
Laula  Renberg  had  organized  the  Southern  Sámi.  That  wave  of  organizational  work  had  ended  in  
the  late  1920s,  at  the  same  time  when  the  Norwegian  Labor  party  turned  to  a  strategy  of  
accommodation  with  the  nationalist  political  class.  However,  the  disobedience  against  assimilation  
policies  had  been  continuous  in  the  area.  The  Solbakk  brothers  were  involved  in  starting  the  
Norwegian  Sámi  Associaton  (NSR),  an  interest  organization  associated  with  the  older  Nordic  Sámi  
Council,  which  in  turn  was  associated  with  the  Nordic  Council.  They  were  also  involved  in  Oslo  
Sámi  Saervi  during  their  studies  in  the  capital  city.  There,  they  used  the  office  of  the  Institute  for  
Social  Research,  with  the  blessing  of  its  leader,  Vilhelm  Aubert.  They  had  gotten  to  know  him  when  
the  sociologist  had  worked  with  post-war  reconstruction  in  the  northern  periphery,  and  another  
sociologist  in  that  team,  Per  Otnes,  had  written  the  famous  book  Den  samiske  nasjon,  “The  Sámi  
Nation”.  The  institutional  detour  to  the  capital  city  provided  a  useful  resource  when  Sameaksjonen  
was  created,  with  inspiration  from  Inuit  movements  and  Gandhian  militancy.  The  Solbakk  brothers  
still  continue  their  organizational  and  public  activities,  with  a  publishing  house  for  Sámi  school  
books  and  Sámi  social  science.  The  two  mentioned  families  come  from  the  villages  Sirbma  and  
Buolbmát,  both  located  in  the  area  that  was  cut  away  from  the  old  Ohcejohka  Siida  in  1751  when  a  
border  between  the  states  was  drawn  on  a  map.  The  local  population  on  each  side  still  belongs  to  
the  same  families,  contribute  to  the  same  barter  economy,  and  speak  the  same  dialect  of  North  
Sámi.  Ancient  subsistence  practices,  with  their  implied  norms  and  lore,  have  been  continuous  and  
persistent  in  the  old  Ohcejohka  Siida,  on  both  sides  of  the  state  border.  Thus,  also  grievances  have  
been  continuous  and  persistent. 
 Further  downstream  along  the  Deatnu  we  find  a  third  well-known  family,  Pedersen.  With  a  
strong  sense  of  belonging  to  the  Coastal  Sámi  area,  the  members  of  this  family  tended  to  keep  
distance  from  the  anti-dam  movement,  but  became  involved  in  the  later  work  of  the  Sámi  Rights  
Commission.  This  family  is  active  in  an  environment  where  the  Norwegian  Sámi  Association  
(NSR)  was  rejected  because  of  its  support  for  civil  disobedience  and  its  ties  to  urban  radical  
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students.  Instead,  Samenes  Landsforbund  (SLF)  was  created,  with  explicit  loyalty  to  the  Labor  
Party  and  the  Norwegian  state. 
 People  from  the  Pedersen  family  and  the  Solbakk  family  have  been  particularly  active  in  
undertaking  historical  research.  During  the  Alta-dam  conflict,  scientific  historical  research  on  the  
ancient  Siida  society  was  scarce.  In  some  publications  from  the  period,  one  can  see  hypotheses  
about  “primordial  communism”  being  proposed.744  That  was  in  line  with  the  dominant  social  
scientific  meta-theory  of  that  age:  the  unilinear  modernization  theory,  shared  by  both  Parsonism  and  
Marxism.745  However,  it  proved  useful  in  an  early  phase,  in  order  to  invert  the  significance  of  Sámi  
belonging  from  one  of  social  stigma  to  a  symbol  of  valuable  culture  and  political  fellowship.  It  also  
provided  research  hypotheses  for  the  more  scientific  historical  archive  work,  which  found  proof  of  
the  existence  of  an  ancient  tribal  confederacy,  and  the  continuous  development  of  customs  from  that  
time.     
 The  network:  Those  three  families  in  the  Deatnu  valley  were  involved  in  the  Alta-dam  
conflict  in  very  different  ways,  used  very  different  strategies,  and  played  very  different  roles  in  the  
wide  indigenous  rights  movement  of  the  area.  The  Solbakks  exemplify  the  organizational  work  and  
smart  media  strategies  in  affiliation  with  the  student  movement  of  the  time.  The  Pedersens  
exemplify  organizational  work  within  the  established  labor  movement  hierarchy,  and  external  
loyalty  to  the  ruling  party/state.  Niilas  Somby  is  a  unique  example  of  highly  controversial  and  
spectacular  direct  action,  in  a  form  that  some  would  classify  as  violent.  In  spite  of  the  differences  
between  those  approaches,  there  are  also  family  resemblances  between  them.  The  Solbakks  and  
Somby  were  together  in  Sameaksjonen  before  they  chose  different  paths.  The  Pedersens  and  the  
Solbakks  together  undertook  historical  research  on  questions  of  relevance  for  indigenous  rights  
claims.  Finally,  Somby  and  the  Pedersens  were  in  different  socialist  parties  that  both  adhered  to  the  
Marxist  dogma  that  political  order  is  made  and  maintained  by  coercive  power. 
 
 
8.4.2  Pluralistic  cultural-political  praxes 
Movement  of  movements:  Those  family  resemblances  between  highly  different  action  repertoires  
make  this  constellation  of  activities  appear  as  a  “movement  of  movements”  in  terms  of  social  
movement  theory.746  Within  such  highly  pluralistic  and  flexible  network  constellations,  there  is  a  
wide  variety  of  different  claims  and  action  repertoires.  The  family  resemblances  between  such  
                                                 
744  The  Norwegian  Folk  Museum  library  and  archive  (retrieved  summer  2009).  Se  especially  the  document:  Tromsø  
Sámi  Association  1986:  The First Nations. Report from Indigenous Days 1984. Romssa: Keviselie Publisher. 
745  Hulme  and  Turner  1990 
746  Della  Porta  &  Diani  2009 
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choices  may  facilitate  alliances,  while  the  discrepancies  between  them  might  facilitate  splits.  It  all  
depends  on  the  situation.  Within  the  global  justice  movement,  the  normative  political  theorist  
Naomi  Klein  legitimizes  such  messiness  as  a  “plurality  of  tactics”.747  Within  the  global  justice  
movement,  such  diversity  is  believed  to  make  the  movement  of  movements  more  sustainable  in  the  
long  run,  analogous  to  how  biological  diversity  in  an  ecosystem  contributes  to  evolutionary  
sustainability.  Certainly,  however,  plurality  may  also  involve  splits  and  co-optation.  That  happened  
in  the  UN  climate  summit  COP  15,  in  Copenhagen  2009.  In  that  instance,  police  provocateurs  had  
taken  control  of  the  “Never  trust  a  COP”  network,  which  actively  recruited  activists  for  rioting.748  
At  that  moment,  Naomi  Klein  publicly  condemned  rioting  as  a  legitimate  tactic.749  While  the  rioters  
were  co-opted  by  the  cops,  they  also  lost  a  tacit  alliance  with  former  comrades  who  chose  different  
tactics.  Thus,  the  plurality  and  flexibility  in  a  movement  of  movements  may  produce  alliances  or  
splits. 
 Pluralistic  political  systems:  From  the  Alta-dam  controversy  to  the  present  Deatnu  
contentions,  the  movement  of  movements  has  interacted  with  other  pluralistic  networks  of  cultural  
praxes,  most  notably  those  that  constitute  the  kinship  systems  and  the  state  systems.  The  mentioned  
examples  of  activism  focused  on  particular  families.  The  Sámi  societies  in  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  
watersheds  are  organized  on  the  basis  of  kinship  and  reciprocity  systems,  with  a  low  degree  of  
centralized  power,  and  a  high  degree  of  flexibility.  As  with  other  kinship-based  systems  of  social  
organization,  the  families  in  the  Alta  and  Detanu  water  areas  often  play  out  complex  and  dynamic  
local  political  games.  The  dynamics  has  some  similarities  with  the  abstract  model  of  “segmentary  
lineage”  used  by  social  anthropologists:  Some  kin  groups  might  be  accommodated  in  political-
economic  centres  outside  the  local  community,  while  others  might  be  in  opposition  to  those  same  
centres  of  power.750  From  my  fieldwork,  my  impression  is  that  the  families  who  enjoy  state-certified  
rights  to  own  many  reindeer  or  to  fish  with  nets  in  the  river  tend  to  be  relatively  more  
accommodated  with  state  politics  and  market  capitalism.  However,  there  also  appears  to  be  a  
tendency  for  subaltern  coastal  fisher-peasants  to  channel  their  grievances  through  the  dominant  
catch-all  party,  since  they  lack  the  resources  to  empower  themselves  by  utilizing  freedom  of  speech  
and  free  competition.  However,  not  only  is  the  local  community  pluralistic  and  open  for  
manipulations;;  the  same  is  the  case  for  the  states.  Most  notably,  our  Alta-dam  case  study  has  
revealed  that  the  split  between  pro-dam  and  anti-dam  blocs  was  a  not  only  a  social  cleavage  within  
the  population,  but  also  within  the  state  system:  the  judiciary  had  been  split,  the  legislators  had  been  
                                                 
747  Klein  2002 
748  Monroy  2011 
749  Field  observation  from  the  assembly  Bunnmøtet,  “the  bottom  meeting”,    held  in  the  free-state  Christiania  during  the  
UN  climate  summit  COP15,  December  2009 
750  Sahlins  1972;;  Gellner  1969,  cited  in  Geertz  1971;;  McGinnis  1999;;  Hutchinson  1996 
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split,  and  the  administration  had  been  split.  That  the  hegemonic  political  bloc  finally  restored  
hegemony  through  party  discipline  and  the  Supreme  Court,  does  not  change  the  fact  that  their  
hegemonic  definitional  power  had  been  challenged  within  the  state  structure.  If  the  anthropological  
gaze  is  turned  from  kinship  systems  to  state  systems,  de  facto  ambiguities  are  often  revealed  within  
a  system  that  might  be  de  jure  unified.751  Thus,  the  movement  of  movements  has  unfolded  in-
between  two  other  political  networks  that  also  are  rather  pluralistic  and  flexible.  One  is  the  local  
kinship  system,  which  has  kept  customary  norms  from  the  ancient  stateless  political  system.  The  
other  is  the  state  system,  which  no  longer  can  uphold  the  high-modernist  over-ambition  of  virtual 
unity.  Anthropologically,  those  are  two  partly  overlapping  political  systems.  They  have  co-evolved  
in  an  ambiguous  way.  The  contemporary  result  is  a  juridical  pluralism  with  some  contradictions,  
which  one  (must)  now  attempt  to  sort  out  and  codify.  The  co-evolution  between  those  two  
pluralistic  orders  opens  up  spaces  for  tactics  of  divide  et  impera  against  the  local  population.  
Symmetrically,  it  also  opens  opportunities  for  local  people  to  utilize  competition  between  different  
state  agencies,  to  make  tactical  alliances  with  one  or  the  other.  Finally,  it  may  not  always  be  entirely  
clear  what  are  illegal  repertoires  of  action,  since  the  actual  jurisdictional  pluralism  includes  
unresolved  inner  contradictions.  Political  contention  over  such  issues  may  contribute  to  an  open-
ended  process  of  normative  clarification.752  Thus,  such  contention  may  function  as  an  informal  form  
of  participatory  deliberative  democracy.753 
 
 
8.4.3  Agenda  setting  for  historical  science 
The  movement  of  movements  also  interacted  with  a  third  pluralist  network  of  cultural  praxes,  
namely  those  that  constitute  the  institutions  of  historical  research.  Like  the  bio-scientific  epistemic  
community,  historians  also  trace  networks  of  invisible  but  actual  phenomena.  The  unified  school  
system  of  the  state  had  selectively  informed  the  population  about  the  historical  findings  that  had  
been  the  result  of  particular  research  interests.  There  had  been  unity  between  “the  Norwegian  
historical  school”  and  the  political  goal  of  fostering  national  patriotism  through  the  school  system.  
This  symbiosis  had  worked  so  well  that  the  highly  educated  population  had  become  equally  highly  
ignorant  of  the  actual  colonial  history  in  the  northern  area.  Only  with  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission,  
would  historians  from  Deatnu  valley,  together  with  Sámi  colleagues  such  a  Kaisa  Korpijaakko,  gain  
the  resources  to  find  scientific  proof  for  what  was  already  known  in  local  oral  history:  that  their  
lands  had  been  colonized.  The  cybernetic  system  that  emerged  via  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission  had  
                                                 
751  Das  &  Poole  2004 
752  Christie  1977 
753  Della  Porta  2011 
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been  institutionalized  when  I  arrived  at  my  fieldwork  along  the  Deatnu  River.  A  Sámi  school  system  
and  Sámi  school-books  were  funded  by  the  Norwegian  Sámi  Parliament  and  the  EU  INTERREG  
program.  That  would  have  been  impossible  during  the  Alta-dam  struggle,  when  national  unity  was  a  
policy  goal  for  the  hegemonic  political  class.  Today,  the  Deatnu  and  Alta  Rivers  are  subjected  to  
states  with  less  pretensions  of  denying  their  own  polycentric  composition.  However,  within  the  
school  system(s)  of  the  polycentric  state,  the  recent  progress  in  historical  research  is  not  being  
shared  with  the  children  of  the  ethnic  majority  within  the  nation  states.  Thus,  the  colonizing  nations  
remain  ignorant  of  their  own  history  of  colonization.  In  the  discussion  about  bio-sciences  (8.3.4)  I  
used  the  concept  of  a  “democratization  of  the  sciences”.754  With  regard  to  the  historical  sciences,  
one  contribution  to  democratizing  the  science  was  the  turn  from  history  of  kings  and  wars,  to  
national  history,  while  a  further  contribution  was  the  turn  away  from  nationalist  framings  of  history,  
to  transnational  history,  regional  history  and  indigenous  history.  Some  push  to  continue  this  trend  
towards  democratization.  For  example,  the  Kvän  teacher  Terje  Aronsen  agitates  that  there  is  a  need  
for  more  research  and  teaching  regarding  the  minorities  of  Sápmi,  such  as  the  Kväns.755  This  is  one  
challenge,  but  it  is  another  type  of  challenge  when  the  colonizing  nations  remain  ignorant  of  their  
own  history  of  colonization.  This  is  a  problem  about  the  relationship  between  different,  partly  
overlapping,  cultural  fellowships.  Those  cultural  fellowships  are  also  democratic  fellowships,  
demoi.  Most  people  in  Sápmi  have  double  cultural  belonging,  and  thus,  they  are  members  of  
different  demoi  with  different  territorial  extension.  Most  local  people  in  the  Deatnu  valley  
participate  in  two  or  more  demoi.  On  both  sides  of  the  border,  most  local  people  participate  in  the  
same  local  and  regional  Sámi  politics;;  while  at  the  same  time,  they  participate  in  the  national  
politics  of  each  of  the  host  states.  On  the  Finnish  side,  they  also  vote  for  the  European  Parliament.  
Additionally,  one  could  ask  why  there  are  no  institutions  for  the  representation  of  Kvänish  interests.  
Shared  school  systems  are  among  the  factors  that  contribute  to  the  maintenance  and  deepening  of  
particular  demoi.  School  politics  tend  to  be  controversial  in  Sámi  areas.756  Everybody  in  the  area  
belongs  to  overlapping  demoi,  and  with  a  standardized  school  system,  the  territorial  boundaries  of  
the  system  will  always  be  arbitrary.  This  challenge  is  also  relevant  beyond  Sámi  areas,  for  the  
public  school  systems  all  of  the  Nordic  states.  When  parents  outside  Sámi  areas  do  not  protest  
against  the  lack  of  colonial  history  and  Sámi  history  in  the  schooling  of  their  children,  it  is  because  
they  themselves  remain  ignorant  of  the  actual  colonial  history  of  their  own  nations.  Additionally,  the  
colonizing  nation  has  little  immediate  self-interests  of  becoming  less  ignorant  of  its  own  history  of  
colonization.  The  maintenance  of  this  ignorance  may  be  a  reason  why  the  True  Finns  and  the  
                                                 
754  Stengers  1999  (1997) 
755  Interview  with  Aronsen,  Terje  (Frogner  Church,  04.03.2012) 
756  Pedersen  &  Høgmo  2012 
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Progress  Party  mobilize  people  who  have  been  kept  under-informed  about  the  colonial  history  of  
Sápmi,  and  therefore  draw  the  logical  conclusion  that  indigenous  rights  must  be  privileges.  The  




8.5.0  Entangled  networks:  complex  dynamics  within  social-ecological  systems 
 
8.5.1  Gathering  the  threads 
Above  we  have  traced  three  different  socio-material  networks  that  link  the  historical  Alta  River  case  
study  to  the  ethnographic  case  study  from  the  Deatnu  River.  First,  I  traced  a  net  of  socio-material  
processes  related  to  phenomena  of  physical  geography,  such  as  topography  and  hydrography.  Then,  
I  traced  similar  networks  related  to  bio-geographical  phenomena,  more  particularly  the  biology  of  
migrating  Atlantic  salmon.  Finally,  I  traced  networks  related  to  phenomena  of  human  geography,  
more  particularly  the  social  organization  of  trans-boundary  Sámi  areas. 
 Those  tracings  have  revealed  complex  interactions  of  various  causal  factors.  These  various  
complexities  may  be  summed  up  in  three  observations: 
I. These  historical-geographical  processes  reveal  actual  topical  complexities:  The  abiotic,  
biotic  and  human  causal  factors  are  not  separate  domains,  but  instead,  such  factors  
constantly  interact.  Thus,  they  constitute  complex  Socio-Ecological  Systems  (SESs).  The  
complexity  between  issue  areas  is  a  concern  in  deliberations  about  environmental  protection  
and  indigenous  rights. 
II. The  same  historical-geographical  processes  reveal  actual  spatial  complexities:  The  various  
SESs  are  spatially  entangled  with  each  other.  Salmon  migration  routes  constitute  one  such  
system.  The  homeland  of  the  Sámi  culture  constitutes  another.  The  territorial  claims  of  
sovereign  states  cut  across  actual  abiotic,  biotic  and  human  systems.  This  complexity  of  
spatial  formations  is  also  a  concern  in  deliberations  about  environmental  protection  and  
indigenous  rights. 
III. In  sum,  both  topical  complexities  and  spatial  complexities  were  revealed  by  the  historical-
geographical  process  tracing  above.  Some  local  actors  in  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  water  areas  
put  forward  claims  that  integrate  both  spatial  and  topical  complexities.  From  a  social  
movement  perspective,  they  could  be  defined  within  that  particular  segment  of  the  
transnational  movement  of  movements,  where  concerns  for  environmental  protection  
coincide  with  concerns  for  indigenous  rights.  These  we  can  label  as  environmental  justice  
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movements.  These  are  movement  with  an  interest  in  the  metabolism  between  bioregions  and  
their  populations,  especially  in  areas  where  these  regions  have  been  colonized  by  dominant  
political  entities.  These  conditions  are  all  found  in  the  Alta  and  Detnu  water  areas. 
Now  I  will  address  each  of  these  complexities  in  turn. 
 
 
8.5.2  Topical  complexity  between  causal  factors:  Social-Ecological  Systems  (SESs) 
The  historical-geographical  processes  traced  reveal  actual  topical  complexities  (ad  8.5.1,  point  I).  
The  abiotic,  biotic  and  human  factors  are  not  separate  domains,  but  instead,  such  causal  factors  
constantly  interact.  Thus,  they  constitute  complex  Socio-Ecological  Systems  (SESs).  This  
complexity  between  issue  areas  is  a  concern  in  deliberations  about  environmental  protection  and  
indigenous  rights.  Abiotic  factors  include  phenomena  such  as  the  spatial  flows  of  water,  the  
potential  energy  of  natural  water  resources,  and  the  possibilities  to  channel  it  otherwise.  Biotic  
factors  include  the  migration  patterns  of  wild  salmon,  hidden  below  the  water  surface;;  the  
genealogy  of  phenotypes,  hidden  betwwen  the  lines  of  genetic  strings;;  and  the  size  of  the  stocks,  
where  the  truth  hides  behind  rough  estimates.  Human  factors  include  the  pluralities  of  the  local  
kinship  system,  and  the  ambiguities  of  the  state  systems.  All  three  networks  inform  scientific  praxes,  
and  all  three  networks  are  informed  by  management  praxes.   
 Management  and  science  are  both  organized  in  socio-material  networks.  Both  of  these  
networks  feed  into  each  other,  and  are  influenced  by  social  movement  networks.  All  of  those  
networks  of  socio-material  processes  are  phenomena  that  may  be  traced  in  terms  of  “Actor  Network  
Theory”.  However,  all  of  these  networks  are  also  integrated  in  more  traditional  terms,  as  “resource  
geography”,  the  basis  of  what  Marx  called  “Man's  metabolism  with  Nature”.  Thus,  all  of  the  
mentioned  networks  constitute  components  in  the  flow  of  energy,  nutrition  and  information  that  
Elinor  Ostrom  characterizes  as  “Social-Ecological  Systems”.   
 After  the  Alta  dam  struggle,  the  transnational  social  movements  and  transnational  epistemic  
communities  succeeded  in  putting  certain  issues  on  the  public  agendas,  which  in  turn,  have  become  
institutionalized  as  specific  policy  areas.  However,  with  the  institutionalization  of  environmental  
protection  and  indigenous  rights,  those  issue  areas  are  sorted  into  separate  institutions  for  research  
and  policy.  With  regard  to  the  present  Deatnu  River,  this  division  of  labor  is  contested  by  some  
coalitions  of  activists,  politicians,  bureaucrats  and  scientists. 
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8.5.3  Spatial  complexities  between  SESs:  poly-centric  geographies 
The  historical-geographical  processes  traced  reveal  actual  spatial  complexities  (ad  8.5.1,  point  II).  
The  various  Socio-Ecological  Systems  (SESs)  are  spatially  entangled  with  each  other.  Salmon  
migration  routes  constitute  one  such  system.  The  homeland  of  the  Sámi  culture  constitutes  another.  
The  territorial  claims  of  sovereign  states  cut  across  actual  abiotic,  biotic  and  human  systems.  The  
complexities  of  such  spatial  formations  are  also  a  concern  in  deliberations  about  environmental  
protection  and  indigenous  rights.  Two  geographical  formations  are  the  Norwegian  and  Finnish  
states,  which  in  principle  claim  sovereignty  within  clearly  defined  borders.  Another  geographical  
formation  is  the  physical  geography  of  water  areas,  where  the  Deatnu  River  runs  between  two  
states,  and  where  Lake  Iešjárvi  represented  a  tempting  reserve  of  potential  energy  for  ambitious  
state  builders.  A  third  geographical  formation  is  the  bio-geography  of  migrating  Atlantic  salmon,  a  
common  natural  resource  for  all  stake  holders  that  are  active  along  the  pathways  of  its  habitat.  A  
fourth  geographical  formation  is  the  pluralistic  social  organization  of  people  in  Sápmi.  Those  
kinship  and  affinity  networks  are  flexible,  decentralized  and  ethnically  heterogeneous,  but  
nevertheless  they  are  the  reminiscent  of  an  ancient  stateless  political  system.  The  geography  of  state  
sovereignties  cut  across  all  the  other  mentioned  geographies,  but  in  practice  the  states  are  in  
themselves  pluralistic  entities,  dealing  with  the  geographical  overlap  in  different  ways.  In  practice,  
Norwegian  and  Finnish  state  builders  never  actualized  their  ideal  of  jurisdictional  monopoly  within  
a  bounded  territory,  but  instead,  had  to  deal  pragmatically  with  each  other,  with  international  norms,  
and  with  trans-boundary  local  customs.  After  the  Alta-dam  struggle,  transnational  social  movements  
and  transnational  epistemic  communities  got  involved  with  all  of  those  sources  of  jurisdiction,  
namely:  local,  national  and  international.  Transnational  contentious  deliberation  led  to  international  
norms  on  environmental  protection  and  indigenous  rights,  which  in  turn  became  ratified  by  the  
states,  so  that  the  movements  could  demand  a  codification  of  the  actual  jurisdictional  pluralism  at  a  
local  level.  Thus,  the  states  are  no  longer  nation-states,  but  have  reverted  to  the  multi-national  
character  they  used  to  have  before  the  rise  of  nationalism.  Still,  the  present  jurisdictional  pluralism  
is  a  product  of  ambiguous  relations  between  the  different  sources  of  norms,  which  have  left  
unresolved  contradictions  in  the  present  jurisdictional  pluralism.  A  principal  difference  between  the  
historical  Alta  case  and  the  ethnographic  Deatnu  case  is  that  during  the  time  that  passed  between  
them,  jurisdictional  pluralism  went  from  being  a  taboo  to  become  codified  in  state  law.757  With  
regard  to  the  present  day  Deatnu  River,  this  is  one  of  the  main  issues  of  contention.  It  is  an  open  
question  as  ton  whether  the  goal  of  sorting  out  those  contradictions  in  codified  form  will  be  less  
utopian  than  it  was  to  attempt  to  create  jurisdictional  monopolies  within  bonded  nation-states.  
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However,  although  this  might  be  a  utopian  ambition  as  a  final  goal,  the  public  contention  on  those  
issues  may  nevertheless  imply  an  ongoing  clarification  of  norms.758  Thus,  the  contention  may  in  
itself  be  seen  as  a  practice  of  participative  deliberative  democracy.759 
 
 
8.5.4  Integrating  spatial  and  topical  complexities:  environmental  justice  movements 
Some  local  actors  in  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  water  areas  put  forward  claims  that  integrate  both  spatial  
and  topical  complexities  (ad  8.5.1,  point  III).  From  a  social  movements  perspective,  they  could  be  
defined  within  that  particular  segment  of  the  transnational  movement  of  movements  where  concerns  
for  environmental  protection  coincide  with  concerns  for  indigenous  rights.  This,  we  can  label  as  
environmental  justice  movements.  Those  are  movements  with  an  interest  in  the  metabolism  
between  bioregions  and  their  populations,  especially  in  areas  colonized  by  dominant  political  
entities.  Those  conditions  are  all  found  in  the  Alta  and  Detnu  water  areas.  We  will  now  have  a  look  
at  some  local  activities  dealing  with  those  concerns:  first  in  research,  and  then  in  policy. 
 Some  controversies  regarding  scientific  research  were  traced  above.  Those  controversies  
regard  the  relationship  between  bioregions  and  indigenous  peoples  in  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  water  
areas.  The  historiographical  controversies  deal  with  how  long  particular  groups  have  inhabited  
particular  areas,  and  the  evolution  of  particular  livelihood  adaptations.  Oaggun  (angling)  among  
River  Sámi  is  one  example,  the  Coastal  Sámi  and  Kvän  cultures  are  other  examples.  The  minorities-
within-the-minority  initiate  their  own  research.  However,  there  is  also  a  lack  of  general  
popularization  of  the  progress  in  scientific  historiography  after  the  fall  of  nationalist  historiography.  
The  bio-scientific  controversies  deal  with  which  research  questions  should  get  priority  and  funding,  
and  in  whose  interest  it  is  to  know  about  such  questions.  One  example  is  the  deliberations  between  
the  Norwegian  eco-technocracy  and  the  Finnish  agricultural-technocracy.  Another  example  is  the  
silencing  and  suppression  of  research  questions  that  are  raised  by  local  practitioners  of  traditional  
net  fishing  in  the  fjord,  net  fishing  in  the  river,  and  oaggun  (angling)  in  rivers,  streams  and  lakes. 
 There  is  a  particular  cluster  of  policy  makers  who  have  an  interest  in  the  mentioned  research  
questions.  Those  policy  makers  deal  with  the  relationship  between  the  indigenous  population  and  
the  local  bioregions  within  socio-ecosystems  that  have  been  divided  by  colonizing  states.  Such  are  
the  concerns  of  the  Sámiráđđi  (The  Nordic  Sámi  Council),  and  its  affiliated  state-specific  interest  
organizations,  such  as  NSR.760  The  same  concerns  have  been  integrated  into  the  official  
                                                 
758  Christie  1977 
759  Della  Porta  2011 
760  Nordic  Sámiráđđi  2009:  see  the  Draft  Nordic  Sámi  Convention 
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environmental  policy  of  the  Norwegian  Sámi  Parliament.761  This  refers  to  international  treaties  on  
the  relationship  between  biological  diversity  and  indigenous  rights.762  It  has  been  politically  
possible  to  speak  relatively  freely  about  these  issues  since  1997,  when  the  Norwegian  Ministry  for  
Police  and  Justice  published  a  report  from  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission,  called  “The  Natural  Basis  
for  the  Sámi  Culture”.763  It  should  be  emphasized  that  those  are  policies  for  the  protection  of  
locally-based  subsistence  practices,  and  for  locally-based  control  of  natural  resources.  This  is  a  
result  of  how  the  Sámi  society  is  organized,  both  as  a  reminiscent  of  an  ancient  stateless  political  
system,  and  after  interactions  with  the  communalist  movement  in  Finno-Scandia.  There  is  no  
“aspiration  to  statehood”  because  Sápmi  never  was  a  state,  and  never  became,  but  always  has  
continued  to  evolve  as  a  stateless  political  system  in  the  shadow  of  the  states.  My  hypothesis  is  that  
some  methodological  nationalists  misunderstand  Sámi  policies  as  “aspirations  for  statehood”  
because  those  readers  lack  the  imagination  to  perceive  that  a  stateless  political  system  might  have  
existed  and  indeed  still  does  exist.  Those  issues  regard  the  most  controversial  tenant  of  indigenous  
politics:  In  international  literature,  it  is  often  called  “the  right  to  territorial  self-determination”.  In  
the  Nordic  area,  we  call  it  “the  right  to  land  and  water”.  Methodological  nationalists  misread  such  
claims  as  “aspirations  to  statehood”  because  they  apply  a  metaphysical  interpretative  scheme,  thus  
limiting  their  ability  to  imagine  a  political  order  that  is  not  a  state.  Such  misunderstandings  are  
found  in  the  rhetoric  of  some  politicians,  such  as  the  True  Finns,  the  Progress  Party,  as  well  as  Olav  
Gunnar  Ballo  from  the  opposition  within  the  Norwegian  Labor  Party.  Similar  misreadings  are  found  
in  the  research  of  the  political  scientist  Anne  Julie  Semb.764  The  nationalist  doxa  is  widespread  in  
the  population.  This  may  be  a  result  of  the  above-mentioned  lack  of  decolonization  in  public  
education  and  public  discourse  among  the  ethnic  majority  within  the  nation  states.  Indeed  there  is  
an  interaction  between  the  social  reproduction  of  nationalist  doxa  and  the  lack  of  dissemination  of  
the  progress  in  historical  research.  Nationalist  doxa,  in  turn,  reproduce  misunderstandings  that  delay  
the  implementation  of  indigenous  rights,  and  thus,  the  Sámi  parliament  has  not  been  capable  of  
influencing  the  bio-scientific  research  agenda  in  favor  of  those  problems  that  would  have  been  
relevant  to  investigate  for  the  more  subaltern  fishery  interests. 
 The  integration  of  geographical  complexities  and  topical  complexities  is  not  only  a  concern  
for  relatively  subaltern  interests  in  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  water  areas.  Political  contentions  in  a  socio-
ecological  multi-level  environment  have  brought  about  two  large-scale  experiments  in  political  
geography,  both  of  which  are  applied  to  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  water  areas.  Local  and  transnational  
indigenous  rights  mobilization  has  resulted  in  the  Finnmark  Act,  which  is  an  attempt  to  sort  out  
                                                 
761  Sámediggi  Norway  2005  (thanks  to  Gro  Ween  for  sharing  the  document) 
762  UN  1966b:  §  27;;  ILO  1989;;  UN  1992b:  pp.  1,  8,  11,  12 
763  Norwegian  Official  Report  1997a  (NOU  1997:4);;  1997b  (NOU  1997:5) 
764  Semb  2001;;  Semb  2003 
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contradictory  claims  between  state  laws  and  local  customs.  European  environmentalist  mobilization  
has  produced  the  Water  Framework  Directive  at  EU  level,  which  is  now  being  implemented.  Both  
are  ambitious  attempts  to  reform  and  transform  the  existing  political  geography,  and  both  have  been  




8.6.0  Macropolitical  formations:  constituted  order 
 
Alta  and  Deatnu  water  areas  are  sites  of  local  and  national  politics,  but  they  are  also  located  within  
a  process  of  geopolitical  transformation  on  a  grand  scale.  The  large-scale  geopolitical  environment  
is  changing  not  as  a  result  of  warfare,  but  rather  as  a  result  of  better  diplomatic  relations  between  
the  well-established  Russian  Federation  and  a  potential  West-European  federation.  The  Alta  and  
Deatnu  Rivers  are  located  in  a  sub-Arctic  fringe  of  Europe  where  two  macro-regional  integration  
processes  overlap:  From  the  north,  there  are  some  initiatives  for  macro-regional  integration  in  the  
Circumpolar  Arctic.  From  the  south,  there  is  an  ongoing  political  experiment  with  Western  
European  political  integration.  The  joint  effect  is  that  of  an  emergence  of  transnational,  bio-
regionally  defined  development  programs  on  a  less  grand  scale.  The  EU  Baltic  Sea  Region  and  the  
Norwegian  Barents  Secretariat  both  work  on  relatively  peripheral  Northern  European  areas  on  the  
European  side  of  the  Ural  Mountain  Range.  This  area  includes  some  vulnerable  socio-ecosystems  
with  Arctic  habitats  and  indigenous  peoples.  This  emerging  political  order  opens  new  political  
opportunities  for  what  the  Nordic  countries  know  as  “district  politics”.  The  Arctic  parts  of  Sápmi  
used  to  be  a  province  for  the  extraction  of  natural  resources,  and  indeed  they  still  are.  Transnational  
district  politics  in  this  area  were  politically  difficult  in  the  Europe  of  Nation-States,  since  nation-
builders  kept  the  Sámi  political  entrepreneurs  down  in  fear  of  potential  Sámi  separatism.  In  spite  of  
sustained  colonial  relationship  under  the  European  common  market,  some  political  opportunities  are  
now  emerging  for  transnational  district  politics  in  Sámi  areas,  with  the  EU  INTERREG  IV  A  Nord  
being  an  example. 
 The  geopolitical  transformations  on  a  large  scale  are  produced  by  a  myriad  of  interacting  
explanatory  factors  that  may  be  impossible  to  keep  track  of.  They  include  local  and  transnational  
social  movement  struggles.  They  also  include  accommodation  with  states  and  intergovernmental  
treaties.  Within  this  vast  socio-ecosystem,  one  particular  contribution  to  the  grand  web  of  causation  
was  the  particular  outcome  of  the  Alta-dam  struggle.  Certain  claims  that  were  radical  during  the  
Alta  controversy  would  be  adopted  and  co-opted  by  the  host  states.  The  anti-dam  coalition  pushed  
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for  ambitious  claims  about  environmental  justice.  Moderate  forms  of  those  claims  would  become  
institutionalized  as  separate  policy  areas:  environmental  policies  and  indigenous  policies. 
 We  will  now  have  a  look  at  the  interaction  between  states  and  social  movements  in  the  time  
that  passed  after  our  historical  Alta  case,  and  until  our  ethnographic  Deatnu  case.  The  two  states  that  
are  relevant  for  those  water  areas  will  be  taken  into  consideration:  Norway  and  Finland.  Thereafter,  
we  will  briefly  look  at  some  details  regarding  the  political  transformation  of  those  polities. 
 In  the  end,  we  will  present  two  regional  policy  initiatives  with  special  relevance  for  the  Alta  
and  Deatnu  water  areas:  the  EU  Water  FrameworkDdirective  and  the  Finnmark  Act.  Both  are  
ongoing  institutional  experiments  that  attempt  to  answer  the  need  to  integrate  concerns  for  nature  
and  culture,  and  integrate  ecosystems  that  have  been  divided  by  nation-state  borders. 
 
 
8.6.1  Policy  adaptation:  co-optation  in  Norway  and  Finland 
The  institutionalization  of  watershed  management  and  fishery  regulation  in  the  Deatunu  River  are  
taking  place  within  a  political  environment,  which  itself  is  in  flux.  Compared  to  the  situation  thirty  
years  earlier,  it  is  striking  that  what  were  then  the  radical  claims  of  new  social  movements,  have  
now  become  institutionalized  policy  areas.  In  Finland  and  Norway,  as  also  in  Sweden,  indigenous  
rights  policies  and  environmental  policies  are  delegated  to  separate  and  specialized  organizational  
bodies  under  the  governments  of  the  existing  states.   
 
Table  8-1:  Insiders  and  outsiders  of  the  policy  process 
 Finnish  polity Norwegian  polity 
environmental  movement Finnish  environmental  policy Norwegian  environmental  policy 
indigenous  rights  movement Finnish  indigenous  rights  policy Norwegian  indigenous  rights  policy 
 
The  interactions  between  movements  and  states  in  Nordic  countries  have  been  investigated  by  
political  scientists,  sometimes  from  a  comparative  perspective,  and  often  with  an  interest  in  the  
policy  areas  pursued  by  new  social  movements,  such  as  environmentalism  and  indigenous  rights. 
 Two  polities,  two  movements:  Within  the  states  of  Finno-Scandia,  the  Sámi  have  succeeded  
comparatively  well  in  making  reforms  to  the  Norwegian  system,  and  have  fared  comparatively  
badly  in  the  Finnish  system.765  One  of  multiple  reasons  for  this,  is  the  stronger  historical  influence  
of  associationalism  (in  the  tradition  of  Proudhon)  in  the  political  culture  of  Western  Scandinavian  
                                                 
765  Forrest  2006 
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states.766  Another  of  the  reasons  is  that  Norwegian  government  has  very  strong  financial  resources,  
from  state-controlled  oil  and  gas  exports.  As  a  result  of  these  two  factors,  the  Norwegian  entity,  to  
an  even  greater  degree  than  the  Finnish  entity,  tends  to  tackle  oppositional  social  movements  by  
inclusion  /  co-optation.767  Thus,  the  Norwegian  entity  has  granted  the  Ministry  of  the  Environment  
comparatively  more  authority  over  minor  political  issues  like  salmon  fisheries,  as  long  as  it  respects  
its  informal  subordination  to  the  Ministry  of  Oil.768  The  Sámi  minority,  which  is  a  much  bigger  
minority  in  Norway  than  in  Finland,  also  enjoys  much  more  funding  for  their  political  institutions  
from  the  Norwegian  state  than  from  Finland,  and  also  a  higher  degree  of  ratification  of  international  
law  that  grant  rights  to  indigenous  peoples.769  Thus,  the  relationship  between  the  Norwegian  and  the  
Sámi  nations  is  largely  regulated  by  both  nations  being  involved  in  /  co-opted  into  the  same  political  
centre.  The  Finnish  nation,  by  contrast,  which  is  relatively  less  prosperous  when  compared  to  the  
Norwegian  one,  and  maybe  more  geostrategically  vulnerable  as  well,  has  been  relatively  more  
reluctant  to  share  the  privilege  of  its  nation-state  with  the  even  more  precarious  Sámi  nation.770  On  
the  Norwegian  side,  oppositional  movements  like  the  Sámi  rights  movement  and  the  environmental  
movement  find  themselves  in  an  ambiguous  plurality  between  co-optation  into  a  neo-liberalist  
regulative  state,  and  keeping  the  circumpolar  alignment  with  other  indigenous  peoples,  within  the  
wider  alter-globalization  movement.771  On  the  Finnish  side,  social  movements  are  confronted  with  
the  same  choice  of  assimilation  or  autonomy.  However,  in  Finland,  compared  to  Norway,  these  two  
tendencies  are  kept  relatively  more  separate,  as  the  political  class  of  the  Finnish  nation  is  relatively  
less  willing  to  include  opposition  movements.772  As  a  consequence,  the  Finnish  political  culture  
provides  a  clearer  divide  between  social  movements  and  state  politics.  Thus,  compared  to  Norway,  
state  politics  in  Finland  is  relatively  more  centralized,  while  social  movements  are  relatively  more  
excluded.  In  Dryzek’s  terms,  exclusion  might  produce  autonomy,  to  the  same  degree  as  inclusion  
may  cause  co-optation.  Thus,  in  his  terminology,  the  Finnish  political  system  opens  more  room  for  
“sub  politics”  amongst  the  civil  society  actors.  The  person  that  is  cited  as  having  coined  the  term  is  
Ulrich  Beck,  who  in  1993  claimed  to  observe  a  “subpolitization  of  society”.773  In  his  definition,  the  
term  “sub-politics”  refers  to  as all  the  politics  that  goes  on  “outside  and  beyond  the  representative  
institutions of the political system  of nation-states”774 
                                                 
766  Kaspersen  2002;;  see  also  “East-Nordic”  management  practice,  according  to  Sandström  et.al.  2008:17,  cited  in  Sande  
2010:46 
767  For  a  critical  stance:  Dryzek  et.al.  2003,  and  for  a  critique  of  the  critique  see  Grenstad  2006,  cited  in  Konttinen  2010. 
768  Dryzek  et.al.  2003:172  (for  a  slightly  less  critical  view,  see  page  78) 
769  Forrest  2005 
770  Forrest  2005:232-234 
771  Heininen  &  Southcott  2010 
772  Kottinen  2011 
773  Beck,  1993:  157  ff.,  referred  to  by  de  Vries  2007:  782 
774  Beck,  1996a:  18,  cited  by  Holzer  and  Mads  2003:  80 
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 The Norwegian state, in the analysis of Stein Rokkan, has two channels of democratic 
participation, one the “electoral-parliamentarian  channel”, and another, the “corporate-functional 
channel”.775 That can be regarded as a centralization and hierarchization of the West-Nordic 
associationalist tradition, what Dryzek referred to as inclusion/co-optation.  On  the  Norwegian  side,  
as  a  result  of  inclusion  of  the  movements,  autonomous  sub-politics  is  a  more  threatened  species.776  
Dryzek  et  al.  even  refer  to  the  Norwegian  environmental  movement  as  the  watchdog  “that  didn’t  
bark  in  the  night”.777  Seen  in  the  context  of  those  theories  about  political  culture  in  the  Norwegian  
nation-state,  it  is  interesting  to  re-visit  the  competition  that  emerged  regarding  salmon  fishery  
regulation,  between  the  institutionalized  environmental  policy  and  institutionalized  indigenous  
rights  policy. 
 Norwegian  statism  and  the  globalization  movement:  Within  the  Norwegian  political  
system,  there  appears  to  be  some  degree  of  competition  between  the  institutions  of  indigenous  
rights  policy  and  the  institutions  of  environmental  policy.  For  example,  regarding  local  fisheries  in  
the  Deatnu  valley,  conflicting  goals  have  been  pursued  by  the  Sámi  parliament  and  the  Directorate  
of  Nature  Management.  Maybe  even  more  striking,  was  the  instance  when  the  Ministry  of  the  
Environment  carried  out  a  policy  process  for  the  regulation  of  salmon  fisheries,  refusing  to  take  into  
consideration  the  parallel  policy  process  for  the  collective  human  rights  of  the  Coastal  Sámi  
minority,  carried  out  by  the  Ministry  of  Fisheries.778  The  mobilization  of  new  social  movements  
during  the  time  of  the  Alta-controversy  has  led  to  gradual  reforms.  The  insiders  within  
institutionalized  politics  have  responded  to  the  grievances  of  the  outsiders,  by  enacting  new  policy  
areas,  designed  to  target  various  goals  of  voiced  by  different  segments  of  the  movements.  Since  the  
new  social  movements  started  out  as  a  heterogeneous  pluralist  counter  culture,  the  sorting  into  
separate  policy  areas  is  a  result  of  the  appropriation  of  radical  causes  to  bureaucratic  routines.  Thus,  
the  heterogeneity  of  the  new  social  movements  has  become  sorted  into  neatly  defined  categories,  
which  are  mutually  exclusive.  Within  each  policy  area,  some  centralized  NGOs  have  been  selected  
to  represent  the  interests  of  the  corresponding  segment  of  the  social  movements.  According  to  
corporativist  practice,  the  representation  is  two-way.  Some  administrative  tasks  are  delegated  by  
state  agencies  to  interest  organizations,  especially  RaD  tasks.  Thus,  the  selected  NGO  ends  up  with  
the  paradoxical  task  of  administering  the  status  quo  while  simultaneously  channeling  the  push  for  
transformation.  In  the  conclusion  of  the  comparative  study  by  Dryzek  et  al.,  the  authors  conclude  
that  the  “muted  quality”  of  the  Norwegian  environmental  movement  in  the  1990s  was  in  part  a  
result  of  “the  analgesic  or  even  anti-democratic  face  of  the  actively  inclusive  state.  Ecological  
                                                 
775  Rokkan  &  Flora  1999 
776  Dryzek  et.al.  2003:  94-95,  171-174 
777  Dryzek  et.al.  2003:  87 
778  Ween  2012a 
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modernization  in  Norway  is  weak  and  set  to  remain  a  moderate,  top-down  project.  There  are  no  
significant  actors  raising  critical  questions  about  the  basic  structure  [...]  no  social  movements  to  
constitute  an  autonomous  public  sphere”779  Some  political  scientists  in  Norway  responded,  accusing  
Dryzek  et  al.  of  overlooking  the  particular  Norwegian  culture  of  “state-friendliness”.780  Thus,  they  
do  not  contest  the  description  by  Dryzek  et  al.,  but  rather  their  normative  evaluation.  In  my  view,  
the  Norwegian  political  elite  has  assimilated  both  environmental  politics  and  indigenous  rights  
politics  in  a  way  that  corresponds  with  the  evaluation  of  Dryzek  et  al.  Thus,  particular  segments  of  
the  social  movements  are  accommodated  within  a  “social  contract”  characterized  by  a  consensus  
described  by  Grenestad  et  al.  as  “state-friendly”.  However,  how  consensual  is  that  consensus  
actually?  When  refraining  from  problematizing  such  a  consensus,  a  political  researcher  has  to  apply  
an  optimistic,  integrative  approach,  looking  away  from  the  pessimistic,  conflict-theoretical  
approach. 
 Independently  of  the  normative  evaluation,  I  think  that  the  descriptive  observation  fits  with  
the  observations  made  in  the  present  chapter,  that  Norwegian  environmental  authorities,  in  their  
active  opposition  to  traditional  Sámi  livelihood  adaptations,  express  the  social  capital  anchored  in  a  
specific  status  group,  nick-named  “the  nickers-nobility”,  and  thus,  marginalize  the  social  radical  
tendencies  of  the  environmental  movement,  associated  with  bio-cultural  diversity  and  
environmental  justice.  However,  this  critique  not  only  applies  to  the  accommodation  of  
environmental  politics,  but  also  to  the  assimilation  of  Sámi  rights  politics.  The  Sámi  Rights  
Commission  chose  a  conciliatory  approach,  in  spite  of  the  historical  injustice  revealed. 
 The  most  contentious  issue  is  the  right  to  land  and  water  in  the  areas  where  Norwegian  
territorial  claims  overlap  with  the  extension  of  Sápmi  as  a  traditional  homeland.  In  1751,  the  Crown  
had  stated  that  this  land  was  Terra Nullius,  and  thus  free  to  be  claimed  as  sovereign  territory  of  the  
Crown  (in  terms  of  public  law),  but  even  also  as  its  landed  property  (in  the  sense  of  private  law)..  
That  was  the  legal  basis  for  the  state’s  claim  of  ownership  of  land  and  water  in  Finnmark  County,  
which  became  publicly  controversial  during  the  Alta-controversy.  Years  of  local,  regional  and  
international  mobilization  led  to  the  enactment  of  several  reforms,  but  the  right  to  land  and  water  in  
Inner  Finnmark  remains  contentious,  as  also  in  other  parts  of  Sápmi.  The  state  created  a  new  
institution,  called  Finnmarkseiendommen  “the  Finnmark  property”,  re-stating  that  the  area  was  state  
property.  For  many  patriotic  Norwegians,  the  creation  of  a  special  body  for  this  purpose  signaled  
that  much,  maybe  too  much,  influence  had  been  exerted  by  the  Sámi  activists.  In  my  opinion,  
however,  such  Norwegian  patriots  are  badly  informed  by  the  history  of  1751,  still  believing  in  the  
political  myth  that  the  land  was  never  colonized  by  the  state.  They  live  in  a  mythic  cosmos,  where  
                                                 
779  Dryzek  et.al.  2003:  174 
780  Grenestad  et.al.  2006,  cited  in  Konttinen  2011 
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the  past  is  a  mythical  past,  before  “Leviathan”,  there  was  only  “anarchy”,  to  put  it  Hobbesian  terms.  
But  the  Crown  did  not  erect  law  and  order  from  “anarchy”,  and  neither  did  it  colonize  any  empty  
Terra  Nullius.  On  the  contrary,  the  early  modern  states  slowly  established  imperial  connections  to  a  
pre-existing  stateless  political  system,  where  specific  customs  already  goverened  the  use  of  natural  
resources  in  specific  territories.  In  my  opinion,  if  we  take  history  into  regard,  then  
Finnmarkseiendommen  should  rather  be  seen  as  a  way  whereby  the  Norwegian  empire  strikes  back,  
against  the  indigenous  human  rights  movement  in  Inner  Sápmi.  To  sort  out  disagreements  between  
the  state,  the  local  Sámi,  and  others  who  claim  rights  to  use  local  natural  resources,  a  special  court  
has  been  constituted,  Finnmarkskommisjonen,  or  “The  Finnmark  Commission”,  whose  task  is  to  
conduct  a  detailed  investigation  of  the  actual  perceptions  and  practices  of  customary  rights  in  every  
locality  all  over  the  area.  Legally,  however,  the  decisions  of  that  court  are  subordinated  to  the  
Supreme  Court  of  Norway.  Thus,  in  spite  of  the  general  acceptance  of  legal  pluralism  within  
jurisprudence,  some  degree  of  of  bias  from  methodological  nationalism  prevails.  However,  with  the  
ratification  of  international  human  rights  norms,  the  state  has  also  accepted  that  citizens  can  make  
complains  about  human  rights  breaches  to  certain  international  institutions  that  monitor  human  
rights  breaches.  For  the  indigenous  peoples  of  Sápmi,  it  can  be  relevant  to  request  legal  opinions  
from  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  from  the  UN  Human  Rights  Council,  and  from  similar  
initutions  in  the  regional  and  global  human  rights  regimes.781 
                                                 
781  The  right  to  appeal:  Indigenous peoples do have some limited opportunities for legal appeal at supra-state level 
when states commit human rights breaches. Through the creation of international human rights institutions, the 
states have given away some of their (claimed) power, so that these institutions may provide legal opinions 
regarding conflicts between the states and their subjects. Thus, various "human rights regimes" emerge as complex 
systems, nested and partially overlapping (Donnelly 2013: 138). The implementation of various human rights is 
rather uneven: though the Universal Declaration of Human Rights insists that all human rights have to be understood 
as a whole, the citizens nevertheless enjoy relatively better mechanisms for individuals to complain breaches of civil 
and political rights, when compared to breaches of economic, social and cultural rights (Riedel, Giacca & Golay 
2014). The Finnish lawyer Martin Scheinin (2000) has mapped some of the opportunities that exist for indigenous 
citizens to draft legal complains regarding breaches of civil and political rights. He observes three paths of relevance 
to Sámi citizens. We could discuss further possibilities as well.   
 (a) Complain for the United Nations: Human Rights Committee (HRC), regarding a state's failure to confirm with 
the ICCPR Article 27 and its Optional Protocol. This option is relevant for all of Sápmi and for most indigenous 
peoples of the world. There are many experiences with indigenous land rights according to Scheinin 2000: §3.1. See 
also Wikipedia: United Nations Human Rights Committee, accessed 05.03.2015. 
 (b) Complain for the Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, regarding violations of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (ECHR). This is relevant for all Sápmi, and other indigenous 
peoples in Europe (Inuit, Nenet...). A few experinces with indigenous land rights (including the Alta-dam case) 
according to Scheinin 2000: §3.2, see also Wikipedia: European Court of Human Rights, accessed 05.03.2015. 
(Comparable paths, but for other regions, exist through the Organization of American States, African Charter of 
Human Rights, Scheinin 2000: §§ 3.3-3.4) 
 (c) Complains for the United Nations: International Labor Organisation regarding ILO convention no.169. This 
option might become potentially relevant for the Sámi in Norway, which is among the few states that have ratified 
the ILO 169 (Scheinin 2000: §3.5). However, the complaint has to be represented through trade union structures 
(ibidem, referring to Samson & Schindler 1999). (Comparable path complains for the World Bank Inspection Panel, 
as used during the dam conflict in Narmada River in India, Scheinin 2000: §3.6) 
 (d) Further potentially relevant paths would include lobbying with other organizations. There exist some weakly 
institutionalized mechanisms at the UN and the Council of Europe levels to control breaches of economic, social and 
cultural rights, in parallel to the rather more powerful mechanisms in the UN and the Council of Europe to control 
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 If  I  take  a  governmental  point  of  view,  the  contemporary  Norwegian  state  is  no  longer  a  
Leviathan  commanded  by  one  head,  but  instead,  a  beast  with  many  heads.  As  with  a  monster  of  
Scandinavian  folk  lore,  the  troll,  one  head  is  arguing  against  the  other.  On  the  one  hand,  that  might  
imply  that  the  impact  of  neoliberal  re-regulation  has  made  the  government  messy  and  no  longer  
accountable,  which  would  pose  a  problem  for  the  sovereignty  of  majoritarian  representative  
democracy.  On  the  other  hand,  if  one  applies  a  wider  concept  of  democratic  participation,  the  many  
headed  troll  might  be  regarded  as  a  more  pluralist  political  order,  with  larger  degree  of  balance  of  
powers,  and  broader  options  of  input  for  citizen  participation. 
 If  I  try  taking  the  point  of  view  of  the  alter-globalization  movement,  the  polarization  between  
the  two  movements  is  a  product  of  their  assimilation  into  the  state  apparatus,  and  the  administrative  
division  into  separate  policy  areas.  From  an  alter-globalist  viewpoint,  the  conflict  in  Norway  
between  environmental  policy  and  indigenous  rights  policy  is  similar  in  its  consequences  to  divide 
et impera  exercised  by  the  institutionalized  center  against  mobilization  in  the  movement  of  
movements.  At  several  other  localities  on  the  earth,  indigenous  rights  activists  and  environmental  
activists  remain  allies,  together  struggling  for  bio-cultural  diversity  and  environmental  justice.782  
Typically,  they  would  have  shared  interests  in  subverting  and  transforming  the  global  dominon  of  
Big  Oil  and  the  so-called  “War  on  Terror”,  and  the  contemporary  Norwegian  state  is  eager  to  serve  
both.  Norwegian  alter-globalization  activists  ask  if  Norway  is  a  state  that  owns  an  oil  company,  or  
an  oil  company  that  owns  a  state.783  In  that  context,  it  is  interesting  that  the  state  has  paid  relatively  
small  sums  of  petrodollars  to  employ  some  of  the  leaders  of  the  environmental  movement  and  the  
indigenous  rights  movement,  defined  them  into  separate  policy  areas,  and  thus  facilitated  an  
institutional  competition  between  them,  while  both  remain  subordinate  to  the  arch-enemy  of  the  
alter-globalization  movement:  the  oil  industry  and  its  military-industrial  complex. 
 Those  two  points  of  view,  the  governmental  and  the  alter-globalist,  do  not  agree.  It  may  be  
that  the  truth  lies  somewhere  in  the  middle,  but  it  is  possible  to  claim  that  about  any  two  stand  
points  that  are  presented  as  alternatives.  It  may  also  be  that  both  views  are  equally  true,  given  
different  pragmatic  premises  and  contexts. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
breaches of civil and political rights. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights oversees the 
ICESCR, in parallel to the UN Human rights Committee's opinions concerning the ICCPR (Wikipedia: Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, accessed 05.03.2015), but without the possibility for individual citizens to 
try their cases (Cismas 2014 pp. 452-453). Similarly, at a regional level, the European Committee of Social Rights 
oversees the European Social Charter, in parallel with the European Court of Human Rights making judgments con-
cerning the ECHR, and with the possibilities for citizens to make complaints via large NGOs (Council of Europe 
2014). Finally, the Sámi of Norway, Sweden and Finland might potentially lobby for their cause within the EU sys-
tem, where the European Ombudsman has some tradition for asking advice from the EU Agency for Fundamental 
Rights (EU Agency for Fundamental Rights 2015, European Ombudsman 2013). 
 (Thanks to professors Steinar Pedersen and Ciarán Burke for pointing out the need to clarify my previous statement 
regarding the opportunity for citizens to make complains about claimed human rights breaches.) 
782  E.g.  when  we  pass  from  the  “Norwegian”  to  the  “Russian”  part  of  the  Barents  Coast:  Ballovara  2014 
783  WWF  Norway  2010 
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8.6.2  Polity  transformation:  the  emergence  of  transnational  district  politics 
The  political  order  in  the  sub-Arctic  fringe  of  Europe  is  being  transformed.  During  the  Cold  War,  
the  normative  ideal  of  a  Europe  of  States  was  instituted  at  the  Western  side  of  the  Iron  Curtain.  
After  1989,  another  world  has  become  possible,  but  we  do  not  yet  know  its  name.  Some  tendencies  
clearly  fit  with  the  normative  ideal  of  a  Europe  of  Regions. 
 Before  the  Cold  War,  the  sub-Arctic  periphery  of  Finno-Scandia  was  struck  hard  by  
Machiavellian  strife  between  Fascist  and  Leninist  movements.  During  the  Cold  War,  the  regional  
geopolitics  was  a  system  in  relative  equilibrium:  The  Nordic  Balance.784  The  states  of  Finnoscandia  
constituted  a  buffer  zone.  Marshall  Aid  donated  to  Norway  and  Iceland  cultivated  a  Westphalian  
power  balance,  and  allowed  a  “third  way”  in  welfare  policy.  However,  military  alliances  divided  the  
area.  The  Deatunu  River  became  a  boundary  between  two  zones  of  influence,  those  of  Moscow  and  
Washington.  During  the  Nordic  balance,  Norway  and  Finland  were  among  the  model  examples  of  
unitary  nation-states,  characterized  by  majoritarian  representative  democracy,  consolidated  state  
apparatuses,  and  Keynesian  planning  through  state-certified  money.785  After  the  end  of  the  Cold  
War,  the  state  centres  in  Oslo  and  Helsinki  chose  slightly  different  strategies.  The  small  Norwegian  
state  possesses  big  invested  interests  in  offshore  oil  and  gas  fields,  and  to  some  degree  in  fishery  
banks.  The  Finnish  state  has  an  interest  in  keeping  good  relations  with  both  the  West  and  Russia.  
The  political  class  in  the  Norwegian  state  is  enthusiastic  of  globalization,  and  Norway  has  
undergone  a  total  reform  of  military  policy,  from  a  defensive  army  based  on  a  home  guard  system,  
to  a  specialized  army  serving  in  NATO  missions  in  overseas  areas.786  Finland,  by  contrast,  stays  
outside  NATO,  and  its  political  class  appears  to  take  more  pride  in  maintaining  a  clear  territorial  
and  hierarchical  order,  the  virtues  of  high  modernist  statism.  If  so,  then  Finland  has  resemblances  
with  EU  member  states  in  Eastern  Europe  in  this  regard.787  Finland  has  also  sought  close  
accommodation  with  the  EU  and  is  a  full  member.  The  political  class  in  Oslo,  by  contrast,  did  not  
manage  to  convince  the  national  populace  to  join  the  EU.  Still  Norway  has  become  integrated  in  the  
EU  Internal  Market  through  the  EEA  Agreement,  and  also  takes  part  in  police  cooperation  and  
shared  migration  control  through  the  Schengen  agreement.788  Both  states  have  adopted  the  
regionalist  mode  of  economic  development,  and  the  states  have  chosen  policies  for  regional  
                                                 
784  Arter  2008:268 
785  On  the  significance  of  state-certified  currencies  for  state  planning,  see  Hart,  Laville  and  Cattani  (eds.)  2010 
786  Matlary  &  Østerud  2007 
787  Eastern  European  EU  member  states,  when  compared  to  the  Western  European  ones,  may  appear  to  be  more  
centralised  and  less  regionalised.  Firstly,  the  EU  Structural  Funds  included  demands  of  centralized  state  control  (to  
avoid  corruption).  Secondly,  some  recent  regional  units  have  been  set  up  within  some  states,  but  still,  the  state  
governments  are  generally  against  internal  federalisation.  See  Keating  (2008:74-5),  see  also  Keating  2006  and  
Brusis  2002.  (Thanks  to  M.Keating  and  his  seminar  “Territorial  politics  in  Europe”,  autumn  2008,  for  those  
references.) 
788  Regarding  Schengen-agreement,  see  Mathiesen  1997 
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development  that  fit  with  the  national  geostrategic  interests  of  each  nation.  Norway  is  a  champion  
for  Barents  Sea  cooperation,  which  fits  well  with  the  small  state’s  grand  interests  in  the  sea.  
Finland,  by  contrast,  has  undertaken  successful  lobbying  within  the  EU  for  the  so  called  Nordic  
Dimension,  a  competitor  to  the  Barents  Sea  co-operation  pushed  by  Norway,  and  to  the  Baltic  Sea  
cooperation  pushed  by  Denmark.789  Finland  has  actually  succeeded  in  attracting  EU  regional  funds  
to  the  land  area  that  lies  between  the  Barents  and  Baltic  Seas,  which  also  includes  the  upper  parts  of  
the  Deatnu  River  basin.790  After  the  cold  war,  the  Norwegian  and  Finnish  states  found  new  
functions,  by  joining  clusters  of  regulatory  states  in  Western  European  and  the  Circumpolar  
Arctic.791  Macro-regional  integration  in  Western  Europea  and  the  Circumpolar  Arcti  is  an  inter-
governmental  and  even  trans-governmental  process.  This  integration  has  created  political  
opportunities  for  local  regional  integration  in  smaller  spaces  that  are  subnational  and  transnational.  
Institutional  infiltration  between  the  states  appears  to  have  been  a  precondition  for  transnational  
regionalism  at  a  more  local  level.   
 The  EU  Strategy  for  the  Baltic  Sea  Region  and  the  Norwegian  Barents  Secretariat  are  both  
regional  development  programs  with  a  bioregional  basis.  Both  have  been  roughly  defined  by  the  
drainage  basins  of  the  two  seas.  The  Baltic  drainage  basin  is  an  area  with  high  degree  of  human  
impact,  especially  in  its  southern  part,  which  includes  densely  populated  areas  in  Poland.  The  
Barents  drainage  basin  by  contrast,  is  scarcely  populated,  but  in  this  arctic  area,  the  socio-
ecosystem  includes  vulnerable  natural  and  cultural  heritage.  The  Barents  area  includes  all  the  main  
habitats  of  reindeer  on  the  European  side  of  the  Ural  Mountains.  Those  habitats  include  several  
unique  indigenous  human  cultures,  such  as  the  Sámi  and  the  Nenet.  The  Barents  Secretariat  is  part  
of  the  ongoing  macro-regional  integration  in  the  Circumpolar  Arctic.  It  implies  better  diplomatic  
relations  between  former  enemies  from  the  Cold  War.  For  military  strategists,  diplomacy  at  the  
north-western  edge  of  the  “pivot  area”  might  be  seen  as  challenging,  but  nevertheless,  the  shared  
natural  and  cultural  heritage  can  be  an  incentive  for  cooperation,  and  not  only  competition.  The  
Baltic  Sea  Region  is  part  of  the  ongoing  European  integration,  though  it  also  includes  partnership  
between  the  Russian  Federation  and  EU/EEA  member  states.  Both  the  Baltic  region  and  the  
Barents  region  imply  federating  relations  between  the  well-established  Russian  Federation  and  the  
potential  Western  European  Federation.  Both  programs  are  of  relevance  for  peripheral  areas  of  the  
Russian  Federation  on  the  European  side  of  the  Ural  Mountains. 
  
                                                 
789  Arter  2000 
790  EU  Commission  2007 
791  Majone  1997 
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Figure  8-1:  The  Baltic  Sea  Basin  as  an  ecologic  and  economic  region 
Top:  EU  regional  program  EUSBSR,  “EU  Strategy  for  the  Baltic  Sea  Region”792 
Bottom  left:  Baltic  Sea  drainage  basin  as  bioregion:  proportions  of  arable  land793 
Bottom  right:  Baltic  Sea  drainage  basin  as  bioregion:  density  of  human  
population794 
 
                                       
                                                 
792  Source:  Official  website  www.eu.baltic.net  retrieved  February  2013) 
793  Artist:  Hugo  Ahlenius  ©  UNEP/GRID  Arendal  2006.  http://www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/arable-land-in-the-
baltic-sea-region_bc7f  (accessed  09.04.2015).  Se  also  Baltic  GIS:  http://www.grida.no/baltic/index.htm 
794  Artist:  Hugo  Ahlenius  ©  UNEP/GRID  Arendal  2006.  http://www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/population-density-in-
the-baltic-sea-drainage-basin_bc92  (accessed  09.04.2015).  Se  also  Baltic  GIS:  http://www.grida.no/baltic/index.htm 
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Figure  8-2:  The  Barents  Sea  Basin  as  an  ecologic  and  economic  region 
Top:  Regional  program  for  Barents  Sea  Area:  target  territories  of  the  Norwegian  Barents  Secretariat795 
Bottom  left:  Barents  Sea  as  economic  region:  oil  and  gas  fields  (violet)  and  special  bird  areas  (red)796 
Bottom  right:  Barents  area  as  ecologic  region:  priority  areas  for  nature  conservation  policies797 
 
                        
                                                 
795  Source:  www.barents.no  retrieved  February  2013) 
796  Artist:  Hugo  Ahlenius  ©  UNEP/GRID  Arendal  2006.  http://www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/barents-sea-ecoregion-
conservation-priority-areas-and-oil-and-gas-infrastructure_13c7  (accessed  09.04.2015). 
797  Artist:  Phillippe  Rekacewicz  ©  UNEP/GRID  Arendal  2006.  http://www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/oil-and-gas-
development-and-seabirds-colonies-in-the-barents-region_670b  (accessed  09.04.2015). 
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These  maps  indicate  plans  and  visions  for  joint  regional  development  on  the  Northern  fringes  of  
Europe,  between  former  enemies  from  the  Cold  War.  Both  regional  initiatives  have  been  
institutionalized  via  relatively  large  programs. 
 
Figure  8-3:  “The  Nordic  Dimension”  as  a  developing  region  in  the  EU 
Regional  program  for  land  areas  between  Barents  and  Baltic:  EU  region  North  –  INTERREG  IV  A  Nord798 
 
 The  EU  Northern  Dimension  initiative  from  Finland  was  institutionalized  on  a  less  
ambitious  scale,  as  one  of  the  regions  within  the  EU  INTERREG  development  system.  INTERREG  
IV  A  Nord  is  not  based  on  bioregional  premises,  but  is  a  regional  development  program  for  scarcely  
populated  and  economically  underdeveloped  provinces  in  the  sub-arctic  fringe  of  the  EU  –  lands  
within  the  colonized  Sámi  areas.  This  regional  development  program  has  become  especially  
relevant  for  Sámi  and  other  local  people  in  this  part  of  Sápmi.  Thus,  the  Northern  Dimension  
resulted  in  a  less  spectacular  program,  but  one  with  concrete  utility  for  what  Nordic  states  call  
“district  politics”.  On  the  one  hand,  the  common  European  Economic  Area  has  opened  up  Sámi  
districts  for  the  extraction  of  natural  resources  by  more  centres  of  accumulation  than  ever  before.  
On  the  other  hand,  the  ongoing  European  integration  has  opened  the  possibilities  to  expand  “district  
politics”  to  transnational  districts.  This  was  politically  difficult  under  the  Europe  of  States,  because  
under  that  geopolitical  order,  Nordic  state  builders  feared  potential  Sámi  separatism. 
 The  regional  development  efforts  pushed  by  Finland  and  Norway  open  up  new  possibilities  
for  Sámi  social  entrepreneurship  across  state  boundaries.  The  municipalities  on  each  side  of  the  
Deatnu  River  have  enjoyed  Interreg  funding  for  some  of  their  cross  border  collaborations.799  The  
large  budget  of  the  Norwegian  Barents  Secretariat  also  allocated  a  small  sum  of  money  for  
                                                 
798  Source:  EU  Commission  2007:  8  (from  www.interregnord.com  retrieved  February  2013) 
799  SEG  group  interview  (focus  group),  Tana  Bru,  08.02.2011 
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collaboration  between  Sámi  at  Kola  Peninsula  and  in  the  Nordic  countries.800  Therefore,  the  
regional  development  projects  targeting  the  sub-Arctic  periphery  of  Europe  open  up  opportunities  
for  Sámi  cooperation  across  the  Sápmi  homeland  and  the  Sámi  nation  as  a  whole.  This  has  led  to  a  
renewed  fear  for  Sámi  separatism  among  strongly  patriotic  Norwegians,  expressed  in  the  politics  of  
the  Progress  Party.  However,  that  danger  is  non-existent,  at  least  as  long  as  the  Sámi  political  class  
and  social  entrepreneurs  have  access  to  political  representation  and  economic  development.  Instead,  
what  happens  appears  to  be  very  close  to  an  actualization  of  the  old  vision  of  a  “Europe  of  
Regions”.    Sámi  human  rights  activists  and  political  entrepreneurs  have  grabbed  the  opportunity  to  
apply  project  funding  from  the  EU  Interreg  program  and  the  Barents  Secretariat.  The  political  class  
among  the  Sámi  nation  have  been  at  on  the  cutting  edge  of  macroregional  integration  in  the  
Circumpolar  Arctic,  by  seeking  to  build  alliances  with  indigenous  populations  in  Greenland,  Canada  
and  Alaska,  and  later,  in  Siberia.801  This  mobilization  was  part  of  the  new  social  movements  after  
1968,  and  simultaneously,  contributed  to  the  prefiguration  of  the  alter-globalization  movement.  
After  bringing  about  reforms  in  international  human  right  legislation,  the  indigenous  movement  also  
succeeded  in  pressing  some  state  law  makers  to  recognize  the  existence  and  significance  of  
customary  law  among  state-less  nations. 
 The  emerging  system  of  watershed  management  in  the  Deatnu  River  valley  is  not  the  result  
of  steering  from  Brussels,  Oslo  and  Helsinki.  Instead,  it  emerges  from  complex  interaction  among  
plural  institution-building  processes,  some  of  whom  are  adversaries  to  each  other.  Initially,  it  was  
pushed  by  the  German  Green  Party,  which  in  the  beginning  was  more  of  an  “anti-party”,  a  pluralist  
movement.  As  the  party  became  institutionalized,  it  also  got  relatively  solid  representation  within  
the  EU  Parliament.  The  EU  Parliament,  unlike  most  other  political  organs  in  the  union,  is  not  an  
inter-governmental  forum,  but  instead,  a  seat  of  democratic  representation  for  all  EU  citizens,  in  
direct  elections  that  by-pass  the  state  level.  The  policy-makers  in  the  EU  Parliament  twinned  their  
networks  with  epistemic  communities  represented  within  the  European  Commission,  the  
administration  of  the  EU.  Together,  those  two  heterogeneous  networks,  the  Green  Party  and  the  
epistemic  community,  propagated  watershed  management.  Their  adversary  was  the  Council  of  
Ministers,  an  inter-governmental  forum,  and  the  stronghold  of  statist  power  within  the  EU.  
Therefore,  the  parliamentarians  chose  to  delay  the  voting  for  the  water  framework  directive,  until  
institutional  reforms  had  been  made,  which  granted  more  power  to  the  European  Parliament.  Thus,  
the  Parliament  had  the  power  to  act.  However,  compromises  had  to  be  worked  out,  particularly  over  
the  social  issue  of  water  pricing.802  After  1989,  another  world  has  become  possible,  but  we  do  not  
                                                 
800  Interview  with  Hansen,  Håvald,  river  fisher  and  social  researcher,  Tana  Bru  (SEG),  5.  July  2012. 
801  Heininen  &  Southcott  2010 
802  Kaika  2003 
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yet  know  its  name.  The  Europe  of  (sovereign)  states  and  the  Europe  of  (overlapping)  regions  are  
two  different  discourses,  partly  used  to  describe  what  Europe  is,  partly  to  prescribe  what  it  should  
be.  As  normative  terms,  they  are  devises  to  communicate  and  develop  hopes  and  promises,  realize  
what  we  want.  As  descriptive  devices,  the  same  terms  might  help  us  to  search  for  elements  of  the  
present  actuality  that  resemble  the  order  we  pursue,  realize  what  we  have  achieved.  Both  the  
normative  and  the  descriptive  use  of  the  chosen  term  may  empower  the  user  to  identify  what  
positive  tendencies  to  further  cultivate,  what  potentials  to  actualize.  Therefore,  such  terms  help  us  to  
realize potentials,  in  both  meanings  of  the  world,  as  acknowledge  and  actualize.  Human  praxis  is  a  
dance  of  learning  and  action.  In  the  social  ecology  of  cultural  praxis  and  nature  praxis,  reality  never  
comes  ready-made,  thus  realism  is  not  to  reify  what  one  can  “positively  observe”.  Realism  is  to  
realize  potentials,  in  two  meanings:  on  the  one  hand  realize  as  getting  to  know,  on  the  other  hand  
realize  as  making  real.  Thus,  there  is  no  difference  between  pragmatism,  instrumentalism  and  
realism.  Political  realism  is  to  realize  potentials,  cognitively  and  practically.  Machiavelli  would  call  




8.7.0  Summing  up:  constituent  praxes  and  constituted  order 
 
In  this  chapter  we  have  identified  some  particular  micropolitical  relations  between  the  two  case  
studies,  through  a  historical-geographical  process  tracing  of  some  particular  pathways  through  the  
actual  networks  of  socio-material  praxes.  We  have  also  mapped  some  particular  macropolitical  
formations  that  have  emerged  in  the  geographical  environment  of  our  two  chosen  water  areas,  
during  the  historical  period  that  has  passed  from  the  past  case  to  the  present  case. 
 Micro-political  relations  –  constituent  praxes:  In  line  with  geographical  conventions,  I  
investigated  how  those  networks  interacted  with  conditions  of  physical  geography,  bio-geography  
and  cultural  geography,  or  in  other  words,  the  abiotic,  biotic  and  human  factors.  I  identified  
complex  interactions  between  the  practice  networks  and  each  of  those  explanatory  factors.  Thus,  it  
was  demonstrated  that  Elinor  Ostrom's  Socio-Ecological  System  (SES)  can  be  a  useful  model  in  
order  to  make  sense  of  this  topical  complexity  between  causal  factors,  but  also  that  there  is  a  spatial  
complexity  between  the  various  SESs,  which  is  also  in  line  with  Ostrom's  polycentric  model  of  
political  ecology.803 
 However,  we  also  included  a  meta-scientific  process  tracing  that  is  alien  to  Ostrom's  
                                                 
803  See  McGinnis  &  Ostrom  2012  for  the  latest  “official  release”  of  the  SES  framework 
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terminology.  On  the  one  hand,  the  geographical  opportunity  structure  appears  to  be  co-determined  
by  abiotic,  biotic  and  human  conditions.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  knowledge  about  those  
environmental  conditions  is  limited.  Empirical  research  is  being  conducted  on  relevant  abiotic,  
biotic  and  human  factors  in  this  environment,  particularly  by  salmon  biologists  and  legal  historians.  
However,  there  is  a  scarcity  of  resources  accessible  to  help  this  endeavor  to  overcome  the  scarcity  
of  knowledge.  Research  priorities  are  an  object  of  contention.  The  institutionalization  of  
environmental  policies  and  indigenous  rights  implies  a  specific  political  economy  of  the  relevant  
transnational  epistemic  communities.  State-certified  salmon  biology  deals  pragmatically  with  
national  economic  interests  as  the  state  governments  define  them,  whereas  this  systemic  bias  is  not  
countered  by  any  bio-scientific  research  funded  by  organizations  for  small-scale  fisheries  or  
indigenous  rights.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Sámi  historians  that  were  funded  by  the  Sámi  Rights  
Commission  have  made  significant  progress  in  documenting  the  colonial  history  of  Sápmi  and  the  
continuous  practice  of  local  norms  and  lore.  However,  those  historiographical  developments  are  
disseminated  mostly  through  Sámi  schools  and  Sámi  media,  and  thus,  most  members  of  the  state-
building  nations  remain  ignorant  of  the  colonial  history  of  their  own  nations.  Those  empirical  
observations  regarding  the  practical  conditions  of  empirical  knowledge  actualize  the  relevance  of  
Science  and  Technology  Studies  (STS).  However,  my  selected  approach  is  not  based  on  Latour  and  
Callon's  approach,  even  though  they  trace  networks  of  socio-material  praxes.  Instead,  I  have  applied  
a  radical  feminist  version  of  STS,  advocated  by  Haraway  and  Stengers.  The  latter  author  calls  for  a  
“democratization  of  the  sciences”.804  I  have  identified  some  collective  actors  pushing  for  such  
democratization  of  the  sciences,  particularly  the  Nordic  Sámiráđđi.  This  spreads  information  on  the  
colonial  history  of  Sápmi.  It  also  advocates  that  natural  resources  management  should  take  into  
account  the  indigenous  human  rights,  as  well  as  issues  of  bio-cultural  diversity,  both  in  line  with  the  
UN  Biodiversity  Convention.  Those  efforts  of  the  Sámiráđđi  and  others,  we  identified  as  the  
regional  contingent  of  a  transnational  environmental  justice  movement.  Regardless  of  intentions,  
the  functional  effect  of  Sámiráđđi  may  be  to  facilitate  convergence  between  dispersed  social  
movements,  which  is  an  intended  goal  for  some  theorists  of  the  transnational  environmental  justice  
movement.805 
 Macro-political  formations  –  constituted  order:  Large-scale  patterns  in  the  political  
environment  were  studied  by  sketching  a  map  on  the  basis  of  secondary  literature  and  public  policy  
documents. 
 First,  I  reviewed  some  relevant  political  research  on  policy  adaptation  in  response  to  
environmental  and  indigenous  mobilization.  Norway  and  Finland  were  examined,  being  the  two  
                                                 
804  Stengers  1999  (1997) 
805  See  e.g.  Bailey  &  Mattei  2012  for  one  example 
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states  of  direct  relevance  for  the  Deatnu  and  Alta  Rivers.  The  emphasis  was  on  the  Norwegian  
polity.  This  was  for  methodological  reasons,  since  the  researcher,  as  a  Norwegian,  has  a  better  
contextual  understanding  of  this  nation.  The  emphasis  was  on  discussions  regarding  John  Dryzek's  
critical  approach  to  Nordic  “inclusive”  associationalism,  emphasizing  its  co-optative  function  rather  
than  its  democratizing  function.  In  the  territory  where  Norway  and  Sápmi  overlap,  it  was  suggested  
that  the  co-optation  of  environmental  and  indigenous  claims  into  separate  policy  areas  produced  a  
division  within  the  social  movements,  which  in  turn  made  them  easier  to  dominate.  Thus,  regardless  
of  intentions,  this  process  functions  as  a  mechanism  of  divide  et  impera  between  environmental  
and  indigenous  movements.  This  political  tendency  produced  by  the  poly-centric  co-optative  state  is  
contrary  to  the  political  tendency  pushed  by  the  environmental  justice  movement.  Thus,  the  review  
of  policy  adaptation  revealed  antagonism  between  a  mechanism  of  divide  et  impera  and  a  
mechanism  of  environmental  justice  convergence. 
 However,  the  review  of  polity  transformation  that  followed  revealed  a  quite  different  
tendency.  It  was  shown  how  the  emergence  of  transnational  regional  development  programs  open  
up  new  spaces  for  socio-economic  development  within  actual  trans-boundary  socio-ecosystems.  
Thus,  programs  like  the  Barents  Region,  the  Baltic  Region,  and,  in  particular,  the  EU-INTERREG  
IV  A  Nord,  have  opened  opportunities  to  expand  what  Nordic  countries  know  as  “district  politics”  
beyond  state  borders.  Thus,  the  Europe  of  Regions  enables  transnational  district  politics  in  trans-
boundary  socio-ecosystems  that  were  previously  suppressed  by  the  Nordic  nation-states.  
Transnational  district  politics  appears  to  interact  in  an  ambiguous  way  with  the  environmental  
justice  movement,  because  it  may  offer  opportunities  to  overcome  divide  et  impera,  at  least  for  those  
who  emerge  from  the  spatial  divisions  of  socio-ecosystems.  At  the  same  time,  district  politics,  like  
other  praxes  in  Nordic  political  culture,  may  serve  one  function  of  co-optation,  and  another  function  
of  empowerment.  By  applying  a  relational  concept  of  power,  Finnish  political  scientists  have  
interpreted  Finnish  Communalism  as  an  ambiguous  relationship  between  local  communities  and  the  
central  state,  while  Norwegian  political  scientists  have  revealed  how  some  bureaucrats  and  policy-
researchers  approach  Local  Agenda  21  in  a  way  where  participation  has  become  a  way  to  silence  
the  voice  of  the  population.806  Likewise,  the  Norwegian  political  anthropologist  Halvard  Vike  has  
shown  how  municipal  politics  in  inner  Southern  Norway  is  an  arena  for  political  struggles  between  
top-down  and  bottom-up  initiatives.807 
 Summa  summarum,  we  have  identified  some  indicators  of  ambiguous  interactions  between  
micro-political  relations  and  macro-political  formations.  The  mechanism  of  divide  et  impera  has  
been  at  work  by  accommodating  the  claims  of  social  movement  into  separate  policy  areas,  but  also  
                                                 
806  Bregnballe  2005;;  Bregnballe  2007;;  Johansson  1990 
807  Vike  2009 
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by  practicing  a  district  politics  that  was  geographically  limited  by  nation-state  borders.  Both  
mechanisms  have  contributed  to  reproducing  the  dividing  and  conquering  within  the  transnational  
socio-ecosystems  of  in  the  Sápmi  region.  Divisions  are  reproduced  in  the  organization  of  bio-
scientific  and  cultural  historical  research  in  the  Sápmi  area,  and  knowledge-production  remains  
divided  and  conquered  under  the  division  between  policy  areas  and  state  territories.  However,  the  
mechanism  of  convergence  between  locally  based  movements  is  at  work  when  the  Nordic  Sámiráđđi  
and  other  locally  based  groups  take  action  for  environmental  justice.  This  includes  pushing  to  
disseminate  knowledge  to  the  public,  shaping  the  agenda  setting  for  scientific  research,  and  
overcoming  the  divisions  between  policy  areas  and  state  territories.  The  convergence  of  
environmental  justice  movements  interacts  with  an  emergence  of  transnational  district  politics.  This  
ongoing  polity  transformation  opens  up  some  possibilities  to  overcome  spatial  dividing  and  
conquering  in  the  transnational  socio-ecosystem  in  Sápmi,  while  the  topical  division  between  policy  




8.8.0  Negative  and  positive  findings  in  the  bridge  chapter 
 
8.8.1  Negative  findings:  some  possible  errors  in  the  geographical  bridge 
The  historical  bridge  chapter  has  methodological  challenges  similar  to  those  of  Case  I,  as  both  study  
recent  history,  using  historical  research  methods.  This  chapter  is  shorter  than  Case  I,  but  suffers  
from  some  similar  spatial  biases.  Firstly,  I  have  not  been  able,  within  the  frame  of  this  thesis,  to  
trace  the  related  policy  process  at  the  UN  level  in  the  1980s  and  1990s.  I  have  the  sources  necessary  
to  sketch  such  a  historiography,  but  those  need  to  be  coded  and  analysed.  Secondly,  it  would  be  
relevant  to  explain  processes  within  those  two  adjacent  watersheds  in  the  context  of  parallel  
processes  within  the  adjacent  watersheds,  such  as  Pasvik.  One  would  probably  find  joint  causal  
processes  not  only  between  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  watersheds.  There  would  probably  also  be  causal  
connections  to  exogenous  local  histories.  Additionally,  the  few  processes  that  I  have  traced  within  
the  two  selected  water  areas  have  also  been  rather  arbitrarily  chosen,  so  there  could  be  a  need  for  a  
“thicker”  description  of  those  endogenous  processes  as  well.  I  cannot  see  any  colonial  bias  implicit  
in  the  two  latter  issues.  Those  appear  to  me  as  being  a  result  of  the  arbitrariness  of  fieldwork  
methods.  However,  the  first-mentioned  issue,  namely  the  lack  of  information  about  the  policy  
process  at  UN  level,  can  be  seen  as  a  reproduction  of  nationalist  bias,  or  alternatively  of  regionalist  
biases.  At  the  very  least,  I  am  conscious  and  explicit  that  this  information  is  lacking. 
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Suggestions  for  further  research:  Regarding  the  constitutional  changes  in  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  
water  areas,  it  would  be  publically  relevant  to  inquire  into  further  questions.  I  will  suggest: 
 a)  To  explain  constitutional  change  in  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  water  areas,  it  would  also  be  
necessary  to  trace  more  of  the  particular  praxis  nets  that  link  the  historical  Alta-dam  case  to  the  
contemporary  Deatnu  River,  and  trace  how  those  interact  with  transnational  policy  processes  in  the  
UN,  national  policy  processes  in  the  two  host  states,  as  well  as  other  local  struggles  in  adjacant  
water  areas. 
 b)  To  explain  the  enactment  of  §110a  of  the  Norwegian  Constitution  in  1988,  the  Finnmark  
Act  from  2005,  and  the  parallel  legal  changes  under  the  Finnish  host  state,  one  would  have  to  trace  
the  relevant  policy  processes  at  UN  level  during  the  1980s  and  90s.  Gaining  access  to  participant  
observation  among  diplomats  is  a  challenging  task.808  However,  one  could  use  secondary  works  
written  by  Henry  Minde,  James  Anaya  and  others,  who  have  gathered  primary  data  from  diplomats,  
Norwegian  and  Sámi  as  well  as  others809.  Some  relevant  methodological  and  theoretical  tools  to  this  
end  were  developed  in  studies  of  international  human  rights  law.810 
 c)  For  the  same  purpose,  it  would  also  be  necessary  to  trace  some  of  the  relevant  struggles  in  
watersheds  adjacent  to  the  Alta  and  Deatnu,  such  as  the  Torne,  Neiden  and  Pasvik.  The  latter  of  
those  rivers  is  shared  between  Norwegian,  Finnish  and  Russian  Sápmi.  This  would  actualize  the  
politics  of  the  Russian  Federation  as  a  more  immediately  relevant  context.  More  knowledge  about  
the  politics  of  these  rivers  would  also  be  relevant  as  exogenous  factors  to  explain  politics  in  Alta  
and  Deatnu  Rivers. 
 
8.8.2  Positive  findings:  “the  struggle  for  agenda-setting”,  a  possible  meso-mechanism 
On  the  basis  of  this  geographical  bridge  chapter,  and  in  spite  of  the  negative  findings  reviewed  
above,  one  possible  mechanism  can  be  suggested.  The  chapter  also  put  me  on  the  track  of  other  
processes,  but  did  not  provide  enough  information  to  formulate  a  mechanism  regarding  these. 
 Struggle  for  agenda-setting:  This  geographical  bridge  chapter  has  linked  the  long  term  
outcome  of  the  Alta-dam  conflict  to  the  emergence  of  bio-regional  management  of  the  Deatnu  
River.  This  chapter  indicates  another  form  of  struggle  about  norms  and  knowledge.  While  Case  I  
revealed  a  struggle  for  the  capacity  to  define  the  already  existing  constitutional  norms  and  scientific  
standards  of  the  state,  the  geographical  bridge  revealed  similar  struggles  about  the  capacity  to  set  
the  agenda  for  future  policy  making  and  future  scientific  inquiry.  The  chapter  traced  some  of  the  
                                                 
808  Neumann  2009 
809  See  Minde  1980,  1984,  1993,  1996,  2001,  2007,  2003a,  2003b,  2005b.  (Thanks  to  Henry  Minde  for  sharing  copies  of  
his  artilcles.)  See  also  Anaya  2004,  as  well  as  Minde,  Eide  &  Åhrén  2007. 
810  Riles  2001;;  Keck  &  Sikkink  1998  (Thanks  to  Gro  Ween  for  the  former  refernce,  and  to  Paul  Routledge  for  the  latter  
one.) 
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particular  pathways  that  together  had  an  impact  on  long-term  changes  that  took  place  after  the  Alta-
dam  controversy  (Case  I),  and  also  influenced  the  emergence  of  bioregional  management  in  the  
Deatnu  water  area  (Case  II).  The  geographical  bridge  traced  several  paths,  within  several  policy  
areas  or  scientific  disciplines. 
 
Table  8-2:  One  meso-mechanism  observed  in  the  geographical  bridge 
Struggle  for  future  agenda-setting  (meso-mechanism,  geographical  bridge) 
i.  struggle  for  agenda-setting  (within  state-certified  policy  making  and  scientific  inquiry) 
ii.  divergent  practical  realities  with  different  socio-material  locations  (in  bureaucracy,  landscape) 
iii.  divergent  research  &  teaching  priorities  within  disciplines  (bio  indicators,  hist  syllabus) 
 
 Path  i):  The  common  denominator  for  all  of  those  was  that  various  interest  groups  from  the  
Alta  and  Deatnu  areas  congregated  in  broad  social  movement  coalitions,  in  order  to  influence  
agenda-setting  within  various  policy  areas  and  various  scientific  disciplines.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  
particular  micro-meso  links  are  the  same  as  those  described  in  Case  I:  the  twinning  of  issue  
networks,  where  joint  action  leads  to  the  expansion  of  organizational  networks,  and  the  re-definition  
of  more  unifying  issues.  At  each  moment  of  issue  network  twinning,  there  is  a  translation  from  one  
intersubjective  framing  to  another.  During  this  process,  something  might  be  lost  in  translation,  and  
internal  minorities  may  become  silenced,  while  something  else  may  be  gained  in  the  same  
translation,  expanding  the  scope  of  networked  coalitions.  By  this  process  of  frame  resonance  and/or  
internal  hegemony,  issue  nets  may  broaden  their  scope  of  action,  become  constituent  issue  nets,  and  
twin  with  already  constituted  policy  nets.  In  Case  I,  it  was  observed  how  they  may  cross  the  
threshold  from  micro-meso  to  meso-macro,  and  constitute  agonistic  historical  blocs,  competing  to  
define  the  actual  norms  that  regulate  policy  and  research.  In  the  geographical  bridge,  by  contrast,  I  
have  not  observed  the  formation  of  any  socially  potent  historical  blocs,  but  only  an  open-ended  
struggle  towards  a  capacity  for  future  agenda-setting.  Thus,  the  open-ended  struggle  for  agenda  
setting,  though  it  remains  unfinished,  is  one  of  the  ways  whereby  the  state,  or  the  formal  norms  of  
the  governance  system  (Explanandum),  co-evolves  with  the  rest  of  the  social  ecological  system,  that  
is,  the  resource  system  plus  the  informal  norms  of  the  governance  system  (Explanans  1).  Thus,  the  
struggle  to  set  the  agenda  is  one  of  the  meso-mechanisms  that  may  explain  the  mutual  causal  
inference  between  Explanans  1  and  Explanandum  (i). 
 Path  ii):  Since  the  struggle  not  only  included  agenda-setting  for  policy-making,  but  also  for  
the  direction  of  scientific  inquiry,  this  process  interacted  with  changes  in  the  collectively  unknown,  
Explanans  2.  With  regard  to  the  link  between  Explanans  1  and  the  interacting  Explanans  2,  it  is  
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interesting  that  the  geographical  bridge  indicates  that  divergent  practical  realities  are  found  between  
different  socio-material  positions  within  the  bureaucracy,  not  only,  as  with  Case  I,  divergent  
location  in  the  local  landscape  ecology.  This  finding  is  similar  to  those  who  observe  that  real  
organizations  do  not  conform  to  Weber's  ideal  type  of  bureaucracy,  but  are  full  of  informal  ties  as  
well.  Thus,  the  empirical  experiences  of  practical  reality  are  situated,  regardless  of  whether  those  
action  situations  are  situated  within  “local  community”  or  in  “state  bureaucracy”.  Both  are  
constituted  orders,  and  in  terms  of  state  laws,  they  are  treated  quite  differently,  but  they  still  have  
sociological  common  denominators.  As  Keith  Hart  points  out  in  an  anthology  edited  by  Elinor  
Ostrom:811  it  is  misleading  to  assume  that  bureaucracy  only  follows  formal  laws  (as  in  Weber's  ideal  
type)  and  it  is  also  misleading  to  assume  that  community  only  follows  informal  customs  (as  in  
Tönnies  idea  of  Gemeinschaft).  Instead,  both  of  them  include  both  formal  and  informal  rules.  This  
insight  from  the  SES  framework  can  be  supplemented  with  observations  from  ANT.  The  latter  
school  developed  when  social  researchers  turned  the  ethnographic  gaze  away  from  assumedly  
“traditional”  communities,  and  instead  used  it  to  dissect  assumedly  “modern”  institutions:  epistemic  
science,  capitalist  markets,  and  bureaucratic  states.812  In  sum,  I  confirm  the  experiences  of  SES  and  
ANT  when  I  observe  that  collective  knowledge  and  collective  ignorance  seem  to  be  situated  not  
only  at  various  nodes  in  the  kinship  network,  but  also  at  various  nodes  within  the  policy  network  
(ii). 
 Path  iii):  Consequently,  the  link  between  state-certified  sciences  (Explanandum)  and  the  
unknown  (Explanans  2)  also  imply  that  science  practices  are  situated,  bounded  and  limited,  just  like  
local  knowledges.  The  case  of  Laboratory  Deatnu  indicates  that  bio-scientific  monitoring  systems  
are  accused  of  biased  priorities,  while  historical  syllabi  reproduce  ignorance  from  colonial  
historiography  among  most  school  children  in  the  host  states  of  Sápmi.  I  do  not  contest  that  the  
methods  of  hard  science  are  reliable.  I  do  not  even  contest  that  the  methods  of  historical  research  
are  reliable.  The  point  is  not  the  method  (if  the  method  is  properly  done),  but  how  one  chooses  to  
use  it:  whose  research  questions  to  pose,  whose  data  to  use,  whose  practical  relevance  to  serve.  
That  is  where  the  struggle  for  agenda-setting  comes  in.  Isabelle  Stengers  described  it  as  a  social  
struggle  for  democratization  of  the  sciences  (iii).813   
 
Divide  and  conquer?  This  chapter  has  also  put  me  onto  the  track  of  another  possible  meso-
mechanism,  but  within  the  limits  of  this  thesis,  I  cannot  articulate  it  into  a  clear  hypothetical  
mechanism.  In  the  comparative  politics  section  of  the  present  chapter,  I  undertook  a  meta-analysis  
                                                 
811  Hart  2006  (see  also  Hann  &  Hart  2011:  88-93  regarding  the  work  of  Elinor  Ostrom) 
812  Lien  1997;;  Asdal  2011;;  Latour  2004;;  Latour  &  Woolgar  1979 
813  Stengers  1999  (1997) 
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of  existing  studies  on  how  some  claims  from  the  new  social  movements  were  accommodated  /  co-
opted  within  two  separate  states,  namely  Norway  and  Finland,  and  within  two  separate  policy  areas,  
namely  environmental  protection  and  indigenous  rights.  Such  territorial  and  administrative  
divisions  may  be  convenient  for  bureaucratic  states,  but  in  this  chapter  I  have  argued  that  those  
divisions  are  against  the  interests  of  environmental  justice  movements,  including  indigenous  human  
rights  movements.  If  Dryzek,  Bregnballe,  Johansson  and  others  are  correct  to  regard  political  
inclusion  in  the  Nordic  states  as  co-optation  rather  than  accommodation,814  then  the  territorial  and  
administrative  divisions  may  serve  the  function  of  dividing  and  conquering  the  movements.  When  I  
suggest  this,  I  do  not  imply  any  conspiracy  theory.  This  social  function  may  be  a  more  or  less  
unintended  consequence  of  more  or  less  well-intended  reforms. 
 In  the  sociological  analysis  of  the  Alta-dam  conflict  (Chapter  6),  I  mapped  a  cleavage  
structure  where  local  subalterns  within  the  Alta  watershed  found  themselves  on  each  side  of  a  
political  split  where  different  subaltern  groups  in  different  locations  were  dependent  on  competing  
elite  networks.  The  split  between  NSR  and  SLF  may  have  been  particularly  weakening  for  the  
subaltern  interests  during  the  Alta-dam  conflict. 
 During  the  epilogue  after  the  Alta-dam  conflict  the  informal  and  formal  constitutional  
process  continued  at  multiple  levels,  but  the  fronts  would  shift  in  the  contexts  of  the  watersheds  and  
the  states.  The  present  chapter  traced  some  of  the  particular  causal  paths  during  that  process.  It  
appears  to  me  that  SLF  and  NSR  would  become  less  alienated  from  each  other,  and  instead  adapt  to  
each  other,  developing  two  complimentary  strategies.  However,  during  the  same  years,  it  appears  to  
me  that  a  split  emerged  between  the  issue  networks  for  indigenous  rights  and  environmental  
protection.  This  is  a  clear  impression  that  I  have  after  fieldwork,  but  I  do  not  have  any  probabilistic  
data  to  document  such  a  generalisinig  statement.  Sometimes  I  also  have  the  impression  that  
accommodation  /  co-optation  under  separate  state  formations  may  imply  some  degree  of  split  
between  indigenous  rights  organizations  subjugated  to  different  states.  However,  the  latter  is  
something  I  have  not  researched  systematically. 
 To  make  sense  of  such  processes  we  may  use  categories  suggested  by  Paul  Pedersen  and  
Asle  Høgmo  in  a  recent  book,  Sápmi  Strikes  Back.  Observing  political  action  in  local  communities,  
they  distinguish  between  “polarizing  issue  areas”  and  “integrating  issue  areas”.815  They  find  this  
conceptual  distinction  particularly  fruitful  in  areas  such  as  the  fjord  that  the  Norwegians  call  
Kåfjord,  while  the  Kväns  call  it  Kaavuono  and  the  Northern  Sámi  refer  to  it  as  Njoammelgohppi.  
One  and  the  same  location  is  experienced  as  a  different  place  by  different  segments  of  the  local  
population,  each  of  them  communicating  in  a  different  language.  Some  political  issues,  such  as  
                                                 
814  Johansson1990:157;;  Bregnballe  2005;;  Bregnballe  2009;;  Dryzek  et  al.2003 
815  Pedersen  &  Høgmo  2012:  23 
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school  politics,  have  split  the  local  population  along  socio-linguistic  lines.  These  are  “polarizing  
issue  areas”.  Other  political  issues,  such  as  natural  resources  management,  have  unified  the  local  
population  against  a  common  adversary.  Those  are  “integrating  issue  areas”.  In  my  opinion,  
however,  “integrating  issue  areas”  is  another  way  of  saying  joint  struggle;;  while  “polarizing  issue  
areas”  may  be  a  euphemism  for  divide  et  impera. 
1. Joint  struggle,  or  “integrating  issue  areas”,  may  refer  to  the  process  of  issue  network  
twinning,  whereby  social  movements  take  joint  action,  broaden  the  scope  of  their  activity,  
and  take  it  to  a  wider  scale. 
2. Divide  et  impera,  or  “polarizing  issue  areas”,  may  describe  cleavages  that  split  issue  groups  
that  could  potentially  have  common  interests,  such  as  the  NSR  against  the  SLF  during  the  
Alta-dam  conflict,  or  the  indigenous  rights  issue  net  against  the  environmental  protection  
issue  net  in  the  aftermath  of  that  conflict. 
Those  may  be  two  different  mechanisms  of  coalition  formation  within  issue  networks,  kinship  
networks,  and  policy  networks,  and  indeed  when  they  all  are  intertwined.  Such  processes  have  been  
particularly  well  researched  with  regard  to  kinship  networks,  but  I  think  the  findings  may  have  
transfer  value  to  issue  networks  and  policy  networks  as  well.  Conducting  fieldwork  among  the  
indigenous  Amazigh  (Berbers)  in  Mahgreb,  Ernst  Gellner  observed  an  interesting  gap  between  
preaching  and  practice.  Local  tribes  had  adapted  a  famous  Semitic  proverb  "Me  against  my  brother,  
my  brother  and  I  against  my  cousin,  my  cousin  and  I  against  the  stranger."  This  is  similar  to  the  
process  of  joint  resistance  or  issue  network  twinning.  However,  this  norm  did  not  correspond  with  
the  actual  practice.  Gellner  described  it  as  "My  cousin  and  I  against  my  brother,  the  stranger  and  I  
against  the  whole  lot  of  my  horse-thieving  relatives."816  This  is  similar  to  the  process  of  dividing  
and  conquering.  The  “stranger”  in  this  context  may  very  well  be  the  Arab  or  French  colonizer,  while  
the  “horse-thieving  relatives”  are  fellow  indigenous  Imazighen.  James  Scott  even  goes  as  far  as  to  
suggest  that  whatever  may  appear  as  the  “tribal”  type  of  political  organization  actually  are  the  
structures  that  typically  emerge  in  formerly  egalitarian  communities  as  a  result  of  colonialist  
intervention.817  Scott  may  or  may  not  be  exaggerating,  but  political  anthropologists  in  the  colonial  
era  certainly  did  not  pay  sufficient  attention  to  the  colonial  powers  that  paid  them.818  There  is  no  
                                                 
816  Gellner,  1969,  cited  in  Geertz  1971 
817  Scott  2009:  259 
818  Recent  research  on  political  life  at  the  Horn  of  Africa  (Hutchinson  1996;;  McGinnis  1999)  has  led  to  fundamental  
rethinking  of  a  paradigmatic  work  in  political  anthropology  (Evans-Pritchard  1940).  The  recent  generation  of  
researchers  have  turned  their  attention  to  the  actual  cultural  and  political  complexities  between  different  social  and  
ecological  systems,  including  interdependencies  between  former  colonizing  states  and  former  colonial  powers.  
Ethnography  itself  has  traditionally  been  undertaken  by  experts  from  the  colonial  power,  who  utilized  the  
organizational  resources  of  the  same  colonial  power,  in  order  to  access  the  colonized  society.  Evans-Pritchard  
portrayed  the  stateless  political  system  among  the  Nuer  as  if  it  was  a  static  system  in  relative  autonomy  from  the  
European  colonial  powers,  and  thus,  he  drew  attention  away  from  the  actual  interdependencies,  including  the  actual  
symbiosis  between  ethnography  and  policy.  Consequently,  his  paradigmatic  work  The  Nuer  is  quite  as  interesting  for  
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doubt  that  divide  et  impera  is  a  mechanism  that  does  intervene  with  tribal  organizations,  from  
Caesar  among  the  “barbarians”  (or  Berbers),  and  onwards.  However,  I  would  suggest  that  this  
mechanism  is  not  only  relevant  to  kinship  networks,  but  also  to  issue  networks,  and  even  to  policy  
networks.  During  the  Alta-dam  conflict,  the  policy  network  under  the  corporatist  state  became  split  
between  the  Ministry  of  Industry,  under  the  command  of  the  pro-dam  bloc,  and  the  Ministry  of  the  
Environment,  which  had  informal  ties  to  the  anti-dam  bloc.  This  split  weakened  the  corporatist  
construction  built  by  the  more  or  less  liberal  nationalists.  In  the  aftermath  of  the  conflict,  the  issue  
network  of  the  new  social  movements  appears  to  have  become  split  within  my  selected  watersheds  
and  states,  when  claims  were  accommodated/co-opted  as  separate  administrative  areas  under  
separated  territorial  states.  This  split  weakened  the  environmental  justice  movements.  Divide  et  
impera  is  a  mechanism  of  dis-empowerment,  in  contrast  to  network  twinning  as  a  mechanism  of  
empowerment.  However,  it  might  be  useful  for  subaltern  groups  to  inquire  how  this  mechanism  
works,  both  in  order  to  avoid  split  among  one's  own  kinship  networks  and  issue  networks,  but  also  
to  utilize  potential  splits  in  the  policy  networks.  Nevertheless,  I  will  not  elaborate  this  particular  
mechanism  theoretically,  with  regard  to  paths  i,  ii  and  iii.  That  may  be  a  task  for  further  research. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
its  systematic  ignorance  as  it  is  for  its  systematic  observation.  Its  biases  have  been  easier  to  discover  after  decades  of  
attempted  decolonisation  in  political  practice  and  science. 
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9.1.0  Case  II:  fisheries  in  the  Deatnu  water  area  2005-2012 
 
The  Deatnu  River  and  Fjord  are  rich  in  natural  and  cultural  heritage.  The  river’s  tributaries  drain  
water  from  the  heart  of  Inner  Sápmi,  and  it  empties  into  a  fjord  with  particularly  vital  Coastal  Sámi  
culture.  Since  times  immemorial,  the  local  population  has  lived  off  the  resources  of  the  river,  
including  one  of  the  world's  most  bio-diverse  stocks  of  Atlantic  salmon  (Salmo  Salar).  When  the  
salmon  spawns,  it  returns  from  its  migrations  in  the  ocean,  and  each  individual  swims  upstream  to  
the  particular  river  hole  where  it  was  once  hatched.  Erosion  and  human  activities  make  the  river  
change  constantly,  and  salmonids  are  highly  adaptable  species.  Since  times  immemorial,  the  Deatnu  
salmon  stocks  have  co-evolved  with  Sámi  customary  praxes  and  knowledge  praxes.  The  salmon  
stock  is  a  common-pool  resource  for  the  humans  who  live  off  it.  However,  the  relatively  recent  
introduction  of  state  politics  has  created  new  challenges  for  natural  resource  management  in  the  
Deatnu  River  and  Fjord.  This  grand  drainage  basin  is  shared  between  two  states,  namely  Norway  
and  Finland.  The  sustainable  management  of  the  shared  natural  and  cultural  heritage  has  been  
hampered  whenever  the  state  governments  have  pursued  unilateral  paths  towards  perceived  
“national”  interests.  In  the  Deatnu  River  and  Fjord,  the  practical  management  of  common  pool  
resources  actualizes  the  need  for  knowledge,  and  these  practical  challenges  render  methodological  
nationalism  and  statism  impotent.  For  example,  a  salmon  biologist  told  me  that  some  journalists  had  
tried  to  measure  increasing  overtaxation  of  the  salmon  resources  by  using  data  only  from  Statistics  
Norway,  but  without  data  from  Statistics  Finland,  they  missed  the  actual  number  of  (registred)  
annual  catch  of  Atlantic  salmon  in  the  Deatnu  watershed.819  This  logical  flaw  is  structurally  
equivalent  to  the  tendency  to  reify  certain  normative  concepts  of  citizenship  and  sovereignty,  
discussed  in  chapters  2.2.0  and  3.2.0.  I  conducted  political  fieldwork  along  the  Deatnu  River  and  
Fjord,  through  four  visits  from  2010  until  2012.  I  had  been  there  previously,  in  2007,  when  I  
attended  training  in  indigenous  forms  of  conflict  management  at  Inner  Finnmark  District  Court.  
That  experience  set  the  tone  for  the  following  four  field  visits,  all  of  which  revolved  around  issues  
of  restorative  justice  in  a  river  shared  between  two  states,  but  three  nations.  I  combined  different  
traditions  of  fieldwork  research,  resulting  in  three  chapters  with  rather  different  forms. 
 Chapter  9,  the  present  one,  provides  a  panorama  of  the  ongoing  attempt  to  establish  a  
                                                 
819  Interview  with  fishery  biologist  Johnson,  Kjell-Magne,  at  LBT  information  meeting,  Tana  Hotel,  07.02.2011 
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bioregional  “management  regime”  across  state  boundaries.  This  study  is  a  “policy  analysis”,  and  
most  of  the  data  consist  of  public  planning  documents.  Here,  I  have  undertaken  fieldwork  according  
to  the  tradition  of  political  scientists.  To  trace  policy  processes  within  “multilevel  network  
governance”  is  a  conventional  approach  within  EU  research.820  I  remain  under-informed  about  how  
this  would  fit  into  the  Finnish  political  science,  but  in  Norwegian  state  science,  it  is  in  line  with  Eva  
Josefsen's  pioneering  study  on  how  Sámi  people  all  over  Sápmi  may  influence  the  policy  processes  
in  each  of  the  four  states.821 This approach is effective for the purpose of studying the emergence of 
formal norms with formal jurisdiction over a territory at large. However, it is impotent in tracing 
local ambiguities or informal norms. 
 Chapter 10 digs deeper into the social conflicts. The analysis of policy documents here is 
combined with qualitative interviews with persons located at interesting junctures in the local policy 
networks. I returned to Inner Finnmark District Court, and from there I started to trace the on-going 
struggle for rights and proofs. Thus, I myself started to uncover proofs that have practical 
consequences for the very struggle for rights and proofs that I observe. Thus, this is a specific form 
of political sociology, using a grounded theory approach for systematic interpretation of data. This 
approach to political fieldwork proves effective to inquire about the politics of knowledge, but data 
gathered through qualitative interviews  remain  limited  to  the  “front-stage”  of  social  life. 
 Chapter 11, therefore, digs even deeper into the social conflicts. In order to gain some 
glimpses  from  the  “back-stage”  of  social  life, I decided that I had to concentrate on gaining more 
data from participant observation, and to apply more coding concepts from political anthropology. 
Thus, I chose to return to the field during the summer of 2012, for a fourth visit. I zoomed in on a 
rather fine-grained level of detail in the politics of everyday life, gaining some samples from socio-
material interactions at the fishing location, at the quay, at the laboratory, at the kitchen, etc. Those 
are  action  situations  at  “an  operational  level”  in the SES framework. But as Elinor Ostrom and 
Keith Hart argue: those are locations that matter for the socio-material (re)production of informal 
norms.822 Here I identified repertoires of public participation, or reformist tactics, but also 
repertoires that seemed to me as constituting forms of political resistance, or autonomous tactics. 
However, I learned that the latter is locally perceived as conformist practice, and absolutely not as 
radicalism. This put me on the track of the non-state, the contemporary reminiscent of the ancient 
siida-system, the de facto legal and jurisdictional pluralism of Sámi areas. However, this will only 
be discussed in Chapter 11.   
 Those three chapters, each with its own approach to political fieldwork, provide 
                                                 
820  Pollack  2010 
821  Josefesen  2007 
822  Ostrom  2005:53-2;;  Hart  2006 
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complimentary forms of information. The political science of policy processes (Chapter 9) is 
limited to formal policies, but within that limitation it allows for a rather wide geographical scope. 
The political sociology of grounded theory (Chapter 10) enables observation of asymmetrical power 
and ideological biases, but it has traditionally operated within the high modernist assumption that 
(civil) society, (state) politics and (market) economy are relatively autonomous spheres. The 
political anthropology regarding the politics of everyday life (Chapter 11) is an approach that 
traditionally traces the circulation of praxes and artifacts between particular and heterogeneous 
action situations. In sum, the three approaches are complimentary: Chapter 9 zooms out on a wide 
panorama with rather thin information, Chapter 11 zooms in for a close focus with rather rich 
information, and Chapter 10 gives a viewpoint from within a system of asymmetrical power 
relations. Together they constitute Case II for this research on state transformation in the high north.  
However, Case II remains limited by the path dependent reproduction of colonial biases. Even 
though I have applied three complimentary approaches to political fieldwork, I have also discovered 
that there are lots of highly relevant issues that remain under-researched, in the literature at large, as 
well as in my own particular contribution. One such limitation is the material stickiness of 
nationally integrated intersubjective framings (or perceptive schemata, or discursive formations). 
My own formation provides specific linguistic skills and contextual knowledge that render me over-
informed about the Norwegian national context, but under-informed about the entangled national 
contexts in Finland and Sápmi. Another such limitation is the lack of relevant biological data from 
beyond the local drainage basin. For local fisher-peasants in the Deatnu area, it would be relevant to 
know how much of the local salmon stock is being caught by larger vessels in the open sea. 
However, this would be less interesting to know for the owners of such vessels, and those have a 
stronger impact on the policies of Norwegian and Russian fishery management. Those are profound 
limitations to our collective knowledge, which imply political biases. It is beyond my competence 
to do anything about bias in fishery biology. In my own political research I have tried to handle 
nationalist bias in two ways: Firstly, in Chapter 9, I have kept my focus on trans-boundary 
“management  regimes”,  not  particular  states.  Thus I try to contribute to the prefiguration of a future 
contextual knowledge with less nationalist bias. Secondly, in Chapters 10 and 11, I have zoomed in 
on one particular part of the Deatnu water area that is subject to the same state where I myself 
belong. Thus I try to take the consequence of the actual limitations imposed by the actual lack of 
non-nationalist knowledge about the political context. At the end of Chapter 9, those limitations are 
discussed in more detail with regard to research on the Deatnu water area as a whole (river and 
fjord). At the end of Chapter 11, I discuss similar biases with regard to research on the more 
particular Deatnu Fjord. Chapter 11 also concludes with hypotheses about some particular 
explanatory mechanisms. 
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9.2.0  Chapter  introduction:  two  political  experiments 
 
9.2.1  Political  science  and  practice:  from  nationalism  to  bio-regionalism 
The  national  interest  of  each  nation-state  is  particularistic,  while  the  natural  and  cultural  heritage  is  
a  local  and  global  common.  This  dilemma  becomes  especially  visible  in  trans-boundary  regions,  
such  as  the  lands  and  waters  of  the  indigenous  Sápmi  homeland.  Ongoing  state  transformation  in  
the  Alta  and  Deatnu  watersheds  may  be  explained  as  a  process  of  gradual  ecological  adaptation  
whereby  state  builders  adapt  to  the  factual  ecological  and  sociological  complexity  of  the  Sápmi  
region.  This  thesis  is  an  attempt  to  trace  some  of  the  particular  causal  paths  of  this  adaptive  process.  
Potential  trans-boundary  nature  management  regimes  are  emerging.  The  geographical  overview  
(Chapter  5)  zoomed  out  to  sketch  a  rough  general  overview  with  a  low  degree  of  specificity.  The  
geographical  bridge  (Chapter  8)  zoomed  in,  to  provide  a  close-up  of  selected  causal  links,  with  a  
high  degree  of  specificity,  but  a  low  degree  of  generality. 
 With  the  present  chapter,  the  time  is  ripe  to  be  more  concrete  about  the  specific  institutional  
innovations  or  ongoing  political  experiments  with  bio-regional  management.  This  chapter  will  
operate  at  macro-level,  observing  the  consequences  of  two  particular  institutional  innovations  for  
one  watershed  as  a  whole:  the  Deatnu  River  and  the  Deatnu  Fjord.  However,  unlike  in  the  
geographical  introduction,  I  will  now  choose  a  more  narrow  topical  limitation,  namely:  formal  
institutions.  The  cost  is  that  it  is  a  rather  limited  topical  limitation:  it  ignores  the  rich  plurality  of  
informal  rules  in  the  actual  nature  governance  system.  The  gain,  however,  is  that  such  limited  
thematic  scope  (topology)  allows  the  researcher  to  trace  practices  that  apply  to  a  wider  
geographical  scope  (topography).  These  are  the  costs  and  gains  of  traditional  political  science  
(which  is  usually  limited  to  formal  rules),  in  contrast  to  traditional  political  sociology  or  political  
anthropology  (which  deal  more  with  informal  rules). 
 Two  ongoing  geopolitical  experiments  may  potentially  have  large  consequences  for  the  
future  politics  of  socio-ecosystems  in  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  water  areas.  Both  experiments  may  lead  
to  increased  bioregionalism,  and  both  may  either  lead  to  increased  participatory  democracy,  or  to  
increased  technocratic  opacity.  The  Finnmark  Act  has  not  received  much  attention  in  European  
political  science,  but  is  hotly  debated  in  the  region.  Thus,  it  is  an  object  of  informal  democratic  
deliberation.  The  EU  Water  Framework  Directive  (EU-WFD)  is  far  from  under-researched  by  
European  political  scientists,  but  few  local  people  have  any  idea  that  it  is  being  implemented  in  the  
Alta  and  Deatnu  water  areas.  Still,  both  experiments  have  the  potential  for  increased  participatory  
democracy  as  well  as  increased  technocratic  opacity.  The  outcome  of  both  experiments  is  open.  
Both  experiments  should  be  traced  if  we  are  to  understand  the  transformation  if  the  geopolitical  
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environment  of  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  watersheds. 
 From  national(ist)  to  bioregionalist  democratization:  There  are  two  ways  whereby  this  
study  actualizes  Elinor  Ostrom's  concept  of  a  “Socio-Ecological  System”  (SES).  Firstly,  I  have  
already  chosen  (in  Chapter  5)  to  delimit  the  scope  of  my  study  to  two  particular  bio-regions,  namely  
the  Alta  and  Deatnu  watersheds.  Bioregionalism  is  a  descriptive  premise  for  my  own  description.  
Secondly,  the  ongoing  institutional  innovations,  such  as  The  Finnmark  Act  and  the  EU-FD  are  
informed  by  an  ideal  of  bio-regional  management.  Bioregionalism  is  a  prescriptive  premise  for  
some  of  the  transformative  practices  I  describe.  It  might  seem  slightly  tautological  that  my  study  
has  already  taken  as  a  premise  the  bioregionalist  approach  that  is  also  the  basis  of  the  Water  
Framework  Directive  and  the  Finnmark  Act.  This  is  because  I  am  an  organic  intellectual  of  
bioregional  democratization,  like  Stein  Rokkan  was  an  organic  intellectual  of  national(ist)  
democratization.  In  the  previous  generation,  Rokkan  was  an  organic  intellectual  of  national  
democracy,  and  thus  he  chose  to  trace  how  nation-builders  succeeded  in  producing  (virtually)  
unified  (uni)national  states.  In  the  present  generation,  Ostrom  has  been  an  organic  intellectual  of  
further  democratisation,  beyond  the  ethnocentric  limitations  of  (uni)national  states.  I  continue  in  the  
same  direction,  by  being  an  organic  intellectual  of  bioregional  democratization.  Like  Rokkan  traced  
the  relative  success  of  nation-builders  in  the  previous  generation,  I  inquire  as  to  the  relative  success  
of  nation-re-builders  in  the  present  generation.  Nation-builders  in  the  previous  generation  produced  
political  science  within  the  limits  of  methodological  nationalism  and  statism.  Nation-re-builders  of  
the  present  generation  have  expanded  the  limits  of  political  science,  by  taking  social-ecological  
systems  as  the  analytical  systems  boundaries. 
 Seize  the  means  of  knowledge  production:  Political  research  in  areas  where  Norway  and  
Sápmi  overlap  is  paradigmatically  and  politically  split  between  an  “old  school”  of  state-centred  
state  scientists  (statsvitere)  and  a  “new  school”  of  researchers  who  turn  their  focus  to  customary  
praxes  and  knowledge  praxes  in  complex  multi-level  environments.  This  was  described  in  Chapter  
2.  However,  I  have  observed  one  significant  exception  from  this  trend,  which  deserves  to  be  
mentioned.  Eva  Josefsen  is  a  Norwegian  state  scientist  (statsviter),  but  she  also  is  an  indigenous  
Sámi.  She  has  pioneered  research  on  state  science  in  cross-boundary  regions.  In a journal for 
indigenous rights,  Gáldu  Čala, she published research on the possibilities for Sámi people to 
influence the state policy processes in each of the four states that have divided and conqured the 
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Figure  9-1:  The  Deatnu  Water  Area 
Left:  The  Deatnu  watershed  (No:  Tana,  Fi:  Teno),  with  locations  for  test  of  pollutants.  The  map  excludes  the  
coastal  watershed  Deanudat  (No:  Tana  Fjord),  which  also  is  part  of  the  administrative  water  area  
Deatnu/Teno/Tana  under  the  EU-WFD.823 
Right:  The  three  main  municipalities  in  the  Deatnu  waterhsed:  Tana  (Deatnu),  and  Krasjok  (Kárášjohka)  at  
the  "Norwegian"  side,  Utsjoki  (Ohcejohka)  at  the  "Finnish"  side.  The  map  shows  the  main  river,  the  main  
roads,  plus  local  administrative  hubs.  Notably,  the  municipal  borders  do  not  coincide  completely  with  the  
extension  of  the  Deatnu  watershed.  Some  significant  parts  of  the  Anarjohka  tributary  are  shared  with  
municipalities  Kautokeino  (Guovdageaidnu)  at  the  "Norwegian"  side  and  Inari  (Anár)  at  the  "Finnish"  side.824 
  
                                                 
823  Map  source:  ©  Finnmark  County  Municipality  2009:  38 
824  Artist:  ©  Minna  Saataimoinen,  map  source:  Solbakk  2011:  13 
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Sápmi area.825 Here she identifies several direct and indirect channels of political influence, and she 
discusses how the states relate to the work towards a shared Nordic Sámi Convention. The latter is a 
main priority for the Nordic Sámirađđi, an internatinal non-governmental organization funded by 
the intergovernmental organization the Nordic Council.826 Thus, Josefsen asks new research 
questions that have direct utility for  indigenous  people  in  Sápmi.  They  need  to  coordinate  across  the  
state-boundaries,  in  order  to  empower  themselves  against  divide et impera, against the actual 
separatism of the existing states. Josefsen seizes control of some particular means of knowledge-
production. Those means were originally developed to fit the practical needs of ethnocentric 
national democracy. However, she turns it against those nationalist biases. Josefssen makes state 
science relevant for  restorative  justice. 
 In  the  present  chapter,  I  follow  Josefsen’s  example.  State  science  is  a  traditionalist  form  of  
political  science.  It  has  clear  limitations,  with  its  one-sided  focus  on  formal  rules.  That  includes  the  
politics  of  state  laws  and  policy  networks.  However,  it  excludes  the  politics  of  international  soft  law  
and  emerging  issue  networks.  It  also  excludes  the  politics  of  longstanding  customs  and  kinship  
networks.  Still,  n  spite  of  these  strict  limitations,  Josefssen  has  demonstrated  that  state  science  can  
be  turned  against  the  ethnocentric  biases  of  institutionalized  national(ist)  democracy,  and  thus  
become  instrumental  for  restorative  justice. 
 
 
9.2.2  The  EU  Water  Framework  Directive  (EU-WFD) 
The  EU  Water  Framework  Directive  (EU-WFD)  has  been  relevant  for  the  Deatnu  River  since  it  was  
enacted  by  the  EU  in  2000,  and  it  has  been  relevant  for  the  Alta  River  since  2006,  when  the  
directive  was  expanded  to  the  EEA.827  The  main  purposes  are  threefold: 
a) territorial  administration  of  water  resources  should  be  based  on  drainage  basins  rather  than  
political  boundaries, 
b) all  policies  with  regard  to  the  water  management  in  the  area  should  be  coordinated,  
regardless  of  administrative  divisions  in  policy  areas,  and 
c) local  civil  society  should  be  actively  involved  in  the  management  of  the  waters  in  their  
habitat;;  the  local  environment  of  their  own  local  livelihood. 
In  the  beginning,  the  directive  applied  to  rivers,  but  it  was  expanded  to  coastal  salt  waters.  The  goal  
is  to  maintain  “good  water  quality”,  a  broad  index  that  includes  pollution,  but  also  biodiversity.  
                                                 
825  Josefsen  2007 
826  Nordic  Sámirađđi  2008:  30,  190-1,  208,  216 
827  EU  Parliament  2000;;  Norwegian  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  2008 
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These  are  principles  of  Integrated  Water  Resources  Management  (IWRM).828  However,  this  school  
of  water  management  had  already  been  adopted  as  a  guideline  for  local  municipalities  in  the  region,  
notably  by  the  municipalities  that  share  the  Deatnu  River:  both  upstream  and  downstream,  on  both  
sides  of  the  border.829  These  local  experiences  are  now  merging  with  policies  made  in  a  
transnational  governance  network.  For  each  of  the  main  rivers  and  fjords,  administrative  “water  
areas”  have  been  established,  spatially  defined  by  the  drainage  basin  of  the  particular  river  or  fjord. 
 With  regard  to  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  Rivers,  each  of  these  is  administered  holistically  together  
with  the  salt  waters  into  which  they  empty.  Thus,  the  drainage  areas  of  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  Rivers,  
together  with  those  of  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  Fjords,  define  two  administrative  “water  areas”  for  Alta  
and  Deatnu.  The  implementation  is  organized  in  cycles  of  planning,  execution,  and  assessment,  in  
accordance  with  common  norms  for  regional  planning.  Thus,  planning  is  an  adaptive  learning  
process.  At  the  beginning  of  2013,  Deatnu  Water  Area  was  in  its  third  cycle  of  action-learning. 
                                                 
828  Global  Water  Partnership  2003 
829  Through  archival  research  at  Tana  and  Utsjok  municipalities,  I  have  documented  that  IWRM  was  translated  to  
Deatnu  River  area  "from  below"  prior  to  its  implementation  "from  above"  via  the  EU-WFD.  Thus,  when  the  
directive  was  to  be  implemented,  relevant  competence  was  already  developed  as  local  knowledge  at  the  local  
municipalities  along  the  Deatnu  River.    (Hoseth,  Osland  &  Kristiansen  2004,  Tana  Municipality  2006,  Hellander  
2010,  interview  with  Svein-Ottar  Helander,  28.  January  2011.)  Consequently,  the  state  governments  of  Norway  and  
Finland  had  a  lot  to  learn  from  the  local  municipalities  along  Deatnu  River,  when  the  states  eventually  started  to  
implement  the  directive.  On  the  one  hand  the  municipal  civil  servant  Hellander  (2010:  11)  claimed,  diplomatically,  
that  the  state  authorities  seemed  to  have  satisfied  the  standards  set  the  bylaw  that  implemented  the  EU-WFD  ("Vårt  
inntryk  er  at  vannregionmyndigheten  har  tilfredsstilt  kravene  til  planlegging  etter  [...]  kravene  i  vannforskriften").  
On  the  other  hand,  I  have  shown  in  this  chapter  that,  in  fact,  the  state  governments  had  a  lot  to  learn  regarding  
IWRM  during  the  first  to  planning  cycles  with  the  EU-WFD,  while  the  municipal  public  servant  confirms  that  the  
principles  of  IWRM  already  were  local  knowledge  in  the  municipal  administrations  (ibidem:  3,  citing  Tana  
municipality  2006).  The  latter  observation  (regarding  the  municipalities)  is  not  only  something  claimed  by  the  
municipal  civil  servants,  but  it  is  also  confirmed  by  an  official  report  from  the  Norwegian  Water  Resources  and  
Energy  Directorate:  Hoseth,  Osland  &  Kristiansen  (2004:  13)  emphasise,  firstly,  that  the  municipalities  Tana,  
Utsjok,  Kautokeino  and  Enare,  since  the  1990s  have  developed  cooperation  regarding  monitoring  and  planning  of  
water  quality  and  salmon  fisheries  in  the  Deatnu  River,  and  secondly,  that  the  municipalities  thus  had  prefigured  the  
EU-WFD  ("Alle  disse  prosjektene  har  bidt  i  prosesen  med  å  karakterisere  Tanavassdraget  i  hht.  vanndirektivet.").  
This  indicates  that,  during  the  first  two  planning  cycles  in  the  implementation  of  the  EU-WFD,  the  state  
bureaucracies  of  Norway  and  Finland  in  fact  had  a  lot  to  learn  from  the  four  border  municipalities  in  Deatnu  River  
regarding  the  actual  practice,  techniques,  and  ethics  of  IWRM.  Therefore,  it  is  relevant  that  Tana  municipality  
(2006),  during  the  Norwegian  state  government's  official  hearing  (consultancy),  presented  the  following  four  
suggestions:  (1)  For  the  implementation  of  the  EU-WFD,  it  would  be  beneficial  that  the  northernmost  counties  in  
Norway  and  Finland  had  already  established  cross-border  cooperation  about  water  resources  management.  
("Finnmark  har  man  lang  erfaring  med  samarbeid  med  Lappland  om  vann-  og  vassdragsforvaltningen,  noe  om  vil  
være  viktig  for  arbeidet  med  felles  norsk-finsk  vannforvaltningsplaner.").  (2)  The  planningn  process  should  be  
participatory,  and  should  include  various  groups  who  claim  user  rights  ("Videre  bør  referansegruppene  bestå  av  
representanter  for  rettighetshavere,  private  og  allmenne  brukere.").  (3)  Implementation  at  the  Norwegian  side  has  to  
follow  the  time  schedule,  in  order  to  facilitate  the  necessary  coordination  with  planning  agencies  at  the  Finnish  side.  
("Fremdriftsplanen  for  gjennomføringen  av  direktivet  bør  være  som  forutsatt  i  forskriften.  Dette  fordi  det  i  Finnmark  
skal  utarbeides  en  felles  vannforvaltningsplan  med  Lappland.").  (4)  Last,  but  not  least,  the  municipalities  should  get  
financial  compensation  for  their  additional  costs  during  implementation  of  the  directive.  ("Tana  kommune  forutsetter  
at  Staten  yter  kompensasjon  til  disse  kommunene  for  de  merkostnader  som  arbeidet  i  henhold  til  forskriften  
innebærer.").  Whether  the  states  were  perceptive  of  these  suggestions  is  a  question  that  lies  outside  the  scope  of  the  
present  research.  During  my  latest  field  trip  to  the  Deatnu  River,  I  learned  that  one  of  the  local  planners  from  Tana  
municipality  (Anne  Smeland)  had  been  employed  by  the  Finnmark  County  Municipality  to  oversee  the  
implementation  of  the  EU-WFD.  This  must  be  seen  as  a  recognition  of  the  local  knowledge  about  IWRM  that  had  
been  developed  in  the  local  municipalities  "from  below",  prior  to  the  implementation  of  IWRM  "from  above"  
through  the  EU-WFD.   
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 The  implementation  of  EU-WFD  in  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  Rivers  is  used  only  for  planning  at  
a  general  or  “strategic”  level.  However,  policies  at  a  particular,  “tactical”  level  are  left  to  other  
arrangements.  Thus,  the  EU-WFD  is  not  used  to  steer  the  management  of  the  wild  salmon  stock.  
Indeed  this  is  an  issue  of  biodiversity,  and  thus  an  indicator  of  “water  quality”.  The  EU-WFD  
prescribes  sustainable  management  of  water  quality,  including  biodiversity,  and  this  general  or  
strategical  goal  is  something  that  all  users  can  agree  on.  The  highly  political  contention,  however,  
regards  the  question  about  how  to  the  competing  groups  of  fishers  should  divide  the  shared  burden  
of  fishing  restrictions.  This  more  particular  or  tactical  regulation  is  being  channelled  through  
institutional  arrangements  different  from  the  EU-WFD.  Those  other  institutional  arrangements  are  
being  shaped  by  the  parallel  implementation  of  the  Finnmark  Act. 
                            
Figure  9-2:  Finnmark  County  and  transboundary  water  areas 
Left:  Finnmark  County:  The  main  rivers  Alta  and  Deatnu  are  marked  in  blue.  Much  of  Deatnu  River  is  hidden  
behind  the  gray  border  demarcation.  The  text  says:  “The  [Finnmark]  Water  Region  includes  whole  catchment  
areas  with  adjacent  coastal  areas.  The  Water  Region  can  be  divided  fully  or  partilly  in  Water  Areas.”830 
Right:  Comment  from  the  European  Commission:  “The  three  River  Basins  (RBs)  Deatnu  (Tana),  Neiden  and  
Pasvik  are  shared  with  Finland,  but  not  been  managed  as  International  River  Basin  Districts  (IRBDs).”  




                                                 
830  Finnmark  County  Municipality  2009:  7 
831  European  Commission  2012a 
 322  
 
9.2.3  The  Finnmark  Act 
The  Finnmark  Act  has  been  widely  perceived  as  highly  relevant  for  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  Rivers  
since  it  was  enacted  by  the  Norwegian  parliament  in  2005.832  After  the  constitutional  amendment  
and  the  establishment  of  a  consolatory  Sámi  Parliament,  an  attempt  was  now  made  to  sort  out  an  
even  more  controversial  issue:  the  right  to  land  and  water  in  Sámi  areas.  The  state  had  not  only  
claimed  sovereignty  over  those  lands,  but  also  ownership  in  the  sense  of  private  law.  In  the  19th  
centruy,  ancient  customary  norms  had  gradually  been  recognized  by  the  state  with  regard  to  local  
communities  in  the  southern  provinces  of  the  state.833  Northern  provinces,  by  contrast,  were  re-
defined  as  a  “Colonie”.834  However,  when  the  state  ratified  international  norms  on  indigenous  
rights,  this  implied  a  de-criminalization  of  ancient  customs  in  the  northern  province.  Thus,  the  
contradictions  between  state  law  and  local  customs  had  to  be  resolved.  In  many  places,  the  
expropriated  rights  had  been  allocated  to  other  local  users,  but  in  Finnmark  County  most  of  the  area  
was  still  defined  as  state  property  qua  private  law.  Thus,  the  issue  would  be  somewhat  simpler  to  
sort  out  in  Finnmark,  and  the  process  started  here.  Implementation  of  the  Finnmak  Act  is  among  the  
few  attempts  to  institutionalize  indigenous  rights  to  land  and  water.  Therefore  it  was  followed  with  
much  interest  by  indigenous  peoples  and  their  “host”  states  in  other  Sámi  areas,  but  also  in  other  
indigenous  territories,  particularly  in  the  Circumpolar  Arctic.  The  law  resulted  in  (a)  the  re-
organization  of  the  common  areas,  and  (b)  the  codification  of  customary  rights  in  each  locality. 
 First,  regarding  re-organization  of  common  areas  (ad  a),  all  areas  that  had  been  considered  
state  property  were  transferred  to  a  new  entity,  the  Finnmark  Estate  (FeFo),  which  was  to  be  
controlled  by  Norwegian,  Sámi  and  regional  democratic  institutions. 
 Second,  with  regard  to  the  codification  of  customary  rights  (ad  b),  the  Finnmark  
Commission  started  the  laborious  work  of  mapping  and  codifying  every  existing  local  customary  
right  in  the  county.  In  case  legal  conflicts  might  arise  through  this  mapping,  a  special  court  was  
created,  The  Outfield  Court. 
 Thus,  three  institutions  were  created  with  the  Finnmark  Act:  the  Finnmark  Estate  (FeFo),  the  
Finnmark  Commission  and  the  Outfield  Court.  Those  three  institutions  apply  to  most  land  areas  in  
Finnmark  County.  Those  land  areas  are  administered  by  FeFo  while  work  has  begun  to  register  and  
settle  all  local  customary  rights. 
 With  regard  to  coastal  waters,  the  indigenous  rights  struggle  has  yielded  less  concrete  
results.  The  Norwegian  parliament  rejected  a  proposition  which  claimed  that  local  fishing  rights  
                                                 
832  Norwegian  Parliament  2005 
833 Sandvig 1998; Stenseth 2010 
834  Historical  research  has  found  documentation  that  at  least  within  a  certain  area  and  during  a  less  certain  period,  the  
lands,  waters,  and  population  of  Sápmi  were  explicitly  managed  as  a  "Colonie".  That  is,  at  least  within  Finnmark  
County,  and  at  least  from  the  1820s  and  for  an  undefined  period  of  time  (Pedersen  1999). 
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belonged  to  the  local  population.  Still,  FeFo  has  taken  over  the  administration  of  salmon  fishing  
locations,  while  the  mandate  of  the  Finnmark  Commission  has  become  widened  to  include  
registration  of  actual  customary  rights.  The  work  is  likely  to  reveal  contradictions  between  state  law  
and  local  customs,  since  the  state  has  already  rejected  the  view  that  local  fishing  rights  belong  to  the  
local  population.835  The  controversy  about  local  fishing  rights  applies  to  all  coastal  and  fjord  areas  
in  Finnmark  County,  including  Alta  Fjord  and  Deatnu  Fjord.  Other  parts  of  the  Barents  Coast  have  
different  political  (and  juridical)  opportunity  structures. 
 With  regard  to  main  waterways,  several  of  them  are  omitted  from  the  Finnmark  Act.  Such  is  
the  case  with  Alta  River.  The  Deatnu  River,  by  contrast,  is  one  of  two  border  rivers  that  were  
specifically  mentioned  in  the  Finnmark  Act.  The  act  suggested  that  in  the  Deatnu  and  Nieden  
Rivers,  the  management  of  salmon  fish  resources  should  be  subject  to  local  management  based  on  
rights.  The  specificities  were  further  developed  by  a  specific  commission  under  the  Norwegian  
Ministry  of  the  Environment.  The  commission  finalized  its  report  in  2009,  and  in  2011  their  
suggestions  were  enacted  as  laws  by  the  Norwegian  Parliament.836  During  2012,  attempts  were  
made  to  implement  those  rules.  Political  contention  influenced  policy-making  processes,  and  such  




9.3.0  Democratizations:  genealogies  of  the  two  political  experiments 
 
There  is  continuity  between  the  social  struggles  that  shaped  the  preparation  and  enactment  of  our  
two  political  experiments,  and  the  social  struggles  that  shape  their  implementation.  Therefore,  in  
order  to  understand  the  powers  at  play  during  the  implementation  of  the  policies,  it  is  useful  to  
know  the  powers  at  play  during  the  preparation  of  the  same  policies.  The  actual  web  of  influences  
constitutes  a  complex  socio-ecological  context,  so  any  process  tracing  is  bound  to  be  selective  and  
                                                 
835  In  fact,  the  Norwegian  Ministry  of  Fisheries  has  already  commissioned  two  reports  (or  "white  papers"),  which  give  
contradictory  conclusions  regarding  this  issue  (Norwegian  Official  Report  2005  [NOU  2005:10]  and  Norwegian  Of-­
ficial  Report  2008  [NOU  2008:5]).  When,  in  Chapters  10-11  of  this  thesis  zooms  in  on  the  Deatnu  Fjord  area  within  
Case  II,  an  argument  will  be  made  in  favor  of  the  view  that  the  Coastal  Sámi  of  the  Deatnu  Fjord  indeed  are  indige-­
nous  peoples,  and  that  their  right  to  freedom  from  cultural  (and  economic)  discrimination  includes  the  right  to  tradi-­
tional  subsistence.  In  that  context,  an  argument  will  also  be  made  for  how  local  indigenous  people,  in  the  case  of  
continued  denial  of  indigenous  human  rights,  may  draft  legal  complains  about  the  Norwegian  state  through  the  in-­
ternational  human  rights  regime,  see  part  10.3.8,  with  footnote  on  precedence.  For  further  background  about  the  
Outfield  Court,  see  8.6.1,  which  includes  a  long  footnote  regarding  the  right  to  appeal  within  the  regional  and  global  
human  rights  regimes. 
836  See  the  report  from  the  committee  Tanautvalget  (Norwegian  Ministry  of  the  Environment  2009a),  see  also  the  
following  proposal  from  the  government  to  the  legislative  (Norwegian  Ministry  of  the  Environment  2009b),  and  
finally,  see  the  resulting  bylaw  enacted  by  the  Norwegian  Parliament  (2011). 
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problem-driven.  We  will  now  have  a  brief  look  at  input  from  actors  advocating  competing  models  
of  democracy  in  natural  resource  management. 
 These  tasks  must  be  conducted  differently  for  the  two  political  experiments.  The  Finnmark  
Act  originates  in  the  emerging  regional  context  that  was  presented  in  the  geographical  introduction  
to  our  two  case  studies.  Our  two  case  studies  both  relate  to  the  same  area  and  period  from  which  the  
Finnmark  Act  originates.  Thus,  it  is  not  necessary  to  introduce  any  new  contexts  in  order  to  trace  its  
emergence.  The  EU-WFD  by  contrast,  originates  from  another  geographical  context,  which,  in  the  
same  chapter  was  presented  as  an  emerging  European  macro-region.  Historically,  the  EU-WFD  
took  shape  during  the  same  period  as  the  Finnmark  Act,  but  geographically,  it  is  the  result  of  
processes  localized  in  other  places.  Thus,  some  additional  context  must  be  introduced. 
 
 
9.3.1  Genealogy  of  the  Finnmark  Act 
The  Finnmark  Act  has  sometimes  been  portrayed  as  a  product  of  compromise  between  the  
Norwegian  nation-state,  concerned  about  minimizing  the  loss  of  Norwegian  sovereignty,  and  Sámi  
institutions,  concerned  about  maximizing  Sámi  self-determination.837  Such  a  caricature  exists  in  the  
eye  of  the  beholder.  It  follows  as  a  tautologically  logical  consequence  when  such  authors  define  the  
nation-state  as  the  ultimate  form  of  self-determination.838  However,  a  more  sociologically  informed  
process  tracing  has  been  done  by  the  political  sociologist  Audun  Sandberg.839  He  applied  concepts  
about  long-term  constitutional  processes  from  Vincent  and  Ellinor  Ostrom.840  Regarding  the  level  of  
formalistic  policies,  Sandberg  confirms  the  impression  of  compromise  between  two  collectives.  He  
refers  to  the  Norwegian  Constitutional  Amendment  of  1988,  stating  that  the  Norwegian  state,  in  
accordance  with  international  norms,  is  obliged  to  “create  favorable  conditions  for  the  Sámi  people  
to  secure  and  develop  its  language,  its  culture,  and  its  society.”  The  sociologist  comments:  “This  is  
interpreted  to  mean  that  the  State  of  Norway  is  founded  on  the  territory  of  two  peoples:  the  
Norwegians  and  the  Sámi  and  from  this  day  the  Sámi  is  viewed  as  a  'State-constiuting  people',  a  
position  which  is  fundamentally  different  from  other  minorities  in  Norway.”841  This  formula  about  
one  state  on  the  territory  of  two  peoples  indeed  reflected  the  official  formulation,  as  it  was  famously  
uttered  by  the  King.  That  official  interpretation  is  a  source  of  misunderstandings,  since  several  other  
national  minorities  have  traditionally  lived  in  the  same  territory,  while  the  traditional  homeland  of  
the  Sámi  only  partially  overlaps  with  the  Norwegian  state  territory.  It  is  not  easy  to  codify  rich  
                                                 
837  Semb  2005;;  see  also  Semb  2001;;  and  Hernes  2008 
838  Semb  2005:532 
839  Sandberg  2008a 
840  Sanderg  2008b 
841  Sandberg  2008a,  §  6 
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cultural  pluralism.  If  we  turn  from  the  level  of  formalistic  policies,  to  the  level  of  actual  social  
struggles,  then  the  picture  becomes  more  nuanced.  Contentious  politics  provided  input  to  the  policy  
process  that  led  to  the  enactment  of  the  Finnmark  Act. 
 Sandberg  identifies  three  blocs  of  social  interests:842  (1)  One  bloc  consisted  of  Sámi  
institutions  such  as  the  Sámi  Parliament  and  the  Sámeráđđi,  together  with  the  municipalities  located  
upon  the  inland  plateau,  where  the  population  has  a  strong  degree  of  Sámi  belonging.  This  bloc  
pushed  for  Sámi  rights,  collective,  familial  and  individual  in  nature,  in  accordance  with  ILO  
convention  169.  (2)  Another  bloc  consisted  of  the  Finnmark  County-Municipality,  administrative  
bodies  of  the  County  Governor,  and  the  municipalities  located  along  the  coast,  where  the  population  
had  alower  degree  of  Sámi  belonging.  This  blok  was  generally  against  strengthening  ethnic  Sámi  
rights  as  such,  but  was  generally  positive  to  increased  local  control  of  natural  resources.  (3)  The  
third  bloc  was  the  central  state  Ministries  and  their  sector  agencies.  This  bloc  was  mainly  concerned  
about  preserving  the  control  of  the  state  over  territory,  and  preserving  the  capacity  of  the  central  
government  to  create  nature  reserves  and  to  steer  infrastructure  development.  In  sum,  these  three  
coalitions  of  interests,  according  to  Sandvik,  determined  the  concrete  design  of  the  Finnmark  Estate,  
and  the  composition  of  its  board.  The  board  is  composed  so  that  the  Norwegian  Sámi  Parliament  
and  the  Finnmark  County  Municipality  share  equal  control,  while  the  central  government  of  the  
Norwegian  state  is  represented  to  oversee  the  process.  The  alliances  between  inland  municipalities  
and  the  Sámi  Parliament  have  become  institutionalized,  as  have  the  ties  between  the  coastal  
municipalities  and  Finnmark  County  Municipality.  Sandvik  also  emphasizes  the  impact  of  Carsten  
Smith,  the  Supreme  Court  judge  who  had  directed  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission.  “This  lex  Smith  
stated  that  when  indigenous  Sámi  rights  are  made  applicable  in  an  area,  those  rights  shall  apply  to  
all  inhabitants  of  that  area,  irrespective  of  ethnic  identity.  In  many  ways  it  is  this  doctrine,  also  put  
forward  by  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission,  that  has  made  the  present  compromise  possible  at  all”843  
This  doctrine  is  sometimes  being  described  as  a  “reconciliatory  approach”  from  the  colonized  Sámi  
towards  the  colonizing  state,  but  it  is  also  true  that  the  demography  is  rather  complex,  with  the  
presence  of  Kväns,  descendants  of  proletarian  Norwegian  settlers,  and  a  generally  mixed  
population. 
 One  of  the  issues  that  remain  unresolved  in  the  Finnmark  Act  is  that  of  the  state  border  
dividing  an  indigenous  homeland.  For  the  Finnmark  Estate,  regional  common  rights  belong  to  the  
inhabitants  of  Finnmark  County.  Public  rights  for  everyone  generally  equal  national  commons,  
accessible  for  all  citizens  of  Norway,  and  under  certain  conditions,  also  visitors  to  the  country.  Thus,  
many  local  Sámi  have  had  rights  recognized  that  are  still  being  denied  their  kinfolks  in  Finnish  
                                                 
842  Sandberg  2008a:  §  6 
843  Sandvik  2008a:  §  6 
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Sápmi.  This  even  excludes  local  indigenous  people  in  the  Deatnu  River  Valley,  if  these  individuals  
happen  to  have  their  citizenship  certified  from  the  wrong  side  of  Deatnu  River.  So  far,  these  local  
inhabitants  of  Sápmi  have  the  same  rights  at  the  “Norwegian”  side  of  Sápmi  as  all  citizens  of  the  
entire  EU/EEA  area.  When  regional  commons  are  identified  with  commons  for  the  Finnmark  
County,  and  when  the  everyman's  right  (the  freedom  to  roam)  as  well  as  every  person’s  right  (basic  
human  rights)  are  identified  with  the  national  commons  of  the  Norwegian  nation-state,  then  it  
means  that  the  bias  of  methodological  nationalism  prevailed  in  the  making  of  the  Finnmark  Act.  
Historically,  the  inhabitants  of  “Finnish”  Sápmi  enjoyed  fishing  rights  in  the  nearby  fjords  of  
“Norwegian”  Sápmi,  which  were  later  denied  them,  in  the  latter  half  of  the  19th  century.  Those  local  
inhabitants  were  not  necessarily  reindeer  nomads,  and  in  practice  they  could  even  be  ethnic  Kväns  
or  Finns.844  The  geographical  complexities  of  historical  injustice  remain  controversial. 
 Nevertheless,  as  stated  in  the  geographical  introduction  to  our  two  case  studies  (Chapter  5),  
the  two  historical  movements  for  municipal  democracy  and  indigenous  democracy  have  interacted.  
Even  though  the  Norwegian  Sámi  Parliament  and  the  Finnmark  County  Municipality  belonged  to  
different  constellations  of  interests  during  the  policy  process  that  led  to  the  Finnmark  Act,  they  were  
both  supported  by  municipalities.  In  the  geographic  introduction,  I  observed  that  some  of  the  
municipalities  in  Inner  Sápmi  have  territorial  borders  that  coincide  more  or  less  with  the  borders  of  
the  ancient  Siida  system.  By  adapting  theory  and  method  from  political  anthropology,  I  have  
advanced  the  view  that  the  contemporary  social  organization  in  Sámi  areas  rerpesent  reminiscences  
of  the  ancient  Siida  system,  and  de  facto  constitute  a  stateless  political  system,  which  has  co-
evolved  with  the  nation  states  in  a  rather  ambiguous  way.  In  this  environment  of  de  facto  
jurisdictional  pluralism,  the  movement  for  municipal  democracy  has  interacted  with  ancient  
traditions  for  indigenous  democracy,  just  as  those  two  traditions  have  also  interacted  with  the  more  
recent  social  movements.  This  is  a  view  from  political  anthropology,  and  compared  to  the  political  
sociology  of  Sandberg,  this  view  distances  itself  even  further  from  formalistic  forms  of  political  
science.  The  anthropological  perspective  reveals  co-evolution,  hybridizations,  and  contradictions  
between  multiple  jurisdictions  and  multiple  traditions  for  democracy  and  democratization. 
 
 
9.3.2  Genealogy  of  the  EU  Water  Framework  Directive 
The  EU-WFD  is  a  product  of  the  European  Green  Party  and  the  emergence  of  some  degree  of  
shared  representative  democracy  for  the  whole  EU  space.  The  directive  was  backed  by  the  EU  
Parliament,  where  the  Green  Party  constituted  an  influential  bloc,  in  alliance  with  environmentalist  
                                                 
844  Pedersen  2008 
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NGOs  (one  legislative  branch  of  power).  They  were  also  supported  by  the  central  EU  bureaucracy,  
the  EU  Commission  (an  “executive”  branch  of  power).  The  directive  was  resisted  and  delayed  by  
the  old  nation-states,  which  were  organized  in  the  Council  of  the  EU  (another  legislative  branch  of  
power).845  The  preparation  of  the  directive  was  stuck  in  a  political  deadlock  until  an  institutional  
reform  gave  the  EU  Parliament  somewhat  more  influence  over  the  EU  policy  process.846  Still,  the  
EU  parliament  has  little  influence  over  EU  politics,  compared  to  how  the  politics  of  each  state  is  
influenced  by  their  national  parliaments.  However,  the  EU-WFD  emerged  from  the  efforts  to  turn  
EU  into  a  multilevel  democracy,  rather  than  a  technocratic  forum  between  state  governments.   
The  tension  between  the  multi-level  democracy  of  the  EU  and  the  national  democracies  of  
the  states  continued  during  the  implementation  of  the  EU-WFD.  In  the  Deatnu  Water  Area,  
authority  has  been  transferred  from  County-level  state  administrations  to  County-level  municipal  
democracies,  in  an  effort  to  strengthen  regional  democratic  input.  The  general  EU  policies  on  this  
issue  were  informed  by  a  report  on  participatory  democracy  from  the  WWF.847  The  specific  EU  
policy  towards  the  Norwegian  state  was  informed  by  a  report  from  Norwegian  environmentalist  
NGOs.848  One  might  wonder  why  this  democratization  did  not  involve  the  Sámi  Parliaments  of  
Norway  and  Finland,  when  it  did  include  the  County-specific  democratic  institutions  at  both  sides  
of  the  state  border.  This  particular  process  of  democratization  was  a  result  of  joint  pressure  from  the  
EU  Commission  (from  “above”)  and  from  NGOs  for  environmental  protection  (from  “below”),  still,  
the  NGOs  for  indigenous  human  rights  were  not  involved.  This  brings  us  over  to  the  geographical  
dimension  of  the  implementation  of  the  directive.  State  governments  preferred  to  use  their  existing  
state  bureaucracies  for  the  implementation  of  the  directive.  The  two  Water  Areas  Deatnu  (Tana,  
Teno)  and  Water  Area  Njávdán  (Neiden,  Näätämö,  Njauddâm,  Nijävđám)  are  both  divided  between  
                                                 
845  The  Council  of  the  European  Union,  which  is  part  of  the  EU  system,  should  not  be  confused  with  the  Council  of  
Europe,  which  is  a  separate  and  more  inclusive  intergovernmental  institution. 
846  Kaika  2003 
847  WWF  &  Moroz  2010 
848  Research  on  participatory  democracy  in  the  implementation  of  the  EU-WFD  indicates  that  there  is  a  considerable  
distance  between  good  intensions  and  practical  realities.  According  to  a  report  from  WWF,  such  democratic  deficit  
is  the  case  for  the  EU-WFD  in  general  (WWF  &  Moroz  2010:14).  Similar  conditions  have  been  observed  in  the  
states  in  charge  of  Deatnu  Water  Area.  There  has  been  observed  a  lack  of  trans-boundary  cooperation  between  the  
administrative  apparatus  of  each  of  the  Nordics  states  (Entson  &  Gipperth  2010:113).  If  we  zoom  in  on  the  
Norwegian  side  of  the  river,  we  find  an  ongoing  debate  regarding  the  involvement  of  citizens  and  civil  society.  On  
the  one  hand,  the  environmentalist  NGOs  of  Norway  have  commissioned  a  report,  which  concludes  that  the  state  
authorities  have  failed  to  facilitate  the  civic  participation  they  are  obliged  to,  and  also,  that  the  state  authorities  are  
unclear  about  what  they  actually  mean  with  civic  participation  (SABIMA  2010:  SWECO  &  Dønnum  2010).  This  
has  similarities  with  critical  political  research  on  environmental  policy  in  Norway  (Bregnballe  2005,  Dryzek  et.al.  
2003).  On  the  other  hand,  the  Norwegian  Directorate  of  Nature  Management  has  commissioned  another  report,  and  
limits  its  data  selection  to  “expert  interviews”  with  insiders  of  the  policy  process  (Indset,  Naustdalslid  &  Stokke  
2010).  This  may  be  closer  to  the  main  strand  of  political  research  on  environmental  policy  in  Norway,  what  
Bregnballe  (2006)  characterises  as  more  technocratic  and  less  interested  in  deliberative  process.  But  regarding  the  
implementation  of  the  EU-WFD  in  Norway,  the  NGO-funded  assessment  in  2010  appears  less  critical  than  even  a  
state-funded  research  five  years  earlier  (NIVA,  Sandberg  &  Bennett  2004).  Thus,  the  official  planning  cycle  might  
have  had  some  capability  of  organizational  learning  regarding  the  orchestration  of  civic  deliberation  “from  above”. 
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two  administrative  Water  Regions,  namely  Finnmark  County  and  Lappland  County.  This  is  because  
it  was  more  convenient  for  the  Finnish  and  Norwegian  state  bureaucracies  to  use  the  existing  
County  system  to  organize  the  Water  Regions.  Thus,  the  EU  Commission  requested  enhanced  trans-
boundary  cooperation  in  the  relevant  Water  Areas  for  the  current  planning  cycle.849  This  
contribution  from  the  EU  Commission  is  aligned  with  the  demand  for  bioregional  management  
from  the  NGOs  for  environmental  protection,  and  it  is  also  pushing  in  parallell  with  similar,  but  
unrelated,  demands  from  the  NGOs  for  indigenous  human  rights.  Further,  the  EU  Commission  also  
challenges  what  I  would  characterize  as  Norwegian  and  Finnish  nationalist  bias  in  the  organization  
of  relevant  natural  science.  The  states  have  based  the  scientific  monitoring  systems  on  their  own  
established  technical  expertise.  The  EU  Commission  requests  further  development  of  the  
monitoring  systems,  including  biodiversity  measures.850  In  particular,  it  requests  more  transparency  
on  the  Finnish  side,  and  better  consultation  mechanisms  on  the  Norwegian  side.851  Thus,  the  EU  
Commission  gives  special  attention  to  policy  areas  affected  by  national(ist)  economic  interests,  
including  hydropower  in  Norway  and  agriculture  in  Finland.852  Regarding  the  Norwegian  side,  there  
is  a  general  request  for  more  transparency  and  a  clear  governance  structure  that  could  encourage  
public  participation.853  The  EU  Commission  desires  monitoring  of  transitional  waters  (mixes  of  salt  
and  fresh  water),  and  requests  a  rationale  for  why  biological  impact  factors  have  not  been  taken  into  
consideration  in  coastal  waters,  mentioning  especially  the  problem  of  salmon  parasites  
(Gyrodactylus  Salaris).854  Those  are  issues  of  potential  relevance  for  the  management  of  wild  
salmon  in  the  Deatnu  Water  Area,  and  particularly  in  the  Deatnu  Fjord.  In  sum,  the  EU  Commission  
not  only  empowers  regional  democratization,  and  requests  better  cross-border  cooperation,  but  also  
questions  the  present  intermingling  of  state-certified  science  and  state-certified  national  interests. 
 The  EU-WFD  has  opened  political  opportunities  through  competition  between  the  national  
democracy  of  the  states  and  the  multi-level  democracy  of  the  EU.  With  this  particular  directive,  the  
multi-level  democracy  could  also  be  called  “multi-level  bioregionalism”.  Originally,  bioregionalism  
was  strictly  a  “localist”  vision  for  natural  resources  management:  Local  ecosystems  should  define  
the  boundaries  of  locally-based  political  systems,  which  should  be  governed  by  direct  democracy.855  
This  was  one  of  the  utopias  advocated  within  the  Fundi  faction  of  the  European  Green  Party.  
However,  the  need  to  address  practical  political  problems  on  multiple  scales  led  to  a  change  from  a  
utopian  goal  of  abolishing  the  system  to  a  pragmatic  action  aimed  at  transforming  the  system.  Thus,  
                                                 
849  European  Commission  2012a:  30;;    European  Commission  2012b:  63 
850  European  Commission  2012a:  29;;  European  Commission  2012b:  61 
851  European  Commission  2012a:  31;;  European  Commission  2012b:  62 
852  European  Commission  2012a:  30;;  European  Commission  2012b:  62 
853  European  Commission  2012a:  29 
854  European  Commission  2012a:  30-1 
855  Barry  1999:  80 
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the  utopia  of  eco-anarchism  was  largely  displaced  by  a  pursuit  of  democratising  states  and  civil  
society.856  Similar  transformations  took  place  in  other  parts  of  the  global  justice  movement  after  
Seattle.857  The  reorientation  of  the  environmental  movement  at  large  led  to  the  above-mentioned  
split  within  the  European  Green  Party,  between  Fundi  and  Realos.858  While  wind  power  was  
transformed  from  a  niche  technology  to  a  profitable  industry,  ecological  hydro  engineers  changed  
their  focus  from  local  closed-loop  systems  and  resistance  against  big  dams,  to  developing  the  
principles  of  Integrated  Water  Resources  Management  (IWRM).  This  was  a  typical  Realos-strategy.  
Above  I  defined  IWRM  with  three  defining  characteristics  on  the  basis  on  version  II  of  the  official  
IWRM  handbook.859  Version  III  of  the  handbook  places  less  emphasis  on  participatory  
democracy.860  Counter-concepts  like  “community  led  total  sanitation”  have  been  developed  by  
people  who  adhere  to  Fundi-ideals.861  IWRM  is  an  adaptation  of  bioregionalism,  and  the  EU-WFD  
is  an  experiment  with  a  direct  application  of  IWRM.  Thus,  EU-WFD  is  a  translation  of  
bioregionalist  principles  from  Fundi-ideals  to  Realos-strategy.  To  date,  the  EU-WFD  is  among  the  
most  prestigious  achievements  of  the  European  Green  Party  within  the  EU  Parliament.  However,  as  
an  open-ended  political  experiment,  the  EU-WFD  unfolds  through  interaction  with  various  political  
forces.  Those  forces  include  Fundi  environmentalists  pushing  for  more  radical  bioregionalist  
claims,  and  eurosceptics  pushing  to  restore  national  sovereignty. 
 
Table  9-1:  Ideal  types  of  two  democracy  models  in  environmental  management,  regarding  three  issue  areas 
 Political  issue Economic  issue Epistemic  issue 
Centralised  democracy Formal  accountability Redistribution Scientific  expertise 
Distributed  democracy Local  democracy Decolonization Bio-cultural  specificity 
 
 Ideal  types  of  two  democratic  models:  The  competing  political  models  referred  to  above  
may  be  roughly  sorted  as  ideal  types.  One  ideal  type  may  be  called  “centralized”,  and  may  be  
legitimized  with  concerns  for  formal  accountability,  redistribution,  and  scientific  expertise.  Another  
ideal  type  may  be  called  “distributed”  and  may  be  legitimized  with  concerns  for  local  democracy,  
decolonization  and  local  bio-cultural  specificity.  Environmental  movements  tend  to  disagree  on  the  
centralisation  of  authority,  a  political  issue;;  but  also  on  social  redistribution,  an  economic  issue;;  and  
finally  on  the  organisation  of  science,  an  epistemic  issue.   
 
                                                 
856  Barry  1999:  2,  5,  79,  81,  92,  93,  97,  98 
857  Day  2005;;  Hallaway  2002 
858  Katsiaficas  2006 
859  Global  Water  Partnership  2003.  The  three  defining  characteristics  I  chose  to  emphasise  were  (a)  the  integration  
across  territorial  divides,  (b)  the  integration  across  policy  areas,  and  (c)  the  integration  of  diverse  stakeholders.  
860  Global  Water  Partnership  2013 
861  Deak  2008 
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Table  9-2:  Ideal  types  used  to  sort  out  what  democratic  models  were  pushed  by  what  collective  actors 
 Finnmark  Act EU-WFD 
Centralized  democracy Pushed  by  the  Norwegian  government Pushed  by  the  states  and  EU  Council 
Distributed  democracy Pushed  by  the  County-Municipality  
and  Norwegian  Sámi  Parliament 
Pushed  by  NGOs,  EU  Parliament  and  
EU  Commission 
 
 This  distinction  roughly  corresponds  with  a  split  between  two  factions  in  the  German  Green  
Party  in  the  1990s:  on  one  side,  those  who  adhered  to  pragmatic  Realpolitik,  the  Realos;;  on  the  
other  side  those  who  kept  the  fundamental  principles,  the  Fundi.862  Though  the  Green  Party  was  
split  between  those  factions,  this  never  constituted  any  schism  within  the  larger  environmental  
movement.  In  practical  politics,  there  is  an  interaction  between  different  segments  of  the  
environmental  movement  as  a  whole.  If  the  purpose  is  to  emphasize  different  visions  of  democracy,  
then  the  ideal  types  Fundi  and  Realos  may  have  heuristic  value  to  describe  the  interacting  
tendencies  of  green  politics.  Realos  may  be  more  pragmatic,  but  also  more  technocratic,  while  
Fundi  may  be  more  concerned  about  social  issues,  but  also  more  utopian.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  
latter  faction  cares  for  social  issues,  and  therefore  this  distinction  is  different  from  one  often  made  
in  readers  on  environmental  politics,  between  a  “technocentric”  bloc,  associated  with  high  tech  
fixes,  and  an  “ecocentric”  bloc,  associated  with  Malthusianism.863  Such  a  distinction  silences  the  
voice  of  movements  for  environmental  justice  and  bio-cultural  diversity.  The  distinction  between  
ecocentric  and  technocentric  movements  has  scarce  relevance  for  the  Deatnu  Water  Area.  On  the  
one  hand,  both  the  involved  state  ministries  take  a  technocratic  approach,  though  the  ministry  of  
one  of  the  states  has  more  ecocentric  policies  than  that  of  the  other.  The  policies  of  these  two  states  
are  technocentric  and/or  ecocentric.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Sámi  Parliaments  have  an  environmental  
policy  that  channels  demands  for  increased  environmental  justice,  and  for  the  protection  of  bio-
cultural  diversity.864  There  are  few  links  between  the  Green  Party  and  the  Sámi  organizations,  but  
there  are  affinities  as  a  result  of  entangled  genealogies. 
                                                 
862  Katsiaficas  2006 
863  The  sorting  of  the  environmental  politics  into  a  “technocentric”  bloc  (associated  with  high  tech  fixes)  and  an  
“ecocentric”  block  (associated  with  –  of  all  things  –  Malthusianism)  can  be  traced  back  to  one  single  author.  One  the  
one  hand,  the  dichotomy  is  presented  in  The  Dictionary  of  Human  Gepography  (Clastree  2000:  224),  citing  
O’Riordan  (1980).  On  the  other  hand,  the  same  dichotomy  is  also  presented  in  the  Environmental  Science  for  
Environmental  Management,  the  chapter  on  policy-processes,  by  Jordan  &  O’Riordan  (2000:  67-8).  In  both  
instances,  the  author  of  the  dichotomy  is  Timothy  O’Riordan,  British  professor  of  Environmental  Science.  He  is  also  
the  general  editor  of  the  latter  volume  (O’Riordan  2000),  with  an  introduction  by  The  Prince  of  Wales  (sic!).  When  
defininitional  power  is  being  executed  by  that  particular  segment  of  the  environmental  movement  that  is  closest  to  
the  landed  aristocracy  of  the  British  Empire,  then  it  should  come  as  no  surprise  that  the  catogorisation  silences  and  
suppresses  the  intersectionality  between  social  issues  and  environmental  issues.  When  the  environmentalist  
discourse  is  being  disciplined  with  such  an  Aristocratic  bias,  then  it  indeed  actualises  the  relevance  of  the  term  
“false  ideology”  as  this  was  coined  in  vulgar  Marxism  (Mao  Tse-Tung  1968  (1937),  Marx  &  Engels  1969  
[1932{1845}]).  This  dialectical  tension  is  being  forced  not  by  the  vulgarity  of  the  Marxian  diagnosis,  but  by  the  real  
extremism  of  the  Aristocratic  denial  of  truth.   
864  Sámediggi  Norway  2005  (thanks  to  Gro  Ween  for  sharing  the  document) 
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If  we  use  the  ideal  types  to  sort  the  various  collective  actors  mentioned  in  the  genealogies  of  
the  two  experiments  above,  we  could  surely  use  the  label  “centralized  democracy”  to  describe  
policies  pursued  by  the  Norwegian  state  government,  as  well  as  by  the  state  governments  
represented  in  the  EU  Council.  One  could  argue  that  the  other  collective  actors  pursued  some  
degree  of  “distributed”  democracy.  Perhaps  surprisingly,  the  EU  Commission  and  the  EU  
Parliament  appear  to  have  exercised  their  supranational  authority  to  call  for  the  devolution  of  
democratic  power  to  regional  bodies  and  participatory  fora.  Maybe  less  surprisingly,  the  
transnational  and  national  NGOs  for  environmental  protection  have  had  similar  concerns.  In  the  
implementation  of  EU-WFD  in  Water  Area  Deatnu,  the  push  for  local  democracy  did  not  emerge  
locally,  but  emanated  from  supranational  bodies  and  transnational  NGOs.  In  accordance  with  
Realos-doctrine,  bioregionalism  has  become  a  multi-scalar  political  project,  where  the  purpose  is  to  
manage  each  ecosystem  at  its  appropriate  level  of  aggregation,  be  it  Deatnu  Water  Area,  the  Barents  
drainage  basin  or  the  North  Atlantic  salmon  habitat.  With  regard  to  the  Finnmark  Act,  the  
Norwegian  Sámi  Parliament  and  the  Finnmark  County-Municipality  are  portrayed  as  adversaries  
regarding  some  issues,  but  regarding  democratic  models,  they  are  both  pushing  for  various  versions  
of  distributed  democracy.  One  is  geographically  bonded  by  the  County,  which  was  once  defined  by  
the  state.  The  other  cares  for  the  geographically  diffuse  Sápmi  area,  represented  through  the  Nordic  
Sámiráđđi.  Both  refer  to  territories  where  some  local  municipal  boundaries  coincide  with  some  
ancient  local  Siida  boundaries,  and  where  the  state-certified  local  democracy  of  the  municipalities  
has  co-existed  with  the  criminalized  local  democracies  that  are  contemporary  adaptations  of  the  
ancient  Siida  system.  Thus,  when  we  investigate  what  collective  actors  are  actually  pushing  for  
distributed  democracy  in  the  Deatnu  Water  Area,  there  is  a  mélange  of  heterogeneous  ethnicities  
and  heterogeneous  scales.  Thus,  neither  the  ethnic  cleavage  nor  the  center-periphery  cleavages  are  
clear  cut  entities.  Still,  there  is  a  mélange  of  heterogeneous  collective  actors  with  some  shared  




9.4.0  Laboratory  Deatnu:  a  test  site  for  the  two  political  experiments 
 
The  ethnographic  case  study  from  Deatnu  Water  Area  involves  information  on  how  those  two  
political  experiments  have  unfolded  in  a  particular  Water  Areas,  from  2010  until  2012.  For  the  Alta  
Water  Area,  I  have  not  conducted  any  similar  ethnographic  fieldwork.  Deatnu  was  chosen  because  
of  the  geographical  location  of  its  ecosystem  in  relation  to  the  nation  states  and  the  Sámi  homeland.  
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For  this  reason,  this  particular  Water  Area  exposes  the  special  challenges  with  the  EU-WFD,  and  for  
the  same  reason,  it  got  its  own  paragraph  in  the  Finnmark  Act.  Some  preliminary  observations  
should  be  presented. 
 
 
9.4.1  EU-WFD  in  the  Deatnu  Water  Area 
Regarding  the  EU-WFD  in  the  Deatnu  Water  Area,  institutional  reform  is  slow,  and  political  
conflicts  are  strikingly  absent.  The  two  states  have  had  well-established  bureaucratic  cultures,  and  
reforming  those  takes  time.  Reforms  have  not  been  initiated  locally,  but  have  been  pushed  by  
centralized  environmental  NGOs,  interacting  with  the  European  Commission.  After  the  first  round  
of  implementation,  the  states  were  pressed  to  democratize  the  organization  of  the  directive  at  
County  level.865  Thus,  some  authority  was  transferred  from  the  County  level  state  administrations  to  
the  County  level  municipal  democracies.  After  the  second  round  of  implementation,  the  states  are  
compelled  to  invest  more  effort  into  integrating  their  work  across  state  borders,  and  into  increasing  
the  reliability  of  scientific  monitoring  systems.866  Regarding  the  Norwegian  side,  a  third  demand  
was  for  further  democratization.  One  preliminary  result  is  that  some  information  material  from  
authorities  on  one  side  of  the  border  is  being  translated  for  end  users  on  the  other  side  of  the  border.  
Thus,  it  becomes  easier  to  participate  in  the  policy  process  on  the  other  side  of  the  border.  Another  
preliminary  result  is  the  employment  of  former  bureaucrats  from  the  local  municipalities,  who  had  
already  been  working  in  the  same  school  of  water  management  before  the  EU-WFD  was  
established.  In  fact,  Water  Resources  Management  (IWRM)  has  been  adapted  in  the  Deatnu  Water  
Area  via  two  separate  pathways:  The  first  was  via  committed  municipal  bureaucrats  and  politicians.  
The  next  was  via  the  EU  system.  Those  two  processes  are  now  being  twinned  into  one.  However,  
maybe  most  striking  of  all  is  the  absence  of  public  controversy  around  the  implementation  of  the  
EU-WFD  in  the  Deatnu  Water  Area.  This,  in  spite  of  natural  resources  management  being  the  
hottest  political  topic  in  the  area,  and  active  public  participation  being  a  main  goal  for  the  EU-WFD  
and  IWRM.  Participatory  democracy  is  being  channelled  into  specific  forms:  reference  groups,  
information  meetings  and  public  hearings.  Those  channels  are  orchestrated  from  “above”.  Thus,  
they  create  fora  for  technical  dialogue,  not  arenas  for  political  struggle.  It  has  been  suggested  that  
overly-depoliticized  forms  of  public  participation  are  more  efficient  to  discipline  public  opinion  
than  to  channel  democratic  power.867  They  foster  civil  society  that  is  so  over-civilized  that  it  leaves  
little  room  for  the  less  educated,  less  well  off,  and  less  consensual  parts  of  the  population.  Thus,  in  
                                                 
865  WWF  &  Moroz  2010;;  SWECO  &  Dønnum  2010;;  interview  with  Opdahl,  J.S.,  ecologist  at  Finnmark  County-
Municipality,  Vadsø,  26.01.2011 
866  EU  Commission  2012a  ibidem;;  EU  Commission  2012b  ibidem 
867  Della  Porta  2011;;  Bregnballe  2009 
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an  indigenous  homeland  like  the  Deatnu  Water  Area,  considerable  parts  of  the  population  are  
actually  excluded  from  the  process,  while  this  is  being  made  publicly  invisible,  because  the  stated  
policy  is  to  include  everyone.  On  one  hand,  this  may  reproduce  the  democratic  deficit  of  EU  
institutions.  On  the  other  hand  it  may  be  a  result  of  good  local  knowledge  among  bureaucrats  with  
experience  from  democracy  at  the  municipal  and  county  levels,  because  they  know  that  too  much  
formal  inclusion  might  have  suppressed  public  debate.  Intended  or  not,  controversial  particularities  




9.4.2  The  Finnmark  Act  in  Deatnu  Water  Area 
Regarding  the  Finnmark  Act  in  the  Deatnu  Water  Area,  the  reform  has  a  wide  variety  of  effects.  
Those  varieties  can  be  sorted  into  four  different  geographical  areas:  (a)  first,  the  tributary  streams  
lakes  and  marshes  on  the  Norwegian  side;;  (b)  second,  the  main  part  of  the  river  on  the  Norwegian  
side;;  (c)  third,  the  tributary  and  river  areas  on  the  Finnish  side;;  and  (d)  fourth,  the  Deatnu  Fjord.  
The  Finnmark  Act  does  not  explicitly  address  either  the  salt  waters  of  the  fjord,  or  those  parts  of  the  
river  system  that  are  under  Finnish  jurisdiction.  Nevertheless,  it  has  consequences  also  in  those  
areas.  With  regard  to  (a)  tributaries  on  the  Norwegian  side,  the  act  applies  as  it  does  to  most  parts  
of  the  inland  plateau.  Numerous  tributary  rivers,  streams,  lakes,  marshlands  and  groundwater  
reserves  are  now  defined  as  properties  of  FeFo.  The  Finnmark  Commission  is  sorting  out  
contradictions  between  state  law  and  local  customs,  which  were  continuously  maintained  and  
developed  over  centuries  when  the  latter  were  criminalized  by  the  former.  With  regard  to  (b)  the  
main  river  on  the  Norwegian  side,  the  act  started  a  process  towards  locally  based  management  of  
salmon  resources.  This  was  briefly  described  above.  One  main  limitation  to  the  implementation  of  
local  management  is  that  the  regulation  of  salmon  fisheries  is  the  result  of  cross-border  negotiation  
between  the  Norwegian  and  Finnish  governments,  with  representation  from  the  two  Sámi  
Parliaments  on  each  side.  Thus,  there  is  a  contradiction  between  a  system  of  centralized  
management  for  the  whole  river,  and  a  system  of  local  management  for  the  Norwegian  side.  At  the  
end  of  the  year  in  2012,  this  contradiction  was  a  source  of  confusion.  Regarding  (c)  the  tributaries  
and  river  on  the  Finnish  side,  an  act  from  the  Norwegian  polity  has  no  direct  relevance.  In  fact,  the  
act  is  an  attempt  to  implement  ILO  convention  169,  and  this  has  not  been  ratified  by  the  Finnish  
government.  Still,  local  people  on  the  Finnish  side  may  refer  to  what  the  act  says  about  the  main  
river  when  they  claim  local  rights  on  the  border  river,  as  well  as  in  tributaries  and  the  fjord  on  the  
                                                 
868  Della  Porta  2011;;  Dryzek  2006 
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Norwegian  side.  This  argument  may  probably  not  be  used  with  regarding  to  tributaries  that  are  
under  purely  Finnish  control.  Regarding  (d)  the  Deatnu  fjord,  local  people  from  this  area  have  been  
much  involved  in  the  indigenous  rights  struggle  for  the  Finnmark  Coast.  This  process  was  briefly  
described  above.  The  process  is  not  only  relevant  for  the  Deatnu  Fjord,  but  the  Deatnu  Fjord  is  also  
relevant  to  explaining  that  process.  In  sum,  the  Deatnu  River  not  only  exemplifies  a  transfer  to  
indigenous-friendly  democracy  at  the  Finnmark  Plateau,  but  also  the  imminent  challenges  of  
expanding  this  transition  to  adjacent  areas  under  Finnish  control  or  along  the  Finnmark  Coast.  As  
shown,  contradictions  are  implied  in  the  fact  that  local  management  is  implemented  in  one  part  of  
the  river  while  regulation  for  the  whole  river  is  the  outcome  of  centralized  negotiations  between  the  
two  states.  Thus,  there  is  a  lack  of  integration  between  two  parts  of  the  socio-ecosystem  that  have  
been  spatially  divided  by  a  state  border.  Another  contradiction  has  not  been  mentioned  so  far,  since  
it  applies  to  the  entire  Deatnu  Water  Area.  On  the  one  hand,  there  is  an  ongoing  institutionalization  
of  indigenous  rights.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  also  an  ongoing  institutionalization  of  
environmental  protection.  Both  processes  are  influenced  by  international  norms,  various  interest  
organizations  and  local  social  movements.  The  preliminary  result  of  those  processes  is  that  
indigenous  rights  have  been  a  policy  area  under  the  two  relevant  Sámi  Parliaments,  while  
environmental  protection  has  become  a  policy  area  under  the  Norwegian  Ministry  of  the  
Environment  and  the  Finnish  Ministry  of  Forestry.  This  has  consequences  for  the  funding  and  usage  
of  knowledge  in  the  fields  of  bio-science  and  anthropology.  One  consequence  is  a  lack  of  
interdisciplinary  collaboration  across  the  disciplinary  divide.  Another  consequence  is  that  the  
political-economic  opportunity  structure  for  bio-science  is  determined  by  compromises  between  
what  the  two  governments  define  as  “national  interests”  for  Finns  and  Norwegians,  while  the  Sámi  
institutions  have  fewer  possibilities  to  influence  the  research  agenda.  Those  issues  were  discussed  in  
the  previous  part  of  this  chapter.  Thus,  there  is  a  lack  of  integration  between  two  parts  of  a  holistic  
thematic  that  has  been  divided  into  separate  topics  under  separate  policy  areas.  In  sum,  this  
synthetic  overview  over  the  consequences  of  the  Finnmark  Act  in  the  Deatnu  Water  System  
indicates  that,  at  present,  there  are  some  contradictions  related  to  the  lack  of  integration  across  two  
divisions:  the  spatial  division  between  state  jurisdictions,  and  the  topical  distinction  between  policy  
areas.  One  reason  to  keep  the  spatial  distinction  is  that  states  still  provide  protection,  and  thus,  
legislation  in  one  state  cannot  apply  to  the  territory  of  the  other.  However,  those  sovereignties  are  
already  entangled  in  a  shared  fate,  as  a  result  of  their  shared,  trans-boundary  natural  and  cultural  
heritage,  as  well  as  the  protection  of  populations  already  relying  on  geo-strategical  alliances.  One  
reason  to  maintain  the  topical  distinction  between  biological  and  cultural  issues  is  that  
anthropologists  and  bio-scientists  ideally  wish  to  pursue  truth  independently  of  dictates  from  
powerful  political-economic  interests.  However,  this  ideal  disciplinary  integrity  is  never  fully  
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actualized,  since  the  sciences  are  dependent  upon  funding,  and  this  is  provided  from  political  
entities  that  have  vested  interests  in  prioritising  the  funding  of  some  research  questions  rather  than  
others.  Thus,  there  may  be  some  good  reasons  to  keep  the  spatial  and  topical  distinctions,  but  
nevertheless  those  distinctions  create  contradictions  for  holistic  ecosystems  management  and  




The  brief  description  above  has  traced  and  mapped  some  processual  and  spatial  features  of  how  two  
parallel  political  experiments  unfold  in  the  Daetnu  Water  Area.  This  description  identified  some  
tensions  within  each  of  the  processes,  and  the  description  of  those  tensions  may  be  seen  as  an  
implicit  comparison  between  the  two.  This  comparison  may  be  carried  out  more  explicitly.  With  
regard  to  implementation  of  the  EU-WFD,  a  contradiction  was  identified,  between  political  goals  to  
foster  active  civil  participation,  and  practices  that  exclude  most  of  the  contentious  issues  that  would  
have  ignited  public  engagement.  This  is  not  so  with  the  implementation  of  the  Finnmark  Act.  The  
reforms  produced  by  this  act  have  caused  a  high  level  of  public  contention,  with  much  commitment.  
Thus,  it  has  ignited  a  process  of  open-ended  clarification  of  norms  through  informal  deliberative-
participative  democracy.  Perhaps  paradoxically,  the  Finnmark  Act,  with  all  its  controversial  
imperfections,  fosters  more  democratic  participation  than  the  technically  smooth  EU-WFD.  
However,  at  the  same  time,  the  implementation  of  the  Finnmark  Act  has  caused  some  contradictions  
that  are  not  found  with  the  EU-WFD.  With  the  Finnmark  Act,  some  contradictions  are  the  result  of  
scarce  integration  between  spatial  areas  that  have  been  divided  by  a  state  border,  while  other  
contradictions  are  the  result  of  scarce  integration  between  topics  that  have  been  divided  by  policy  
areas.  Those  are  exactly  the  two  forms  of  integration  that  Integrated  Water  Resources  Management  
(IWRM)  is  supposed  to  address,  and  for  that  reason,  the  European  Commission  and  the  
environmentalist  NGOs  have  put  a  great  deal  of  effort  into  encouraging  the  states  to  develop  such  
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9.5.0  Preliminary  conclusion  to  first  part  of  Case  II,  the  Deatnu  River  &  Fjord 
 
9.5.1  Summing  up  the  argument 
In  sum,  this  argument  could  have  concluded  by  assessing  policies,  claiming  that  in  the  Deatnu  
Water  Area,  the  good  sides  of  the  Finnmark  Act  are  the  bad  sides  of  the  EU-WFD,  and  vice  versa.  
Such  an  argument  could  have  been  elaborated  by  defining  explanatory  factors:  integration  across  
territorial  divides,  integration  across  policy  areas,  and  participatory  democracy.  Those  are  exactly  
the  three  features  that  were  used  to  define  Integrated  Water  Resources  Management  (IWRM)  above. 
 However,  I  will  not  conclude  this  argument  in  such  a  manner.  Indeed  it  might  be  fruitful  
with  some  cross-fertilizing  between  the  two  ongoing  experiments,  and  indeed  they  are  both  open-
ended  processes  of  learning  and  action.  The  problem  with  policy  analysis  is  that  this  study  has  
already  rejected  the  epistemological  and  utilitarian  assumptions  that  are  implicit  in  policy  analysis.  
That  is  because  I  subscribe  to  a  democracy  theory  that  takes  conflict  to  be  the  defining  characteristic  
of  politics,  and  consequently  see  informal  deliberation  over  contentious  issues  as  integral  to  
democratic  praxis.869  From  such  a  viewpoint,  democratic  participation  can  hardly  be  fostered  
through  codified  technical  fixes  from  policy  experts.  Instead,  democratization  has  to  emerge  via  
interaction  between  the  social  engineers  and  carnivalesque  contention  from  diverse  actors.  The  
tensed  jurisdictional  pluralism  in  the  Deatnu  Water  Area  highlights  this  issue.  In  such  a  situation,  
with  its  unresolved  internal  contradictions,  the  making  and  maintenance  of  political  systems  is  at  
stake.  This  will  be  further  investigated  in  Chapters  10  and  11,  which  will  zoom  in  on  the  Deatnu  
Fjord,  as  a  sub-case  within  Case  II. 
 
 
9.5.2  Preliminary  negative  findings:  the  Deatnu  water  area  in  large 
Regarding  Case  II,  I  have  identified  two  of  my  own  biases.  One  bias  regards  ethnocentrism  in  the  
anthropological  research  about  the  actual  governance  system(s),  in  particular  the  national  biases  
inherent  in  my  own  education  and  competence,  but  also  the  reproduction  of  nation-state  bias  in  the  
fact  that  local  history  at  the  “Finnish”  side  of  the  river  lacks  the  funding  that  is  accessible  on  the  
“Norwegian”  side.  Another  bias  concerns  watershed-centrism  in  the  ecological  knowledge  about  the  
resource  system(s).  There  have  been  many  efforts  to  develop  functioning  monitoring  systems  for  
the  size  of  the  local  salmon  stock  within  the  river.  However,  this  is  a  migrating  species.  What  
remains  under-researched  is  the  life,  and  particularly  death,  of  salmons  from  the  local  stock  during  
                                                 
869  Della  Porta  2011,  Dryzek  2006 
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their  migration  in  the  deep  sea.  Similarly,  local  subsistence  fierhermen  claim  that  there  are  few  
salmon  when  there  are  more  seals,  but  complain  that  biologists  have  not  been  willing  to  investigate  
if  the  seal  eats  much  of  the  salmon.  Those  two  biases  are  closely  related.  Both  forms  of  under-
information  are  of  relevance  to  various  uses  of  the  shared  salmon  stock.  There  are  particular  groups  
of  subsistence  practitioners  who  have  not  succeeded  in  setting  the  research  agenda.  Consequently,  
the  research  questions  that  appear  relevant  for  them  remain  under-researched.  Thus,  both  forms  of  
bias,  the  ethnocentric,  as  well  as  the  hydro-centric,  can  be  partially  explained  as  a  product  of  
political-economic  bias.  In  order  to  influence  the  research  agenda,  deliberation  matters,  but  
resources  decide. 
 Suggestions  for  further  research:  Following  my  discussion  of  biases  above,  the  four  
following  research  agendas  can  be  suggested: 
a) We  need  more  ecological  knowledge  about  the  ocean  migration  routes  of  the  Deatnu  salmon  
stocks,  and  better  information  about  catches  in  the  open  sea.  Perhaps  one  could  place  radio  
transmitters  on  selected  specimen.  There  is  also  a  need  for  more  research  on  the  web  of  
nutrition  in  the  Deatnu  ecosystem,  for  example,  one  relevant  hypothesis  is  provided  by  the  
observation  among  fjord  fishers  that  an  increase  of  seals  correlates  with  a  decrease  in  
salmon  catch.  Better  biological  knowledge  about  those  issues  might  have  been  beneficial  for  
the  environmental  policy  of  the  Sámi  parliaments  and  the  Nordic  Sámirađđi.  However,  such  
research  might  be  contrary  to  the  interests  of  Norwegian  and  Russian  industrial  fisheries,  as  
well  as  Finnish  and  Norwegian  anglers’  associations. 
b) We  need  more  historical  knowledge  about  traditional  livelihoods  on  the  Finnish  side  of  the  
river,  for  example  investigating  one  view  circulating  in  oral  history,  saying  that  tourism  is  a  
traditional  livelihood  adaptation  among  the  local  Sámi.  The  documentation  of  relevant  
anthropological  history  has  begun,  but  mainly  on  the  Norwegian  side  of  the  river.870  More  
research  on  the  history  of  tourism  at  the  Finnish  side  may  not  be  in  the  immediate  interest  of  
the  Norwegian  Sámi  Parliament,  because  it  is  outside  the  Norwegian  territory,  but  more  
holistic  knowledge  about  this  trans-boundary  socio-ecosystem  is  probably  in  the  long-term  
interest  of  the  Sámi  Parliaments  as  well  as  the  Nordic  Sámirađđi. 
c) We  need  more  SES  research  on  how  the  local  and  Sámi  population  have  overcome  the  
“tragedy  of  the  commons”  in  their  traditional  use  of  natural  resources,  and  more  on  how  the  
increasing  state  intervention  might  sabotage  such  possibilities.  By  taking  Ostrom's  SES  
perspective,  I  think  a  relevant  diagnosis  on  this  issue  might  have  been  set  by  Geir  Wulff,  
editor  of  the  Sámi  newspaper  Ságat,  when  he  claims  that  everyone  loses  because  the  
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authorities  have  made  a  mess.871  For  example,  there  is  a  need  for  multi-sited  ethnography  
regarding  the  water  area  as  a  whole.  Here  I  suggest  the  need  for  research  that  I  myself  have  
started,  though  the  data  are  still  incomplete.  Such  research  might  also  be  in  line  with  the  
environmental  policy  of  the  Sámi  parliaments  and  the  Nordic  Sámirađđi.  However,  it  might  
not  be  in  the  interest  of  the  governing  political  faction  within  the  Norwegian  and  Finnish  
state  apparatus. 
d) We  need  further  ANT  research  on  the  politics  of  agenda  setting  in  the  biological  and  social  
sciences  of  relevance  to  Deatnu  fishery  management.  This  work  has  been  pioneered  by  Gro  
Ween.  Continuing  her  research  may  also  be  in  line  with  the  environmental  policies  of  the  
Sámi  parliaments  and  the  Nordic  Sámirađđi. 
Those  suggested  directions  for  further  research  are  rather  diverse,  but  they  have  one  feature  in  
common:  To  make  inquires  concerning  certain  issues  of  (a)  ecology,  (b)  history,  (c)  SES-systems,  
and  (d)  ANT-nets  would  be  relevant  for  the  Nordic  Sámirađđi  and  the  four  Sámi  Parliaments,  but  
would  not  be  relevant  for  the  better  resource-endowed  interest  organisations,  that  are  have  
succeeded  into  defining  “national  interests”  within  the  Norwegian  and  Finnish  states  (and  for  the  
case  of  ocean  fisheries,  also  the  Russian  state).  The  struggle  for  rights  and  proof  seems  to  imply  a  




9.5.3  Preliminary  positive  findings:  the  Deatnu  water  area  au  sens  large 
By  tracing  two  entangled  policy  processes,  Chapter  9  confirms  the  mechanisms  that  were  
hypothesized  at  the  end  of  sub-case  I  as  well  as  at  the  end  of  the  geographical  bridge  chapter.  
However,  the  new  information  provided  by  Chapter  9  does  not  allow  me  to  develop  any  further  
hypotheses  about  further  causal  mechanisms.  In  order  to  do  that,  I  will  zoom  in  on  the  politics  of  
everyday  life  in  a  more  particular  area  within  the  Deatnu  water  area.  In  the  following  two  chapters  I  
will  dig  deeper  and  deeper  into  non-state  politics,  first  by  conducting  political  sociology  of  
knowledge  practices  (Chapter  10),  and  then  through  a  political  anthropology  about  the  politics    of  
everyday  life  (Chapter  11). 
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10.1.0  Introduction  to  the  second  part  of  Case  II 
 
The  focus  will  now  zoom  in.  The  previous  chapter  provided  thin  information  about  a  wide  
geographical  area:  a  panorama.  That  is  the  virtue  of  a  conventional  political  science  approach  to  
political  fieldwork.  However,  we  also  need  thicker  information  about  more  particular  action  
situations:  a  close-up.  Thus,  I  will  now  turn  to  other  forms  of  political  fieldwork,  conventionally  at  
home  in  political  sociology  and  political  anthropology.  In  the  following  sections,  I  will  anchor  the  
discussion  in  interviews  and  observations  that  took  place  in  particular  action  situations,  at  particular  
places  within  the  wider  Deatnu  water  area.  For  various  reasons,  I  will  limit  myself  to  information  
about  sites  in  the  downstream  part  of  the  Deatnu  water  area,  mostly  the  Deatnu  fjord:  Deanuvuotna.  
One  reason  is  that  this  thesis  is  already  long  enough,  so  I  had  to  be  selective.  Another  reason  is  my  
limited  linguistic  capabilities:  It  is  easier  to  participate  in  a  superficially  “norwegianised”  
community. 
 The  Deatnu  Fjord  (Deanuvuotna)  actualizes  particular  conflicts  about  the  stewardship  of  
common  natural  resources.  It  is  the  place  where  the  great  Deatnu  River  empties  into  the  Barents  
Sea.  Thus,  it  is  also  a  place  where  the  Coastal  Sámi  culture  of  the  coast  meets  the  River  Sámi  
culture  of  this  grandest  river  of  the  Sápmi  homeland.  An  ethnically  heterogeneous  indigenous  rights  
movement  is  active  along  the  Deatnu  River  as  well  as  the  Barents  coast.  Where  those  two  
ecosystems  overlap,  we  find  one  of  the  particularly  vibrant  locations  of  the  indigenous  rights  
struggle.  My  fieldwork  along  the  Deatnu  River  and  Fjord,  from  2010  until  2012,  brought  me  into  
contact  with  this  social  struggle.  During  those  travels,  I  met  asymmetrical  political  conflict  
everywhere,  but  in  the  fjord,  the  conflict  appeared  as  particularly  urgent.  Locally  based  leaders  
claim  that  the  Coastal  Sámi  culture  is  in  a  critical  situation  because  local  youth  see  no  future  in  the  
locally  based  livelihoods.872 
 I  owe  thanks  to  Gro  Ween  for  having  read  through  and  commented  upon  an  earlier  version  
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10.2.0  Political  sociology:  inclusion,  resistance,  and  structural  violence 
 
10.2.1  Diagnoses:  public  claims 
When  I  arrived  at  the  Denuvuotna  (Deatnu  Fjord),  I  found  myself  thrown  into  a  conflict  about  for  
rights  and  proofs.  Therefore,  whatever  proofs  I  found  were  bound  to  become  enrolled  in  the  
conflict,  by  some  party  or  another,  in  order  to  justify  claimed  rights.  That  actualized  the  question  of  
what  proofs  to  seek,  what  to  look  for.  Whose  research  question  shall  I  ask?  Whose  information  shall  
I  disclose?  As  a  scientist  I  seek  to  work  in  relative  autonomy  from  the  state.  The  state  is  not  the  
exclusive  owner  of  the  local  natural  and  cultural  heritage,  because  the  salmon  biotope  and  the  
indigenous  homeland  are  shared  between  different  states.  In  the  Deatnu  Water  Area,  transnational  
institutions  have  been  beneficial  to  the  efforts  to  overcome  some  of  the  nationalist  bias  in  the  
development  of  rights  and  proofs.  Salmon  biology  has  become  more  reliable  (or  less  unreliable)  
with  help  from  the  North  Atlantic  Salmon  Conservation  Organization.  International  law  has  become  
partly  de-colonized  with  the  emergence  of  collective  human  rights,  including  the  right  to  indigenous  
self-determination.  With  the  increasing  institutionalization  of  multilateral  organizations,  including  
my  own,  the  European  University  Institute,  it  becomes  politically  possible  to  inquire  questions  that  
were  taboo  only  one  generation  ago.  I  am  particularly  interested  in  the  very  most  contentious  issue  
in  Deanuvuotna:  the  territorial  rights  of  indigenous  people.  Who  has  the  right  to  fish  from  the  local  
fish  stock?  Who  has  the  right  to  regulate  the  fisheries?  Who  is  in  charge  of  those  fish? 
 What  I  do  to  overcome  politically  biased  knowledge  is,  firstly,  to  acknowledge  that  all  
knowledge  production  is  bound  to  be  positioned  in  one  manner  or  another,  and  secondly,  to  try  and  
look  for  surprising  facts  that  may  challenge  prejudice  of  every  kind.  I  have  listened  to  various  
voices  in  the  field.  The  fishery  biologist  Kjell-Magne  Johnsen  taught  me  about  how  his  profession  
strives  to  develop  more  reliable  (or  less  unreliable)  techniques  to  monitor  the  size  of  the  salmon  
stock.873  The  river  fisherman  and  angler  tourist  guide  Aslak  Tapiola  thought  me  to  question  why  no  
attempts  are  made  to  estimate  how  much  of  the  local  salmon  is  being  caught  by  large  vessels  in  the  
open  sea.874  Those  represent  some  of  the  relevant  lessons  I  learned  from  my  fieldwork  in  the  Deatnu  
Water  Area. 
 When  I  zoom  in  on  the  downstream  waters,  I  will  highlight  another  of  the  relevant  voices.  
Bjarne  Johansen,  leader  of  the  local  sea  salmon  fishers’  association,  set  a  political  diagnosis  in  a  
letter  to  the  editor  in  a  regional  newspaper.  He  stated  that  “[t]he  sea  salmon  fishermen  in  coastal  
Sámi  areas  still  feel  like  a  people  with  no  rights”  arguing  that  this  group  cannot  accept  “to  take  the  
                                                 
873  Interviews:  Johnsen,  Kjell-Magne,  at  Tana  Bru  and  at  Masjoka  River,  at  several  occasions  in  2011  and  2012. 
874  Interview:  Tapiola,  Alsak  (interpreted  by  Katja  Tapiola),  at  Utsjoki,  6.  February,  2011. 
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whole  burden  when  the  salmon  fisheries  are  being  regulated”.875  The  fisherman  explained  this  
situation  with  regard  to  the  struggle  for  rights,  as  well  as  the  struggle  for  proofs.  With  regard  to  the  
struggle  for  rights,  he  implied  that  the  established  channels  for  political  participation  are  politically  
biased:  “The  Sámi  parliament  has  made  an  agreement  with  the  Ministry  of  the  Environment  without  
discussing  this  with  the  local  competence  that  does  exist  among  sea  salmon  fishermen.”  With  regard  
to  the  struggle  for  proofs,  he  stated:  “People  are  indignant,  and  feel  punished  by  researchers  who  
are  operating  with  numbers  and  graphs  with  no  grounding  in  reality.”  Thus,  the  political  diagnosis  
is  supported  by  an  etiological  explanation,  which  states  that  there  is  an  absence  of  lawful  rights  and  
a  lack  of  truthful  proofs. 
 The  view  from  the  fjord  fisher  is  different  from,  but  compatible  with,  what  I  learned  from  
the  fishery  biologist,  or  from  the  river  fisherman  who  lives  from  angling  tourism.  All  of  these  
people  have  a  shared  interest  in  maintaining  a  sustainable  salmon  stock,  as  a  resource  for  
sustainable  fisheries.  However,  within  this  frame  of  this  shared  interest,  there  are  also  particular  
interests  that  divide  them.  Which  fishers  have  to  restrain  their  fishing  at  present  so  that  everyone  
can  keep  on  fishing  in  the  future?  The  issue  is  much  debated  between  fjord  fishers,  river  fishers,  and  
those  who  derive  income  from  tourist  angling.  This  is  an  issue  for  the  ongoing  deliberation  about  
rights  and  proofs.  Firstly,  there  is  deliberation  about  rights.  The  fish  in  the  Deatnu  Water  Area  is  a  
shared  resource  between  two  nation-states  and  one  stateless  people,  and  the  fish  also  migrates  
through  international  waters.  The  local  fish  and  the  local  fisheries  are  part  of  a  common  natural  and  
cultural  heritage.  After  the  ratification  of  various  international  treaties,  such  as  the  ICCPR/ICESCR  
and  the  NASCO,  it  is  no  longer  possible  for  Norway  and  Finland  to  manage  the  shared  resources  
according  to  particular  national  interests.  State  laws  are  adjusted  to  fit  recent  international  norms  
and  longstanding  local  customs.  However,  how  exactly  to  do  that,  remains  a  contentious  issue.  
Secondly,  there  is  also  a  deliberation  about  proofs.  The  scientific  knowledge  practices  have  gained  
an  increasing  independence  from  particular  national  interests.  The  Nordic  Sámi  Institute  pioneered  
the  search  for  new  proofs  on  legal  history.  The  RKTL  research  station  developed  better  techniques  
for  field  biology.  Thirdly,  the  deliberations  about  proofs  and  about  rights  feed  each  other  and  co-
evolve.  The  previously  established  national  bodies  of  law  and  national  bodies  of  knowledge  are  
supplemented  with  legal  pluralism  and  transnational  epistemic  communities.  Knowledge  praxes  and  
customary  praxes  are  becoming  less  limited  by  the  perceived  national  interests  of  each  state  
government.  There  was  a  highly  uneven  development  of  rights  and  proofs  under  nationalist  state-
builders.  The  ongoing  state-re-building,  can  be  seen  as  an  attempt  to  make  the  development  of  
rights  and  proofs  slightly  less  uneven.  Should  the  progress  be  seen  as  a  glass  half  full,  or  a  glass  half  
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empty?  That  depends  on  one's  position  and  perspective. 
 When  I  zoomed  in  on  the  Deanudat  area,  I  gained  some  knowledge  about  the  practical  
reality  experienced  by  small-scale  fisheries  in  a  Coastal  Sámi  community.  Bjarne  Johansen  implied  
that  there  is  a  profound  absence  of  lawful  rights  and  lack  of  truthful  proofs.  The  injustice  that  he  
experiences  is  something  he  ascribes  to  profound  asymmetries  of  power.  For  less  marginalized  
interest  groups  in  the  Deatnu  Water  Area,  the  glass  may  look  half  full.  For  sea  salmon  fishermen  in  
Deanuvuotna,  the  glass  looks  half  empty.  In  the  cited  letter  to  the  editor,  the  syndical  leader  goes  on,  
suggesting  that  his  organization  might  boycott  the  consultation  organized  by  the  Norwegian  Sámi  
Parliament.  It  would  be  wrong  to  see  this  rejection  as  trouble-making;;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  a  way  to  
counter  trouble  that  has  already  been  made.  If  it  is  not  possible  to  have  dialogue  on  equal  terms,  it  
may  be  necessary  to  reject  dialogue  in  order  to  obtain  the  possibility  for  dialogue  on  equal  terms.  If  
dialogue  is  constrained  by  asymmetrical  power,  then  true  deliberation  has  to  be  contentious. 
 In  this  chapter  I  will  trace  how  Coastal  Sámi  salmon  fishers  in  Deanuvuotna  have  
empowered  themselves,  striving  to  participate  on  equal  terms  with  some  competing  interest  groups.  
For  this  purpose  they  have  combined  political  entrepreneurship  along  two  different  tracks:  
corporatist  channels  and  political  representation  have  been  utilized  for  political  participation,  while  
liberal  freedoms  and  public  protests  have  been  utilized  for  political  resistance.  This  chapter  is  a  
political  sociology  about  the  dynamics  of  contention,  which  are  constrained  by  systematically  
unequal  opportunities.  The  political  sociology  of  unequal  opportunities  actualizes  the  issues  of  
“structural  violence”  and  of  “inclusion”  versus  “resistance”. 
 
 
10.2.2  Inclusion  or  resistance? 
Various  political  entrepreneurs  may  pursue  different  paths  to  constituent  power.  The  association  for  
sea  salmon  fishers  in  Deatnu  has  chosen  to  reject  dialogue  on  unequal  terms.  They  use  the  freedom  
of  speech  and  the  freedom  of  assembly  to  shape  popular  public  opinion.  The  Norwegian  Sámi  
Parliament  has  chosen  loyalty  to  the  already  constituted  procedures.  They  use  ritualized  channels  of  
consultation  to  participate  in  the  policy  process.  The  options  are  structurally  similar  to  what  I  have  
discussed  regarding  the  institutionalization  of  environmentalist  and  indigenous  politics  in  Norway  
and  Finland  (in  Chapter  8).  According  to  John  Dryzek  and  Anne  Bregnballe,  there  is  an  excess  of  
political  inclusion  in  the  Nordic  states,  actually  leading  to  dis-empowerment  of  the  less  resourceful  
participants.876  Similarly,  Chantal  Mouffe  has  argued,  that  in  some  situations,  conflictual  political  
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resistance  may  be  more  democratic  than  harmonic  inclusion.877  Both  paths  are  included  in  
contemporary  theories  of  democracy.  Donatella  della  Porta  draws  a  distinction  between  “limited  
participatory  democracy”  on  the  one  hand,  and  “deliberative  participatory  democracy”  on  the  
other.878  Limited  participation  is  channeled  through  codified  routines,  through  state-affiliated  
organizations  such  as  the  Norwegian  Federation  of  Trade  Unions  (LO)  or  the  Norwegian  Sámi  
Parliament.  By  contrast,  deliberative  participation  utilizes  the  freedom  of  speech  and  the  freedom  of  
assembly  to  stage  public  protests  and  public  debates.  The  aim  is  to  form  public  opinion,  and  through  
that  to  form  political  choices.  Such  is  the  tension  between  political  inclusion  and  political  resistance  
under  contemporary  liberal  regimes.  However,  in  the  political  culture  of  the  Norwegian  political  
entity,  the  tension  between  inclusion  and  resistance  date  back  to  an  age  were  political  liberties  when  
scarcer.  Between  1927  and  1936,  the  Norwegian  Labor  Party  totally  changed  its  strategy.  Before  
that  period,  the  party  had  been  internationalist  and  revolutionary,  in  affiliation  with  the  IWW  in  the  
West  and  the  Worker's  Opposition  in  the  East.879  After  that  period,  however,  it  embraced  
corporatism,  through  two  large  national  compromises,  first  with  the  federation  of  industrialists,  and  
then  with  the  agrarian  party.880  As  I  know  the  Norwegian  National  Federation  of  Trade  Unions  (LO)  
today,  there  still  is  a  persistent  tension  between  corporatist  inclusion  and  syndicalist  resistance.  I  
think  this  is  a  relevant  context  in  which  to  interpret  the  rejectionist  strategy  suggested  by  the  
association  of  sea  salmon  fishers  in  Deatnu.  In  this  chapter,  I  will  describe  how  fishery  interest  
organizations  and  indigenous  rights  organizations  along  the  Barents  Coast  have  been  entangled  with  
labor  militancy  as  well  as  labor  party  discipline.  An  interesting  example  is  a  petition  sent  in  1988  
from  Samenes  Landsforbund  (SLF)  to  Prime  Minister  Gro  Harlem  Brundtland: 
 
Salmon  fisheries  have  been  one  of  the  most  important  bearers  of  Sámi  culture  throughout  centuries.  
This  is  the  case  for  Sámi  along  the  coast,  in  the  fjords,  and  along  the  rivers.  SLF  wishes  to  remind  that  
many  of  them  have  had  to  tolerate  strict  limitations  in  the  salmon  fisheries.  Thus,  it  is  totally  
unacceptable  that  drift  net  fishermen,  who  mainly  are  large  capitalists,  shall  violate  ancient  Sámi  rights.  
[my  emphasis]881 
 
In  this  argument,  the  issue  of  capitalist  exploitation  is  entangled  with  the  issue  of  indigenous  rights.  
The  argument  indicates  an  intersectionality  of  two  subaltern  positions,  namely:  subordinate  class  
belonging  and  marginalized  ethnic  belonging.  These  are  people  who  have  experienced  double  
discrimination,  both  under  corporate  capitalism,  and  under  official  nationalism.  In  Deanuvuotna,  the  
                                                 
877  Mouffe  2005: 
878  Della  Porta  2011:16-7 
879  Furre  1996:  69-76,  127-8 
880  Furre  1996:  129-139 
881  Letter  from  Samenes  Landsforbund  to  the  Prime  Minister,  1.9.1988,  cited  in  Länsmann  2012:80 
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struggles  for  indigenous  rights  and  against  corporate  capitalism  go  together.  The  letter  cited  above  
was  a  contentious  action  aimed  at  influencing  the  policy  process  internally  in  the  Norwegian  Labor  
Party.  The  Prime  Minister  was  from  this  party,  and  as  described  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  chosen  
strategy  of  SLF  was  to  work  through  the  same  party.  Premier  Brundtland,  like  other  leaders  in  her  
party,  used  a  method  of  pragmatic  Realpolitik,  but  she  was  also  seen  as  a  visionary.  She  had  been  
the  leader  of  the  UN-appointed  World  Commission  of  Environment  and  Development,  the  report  of  
which  had  been  published  one  year  earlier.882  This  report,  which  discussed  the  concept  of  
“sustainable  development”,  should  therefore  be  seen  as  a  relevent  subtext  or  context  for  interpreting  
the  text  in  the  petition  from  SLF.  How  to  understand  sustainable  development  is  still  contested  
today,  between  the  Ministry  of  the  Environment  and  the  association  of  sea  salmon  fishers  in  Deatnu.  
Only  minor  changes  have  taken  place  since  this  letter  was  written.  Drift  net  fishing  has  been  strictly  
regulated,  but  other  forms  of  mobile  gear  used  by  large  vessels  still  constitute  a  threat  against  salt-
water  salmon  fisheries  in  Coastal  Sámi  areas. 
 The  choice  between  inclusion  and  resistance  is  found  in  the  context  of  the  labor  movement  
as  well  as  that  of  the  environmental  movement.  For  both  of  them,  rejection  or  resistance  may  be  a  
preferred  choice,  in  order  to  avoid  “false”  dialogue,  that  is,  dialogue  on  highly  unequal  terms.  Thus,  
rejection  and  resistance  is  one  of  the  tools  used  to  avoid  being  dominated,  while  one  builds  up  
resources  in  order  to  become  capable  of  meeting  the  opponent  on  more  equal  terms,  in  a  “truer”  
dialogue.  For  the  labor  movement,  this  is  a  strategy  of  labor  militancy,  even  class  struggle.  For  the  
environmental  movement,  it  is  a  strategy  to  empower  local  communities  and  niche  technologies  
against  technocratic  dominance.  Political  resistance  may  be  played  out  within  the  freedom  of  
assembly  and  the  freedom  of  speech.  In  other  cases  it  may  stretch  the  boundaries  of  already  
established  law,  such  as  with  civil  disobedience,  or  may  be  outside  the  realm  of  legal  actions,  as  
with  disruptive  actions,  material  sabotage,  or  in  some  cases,  even  violent  resistance.  With  either  
path,  the  aim  is  to  empower  one's  constituent  power. 
 The  strategies  suggested  by  Bjarne  Johansen  may  be  mis-interpreted  by  some  as  disruptive  
or  destructive.  On  the  one  hand  he  refuses  dialogue  when  the  sea  salmon  fishers  are  denied  the  same  
right  to  consultation  as  comparable  trades,  such  as  reindeer  husbandry.  On  the  other  hand,  he  argues  
that  the  politicians  base  their  decisions  on  numbers  that  lack  roots  in  reality.  Some  may  misinterpret  
this  as  sabotage  of  a  joint  effort  towards  more  just  rights  and  more  valid  data.  He  insists  that  the  
glass  is  half  empty  rather  than  half  full.  That  is  because  he  belongs  to  one  of  the  groups  that  suffer  
from  the  glass  being  half  empty,  and  do  not  profit  from  the  glass  being  half  full.  This  group  
experience  a  practical  reality  where  the  most  conventional  repertoires  of  action  have  proven  
                                                 
882  World  Commission  on  Environment  and  Development  1987 
 345  
 
impotent,  and  where  somewhat  more  drastic  tactics  are  necessary.  If  I  am  correct  in  my  analysis,  
namely  that  fisher-peasants  in  Coastal  Sámi  areas  have  been  marginalized  both  by  Norwegian  
nationalism  and  by  corporate  capitalism,  then  this  may  imply  that  their  structural  position  is  so  
unfavorable  that  political  entrepreneurship  depends  both  on  protection  from  a  big  political  party  and  




10.2.3  Structural  violence? 
Different  persons  may  enjoy  highly  unequal  life  chances,  even  in  spite  of  equal  liberal  rights.  The  
consequences  are  concrete.  The  poor  tend  to  have  a  higher  prevalence  of  illness  and  earlier  
mortality,  when  compared  to  the  rich.  Unequal  life  chances  are  a  fact  of  life,  and  a  reason  why  
collective  human  rights  were  created  as  an  addition  to  state  rights  and  individual  rights.  After  all,  
the  ICESCR  refers  not  only  to  cultural  rights,  but  to  social  and  economic  ones  as  well.  The  right  to  
indigenous  self-determination  is  not  only  the  right  to  speak  your  native  language,  and  to  keep  folk  
art  alive.  It  is  a  right  to  freedom  from  discrimination,  a  right  to  freedom  from  colonization.  This  is  
why  the  right  to  use  natural  resources  in  Sápmi  is  so  contentious.  Least  contentious  is  the  right  to  
maintain  Sámi  reindeer  nomadism.  This  is  profitable  for  the  GDP  of  the  states.  More  controversial  
is  the  right  to  harvest  berries  and  to  fish  in  mountain  lakes.  After  five  hundred  years  of  ethnic  and  
cultural  mixing,  it  is  impossible  to  define  a  clear  boundary  between  indigenous  persons  and  the  
prodigy  of  settlers,  and  many  settlers  were  anyway  other  subalterns  from  other  peripherial  areas.  
The  Sámi  Rights  Commission  interpreted  the  indigenous  right  to  freedom  from  racial  
discrimination  and  land  grabbing  as  meaning  that  everyone  who  lives  permanently  in  the  local  
community  should  have  the  right  to  use  the  local  natural  resources.  However,  the  most  controversial  
issue  is  the  right  to  harvest  the  rich  fish  resources  along  the  Barents  Coast.  The  sole  reason  is  not  
that  the  coastal  areas  are  ethnically  and  culturally  mixed.  That  is  the  case  for  many  areas  in  Sápmi.  
What  is  more  unique  for  the  Coastal  Sámi  areas  is  that  if  the  local  fisher-peasants  are  the  primary  
right  holders  to  use  local  fish  stocks  in  their  local  waters,  then  this  will  pose  a  challenge  to  strong  
vested  interests.  The  governments  of  Norway  and  Russia  manage  their  coastal  waters  as  national  
commons,  not  regional  commons.  Thus,  the  state  builders  have  made  laws  that  allow  them  to  use  
coercive  force  to  ensure  the  fishing  rights  of  larger  vessels  owned  by  investors  located  at  more  
central  places  in  the  polities.  The  struggle  for  indigenous  rights  in  Coastal  Sámi  areas  challenges  the  
Norwegian  and  Russian  fishery  capitalists  that  rule  the  Barents  Coast.  Because  strong  capital  
interests  are  at  stake,  the  socio-economic  dimension  of  the  ICESCR  becomes  more  immediately  
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visible  along  the  Sámi  Coast  than  in  Inner  Sápmi.883 
 Socio-economic  inequality  is  one  of  the  issues  that  sociologists  can  research  with  relatively  
“hard”  scientific  methods.  Raymond  Boudon  and  Pierre  Bourdieu  were  amongst  those  who  shaped  
a  paradigm  of  quantitative  research  on  a  form  of  social  heritage:  how  class  positions  are  socially  
reproduced  from  one  generation  to  the  next.  This  paradigm  is  rather  strong  in  Norwegian  
sociology.884  Stein  Rokkan  and  Ottar  Brox  were  amongst  those  who  inquired  about  the  geographical  
dimension  of  social  inequality.  Still,  they  never  addressed  Sápmi  as  a  trans-boundary  region,  even  if  
this  came  in  focus  in  1970,  when  Per  Otnes  published  his  (in)famous  book  The  Sámi  Nation.  This  
was  part  of  a  wave  of  literature  on  “internal  colonialism”  within  Western  Europe.885  One  generation  
later,  Otnes  looked  back  at  the  reception  of  his  book.  After  the  reports  from  the  Norwegian  Sámi  
Rights  Commission,  his  book  did  not  look  as  scandalous  as  before.  Therefore,  he  concluded,  the  
book  had  stirred  controversy  because  it  disclosed  actual  structural  violence.  This  term  is  borrowed  
from  Bourdieu's  research  on  social  reproduction.  The  metaphor  refers  to  the  systematically  unequal  
opportunities  experienced  by  children  of  different  socio-economic  classes.  When  zooming  in  on  
how  school  syllabi  contribute  to  reproduction  of  social  inequality,  Bourdieu  and  Passeron  talk  about  
symbolic  violence.  For  more  than  a  century,  the  national  school  system  was  an  instrument  of  forced  
cultural  assimilation  of  the  Sámi,  especially  in  coastal  areas.886  Symbolic  violence  is  the  cognitive  
dimension  of  structural  violence.  Some  might  consider  the  metaphor  “violence”  to  be  misleading,  
especially  because  social  reproduction  is  being  executed  by  everyone,  including  by  persons  with  the  
best  intentions.  Whether  the  metaphor  is  exaggerated  or  not,  it  nevertheless  refers  to  the  (corpo)real  
suffering  of  real  human  beings,  and  appears  to  be  the  aggregate  product  of  mundane  everyday  
routines.  One  typical  example  of  such  a  phenomenon  is  the  uneven  development  of  rights  and  
proofs  in  Coastal  Sámi  areas.  Within  this  process,  the  cognitive  dimension  is  the  struggle  for  proof.  
If  valid  proofs  are  being  neglected,  or  if  relevant  research  questions  remain  under-researched,  then  
it  may  not  be  incorrect  to  characterize  the  consequences  as  symbolic  violence. 
 Two  competing  descriptions  of  the  same  reality  stand  against  each  other  in  the  struggle  for  
rights  and  proofs  in  Deanuvuotna  and  neighbouring  fjords.  On  one  side  are  those  who  claim  that  the  
states  are  correct  to  treat  the  coastal  fish  resources  as  the  national  commons  of  Norway,  with  the  
                                                 
883  The  UN  Human  Rights  Council  considers  breaches  of  the  ICCPR,  whereas  the  ICESCR  lacks  strong  implementation  
(see  part  2.1.1,  in  particular  the  footnote  regaring  the  decolonisation  of  human  rights  law).  Freedom  from  socio-
economic  discrimination  is  a  human  right  according  to  the  ICESCR.  Freedom  from  socio-cultural  discrimination  is  
also  a  human  right,  not  only  according  to  the  ICESCR,  but  also  according  to  the  ICCPR  §27.  However,  there  is  
some  presedence  fot  the  UN  Human  Rights  Council  to  define  the  indigenous  right  to  freedom  from  socio-cultural  
discrimination  (according  to  ICCPR  §27)  as  including  the  right  to  traditional  livelihood  (Scheinin  2000,  2004).  This  
practice,  however,  does  not  consider  any  human  right  to  freedom  from  forced  socio-economic  underdevelopment.   
884  Marianne  Nordli-Hansen  is  an  eminent  example  of  this  paradigm  in  Norwegian  sociology 
885  Otnes  1970:  218;;  Lafont,  1967;;  Homme  1969 
886  Minde  2005a 
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restrictions  demanded  by  NASCO.  On  the  other  side  are  those  who  claim  that,  according  to  
international  law,  the  local  fish  should  in  fact  be  a  regional  commons  for  the  local  people  in  Sápmi,  
also  with  the  restrictions  demanded  by  NASCO.  The  Norwegian  Ministry  of  Fisheries  has  given  
two  contradictory  reports  on  the  issue.  In  2005,  the  Ministry  followed  the  lawyer  Peter  Ørebech,  in  
stating  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  Sea  Sámi  culture,  because  Sámi  fishermen  use  the  same  
industrially  produced  tools  as  other  fishermen  do.887  Two  years  later,  in  2008,  the  ministry  took  the  
opposite  stance,  with  a  report  about  Sámi  and  local  fishery  rights  along  the  Finnmark  Coast.  Here,  it  
was  stated  that  Sámi  culture  has  continued  to  develop  throughout  the  modern  day,  adapting  the  
same  tools  as  the  surrounding  culture,  but  adopting  them  to  practices  with  specific  forms  of  
language,  lore  and  norms888.  Those  two  reports  provide  contradictory  interpretations  of  the  proof,  
and  lead  to  contradictory  interpretations  of  rights.  The  2005  version  implies  that  the  historical  
assimilation  policies  were  so  effective  that  there  are  no  longer  any  indigenous  people  along  the  
Barents  Coast.  Consequently,  the  ICCPR  §1  and  ICESCR  §1  would  simply  imply  state  sovereignty  
in  fjords  such  as  Deanuvuotna.  By  contrast,  the  2008  report  implies  that  in  Coastal  Sápmi,  as  in  
Inner  Sápmi,  longstanding  customary  praxes  and  knowledge  praxes  were  continuously  maintained  
and  developed  regardless  of  whether  these  were  codified,  criminalized  or  ignored  by  the  state.  
Consequently,  the  implication  of  this  report  is  that  the  ICCPR  §1  and  ICESCR  §1  would  demand  
both  indigenous  self-determination  and  state  sovereignty  in  fjords  such  as  Deanuvuotna.  Thus,  there  
are  competing  interpretations  of  international  norms  that  regulate  the  sustainable  use  of  salmon  
resources  in  Deanuvuotna.  Both  sides  of  the  conflict  have  a  shared  interest  in  a  sustainable  salmon  
stock,  and  thus,  they  adhere  to  the  collective  management  of  North  Atlantic  salmon  as  a  global  
common,  through  NASCO.  However,  how  should  the  different  forms  of  fishery  share  the  burden  of  
regulation?  That  is  the  conflict.  Industrial  fisheries  justify  their  stance  with  the  2005  report,  
according  to  which  the  human  right  to  popular  self-determination  is  interpreted  nationalistically.  
Locally  based  small-scale  fisheries,  by  contrast,  justify  their  stance  with  the  2008  report.  This  
implies  that  the  human  right  to  popular  self-determination  is  interpreted  in  postcolonial  terms,  as  an  
obligation  for  states  to  heal  the  harm  they  have  done  through  nationalist  and  colonialist  resource  
grabbing. 
 Those  two  competing  versions  of  the  truth  are  accepted  by  different  clusters  of  social  actors.  
The  2005  report,  which  denied  the  relevance  of  indigenous  human  rights,  has  informed  the  official  
stand  point  of  the  Norwegian  parliament  and  government.  The  2008  report,  by  contrast,  which  
demands  implementation  of  indigenous  human  rights,  is  the  one  accepted  among  experts  in  cultural  
and  social  sciences.  If  the  social  scientists  are  right  that  the  pro-Sámi  2008  report  is  correct,  then  the  
                                                 
887  Norwegian  Ministry  of  Fishery  2005:  10,  chpt  3.2,  cited  in  Eyþórsson  2008:  209 
888  Norwegian  Ministry  of  Fishery  2008:  5 
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Norwegian  political  establishment  is  wrong,  and  that  would  also  constitute  an  economic  threat  to  
the  Norwegian  fishery  capitalists.  This  also  means  that  if,  in  fact,  the  pro-indigenous  report  is  
correct,  then  the  policy  process  so  far  may  not  have  been  determined  by  the  power  of  the  better  
argument.  In  this  chapter,  I  will  trace  the  policy  process  in  which  the  two  reports  were  involved.  In  
the  following  chapter,  I  will  provide  some  evidence  in  support  of  the  pro-Sámi  2008  report.  Thus,  at  
the  end  of  the  following  chapter,  I  will  conclude  that  the  policy  process  so  far  has  indeed  not  been  
determined  by  the  power  of  the  better  argument,  but  rather  by  a  mechanism  that  I  call  “arguments  




10.3.0  State  transformation  in  practice  in  one  fjord  area 
 
10.3.1  On  the  track  to  human  rights  in  Coastal  Sápmi? 
What  does  some  of  the  sociological  evidence  tell  us  about  participation,  resistance  and  structural  
violence  in  downstream  Deatnu?  During  my  fieldwork  I  gathered  thematically  relevant  samples  of  
information.   
Now,  I  will  take  the  reader  with  me,  back  to  some  relevant  sites  in  the  field.  These  are  
particular  “nodes  of  power”  in  the  local  environment.  They  are  material  sites  where  several  praxis  
nets  run  together  into  shared  pools  of  praxes,  and  from  which  further  praxis  nets  emanate.  Such  are  
local  nodes  where  social  power  is  being  generated  and  maintained.   
First,  we  will  visit  the  district  court  house,  situated  along  the  downstream  Deatnu  River.  
Then  we  will  proceed  to  the  local  community  house  in  Deanudat,  a  fjord  arm  of  the  Deanuvuotna  
Fjord.  Finally,  we  will  visit  a  local  public  debate  in  the  pages  of  a  regional  newspaper,  Finnmarken.  
The  latter  is  actually  produced  in  Kirkenes,  a  town  in  the  proximity  of  the  Deatnu  River,  but  what  
interests  me  here  is  how  local  people  in  downstream  Deatnu  use  this  newspaper  as  a  medium  of  
public  deliberation.  This  networked  approach  to  local  and  multilevel  politics  could  be  theorized  as  
“networks  of  adjacent  action  situations”,  or  as  “actor-networks”,  in  terms  of  SES  or  ANT,  
respectively.  Those  nodes  of  power  are  meeting  places  between  already  constituted  policy  networks,  
already  constituted  kinship  networks,  and  potentially  constituent  issue  networks.  Thus,  we  will  get  
on  the  track  of  some  particular  paths  of  participation  and  resistance. 
 As  in  the  previous  sociological  chapter  (Chapter  7),  the  present  chapter  also  makes  use  of  a  
historical-sociological  approach.  However,  unlike  the  previous  sociological  chapter,  the  present  one  
does  not  build  on  data  from  any  historical  chapter.  Instead,  I  will  introduce  to  the  reader  some  
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selected  historical  glimpses,  starting  with  traces  of  the  past  that  are  found  at  the  selected  nodes  of  
power.  From  the  district  court  house,  I  will  trace  back  to  the  Coastal  Sámi  Awakening,  which  
emerged  towards  the  end  of  the  more  spectacular  Alta-dam  struggle.  From  the  local  community  
house  in  Deanudat,  we  will  follow  traces  left  behind  after  a  policy  process  led  by  the  Coastal  
Fisheries  Commission,  which  failed  to  make  the  state  recognize  Coastal  Sámi  rights.  With  the  
newspaper  debates  in  Finnmarken  I  will  use  selected  samples  to  show  where  the  contention  stood  in  
the  recent  past,  2011.  When  I  choose  to  provide  historical  background  in  the  form  of  flash-backs  the  
reason  is  not  (only)  stylistic.  The  purpose  is  (also)  to  expose  the  reader  to  how  contemporary  
knowledge  about  the  past  is  embedded  in  contemporary  practice  and  needs.  All  history  is  
“contemporary  history”,  as  Benedetto  Croce  famously  put  it.889  The  three  historical  fragments  I  
have  chosen  trace  some  of  the  causal  chains  from  the  beginning  of  the  Coastal  Sámi  awakening  
until  the  contemporary  indigenous  human  rights  struggle  in  Coastal  Sápmi.  Thus,  I  will  zoom  in  on  
a  particular  part  of  the  history,  which  was  slightly  ignored  in  the  earlier  historical  chapters  
(Chapters  6-8). 
 The  selected  historical  samples  are  contextualized  by  the  selected  samples  of  contemporary  
nodes  of  local  social  power.  However,  at  the  same  time,  the  selected  nodes  of  power  are  partially  
explained  by  the  selected  historical  samples.  Together  they  provide  a  socio-materially  situated  
entrance  to  the  ongoing  indigenous  human  rights  struggle  in  Coastal  Sápmi. 
 
 
10.3.2  One  regional  node  of  empowerment:  the  district  court  house 
The  district  court  house  in  Tana  Bru  was  the  starting  point  and  entry  point  for  my  political  
fieldwork.  This  is  the  site  where  I  started  to  learn  about  the  contemporary  situation  of  the  
indigenous  human  rights  struggle  in  Deanuvuotna,  the  Deatnu  water  area,  and  Sápmi.  The  
courthouse  was  also  the  site  where  I  began  to  learn  about  the  collective  memories  about  past  
struggles,  and  this  is  where  I  gained  access  to  information  that  helped  me  to  learn  more  about  the  
contemporary  effort  to  shape  the  future  course  of  that  struggle. 
                                                 
889  For  a  comment,  see  Carr  1987  (1961):  20-21.  The  original  statement  is:  “Il  bisogno  pratico,  che  è  nel  fondo  di  ogni  
giudizio  storico,  conferisce  a  ogni  storia  il  carattere  di  "storia  contemporanea",  perché,  per  remoti  e  remotissimi  che  
sembrino  cronologicamente  i  fatti  che  vi  entrano,  essa  è,  in  realtà,  storia  sempre  riferita  al  bisogno  e  alla  situazione  
presente,  nella  quale  quei  fatti  propagano  le  loro  vibrazioni.”  (Croce  1938)  Cited  in:  
http://it.wikiquote.org/wiki/Benedetto_Croce  last  accessed  16.  May  2014. 
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Figure  10-1:  The  District  Court  House  –  one  local  node  of  power 
Left:  Inner  Finnmark  District  Court,  at  the  municipal  centre  Tana  Bru,  September  2010. 
Right:  Cover  of  “Sjølaksefisket  i  Finnmark”,  report  to  the  Finnmark  Commission,  June  2010. 
 
  “Diggegoddi”.  During  my  fieldwork,  I  was  thrown  directly  into  turbulent  political  waters,  
and  had  to  learn  to  swim.  My  first  introduction  to  Deanudat  and  fjord  salmon  fishing  happened  
outside  the  Deatnu  Fjord.  Along  the  lower  parts  of  the  Deatnu  River  there  is  a  special  courthouse,  
or  "diggegoddi"  in  North  Sámi.  I  had  been  there  before,  to  be  trained  in  conflict  mediation  by  
indigenous  people  from  the  Yukon  River.  Therefore  I  went  here  when  my  fieldwork  started  in  
September  2010.  Chief  judge  Schanche  Selfors  welcomed  me  back.  I  was  at  the  seat  of  Inner  
Finnmark  District  Court.  It  has  a  special  mandate:  to  judge  in  local  cases  by  considering  both  
Norwegian  state  law  and  local  Sámi  custom.  That  might  be  a  tricky  task.  There  is  often  a  rather  
unclear  relationship  between  those  two  sets  of  norms.  In  the  “diggegoddi”,  I  also  met  another  judge  
from  another  court.  Anne-Marit  Pedersen  works  for  the  Finnmark  Commission.  Their  secretariat  is  
at  the  “diggegoddi”,  and  therefore  Pedersen  was  here.  She  agreed  to  meet  for  a  long  interview.  She  
told  me  about  the  mandate  of  the  Finnmark  Commission.  It  is  supposed  to  clarify  the  relationship  
between  Norwegian  state  law  and  local  Sámi  customs  in  the  area.  It  had  been  created  to  work  with  
land  and  water  issues  on  the  inland  of  Finnmark  County.  However,  more  recently,  it  had  also  been  
given  the  task  of  clarifying  rights  to  use  salt  waters  in  fjord  and  coastal  areas  along  the  County.  
Three  months  earlier,  they  had  finalized  a  report  regarding  traditional  salmon  fishing  in  these  
waters. 
 Juridical  pluralism:  The  Finnmark  Commission  is  a  special  court  that  was  constituted  in  
order  to  investigate  every  single  claim  regarding  the  right  to  land  and  water  within  Finnmark  
County.  Many  local  people  claim  that  they  own  the  right  to  use  specific  natural  resources,  by  
reference  to  longstanding  customs.  Some  claim  that  local  customs  have  been  continuously  
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maintained  since  the  age  of  the  siida-system,  regardless  of  whether  these  were  codified,  
criminalised  or  ignored  by  state  law.890  After  international  law  has  recognised  the  right  of  
indigenous  peoples  to  be  free  from  racial  discrimination  and  resource  grabbing,  and  after  the  state  
legislators  have  recognized  these  international  norms,  there  is  an  ongoing  effort  within  state  
legislation  to  legalise  some  longstanding  local  customs,  which  previously  were  subject  to  
(theoretical)  criminalisation  by  state  legislators.891  After  the  state  ratified  the  relevant  international  
laws,  its  judiciary  and  legislative  powers  faced  a  paradox:  The  state  now  recognized  that  the  state  
had  unlawfully  outlawed  local  customary  laws!  It  had  a  lot  to  clarify.  Exactly  what  local  customs  
had  become  decriminalized?  What  practices  should  still  constitute  a  crime,  according  to  one  or  both  
sets  of  norms?  Such  questions  are  to  be  considered  by  the  Finnmark  Commission.  This  court  has  a  
large  degree  of  autonomy,  and  commissions  its  own  reports.  However,  in  cases  of  controversy,  the  
judge  told  me,  their  decisions  might  be  appealed  to  the  Norwegian  Supreme  Court.  However,  the  
present  situation  of  legal  pluralism  also  include  complex  regional  and  global  human  rights  regimes,  
where  the  citizens  enjoy  the  right  to  draft  complains  before  the  UN  Human  Rights  Council  and  the  
European  Court  of  Human  Rights.892  Jurisdictional  authority  has  become  complex,  after  the  state  
has  ratified  international  laws,  and  thus  accepted  legal  pluralism. 
 Who  is  in  charge  of  those  fish?  When  judge  Pedersen  gave  me  the  report  on  sea  salmon  
fisheries  in  September  2010,  it  had  been  delivered  to  the  Finnmark  Commission  only  three  months  
earlier,  in  June.  Experts  in  various  fields  had  contributed:  biology,  law,  history,  sociology  and  
anthropology.  One  chapter  dealt  with  the  political  sociology  of  political  mobilization  amongst  
traditional  salmon  fishermen  in  the  fjords.  (Here  I  found  the  citation  from  the  petition  from  SLA  to  
premier  Brundtland,  which  was  cited  above.)  The  chapter  traced  the  mobilization  until  three  months  
before  the  report  had  been  delivered.  In  April  2010,  the  UN  special  rapporteur  had  received  a  
declaration  from  the  coastal  Sámi  fishery  organization  Bivdi. 
 The  UN  special  rapporteur  for  indigenous  issues  had  met  with  local  indigenous  rights  
organizations  in  Rovaniemi,  a  city  in  the  Finnish  part  of  Sápmi.  Amongst  the  participants  were  the  
coastal  Sámi  fishery  organization  Bivdi.  The  name  "Bivdi"  is  a  North  Sámi  word  referring  to  
persons  engaged  in  hunting,  gathering  and  fishing.  Bivdi  declared:  “Detailed  decisions  regarding  
management  of  marine  resources  are  today  taken  centrally,  without  any  local  levels  having  
                                                 
890  Jebens  2010:  22 
891  The  actual  situation  of  legal  pluralism  has  resemblences  with  the  Latin  American  situation,  where  500  years  of  re-­
sistance  from  native  Americans  has  resulted  in  transformations  of  constitutional  law,  where  the  actual  social  legiti-­
macy  of  longstanding  customs  can  no  longer  be  simply  denyed  (Anaya  2004:  7;;  Neves  2013;;  Bailey  &  Mattei  2012;;  
Agnew  &  Oslender  2010,  2013,  thanks  to  Paul  Routledge  for  the  latter  reference).  See  also  part  2.2.2,  in  paticular  
the  long  footnote  on  how  to  define  "jurisdiction"  and  "sovereignty";;  and  part  4.3.6,  in  particular  Figure  4.2.   
892  For  more  background  information,  see  part  8.6.1,  in  particular  the  footnote  regarding  the  right  to  appeal.  For  a  more  
particular  argument  about  the  possibilities  for  Coastal  Sámi  interest  groups  to  make  complains  through  the  interna-­
tional  human  rights  regime,  see  part  10.3.8,  including  the  footnote  on  precedence.   
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decisional  power.  The  local  communities  have  been  put  on  the  side  also  regarding  their  own  
resource  management.”893    This  statement  is  strong  when  uttered  in  the  context  of  international  
norms  on  indigenous  rights.  The  UN  and  ILO  conventions  on  indigenous  rights  suggest  that  in  
indigenous  homelands,  local  people  should  be  in  control  of  the  natural  resources,  because  those  
resources  are  integral  to  their  traditional  livelihood  and  culture.  Therefore,  arguments  about  
indigenous  rights  not  only  deal  with  jurisprudence  and  legal  history,  but  equally  with  cultural  and  
economic  anthropology.  An  anthropologist  had  written  the  final  chapter  of  the  report.894  She  had  
conducted  fieldwork  in  the  Deatnu  valley  before  me.  She  emphasized  that,  in  order  to  investigate  
the  cultural  significance  of  fjord  salmon  fisheries,  surveys  and  interviews  were  not  enough.  
Participant  observation  was  necessary. 
 In  the  summary,  she  observed  that  salmon  fishing  in  the  fjords  endures  in  spite  of  strict  
regulations,  and  that  salmon  fisheries  serve  several  functions  for  the  community:  it  is  of  central  
importance  to  maintain  traditional  knowledge  about  nature;;  it  is  a  key  asset  in  the  maintenance  of  
gift  economy,  and  finally;;  it  is  a  source  of  income,  thereby  contributing  to  the  fjord  fishermen’s  
combination  of  different  livelihoods,  which  secures  flexibility  and  adaptability.895  In  sum,  she  stated  
that  salmon  fishery  has  special  functions  for  the  local  community  in  terms  of  cultural  and  economic  
anthropology,  and  that  therefore,  it  contributes  significantly  to  the  maintenance  of  the  coastal  Sámi  
form  of  life,  which  in  itself  is  a  contribution  to  bio-cultural  diversity  and  sustainability.896  My  
impression  is  that  the  rights  of  traditional  salt  water  salmon  fisheries  had  gained  an  additional  
significance  as  a  symbolic  issue  for  the  indigenous  rights  struggle  in  Coastal  Sámi  areas.  This  
symbolic  meaning  had  not  been  chosen  arbitrarily,  or  out  of  convention.  On  the  contrary,  salt  water  
salmon  fishing  appears  to  be  one  of  the  livelihood  adaptations  that  have  special  cultural  significance  
for  the  continuous  maintenance  and  development  of  the  Sámi  socio-ecological  organisation.  The  
symbolic  status  of  “sea  salmon  fishing”  reflects  the  fact  that  it  this  fishery  is  among  those  cultural  
praxes  that  have  a  key  function  for  the  maintenance  of  the  Coastal  Sámi  form  of  life.  This  is  not  to  
say  that  the  salmon  is  the  most  financially  significant  catch  for  Coastal  Sámi  fishery  households,  
but  that  it  is  among  the  most  socio-economically  and  socio-culturally  significant  catches  for  Coastal  
Sámi  communities.  If  this  analysis  is  correct,  and  if  it  really  is  correct  to  regard  the  coastal  Sámi  
people  as  an  indigenous  people,  then  the  mentioned  UN  and  ILO  norms  are  relevant  to  the  question:  
Who  is  in  charge  of  those  fish?  Answer:  The  local  population  is.  The  right  to  harvest  from  local  fish  
stocks  along  the  Barents  Coast  has  been  a  controversial  topic  since  the  industrialization  of  fisheries.  
However,  it  is  only  after  the  Coastal  Sámi  Rebellion  that  this  conflict  has  become  defined  as  an  
                                                 
893  Minutes  from  from  "Sjølaksemøte  i  Lakselv",  31.10.2009,  cited  in  Länsmann  2010 
894  Ween  2010 
895  Finnmark  Commission  2010:  10 
896  Ween  2010 
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10.3.3  Memories  of  the  Coastal  Sámi  Rebellion 
At  the  district  court  house,  I  was  introduced  to  a  collective  memory  about  the  genealogy  of  the  
indigenous  human  rights  struggle  in  Coastal  Sápmi.  Some  documented  historical  proof  was  
presented  in  the  report  from  the  Finnmark  Commission  regarding  the  regulation  of  salmon  fisheries.  
In  this  report,  the  sociologist  Trine  Länsmann  has  traced  how  local  fishermen  organized  themselves  
in  response  to  regulations  they  perceived  as  unfair.  This  may  be  a  relevant  entrance  to  the  Coastal  
Sámi  Rebellion,  and  thus,  to  the  dynamics  of  contention  in  this  coastal  Sámi  environment.  Let  us  
start  with  a  document  that  Länsmann  found  in  the  archive  at  the  Deatnu  office  of  the  Norwegian  
Labor  Party.  In  Deatnu,  in  1988,  the  local  contingent  of  the  Norwegian  Labor  Party  declared  that  it  
was  unfit  for  a  Labor  Party  government  to  take  away  resources  from  the  local  people  and  give  them  
to  others.897  The  contentious  issue  was  about  salmon  fisheries  in  salt  water.  There  was  a  peculiar  
political  bias  in  the  government's  protection  of  wild  salmon.  Drift  net  fishing  by  larger  vessels  from  
southern  Norway  had  escaped  regulation,  while  the  locally  based  small-scale  salmon  fishing  was  
governed  by  strict  regulations.  The  political  struggle  was  being  played  out  within  the  Labor  Party.  A  
Coastal  Sámi  “rebellion”  was  spreading  from  fjord  to  fjord.  The  wave  had  started  four  years  earlier,  
in  the  neighbouring  Porsanger  fjord,  west  of  Deatnu  fjord,  and  east  of  Alta  fjord.  In  1984,  some  
fishermen  in  Porsanger  had  sent  a  petition  to  the  Ministry  of  the  Environment.  They  had  pointed  out  
that  the  Ministry  of  the  Environment  imposed  restrictions  on  the  small-scale  gill  net  fishing  of  local  
fjord  fishermen,  while  accepting  that  larger  vessels  from  Southern  Norway  use  drift  nets  in  the  same  
fjords,  catching  much  young  salmon.898  The  issue  had  emerged  in  the  shadow  of  the  publicly  better-
known  Alta-dam  struggle.  That  struggle  had  put  Sámi  ethnicity  on  the  public  agenda.  However,  in  
1973,  when  the  Sámi  association  NSR  (Norske  Samers  Riksforbund)  supported  public  civil  
disobedience,  many  coastal  Sámi  found  it  unacceptable.  Some  of  those  coastal  Sámi  founded  SLF  
(Samenes  Landsforbund)  as  an  alternative  Sámi  association,  loyal  to  the  Norwegian  Labor  Party.899  
However,  SLF  had  immediately  become  involved  in  the  less  spectacular  struggle  against  drift  net  
fishing  in  Porsanger  fjord.  When  the  fishermen  in  Porsanger  had  sent  their  petition  in  1984,  they  
had  been  organized  as  a  local  contingent  of  SLF.  When  fishermen  in  Porsanger  had  mobilized  
through  SLF,  it  had  provoked  their  suspension  from  the  Association  of  Norwegian  Fishermen  
                                                 
897  Tana  arbeiderpartis  møtebok,  16.2.1988,  cited  in  Länsmann  2012:80 
898  Porsanger  SLF  archive,  issue  24/83,  cited  in  Länsmann  2012:79 
899  Eyþórsson  2008:173 
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(Fiskarlaget).  The  association  declared  that  it  was  unacceptable  that  Coastal  Sámi  organizations  got  
involved  in  fishery  management.  This  national  fishery  organization  had  gradually  come  under  the  
control  of  new  capital-intensive  fisheries,  and  their  interests  differed  from  those  of  small-scale  
coastal  and  fjord  fishermen.  A  competing  interest  organization  was  created  in  1987,  the  Association  
of  Coastal  Fishermen  (Kystfiskarlaget),  which  organized  small-scale  fisheries  operating  locally  in  
their  home  fjords.900  The  new  organizations,  SLF  and  the  Association  of  Coastal  Fishermen,  were  
capable  of  constituting  a  bloc  of  counter-power.  From  1987  until  1989,  the  government  vacillated,  
but  eventually  ended  up  regulating  the  drift  net  fishing  in  the  fjords.  The  policy  process  was  then  at  
a  critical  stage.  In  1988,  the  same  year  as  the  Deatnu  contingent  of  the  Norwegian  Labor  Party  took  
a  stance  against  the  Labor  Party  Government,  Prime  Minister  Brundtland  also  received  a  petition  
from  the  central  committee  of  SLF.901  An  excerpt  from  the  letter  was  cited  above.  In  1989  the  
government  started  to  regulate  drift  net  fishing.  However,  even  today,  small-scale  fishermen  accuse  
larger  vessels  from  outside  of  over-exploiting  the  salmon  stock  with  their  mobile  fishing  gear.902 
 The  report  from  the  Finnmark  Commission  had  a  specific  mandate.  It  mainly  dealt  with  
legal  history,  and  the  documents  Länsmann  had  found  were  used  to  serve  that  purpose.  However,  
we  can  also  read  the  historical  texts  she  found  in  the  context  of  political  history.  I  have  mentioned  
the  Norwegian  Labor  Party  as  particularly  important  for  Coastal  Sámi  politics.  Thus,  the  history  of  
this  party  might  be  a  relevant  context  for  re-reading  the  archival  data  presented  by  Länsmann. 
The  drift  net  controversy  was  a  struggle  within  the  Norwegian  Labor  Party.  It  was  not  only  
about  SLF  and  indigenous  rights.  This  was  also  about  the  Association  of  Fjord  Fishermen,  and  an  
economic  conflict  involving  competing  forms  of  fishery.  Local  small-scale  fisheries  stood  against  
national  large-scale  fisheries.  There  was  the  centre  versus  the  periphery,  and  there  was  corporate  
fishery-industrialists  versus  self-employed  fishery-labourers.  Such  dimensions  have  been  
emphasized  by  social  scientists,  from  Stein  Rokkan  through  Ottar  Brox.  In  the  same  tradition  was  
The  History  of  Northern  Norway  written,  by  the  editor  of  regional  newspaper  Nordlys  (Northern  
Light),  which  is  close  to  the  Labor  Party.  In  this  book  we  meet  with  a  long  tradition  for  labor  
militancy  dating  back  to  the  early  1900s.903  The  Party  was  a  revolutionary  socialist  party  during  its  
radical  youth,  until  1936.  After  1945,  it  had  reached  its  maturity  as  a  national  catch-all  party.  During  
The  Second  World  War,  the  Labor  Party  government  and  the  king  had  been  exiled  in  London.  They  
had  come  closer  to  each  other,  to  the  Western  powers,  and  to  the  guerrilla  Milorg,  which  took  its  
orders  from  London.  However,  the  war  had  been  harsher  in  the  northernmost  region  of  the  nation-
state.  The  occupation  army  had  used  the  tactic  of  the  burned  soil,  and  the  partisans  of  the  area  been  
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901  Letter  from  Samenes  Landsforbund  to  the  Prime  Minister,  1.9.1988,  cited  in  Länsmann  2012:80 
902  Pedersen  2012:  53 
903  Jaklin  2004 
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coordinated  from  Murmansk.  The  communist  party  in  Finnmark  gained  strong  support  in  the  first  
parliamentary  election  after  the  occupation.  During  the  first  part  of  the  Cold  War,  the  population  of  
Finnmark  might  have  been  closer  to  Moscow  than  to  Washington.  While  class  peace  had  been  made  
in  the  central  areas  of  Southern  Norway,  labor  militancy  prevailed  in  the  Northern  periphery.  In  the  
post-war  era,  Labor  as  a  national  catchall  party  had  to  accommodate  Labor  as  a  radical  socialist  
party.   
Those  phases  have  left  an  ambiguous  heritage.  During  the  Coastal  Sámi  Rebellion,  the  
struggle  about  regulation  of  the  salmon  stock  was  a  fight  for  control  over  the  means  of  production.  
The  issues  about  gill  netting  and  drift  netting  were  the  technical  articulation  of  the  conflict,  but  the  
economic  interests  at  stake  were  labor  against  capital,  the  periphery  against  the  centre.  Gill  netting  
was  a  technique  used  by  local  self-employed  fishery-labourers,  while  drift  netting  was  the  tool  of  
national  fishery-industrialists.  When  this  conflict  was  channeled  through  the  Labor  Party,  Labor  as  a  
radical  socialist  party  stood  against  Labor  as  a  national  catchall  party. 
 The  Coastal  Sámi  Rebellion  was  a  process  where  the  struggle  for  control  of  coastal  fishery  
resources  became  defined  as  an  issue  of  cultural,  social  and  economic  human  rights.  The  conflict  
was  in  part  re-defined  from  class  struggle  to  indigenous  rights  struggle.  Class  consciousness  and  
indigenous  identity  are  rather  different  identity  markers,  but  the  change  from  the  one  to  the  other  is  
not  arbitrary,  because  both  are  intrinsically  associated  with  conflict  about  economic  interests.  
Indigenous  human  rights  are  not  principally  concerned  with  the  right  to  speak  an  unusual  language,  
represent,  first  and  foremost,  a  right  to  freedom  from  ethnic  discrimination  and  colonial  
exploitation.  The  ICESCR  is  an  attempt  to  heal  the  illiberal  bias  of  corporate  capitalism.  Trawler  
capitalism  in  the  Barents  Sea  is  the  adversary  of  the  struggle  for  sustainable  local  communities  in  




10.3.4  Another  regional  node  of  empowerment:  the  community  house 
Let  us  return  to  the  contemporary  time.  The  district  court  house  in  Tana  Bru  was  the  starting  point  
and  entry  point  for  my  political  fieldwork.  This  is  where  I  started  to  learn  about  the  legal  history  
that  put  me  on  the  track  of  the  genealogy  of  the  indigenous  rights  struggle  in  Coastal  Sápmi,  and  
this  is  the  story  that  I  have  just  told.  However,  the  courthouse  also  was  the  site  where  I  gained  
access  to  further  fieldwork  in  the  fjord  area.  To  gain  access  is  to  build  trust.  To  build  trust  is  to  
convince  others  that  one  will  do  no  harm.  When  observing  the  continuous  struggle  for  rights,  I  
provide  input  to  the  continuous  struggle  for  proofs.  All  political  sociology  becomes  sociological  
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intervention.  The  committed  human  rights  lawyers  know  the  potential  power  of  proof.  I  met  with  
them  in  their  own  homely  waters,  where  they  were  the  ones  who  knew  how  to  navigate.  Therefore,  I  
could  not  simply  interview  them,  without  at  the  same  time,  them  interviewing  me.  I  fished  for  
information  of  potential  relevance  to  my  research.  They  fished  for  reliable  research  of  potential  
relevance  to  the  human  rights  cause.  In  this  conversation,  potential  relevance  was  one  main  concern  
for  both  parties.  If  we  could  find  topics  of  shared  relevance,  then  we  would  also  have  a  joint  interest  
in  tighter  collaboration. 
 An  invitation  to  Deanudat:  In  the  conversation  with  Judge  Pedersen,  I  asked  questions  of  
relevance  to  European  Political  and  Social  Science.  The  judge  might  have  found  such  questions  
potentially  useful,  since  she  invited  me  to  visit  her  and  her  husband's  summerhouse  in  Deanudat.  
This  particular  fjord  arm  of  the  Deanuvuotna  Fjord  is  the  place  of  origin  of  her  father,  the  historian  
Steinar  Pedersen,  as  well  as  her  cousin  (his  niece),  the  politician  Helga  Pedersen.  Thus,  my  entry  
point  to  the  Deanudat  community  would  be  through  the  Pedersen  family,  who  tend  to  be  political  
entrepreneurs.  However,  when  eventually  I  arrived  there,  I  would  bond  just  as  much  with  the  Larsen  
family,  several  of  whom  are  small  business  entrepreneurs.  Both  forms  of  entrepreneurship  can  be  
seen  as  strategies  for  empowerment  of  the  local  community. 
 The  conversations  with  human  rights  judges  at  the  district  court  house  were  my  entry  point  
to  some  of  the  political  entrepreneurs  in  Deanuvuotna.  My  conversations  with  those  political  
entrepreneurs  would  be  my  entry  point  to  some  of  the  social  entrepreneurs  as  well.  As  an  approach  
to  data  selection,  this  may  be  called  “snowball  rolling”:  by  doing  one  relevant  interview,  I  gain  new  
information  and  contacts  that  enable  me  to  do  the  next  relevant  interview.  This  is  how  data  are  
accessed  to  begin  with,  and  because  the  process  is  selective,  it  gives  a  positioned  form  of  
knowledge.  In  short:  access  is  position  for  political  fieldwork.  When  presenting  findings  from  
political  fieldwork,  one  should  not  pretend  to  be  neutral,  but  in  addition  to  being  empirical  and  
neuanced,  one  should  also  observe  one’s  own  positionality.  When  one’s  positionality  is  made  
explicit,  then  it  is  a  way  to  control  for  bias  and  avoid  engaging  in  propaganda.  In  the  next  chapter,  I  
will  present  samples  of  participant  observation  from  Deanudat  and  two  other  fjord  arms  in  the  
Deanuvuotna  Fjord.  For  now,  however,  I  will  give  only  one  sample,  from  the  local  community  
house,  which  actualizes  the  conspicuous  absence  of  some  particular  reforms. 
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Figure  10-2:  The  community  house  –  another  node  of  power 
Left:  The  church  and  "grendehus"  in  Deanudat,  August  2011. 
Right:  Cover  of  the  report  from  the  Coastal  Fishery  Committee,  February  2008. 
 
“Grendehus”:  My  field  trip  brought  me  to  the  local  church  in  Deanudat,  which  also  serves  as  
"grendehus".  This  Norwegian  word  refers  to  a  house  where  a  small  countryside  community  gathers  
for  special  occasions.  I  met  nobody  there.  It  was  August  2011.  Big  celebration  had  taken  place  four  
and  a  half  year  earlier.  In  February  2008,  the  government-appointed  Coastal  Fishery  Commission  
had  presented  its  proposal.  But  by  my  visit,  the  celebration  had  ended  long  ago.  Here  was  little  
participant  observation  to  be  done.  My  visit  to  the  local  church  and  “grendehus”  was  more  of  a  
political  pilgrimage. 
 In  order  to  trace  the  policy  process,  I  must  use  written  sources.  Let  us  have  a  look  at  textual  
traces  from  the  storm  that  had  blown  through  along  the  coast  three  years  earlier. 
 
 
10.3.5  Memories  from  the  Coastal  Fisheries  Commission 
Journalists  from  Norwegian  and  Sámi  media  were  reporting  when  fisheries  minister  Helga  Pedersen  
returned  to  her  own  homeland  to  present  the  report  from  the  Committee.  According  to  the  state  
television  channel,  the  proposal  awoke  a  veritable  “storm”  along  the  coast.  In  the  end,  the  minister  
gave  in  for  the  storm.904  The  autumn  2009,  she  rejected  the  principal  suggestion  of  the  Committee  
that  she  herself  had  appointed,  but  her  government  suppoerted  some  of  its  minor  suggestions,  and  
proposed  those  for  the  national  Parliament.  During  obligatory  consultations,  the  Norwegian  Sámi  
Parliament  stated  that  it  supported  the  government's  proposals,  while  also  expressing  regret  that  the  
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principal  suggestion  of  the  Committee  had  been  rejected.905  The  storm  had  been  too  harsh.  What  
was  this  proposal  that  had  awoken  such  a  storm?  And  why?  Both  economic  interests  and  ethnic  
belonging  were  at  stake. 
 Policy  process:  When  the  Coastal  Fishing  Committee  presented  its  proposal  in  February  
2008,  this  had  become  possible  because  of  the  indigenous  rights  struggle.  Convention  number  169  
of  the  International  Labor  Organization  (ILO  169)  suggests  that  indigenous  peoples  and  tribes  
peoples  have  the  right  to  control  the  natural  resources  that  are  integral  to  their  traditional  
livelihoods.  The  Norwegian  state  ratified  the  convention  in  1990,  following  the  advice  of  the  Sámi  
Rights  Commission.  The  Norwegian  Sámi  Parliament  had  been  established  the  year  before.  In  2005,  
the  new  Glasnost  towards  the  indigenous  people  resulted  in  the  Finnmark  Act,  regarding  ownership  
of  land  and  water  on  the  mainland  of  the  northernmost  county.  The  so-called  state  lands  were  now  
to  be  managed  as  a  joint  venture  between  the  Norwegian  nation,  the  Sámi  people  and  the  local  
population.  The  new  “Finnmark  Estate”  was  to  organize  this,  and  the  three  different  interests  were  
to  be  represented  by  the  state  government,  the  Norwegian  Sámi  Parliament,  and  the  regional  
democratic  body  for  Finnmark  County  (Finnmark  fylkeskommune).  Additionally,  the  Finnmark  
Commission  was  created,  in  order  to  assess  all  species  of  longstanding  rights  within  the  territory  of  
the  Finnmark  Estate.906  This  institutional  arrangement  is  an  ongoing  experiment  in  how  the  ILO  169  
Convention  might  be  applied.  The  Coastal  Fisheries  Commission  was  a  continuation  of  the  same  
process,  as  it  dealt  with  the  salt  waters  along  the  Finnmark  coast.  The  Coastal  Fisheries  
Commission  worked  according  to  the  same  premises  as  the  Finnmark  Act.  The  commission  was  led  
by  Carsten  Smith,  the  same  supreme  judge  who  had  led  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission.  The  fishery  
controversies  along  the  western  part  of  the  Barents  Coast  were  now  channeled  through  the  policy  
process  for  indigenous  rights.  In  their  report,  the  Coastal  Fisheries  Commission  suggested  that  state  
law  should  recognize  that  the  local  people  of  Finnmark  County  enjoy  special  fishing  rights  along  
the  coastline,  and  also  that  there  exists  a  special  fjord  right  for  the  local  population.  Those  rights  
were  to  be  managed  by  a  proposed  governing  body  similar  to  the  Finnmark  Estate.  This  awoke  the  
storm. 
 Political  storm:  The  reformists  had  pushed  Norwegian  Glasnost  to  its  limits.  A  significant  
reason  may  be  that  large  economic  interests  were  at  stake.  The  Committee  had  suggested  that  
fishing  along  the  Finnmark  Coast  was  a  right  for  the  local  people,  that  this  right  was  grounded  in  
longstanding  customs  and  in  international  treaties  that  the  state  had  ratified,  and  therefore,  that  state  
                                                 
905  Norwegian  Sámi  parliament,  plenary  case  SP  27/2011,  cited  in  Pedersen  2012:59 
906  For  more  on  the  politial  process  that  brought  about  the  Finnmark  Commission  and  the  Outfeld  Court,  see  part  8.6.1,  
which  includes  a  footnote  on  the  right  to  appeal,  and  part  9.2.3.  For  further  arguments  about  the  opportunities  for  
Coastal  Sámi  groups  to  defend  their  indigenous  human  rights  through  these  institutions,  and  through  the  internation-­
al  human  rights  regimes,  see  10.3.8,  including  the  footnote  on  precedence.   
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law  had  to  recognize  this  local  right.907  The  view  that  fishing  rights  belong  to  the  local  population  
breaks  radically  with  the  view  that  fish  stocks  are  so-called  “national  resources”.908  Thus,  it  breaks  
with  “the  practice  that  is  established  in  the  fishery  management,  to  not  discriminate  fishermen  
according  to  where  they  live”  –  as  long  as  they  belong  to  the  Norwegian  nation.909  Norwegian  
policy  documents  often  refer  to  “the  common  good”  (allmennhetens  interesse)  as  the  common  good  
of  either  all  Norwegian  citizens,  or  alternatively,  of  everyone  who  is  allowed  by  Norwegian  state  
law  to  be  on  its  territory.  The  latter  category  may  be  relatively  wide,  after  Norway  became  part  of  
the  EEA  agreement.  Nevertheless,  the  common  good  is  no  global  common;;  it  is  a  common  good  for  
some  legally  defined  community.  How  to  define  that  community  is  controversial  in  the  homeland  of  
an  indigenous  people  that  is  divided  by  state  boundaries.  The  concepts  of  national  rights  and  
national  self-determination  are  so  well  established  that  many  people  habitually  regard  commons  as  
national  commons.910  Therefore,  it  appears  unorthodox  to  talk  about  regional  rights  and  regional  
commons.  In  fact,  however,  local  commons  are  no  more  particularistic  than  national  commons.  
“Methodological  nationalism  and  statism”  which  has  been  criticized  in  political  science,911  exists  in  
political  practice  as  well.  The  actual  political  boundaries  are  not  in  sync  with  the  actual  ecological  
and  cultural  complexity  of  the  Deatnu  Fjord  and  River  area. 
 The  political  distance  between  (Norwegian)  nationalism  and  (Sámi)  regionalism  is  a  
considerable  one.  Legal  historians  are  discussing  whether  local  people  on  the  Finnish  side  of  the  
Deatnu  River  might  have  an  ancient  right  to  fish  in  the  Deatnu  Fjord.  Documentation  is  found  in  old  
treaties  dating  back  to  the  early  territorial  states.912  During  the  age  of  despotism,  the  kingdoms  had  
recognized  the  rights  of  various  “nations”  or  population  groups  within  their  dominions,  even  
recognizing  old  rights  to  use  resources  across  state  borders.  The  treaties  were  never  cancelled,  but  
their  application  changed  during  the  age  of  nationalism.  Historians  are  now  putting  together  the  lost  
pieces,  slowly  reconstructing  the  knowledge  of  how  the  Finnish-Norwegian  border  was  closed  in  
1852.913  Coastal  Sámi  fisher-peasants  were  supposed  to  become  Norwegian  in  order  to  enjoy  the  
comforts  of  modernity.914  Fishing  vessels  from  Southern  Norway  started  to  extract  resources  from  
                                                 
907  Pedersen  2012:  56 
908  Eyþórsson  2008:  236 
909  Eyþórsson  2008:  236 
910  As  the  lawyer  Ugo  Mattei  (2011)  points  out,  the  common  good  is  not  equal  to  the  national  good,  as  common  property  
is  not  the  same  as  state  property.  In  my  view,  such  a  legal  view  may  represent  a  break  with  Roman  Law.  The  Roman  
Empire  was  a  boundless  empire  with  pretensions  of  global  jurisdiction.  Therefore  Roman  Law  is  not  automatically  
fit  for  contemporary  rights  to  land  and  water,  that  are  territorially  bounded  by  national  sovereignty  and  indigenous  
self-determination.  Roman  Law  was  jurisdiction  for  imperialism,  not  for  popular  self-determination. 
911  Bauböck  2008 
912  Pedersen  2012:  60-75 
913  Pedersen  (doktoravhandling  utgitt  på  Diedut) 
914  Minde  2005a;;  Eriksen  and  Niemi  1981;;  see  Kramvig  2005 
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the  fjords  where  these  fisher-peasants  lived.915  They  still  do.  Therefore,  the  Commission's  
suggestion  constituted  a  provocation  to  strongly  vested  capital  interests,  especially  Southern  
Norwegian  owners  of  larger  vessels.  The  Association  of  Norwegian  Fishermen  reacted.916 
 The  Commission  had  taken  a  conciliatory  approach.  It  suggested  that  old  fishing  rights,  
which  had  been  taken  away  from  some  groups  and  given  to  others,  could  be  bought  back  to  the  
original  right-holders  through  the  market  for  tradable  fishing  quotas.917  Thus,  there  would  be  no  
expropriation  without  compensation.  That  was  not  enough  for  the  Association  of  Norwegian  
Fishermen.  When  socio-economic  gain  is  measured  in  GDP,  individual  profit  for  capital  owners  in  
Southwestern  Norway  is  presented  as  a  patriotic  act,  empowering  the  nation  as  a  whole  in  
international  competition  against  other  nations.  Such  an  argument  is  a  nationalist  way  of  doing  
politics,  and  it  still  has  currency.  Through  the  ongoing  process  of  European  integration,  the  
nationalist  way  of  doing  politics  is  gradually  being  replaced  by  more  federalist  arrangements.  
However,  in  2008,  the  proposal  made  by  the  Costal  Fishery  Association  was  still  quite  bold.  The  
Icelandic  fishery  researcher  Einar  Eyþórsson  commented:  “When  regarding  the  past,  and  how  
Coastal  Sámi  demands  have  been  met  in  the  previous  century,  the  proposal  of  the  Coastal  Fishing  
Committee  is  nearly  revolutionary.”918  This  was  while  the  outcome  of  the  policy  process  was  not  
yet  clear.  The  argument  continued  “How  [the  Commission's  proposal]  will  be  followed  up  during  
the  years  to  come,  will  of  course,  depend  on  the  political  authorities.  The  struggle  about  the  fjord  
resources  has  not  ended.”  The  struggle  had  indeed  not  ended.  The  proposal  that  Eyþórsson  
characterized  as  “nearly  revolutionary”  would  awaken  a  political  storm.  The  proposal  met  with  
immediate  resistance.  Hearings  from  various  organizations  and  state  agencies  showed  that  many  
were  supporting  the  status  quo.  Thus,  they  supported  the  view  that  there  are  no  other  fishing  rights  
than  the  tradable  quotas.  Thus,  they  contested  the  view  that  there  exist  any  indigenous  or  local  
rights  in  Finnmark.919  The  issue  also  split  the  judiciary  of  the  Norwegian  political  entity. 
 The  Sámi  Rights  Commission  had  suggested  that  local  fishing  rights  exist  according  to  
recent  international  law  and  ancient  local  customs.  Since  the  leader  of  the  committee  had  been  
supreme  judge  Carsten  Smith,  its  suggestions  had  been  given  the  blessing  of  the  top  level  of  the  
state’s  judicial  branch  of  power.  Still  the  view  was  publicly  contested  by  another  top  figure  within  
the  judiciary.  The  Attorney  General,  chief  juridical  advisor  of  the  government,  claimed  that  
international  law  and  local  customs  had  no  relevance.920  Both  views  have  support  from  their  own  
legal  historians.  The  Ministry  of  Fisheries  had  received  two  contradictory  reports  regarding  Coastal  
                                                 
915  Eyþórsson  2008 
916  Pedersen  2012:  57 
917  Eyþórsson  2008:  236 
918  Eyþórsson  2008:  236 
919  Pedersen  2012:  57 
920  Pedersen  2012:  57 
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Sámi  rights.  In  2005,  the  government  had  received  a  report  by  the  lawyer  Peter  Ørebech,  claiming  
that  indigenous  human  rights  law  has  no  relevance  along  the  Barents  Coast,  because,  he  claimed,  
Coastal  Sámi  culture  no  longer  exists.921  Two  years  later,  in  2008,  the  opposite  stance  was  taken  in  a  
report  from  the  Coastal  Fishery  Commission.922  The  two  reports  present  competing  interpretations  
of  historical  and  cultural  issues,  but  only  the  latter  report  enjoys  the  support  of  academic  historians  
and  anthropologists.  While  the  social  scientists  reject  the  interpretation  given  by  the  Ørebech  report,  
they  also  subject  his  discourse  to  social  scientific  enquiry.  To  this  controversy  we  will  return  later. 
 Policy  outcome:  About  a  year  after  the  Coastal  Fisheries  Commission  had  delivered  its  
report,  Fisheries  Minister  Helga  Pedersen  had  rejected  the  main  suggestions  of  the  Committee.  It  
was  a  loss  of  prestige  for  a  minister  from  a  Coastal  Sámi  community.  However,  as  the  strategist  Sun  
Tzu  said:  "With  regard  to  precipitous  heights  [...]  if  the  enemy  has  occupied  them  before  you  do  not  
follow  him,  but  retreat  and  try  to  entice  him  away."923  The  Glasnost  of  the  Norwegian  polity  had  
been  stretched  to  its  limits.  Those  forces  within  the  judiciary  who  relied  on  scientific  historiography  
had  been  beaten  by  those  forces  within  the  same  system  who  mobilized  old  historical  myths.  For  a  
coastal  Sámi  minister  working  through  the  governing  party,  it  was  not  politically  possible  to  push  
any  further.  After  having  rejected  the  principal  suggestion  of  the  Commission,  details  in  the  
proposal  could  be  considered.  Only  at  this  juncture,  did  the  government  enter  the  process  of  formal  
consultancy  with  the  Norwegian  Sámi  Parliament.924  The  government  prepared  a  law  proposal  that  
included  some  of  the  minor  suggestions  from  the  Commission.  Some  cod  fishing  quotas  was  
granted  to  small-scale  fishermen  in  coastal  Sámi  areas,  in  consideration  of  a  controversy  regarding  
tradable  cod  fishing  quotas.  The  Marine  Resources  Act  got  a  new  paragraph  stating  that  coastal  
Sámi  interests  should  be  considered.  A  special  management  body  was  created  to  take  care  of  this,  
even  though  the  state  had  rejected  the  proposal  that  the  coastal  areas  should  be  managed  by  a  body  
similar  to  the  Finnmark  Estate.  Still,  the  controversy  about  fishing  areas  was  defined  within  the  
mandate  of  the  Finnmark  Commission,  the  special  court  that  had  already  been  set  up  in  order  to  
clarify  longstanding  rights  to  land  and  water  under  the  new  Finnmark  Estate.  When  the  Norwegian  
Sámi  Parliament  was  to  consider  the  proposed  law,  the  majority  proposed  that  it  should  be  enacted  
by  the  Norwegian  Parliament.  Still,  the  whole  Sámi  parliament  regretted  that  the  government  had  
denied  the  principal  claim  of  the  Coastal  Fisheries  Commission:  that  local  rights  exist  since  times  
immemorial.  It  might  be  discussed  if  there  is  any  point  to  let  the  Finnmark  Commission  consider  
claims  of  longstanding  rights  if  the  government  has  already  rejected  the  relevance  of  international  
indigenous  rights  law  in  coastal  areas.  This  actualises  the  strategic  question  of  whether  to  pursue  the  
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paths  of  inclusion  or  resistance,  or  a  combination  of  both.  Let  us  again  turn  to  the  contemporary  
time,  to  a  third  node  of  social  power,  a  medium  and  an  outlet  for  the  continuous  struggle. 
 
 
10.3.6  A  third  regional  node  of  empowerment:  letters  to  the  editor 
Regional  newspapers  mediate  an  active  and  critical  public  debate  in  Coastal  Sámi  communities.  
Along  the  Norwegian  side  of  the  Barents  Coast,  several  regional  newspapers  have  an  effective  
distribution  system:  Finnmarken,  Finnmark  Dagblad,  Sør-Varanger  avis,  Nordlys,  Ságat  and  Ávvir.    
Fisher-peasant  communities  in  the  fjords  get  newspapers  and  letters  delivered  via  the  occasional  bus  
routes.  Several  of  the  editors  express  opinions  that  are  more  or  less  affiliated  with  the  labor  
organizations.  However,  these  are  not  one-way  information  channels.  Local  fishers  who  read  
something  outrageous  in  the  newspaper  may  sit  down,  write  a  letter  to  the  editor,  and  give  it  to  the  
bus  driver.  A  few  days  later,  the  bus  driver  returns  with  a  new  issue  of  the  newspaper,  where  the  
fisher  can  read  his  own  words  in  the  opinion  pages.  During  the  coldest  winter  moths,  fisher-
peasants  have  time  to  commit  themselves  to  heated  political  debate.  This  is  obligatory  but  also  
fascinating  reading  for  the  ethnographer.  The  regional  newspapers,  when  compared  to  the  national  
ones,  accept  letters  to  the  editor  that  with  fresh  rhetoric  and  undiplomatic  style.  Such  a  style  is  not  at  
home  in  the  “bourgeois  public  sphere”  of  Jürgen  Habermas.  The  rhetorical  means  are  rather  more  
“carnivalesque”,  to  use  a  term  from  Mikhail  Bakhtin.  For  this  exact  reason,  the  critical  public  
debate  in  this  region  appears  to  be  more  engaging,  more  engaged,  edgier,  and  more  socially  
inclusive.  Therefore,  the  “carnivalesque  public  sphere”,  is  more  democratic  than  the  “bourgeois  
public  sphere”.  Coastal  Sámi  fisher-peasants  may  hunt  in  the  morning,  fish  in  the  afternoon,  rear  
sheep  in  the  evening,  and  participate  in  political  critique  after  dinner.  Letters  to  the  editor  are  not  
only  an  outlet  of  frustration.  They  are  a  medium  whereby  public  opinion  is  constituted,  political  
strategies  are  formed,  and  political  choices  are  deliberated. 
 
 
10.3.7  The  ongoing  public  contention 
Who  should  fish  less  when  there  are  fewer  fish?  In  the  Deatnu  area,  “the  sea-salmon  fishers”,  small-
scale  salmon  fishers  in  salt  water,  claim  that  they  take  an  unfair  share  of  the  burden.  This  was  a  
publicly  contested  issue  during  my  visits  to  the  Deatnu  area. 
 Strategies  for  the  rights  of  the  “sea  salmon  fishers”  were  at  stake  in  a  series  of  open  letters  
printed  in  Finnmarken  during  the  two  first  months  of  2011.  On  one  side  was  Bjarne  Johansen,  
leader  of  “Tana  og  omegn  sjølaksefiskeforening”,  an  interest  organization  for  sea  salmon  fishermen  
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in  the  Deatnu  area.925  On  the  other  side  was  Marianne  Balto,  president  of  the  Norwegian  Sámi  
Parliament.926  This  newspaper  debate  was  particularly  interesting  for  an  ethnographer  fishing  for  
samples  of  democratic  participation.  Johansen  put  forward  his  accusations  in  rather  fresh  language,  
while  Balto  answered  in  a  more  formalistic  tone.  Here  follow  some  excerpts  from  Johansen's  and  
Balto's  letters.  I  have  chosen  specific  arguments  from  their  original  letters,  and  assembled  them  in  
another  order,  in  the  form  of  a  dialogue.  Thus,  I  de-contextualize  each  excerpt  from  the  original  
flow  of  argument,  and  re-contextualize  them  as  samples  of  what  I  am  researching.927  As  with  all  
interpretation,  some  contextual  information  is  lost  in  translation,  while  another  layer  of  meaning  is  
value-added.928  When  the  excerpts  are  re-cycled  within  my  text,  they  serve  as  samples  of  public  
deliberation  regarding  how  to  prioritize  between  different  paths  to  democratic,  people's  power. 
 
Bjarne  Johansen:  The  sea  salmon  fishers  in  Finnmark  do  not  feel  targeted  by  any  form  of  armistice,  
such  as  […]  the  agreement  between  the  Sámi  Parliament  and  the  Ministry  of  the  Environment.  The  sea  
salmon  fishermen  in  coastal  Sámi  areas  still  feel  like  a  people  with  no  rights.  We  cannot  accept  to  take  
the  whole  burden  when  the  salmon  fisheries  are  being  regulated.929 
 
Marianne  Balto:  I  have  understanding  for  the  despair  that  the  sea  salmon  fishermen  experience,  as  
they  find  fishing  periods  slowly  but  steadily  are  being  regulated  away.  [....]  It  is  always  so  in  
consultations  that  the  Sámi  parliament  never  gains  approval  for  more  than  what  the  state  is  willing  to  
accommodate.  [...]  Sometimes  we  do  not  reach  any  agreement.930 
 
The  syndicalist  starts  out  by  rejecting  dialogue  with  the  authorities  on  what  he  regards  as  false  
premises.  That  there  is  no  “armistice”  is  his  metaphor.  The  politician  answers  diplomatically  that  
she  understands  the  despair  of  the  fishermen,  and  even  admits  that  the  Sámi  Parliament  is  unable  to  
gain  more  than  what  the  government  is  already  willing  to  admit.  Thus,  the  activist  and  the  politician  
agree  that  there  are  limited  opportunities  to  influence  policy  through  formal  channels.  The  activist  
points  at  a  half  empty  glass,  while  the  politician  objects  that  the  glass  is  half  full. 
 
Bjarne  Johansen:  The  Sámi  parliament  has  made  an  agreement  with  the  Ministry  of  the  Environment  
without  discussing  this  with  the  local  competence  that  does  exist  among  sea  salmon  fishermen.  We  
demand  that  our  rights  are  taken  into  regard,  and  that  we  may  participate  at  every  level  of  the  
management,  on  equal  foot  with  the  reindeer  husbandry  and  other  livelihoods  in  Sámi  areas.931 
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Marianne  Balto:  The  Sámi  parliament  and  the  Ministry  of  the  Environment  have  made  a  framework  
agreement  about  regulation  of  fishing  for  migrating  salmon  fishes.  [...]  In  my  opinion,  the  framework  
agreement  is  a  step  in  the  right  direction.  [....]  The  goal  is  that  the  parties  reach  a  common  
understanding  regarding  the  situation  for  the  [salmon]  stocks.932 
 
The  syndicalist  and  the  politician  continue  to  discuss  the  content  of  the  agreement  that  had  been  
made  between  the  Norwegian  Sámi  Parliament  and  the  Norwegian  Ministry  of  the  Environment.  
Both  are  political  institutions  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Norwegian  state.  This  is  what  the  
syndicalist  had  referred  to  as  an  “armistice”  in  the  beginning  of  his  open  letter.  “Framework  
agreement”  is  the  more  bureaucratic  term  employed  by  the  politician.  This  is  an  agreement  
regarding  the  rules  of  the  game  for  further  deliberation  on  the  issue  at  stake.  The  activist  rejects  the  
rules  given  by  that  agreement.  He  claims  that  the  “sea  salmon  fishermen”  enjoy  less  formal  
influence  than  other  Sámi  groups,  even  though  all  of  these  should  have  the  same  rights  according  to  
international  law.  The  politician  objects  that  the  agreement  with  the  Ministry  is  acceptable  because  
the  ultimate  goal  is  to  reach  a  consensus  between  her  own  political  institution  and  the  Ministry.  The  
politician  claims  that  such  a  goal  is  a  step  in  the  right  direction,  even  though  the  syndicalist  implies  
that  it  might  be  a  violation  of  international  law. 
 
Bjarne  Johansen:  People  are  indignant,  and  feel  punished  by  researchers  who  are  operating  with  
numbers  and  graphs  with  no  grounding  in  reality.  [….]  Even  though  we  get  the  opportunity  to  
participate  in  an  advisory  working  group  (arbeidsgruppe),  we  do  not  expect  to  gain  our  fishing  times  
back,  as  long  as  our  right  to  equal  consultations  is  being  ignored.933 
 
Marianne  Balto:  The  organizations  are  invited  to  participate  in  the  consultation  process  through  the  
Committee  (Arbeidsutvalget).  […]  When  the  organizations  choose  to  accept  the  invitation,  and  choose  
their  representatives,  then  the  Sámi  Parliament  expects  that  the  organizations  work  constructively  
together  with  the  rest  of  the  Committee,  within  the  framework  defined  by  the  agreement.934 
 
Here  the  syndicalist  and  the  politician  go  from  discussing  the  rules  of  the  game,  to  discuss  how  the  
game  will  be  played.  Both  agree  that  the  interest  organization  has  been  invited  to  participate  in  an  
advisory  board  with  no  formal  powers.  The  syndicalist  expresses  the  view  that  there  is  nothing  to  
gain  from  this.  Moreover,  he  also  accuses  the  state-employed  bio-scientific  expertise  of  being  slack  
with  their  scientific  standards  when  only  local  fishermen  are  suffering  from  their  badly  grounded  
conclusions.  (To  this  issue  I  will  return  in  the  discussion  about  civil  society  action.)  The  politician  
states  that  if  the  activists  accept  the  invitation,  then  they  will  also  have  to  obey  the  rules  of  the  game  
                                                 
932  Marianne  Balto,  vice  president  of  the  Sámi  parliament  in  Finnmarken,  1st  of  February,  2011. 
933  Johansen  2011 
934  Balto  2011 
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as  they  have  been  agreed  upon  between  the  Norwegian  Sámi  Parliament  and  the  Norwegian  
Ministry  of  Fisheries. 
Throughout  this  debate,  there  is  an  implicit  intertextual  reference  to  the  Coastal  Fisheries  
Commission.  For  most  readers  of  the  newspaper  Finnmarken,  this  process  is  probably  well  known.  
The  syndicalist  Bjarne  Johansen  put  forward  accusations  that  echo  the  principal  suggestions  of  the  
Coastal  Fisheries  Commission:  that  the  coastal  resources  are  regional  commons.  This  was  rejected  
by  the  state  legislators.  They  had  previously  accepted  a  similar  legal  interpretation  with  regard  to  
the  lands  and  waters  of  mainland  Finnmark.  However,  with  regard  to  the  coastal  waters  of  Finnmak,  
they  kept  defining  these  as  national  commons.  This  was  the  view  that  had  to  be  accepted  by  Helga  
Pedersen  as  a  Fisheries  Minister,  in  a  political  move  that  might  be  interpreted  as  a  tactical  retreat.  
That  tactic  is  echoed  in  the  stance  taken  by  the  politician  Marianne  Balto.  In  their  roles  as  top  
politicians,  Helga  Pedersen  and  Marianne  Balto  were  bound  to  be  loyal  to  the  decisions  taken  by  the  
state  legislators,  despite  the  fact  that  some  would  claim  that  the  state  laws  violate  international  laws  
that  have  been  ratified  by  the  state  itself. 
 Johansen  and  Balto  discuss  a  specific  policy  process  aimed  at  making  regulations  for  
traditional  salmon  fishing  in  the  salt  waters  along  Finnmark.  We  have  now  read  this  debate  in  the  
context  of  a  specific  policy  process,  the  processing  of  the  suggestions  from  the  Coastal  Fisheries  
Commission.  Johansen  also  refers  to  another  context,  which  is  what  he  presents  as  politically  biased  
priorities  amongst  the  bio-scientific  establishment.  (Regarding  the  latter  context,  I  will  return  to  this  
issue  in  Chapter  11.)  Within  those  contexts,  the  public  deliberation  between  Johansen  and  Balto  is  
read,  and  becomes  a  strategical  dispute,  about  what  channels  of  democratic  participation  should  be  
chosen. 
 Indigenous  political  entrepreneurs  have  had  an  impact  on  the  policies  of  the  party,  but  the  
party  has  also  had  an  impact  on  the  policies  of  indigenous  political  entrepreneurs.  When  Bjarne  
Johansen  and  Marianne  Balto  deliberate  about  strategies,  how  do  the  interactions  between  Labor  
party  discipline  and  coastal  Sámi  rebellion  actually  play  out?  Is  there  co-optation,  or  co-operation,  
or  both?  The  trade  union  leader  Bjarne  Johansen  argues  strongly  that  international  human  rights  
norms  must  be  fundamental.  He  expresses  fear  that  professional  politicians  such  as  Marianne  Balto  
might  be  co-opted  by  the  ruling  political  class.  He  has  also  defined  his  adversary,  namely  the  
Ministry  of  the  Environment,  and  also,  its  hand-picked  experts,  who  argue  in  a  seemingly  apolitical,  
technical  way.935  The  ambiguous  relationship  between  Balto  and  Johansen  exemplifies  a  tension  
often  found  under  corporatism:  catch-all  party  or  syndicalist  organization;;  inclusion  or  resistance. 
 
                                                 
935  Ween  2012a 
 366  
 
 
10.3.8  Back  to  the  Diggegoddi:  state  laws,  longstanding  customs,  international  norms 
With  these  empirical  samples,  I  have  taken  the  reader  with  me  back  to  my  political  fieldwork.  The  
description  started  at  the  district  court  house  in  Tana  Bru.  This  was  my  entrance  point  to  the  
fieldwork.  The  description  has  reconstructed  how  at  this  particular  site,  the  reflexive  sociologist  
became  introduced  to  the  indigenous  human  rights  struggle  in  Coastal  Sápmi. 
 I  have  shown  how  the  interviewer  was  fishing  for  reliable  data  of  relevance  to  describe  the  
struggle  for  rights,  while  the  interviewee  was  fishing  for  reliable  research  of  relevance  to  the  
struggle  for  proofs.  Both  interviewer  and  interviewee  adapted  to  the  other's  perception  of  relevance,  
together  approaching  towards  a  shared  research  interest.  By  proving  potentially  useful  in  the  local  
struggle  for  rights  and  proofs,  the  political  sociologist  gained  access  to  data. 
 The  conversation  introduced  the  sociologist  to  to  the  past  history  of  the  struggle,  by  selected  
collective  memories,  supported  by  selected  historical  documents.  Through  the  same  conversation,  
the  sociologist  was  also  introduced  the  present  situation  of  the  same  struggle,  by  being  invited  to  do  
further  political  fieldwork  in  a  fisher-peasant  community  by  the  fjord.  These  clues  were  
reconstructed  in  the  description  above,  and  from  there,  the  description  traced  two  intertwined  praxis  
networks:  On  the  one  hand,  the  description  traces  some  particular  praxis  nets  in  the  present,  through  
three  particular  regional  nodes  of  empowerment:  the  district  court  house,  the  local  community  
house,  and  the  local  labor  press.  Thus,  I  sketched  a  selective  map  of  contemporary  human  rights  
struggles.  On  the  other  hand,  the  description  also  traces  collective  memories  left  behind  by  
particular  praxis  nets  in  the  past:  the  Coastal  Sámi  Rebellion,  the  Coastal  Fisheries  Commission,  
and  the  ongoing  political  deliberation  in  the  carnivalesque  public  sphere.  Thus,  I  traced  a  selective  
genealogy  in  order  to  to  explain  how  the  contemporary  situation  came  about.  In  sum,  I  have  
inquired  concerning  some  of  the  ways  whereby  some  particular  praxis  nets  have  unfolded,  both  in  
the  past  and  in  the  present:  some  of  their  past  effects  were  identified  through  selective  tracing  of  
their  emergence  in  the  past;;  some  of  their  contemporary  effects  were  identified  through  selective  
mapping  of  their  structure  in  the  present.  The  inquiry  remains  highly  specific  and  selective,  a  
myopic  view.  Regarding  data  selection,  probabilistic  sampling  is  impossible  in  qualitative  research.  
However,  this  does  not  mean  that  data  selection  is  arbitrary.  Access  to  data  is  a  direct  result  of  
perceived  relevance  among  social  actors  who  own  the  data.  The  greater  the  perceived  relevance,  the  
easier  access  to  data:  the  degree  of  data  access  is  a  linear  function  of  the  degree  of  perceived  
relevance  among  those  who  own  the  data.  In  this  process,  epistemic  reliability  comes  with  political  
reliability. 
 In  this  presentation,  I  have  chosen  a  narrative  form  to  present  the  selected  empirical  
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findings,  and  this  form  was  chosen  in  order  to  expose  the  interdependence  between  the  object  of  
observation  and  the  act  of  observing.  The  reflexive  political  sociologist  tries  to  reveal  and  not  
conceal  the  fact  that  the  science  of  constituent  power  is  one  of  the  means  for  the  art  of  constituent  
power.  The  interview  situation  and  the  search  for  documentation  are  in  themselves  potentially  
constituent  acts,  contributing  to  potential  revisions  of  the  already  constituted  body  of  knowledge.  In  
the  description  above,  I  have  described  some  praxis  nets,  both  past  and  present,  which  are  pathways  
within  which  constituent  and  constituted  power  operate.  The  described  praxis  nets  include  already  
constituted  policy  nets,  such  as  the  organization  of  the  three  visited  nodes  of  empowerment,  but  
they  also  include  potentially  constituent  issue  nets,  such  as  the  creation  of  SLF  and  the  ongoing  
deliberation  in  the  local  labor  press.  The  interview  situation  in  itself  constitutes  a  temporary  node  in  
the  praxis  network.  Because  it  may  potentially  provide  input  to  the  ongoing  struggle  for  proofs,  the  
interview  situation  is  one  of  the  socio-material  ties  whereby  constituted  and  constituent  realities  are  
being  (re)produced. 
 For  reflexive  political  sociology,  knowledge  is  provisional,  participatory,  and  grounded  in  
practical  application:  it  is  participatory  action  research.  When  sociological  interviews  with  human  
rights  lawyers  in  one  site  brought  me  into  touch  with  political  entrepreneurs  at  another  site,  then  our  
conversations  functioned  not  only  as  interviews,  but  also  as  focus  groups.  Such  conversations  are  
deliberative  processes,  facilitating  confrontation  and  dialogue  between  divergent  partial  practical  
realities.  When  sociological  publications  may  be  read  by  the  interviewees  or  by  other  actors  in  their  
homely  field,  then  the  published  text  functions  not  only  as  publications,  but  also  as  practical  
interventions  into  the  ongoing  struggle  for  proofs.  Political  sociology  is  sociological  intervention. 
 There  are  conflicting  views  about  who  actually  has  the  right  to  fish  salmon  in  the  fjord,  and  
this  controversy  is  one  issue  within  a  wider  problematic:  whether  or  not  colonization  has  taken  
place.  If  I  tried  to  pretend  that  my  viewpoint  was  not  positioned  in  a  certain  manner,  then  it  would  
be  an  attempt  to  monopolize  the  only  acceptable  political  view.  The  only  thing  I  really  know  for  
certain  is  that  all  possible  views  remain  more  or  less  under-informed,  limited,  and  therefore  
positioned.  However,  as  I  will  later  discuss,  I  also  find  it  rather  likely  that  residual  colonial  bias  has  
a  social  function  according  to  Bourdieu's  metaphor  of  “symbolic  violence”.  Reflexive  political  
sociology  is  instrumental  for  the  collective  struggle  to  slightly  overcome  our  own  collective  biases. 
 Let  us  return  to  the  “diggegoddi”  at  the  side  of  Deatnu  River,  where  we  found  the  secretariat  
of  the  Finnmark  Commission.  This  had  been  given  the  task  of  considering  any  claims  arising  from  
longstanding  rights  to  fishing  in  salt  waters  along  the  Finnmark  coast,  to  be  considered  by  the  
Outfield  Court.  Originally,  the  Finnmark  Commission  had  been  set  up  to  address  such  claims  
regarding  land  and  water  in  mainland  Finnmark,  with  exception  for  the  main  river  bodies  and  the  
salt  waters.  Nevertheless,  the  Finnmark  Commission  will  now  also  consider  similar  claims  in  
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coastal  areas.    Their  work  is  likely  to  reveal  contradictions  between  state  law  and  local  customs,  
since  the  state  has  already  rejected  the  view  that  local  fishing  rights  belong  to  the  local  
population.936  If  those  contradictions  will  be  tested  before  the  Outfield  Court  or  a  District  Court,  
they  will  eventually  be  brought  before  the  Norwegian  Supreme  Court.  However,  under  the  current  
humann  rights  regime,  citizens  have  some  opportunities  to  make  complains  before  international  
bodies.937  A  precedent  has  been  set  in  this  regard  controversies  about  reindeer  herding  rights  in  
Finnish  Sápmi.938  Quite  legally,  the  emergence  of  human  rights  regimes,  together  with  various  
environmental  management  regimes,  has  resulted  in  the  emergence  of  an  apparatus  of  
“jurisdictional  complexity”,  which  responds  to  the  actual  ecological  and  cultural  complexity. 
 The  political  map  is  being  transformed.  Sámi  human  rights  lawyers  in  the  Deatnu  water  area  
have  introduced  me  to  the  situation  in  various  parts  of  the  watershed.  For  the  upstream  parts  of  
Deatnu,  the  states  have  implemented  some  limited  attempts  to  regulate  the  relationship  between  
state  sovereignty  and  indigenous  self-determination,  in  accordance  with  international  human  rights  
law.  This  has  been  done  rather  differently  on  the  “Norwegian”  and  the  “Finnish”  sides  of  the  river,  
but  on  either  side,  attempts  have  been  undertaken,  and  those  attempts  remain  limited.  However,  
downstream  in  Deatnu  Water  Area,  particularly  in  Deanuvuotna  Fjord,  there  has  been  no  attempt  
whatsoever  by  the  state  to  reconcile  the  right  to  national(ist)  state  sovereignty  with  the  right  to  
indigenous  self-determination.  This  is  still  the  situation,  after  the  Coastal  Sámi  Rebellion  and  the  
Coastal  Fisheries  Commission.  The  struggle  continues. 
                                                 
936  In  the  following  chapter,  I  will  contribute  with  some  ethnographical  proof  in  support  of  the  claim  that  the  indigenous  
human  rights  to  freedom  from  cultural  and  economic  discrimination  do  apply  in  Coastal  Sápmi,  and  consequently,  
that  the  local  fishery  resources  actually  belong  to  the  local  populaion.   
937  The  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  and  the  UN  Human  Rights  Council  are  the  most  relevant  parts  of  the  human  
rights  regime  for  monitoring  how  the  state  will  respond  to  the  Finnmark  Commission.  For  further  info,  see  part  
8.6.1,  in  particular  the  footnote  regarding  the  right  to  appeal.  (See  also  part  9.2.8  for  some  further  details  regarding  
the  establishment  of  the  Finnmark  Commission.) 
938  Of  potential  relevance  to  the  Coastal  Sámi  is  a  specific  case  where  the  UN  Human  Rights  Committee  (UN-HCR)  
gave  its  opinion  regarding  a  legal  complain  from  a  Sámi  reindeer  owner  against  the  Finnish  state  (UN  Human  Rights  
Committee  1992).  Regarding  this  case,  the  UN-HRC  "emphasized  that  article  27  does  not  protect  only  traditional  
means  of  livelihood,  but  even  their  adaptation  to  modern  times.  As  to  what  kind  of  interference  with  a  minority  
culture  constitutes  'denial'  in  the  sense  of  article  27,  the  Committee  developed  the  combined  test  of  meaningful  
consultation  of  the  group,  and  the  sustainability  of  the  indigenous  or  minority  economy"  (Scheinin  2004:  6,  thanks  
to  Aimo  Guttorm  for  this  reference).  These  questions,  the  modernised  tradition,  the  scarce  consultation,  and  the  
economic  sustainability,  may  all  have  potential  transfer  value  if  the  Coastal  Sámi  is  to  make  a  complain  against  the  
Norwegian  state.  Regarding  the  specific  question  of  traditional  and  modern  forms  of  livelihood,  the  UN-HRC  
concluded:  "The  right  to  enjoy  one's  culture  cannot  be  determined  in  abstracto  but  has  to  be  placed  in  context.  In  
this  connection,  the  Committee  observes  that  article  27  does  not  only  protect  traditional  means  of  livelihood  of  
national  minorities,  as  indicated  in  the  State  party's  submission.  Therefore  that  the  authors  may  have  adapted  their  
methods  of  reindeer  herding  over  the  years  and  practice  it  with  the  help  of  modern  technology  does  not  prevent  them  
from  invoking  article  27  of  the  Covenant.  Furthermore,  mountain  Riutusvaara  continues  to  have  a  spiritual  
significance  relevant  to  their  culture"  (UN  Human  Rights  Committee  1992:  §9.3).  This  question  has  specific  
relevance  for  the  debate  between  the  competing  views  held  by  the  Ørebech-report  (Norwegian  Official  Report  2005  
[NOU  2005:10])  and  the  Coastal  Fishery  Commission  (Norwegian  Official  Report  2008  [NOU  2008:5]),  the  former  
being  in  conflict  with  ICCPR  article  27.     
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10.4.0  Structural  violence:  between  political  inclusion  and  political  resistance 
 
10.4.1  Learning  from  indigenous  fisher-peasants 
The  art  and  science  of  constituent  power  requires  caution  and  care.  When  the  state's  parliament  and  
government  deny  the  existence  of  Coastal  Sámi  indigenous  rights,  then  this  policy  fits  well  with  the  
vested  interests  of  Norwegian  fishery  capitalists,  but  it  might  go  against  the  power  of  the  better  
argument.  If  the  report  published  by  the  Ministry  of  Fisheries  in  2005  was  correct,  then  the  policies  
are  justified.  However,  if  the  report  published  by  the  same  ministry  in  2008  is  correct,  then  these  
policies  are  not  justified.  If  the  latter  is  the  case  (which  I  think  it  is),  then  we  are  dealing  with  social  
reproduction  of  unequal  opportunities,  the  phenomenon  sometimes  referred  to  as  “structural  
violence”.  I  have  also  suggested  that  Coastal  Sámi  fisher-peasants  struggle  against  double  
marginalization,  under  corporate  capitalism  as  well  as  official  nationalism.  If  this  is  correct,  then  
Bjarne  Johansen  is  probably  right,  that  it  is  necessary  to  limit  the  co-operation  with  the  government,  
and  to  empower  the  movement  with  other  means,  in  order  to  enable  dialogue  on  more  equal  terms.  
Thus,  it  might  be  necessary  to  pursue  the  path  of  political  resistance,  as  a  supplement  to  political  
inclusion.  However,  if  the  structural  violence  really  is  so  strong  as  to  marginalize  the  power  of  the  
better  argument,  this  might  also  mean  that  real  empowerment  of  the  subalterns  would  constitute  a  
real  economic  threat  to  vested  capital  interests.  If  so,  there  might  be  a  risk  that  potent  political  
resistance  could  attract  suppressive  violence,  which  could  breed  violence.  Thus,  it  might  be  
necessary  to  pursue  the  path  of  political  inclusion,  as  a  supplement  to  political  resistance.  Through  
sociological  fieldwork  in  Deanuvuotna,  I  have  learned  some  lessons  about  how  truly  subaltern  
indigenous  fisher-peasants  may  empower  themselves  and  become  political  entrepreneurs  by  
combining  diverse  paths  to  constituent  power.  The  different  paths,  namely  political  inclusion  or  
political  resistance,  may  be  related  to  the  democracy  theory  that  I  discussed  at  the  beginning  of  this  
chapter  (see  Table  10.1).  Marianne  Balto  and  Helga  Pedersen  on  the  one  hand,  Bjarne  Johansen  on  
the  other,  pursue  different  paths,  namely  what  della  Porta  has  characterized  as  “limited  participative  
democracy”  and  “deliberative  participative  democracy”.  The  former  is  related  to  the  corporatist  
political  culture  of  national  unity.  The  latter  is  related  to  the  concept  of  public  debate  that  leads  to  
the  formation  of  opinions,  in  the  “bourgeois  public  sphere”  and  “carnivalesque  public  sphere”  
which  I  discussed  above.  Fisher-peasants  in  Dranuvuotna  appear  to  be  as  pluralistic  in  their  political  
repertoires  as  they  are  in  their  livelihood  adaptations:  hunt  in  the  morning,  fish  in  the  afternoon,  rear  
sheep  in  the  evening,  and  participate  in  the  carnivalesque  public  sphere  after  dinner. 
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Table  10-1:  Typology  for  the  repertoires  of  constituent  praxes,  applied  to  Deanuvuotna 
 Politics  of  state  (regulating  coercive  force) Examples  from  Deanuvuotna 
Inclusion Political  inclusion,  using  ritualized  channels:  
limited  participatory  democracy,939  or  
corporatist  consensual  democracy940 
Corporatist  inclusion:  compulsory  
arbitration,  dialogue  on  unequal  terms  
(Marianne  Balto),  democratic  centralism  
within  the  catch-all  party  (Helga  Pedersen) 
Resistance Political  resistance,  using  political  liberties  
and  civil  disobedience:941  deliberative  
participatory  democracy942  or  agonistic  
consensual  democracy943 
Syndicalist  resistance:  withdrawal  of  
consent,  boycott  of  dialogue  on  unequal  
terms,  letters  to  the  editor  in  the  local  labor  
press  (Bjarne  Johansen) 
 
 
10.4.2  Civic  republicans?  –  Common  interest  and  constituent  power 
Being  in  Coastal  Sámi  communities  has  destabilized  my  prejudices  about  Norwegian  belonging.  I  
knew  the  history  of  Norwegian  nation-building  from  the  Norwegian  Folk  Museum,  where  I  had  
worked  as  a  pedagogist.  We  had  many  artefacts  from  mountain  peasants  in  Southern  Norway,  few  
from  coastal  areas,  and  even  fewer  from  Sámi  culture.  In  the  past,  we  told  the  visitors,  the  nation-
builders  had  created  national  solidarity  by  using  some  local  cultural  traits  as  national  symbols,  and  
marginalizing  the  local  culture  in  other  areas.  Thus,  we  taught  our  pupils,  the  Norwegian  form  of  
liberal  nationalism  had  been  an  ethnic  one.  However,  in  order  to  change  this,  and  make  Norwegian  
belonging  more  inclusive,  we  showed  artefacts  from  the  previously  marginalized  provinces:  from  
Inner  Sápmi,  Finnish  settlements  in  the  forest,  ethnically  mixed  coastal  areas,  and  contemporary  
migrants  from  the  third  world.  Our  pedagogical  task  was  to  educate  the  nation  away  from  the  ethno-
nationalism  of  the  past,  towards  a  potential  civic  national  belonging  in  the  future.  Howeverk,  when  I  
came  to  the  far  North  I  met  another  reality. 
 Civic  nationalism?  In  Chapter  2,  I  described  the  clash  between  Helga  Pedersen  and  Olav  
Gunnar  Ballo.  Both  are  in  the  same  party,  and  both  are  in  favour  of  freedom  and  equality.  However,  
they  disagree  on  whether  or  not  systematic  ethnic  discrimination  has  taken  place.  Ballo  sees  the  
golden  age  of  equality  in  the  past,  and  frames  indigenous  rights  as  privileges.  Pedersen  frames  
indigenous  human  rights  as  a  way  to  overcome  actual  ethnic  discrimination,  and  aims  at  a  golden  
age  of  equality  in  the  future.  The  perception  that  Ballo  has  of  Norwegian  nation-building  is  totally  
                                                 
939  Della  Porta  2011 
940  On  “consensual  democracy”  as  national  consensus  in  corporativist  states,  see  Lijphart  (1977)  –  cited  in  Keman  
(2011:  125)  –  this  in  contrast  to  a  most  different  meaning  of  the  same  term  (note  885  below).  Regarding  
corporativist  misreadings  of  Habermas  1971  (1962),  see  Kemmis  (2006)  –  in  contrast  to  the  correct,  conflict-
theoretical  reading  of  Habermas  (note  884  below). 
941  Thoreau  2009  (1849) 
942  On  “deliberative  participative  democracy”,  see  Della  Porta  2011;;  plus  Bakhtin  1984  (1965).  See  also  Kemmis  (2006)  
regarding  the  conflict-theoretical  and  correct  reading  of  Habermas  1971  (1962)  –  in  contrast  to  the  widespread  
corporativist  misreading  of  Habermas  (note  882  above). 
943  On  “consensual  democracy”  as  direct  democracy  in  social  movements,  see  della  Porta  2009b  –  in  contrast  to  a  most  
different  meaning  of  the  same  term  (note  882  above).  Regarding  the  term  “agonism”,  see  Mouffe  (2005)  and  Mouffe  
(2013). 
 371  
 
different  from  the  knowledge  we  had  at  the  Norwegian  Folk  Museum.  However,  we  in  the  capital  
city  were  much  closer  to  the  “core  area”  of  ethnic  Norwegian  culture,  and  the  Barents  Coast  is  
much  further  from  the  King's  Castle.  Civic  nationalism,  or  even  civic  republicanism,  may  have  been  
functional  to  accommodating  the  radical  syndicalists  along  the  Barents  Coast.  This  would  probably  
not  have  worked  with  the  ethnic  liberal  nationalism  that  was  used  by  the  nation-builders  in  the  
capital  city.  Civic  values  are  shared  currency  among  Ballo  and  Pedersen,  but  only  the  latter  knows  
what  the  Norwegian  Folk  Museum  knows,  namely  that  ethnic  pluralism  is  needed  to  overcome  
actual  ethnocentrism,  and  strive  towards  potential  civic  national  belonging. 
 Civic  republicanism?  In  the  present  chapter  I  have  described  the  debate  between  Marianne  
Balto  and  Bjarne  Johansen.  This  debate  may  also  be  understood  within  the  framework  of  civic  
values.  Both  are  advocates  of  popular  power  and  the  common  interest,  two  core  values  of  civic  
republicanism.944  The  republican  citizen  has  an  obligation  to  defend  the  republic,  but  also  has  the  
right  to  rebel.  There  may  be  a  tension  between  Balto’s  corporate  inclusion  and  Johansen’s  
syndicalist  resistance,  but  there  is  no  contradiction.  There  is  a  division  of  labor:  one  takes  care  of  
the  right  to  rebel,  another  of  the  obligation  to  defend  the  republic.945  Those  two  tasks  serve  the  
functions  of  constituent  praxes  and  constituted  order,  respectively.  Both  functions  are  integral  to  
people's  self-determination  –  even  if  we  here  have  to  do  with  two  partly  overlapping  peoples.  On  
the  one  hand,  state  power  is  enabled  by  the  people.  The  state  system  has  to  be  legitimized  in  the  
civil  society.  On  the  other  hand,  people's  power  is  enabled  by  the  state.  The  civil  society  is  
regulated  by  the  state  (Figure  10.3).  This  is  the  circular  relationship  of  constituent  and  constituted  
power,  which  has  been  theorized  by  constitutional  theorists  such  as  Joseph  Weiler  (see  Chapter  2). 
 
Figure  10-3:  Political  liberty  as  security  valve:  deliberative  participation  as  an  outlet  for  the  right  to  rebel 
 
                                                 
944  Galli  2001:  48-50,  105-9,  145-6,  254-6,  287-292 
945  The  Norwegian  political  entity  is  indeed  a  kingdom.  However,  I  remind  the  reader  that  the  labor  movement  has  no  
unified  history  under  the  state  (see  10.2.2  and  10.3.3  above):  At  the  beginning  of  the  20th  century,  the  labor  move-­
ment  at  the  Scandinavian  Peninsula  was  revolutionary,  internationalist,  syndicalist  and  republican  (Furre  1996:69-
76,  127-8).  In  1936,  the  centralists  of  the  Norwegian  labor  party  made  a  grand  compromise  with  the  more  or  less  
liberal  nationalists  within  the  political  entity  (Furre  1996:  127-8).  By  contrast,  a  quite  different  trajectory  took  place  
for  the  labor  movement  in  the  Arctic  periphery  of  the  Norwegian  political  entity.  Along  the  Barents  Coast,  the  labor  
movement  remained  revolutionary,  internationalist,  syndicalist  and  republican  until  the  Cold  War  (Jaklin  2004).  This  
may  explain  why  I  observe  different  forms  of  state-patriotism  in  different  parts  of  the  Norwegian  political  entity. 
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 The  right  to  rebel:  The  pathway  of  corporatist  inclusion,  pursued  by  Marianne  Balto,  is  a  
strongly  ritualized  one,  where  the  only  path  to  constituent  power  is  via  constitutional  amendments  
enacted  by  the  state  parliament.  This  path  goes  through  the  state  system,  and  via  state  regulation,  it  
aims  at  re-constitution  of  society.  The  pathway  of  syndical  resistance,  pursued  by  Bjarne  Johansen,  
has  more  room  for  improvisation.  This  path  goes  through  civil  society,  it  aims  at  re-constituting  the  
public  opinion,  or  to  transforming  the  economic  capacity  of  the  citizens,  and  thereby,  gaining  
political  strength  in  the  state  parliament  as  well.  Back  in  the  days,  when  the  freedom  of  speech  and  
the  freedom  of  assembly  were  more  limited,  this  path  would  frequently  involve  civil  disobedience  
and  disruptive  actions.  Today's  liberal  regulation  of  civil  society  offers  somewhat  wider  
opportunities  to  re-constitute  the  laws  of  the  state  by  acting  within  the  already  constituted  laws  of  
that  state.  The  opportunity  for  legal  public  contention  and  public  deliberation  is  a  recent  channel  of  
constituent  power,  and  a  supplement  to  the  older  possibility  to  use  parliamentary  power  for  
constitutional  amendments.  Thus,  with  increasing  political  liberties,  the  right  to  rebel  has  become  
somewhat  better  accommodated  within  the  already  constituted  laws.  Some  constitutional  lawyers  
argue  that  all  constitutional  arrangements  should  involve  legal  paths  whereby  the  system  might  be  
re-constituted  by  popular  power.946  By  better  accommodating  the  right  to  rebel,  liberal  norms  might  
function  as  a  security  valve  in  order  to  avoid  more  disruptive  outbursts  of  constituent  power.  This  is  
not  to  suggest  that  the  Coastal  Sámi  will  not  need  civil  disobedience  and  disruptive  actions.  The  
freedom  of  assembly  and  the  freedom  of  speech  may  or  may  not  be  sufficient  for  subaltern  groups  
to  counter  unequal  opportunities,  to  mobilize  the  necessary  resources  to  set  the  agenda,  and  to  
transform  the  unequal  opportunities.  It  may  or  may  not  be  necessary  for  Coastal  Sámi  political  
resistance  to  stretch  the  already  constituted  laws,  or  even  to  break  them.  However,  the  point  is  that  it  
seems  to  me  as  if  the  various  parts  of  the  movement  adapt  to  each  other  in  such  a  way  as  to  keep  
some  form  of  balance  between  the  right  to  rebel  against  unjust  rulers,  and  the  obligation  to  defend  
the  republic.  In  this  sense,  the  Coastal  Sámi  political  entrepreneurs  seem  to  be  civic  republicans. 
 The  common  good:  As  civic  republicans,  the  Coastal  Sámi  political  entrepreneurs  remain  
patriotic,  in  favour  of  the  common  good,  even  when  they  exercise  their  right  to  rebel:  Bjarne  
Johansen  is  a  champion  of  political  resistance,  against  Marianne  Balto's  political  inclusion,  but  
through  their  public  contention,  the  two  actually  adapt  their  strategies  to  each  other,  and  are  in  a  
way  coordinated.  The  currency  of  the  common  good  is  not  insignificant.  When  the  sea  salmon  
fishers  in  Deanudat  debate  with  river  fishers  in  upstream  Deatnu,  or  with  those  who  make  a  living  
from  tourist  angling,  then  we  are  dealing  with  a  classic  common  pool  problem:  All  of  them  fish  
from  the  same  stocks  of  fish,  and  therefore,  everyone  has  a  shared  interest  in  maintaining  the  fish  
                                                 
946  Cólón-Ríos  2010 
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stocks  for  future  seasons,  but  they  may  have  conflicting  interests  about  who  has  to  restrain  their  
fishing  this  season.  When  Bjarne  Johansen  expresses  skepticism  concerning  the  present  regulation  
regime,  as  well  as  the  present  monitoring  regime,  this  does  not  mean  that  he  is  against  regulation  or  
monitoring  as  such,  but  that  he  claims  that  the  burden  has  been  distributed  in  a  deeply  unfair  way.  
Everyone  agrees  that  there  is  a  need  to  develop  better  regulation  systems,  but  the  challenge  is  whose  
right  to  fish  should  get  priority.  Everyone  agrees  that  there  is  need  to  develop  better  monitoring  
methods,  but  the  challenge  is  whose  research  questions  should  get  priority.  Elinor  Ostrom's  theory  
of  natural  resources  management  implies  that  common  pool  problems  may  in  some  cases  be  solved  
through  deliberation,  negotiations,  and  the  maintenance  of  customary  norms.  The  traditional  
communities  that  sustained  over  time  were  those  that  adapted  sustainable  management  of  natural  
resources.  By  contrast,  the  old  theory  from  Hardin  and  Hobbes  implies  that  central  command  is  
necessary.  However,  central  command  may  also  create  the  tragedy  of  the  commons,  by  disturbing  
traditional  customs  that  were  once  sustainable.947  In  Deatnuvotna,  as  in  other  Coastal  Sámi  areas,  
the  states  have  already  made  a  mess  in  the  ancient  fishery  management  system,  by  using  their  
coercive  force  to  open  up  the  fjords  for  larger  vessels  owned  by  capitalists  from  more  central  
places.  Thus,  the  Coastal  Sámi  did  not  have  the  option  that  outfield  users  in  Inner  Sápmi  may  have  
had,  which  was  to  just  ignore  the  states  and  go  on  with  the  ancient  way  of  managing  fisheries.  Since  
the  Coastal  Sámi  could  no  longer  avoid  the  state,  they  had  to  engage  with  it  instead,  to  try  to  reform  
it.  Thus,  they  deal  with  a  management  system  that  is  a  combination  of  carrot  and  stick,  unlike  their  
kinfolk  in  Inner  Sápmi,  who  may  avoid  the  stick,  and  stick  to  the  carrot.  When  Coastal  Sámi  
political  entrepreneurs  such  as  Marianne  Balto  and  Bjarne  Johansen  adapt  to  each  other,  they  may  
be  capable  of  countering  the  mess  made  by  the  colonial  state,  by  empowering  themselves  to  re-
constitute  it,  while  at  the  same  time  avoiding  stirring  up  even  more  mess,  by  combining  the  right  to  
rebel  with  the  obligation  to  defend  the  republic.  This  may  perhaps  be  a  method  whereby  indigenous  
peoples  can  try  to  decolonize  a  very  intrusive  state. 
 
 
10.4.3  The  limits  of  political  sociology 
In  the  previous  chapter  (9.0.0),  I  approached  political  fieldwork  with  concepts  and  methods  typical  
to  political  science.  That  was  thematically  limited  to  formal  institutions,  but  this  limitation  avoided  
a  wider  geographical  scope,  taking  the  entire  Deatnu  Water  Area  into  consideration.  In  the  present  
chapter,  by  contrast,  I  have  zoomed  in  on  more  fine-grained  details.  Here,  I  have  used  concepts  and  
methods  typical  to  political  sociology,  which  has  allowed  me  to  trace  how  political  entrepreneurs  
                                                 
947  Ostrom  2005:62-4 
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generate  constituent  power  from  within  the  civil  society,  interacting  with  the  formal  institutions  of  
the  political  system.  This  is  thematically  wider,  but  geographically  I  have  narrowed  the  focus,  to  
downstream  areas  of  the  Deatnu  Water  Area.  Those  two  approaches  to  political  fieldwork  are  
complimentary.  The  approach  used  in  the  previous  chapter  was  useful  for  tracing  some  of  the  large-
scale  changes  in  the  political  system  at  large.  The  approach  used  in  the  present  chapter  was  
instrumental  in  identifying  some  of  the  possibilities  that  exist  for  subaltern  political  entrepreneurs  to  
empower  themselves  from  within  the  civil  society. 
 In  the  following  chapter,  however,  I  am  going  to  apply  a  third  approach  to  political  
fieldwork,  in  order  to  overcome  a  limitation  with  both  of  the  approaches  I  have  used  thus  far.  I  will  
now  turn  to  methods  and  concepts  traditionally  used  by  political  anthropologists.  Regarding  
methods,  a  preference  for  participant  observation,  rather  than  qualitative  interviews  or  archive  
studies,  makes  it  easier  to  access  action  situations  located  at  the  “social  backstage”,  and  this  has  
been  a  force  for  the  anthropology  of  Coastal  Sámi  communities.948  Regarding  concepts,  political  
anthropologists  do  not  assume  that  functional  differentiation  between  political  systems  and  civil  
society  has  actually  taken  place.  Instead,  they  observe  how  mundane  everyday  praxes  may  function  
as  acts  of  power.949  By  not  assuming  any  distinction  between  civil  society  and  the  political  system,  
the  researcher  is  enabled  to  observe  a  wider  repertoire  of  constituent  praxes.  The  researcher  may  
even  be  empowered  to  identify  a  wider  plurality  of  actual  constituted  orders.  Contemporary  political  
anthropology  has  been  adapted  to  postcolonial  situations  where  legal  pluralism,  or  even  overlapping  
sovereignties,  are  the  rule  rather  than  the  exception.  Concepts  and  methods  from  political  
anthropology  are  relevant,  of  two  reasons. 
 Firstly,  political  anthropology  will  enable  us  to  address  the  disagreements  between  the  two  
contradictory  reports  from  the  Norwegian  Ministry  of  Fisheries.  In  order  to  provide  a  few  more  
relevant  proofs,  one  has  to  be  able  to  observe  if  any  actual  customary  practice  and  any  actual  
perceptions  of  justice  indicate  any  de  facto  legal  and  jurisdictional  pluralism.  In  order  to  observe  
that,  the  researcher  needs  a  method  that  gives  access  to  the  social  “back  stage”,  and  she  needs  
concepts  that  do  not  assume  that  there  is  an  actual  functional  differentiation  between  the  political  
system  and  civil  society.  In  other  words,  the  researcher  should  not  have  prejudices  that  disable  him  
from  observing  if  there  is  any  actual  legal  and  jurisdictional  pluralism.  In  the  following  chapter,  I  
will  proffer  a  few  more  proofs  in  support  of  the  report  from  the  Coastal  Fisheries  Commission,  
which  indicates  that  Coastal  Sápmi  actually  does  possess  a  degree  of  legal  and  jurisdictional  
pluralism  similar  to  what  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission  identified  in  Inner  Sápmi. 
 Secondly,  political  anthropology  is  useful  for  identifying  a  wider  range  of  possibilities  for  
                                                 
948  Eidheim  1971,  referred  to  in  Eyþórsson  2008:  46-7 
949  Nustad  &  Krohn-Hansen  2005 
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subaltern  empowerment.  Above,  I  have  discussed  corporative  inclusion  and  syndical  resistance  as  
two  particular  forms  of  political  entrepreneurship.  Both  paths  were  theorized  in  terms  of  civic  
republicanism,  as  paths  whereby  the  political  system  and  the  civil  society  regulate  each  other.  
However,  in  the  following  chapter,  I  will  show  samples  of  a  much  wider  repertoire  of  action,  
including  social  entrepreneurship  within  the  market  economy  and  the  scientific  knowledge,  as  well  
as  social  defence  of  immemorial  customary  praxes  and  knowledge  praxes.  The  latter  is  not  civil  
society  action.  It  is  non-violent  maintenance  of  a  parallel,  but  more  ancient,  jurisdictional  order.  In  
the  present  chapter,  I  dealt  with  the  state  system  that  was  never  fully  consolidated.  In  the  next,  I  will  
deal  with  the  siida  system  that  never  fully  disappeared. 
 This  harks  back  to  my  discussion  of  structural  violence  at  the  beginning  of  this  chapter.  
There  I  observed  that  the  two  contradictory  reports  from  the  Norwegian  Ministry  of  Fisheries  are  
supported  by  different  social  actors:  the  hegemonic  political  class  accepts  the  2005  report,  the  social  
scientists  accept  the  2008  report.  If  the  latter  are  actually  more  correct  than  the  former,  then  it  
means  that  the  policy  process  so  far  has  not  been  determined  by  the  power  of  the  better  argument.  
By  mobilizing  tools  from  political  anthropology,  we  will  see  that  this  is  probably  the  case,  but  also,  




10.5.0  Preliminary  conclusion  to  second  part  of  Case  II 
 
Negative  findings:  This  chapter  has  traced  some  moments  in  the  struggle  for  rights  and  proof,  
which  indicates  that  knowledge  on  Coastal  Sámi  communities  is  bound  to  be  used  by  political  
actors  with  specific  interests.  Therefore  there  is  no  knowledge  that  is  not  positioned.  In  this  chapter,  
I  presented  some  specific  reports,  tools  in  the  struggle  for  proofs.  They  are  circulating  at  specific  
nodes  of  empowerment.  The  reports  can  be  seen  as  contributions  to  the  collective  effort  to  
overcome  colonial  bias.  However,  this  does  not  mean  that  we  have  suddenly  overcome  bias  and  
reached  neutral  knowledge.  In  the  struggle  for  rights  and  proofs,  there  is  no  neutral  knowledge,  and  
since  knowledge  always  remains  unfinished,  there  will  always  be  some  residual  bias  to  overcome.  
However,  this  chapter  has  not  provided  such  detailed  information  that  I  can  possibly  assess  what  
colonial  biases  might  remain  to  be  overcome  in  those  observations.  In  the  following  chapter,  
however,  I  will  engage  in  much  more  detail,  and  will  end  with  a  thorough  discussion  of  biases  that  
remain  to  be  overcome. 
 
 376  
 
Positive  findings:  This  chapter  has  confirmed  the  mechanisms  already  observed  in  Case  I  and  in  the  
geographical  bridge  chapter.  There  is  a  struggle  to  define  the  hegemony  within  a  body  of  law  and  a  
body  of  knowledge,  and  there  is  a  struggle  to  set  the  agenda  for  policy-making  and  scientific  
inquiry.  However,  in  the  present  chapter,  in  contrast  to  the  previous  instances,  we  have  traced  a  
process  where  the  emerging  political  entrepreneurs  have  thus  far  failed  to  set  the  agenda,  and  
likewise,  have  thus  far  failed  to  define  hegemony.  This  might  not  be  because  there  is  insufficient  
proof.  In  the  following  chapter,  I  will  attempt  to  uncover  what  factors  have  been  decisive  so  far,  and  
I  will  argue  that  the  decisive  factor  so  far  has  certainly  not  been  lack  of  reliable  proof.  I  will  now  
dig  deeply  into  the  politics  of  everyday  life,  supplementing  the  sociological  approach  to  political  
fieldwork  with  the  anthropological  approach. 
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11.1.0  Introduction  to  third  part  of  Case  II 
 
The  present  chapter  will  continue  the  local  focus  on  Denuvuotna,  the  Deatnu  Fjord.  However,  in  
this  chapter  I  will  zoom  in  to  an  even  greater  extent,  by  bringing  the  reader  back  to  situations  I  
experienced  through  participant  observation.  Here,  I  will  provide  some  more  concrete,  selective  
samples,  of  what  local  people  do  in  order  to  empower  themselves.  We  will  visit  local  fisher-
peasants  at  the  social  “front  stage”,  where  we  can  see  some  of  the  ways  whereby  they  engage  in  
public  participation:  they  participate  in  state  politics  by  informing  the  policy  process;;  they  
participate  market  economy  through  small  business  entrepreneurship;;  they  participate  in  epistemic  
knowledge  through  bio-scientific  reporting.  However,  the  reader  will  also  be  brought  to  some  
selected  situations  at  the  social  “back  stage”,  and  here  we  will  unearth  some  examples  of  everyday  
praxes  of  a  form  that  has  been  branded  “everyday  forms  of  peasant  resistence”.  Those  data  have  
been  gathered  through  participant  observation,  an  approach  to  political  fieldwork  that  is  typical  for  
anthropology. 
 The  findings  will  also  be  discussed  in  relation  to  theoretical  developments  in  political  
anthropology.  On  the  one  hand,  the  various  paths  to  public  participation  (political,  economic,  
epistemic)  will  be  synthesized  as  a  mechanism,  that  I  call  “resources  decide”.  On  the  other  hand,  
regarding  the  more  discrete  forms  of  empowerment,  I  will  discuss  this  in  light  of  postcolonial  
human  rights  law,  and  will  raise  the  question  of  whether  the  term  “everyday  forms  of  peasant  
resistance”  actually  fits.  The  latter  question  will  be  further  discussed  in  the  next  chapter.  The  present  
chapter,  however,  will  conclude  with  a  long  list  of  biases  that  remain  to  be  overcome,  and  
suggestions  for  further  research. 
 I  owe  thanks  to  Gro  Ween  for  having  read  through  and  commented  upon  an  earlier  version  
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11.2.0  Political  anthropology:  entrepreneurship,  defence,  legal  pluralism 
 
11.2.1  Diagnoses:  secret  whispers 
The  fisher-peasants  recognized  me  when  I  returned  one  year  later.  I  had  been  there  one  year  before,  
and  was  supposed  to  sit  down  and  write.  In  the  meantime,  however,  I  had  learned  more  about  
political  anthropology.  I  had  been  to  another  Coastal  Sámi  area,  where  everyday  praxes  had  become  
explicitly  politicized.  Thus,  it  had  become  easier  to  spot  the  political  dimension,  and  practices  that  
the  anthropologists  formerly  perceived  as  “conflict  avoidance”  were  now  re-defined  as  discrete  
forms  of  “everyday  resistance”.950  I  realized  that  my  own  data  were  too  thin  about  whatever  might  
be  going  on  the  social  “back-stage”  in  Deanduvuotna.  I  felt  responsible  for  the  public  usefulness  of  
my  research.  Within  Coastal  Sámi  areas,  few  people  would  publicly  question  the  legitimacy  of  the  
nation-states  or  the  dominant  political  parties.  However,  in  private  conversation,  I  have  heard  some  
of  the  most  lawful  citizens  whisper  “Actually,  it’s  is  still  a  colony”. 
 Coastal  Sápmi  is  not  Inner  Sápmi.  In  the  latter  area,  it  is  clear  that  the  ICCPR  and  ICESCR  
provides  legal  blessings  to  the  secret  whispers.  This  is  because  international  human  rights  law  
demands  that  in  areas  where  Norway  and  Sápmi  overlap,  it  is  necessary  to  reconcile  the  right  to  
state  sovereignty  with  the  right  to  indigenous  self-determination.951  This  clearly  applies  to  Inner  
Sápmi,  because  the  ongoing  reform  process  is  an  admission  from  the  states  that  the  Sámi  Rights  
Commission  was  correct  to  claim  that  the  de  facto  legal  pluralism  has  remained  in  the  area  ever  
since  the  state  builders  attempted  to  criminalize  the  ancient  stateless  political  system  in  Sápmi.  This  
description  of  the  reality  remains  controversial,  but  it  has  been  accepted  by  the  hegemonic  political  
class  within  the  Norwegian  political  entity.  However,  the  states  have  accepted  this  description  only  
with  regard  to  Inner  Sápmi,  not  with  regard  to  the  Sápmi  Coast.  With  regard  to  the  coastal  area,  the  
Norwegian  Ministry  of  Fisheries  has  produced  two  contradictory  reports,  as  I  described  in  the  
previous  chapter.  The  report  from  the  Coastal  Fisheries  Commission  is  in  favour  of  indigenous  
rights  in  Coastal  Sápmi,  identical  to  what  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission  suggested  for  Inner  Sápmi.  
However,  only  four  years  earlier,  the  Ørebech  Report  had  come  to  the  opposite  conclusion,  claiming  
that  Coastal  Sámi  culture  no  longer  exists.  This  is  the  view  that  so  far  has  gained  acceptance  among  
the  hegemonic  political  class  in  the  Norwegian  political  entity.  Therefore,  for  areas  in  Coastal  
Sápmi,  it  is  not  (yet)  clear  that  the  ICCPR  and  ICESCR  provide  legal  blessings  to  the  secret  
whispers.  Thus,  the  subaltern  voices  remain  silent.952 
 
                                                 
950  Bjerkli  2000;;  Bjerkli  2010 
951  According  to  the  ICCPR,  §1  and  §27,  as  well  as  the  ICESCR,  §1.  For  further  info,  see  Anaya  2004.   
952  ...and  thus,  we  may  rhetorically  ask,  with  Spivak  (1988):  “Can  the  subaltern  speak?” 
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 With  this  chapter  I  aim  at  making  secret  whispers  public.  By  writing  this  paragraph,  I  have  
already  publicized  what  one  of  the  publically  state-loyal  fisher-peasants  stated  in  private;;  that  
“Actually,  it’s  still  a  colony”.  There  are  two  reasons  why  I  choose  to  publicize  the  private. 
 First,  I  think  public  attention  to  secret  whispers  may  provide  further  proof  that  indeed  the  
Coastal  Fisheries  Commission  was  correct,  while  the  Ørebeh  Report  merely  reproduced  
colonial  prejudice. 
 Second,  I  think  that  brining  public  attention  to  secret  whispers  may  help  subaltern  political  
entrepreneurs  identify  some  of  the  actual  paths  to  empowerment  that  are  being  pursued  in  
some  concrete  cases,  and  may  be  replicated  in  other  cases  too. 
I  do  not  try  to  cover  up  the  political  function  of  social  research.  Instead  I  take  full  responsibility  for  
how  my  research  may  be  (mis)used:  By  conducting  participant  observation  on  the  struggle  for  
rights,  I  become  an  observant  participant  in  the  related  struggle  for  proofs.  My  contribution  is  not  
particularly  “Sámi  activist”.  I  am  an  ethnically  mixed  Norwegian,  but  a  non-Sámi  one.  I  contribute  
to  ongoing  Norwegian  nation-re-building:  our  collective  effort  to  overcome  nationalist  
particularism.  Norwegian  methodological  nationalism  and  statism,  as  I  discussed  in  Chapter  2,  is  a  
shared  adversary  for  environmental  scientists  who  defend  their  methodological  integrity,  for  the  
multi-ethnic  subaltern  struggle  in  Kåfjord,  and  for  the  indigenous  rights  struggle  in  Deanuvuotna.  In  
my  view,  the  joint  struggle  against  Norwegian  nationalist  particularism  could  potentially  be  what  
Pedersen  and  Høgmo  call  “an  integrating  issue  area”.953  Postcolonial  human  rights  law,  as  well  as  
the  treaties  on  environmental  management,  imply  that  the  states  should  leave  behind  the  chauvinism  
of  “national  interest”  in  the  management  of  common  natural  and  cultural  heritage  in  Sápmi. 
 The  present  chapter  has  mobilized  concepts  and  methods  from  political  anthropology.  
Empirically,  participant  observation  is  a  technique  that  has  enabled  me  to  gather  samples  of  
information  from  some  everyday  action  situations,  at  the  social  “front  stage”  as  well  as  the  “back  
stage”.  Conceptually,  I  have  chosen  to  trace  the  circulation  of  an  object  that  serves  various  
functions  for  a  community.  This  is  a  classical  anthropological  method,  in  the  tradition  of  Marcel  
Mauss.954  The  chosen  object  is  salmon  flesh.  I  follow  its  circulation  between  various  action  
situations  where  it  is  used  for  highly  diverse  practices:  economic  (nutrition  and  distribution),  
epistemic  (knowledge  praxes)  and  normative  (customary  praxes).  When  we  follow  the  flesh,  we  go  
back  and  fro  across  the  conceptual  boundary  between  political  system  and  civil  society.  One  force  
of  classical  anthropology  is  that  it  does  not  assume  that  there  is  any  actual  functional  differentiation  
in  the  society.  This  is  why  fieldwork  in  the  tradition  of  political  anthropology  will  provide  different  
data  from  fieldwork  based  on  the  traditions  of  political  sociology  or  political  science.  The  political  
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954  Appadurai  1998;;  Mauss  1923-4. 
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science  approach  has  helped  me  to  garner  a  broad  overview  on  some  of  the  formal  political  
institutions  in  the  Deatnu  Water  Area  (Chapter  9).  The  political  sociology  approach  helped  me  to  
zoom  in  on  how  subalterns  may  counter  unequal  opportunities  through  political  entrepreneurship  in  
civil  society  and  the  political  system  (Chapter  10).  But  the  political  anthropology  approach  will  help  
me  with  the  two  tasks  mentioned  in  the  two  bullet-points  above:  to  find  some  further  proof  in  
support  of  the  Coastal  Fisheries  Commission,  and  to  identify  some  ways  whereby  subalterns  may  
empower  themselves  away  from  the  already  constituted  state.  In  particular,  political  anthropology  
has  been  developed  in  postcolonial  areas,  where  legal  pluralism,  or  even  overlapping  sovereignties,  
is  the  rule  rather  than  the  exception.955  In  such  situations  it  is  hard  to  draw  a  clear  distinction  
between  the  political  system  and  civil  society.  Instead,  there  may  be  co-existence  between  several  
complex  dynamic  systems,  each  of  them  serving  both  political  and  social  functions.  The  dynamics  of  
such  complex  dynamic  systems  may  be  observed  in  unusual  events  or  in  violent  actions,  but  may  
equally  well  be  observed  in  seemingly  mundane  everyday  praxes. 
 
A state formation is the result of myriads of situations where social actors negotiate power and meaning. 
This shifts the focus of analysis to the many practices of power and the mundane and ritual forms that 
constitute the state.956 
 
Such a view of constituent power differs strongly from the conventional view in so-called  “realist”  
political science, where the assumption is that monopoly of violence produces sovereignty, which in 
turn produces constitutional order. With that assumption, one would predict that constituent power 
is  the  “state  of  exception”,  the  situations  where  everyday  routines  of  legitimized  rule  are  set  a  side,  
and only naked force remains. By contrast, the anthropological view is that constituted order is 
being socially reproduced through every kind of praxes, including customary praxes and knowledge 
praxes. Maintenance and transformation of political order becomes equal to social reproduction. 
This actualizes the conceptualization of constituted order as  “legal  pluralism”,  and  of  contentious  
constituent praxes as  a  combination  of  “social  entrepreneurship”  and  even  “social  defence”. 
 
 
11.2.2  Legal  pluralism 
Local  people  in  Sámi  areas  know  how  it  is  to  live  with  parallel  systems  of  norms.  Practical  
experience  from  Inner  Sápmi  found  support  in  documented  proofs,  which  were  published  by  the  
Sámi  Rights  Commission.  Similar  local  experiences  from  Coastal  Sápmi  were  expressed  in  the  
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report  from  the  Coastal  Fisheries  Commission.  Steinar  Pedersen  was  a  local  schoolteacher  and  
salmon  fisherman,  who  became  a  politician  and  a  historian.  In  a  recent  article,  he  wrote: 
 
[I]n  reality,  both  the  jurisdictional  and  juridical  history  of  Finnmark  contains  many  elements  which  
should  signal  the  highest  sensitivity  and  regard  in  these  matters,  especially  when  Norway  is  dealing  with  
minority  and  indigenous  rights.  One  particular  and  significant  fact  is  that  Finnmark  is  the  most  recent  
territory  to  be  part  of  the  Norwegian  sovereign  state.  Some  fjord  districts  have  in  fact  been  part  of  
Norway  for  less  than  two  hundred  years,  with  their  own  possible  legal  arrangements  before  the  actual  
districts  became  a  part  of  Norway  [my  emphasis].957 
 
The  author  comes  from  Deanuvuotna.  This  fjord  is  located  in  Eastern  Finnmark,  an  area  where  even  
the  theoretical  state  borders  remained  contested  until  modern  times.  Taking  this  historical  context  
into  regard,  it  may  not  be  unlikely  that  Deanudvuotna  is  one  of  those  areas  where  the  siida  system  
never  fully  disappeared,  and  the  state  system  was  never  fully  consolidated.  With  regard  to  Inner  
Sápmi,  the  indigenous  rights  movement  has  gained  some  degree  of  recognition  from  the  hegemonic  
political  class  in  the  Norwegian  political  entity.  With  the  constitutional  amendment  and  the  
Finnmark  Act,  the  state  legislators  have  also  accepted  the  validity  of  the  new  proofs  on  legal  history,  
which  were  presented  by  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission:  Since  times  immemorial,  there  has  been  a  
de  facto  legal  pluralism  in  Inner  Sápmi,  in  spite  of  de  jure  claims  that  the  state  was  the  only  source  
of  law.  Local  customary  norms  and  local  traditional  knowledge  were  maintained  and  developed  
since  times  immemorial,  regardless  of  whether  those  were  codified,  criminalized,  or  ignored  by  
state  law.  This  also  means  that  the  states  never  became  the  only  sources  of  actual  legal  norms  in  
Sápmi.  If  the  power  to  create  actual  legal  norms  is  called  jurisdiction,  then  the  legal  pluralism  in  
Sápmi  was  actually  a  jurisdictional  pluralism.  However,  jurisdiction  in  this  sense  is  not  the  same  as  
sovereignty,  if  the  latter  means  monopoly  of  violence.  What  is  challenging  for  the  old  state  theory  is  
that  in  Sápmi  there  were  clear-cut  sovereignties  (meaning  monopolies  of  violence),  but  complex  
jurisdictions  (meaning  sources  of  law).  In  the  Sápmi  area,  the  political  geography  of  sovereignty  is  
not  identical  to  the  political  geography  of  jurisdiction.  Such  is  the  actual  legal  pluralism,  or  even  
jurisdictional  pluralism,  that  was  disclosed  by  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission.  There  are  many  
reasons  why  this  situation  came  into  being.  One  reason  is  that  when  pluri-national  despotic  states  
were  turned  into  democratic  nation-states,  they  then  codified  the  local  customs  in  areas  that  were  
defined  as  culturally  central  to  the  national  culture,  while  criminalizing  the  local  customs  in  areas  
that  were  defined  as  culturally  different  from  the  state-building  nation.  In  Western  Sápmi,  the  
Scandinavian  peasants  were  defined  as  in-group  to  the  Norwegian  and  Swedish  nation-states,  while  
the  Sámi  peoples  were  defined  as  out-group.  Political  democratization  for  the  in-group  implied  
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colonization  of  the  out-group.  Economic  development  for  the  in-group  implied  economic  
underdevelopment  for  the  out-group.  The  actual  legal  and  jurisdictional  pluralism  of  Sápmi,  at  least  
in  its  contemporary  form,  is  a  product  of  eugenics  and  colonization. 
 International  norms  did  not  introduce  legal  pluralism.  On  the  contrary,  when  the  states  
ratified  recent  international  norms,  they  also  accepted  that  there  had  been  a  de  facto  legal  and  
jurisdictional  pluralism  since  times  immemorial.  Both  ICESCR  and  ICCPR  (§  27)  deal  with  
cultural  rights,  but  only  the  ICESCR  also  deals  with  social  and  economic  rights.  Collective  human  
rights,  including  the  right  to  indigenous  self-determination  are  not  only  the  right  to  maintain  
colorful  folklore.  They  also  include  the  right  to  freedom  from  economic  exploitation,  freedom  from  
political  marginalization,  and  freedom  from  territorial  colonization.958   
 The  indigenous  rights  struggle  in  Deanuvuotna,  as  well  as  in  other  communities  in  Coastal  
Sápmi,  actualizes  all  three  dimensions  of  the  ICESCR,  namely  cultural,  economic  and  social.  The  
struggle  for  indigenous  rights  for  fisher-peasants,  and  against  Norwegian  trawler  capitalists,  is  a  
struggle  against  resource  grabbing,  and  for  indigenous  territorial  rights.  The  ICCPR  and  ICESCR  
are  interpreted  in  two  competing  ways,  justified  with  the  two  contradictory  reports  from  the  
Norwegian  Ministry  of  the  Environment,  and  serving  the  economic  interests  of  two  competing  blocs  
of  fisheries  organizations.  For  some,  state  sovereignty  defines  the  common  good  (“allmennhetens  
interesse”).  For  them,  the  fish  stocks  should  be  managed  as  a  national  commons,  adjusted  by  
multilateral  agreements  on  environmental  protection  (NASCO,  EU-WFD).  This  implies  that  fjord  
fishing  rights  along  the  Barents  Coast  belong  to  the  citizens  of  each  state.  Trawlers  from  Portugal  
would  not  be  welcome.  Trawlers  from  Bergen  would  be  welcome  because  they  contribute  to  
Norwegian  GDP.  That  measurement  conceals  the  fact  that  by  grabbing  the  regional  resources,  those  
trawlers  also  contribute  to  regional  underdevelopment.  For  some  others,  international  norms  
demand  both  state  sovereignty  and  indigenous  self-determination  be  accommodated  in  Coastal  
Sámi  fjords,  in  addition  to  multilateral  agreements  on  environmental  protection  (NASCO,  EU-
WFD).  They  argue  that  the  right  to  fish  in  Coastal  Sápmi  is  a  regional  right,  just  as  the  right  to  
harvest  off  the  land  in  Inner  Sápmi  has  also  been  defined  as  a  regional  right.  Thus,  they  suggest  that  
the  fish  stocks  should  be  managed  as  a  regional  common  good,  also  adjusted  by  multilateral  
agreements  on  environmental  protection  (NASCO,  EU-WFD).  This  would  also  imply  usage  of  
fishery  regulation  in  order  to  heal  the  harm  that  has  been  inflicted  through  forced  regional  
underdevelopment.  The  fishery  conflicts  of  Coastal  Sápmi  render  visible  the  intersection  of  
economic  interest  politics  and  indigenous  rights  politics.  This  does  not  mean  that  the  indigenous  
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rights  movement  has  an  ulterior  motive,  but  on  the  contrary,  that  the  justification  for  indigenous  
rights  is  systematic  discrimination,  colonisation  and  forced  underdevelopment. 
 In  many  action  situations,  state  laws  and  indigenous  customs  prescribe  the  same  actions.  
This  is  the  case  whenever  longstanding  customs  have  been  codified  –  or  are  simply  ignored  –  by  
state  legislation.  However,  in  some  action  situations,  state  laws  and  indigenous  customs  may  be  in  
conflict  with  one  another.  This  may  be  the  case  especially  whenever  contentions  about  indigenous  
rights  remain  unresolved.  This  unresolved  conflict  between  competing  legal  interpretations  implies  
that  some  people  might  very  well  act  in  good  faith,  while  still  breaking  international  law.  On  the  
one  hand,  local  fisher-peasants  may  act  in  good  faith  in  situations  where  obedience  of  longstanding  
customs  implies  disobedience  of  state  law.  On  the  other  hand,  state  servants  may  act  in  good  faith  in  
situations  where  obedience  of  state  law  implies  violations  of  longstanding  customs.   
 It  is  hard  to  work  as  a  judge  at  the  Inner  Finnmark  District  Court,  and  the  political  scientist  
should  not  take  the  normative  implications  of  his  writings  lightly.  In  my  opinion,  the  Coastal  
Fisheries  Commission  was  correct,  and  my  mission  is  to  provide  further  proof  to  bolster  its  claims.  I  
think  that  those  who  reject  the  Commission’s  claims  simply  ignore  the  factual  proof  –  but  I  must  
recognize  that  they  may  act  in  good  faith,  and  I  do  not  believe  that  the  Commission  offered  any  
panacea.  More  importantly,  I  must  recognize  that  some  fishing  practices,  that  I  see  as  legal  under  
international  law,  may  be  adjudged  illegal  by  others,  who  are  much  more  powerful  than  me.  For  this  
reason,  I  have  found  it  necessary  to  anonymize  a  few  of  the  local  fisher-peasants  who  have  shared  
their  precious  traditional  knowledge  with  me  during  my  visits  in  their  livelihood. 
 
 
11.2.3  Social  entrepreneurship  and  social  defence 
Some  of  the  tension  between  small-scale  fisheries  in  Coastal  Sápmi,  and  industrial  fisheries  in  
Norway  is  being  channelled  through  political  entrepreneurship  of  the  forms  that  were  described  in  
the  previous  chapter:  corporatist  participation  through  the  Sámi  Parliament,  and  syndical  resistance  
through  the  “carnivalesque  public  sphere”.  One  is  a  channel  of  limited  participatory  democracy,  the  
other  a  path  of  deliberative  participatory  democracy.  Both  represent  routes  to  constituent  power.  
However,  even  when  they  are  combined  they  provide  limited  possibilities.  Nonetheless,  they  may  
also  be  combined  with  other  paths  to  empowerment,  which  deal  less  with  state-led  policy  processes. 
 Social  entrepreneurship  is  a  recent  term  used  to  describe  some  ways  to  empower  
communities,  through  the  cultivation  of  social  capital.  This  takes  place  outside  state  politics.  
Therefore  it  is  different  from  what  I  have  called  political  entrepreneurship,  and  more  similar  to  what  
we  conventionally  know  at  business  entrepreneurship.  However,  while  business  entrepreneurship  is  
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private  enterprise  for  individual  gain,  social  entrepreneurship  is  collective  enterprise  for  the  
common  good.959  This  is  rather  similar  to  the  agricultural  cooperatives,  which  were  built  up  in  the  
1920s,  and  later  enrolled  into  the  corporatist  state.  Social  entrepreneurship  stands  up  to  neoliberal  
innovation  clusters,  just  as  the  cooperative  movement  stood  up  to  corporatist  centralization.  Social  
entrepreneurship  takes  place  outside  the  state,  in  civil  society.  However,  it  is  limited  by  state  
regulations  and  other  structural  trains.  In  regional  innovation  clusters,  different  market  actors  have  
different  opportunities.  The  WTO  is  in  favor  of  corporate  capitalism,  and  therefore  also  against  
social  liberalism.  It  may  also  be  hard  to  influence  the  research  agenda  for  those  who  are  not  already  
insiders  in  a  transnational  epistemic  community.  Social  entrepreneurship  is  limited  by  already  
constituted  order,  but  may  also  offer  some  limited  opportunities  to  constitute  a  new  order. 
 Social  defence  is  a  term  I  have  taken  from  Gene  Sharp,  who  uses  it  to  describe  social  
sanctions,  non-violent  actions,  that  are  being  used  to  maintain  and  defend  a  parallel  social  
system.960  By  choosing  this  term,  my  work  represents  both  continuity  and  a  break  with  the  work  by  
Bjørn  Bjerkli.  He  initated  the  transfer  from  economic  anthropology  to  political  anthropology  in  
areas  where  Sápmi  and  Norway  overlap.  After  the  political  awakening  of  the  Sámi,  Kvän  and  
Norwegian  peasants  in  Kåfjord  /  Gáivuotna  /  Kaivuono,  anthropologists  in  the  nearby  city  of  
Tromsø  /  Romssa  /  Tromssa  changed  their  focus  from  economic  anthropology  to  political  
anthropology.  Influenced  by  the  new  political  agenda,  they  also  re-read  the  classics  with  new  eyes.  
Thus,  Bjørn  Bjerkli  suggests  that  it  may  actually  not  have  been  quite  to  the  point  when  Robert  Paine  
observed  a  culture  of  “conflict  avoidance”  and  Tim  Ingold  described  “dwelling  landscapes”.961  
Being  more  observant  of  the  political  dimension,  Bjerkli  suggested  that  what  might  superficially  
appear  as  conflict  avoidance  may  actually  be  more  similar  to  the  action  repertoires  that  James  Scott  
called  “everyday  forms  of  peasant  resistance”.962  Similarly,  the  dwelling  landscape  may  also  serve  a  
function  as  a  “landscape  of  resistance”.963  This  is  rather  close  to  the  ideas  developed  by  the  critical  
political  geographers  David  Slater  and  Paul  Routledge,  for  example  the  latter’s  concept  of  “terrains  
of  hegemony  and  resistance”.  This  is  also  similar  to  the  action  repertoires  that  I  observed  in  the  
previous  chapter,  namely  corporatist  inclusion  versus  syndicalist  resistance.  These  are  concepts  in  
the  matrix  of  civic  republicanism:  hegemony  is  the  state;;  resistance  is  the  power  of  the  people.  This  
is  well  and  good,  but  is  not  quite  fit  for  situations  of  legal  and  jurisdictional  pluralism.  If  it  is  correct  
that  the  siida  system  never  fully  disappeared,  while  the  states  system  was  never  fully  consolidated,  
then  the  actual  constituted  order  is  a  de  facto  situation  of  complex  jurisdictions  (meaning  sources  of  
                                                 
959  Brøgger  &  Eikeland  2009;;  Brøgger  2012 
960  Sharp  1973;;  Sharp  1990 
961  Paine  1967;;  Ingold  1986;;  Ingold  1995 
962  Bjerkli  2000;;  Scott  1985 
963  Bjerkli  2010 
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law)  combined  with  clear-cut  sovereignties  (meaning  monopolies  of  violence).  One  may  resist  
Norwegian  state  laws,  and  thus  challenge  a  political  hegemony  that  is  policed  with  coercive  force.  
However,  one  may  also  resist  Sámi  customary  practices,  something  that  entails  challenging  a  social  
hegemony,  policed  with  non-violent  sanctions.  James  Scott,  the  political  scientist  that  coined  the  
term  “everyday  peasant  resistance”,  observed  resistance  against  state  hegemony  in  lowland  South-
East  Asia.  However,  when  he  turned  to  the  history  of  highland  South-East  Asia,  he  found  social  
reproduction  of  a  parallel  normative  system,  which  was  more  egalitarian  and  more  nonviolent.964  
Political  anthropologists  have  found  that  this  description  also  fits  to  describe  some  contemporary  
isolated  societies  in  the  jungles  of  the  South-Asian  islands.965  Scott  compared  the  social  order  he  
found  to  Gellner's  descriptions  of  the  Amazigh  (Berber),  an  indigenous  people  of  the  Atlas  
Mountains.966  I  think  this  may  very  well  have  transfer  value  to  Sápmi  as  well,  especially  when  
having  in  mind  the  new  findings  in  legal  history  that  were  presented  by  the  Sámi  Rights  
Commission.  Inner  Sápmi,  similar  to  highland  South-East  Asia,  has  maintained  and  developed  a  
more  egalitarian  and  nonviolent  order,  in  spite  of  attempted  suppression  from  the  states.  The  
question  is  whether  the  same  has  also  happened  in  Coastal  Sápmi.  This  depends  on  which  one  of  the  
two  conflicting  reports  that  were  published  by  the  Ministry  of  Fisheries  we  should  believe.967  If  the  
Ørebech  Report  from  2005  is  correct,  then  there  is  no  longer  any  Coastal  Sámi  culture.968  If  so,  then  
the  discrete  subversion  of  state  power  in  these  areas  does  indeed  amount  to  “everyday  forms  of  
peasant  resistance”,  similar  to  what  Scott  observed  in  lowland  South-East  Asia.  If  this  is  the  case,  
then  Bjørn  Bjerkli  was  correct  to  use  the  term  everyday  peasant  resistance.  However,  if  the  report  
from  the  Coastal  Fisheries  Commission,  published  in  2008,  is  correct,  then  there  would  be  a  social  
reproduction  of  a  parallel  normative  order.  This  would  be  more  similar  to  what  Scott  observed  in  
highland  South-East  Asia.  If  this  is  the  case,  then  the  term  resistance  would  be  slightly  misleading,  
and  we  should  instead  use  Gene  Sharp’s  term,  “social  defence”.  I  have  now  formulated  this  as  
expectations  or  hypotheses.  Below,  I  provide  some  samples  of  information  which  indicate  that,  even  
though  the  report  from  the  Coastal  Fisheries  Commission  might  not  be  perfect,  the  Ørebech  Report  
should  be  seen  as  having  been  falsified.  Consequently,  I  do  not  use  the  term  “everyday  resistance”,  
and  instead  employ  the  term  “social  defence”.     
 Social  entrepreneurship  and  social  defence  are  two  terms  that  refer  to  political  
empowerment  outside  the  state.  Social  entrepreneurship  takes  place  outside  the  state,  but  is  
regulated,  enabled  and  limited  by  state  laws.  Thus  it  is  civil  society  action.  It  may  constitute  better  
                                                 
964  Scott  2009 
965  Gibson  &  Sillander  2011 
966  Scott  2009:  30 
967  NOU  2008 
968  NOU  2005:10,  kap.  3.2,  cited  in  Eyþórsson  2008:38 
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life  chances  directly,  by  generating  a  new  market  position,  or  a  new  epistemic  community.  It  may  
also  constitute  better  life  chances  indirectly,  through  resource  mobilization  and  framing  processes  
that  influence  constitutional  reforms  in  states  or  treaties.  Thus,  social  entrepreneurship  is  a  term  that  
may  be  used  to  discover  a  wide  range  of  empowering  activities  beyond  political  inclusion  and  
political  resistance.  Social  defence  also  takes  place  outside  the  state,  but  it  is  not  part  of  civil  
society,  because  it  is  not  regulated  by  state  laws.  Instead  it  is  regulated  by  the  parallel  normative  
system  that  it  defends.  For  example,  it  may  be  in  accordance  with  longstanding  customs  in  an  
indigenous  homeland.  However,  even  though  this  is  not  part  of  civil  society  it  is  also  not  party  of  
any  state  system.  It  is  action  that  emerges  from  a  parallel  jurisdiction  (meaning  a  source  of  law),  
which  is  free  from  sovereignty  (meaning  a  monopoly  of  violence).969  Social  defence  is  not  aimed  at  
state  transformation,  but  at  the  maintenance  of  the  parallel,  non-state  order.  However,  by  defending  
against  intrusive  state  power,  social  defence  also  is  an  interface  between  different  constituted  
orders.  Social  defence  is  one  possible  pathway  in  the  co-evolution  between  the  siida  system  that  
never  fully  disappeared  and  the  state  system  that  was  never  fully  consolidated.  Social  defence  of  the  
non-state  may  also  have  an  impact  on  the  course  of  state  transformation. 
 
 
11.2.4  Constituted  order:  legal  pluralism  as  social-ecological  systems 
In  the  previous  paragraph,  I  defined  the  concept  of  legal  pluralism,  including  jurisdictional  
pluralism.  At  the  beginning  of  the  previous  chapter,  I  defined  the  concept  of  structural  violence  as  
well.  Both  terms  refer  to  macro-sociological  phenomena.  As  such,  they  cannot  be  observed  directly.  
Instead,  such  concepts  remain  abstractions  about  spatio-temporal  patterns,  but  are  necessary  in  daily  
life  to  navigate  between  different  concrete  action  situations.  Before  I  engage  in  some  particular  
examples  that  indicate  the  presence  of  patterns  that  can  be  described  as  “legal  pluralism”  and  
“structural  violence”,  I  will  make  a  rough  sketch  that  provides  a  general  overview  over  the  social-
ecological  environment  in  Deanuvuotna.  Macro-political  formations  may  be  made  somewhat  more  
empirically  tangible  by  approaching  them  as  historical-geographical  formations,  as  patterns  with  
specific  spatial  extension  (and  density)  and  specific  temporal  durability  (and  continuity).  First,  we  
will  turn  to  environmental  and  humanistic  landscape  geographies,  and  then  to  political  geography.  
This  is  a  spatially  sensitive  way  of  introducing  what  Elinor  Ostrom  calls  the  Social-Ecological  
System,  which  she  sees  as  the  environmental  context  of  concrete  action  situations.  Environmental  
                                                 
969  This  definition  of  "jurisdiction"  and  "sovereignty"  might  be  peculiar,  but  I  find  it  useful  to  refer  to  a  situation  of  
constitutional  complexity,  where,  similarly  to  Latin  American  countries,  some  regions  may  be  de  facto  governed  ac-­
cording  to  longstanding  customs  among  indigenous  peoples  (Neves  2013,  Agnew  &  Oslender  2013),  whereas,  con-­
trary  to  the  Latin  American  cases  the  indigenous  peoples  do  not  answer  violence  with  violence.  See  part  2.2.2,  in  pa-­
ticular  the  long  footnote  on  how  to  define  "jurisdiction"  and  "sovereignty";;  and  part  4.3.6,  in  particular  Figure  4.2. 
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landscape  geography  is  an  empirical  version  of  what  what  she  calls  the  “resource  system”.  
Humanistic  landscape  geography  is  an  empirical  version  of  the  informal  norms  within  her  
“governance  system”.  Finally,  the  political  geography  of  states  corresponds  to  the  formal  norms  
within  her  “governance  system”.  My  object  of  research  is  state  transformation,  hence  formal  norms  
within  the  governance  system.  However,  I  explain  this  as  something  that  co-evolves  with  the  
informal  norms  of  the  governance  system  as  well  as  the  resource  system.  Let  us  see  have  a  look  at  
how  state  norms  are  being  adapted  to  the  ecological  and  sociological  realities  in  Deanuvuotna. 
 
Figure  11-1:  A  view  on  the  Deatnu  Fjord,  from  Durevuohppi 
The  Deatnu  Fjord  landscape,  as  seen  from  the  bottom  of  the  fjord  arm  Durevuohppi  (Indre  Torhop).  In  the  
background  one  can  see  the  eastern  wall  of  the  Deatnu  Fjord,  illuminated. 
 
 Environmental  landscape  geography:  The  Deatnu  fjord  is  the  downstream  part  of  the  
administrative  "water  area"  that  is  called  Teno  in  Finnish,  Tana  in  Norwegian,  or  Deatnu  in  Sámi.  
The  Deatnu  fjord  is  a  saltwater  ecosystem.  The  river  runs  from  the  south,  and  the  fjord  is  a  canyon  
continuing  north.  Steep  rock  walls  to  the  east  and  west  sides  protect  the  fjord  livelihood,  but  
towards  the  north,  the  fjord  is  an  open  gap  into  the  Arctic  Ocean.  On  the  southern  side,  the  fjord  
branches  into  a  number  of  smaller  fjord-arms.  Only  one  of  the  fjord  arms  receives  the  waters  from  
the  great  Deatnu  River.  This  particular  fjord  arm  has  a  special  ecosystem  of  mixed  waters,  where  
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the  ebbs  of  salt  water  meet  the  flow  of  fresh  water.  Those  mixed  coastal  waters  have  a  high  degree  
of  biodiversity,  and  are  administered  as  a  natural  reserve.970  The  other  fjord  arms  have  small  streams  
emptying  into  them,  sometimes  with  small  wetland  areas.  Those  small  streams  are  part  of  the  
Deatnu  Fjord  Basin,  but  are  outside  the  Deatnu  River  Basin.  According  to  the  EU  Water  Framework  
Directive,  the  Deatnu  fjord  and  river  basins  are  defined  as  one  administrative  "water  area".  
However,  it  is  hard  to  define  where  the  river  basin  ends,  and  where  the  larger  fjord  basin  starts.  
Likewise,  it  is  hard  to  say  where  the  fjord  basin  ends  and  where  the  much  larger  Barents  Sea  basin  
starts.  The  one  drainage  basin  is  folded  into  the  next:  the  hydrological  landscape  consists  of  
complex  or  entangled  ecosystems.  Thus,  it  is  somewhat  artificial  when,  for  analytical  purposes,  a  
system  boundary  is  defined.  This  is  relevant  for  the  politics  of  natural  resources  management.  The  
NASCO  treaty  and  the  EU-WFD  are  among  the  various  attempts  to  overcome  methodological  
nationalism  and  statism,  and  to  come  to  terms  with  the  actual  geography  of  complex  ecosystems. 
 Humanistic  landscape  geography:  In  the  Deatnu  fjord,  not  only  the  ecosystems  are  folded  
into  each  other.  The  same  is  the  case  for  social  systems.  Demographically,  the  Deatnu  Fjord  has  
relatively  high  degrees  of  ethnic  richness  and  financial  poverty,  when  compared  to  most  other  parts  
of  the  Nordic  states.  Economically,  the  households  tend  to  combine  wage  work  with  diverse  small-
scale  subsistence  practices:  fishing,  farming,  gathering  and  hunting.  Ethnically  and  linguistically,  
the  households  tend  to  be  mixed,  with  a  predominance  of  either  Northern  Sámi  or  Norwegian  
cultural  belonging.  This  demographic  pattern  is  typical  to  fjords  along  the  shore  of  the  Barents  Sea,  
though  some  other  socio-cultural  minorities  and  socio-economic  classes  tend  to  be  prevalent  on  the  
Russian  side.  On  the  Norwegian  side  of  the  Barents  Coast,  the  fjords  have  received  many  visits  
from  social  scientists  in  recent  decades.  Sociologists  have  documented  socio-economic  tensions  
between  centre  and  periphery  within  the  state  formation.971  Anthropologists  have  described  socio-
cultural  hybrids  and  tensions  between  the  Kvän  and  Coastal  Sámi  minorities,  the  Mountain  Sámi  
“majority  within  the  minority”,  and  the  Norwegian  majority.972  In  fjords  like  Deatnu  Fjord,  
sociologists  and  anthropologists  have  described  how  various  social  systems  are  folded  into  each  
other.  In  socio-cultural  terms,  minority  ethnicities  are  folded  into  majority  ethnicities.  Similarly  to  
how  the  ecosystems  are  complex  or  entangled,  there  is  cultural  complexity  as  well.973  In  socio-
economic  terms,  peripheral  local  communities  are  entangled  with  centralized  politics  and  capital.  
                                                 
970  Regaring  the  natural  reserve  of  Tanamunningen,  see  Finnmark  County  Governor  (undated) 
971  Brox  1966;;  Brox  1984;;  Otnes  1070;;  Otnes  2006 
972  Paine  1967;;  Eyþórsson  2008;;  Brattland  2012;;  Thuen  2004;;  Kramvig  2005 
973  Frederik  Barth  (1969)  is  famous  for  his  ethnologic  theorizing  on  ethno-cultural  complexity,  and  among  his  sources  
were  Eidheim's  (1971)  ethnographic  observations  from  Coastal  Sámi  areas  (Eriksen  2004).  The  term  cultural  
complexity  I  have  from  the  research  project  Cultural  Complexity  in  the  New  Norway  (CULCOM).  This  was  led  by  
Thomas  Hylland  Eriksen,  who  took  some  inspiration  from  Barth,  but  more  from  Bateson  (1972).  For  more  on  the  
CULCOM  project,  see  e.g.  Eriksen,  &  Næss  (2011). 
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Thus,  cultural  complexity  plus  ecological  complexity  equals  economic  complexity.  Those  socio-
cultural  and  socio-economic  complexities  are  relevant  for  the  management  of  natural  and  cultural  
heritage.  Reforms  such  as  the  ICESCR,  the  ILO169,  and  the  Finnmark  Act,  as  well  as  the  
suggestions  put  forward  by  the  Coastal  Fisheries  Commissions,  can  be  seen  as  attempts  to  
overcome  the  bias  of  methodological  nationalism  and  statism,  and  to  come  to  terms  with  the  actual  
geography  of  complex  social  systems.     
 Political  geography:  Ecosystems  management  in  the  Deatnu  Fjord  has  to  deal  with  
ecological  and  sociological  systems  that  are  folded  into  each  other:  Such  is  the  case  for  the  mixed  
coastal  waters,  where  the  freshwater  of  the  river  ecosystem  is  folded  into  the  saltwater  of  the  fjord  
ecosystem.  Also,  the  sociological  systems  are  folded  into  each  other,  in  a  structurally  analogous  
manner.  Ethnic  majorities  and  minorities  are  folded  into  each  other  in  ethnically  mixed  kinship  and  
reciprocity  networks.  Peripheral  local  communities  maintain  Longstanding  customs  and  traditional  
knowledge  from  the  indigenous  culture,  but  the  use  of  natural  resources  also  involves  more  central  
nodes  at  other  localities,  where  capital  is  accumulated,  culture  is  standardized,  and  authority  is  
centralized.  The  folded  ecosystems  and  the  folded  social  systems  produce  folded  jurisdictional  
systems.  Thus,  even  though  there  is  clear-cut  sovereignty  (meaning  a  monopoly  of  violence),  there  
are  multiple  and  terriotirially  overlapping  normative  sources.  Actual  norms  used  in  actual  natural  
resources  management  is  not  (only)  imposed  by  coercive  force,  but  are  (also)  maintained  and  
developed  through  the  hands-on  use  of  natural  resources. 
 What  does  the  folding  of  ecological  and  social  systems  in  the  Deatnu  fjord  mean  for  our  
understanding  of  political  systems  in  the  area?  Does  the  Norwegian  state  co-exist  with  parallel  or  
competing  legal  orders?  What  is  the  social  status  of  codified  laws  and  longstanding  norms  in  the  
actual  customary  praxes  of  the  local  community?  What  is  the  practical  usage  of  state-certified  
science  and  local  lore  in  the  actual  knowledge  praxes  of  the  local  community?  Are  we  actually  
dealing  with  structures  that  should  be  seen  as  two  distinct  socio-ecological  systems:  state  laws  and  
state-certified  science  on  the  one  hand,  and  local  indigenous  customs  and  local  indigenous  lore  on  
the  other  hand?  And,  if  these  should  be  seen  as  relatively  autonomous  formations,  how  do  they  co-
evolve?  My  tentative  answer  is  twofold:  First,  the  Coastal  Fisheries  Commission  was  correct  to  
suggest  that  the  conditions  in  Coastal  Sápmi  are  similar  to  the  conditions  that  the  Sámi  Rights  
Commission  found  in  Inner  Sápmi.  Second,  in  both  areas,  the  siida  system  never  fully  disappeared,  
and  consequently  the  state  system  has  never  never  been  fully  consolidated,  at  least  not  until  it  might  
attempt  to  codify  the  longstanding  customs  it  had  previously  attempted  to  criminalize.     
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11.2.5  Constituent  praxes:  entrepreneurship  and  social  resistance  in  action-situations 
In  order  to  be  as  “hands  on”  as  possible,  I  chose  to  direct  my  attention  to  concrete  action  situations,  
the  smallest  unit  of  analysis  in  Elinor  Ostrom’s  SES  framework.  I  will  turn  to  what  she  calls  the  
“operational  level”  of  fishery  management,  that  is,  what  fishers  do  in  the  boat  and  at  the  location  
where  fishing  takes  place,  at  the  quay  and  at  the  receiving  facility,  in  the  kitchen  and  during  the  
shared  consumption.  Thus,  by  following  the  flesh  of  the  salmon,  the  reader  and  myself  are  also  
tracing  particular  connections  in  the  network  of  “adjacent  action  situations”  as  Michael  McGinnis  
called  it,  the  social  circulations  whereby  deliberation  in  one  action  situation  may  further  develop  the  
norms  that  regulate  behaviour  in  another  action  situation.  This  method  provides  us  with  a  few  
selected  samples  of  a  rather  complex  process:  how  informal  and  formal  institutions  are  maintained  
and  developed  in  everyday  action  situations.  This  is  the  same  as  how  a  state  is  made  and  maintained  
through  mundane,  everyday  practice  (according  to  the  anthropologists  Nustad  and  Krohn-Hansen,  
cited  above).  By  taking  a  few  selected  samples  from  the  actual  network  of  adjacent  action  situations  
in  a  local  fishery  community,  I  exemplify  a  few  of  the  particular  mechanisms  that  are  at  play  in  the  
maintenance  and  development  of  institutional  norms.  This  is  particularly  interesting  when  we  deal  
with  a  local  community,  which,  according  to  some,  is  governed  both  by  written  state  laws  and  by  
unwritten  indigenous  customs.  I  think  my  particular  observations  provide  further  evidence  to  
support  this  view.  I  will  present  examples  of  some  customs  that  are  regulated  by  state  law;;  other  
customs  that  the  state  does  not  care  about,  but  which  regulate  themselves;;  and  finally,  a  few  
customs  where  there  is  still  an  unresolved  tension  between  the  two  normative  systems.  According  to  
how  those  samples  are  contextualized,  they  may  be  read  in  two  different  ways:  Either,  they  indicate  
everyday  forms  of  peasant  resistance  against  a  hegemonic  political  system,  or  alternatively,  they  
indicate  the  continuous  maintenance  and  development  of  longstanding  customs,  regardless  of  
whether  those  have  been  codified,  criminalized  or  ignored  by  the  state. 
 My  selection  procedures  are  not  statistical,  and  consequently,  I  have  no  pretensions  about  
saying  anything  whatsoever  about  the  relative  prevalence  of  various  forms  of  practice.  My  purpose  
is  to  find  indicators  of  actual  possibilities,  not  probabilities,  in  other  words,  mechanisms,  not  
correlations.  The  method  is  to  “follow  the  flesh”  of  the  salmon,  as  this  asset/sign/biomatter  
circulates  through  the  social  ecology.  Geographically  and  thematically,  my  attempt  to  follow  the  
salmon  flesh  through  the  Deatnu  fjord  brought  me  to  some  specific  sites  in  the  topography,  and  
some  specific  terms  in  a  typology.  
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Figure  11-2:  Panorama  over  the  fjord  arm  Deanudat,  from  its  western  side 
Panoramic  view  over  the  fjord  arm  Deanudat  (Vestertana),  seen  from  the  
eastern  side  of  the  fjord  arm.  The  fish  receiving  facility  is  at  the  middle,  the  
main  fjord  at  the  far  right. 
 
 
 Topography:  The  attempt  to  follow  flesh  of  the  salmon  
through  the  downstream  Deatnu  area  brought  me  to  some  specific  
geographic  sites  (material  topoi.)  This  is  the  matter  of  topography,  
the  description  of  sites,  the  scene  for  the  terrains  of  hegemony  and  
resistance.  My  travel  memories  from  the  summers  2011  and  2012  
include  visits  at  three  particular  “fjord  arms”  within  the  larger  Deatnu  
Fjord  (Deadeanuvuotna  /  Tanafjorden).  One  fjord  arm  is  called  
Deanudat  (Vestertana).  This  is  where  the  fish  receiving  facility  is  
located,  as  well  as  the  home  farm  of  the  Labor  party  politician  Helga  
Pedersen.  Here,  I  got  involved  in  verdde  relations  with  members  of  
the  Larsen  family,  who  are  much  involved  with  small  business  
entrepreneurship  in  the  fish  receiving  facility,  and  the  Pedersen  
family,  who  are  much  involved  in  state-led  policy  processes.  Bonding  
with  those  two  families  provided  me  with  much  knowledge  about  a  
variety  of  politically  significant  practices  in  the  fjord.  Another  fjord  
arm  I  visited  is  Čuollovuotna  (Tarmfjord).  Here  I  developed  verdde  
relations  with  Truls  Abbedissen,  who  is  half-local,  half-tourist.  Every  
summer,  he  returns  to  the  house  of  his  grandfather,  where  he  
maintains  some  traditional  knowledge  about  traditional  rod  fishing  
(oaggu,  dorging)  in  salt  water,  and  commits  himself  to  tourist  angling  
along  the  river  and  in  the  outfields  (meacchi).  His  biography  shows  
some  rich  cultural  hybrids  between  indigenous  and  tourist.  Together,  
we  went  to  the  midsummer  celebration  at  Storraoaivi  (Indre  Torhop),  
where  we  met  people  from  all  over  the  fjord.  The  third  fjord  arm  I  
visited  must  remain  anonymized.  This  is  the  home  of  three  fisher-
peasants  that  I  also  have  anonymized.  I  have  not  visited  Guro  Saniola  
Bjerk  in  Austertana.  She  made  a  well-known  documentary  film  about  
local  people  that  are  skeptical  to  the  ongoing  legal  reforms.  However,  
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  hers  is  only  the  most  publically  outspoken974    among  the  myriad  of  different  voices  that  are  ignored  
in  the  present  study.  In  my  view,  her  polarized  view  makes  a  caricature  of  the  actual  social  conflicts,  
and  before  I  interviewed  her,  I  would  have  prioritized  the  publicizing  of  data  about  more  hybrid  
practices  and  identities.  For  example,  I  regret  that  I  have  not  included  my  ethnographic  material  
from  oaggun  with  my  new  friends  Truls  Abbedissen  and  Rajan  Chaomar,  in  the  outfields  (meacchi)  
as  well  as  the  main  river.  These  two  persons  exemplify  cosmopolitain  hybridities  between  Sámi,  
Scandinavian,  and  Kurdish  ethnicity,  and  I  regret  that  their  stories  are  not  told  here.  There  is  no  
reason  to  pretend  that  I  know  the  Deatnu  Fjord  as  a  whole.  In  practice,  all  fieldwork  research  
projects  are  multi-sited,  because  it  is  not  possible  to  directly  observe  any  community  “as  a  whole”,  
and  instead  one  must  find  indicator  samples  by  visiting  particular  action  situations  in  particular  
geographical  sites.975  There  is  always  a  selection  process,  and  the  selection  criteria  can  seldom  be  
statistical  (see  Chapter  4  for  a  discussion  on  selection  criteria  in  abductive  research).  Thus,  the  
biases  cannot  be  controlled  by  being  neutralized,  but  by  the  ethnographer  informing  his  readership  
about  the  “positionality”  of  his  work. 
 Thematic  topics  (typology):  By  following  the  salmon  flesh  trough  Deanuvuotna,  I  was  
brought  to  action  situations  that  are  not  only  located  at  specific  geographic  sites  (spatial  topoi),  but  
which  also  involve  specific  thematic  topics  (discursive  topoi).  Taking  field  notes  was  an  attempt  to  
put  what  I  observed  into  words.  Writing  the  ethnography  was  an  attempt  to  interpret  the  field  notes.  
Both  acts  involved  some  terms  I  had  learned  from  my  previous  education  (etic  view),  but  also  some  
other  terms  that  I  learned  during  participation  (emic  view).  The  terms  I  had  previously  learned  (etic  
view)  were  mainly  aquired  from  my  experience  with  the  theory  and  practice  of  environmental  
politics,  in  particular  various  terms  about  grass  roots  democracy.976  The  terms  I  learned  in  the  field  
were  inspired  by  three  different  kinship  and  affinity  networks:  the  Pedersen  family  in  the  Deanudat  
fjord  arm  are  much  involved  in  state  politics,  and  brought  me  into  touch  with  what  I  call  political  
entrepreneurship  (see  Chapter  10).  The  Larsen  family,  in  the  same  fjord  arm,  are  more  involved  in  
local  business  and  economic  development,  and  brought  me  into  touch  with  what  I  call  social  
entrepreneurship.  Finally,  three  fisher-peasants,  about  whose  names  I  will  remain  silent,  introduced  
me  to  the  other  side  of  the  Deanuvotna  fjord,  where  I  got  a  few  samples  of  practices  that  are  
stigmatized  by  the  state  administration,  but  framed  as  conformism  by  the  actors  themselves.  These  
were  actions  that  I  had  discovered  because  I  was  interested  in  repertoires  that  are  called  radical  
                                                 
974  Guro  Saniola  Bjerk:  Fjellfinnhua  –  film  screening  at  Fritt  Ord,  Oslo,  12.  January  2011  [http://www.fritt-
ord.no/no/hjem/mer/fjellfinnhua_usensurert_samepolitikk_Finnmark/] 
975  Marcus  1995 
976  Terms  regarding  grass  roots  democracy  in  environmental  politics  include  (among  others)  “bioregionalism”  (Barry  
1999),  “policy  net”  (Jordan  &  O’Riordan  2000),  “sub-politics”  (Beck  1993,  1996a,  1996b)  and  “anti-politics”  (Katsiafi-­
cas  2006). 
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democracy  in  the  environmental  movement,  which  includes  civil  disobedience.  However,  what  I  
found  was  not  radical,  because  it  is  practiced  by  politically  moderate  persons  who  frame  their  own  
actions  as  morally  conformist.  This  is  what  I  suggest  to  call  “social  defence”.  This  interpretation  
emerged  through  a  dialogue  between  local  terminology  (emic  view)  and  my  formation  (etic  view),  
and  is  therefore  what  I  have  called  an  abductive  approach  (see  Chapter  4).  The  emerging  typology  is  
summarized  in  Table  11.1.  Political  entrepreneurship  is  found  in  the  left  column.  This  includes  all  
the  action  repertoires  that  I  traced  in  Chapter  10,  all  of  which  are  aimed  at  influencing  the  formal  
constitutional  process  within  the  state  apparatus.  The  other  repertoires,  which  will  be  exemplified  in  
the  present  chapter,  are  described  by  the  two  columns  to  the  right.  For  the  moment,  it  is  sufficient  to  
regard  those  two  columns  as  one.  Both  deal  with  pathways  of  constituent  praxes  and  constituted  
order  outside  the  state  formation.  Some  action  repertoires  follow  rules  of  the  game  that  are  codified  
by  states  and  inter-governmental  treaties.  These  I  call  social  entrepreneurship.  Some  other  actions  
follow  rules  of  the  game  that  are  maintained  as  local  customs,  and  ignored  by  the  states.  These  can  
be  called  maintenance  of  community.  Finally,  there  are  some  actions  that  are  normatively  
ambiguous:  they  are  accepted  as  moral  conformism  in  the  local  community,  but  are  stigmatized  as  
uncivic  behavior  by  the  state  bureaucracy.  These  are  the  actions  that  I  call  “social  defence”.  Now  I  
will  present  the  empirical  samples.  Then  I  will  discuss  the  action  repertoires  in  a  more  detailed  
version  of  this  table. 
 
Table  11-1:  Typology  for  the  repertoires  of  constituent  praxes,  applied  to  Deadeanuvuotna 
 Politics  of  state 
(coercive  force) 
Politics  of  economy 
(customary  praxes) 
Politics  of  knowledge 
(knowledge  praxes) 
Action  repertoires Political  
entrepreneurship  
(inclusion  or  resistance) 
-  Social  entrepreneurship  (within  state’s  norms) 
-  Social  defence  (conflict  between  norm  systems) 




11.3.0  Social  entrepreneurship:  samples  from  the  Deanudat  fjord  arm 
 
11.3.1  Return  to  the  field:  ethnography  of  entrepreneurship 
Fisher-peasants  in  Deanuvuotna  are  not  rich,  but  they  are  industrious.  The  reader  will  now  be  
brought  to  some  concrete  action  situations  that  provide  samples  of  social  entrepreneurship  in  
various  forms.  We  will  now  follow  the  flesh  of  the  salmon,  through  a  series  of  photographs  and  
field  notes.  These  samples  are  taken  from  the  Deanudat  fjord  arm.  This  is  where  the  fjord’s  fish  
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receiving  facility  is  located,  and  much  political  work  has  been  based  in  this  community.  After  
briefly  introducing  the  reader  to  this  specific  area,  we  will  follow  the  flesh  from  the  fishing  location,  
via  the  quay  and  the  fish  receiving  facility,  to  bio-scientific  reporting  and  storage  at  the  same  
facility.  From  there,  we  will  not  trace  its  further  distribution  through  the  capitalist  market  system,  
but  will  instead  observe  its  use  values  an  asset  for  nutrition  and  verdde  in  the  local  community.  This  
is  a  linear  process,  and  it  is  supposed  to  be,  in  line  with  the  anthropological  method  of  tracing  the  
circulation  of  material  things.977  The  different  phases  in  this  circulation  actualize  various  social  
functions  ascribed  to  the  object. 
1. At  the  fishing  locations,  we  will  meet  the  political  salmon,  and  we  will  visit  the  political  
struggle  about  the  right  to  fishing  locations. 
2. At  the  fish  receiving  facility,  we  will  meet  the  economic  salmon,  and  will  peek  into  the  
social  mobilization  for  regional  development. 
3. In  the  local  “laboratory”  of  bio-scientific  reporting  we  will  meet  the  scientific  salmon,  and  
indicate  the  complex  interaction  between  scientific  and  political  deliberation. 
4. Finally,  when  we  arrive  at  the  kitchen,  we  will  address  the  salmon  as  a  “total  object”.  There,  
we  will  have  a  more  holistic  look  at  the  entangled  issues  of  political,  economic  and  
epistemic  empowerment. 
Thus,  the  text  is  written  in  such  a  way  that  it  traces  the  circulation  of  salmon  flesh  through  a  local  
“production  line”,  from  the  fisher’s  fishing  location,  to  the  stomach  of  the  fisher’s  guest  and  friend.  
On  the  way  we  pass  through  various  concrete  places  in  the  local  topography,  but  also  several  
abstract  issues  in  the  thematic  typology:  political  power,  economic  power  and  epistemic  power.  In  
chronolotical  order  we  will  therefore  discuss: 
1. The  political  salmon 
2. The  economic  salmon 
3. The  scientific  salmon 
4. The  salmon  as  a  “total  object”  in  an  anthropological  sense 
Since  those  aspects  of  human  existence  are  functionally  integrated  in  the  local  community,  it  is  
convenient  to  end  this  little  story  by  addressing  the  salmon  as  a  “total  object”.  One  and  the  same  
object,  in  this  case  salmon  flesh,  serves  several  functions.  Each  of  those  functions  will  enable  or  
empower  humans  to  do  carry  out  various  forms  of  praxes.  Therefore,  each  of  the  different  functions  
constitutes  a  different  form  of  social  power.  To  understand  the  impact  of  each  of  the  three  types  of  
social  power,  each  should  be  understood  in  the  context  of  how  it  interacts  with  the  other  two  types.  
The  conceptual  division  between  three  different  functions,  or  three  different  forms  of  
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empowerment,  do  not  correspond  with  any  empirical  divisions  in  the  practical  reality.  As  a  “total  
object”,  salmon  flesh  serves  social  power  in  many  different  ways.  If  we  define  “political”  widely,  
then  it  is  the  totality  of  the  various  use  values  that  is  the  actual  political  salmon.  The  biography  of  
the  salmon  flesh  in  Deanudat  is  a  story  about  multiple  paths  to  empowerment. 
 As  with  the  reflexive  sociology  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  present  chapter  also  is  
occasionally  self-reflexive.  The  ethnographer  should  be  aware  of  his  or  her  own  positionally  in  the  
field,  and  how  the  act  of  observation  may  influence  the  object  of  research.  Participant  observation  
in  this  Coastal  Sámi  community  implies  gradual  integration  into  the  local  social  fabric,  by  growing  
a  network  of  reciprocities  that  deepen  and  diversify. 
 Fjord  fisheries  are  a  main  source  of  livelihood  for  the  local  people  in  the  Deatnu  fjord.  The  
fish  is  used  for  subsistence,  as  an  asset  for  gift  exchanges,  and  finally,  is  a  source  of  income.  The  
local  fish  receiving  facility  is  an  important  location  for  all  fishermen  in  the  fjord.  This  saves  the  
fjord  fishermen  from  long  travels  in  their  small  boats.  The  fish  receiving  facility  is  located  in  the  
fjord  arm  called  Deanudat  in  Sámi,  or  Vestertana  in  Norwegian.  This  is  a  local  centre  for  local  
economic  life,  and  also  a  social  meeting  place,  were  people  deliberate  over  matters  of  interest  to  the  
local  community. 
                
Figure  11-3:  The  quay,  fishing  boats  and  the  delivery  of  King  crab  catch,  August  2011. 
Left:  The  quay,  and  some  fishing  boats.  Right:  Weighing  a  King  Crab. 
 
 The  first  time  I  arrived  at  the  quay,  a  small  and  swift  fishing  boat  landed  with  a  load  of  red  
king  crab.  At  the  regional  office  for  the  Water  Framework  Directive,  I  had  been  told  that  many  
ecologists  and  environmentalists  regard  this  so-called  “immigrant”  species  as  a  threat  to  local  
biodiversity  in  its  presumed  “state  of  nature”.  After  unloading  the  crabs,  the  young  fishermen  had  a  
smoke  with  me.  “The  red  king  crab  is  a  blessing”  Roger  claimed.  Geir  showed  me  their  new  fishing  
boat:  Icelandic  production,  swift  moto;;  a  convenient  time  saving  tool.  “Without  the  king  crab  we  
would  have  to  leave  the  local  community,  to  find  other  work,”  he  claimed. 
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 However,  I  was  more  interested  in  salmon  fisheries.  Indigenous  rights  activists  had  told  me  
that  this  particular  type  of  fishery  had  become  a  symbol  of  traditional  indigenous  fisheries.  The  two  
young  men  were  not  interested.  “First  you  must  fight  the  seals.  Then  you  must  struggle  against  the  
state.”  We  left  the  quay  in  their  SUV.  The  following  day,  I  met  the  local  fisherman  Reidar  Larsen.  
He  served  cloudberries  from  the  outfields  and  coffee  from  a  thermos.  He  was  worried  about  the  
recruitment  to  small-scale  fisheries.  Most  young  people  find  less  risky  business.  Few  of  them  find  
time  to  work  with  the  old  people  on  the  ocean  or  in  the  outfield.  There  is  a  loss  of  practical  skill  and  
natural  lore  –  bio-cultural  diversity. 
 The  anthropologist  Gro  Ween  read  through  the  draft  version  of  the  text  above.  She  had  done  
fieldwork  in  the  same  waters.  In  the  margin,  outside  the  ethnographic  fragment  above,  she  jotted  
down:  “What  does  this  say?  There  are  complex  inter-species  relations,  which  transcend  the  thoughts  
about  wild  or  hybrid  in  the  bureaucracy.”  These  are  interesting  issues  about  the  relationship  between  
nature  and  culture,  a  topic  that  is  Ween’s  field  of  expertise.  My  interest  at  the  moment  is  on  another  
topic:  forms  of  empowerment.  These  topics  are  related.  She  mentioned  “complex  inter-species  
relations”.  This  includes  conjunctures  in  the  ecological  “web  of  nutrition”:  Salmon  fishing  is  
important  to  maintain  bio-cultural  diversity,  but  has  lost  some  of  its  importance  for  subsistence.  
King  crab  has  become  more  important  for  subsistence,  but  as  a  “migrant  species”  it  challenges  the  
traditional  definitions  used  by  the  state  bureaucracy.  Ecological  dynamics  pose  continuous  
challenges,  both  cognitively  and  normatively,  for  the  utilisation  of  the  resources.  Therefore,  
knowledge  praxes  and  customary  praxes  are  continuously  fitted  to  the  changing  social-ecological  
opportunity  structure  (Fortuna),  and  by  negotiating  revisions  of  lore  and  customs,  fishers  may  build  
their  capacity  for  sustainable  local  development  (Virtù).  Local  fisher-peasants  seek  various  paths  to  
social  development;;  they  are  social  entrepreneurs.  The  process  of  socio-economic  and  socio-
cultural  is  empowerment,  and  hence  political  in  a  wide  sense.  However,  it  is  also  political  in  a  
narrow  sense,  because  there  is  a  social  struggle  to  set  the  agenda  for  policy  and  research  in  the  state.  
State-certified  science  interacts  with  local  lore.  State-codified  laws  interact  with  local  customs.  The  
competing  fishery  interest  organisations  have  competing  policy  and  research  agendas.  As  Roger  and  
Geir  put  it,  “First  you  have  to  fight  the  seals.  Then  you  must  struggle  against  the  state.”  That  is  why  
they  chose  not  to  practice  salmon  fishing,  something  Reidar  laments  as  a  loss  of  traditional  
knowledge,  and  ultimately  a  weakening  of  bio-cultural  diversity  and  indigenous  culture.  What  is  at  
stake  is  the  sustainable  usage  of  the  natural  and  cultural  heritage.  It  would  have  been  interesting  to  
observe  how  the  introduction  of  king  crab  leads  to  innovation  in  customary  praxes  and  knowledge  
praxes,  both  those  forms  that  are  certified  by  the  state,  as  well  as  those  maintained  in  the  indigenous  
culture.  However,  that  will  be  another  story.  I  will  focus  on  what  the  sustainable  management  of  
salmon  and  sea  salmon  fishery  implies  for  the  (re)production  of  customary  praxes  and  knowledge  
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praxes.  In  this  way,  salmon  flesh  becomes  an  indicator  of  how  local  fisher-peasants  may  empower  
themselves  along  this  Coastal  Sámi  fjord. 
 In  her  comment  on  the  ethnographic  framgent  above,  Ween  continued:  “And  here  is  
outreach.  Reidar  gives  you  something  and  hopes  that  The  Gift  will  have  an  effect.”  The  bite  




11.3.2  Out  to  the  fishing  locations  –  the  political  salmon 
For  the  sea  salmon  fisherman,  the  fish  is  caught  at  specific  fishing  locations  in  the  fjord,  where  his  
fishing  net  has  been  standing  in  the  water  overnight.  Each  fishing  location  is  clearly  defined.  Each  
fishing  hour  is  clearly  defined  as  well.  Each  sea  salmon  fisher  possesses  the  right  to  fish  at  specific  
fishing  locations,  for  the  duration  of  specific  fishing  hours.  The  exact  definition  of  fishing  locations  
and  fishing  hours  is  determined  by  a  mix  of  state  law  and  indigenous  law.  These  definitions  may  be  
seen  as  a  property  rights  regime.  In  order  to  sort  out  some  tensions  between  state  law  and  
indigenous  laws,  the  sea  salmon  fishing  rights  are  now  regulated  by  the  Finnmark  Estate.  Thus,  the  
state  has  also  recognized  that  legal  pluralism  is  a  fact  of  life  for  sea  salmon  fishers.  Let  us  have  a  
look  at  a  concrete  fishing  location  and  a  concrete  fishing  hour,  in  order  to  observe  institutional  
norms  in  an  action  situation  that  Elinor  Ostrom  would  have  classified  as  an  “operational  level”. 
 When  I  returned  to  Deanudat  for  the  salmon  fishing  season,  I  was  welcomed  by  Reidar  
Larsen.  He  knows  the  local  waters  well.  Throughout  his  career,  he  had  been  committed  to  
sustainable  local  communities,  both  as  a  small  business  entrepreneur,  and  as  a  local  politician  for  
the  agrarian  Centre  Party.  During  his  many  years  on  the  fjord,  he  has  learned  to  navigate  to  the  
different  places  where  the  various  fish  species  tend  to  swim,  and  he  has  experienced  how  to  survive  
on  the  fjord  during  arctic  winter  storms.  He  welcomed  me  warmly,  eager  to  share  his  special  
competence.  One  day  I  followed  Reidar  on  his  two  trips  to  check  his  salmon  nets.  He  picked  me  up  
early  from  my  tent,  and  drove  us  to  the  quay.  On  our  first  trip,  I  brought  my  camera  in  a  dry  bag,  as  
a  tool  of  observation.  On  the  second  trip,  I  left  it  at  the  quay,  in  order  to  experience  how  the  fishing  
is  carried  out. 
 [Field  note,  27.06.2012]  When  we  arrived  at  the  quay,  we  had  to  change  cloths.  We  pulled  
thick  plastic  “oilskins”  outside  the  cloths  we  were  wearing.  [Then  we  entered  a  dinghy.]  Reidar  
took  the  ballast  out  of  the  boat,  two  large  stones  in  the  front.  We  sat  down,  and  he  drove  us  
outwards.  The  water  was  still.  It  was  rather  cloudy.  Soon  it  also  became  cold,  as  I  was  wearing  too  
little  clothing. 
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Figure  11-4:  Reidar  Larsen,  a  sea  salmon  fisherman,  on  his  way  to  the  fishing  location,  June  2012 
Left:  Steering  the  boat.  Right:  Approaching  towards  the  buoys. 
 
 Outside  Deanudat,  within  the  Deanuvuotna  proper,  we  came  to  the  first  salmon  fishing  
location.  The  nets  were  resting  high  in  the  water,  since  the  salmon,  and  also  the  sea  trout,  swim  
close  to  the  surface.  There  were  two  gillnets,  hanging  from  two  float  lines,  tied  up  in  parallel  
between  two  orange  buoys.  Each  buoy  was  anchored  to  the  sea  bed  with  a  stone  that  weights  half  a  
ton.  One  “leading  net”  (ledegarn)  was  stretched  out  crosswise,  with  a  line  that  ran  out  from  the  
shore,  ran  through  two  small  floats,  and  ended  in  an  orange  buoy  at  the  other  end. 
 
          
Figure  11-5:  Arriving  at  the  salmon  fishing  location:  the  allotment  used  by  Reidar  Larsen,  June  2012. 
Left:  Buoys  and  lines  that  hold  the  gilnet.  Right:  Lines  are  anchored  in  the  shore,  where  a  number  is  written. 
 
 Reidar  used  a  kind  of  “pike  pole”  with  four  hooks  to  get  hold  of  the  net,  and  he  went  
systematically  through  from  the  one  end  to  the  other.  Each  time  he  found  a  fish,  he  had  to  use  other  
tools.  There  was  a  hook  on  a  long  handle,  and  another  hook  on  a  shorter  handle.  Those  were  used  
to  get  hold  of  the  net  that  had  entangled  the  fish,  and  to  pull  the  fish  out  through  one  of  the  large  
and  wide  meshes  of  the  net.  Thereafter  the  fish  was  “bløgga”  [had  its  throat  cut]  with  a  knife,  and  
ended  up  on  the  deck.  The  fisherman  went  on  further  through  the  net. 
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Figure  11-6:  At  the  fishing  location:  Reidar  Larsen  checking  his  salmon  nets,  June  2012. 
Left:  The  fisher  "bløgger"  the  fish.  Right:  Un-entangling  the  catch. 
 
 This  was  repeated  twice  [...],  since  Reidar  uses  two  installations  with  salmon  nets,  at  two  
different  places.  The  places  are  numbered.  They  were  assigned  by  The  Finnmark  Estate,  especially  
after  former  users  have  died.  It  was  the  same  way  in  Čuollovuotna  where  Olaf  had  taken  over  the  
fishing  location  after  his  close  friend  Per.  [The  week  before  I  went  with  Reidar,  I  had  visited  Olaf.  
Both  engage  in  sea  salmon  fishing.  They  live  in  two  different  arms  of  the  Deatnu  fjord:  Deanudat  
and  Čuollovuotna.]  [...]  [A]t  Reidar’s  locations,  the  catch  wasn’t  great  today.  He  got  seven  small  
salmon,  of  the  size  that  is  called  diddi. 
 
          
Figure  11-7:  The  catch  of  the  day,  Reidar  returning  from  the  salmon  fishing  location,  June  2012 
Left:  Five  small  diddi  salmons  and  one  sea  trout.  Right:  Steering  back  to  the  quay.   
 
 Whose  are  those  fishing  locations?  This  ethnographic  glimpse  shows  sea  salmon  fishing  at  
an  operational  level.  The  reader  has  been  introduced  to  what  these  fisheries  actually  are,  as  a  
concrete,  practical  reality.  However,  to  do  fishing  is  not  only  to  carry  out  technical  routines.  
Additionally,  the  routines  follow  and  maintain  a  specific  script  with  normative  significance.  The  
behaviour  of  the  fisherman  is  technical,  in  the  sense  that  it  is  instrumental  to  catching  the  fish,  and  it  
 400  
 
is  practical,  in  the  sense  that  it  obeys  and  confirms  a  specific  fishery  management  regime.  From  a  
purely  technical  viewpoint,  it  might  have  been  easy  to  put  fishing  nets  all  over  the  place,  and  to  let  
them  stay  there  every  day  for  the  whole  season.  In  practice,  however,  that  would  be  impossible,  
because  it  would  have  led  to  severe  social  sanctions  from  peers  in  the  fisher-peasant  community.  
Reidar  and  Olaf  rig  thei  gillnets  at  places  that  are  accepted  as  theirs  to  use.  This  right  is  respected  
locally.  Additionally,  it  is  certified,  blessed  and  protected  by  the  Crown.  In  the  Deatnu  Fjord,  one  
cannot  take  for  granted  that  the  local  people  and  the  Crown  actually  concur  on  such  issues.  Most  
people  I  have  met  in  Deanudat  and  Čuollovuotna  publicly  recognize  that  the  Norwegian  state  has  
the  sovereign  right  to  certify  property  and  user  rights  in  the  fjord.  Still,  in  confidential  
conversations,  I  have  heard  some  of  the  most  lawful  individuals  whisper:  "Actually  it’s  still  a  
colony"  (see  Chapter  10).  Whose  land  and  water  is  this?  What  political  collective  is  the  legitimate  
owner  of  the  territory?  International  law  recognizes  the  right  of  states  to  national  sovereignty.  
However,  since  the  1980s,  international  law  also  recognizes  the  right  of  indigenous  peoples  to  
collective  self-determination.  Thus,  international  law  accorded  political  protection  to  the  secret  
whispers.  Thereafter,  it  has  been  more  difficult  for  state  legislators  to  criminalize  local  customary  
law.  The  ongoing  reform  of  the  political  system  is  the  reason  why  today  it  is  the  Finnmark  Estate  
that  assigns  fishing  allotments  to  Reidar  and  Olaf.  In  the  decades  before  2005,  the  sea  salmon  
fishermen  in  Deatnu  had  to  get  their  papers  from  Statsskog,  an  agency  that  takes  care  of  the  
Crown’s  properties.  After  2005,  they  get  the  papers  from  the  Finnmark  Estate,  which  is  a  joint  
venture  between  three  partners:  the  Norwegian  state  government,  the  Norwegian  Sámi  parliament,  
and  Fylkeskommunen,  a  municipal  democratic  body  at  County  level.  So  whose  lands  and  waters  are  
these?  In  the  decades  before  2005,  the  Norwegian  state  used  to  claim  ownership  of  the  natural  
resources  of  its  northernmost  county.  After  2005,  a  new  coalition  of  political  power  had  to  be  taken  
into  account,  but  also  strong  historical  proofs  about  ownership  in  the  region.  The  Finnmark  Estate  is  
a  result  of  the  social  and  argumentative  empowerment  of  the  Sámi  rights  movement,  the  municipal-
democratic  movement,  and  the  political  institutions  that  those  two  movements  had  gained.  
Regarding  ownership  of  the  salmon  fishing  locations  in  the  Deatnu  Fjord,  the  conflict  might  have  
been  resolved  with  the  Finnmark  Estate.  It  is  interesting  that  the  Finnmark  Estate  has  given  its  
blessing  to  old  Olaf  using  the  fishing  ground  of  his  late  friend  and  neighbour  Per.  Because  Olaf  and  
Per  had  cooperated  closely  in  the  local  kinship  and  affinity  network,  Olaf  had  already  been  part  of  
Per’s  household  economy.  Sámi  households  tend  to  be  based  on  kinship  and  reciprocity  networks  
(verdde),  while  Norwegian  households  tend  to  be  defined  by  the  nuclear  family.  Thus,  the  Finnmark  
Estate  respected  local  Sámi  norms  when  it  gave  its  blessing  to  Olaf’s  use  of  Per’s  old  salmon  
fishing  ground.  (I  have  found  examples  of  the  opposite  attitude  from  state  agencies  with  regard  to  
river  salmon  fisheries.)  The  example  of  Olaf  may  indicate  that  state  law  has  been  brought  into  
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harmony  with  local  customs,  regarding  the  allotment  of  salmon  fishing  locations  in  the  Deatnu  
fjord. 
 However,  the  struggle  continues.  Though  the  issue  of  ownership  of  fishing  locations  might  
have  been  sorted  out,  the  allocation  of  fishing  hours  remains  highly  contested.  The  legal  season  for  
sea  salmon  fishing  has  become  steadily  shorter,  and  within  that  season,  the  legal  fishing  days  per  
week  have  become  fewer.  Therefore,  the  sea  salmon  fisheries  in  the  Deanuvuotna  Fjord  have  been  
strictly  regulated.978  Relatively  fewer  regulations  have  been  imposed  on  other  forms  of  fisheries  that  
harvest  from  the  same  stocks.  Net  fishing  and  oaggun  in  the  Deatnu  River  have  been  regulated,  but  
not  quite  as  strictly  as  the  sea  salmon  fisheries.  At  the  same  time,  the  two  state  governments  that  
share  the  Deatnu  waterway  have  allowed  increased  levels  of  tourist  angling.  Finally,  there  has  not  
been  any  attempt  to  regulate  or  even  register  whatever  portion  of  the  local  salmon  stock  might  be  
caught  by  larger  vessels  from  more  central  locations  in  Norway  and  Russia.  For  the  local  fjord  
fishers,  it  is  natural  that  salmon  fishing  will  go  up  and  down,  as  will  fishing  of  other  species.  During  
some  periods,  there  is  much  of  one  species,  during  other  periods,  there  is  more  of  another,  and  this  
is  the  result  of  ecological  cycles  or  conjunctures.  However,  it  is  a  product  of  state  intervention  and  
market  intrusion  when  salmon  fishing  by  large  vessels  is  neither  monitored  nor  controlled,  while  
sea  salmon  fishers  find  their  fishing  hours  cut  dramatically.  As  Roger  and  Geir  say,  “First  you  must  
fight  the  seals.  Then  you  must  struggle  against  the  state.”  Tensions  remain  in  the  actual  property  
rights  regime.979  Some  of  these  tensions  might  seem  to  have  been  resolved,  with  regard  to  the  
allotment  of  fishing  locations.  Those  are  granted  according  to  longstanding  indigenous  law  as  well  
as  codified  state  laws.  However,  other  conflicts  remain  unresolved,  with  regard  to  the  allocation  of  
fishing  hours.  It  seems  as  though  policy  and  research  in  the  state  remain  politically  biased,  with  the  
following  order  of  priority: 
1. Industrial  fisheries  from  more  central  locations  in  Norway  and  Russia  avoid  monitoring  or  
regulation  of  their  eventual  fishing  from  the  local  salmon  stocks.980 
2. Sports  anglers  from  Finland  (mostly  common  people)  and  Norway  (mostly  urban  
bourgeoisie)  have  succeeded  to  congregate  into  international  alliances,  capable  of  
encouraging  their  own  form  of  fishing,  at  the  cost  of  other  fishing.981 
                                                 
978  Finnmark  Commission  2010 
979  For  further  details  on  thisissue,  see  Norwegian  Official  Report  2001(NOU  2001:31),  and  in  particular  Helander  2001  
(thanks  to  Gro  Ween  for  this  reference).   
980  Larger  vessels  from  South-Western  Norway  still  come  there  to  exploit  the  local  resources  with  mobile  gear  (Pedersen  
2012:53). 
981  Burgess  (1996)  reports  that  NASCO  led  Norway  to  forbid  drift  net  fishing  in  1989.  Such  a  policy  was  of  joint  
interest  for  anglers  as  well  as  small-scale  fjord  fisheries.  However,  Burgess  also  reports  that  an  international  lobby  
group,  The  North  Atlantic  Salmon  Fund,  (NASF)  raises  funds  to  buy  local  fishing  quotas  without  using  them  
(Burgess    1996:7,  citing  an  archival  resource:  p.  2  in  Arctic  Salmon  1995:  “Salmon  fishing  experience  in  Russia,  
Norway,  Finland  and  Sweden”.  No.1.  Kuusamo:  Occasional  publication.) 
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3. Traditional  rod  fishing  (oaggun)  among  the  River  Sámi  in  Deatnu  tributaries  appears  to  have  
avoided  the  heavy  regulations,  because  their  activities  resemble  sports  angling. 
4. Traditional  net  fishing  among  the  River  Sámi  along  Deatnu  is  regulated  in  an  uneven  
process,  with  different  legislation  on  the  Norwegian  and  Finnish  sides  of  the  river. 
5. Traditional  sea  salmon  fishing  among  the  Coastal  Sámi  in  the  Deanuvuotna  Fjord  is  the  
form  of  fishery  that  is  most  heavily  regulated,  via  strict  cut  in  legal  fishing  hours. 
This  prioritized  order  is  no  mechanical  reflection  of  a  pattern  of  social  stratification.  However,  I  
have  a  strong  impression  that  the  top  and  the  bottom  of  the  scale  express  what  is  the  top  and  bottom  
in  the  social  stratification  of  the  various  fisheries  that  share  the  salmon  stocks  in  the  Deatnu  Water  
Area.  One  main  issue  of  contention  is  one  that  I  addressed  in  the  previous  chapter:  whether  or  not  
there  still  is  a  vibrant  indigenous  culture  in  Coastal  Sápmi,  which  would  constitute  the  basis  for  
indigenous  human  rights  according  to  international  human  rights  law.  If  there  has  actually  been  a  
continuous  presence  of  indigenous  culture  in  Coastal  Sápmi,  then  collective  human  rights  would  
clearly  be  relevant  to  protect  the  local  natural-cultural  heritage,  the  local  bio-cultural  diversity,  and  
the  local  freedom  from  neocolonial  fisheries.  The  politically  contentious  question  is:  Did  the  ancient  
Sámi  culture  actually  survive  the  harsh  eugenic  assimilation  policies  of  the  past? 
 [Travel  memory  23.08.2012]  [Reidar]  steered  the  small  boat  in  a  smooth  movement  right  
into  the  right  “booth”  at  the  dock.  [...]  In  order  to  do  that,  he  decreased  the  velocity  of  the  motor  [a  
little,  then  a  little  more].  The  sound  was  changing;;  it  was  tuned  down  into  an  increasingly  deeper  
bass.  At  the  same  time,  the  boat  glided  ever  slower,  while  Reidar  tilted  the  helm  ever  more  to  the  
left.  By  precisely  adjusting  the  course  (the  derivate)  at  every  single  point  in  the  swing  (the  curve),  
Reidar  managed  to  guide  the  boat  to  the  right  place  with  no  use  of  reverse  gear. 
 Is  this  traditional  knowledge?  Here  is  an  example  of  tacit  knowledge,  but  is  it  also  
“traditional”?  This  question  became  a  political  and  juridical  one  with  a  governmental  report  on  
“The  Natural  Basis  of  Sámi  Culture”.982  The  argument  is  that  the  right  for  indigenous  people  to  
enjoy  their  own  language  and  culture  implies  that  certain  livelihood  adaptations  must  be  protected  
as  well,  since  material  and  immaterial  culture  are  embedded  into  each  other.  This  is  relatively  
uncontroversial  with  regard  to  Reindeer  husbandry,  which  has  been  an  ethnic  Sámi  trade  in  Norway  
and  Sweden  since  the  late  1800s.  However,  when  it  comes  to  Coastal  Sámi  areas,  the  issue  is  much  
contested.  As  I  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  Norwegian  Ministry  of  Fisheries  has  published  
two  contradictory  reports  regarding  the  issue  of  indigenous  rights  in  Coastal  Sápmi.  The  report  from  
2005  concluded  that  the  indigenous  culture  disappeared  during  the  period  of  eugenic  
assimilation.983    The  report  from  2008  concluded  that  the  indigenous  culture  in  Coastal  Sápmi  had  
                                                 
982  Norwegian  Ministry  of  Justice  and  Police  1997 
983  Norwegian  Official  Report  2005  (NOU  2005:10):  chpt.  3.2,  cited  in  Eyþórsson  2008:  209 
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been  maintained  since  times  immemorial  on  the  “social  backstage”.984  If  the  first  report  is  correct,  
then  the  class  struggle  is  not  also  an  indigenous  rights  struggle.  If  the  second  report  is  correct,  then  
this  is  both  an  indigenous  rights  struggle  and  a  class  struggle.  The  first  report  is  referred  to  by  the  
hegemonic  political  class  in  the  Norwegian  entity.  The  second  report  is  supported  by  the  social  
scientists  that  research  the  issue.  If  the  social  scientists  are  correct  in  their  assessment  of  the  relative  
reliability  of  the  two  reports,  then  the  policy  process  so  far  has  not  been  determined  by  the  power  of  
the  better  argument.  At  the  end  of  the  present  chapter,  I  will  argue  why  I  think  this  is  the  case. 
 We  have  followed  one  sea  salmon  fisherman  to  one  of  the  allotted  fishing  locations,  within  
one  of  the  allocated  fishing  hours.  Thus,  we  have  had  a  look  at  what  sea  salmon  fishing  actually  is,  
in  technical  terms.  However,  we  have  also  discussed  how  the  actual  fishing  follows  a  specific  
normative  script,  in  practical  terms.  This  normative  script  implies  respect  for  delimited  fishing  
locations  and  fishing  hours.  The  allotment  of  fishing  locations  appears  to  be  in  accordance  with  
longstanding  indigenous  customs  and  codified  state  laws.  However,  the  allocation  of  fishing  hours  
remains  highly  controversial.  The  hegemonic  political  class  in  the  Norwegian  political  entity  denies  
that  the  longstanding  indigenous  culture  has  been  continuously  maintained  in  Coastal  Sápmi,  and  
consequently  they  claim  that  the  local  fish  resources  are  national  commons  for  the  state  (including  
adjustments  for  the  NASCO)  treaty.  However,  the  Coastal  Sámi  political  entrepreneurs  argue  that  
the  indigenous  culture  has  in  fact  been  continuously  maintained  on  the  social  backstage,  and  
consequently,  that  the  local  and  regional  fish  resources  actually  belong  to  the  local  and  regional  
population.  If  they  are  correct,  then  the  strict  regulation  of  sea  salmon  fishing,  combined  with  the  
liberal  regulation  of  larger  vessels,  amounts  to  neocolonial  resource  grabbing.  If  the  indigenous  
culture  has  been  continuously  maintained,  and  the  ICESCR  (and  the  ICCPR  §27)  therefore  applies,  
then  the  state  has  regulated  salt  water  salmon  fishing  in  a  way  that  implies  stealing  from  the  poor  
and  giving  to  the  rich. 
 Let  us  now  follow  the  flesh  of  the  salmon  further  throughout  the  value  chain.  While  fishing  
locations  actualized  the  issue  of  property  regimes,  the  fish  receiving  facility  and  its  local  laboratory  
will  actualize  economic  development  policies  and  the  management  of  bio-science.  Finally,  sharing  






                                                 
984  Norwegian  Official  Report  2008  (NOU  2008:5) 
 404  
 
 
Figure  11-8:  Local  people  at  the  quay,  the  Deanuvuotna's  fish  receiving  facility  in  Deanudat,  June  2012 
 
 
11.3.3  Back  to  the  quay  –  the  economic  salmon 
When  we  follow  the  salmon  flesh  from  the  fishing  location  to  the  quay,  we  pass  from  one  site  to  
another.  This  also  changes  the  thematic  focus.  The  politics  of  property  rights  regimes  were  in  focus  
at  the  fishing  location.  At  the  fish  receiving  facility,  however,  the  politics  of  regional  economic  
development  will  come  into  focus.  When  the  fish  has  been  dragged  up  from  the  water,  it  
immediately  becomes  an  economic  asset.  It  has  to  be  handled  with  care,  to  maintain  its  use  value  
and  exchange  value.  Fjord  fishers  in  Deanuvuotna  are  raw  material  producers  in  a  periphery.  Such  
an  economic  position  actualizes  specific  challenges  for  the  local  social  entrepreneur. 
 When  we  returned  to  the  quay,  I  was  frozen.  Reidar  appeared  to  be  in  the  same  good  shape  
[...]  I  was  sent  to  get  a  plastic  container,  and  this  Reidar  filled  with  fish.  [Fieldnote,  27.06.2012] 
 The  fisherman  smiled.  “I  enjoy  relaxing  with  some  salmon  fishing  after  the  heavy  fishing  is  
done.”  He  said  it  in  a  light  tone.  The  ethnographer  took  notice  that  his  own  academic  body  was  not  
habituated  to  the  activity,  but  he  had  read  in  a  book985  that  a  good  ethnographer  must  experience  the  
practical  habit(u)s  of  others. 
                                                 
985  Madden  2010 
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 The  quay  as  a  “community  forum”:  I  went  to  get  the  plastic  container,  as  the  fisherman  had  
requested.  To  carry  it  between  the  storage  house  and  the  dinghy,  I  had  to  cross  the  pier.  More  people  
had  come  since  we  went  out  in  the  morning.  They  had  gathered  around  two  big  containers  of  red  
king  crab.  Some  were  at  work.  Others  appeared  to  be  off  duty,  remaining  there  for  a  chat,  getting  
the  latest  news  and  being  sociable.  I  would  get  to  know  several  of  the  faces  over  the  days.  The  quay  
is  the  main  social  forum  of  the  community,  like  the  village  square  in  the  Italian  countryside.  Today  
the  Italians  call  it  piazza,  but  the  Romans  called  it  forum,  and  today  we  use  their  word  as  a  
metaphor  describing  any  meeting  place.  The  quay  at  the  fish  receiving  facility  looked  like  a  village  
forum  to  me,  and  soon  I  would  learn  that  this  resemblance  was  more  than  mere  impression.  Later  I  
would  learn  what  socio-economic  importance  the  facility  has  for  the  whole  Deatnu  fjord.  The  quay  
appears  to  be  an  economic  heart  and  a  social  mind  of  the  local  community.  My  knowledge  about  the  
fish  receiving  facility  has  come  about  from  me  taking  part  in  particular  activities  with  particular  
persons,  such  as  Reidar  and  others. 
 The  facility  as  a  local  “growth  machine”:986  The  fish  receiving  facility  in  Deanudat  opened  
in  2009.  The  state  television  channel  reported:  “So  unique  is  it  to  open  a  new  fish  receiving  facility,  
that  minister  of  fishery  Helga  Pedersen  came  with  home  made  chocolate  cake  to  celebrate  that  the  
home  community  has  got  its  own  fish  receiving  facility”  The  minister  was  interviewed,  and  said:  
“This  is  a  bright  spot  in  the  midst  of  the  financial  crisis,  and  it  gives  the  fishers  in  the  Deatnu  fjord  a  
place  to  deliver  their  catch.”987  I  would  learn  more  about  the  political  economy  of  the  facility  after  
we  had  left  it.  Reidar  would  invite  me  to  his  house  and  serve  bread  loaves  with  cold  fried  salmon,  
and  I  would  jot  down  the  information.  There  is  one  dock  where  the  boats  are  moored,  and  there  is  
one  quay  with  a  fish  receiving  facility.  The  dock  is  municipal.  It  was  initiated  through  municipal  
democracy,  and  was  implemented  through  municipal  planning.  Local  people  in  Deanudat  are  active  
in  the  Labor  Party  and  the  agrarian  Centre  Party.  The  staff  at  the  municipal  planning  office  have  a  
professional  interest  in  sustainable  development.  So,  the  dock  is  a  result  of  a  complex  policy  
process:  local  political  entrepreneurs,  political  parties  at  the  municipal  level,  and  the  municipal  
planners,  were  all  involved.  The  fish  receiving  facility  is  not  municipal,  but  is  owned  by  a  stock  
company,  Tana  fisk  og  sjøfarmer  AS.988  This  company  was  originally  set  up  when  local  fishers  
started  an  experiment  with  cod  farming.  When  that  effort  failed,  they  decided  to  build  their  own  fish  
receiving  facility  instead.  The  funders  were  various  public  and  private  actors.  Tana  fisk  og  sjøfarmer  
is  a  small  stock  company.  Local  fisher-peasants  put  their  private  savings  onto  a  common  pool,  
together  empowering  themselves  to  build  facilities  for  shared  benefit.  This  way  of  doing  things  is  
                                                 
986  Molotoch  1993 
987  Myreng  &  Arvola  2009 
988  For  public  info  about  the  company  (in  Norwegian)  see  http://www.purehelp.no/company/details/989717278  last  
retrieved  5.  May  2014 
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well  known  from  the  agrarian  cooperative  tradition  in  the  Nordic  countries.  However,  Tana  Fisk  og  
sjøfarmer  is  tailored  to  new  economic  opportunity  structures,  and  is  therefore  organized  as  a  small  
stock  company.  Seven  individual  fishers  own  a  bit  less  than  10%  each,  about  65%  in  sum,  but  they  
have  also  mobilized  finances  from  outside  the  fjord  community.  Nearly  35%  of  the  stocks  are  
owned  by  a  regional  investment  company  for  Inner  Finnmark,  Indre  Finnmark  investeringsselskap  
AS.989  The  investment  company  is  a  tool  of  regional  socio-economic  development,  and  had  been  
created  by  four  local  municipalities:  Deatnu  (No:  Tana.  Kv:  Teno),  Kárášjohka  (No:  Karasjok,  Fi:  
Kaarasjoki),  Porsáŋgu  (No:  Porsanger,  Kv:  Porsanki)  and  Unjárgga  (No:  Nesseby,  Kv:  Uuniemen).  
All  four  are  Norwegian  municipalities,  but  three  of  the  four  are  also  located  in  Coastal  Sápmi,  while  
the  fourth  is  in  Inner  Sápmi.  One  contains  most  of  the  downstream  Deatnu  River  and  Fjord,  another  
the  “Norwegian”  part  of  upstream  Deatnu  River.  Thus,  the  investment  company  is  a  tool  of  regional  
socio-economic  development  in  some  of  the  areas  where  Sápmi  and  Norway  overlap.  Various  funds  
have  been  established  to  stimulate  socio-economic  development  in  areas  where  Norway  and  Sápmi  
overlap.  Some  local  social  entrepreneurs  benefit  from  the  Sámi  Development  Fund  (Samisk  
utviklingsfond),  the  investments  of  which  are  decided  upon  by  the  Norwegian  Sámi  Parliament.990  
This  is  slightly  different  from  how  it  works  at  the  fish  receiving  facility  in  Deanuvuotha,  because  
Inner  Finnmark  Investment  Company  gets  much  of  its  funds  from  Finnmark  County-Municipality.  
The  County-Municipality  and  the  Sámi  Parliament  are  the  products  of  two  slightly  different  waves  
of  democratization,  as  I  have  discussed  above  (in  Chapter  8,  in  the  genealogy  of  the  Finnmark  Act).  
The  Sámi  Parliament  is  a  result  of  the  indigenous  human  rights  struggle  that  took  place  since  the  
mid  20th  Century,  while  the  County  Municipality  is  a  product  of  the  agrarian  cooperative  and  
municipal  movement,  which  started  in  the  mid  19th  Century.  Both  movements  are  generally  in  
favour  of  increased  decentralization  of  power,  combined  with  and  geographical  redistribution,  or  
“district  politics”.  Both  have  been  accommodated  within  the  Nordic  model  of  parliamentarian  
corporatism.  Locally  based  entrepreneurial  activities  gain  financial  support  from  municipal,  county  
and  state  level.  Those  funds  emerge  from  common  pools  at  each  of  those  levels,  which,  in  turn  
emerge  from  taxes  at  municipal  and  state  level,  as  well  as  from  the  state-owned  petroleum  industry.  
Thus,  value  is  first  extracted  from  the  territory,  and  then  some  of  the  value  is  redistributed  to  some  
of  the  provinces  around  the  territory.  This  is  a  traditional  pattern  of  redistribution  under  
parliamentarian  corporatism,  though  regional  investment  companies  represent  a  more  recent  means  
of  doing  this.  In  sum,  the  local  fish  receiving  facility  in  Deanuvuotna,  is  35%  owned  by  the  
institutions  of  the  corporatist  redistributive  state,  and  65%  owned  by  the  institutions  of  the  agrarian  
                                                 
989  Web  page  of  Indre  Finnmark  investeringsselskap  AS:  http://www.ifu.no/  last  retrieved  5.  May  2014. 
990  Pedersen  and  Høgmo  2012;;  for  info  on  Sámi  Development  Found,  see  wikipedia  (in  Norwegian)  
http://no.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samisk_Utviklingsfond  last  retrieved  5.  May  2014. 
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cooperative  movement.  The  distribution  of  stock  ownership  between  local  fishers  and  regional  
development  institutions  expresses  a  specific  political  culture.  The  mix  between  corporatism  and  
cooperatives  is  typical  for  Norway,  Finland  and  Sápmi.  However,  the  economic  practice  of  
gathering  and  redistributing  resources  might  be  a  globally  universal.  The  economic  anthropologist  
Marshall  Sahlins  has  explained  “redistribution”  as  a  “system  of  reciprocities”,  where  many  small  
actors  give  a  small  contribution  to  a  common  pool,  before  resources  from  the  pool  are  transferred  
back  to  each  actor.991  Thus  we  deal  with  a  specific  network  structure  in  a  reciprocity  system.  For  
Sahlins,  each  relationship  of  reciprocity  in  this  net  may  take  the  form  of  a  “balanced  reciprocity”,  
which  would  be  close  to  the  normative  ideal  of  the  cooperative  business  model.  Alternatively,  each  
relation  may  rather  take  the  form  that  he  calls  “negative  reciprocity”,  which  is  economic  
exploitation  or  pure  theft.  The  former  alternative  corresponds  with  Ostrom's  “new  theory”  of  
covenants  based  on  consent  and  mutual  gain,  while  the  latter  corresponds  with  what  she  calls  the  
“old  theory”,  of  covenants  by  the  sword.  Cooperative  redistribution  is  of  the  first  type;;  tribal  
redistribution  may  be  of  either  type;;  feudal  redistribution  certainly  includes  the  sword;;  as  does  
corporatist  redistribution.  When  some  social  classes  enjoy  historical  privileges,  redistribution  may  
imply  stealing  from  the  rich  in  order  to  give  to  the  poor.  However,  corporatism  may  also  be  based  
on  theft  from  the  poor  (such  as  the  fishing  rights  of  the  Coastal  Sámi),  or  from  the  global  natural  
heritage  of  humankind  (such  as  oil  and  gas  fields  in  the  Arctic  Ocean).  The  corporatist  state  takes  
with  one  hand,  gives  with  the  other,  and  the  end  result  may  vary. 
 Before  the  quay  and  the  fish  receiving  facility  were  built,  there  was  a  period  when  the  
fishermen  had  to  go  to  the  neighbouring  fjord  in  order  to  deliver  their  catch.  That  would  take  the  
whole  day,  and  thus  they  couldn’t  live  with  that.  The  new  fish  receiving  facility  has  a  use  value  that  
is  socio-economically  very  important  to  maintain  vital  communities  in  the  Deatnu  fjord  –  even  
though  the  facility  seen  in  isolation  is  not  very  profitable.  Thus,  there  is  a  difference  between  the  
lack  of  profit  on  the  one  hand,  and  “materialistic  value”  (use  value,  utility)  on  the  other.  (Reidar  
used  the  expression  materialistic  value.)  (Travel  memory,  23.08.2013) 
 Therefore,  the  fish  receiving  facility  contributes  to  combating  the  economic  downturn.  
Proponents  of  corporate  capitalism  use  the  term  “growth  machine”  to  legitimate  large  capital  
concentration.  In  this  case,  however,  a  small  capital  concentration,  based  on  local  and  public  
resources,  has  generated  growth  for  a  local  community.  According  to  my  interviews,  the  fish  
receiving  facility  has  facilitated  sustained  activity  in  small-scale  fisheries  all  over  the  Deatnu  Fjord.  
The  former  Minister  of  Fisheries  probably  was  of  the  same  opinion  when  she  celebrated  it  by  
serving  cake. 
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Figure  11-9:  The  dock  (foreground),  with  the  quay  and  the  fish  receiving  facility  (background),  June  2012 
 
 Ecological  economy:  Local  fishermen  tell  me  that  not  all  fishermen  own  equal  shares  in  the  
fish  receiving  facility.  Those  who  took  part  in  the  attempt  to  start  cod  farming  still  own  somewhat  
more.  Those  who  own  more  shares  are  those  who  took  the  risk  of  testing  whether  cod  farming  could  
work  or  not.  However,  the  emphasis  of  the  economic  activity  has  changed,  with  the  changes  in  the  
natural  stocks  of  various  species.  At  present  time,  red  king  crab  is  the  main  source  of  income.  The  
crabs  are  processed  by  another  locally  based  firm,  Bugøynes  kongekrabbe  based  in  Sør-Varanger.  
The  journalists  who  used  the  minister's  chocolate  cake  to  illustrate  the  importance  of  the  facility,  
also  interviewed  the  crab  processing  factory: 
 
"[T]he  Crab  King  [...]  has  great  belief  that  they  will  manage  to  get  the  wheels  running  in  spite  of  the  
financial  crisis.  –  If  this  receiving  facility  had  invested  in  cod  only,  then  it  would  never  have  been  
opened.  The  benefit  of  having  such  facilities  in  small  places  is  that  you  always  have  something  that  
subsidizes  that  which  has  a  bad  market  access,  says  Øyvind  Seipajævri  from  Bugøynes  
Kongekrabbe."992 
 
For  fjord  fishers,  it  can  be  difficult  to  foresee  what  investment  will  give  profit,  because  their  local  
economy  is  highly  integrated  with  the  local  ecology.  Sometimes  there  are  good  conditions  for  one  
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species;;  sometimes  there  are  better  conditions  for  another.  Naturally,  there  are  fluctuations  in  the  
web  of  nutrition  between  different  species.  As  the  so-called  “Crab  King”  emphasizes  in  the  
interview,  the  small-scale  fishermen  are  highly  adaptable.  Traditionally,  every  household  in  the  area  
combines  various  livelihood  strategies.  The  small-scale  community  has  to  be  sensitive  to  ecological  
diversity,  and  thus,  its  economy  is  diverse  too.  Reidar  tells  me  that  his  advice  to  young  fishermen  is  
to  save  money  in  the  bank  to  provide  security  for  bad  years.  When  I  asked  if  it  isn’t  better  to  invest  
in  facilities,  he  explains  that  it  is  necessary  to  save  some  money  because  you  never  know  for  sure  
what  will  turn  out  to  give  income.  Reidar  wore  a  jacket  with  the  logo  of  Bugøynes  Kongekrabbe  on  
the  back  during  the  midsummer  celebration.  This  company  is  a  collaborator  but  also  a  potential  
competitor.  The  local  people  in  the  Deatnu  Fjord  would  prefer  to  establish  a  local  processing  facility  
in  their  own  fjord,  in  order  to  gain  more  from  the  value  chain.  Reidar  is  a  proponent  of  “vital  local  
communities”  (levende  bygder),  and  used  to  be  a  member  of  the  agrarian  Centre  Party.  Their  policy  
is  that  small-scale  primary  businesses,  rather  than  state  or  market,  represent  better  shepherds  for  
natural  resources. 
 Social  entrepreneurship:  When  visiting  the  fish  receiving  facility,  one  may  easily  observe  
that  it  is  a  social  meeting  place  for  the  local  people,  a  “community  forum”.  When  one  takes  part  in  
the  work  there,  and  learns  about  how  this  work  is  organized,  then  one  learns  that  it  is  also  a  “local  
growth  machine”.  Those  are  indicators  that  the  fish  receiving  facility  serves  a  key  function  for  the  
sustainability  of  the  local  community,  especially  economically,  but  also  socially.  Deanudat  is  a  local  
community  struggling  to  maintain  itself,  its  small-scale  economy,  its  diverse  livelihood  adaptations,  
and  its  bio-cultural  diversity.  The  same  is  the  case  for  the  Deatnu  Fjord  as  a  whole.  The  same  is  also  
the  case  for  all  such  fjords  along  the  southern  coast  of  the  Barents  Sea.  The  scramble  for  local  fish  
receiving  facilities  is  a  struggle  for  the  sustainability  of  small-scale  fjord  fishery  communities.  The  
fish  receiving  facility  in  Deanudat  is  the  outcome  of  entrepreneurial  spirit,  channeled  through  
economic  activities  and  political  representation. 
 Local  people  pooled  their  small  savings,  and  invested  them  for  the  common  good.  At  the  
same  time,  they  utilized  the  political  and  economic  opportunity  structure  to  mobilize  resources.  
Those  came  from  various  levels  of  “innovation  clusters”  and  “policy  networks”  –  contemporary  
configurations  of  political-economic  potency.  Such  action  could  be  called  “social  entrepreneurship”.  
Capital  is  capacity,  in  a  rather  literal  sense.  Therefore,  such  small-scale  entrepreneurship  is  capacity  
building.  This  entails  self-empowerment  and  fighting  poverty.  Above,  I  have  argued  that  the  local  
fish  receiving  facility,  according  to  the  ownership  of  stocks,  is  65%  cooperative  private  initiative  
and  35%  corporatist  state  planning.  The  65%  cooperative  business  is  worker-controlled  capital.  
Capital  is  power.  Cooperative  business  is  labor  power.  However,  the  35%  corporatist  business  is  
politically  controlled  capital.  Corporatist  business  is  party  power.  The  relationship  between  those  
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two  forms  of  power  may  be  ambiguous.  The  political  culture  of  Norway,  Finland  and  Sápmi  
includes  both  cooperative  and  corporatist  tendencies.  However,  this  does  not  mean  that  those  two  
tendencies  are  always  in  resonance.  It  might  be  equally  correct  to  see  the  two  tendencies  as  being  in  
a  constant  tension,  producing  various  institutional  arrangements.  The  tension  between  corporatist  
and  cooperative  traditions  is  one  source  of  dynamics.  It  plays  into  the  general  changes  in  the  
capitalist  system.  The  local  fish  receiving  facility  in  Deanduvuotna  is  funded  according  to  a  
complex  stock  company  model,  which  may  be  seen  as  a  neoliberal  adaptation  of  the  older  
cooperative  and  corporatist  traditions.  The  neoliberal  capitalism  may  be  seen  as  a  loss  of  
opportunity  for  redistribution  policies  with  social  aims,  when  compared  to  the  older  state  
capitalism.  However,  this  may  also  be  seen  differently.  Local  social  entrepreneurs  in  the  Deatnu  
watershed  mobilize  resources  from  a  complex  set  of  institutions,  including  trans-boundary  regional  
development  programs,  such  as  the  Barents  Secretariat  and  EU  Interreg  North.  As  I  discussed  at  the  
end  of  the  Geographical  Bridge  (Chapter  8):  new  opportunities  have  opened  up  for  regional  
development  across  state  boundaries,  while  old  opportunities  have  disappeared  for  state-directed  
command  and  control  tactics.  The  new  situation  is  certainly  less  nationalistically  biased  than  the  
old.  Still,  one  may  also  wonder  whether  the  gain  in  trans-boundary  economic  democratization  is  
capable  to  outweigh  the  loss  in  national  democratization.  The  subaltern  classes  in  Sápmi,  such  as  
the  Coastal  Sámi  suffered  a  great  deal  under  the  so-called  “golden  age”  of  social  democracy.  In  the  
neoliberal  age,  their  desire  for  collective  human  rights  has  at  least  become  publicly  known.  Again  
(as  in  Chapter  2),  my  assessment  is  that  it  is  more  misleading  to  be  nostalgic  about  a  presumed  
golden  age  in  the  past  (as  Olav  Gunnar  Ballo  certainly  is)  than  to  hope  for  a  potential  golden  age  in  
the  future  (as  Helga  Pedersen  seems  to  do).  In  areas  where  Sápmi  and  Norway  overlap,  the  interest  
organizations  for  small-scale  fisheries  have  always  remained  loyal  to  the  Norwegian  Labor  Party.  
They  might  have  had  less  to  gain  from  the  Social  Democrats  when  the  latter  made  compromises  
with  liberal  nationalism,  than  what  they  now  can  gain  from  Social  Democrats  making  compromises  
with  global  neoliberalism.  For  fisher-peasants  in  Coastal  Sápmi,  there  was  never  any  alternative  to  
collaboration  with  the  colonial  state,  but  nevertheless,  the  opportunities  for  social  entrepreneurship  
have  become  less  limited  now  than  what  they  were  before. 
 Now  I  have  concluded  the  discussion  about  the  economic  salmon  at  the  fish  receiving  
facility.  Still,  I  will  not  abruptly  proceed  to  the  scientific  salmon  and  the  local  involvement  of  
fishery  biology.  Instead  I  will  provide  an  anecdote  that  illustrates  the  seamless  relationship  between  
social  entrepreneurship  within  regional  innovation  clusters,  and  social  entrepreneurship  within  
transnational  epistemic  communities.  One  day,  before  going  out  with  Reidar  to  the  sea,  I  checked  
my  e-mail  in  the  pause  room  in  the  fish  receiving  facility.  I  had  received  an  answer  from  a  contact  at  
the  Norwegian  Business  School  (BI).  She  is  an  expert  on  social  entrepreneurship.  I  had  written  
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some  enthusiastic  lines  about  the  fish  receiving  facility,  and  she  showed  an  interest  in  knowing  
more  about  the  case.  I  showed  it  to  Reidar.  The  fisherman’s  poker  face  was,  as  always,  difficult  for  
the  ethnographer  to  interpret.  Local  fishers  guard  their  traditional  knowledge,  concerning  where  
they  find  fish,  for  example.  Knowledge  is  a  precious  economic  asset  for  fisher-peasants.  Traditional  
knowledge  has  continuously  adapted  to  the  environment.  Experience  about  where  to  find  fish  may  
be  combined  with  salmon  zoology,  fishery  economy,  or  artful  practices  of  collaborating  with  
ethnographers.  When  I  had  drafted  this  text,  and  my  colleague  Gro  Ween  read  through  it,  she  told  
me  how  local  fishers  had  sought  her  and  other  ethnographers  too.  We  fish  for  information  to  further  
entrepreneurship  within  the  field  of  knowledge-production.  They  fish  for  relevant  research  to  
further  entrepreneurship  within  the  field  of  fjord  fisheries.  We  and  they  get  caught  in  each  others’  
respective  nets.  The  ethnographers  come  from  the  capital  city,  but  we  visit  the  fishermen  in  their  
homely  waters,  where  they  are  the  experts  on  navigation.  Clever  social  entrepreneurs  in  
Deanuvuotna  mobilize  resources  from  the  neoliberal  financial  economy,  and  from  the  neoliberal  
knowledge  economy  as  well.  This  brings  us  over  to  the  next  topic:  bio-scientific  reporting.  Let  us  
follow  the  local  fisherman  into  the  storage  at  the  fish  receiving  facility,  and  further  into  the  room  
where  biological  sampling  takes  place. 
 
 
11.3.4  Biological  reporting  –  the  scientific  salmon 
When  we  follow  the  salmon  flesh  further,  from  the  quay,  into  the  fish  receiving  facility,  the  flesh  
becomes  enriched  with  more  social  functions.  It  still  is  an  economic  asset,  which  has  to  be  handled  
with  care.  However,  additionally,  it  also  becomes  an  object  of  bio-scientific  observation.  Fjord  
fishers  collaborate  with  fishery  biologists.  Thus,  the  biologist  acquires  data,  empowering  her  to  
conduct  systematic  analysis,  while  the  fisher  gets  neat  graphs,  empowering  him  to  know  better  what  
fishes  to  catch  this  season,  and  which  one  to  save  for  next  year.  Following  the  flesh  of  the  salmon  
into  the  local  laboratory  of  bio-scientific  reporting,  we  also  enter  the  politics  of  knowledge. 
 The  box  with  small  diddi  salmon  was  brought  into  the  fish  receiving  facility.  The  youngman  
was  now  allowed  to  enter  directly  into  the  production  room.  As  a  clean,  white  cube,  this  locality  
functioned  well  to  expose  the  processing  of  fish.  Reidar  arrived  with  some  tools  and  took  over  the  
Salmon  again.  The  youngman  rigged  his  camera  for  observation.  [Travel  memory,  27.08.2012] 
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Figure  11-10:  Photos  as  ethnographical  samples  from  biological  sampling  practice,  June  2012. 
Left:  Taking  measures  and  scale  samples.  Right:  Writing  numbers  on  the  envelopes  for  scale  samples.   
 
 With  rapid  movements,  the  fisherman  sliced  each  fish  open  with  a  knife.  He  turned  the  knife  
around,  and  on  the  other  end  was  a  spoon  that  he  used  to  get  out  all  the  intestines.  The  intestines  
dropped  to  the  floor,  and  were  flushed  by  running  water  into  a  hole  in  the  floor.  The  weight  and  
length  of  the  fish  were  measured,  using  specific  tools.  The  fisherman  put  his  glasses  on,  observed  
the  numbers,  and  wrote  them  down  on  a  small,  brown  envelope.  Then  he  slid  the  knife  gently  along  
the  surface  of  the  fish.  Under  the  fine  layer  of  mucus,  a  few  scales  loosened  from  the  fish  body.  
Those  were  removed,  and  put  into  the  envelope.  The  same  procedure  was  done  for  each  individual  
salmon.  Only  after  this  detailed  registration,  were  the  fish  further  transported  through  a  curtain  of  
hanging  bands  of  thick  plastic,  into  the  cold  storage.  There,  the  dead  fish  were  laid  to  rest  on  
crushed  ice  in  white  boxes.  [Travel  memory,  27.08.2012] 
 Laboratory  Life:  Scale  sampling  is  a  form  of  systematic  observation.  It  is  an  act  of  natural  
science  observing  nature.  Photographing  the  scale  sampling  is  a  way  of  obeserving  the  observation.  
It  is  an  act  of  human  science  observing  natural  science.  My  photographic  praxis  referred  to  Reidar’s  
scale  sampling  praxis.  It  was  one  form  of  knowledge  praxis  regarding  another  form  of  knowledge  
praxis.  As  such,  my  photos  of  Reidar's  scale  samples  are  an  instance  of  “science  and  technology  
studies”  (STS).  By  pursuing  such  an  approach  in  Deanuvuotna,  I  followed  a  path  trodden  by  Gro  
Ween  through  her  earlier  fieldwork  in  the  same  environment.  She  had  observed  the  complex  
relationships  between  traditional  knowledge  among  Sámi  fishers,  and  scientific  knowledge  among  
salmon  biologists.993  Thus,  she  had  been  a  broker  between  two  networks  of  researchers,  those  who  
document  traditional  knowledge  in  Sámi  areas,994  and  those  who  pursue  the  politics  of  knowledge  
in  the  Norwegian  state.995  However,  I  chose  another  instrument  of  observation.  The  camera  became  
                                                 
993  Ween  2012a 
994  Joks  2009;;  Solbakk,  J.T.  2007 
995  Asdal  2001;;  Law  &  Lien  2013;;  Lien  &  Law  2011 
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a  natural  choice  because  I  had  worked  with  visual  studies  and  participatory  art.  The  “white  cube”  of  
the  art  gallery,  the  showcases  with  specimen  in  the  natural  history  museum,  and  the  systematic  
registration  at  the  laboratory  are  all  various  ways  to  stage  observation  in  a  systematic  manner.  ANT  
researchers  select  data  of  relevance  to  both  aesthetic  and  epistemological  theory.996 
 My  photos  are  index,  sample,  specimen,  from  his  reporting  practice,  which  also  is  index,  
sample,  and  specimen.  [....]  The  practice  was  performed  in  the  facility’s  white  cube,  with  walls  at  
three  sides,  my  insight  from  the  fourth  side,  as  a  [when]  professor  of  medicine  demonstrates  his  arts  
in  an  anatomical  theatre.  [Travel  memory,  27.08.2012] 
 The  scientific  salmon:  Precise  observations  are  gathered  by  fishers  in  their  local  field  
laboratories  at  local  fish  receiving  facilities.  However,  data  gathering  is  only  the  first  stage  in  the  
logistical  chain  of  scientific  inquiry.  Lots  of  particular  observations  are  being  gathered,  then  
analysed  and  interpreted,  and  the  output  feeds  back  into  practical  policy  in  the  fishery  management  
system.  While  I  made  photographs  of  Reidar's  scale  sampling  practice,  I  also  talked  with  local  
fishers  and  local  biologists  to  learn  about  the  further  circulation  of  the  information  from  the  scale  
samples.  In  the  field  notes,  I  used  terms  I  had  learned  from  other  ANT  research. 
 His  report  is  being  sent,  with  samples  from  other  fishermen,  to  a  “centre  of  calculation”,  
where  the  information  becomes  “translated”  into  a  quasi-statistical  analysis  (quasi-  because  the  
scale  samples  have  not  been  gathered  through  [probabilistic]  sampling  [procedures]).  [Travel  
memory,  27.08.2012] 
 My  own  sampling  is  being  brought,  together  with  other  data  from  my  travel,  to  the  
temporary  “centre  of  calculation”  which  is  my  PhD  research.  The  Photos  are  being  “translated”  
into  qualitative  interpretation.  Here,  the  observation’s  unique,  environmentally  specific,  character  is  
quite  as  important  as  its  representativity.  [Travel  memory,  27.08.2012] 
 The  phrase  “centre  of  calculation”  has  been  borrowed  from  Bruno  Latour.997  Such  centres  
are  material  locations  and  social  institutions.  They  are  not  identical  with  the  places  and  practices  
whereby  information  is  being  found.  A  centre  of  calculation  is  a  place  and  practice,  into  which  
information  is  being  fed,  to  be  accumulated,  analysed  and  synthesised.  According  to  Latour,  such  
centres  of  calculation  have  a  key  function  for  the  stabilization  or  standardization  of  any  body  of  
knowledge.998  Centres  of  calculation  are  socio-material  entities,  which  are  somehow  organized.  
Thus  they  have  some  kind  of  political  economy.  The  organizational  context  of  scientific  practices  is  
politically  charged,  even  though  the  scientific  practice  itself  may  be  unbiased.  Research  methods  
may  or  may  not  be  objective,  but  research  priorities  can  hardly  be  apolitical.  Political  science  
                                                 
996  Latour  &  Woolgar  (1979);;  see  also  Brenna  2012  and  Brenna  2013  (thanks  to  Gro  Ween  for  the  latter  two  references) 
997  Latour  1987,  cited  in  Jöns  2011 
998  Latour  2004:  178,  181,  221-232 
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aquires  funds  and  justification  on  the  basis  of  its  ability  to  serve  political  practice.  Salmon  biology  
aquires  funds  and  justification  on  the  basis  of  its  ability  to  serve  natural  resources  management.  The  
political  context  of  science,  not  its  content,  is  what  feminist  critiques  and  ANT  scholars  refer  to  
when  they  use  the  term  “positionality”.999  (This  should  not  be  misunderstood  as  a  denial  of  what  the  
hard  sciences  call  reality;;  it  is  exactly  because  science  may  say  something  about  reality  that  it  
empowers  practical  interests.)  The  ANT  researcher  maintains  a  “myopic”  focus  by  zooming  in  on  
observations  with  a  high  degree  of  specificity,  on  the  cost  of  generality.  However,  by  maintaining  
focus  on  the  particular,  she  may  gain  particular  samples  of  positionality,  she  “stays  with  the  trouble”  
as  Law  &  Singleton  say.1000 
 The  unique  is  the  fisherman’s  pedagogical  performance  or  staging  of  his  own  practice.  […]  
The  photos  are  index  of  a  particular  situation  located  in  time  and  space,  where  particular  human  
bodies  work  together  on  a  joint  task.  However,  concerning  representativity,  the  photos  may  also  be  
seen  as  illustrations  of  such  practices  in  other  places  within  the  Deatnu  Fjord  socio-ecosystem.  As  
such,  the  photos  may  nowise  be  interpreted  as  any  statistical  sample,  but  as  an  illustrative  
performance  of  normative  practice.  It  is  an  enactment  of  an  ideal  practice,  an  enactment  of  an  ideal  
paradigm.  The  norm  comes  from  the  authorities,  and  has  a  contentious  status  within  local  customs.  
[Travel  memory,  27.08.2012] 
 Through  my  ethnographic  observation  of  fishers  in  the  Deatnu  Water  Area,  my  impression  is  
that  many  of  them  have  a  rather  good  understanding  of  scientific  method.  For  example,  I  met  many  
fishers  who  understand  the  rules  of  statistical  sampling  better  than  many  qualitative  social  scientists  
do.  Nevertheless,  they  tend  to  be  rather  critical  participants  in  the  research  system  that  they  are  
feeding  into.  For  example,  there  are  many  who  would  like  to  see  more  research  on  how  much  
salmon  is  being  caught  by  predator  animals  such  as  seals  or  ducks.1001  Others  suggest  that  the  
largest  portion  of  the  human  catch  may  be  from  larger  vessels  with  mobile  gear,  along  the  coast  or  
in  the  open  sea.1002  I  have  never  seen  any  attempt  to  gain  any  indicators  about  such  catches,  while  
all  traditional  fishers  and  sports  anglers  are  obliged  to  report  each  individual  they  catch. 
 The  scale  samples  represent  bits  of  information  with  a  potential  use  value.  It  is  not  the  
reliability  of  the  particular  scale  sampling  that  is  contested.  What  is  contested  is  the  reliability  of  
the  analytical  procedures,  in  part  also  the  external  [conceptual]  validity  of  the  analytical  concepts,  
and  definitely  the  political  economy  of  the  scientific  practice  (use  value  and  control).  [Travel  
memory,  27.08.2012] 
 When  it  comes  to  the  statistical  reliability  of  the  analytical  procedures,  representativity  is  a  
                                                 
999  See  for  example  Haraway  1991;;    Stengers  1999  (1997);;  and  Smith  1999 
1000  Law  &  Singleton  2012 
1001  Ween  2012a 
1002  Interview  with  Tapiola,  Aslak,  interpreted  by  Katja  Tapiola,  Utsjoki,  6th  February  2011 
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problem.  The  size  of  the  actual  fish  stock  is  estimated  on  the  basis  of  measures  of  the  annual  catch,  
and  the  measure  of  the  annual  catch  is  calculated  on  the  basis  of  catch  reports  from  all  the  
fishermen.  In  theory,  every  fisherman  is  supposed  to  report  on  every  fish  he  catches.  However,  in  
practice,  all  fishermen  know  that  most  fishermen  tend  to  deliver  exaggerations  or  understatements  
according  to  the  situation.  Catch  statistics  are  like  crime  statistics.  You  can  be  almost  certain  that  
some  of  what  you  try  to  measure  is  being  kept  secret,  but  you  have  no  basis  whatsoever  to  estimate  
the  difference  between  the  estimated  score  and  the  real  score.  Local  fishermen  contest  the  reliability  
of  catch  statistics  as  an  index  of  the  actual  size  of  the  salmon  stock,  and  their  argument  is  supported  
by  the  generally  accepted  procedures  for  statistics.  However,  the  catch  statistics  have  become  
supplemented  by  other,  more  reliable  observation  methods.  The  critique  from  traditional  fishers  did  
not  have  much  say  in  this  development.  However,  the  Finnish  Ministry  of  Forestry  was  also  critical  
of  the  widespread  use  of  catch  statistics  in  the  Norwegian  Ministry  of  the  Environment.1003  
Registration  with  underwater  cameras,  echo  sounding  and  ultrasound  has  made  it  possible  for  the  
biologists  to  see  the  salmon  population,  which  usually  hides  below  the  silver  surface  of  the  water.  
Another  contribution  to  increased  reliability  is  DNA  samples  in  the  form  of  scale  samples.  My  
impression  is  that  local  fishers  are  generally  happy  to  take  part  in  such  reporting;;  perhaps  because  it  
contributes  to  overcoming  some  of  biases  that  were  implicit  in  the  (mis)use  of  catch  statistics  as  the  
sole  indicator  of  the  size  of  the  fish  stock. 
 When  it  comes  to  conceptual  validity,  some  terms  may  be  more  relevant  to  some  policy  
interests.  I  have  never  heard  any  local  fishers  contest  the  terminology  of  zoology  or  ecology.  They  
may  sometimes  use  complimentary  terms  from  local  traditional  knowledge.  In  any  case,  however,  
the  policy  interest  is  in  a  sustainable  fish  stock  as  a  basis  for  sustainable  fisheries,  and  sustainable  
indigenous  culture.  However,  practical  fishery  research  is  interdisciplinary,  and  even  though  the  
biological  terms  are  uncontroversial,  these  are  often  combined  with  social  science  terms  that  are  
fundamentally  contested.  In  particular,  this  regards  how  the  experts  at  the  Ministry  of  the  
Environment  have  chosen  to  operationalise  the  issue  of  socio-economic  benefit.  They  may  be  
experts  in  biology,  and  even  in  monetary  economy.  What  they  lack  is  knowledge  about  the  practical  
realities  of  subsistence  and  reciprocity  economy,  the  issues  of  interest  for  substantivist  (such  as  
Marianne  Lien)  and  neo-institutinalist  economists  (such  as  Elinor  Ostrom).  It  may  be  easy  to  
compare  the  monetary  differences  between  income  from  selling  angler  licenses,  and  income  from  
selling  one’s  own  catch.  The  income  (measured  in  money)  per  unit  of  salmon  flesh  (measured  in  
biomass)  is  considerably  larger  if  the  local  communities  rely  on  tourism,  rather  than  on  traditional  
fisheries.  The  monetary  economy  is  relatively  easy  to  measure,  but  unFortunately,  this  is  only  one  
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component  of  the  real  economy  in  the  Deatnu  Water  Area.  It  is  hard  to  measure  the  use  value  of  
subsistence  practices,  or  exchange  values  in  a  gift  economy.  It  is  impossible  to  measure  the  value  of  
subsistence  and  reciprocity  practices  that  maintain  the  social  fabric  of  the  Sámi  culture.  The  cultural  
value  of  subsistence  economy  is  invaluable.  (To  this  issue  we  will  return  after  we  have  left  the  scale  
sample  reporting,  and  will  follow  the  flesh  further  to  the  kitchen  table.)  The  bio-scientific  
authorities  have  chosen  a  monetarist  operationalisation  of  economic  benefit.  It  is  simpler  to  
measure,  but  it  is  politically  biased  towards  the  specific  interests  of  sports  anglers  (and  industrial  
fisheries).  Such  an  operationalisation  of  economic  benefit  exposes  the  economic  benefit  of  tourism  
(and  of  industrial  fisheries),  which  is  part  of  the  market  economy,  but  conceals  the  benefit  of  
subsistence  and  reciprocity  economy. 
 With  regard  to  the  political-economic  context  of  the  scientific  practice,  many  local  fishermen  
complain  that  the  information  they  give  is  being  used  against  them.  In  that  regard,  it  is  interesting  
that  certain  scientific  institutions  refrain  from  publicly  discusings  statistical  reliability  or  conceptual  
validity.  It  might  be  the  case  that  they  do  not  discuss  their  own  monitoring  routines  because  they  
have  the  political  power  not  to  do  so.  For  the  fishermen  in  the  Deatnu  fjord,  the  main  centres  of  
calculation  are  found  within  a  complex  policy  network  for  state-led  natural  resources  management.  
It  includes  the  NINA  research  institute,  the  Norwegian  Directorate  of  Nature  Management,  and  the  
Norwegian  Ministry  of  the  Environment.  It  also  includes  the  RKTL  research  station  on  the  Finnish  
side  of  the  Deatnu  River,  and  the  Finnish  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Forestry.  The  policy  net  
further  includes  the  international  networks  of  salmon  biologists  (a  so-called  “epistemic  
community”),  loosely  affiliated  with  the  NASCO  Treaty.  There  is  much  internal  deliberation  within  
this  policy  net.  The  Norwegian  and  Finnish  state  ministries  have  pushed  for  perceived  “national  
interests”  in  the  management  of  shared  salmon  resources.  This  has  opened  opportunities  for  
scientific  deliberations  among  biologists,  which  is  one  reason  why  the  RKTL  developed  more  
reliable  (or  less  unreliable)  monitoring  techniques.1004  Within  this  policy  network,  the  scientific  
deliberation  among  biologists  is  strongly  influenced  by  bureaucrats.  This  imposes  a  certain  bias,  
without  the  biologists  being  capable  to  maintain  any  scientific  autonomy,  and  without  the  subaltern  
fishery  organizations  being  capable  of  counter-balancing  the  biases  of  perceived  “national  interests”  
in  the  two  states.  Deliberation  over  scientific  truth  might  be  settled  by  political  forces  in  the  absence  
of  empirical  proof  and  rational  argument.  Therefore,  it  is  understandable  when  some  sea  salmon  
fishers  say  that  “[p]eople  are  angry.  They  feel  they  have  been  run  over  and  punished  by  researchers  
who  use  numbers  and  graphs  with  no  rooting  in  the  actualities.”1005  Science  is  indeed  open  for  
discussion,  because  it  is  an  open-ended  endeavour.  When  the  biologists  are  impotent  to  defend  their  
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autonomy  against  state  interests,  and  when  the  state  interests  suppress  the  subaltern  interests  that  
could  have  counterbalanced  them,  then,  indeed,  the  local  population  has  been  “run  over”,  as  one  of  
the  subalterns  himself  voiced  it. 
 Transnational  epistemic  communities:  Here  I  have  traced  some  of  the  ties  in  the  political  
economy  of  salmon  biology  in  Deatnu  River.  I  have  traced  some  organizational  ties  of  research  
funding  and  research  demands  from  the  institutionalized  policy  network.  However,  I  have  also  
mentioned  the  biological  experts  themselves,  between  the  rock  of  hard  science  and  the  hard  place  of  
state  interests.  An  expert  profession  can  be  referred  to  as  an  “epistemic  community”,  defined  as  “a  
network  of  professionals  with  recognised  expertise  and  competence  in  a  particular  domain  and  an  
authoritative  claim  to  policy  relevant  knowledge  within  that  domain  or  issue-area”1006  Such  
epistemic  communities  are  transnational  networks,  and  may  have  plural  nodes  of  power.  Those  
who  deliberate  about  the  size  of  the  salmon  stock  in  Deatnu  River  may  refer  to  the  RKTL  field  
research  station,  they  may  refer  to  the  NINA  research  institute,  or  they  may  refer  to  the  Institute  of  
Marine  Research.  These  nodes  of  epistemic  power  are  not  autonomous  from  political-economic  
power,  but  still,  there  is  some  degree  of  pluralism,  because  they  are  dependent  upon  diverse  nodes  
of  political-economic  power.  The  first  is  affiliated  to  the  Finnish  Ministry  of  Forestry,  and  to  the  
Finnish  Angler’s  Association,  which  has  a  popular  basis  all  over  the  nation.  The  second  is  affiliated  
to  the  Norwegian  Ministry  of  the  Environment,  which  is  socially  entangled  with  environemtalist  
NGOs  dominated  by  the  urban  bourgeoisie.  The  third  is  under  the  Norwegian  Ministry  of  Fishery,  
and  serves  the  national  salmon  farming  industry.  None  of  these  research  centres  have  any  affiliation  
with  small-scale  fisheries  in  Coastal  Sápmi.  However,  local  fishers  keep  themselves  updated  bout  
the  research  centres,  for  example  by  reading  the  newspaper  Fiskarbladet  Fiskaren,  or  by  gossiping  
with  local  biologists.  Thus,  the  fishers  pick  up  arguments  from  the  various  research  centres,  and  
change  alliances  tactically.  The  public  deliberation  about  bio-scientific  issues  can  sometimes  be  
rather  contentious.  The  mentioned  competition  between  Norwegian  and  Finnish  state  interests  
fuelled  deliberation  between  research  centres  on  both  sides,  leading  to  more  reliable  methods  for  
everyone.  I  also  had  the  pleasure  to  join  Gro  Ween,  Marianne  Lien  and  their  ANT  research  group  
when  they  organized  a  dialogue  meeting  between  competing  experts  affiliated  with  fish  farming  
industry  on  one  side,  and  sports  anglers  and  conservationists  on  the  other.1007  As  far  as  I  could  
observe,  they  had  a  dialogue  on  equal  terms.  Both  of  these  tribes  within  the  epistemic  community  
are  resourceful,  and  since  both  are  empowered,  they  are  capable  of  having  a  real  dialogue.  The  
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conservationists  and  sports  anglers  are  close  to  the  international  North  Atlantic  Salmon  Treaty  
Organization,  NASCO.  The  salmon  farmers  are  influential  because  they  contribute  considerably  to  
GDP.  In  the  context  of  the  Norwegian  state,  neither  of  those  groups  runs  the  risk  of  challenging  the  
more  dominant  trawler  capitalists.  They  debate  whether  or  not  it  poses  an  ecological  risk  that  
artificial  selection  intervenes  into  the  natural  selection,  in  the  evolution  of  Atlantic  salmon.  Bio-
scientific  deliberation  is  fuelled  by  competing  economic  interests,  and  both  interests  appear  to  be  
rather  well  organized.  However,  I  think  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  have  any  true  dialogue  if  
there  had  been  considerable  asymmetries  of  power  between  the  participants.  Therefore,  I  think  it  
was  good  not  to  include  any  representatives  of  the  traditional  knowledge  amongst  fjord  fishers  in  
Coastal  Sápmi.  The  UN  Biodiversity  Convention  does  in  fact  state  that  the  traditional  knowledge  is  
an  asset  for  ecological  sustainability.  This  is  the  basis  for  the  nature  conservation  policy  of  the  
Norwegian  Sámi  Parliament,1008  and,  on  paper,  this  principle  has  been  incorporated  into  the  new  
Norwegian  Biodiversity  Act  as  well.1009  Still,  in  the  practical  management  of  salmon  in  Deatnu  
Water  Area,  the  Norwegian  Ministry  of  tht  Environment  has  the  capacity  to  choose  another  
interpretation  of  whatever  “knowledge  based  management”  might  mean.  That  ministry  only  
recognizes  experts  that  have  been  appointed  by  itself,  or  by  its  counterpart  at  the  Finnish  side.  This  
is  exactly  the  same  modus  operandi  as  the  Ministry  of  Industry  chose  during  the  Alta-dam  conflict.  
At  that  time,  salmon  biology  and  nature  conservationists  were  in  the  oppositional,  constituent  issue  
net.  Now  they  are  in  the  hegemonic,  constituted  policy  net.  Within  their  newly-gained  position,  they  
seem  to  replicate  the  same  mode  of  domination  as  was  formerly  used  against  them,  by  their  former  
adversary.  In  this  situation,  the  organizations  for  Coastal  Sámi  fjord  fisheries  and  traditional  
knowledge  have  done  exactly  what  the  various  Sámi  rights  organizations  did  during  the  aftermath  
of  the  Alta-dam  conflict:  they  have  bypassed  the  state,  expanded  their  alliances  on  the  transnational  
stage,  and  have  build  up  their  own  capacity.  They  have  started  an  effort  to  develop  a  new  off-shoot  
from  the  transnational  epistemic  community,  one  that  builds  up  expertise  on  indigenous  fishery  
sciences.  The  effort  started  with  a  seminar  funded  by  the  German,  Canadian  and  Norwegian  
governments.  Political  entrepreneurs  from  North  American  First  Nations  congregated  with  
comrades  from  areas  where  Sápmi  and  Norway  overlap,  more  specifically,  from  downstream  
Deatnu.  Here  were  the  syndicalist  Bjarne  Johansen,  the  politician  Marianne  Balto,  and  the  historian  
Steinar  Pedersen.1010  This  is  social  entrepreneurship  within  the  transnational  epistemic  community  
of  fishery  sciences.  In  more  politicized  terms,  we  may  call  it  non-violent  direct  action  aimed  at  
prefiguring  another  control  over  the  means  of  knowledge-production.  When  it  seems  impossible  to  
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defend  the  scientific  autonomy  of  salmon  biology,  one  might  at  least  try  to  counterbalance  the  
biased  research  priorities  that  are  imposed  by  state  interests.  If  we  see  this  in  a  historical  context,  it  
is  relevant  that  the  nature  conservationists  and  the  indigenous  rights  activists  were  allied  during  the  
Alta-dam  conflict  (Chapters  6  and  7),  while  they  became  split  during  the  process  of  gradual  
accommodation  and  co-optation  in  the  aftermath  of  that  conflict  (Chapter  8).  At  that  time,  North  
Atlantic  integration  from  above  had  already  been  constituted,  via  the  Marshall  Aid  program  and  the  
NATO  alliance.  This  facilitated  but  also  provoked  a  counter-movement  of  North  Atlantic  integration  
from  below,  in  the  form  of  new  social  movements  and  emerging  epistemic  communities.  
Movements  for  and  experts  on  environmental  protection  upscaled  their  constituent  power,  and  
treaties  such  as  NASCO  emerged.  That  was  positive  for  the  purposes  of  sustainable  management  of  
the  shared  natural  heritage.  Such  a  gain  is  also  necessary,  but  not  sufficient,  for  the  sustainable  
management  of  shared  cultural  heritage.  The  potential  epistemic  community  for  indigenous  fishery  
science,  if  it  succeeds,  can  constitute  a  further  positive  contribution  to  the  sustainable  management  
of  both  natural  and  cultural  heritage. 
 Social  entrepreneurship  is  constituent  power.  Social  entrepreneurship  within  transnational  
epistemic  communities  has  already  had  an  impact  on  the  constituted  order,  for  example  via  
NASCO.  Further  progress  in  the  same  direction  may  be  the  result  if  the  emerging  network  for  
indigenous  fishery  science  succeeds  in  broadening  its  scope  of  action  and  builds  capacity  for  
constituent  power.  Social  entrepreneurship  in  the  epistemic  field  is  coordinated  and  interwoven  with  
similar  efforts  in  the  economic  field.  Some  local  fishers  are  good  at  utilizing  the  limited  
opportunities  that  are  offered  by  the  regional  innovation  cluster.  Other  local  fishers  are  good  at  
utilizing  the  limited  opportunities  that  exist  within  the  transnational  epistemic  communities.  The  
mobilization  of  resources  and  framings  on  one  front  may  serve  the  mobilization  of  resources  and  
framings  on  another  front.  My  own  research  is  one  of  the  many  particular  assets  that  are  mobilized.  
There  is  a  seamless  connection  between  the  entrepreneurial  efforts  in  the  economic,  epistemic  and  
political  spheres.  In  the  local  social-ecological  context,  these  represent  some  additional  livelihood  
adaptations  for  flexible  fisher-peasant  households  in  vulnerable  communities.  The  natural  basis  for  
Sámi  culture  involves  subsistence  practices,  longstanding  customs  and  traditional  knowledge,  and  
those  practices  may  or  may  not  mix  with  regional  innovation  clusters,  multi-level  constitutional  
processes,  and  transnational  epistemic  communities.  Fisher-peasants  in  Coastal  Sápmi  may  hunt  in  
the  morning,  fish  in  the  afternoon,  rear  sheep  in  the  evening  –  and  engage  in  social  and  political  
entrepreneurship  after  dinner.  Let  us  now  follow  the  flesh  of  the  salmon  directly  to  the  dinner  table. 
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Figure  11-11:  At  the  dinner  table:  sharing  wild  salmon 
 
 
11.3.5  Using  the  salmon  flesh  –  salmon  as  a  “total  object” 
When  we  follow  the  flesh  of  the  salmon  from  the  fish  receiving  facility,  we  could  choose  various  
paths.  Some  individual  salmon  are  being  sold  on  the  capitalist  market;;  others  are  fed  into  the  local  
subsistence  and  reciprocity  economy.  Thus,  one  possible  path  passes  through  the  capitalist  market,  
where  flesh  is  sold  for  money.  However,  as  with  most  raw  material  products,  sea  salmon  flesh  
provides  scarce  income  when  it  is  being  distributed  directly  as  a  market  commodity.  Another  path  is  
to  follow  it  through  the  local  subsistence  and  reciprocity  economy.  By  observing  the  further  
processing  and  preparation  of  the  salmon  flesh,  I  will  discuss  how  local  social  entrepreneurs  try  to  
make  business  out  of  further  processing  of  the  raw  material  at  home,  and  then  selling  the  final  
gourmet  food.  Even  more  importantly,  by  observing  how  the  salmon  meal  is  shared  around  the  
kitchen  table,  I  will  also  discuss  how  it  functions  as  a  significant  of  social  integration.   
 When  the  salmon  flesh  leaves  the  fish  receiving  facility,  in  order  to  be  circulated  in  the  
household  economy,  it  gains  a  complex  social  function  that  combines  nutrition,  barter,  
communication,  emotions,  and  spirituality:  it  becomes  what  the  anthropologists  call  a  “total  social  
object”.  As  such,  salmon  flesh  is  one  of  several  key  assets  in  the  traditional  Sámi  community,  and  
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these  are  traditionally  being  used  in  ways  that  maintain  and  develop  the  very  fabric  of  society.  I  will  
now  leave  the  discussion  about  various  paths  of  social  entrepreneurship,  and  instead  turn  to  the  
discussion  about  how  the  Sámi  society  is  continuously  maintained  and  developed:  the  siida  system  
that  never  fully  disappeared. 
 Was  the  fisherman  satisfied  with  his  catch  this  day?  For  the  ethnographer,  it  was  hard  to  read  
the  fisherman’s  poker  face.  Five  small  salmons  and  a  trout  had  been  entangled  in  his  gillnets  over  
night.  On  the  photo  they  lay  bleeding  on  the  boat  deck.  Their  throats  had  been  cut  immediately  to  
preserve  the  quality  of  the  meat,  and  also  to  minimize  their  suffering. 
 High  quality  products:  Such  small  salmon  are  called  diddi  in  Northern  Sámi.  The  word  for  
“salmon  proper”,  luossa,  is  used  only  for  larger  specimen.  The  diddi  has  less  prestige  as  a  
commodity.  Thus,  it  is  less  valuable  in  terms  of  monetary  economy.  However,  the  value  of  the  diddi  
is  different  in  terms  of  a  wider  understanding  of  economy. 
 In  terms  of  ecology,  a  diddi  is  not  the  most  valuable  individual  for  the  reproduction  of  the  
regional  salmon  stock.  The  very  large  female  salmon  specimens  are  the  most  valuable  ones,  because  
they  bear  the  largest  quantities  of  roe.  These  are  relatively  old  individuals,  who  have  survived  four  
or  more  winters  in  the  deep  ocean.  The  diddi  is  younger,  and  has  survived  one  or  two  winters  in  the  
ocean.  Thus,  the  population  of  young  individuals  is  much  larger,  and  most  of  them  will  never  grow  
old  anyway.  Thus,  for  an  ecological  economy,  one  might  be  less  restrictive  when  catching  diddi,  
when  compared  to  taxation  on  the  few  large  individuals.  Still,  a  large  salmon  is  often  considered  
more  prestigious  as  catch  and  as  commodity.  One  reason  is  that  a  bigger  individual  gives  more  
meat.  Another  reason  might  be  that  for  sports  anglers,  it  is  a  great  feat  to  defeat  a  large  salmon  with  
fly-fishing  gear.  Sports  anglers  in  the  Alta  River  are  adopting  “catch  and  release”  practices.  They  
“play  with  the  food”,  the  traditional  subsistence  fishermen  in  the  Deatnu  area  say.  It  is  a  contentious  
question  whether  “catch  and  release”  is  unharmful  for  the  salmon  or  not.  Nevertheless,  from  an  
ecological  point  of  view,  it  is  relatively  less  harmful  to  catch  a  diddi  than  a  big  salmon. 
 In  terms  of  subsistence,  it  is  interesting  that  some  local  people  claim  that  the  meat  of  a  diddi  
tastes  better  than  that  of  a  large  salmon.  Thus,  even  though  it  gives  less  meat,  it  gives  better  meat.  A  
diddi  is  quality  over  quantity.  Wild  salmon  is  in  any  case  a  product  for  the  gourmet,  not  for  the  
gourmand,  because  farmed  salmon  has  become  everyman’s  nutrition.  Farmed  salmon  and  wild  
salmon  confer  different  types  of  meat.  Farmed  salmon  meat  is  stronger  on  quantity,  and  therefore  
more  affordable.  Wild  salmon  meat  is  stronger  on  quality,  and  therefore  a  niche  product.  Regarding  
the  quality  of  the  meat,  the  diddi  is  at  least  as  good  as  the  large  salmon,  and  some  would  say  it  is  
better. 
 In  terms  of  distribution,  salmon  fisherman  in  the  Deatnu  fjord  may  have  other  alternatives  
than  to  sell  the  raw  fish  meat  at  a  price  per  kilogram.  Firstly,  fish  meat  is  traditionally  distributed  as  
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a  gift  amongst  friends  and  family.  Then  it  does  not  become  a  market  commodity,  but  it  still  is  an  
asset  for  the  exchange  of  goods  and  services.  Secondly,  when  local  fishermen  want  to  sell  the  
salmon  on  the  market,  it  would  be  more  profitable  to  sell  finished  gourmet  products,  and  not  raw  
fish  meat. 
 Neither  of  those  options  is  taken  into  consideration  by  the  calculations  made  by  the  
Directorate  of  Nature  Management.  Their  socio-economic  analysis  is  limited  to  measuring  the  
potential  income  from  selling  salmon  meat,  compared  to  the  potential  income  from  selling  fish  
licenses  to  sports  anglers.  That  operationalisation  of  socio-economic  benefit  is  biased.  Monetary  
economic  terms  do  apply  to  sports  anglers,  who  are  consumers  of  services  in  a  market.  However,  
those  terms  do  not  apply  to  local  fishermen,  because  purely  monetary  terms  overlook  the  elements  
of  subsistence  economy,  distribution  through  reciprocities,  and  small  business  entrepreneurship. 
 Reciprocities:  The  fisherman  Reidar  invited  me  to  pitch  my  tent  by  the  quay.  The  facility  
had  a  bathroom  and  Internet  access,  and  I  knew  that  this  was  the  meeting  place  for  the  local  people.  
However,  I  had  chosen  to  ask  for  permission  to  put  my  tent  on  the  ground  of  Terje’s  farm,  the  
family  home  of  the  famous  politician  Helga  Pedersen.  After  my  fieldwork  in  Lebanon’s  clan-based  
political  landscape,  I  calculated  that,  in  order  to  gain  access  to  the  local  community,  I  should  obtain  
clearance  from  persons  who  are  close  to  the  political  leaders.  The  farmer  invited  me  to  eat  at  his  
table.  He  served  salmon  preserved  with  salt  and  sugar.  The  taste  had  some  resemblances  with  the  
mass-produced  preserved  salmon  sold  at  the  supermarket,  but  the  fish  taste  was  more  intense.  I  was  
surprised  to  experience  that  wild  salmon,  when  compared  to  tame  salmon,  tastes  significantly  more  
of  salmon.  We  had  much  to  talk  about.  Terje  had  served  as  a  UN  soldier  in  Gaza  during  his  youth.  
The  day  before,  the  farmer-wife  Hjørdis  had  received  the  ethnographer,  who  came  wandering  from  
the  other  side  of  the  mountain.  She  had  allowed  me  to  me  pitch  my  tent  in  their  flowery  meadow,  
close  to  a  small  stream.  After  the  couple  and  the  ethnographer  had  gotten  to  know  each  other  better,  
I  crossed  the  stream.  I  went  to  find  Jan  Larsen,  cousin  of  Reidar,  and  active  in  Bivdi,  an  interest  
organization  for  Coastal  Sámi  fjord  fisheries. 
 I  remember  that  when  I  arrived  at  his  yard,  I  remembered  that  I  had  been  there  the  year  
before.  The  last  time  I  had  been  there,  he  was  not  at  home.  But  this  time  he  was.  The  yard  looked  a  
mess  to  my  eyes.  It  was  like  what  architect  Joar  Nango  later  thought  me  to  appreciate  as  “the  
Nordic  garden”.  I  was  welcomed  into  the  house  by  a  man  who  was  economic  with  his  smiles.  But  he  
offered  me  coffee.  The  salon  had  a  large  sofa  with  a  view  towards  a  huge  TV,  but  also  out  through  
the  windows,  towards  the  gate  of  his  small  farm,  and  the  road.  There  were  case  papers  floating  
upon  the  bookshelf.  The  kitchen  I  had  passed  through  was  a  workshop  as  much  as  a  place  for  
cooking.  Motor  parts  and  lubricate  oil  rested  on  a  table  of  respatex  [high  pressure  laminate  from  
the  1960s].  We  sat  down  with  our  coffee  to  talk.  Jan  wanted  to  hear  about  my  research,  and  I  got  to  
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hear  about  his  organizational  work.  During  our  conversation,  he  also  called  his  good  contacts  
Steinar  Pedersen  and  Jan  Nilsen.  Thus,  I  could  also  exchange  some  words  with  them  via  the  
telephone,  while  Steinar  also  inquired  about  my  work  from  an  academic  point  of  view.  [....]  I  
remember  that  I  stayed  with  Jan  Larsen  the  whole  day  and  evening.  However,  I  made  few  notes  
from  what  we  talked  about.  [Travel  memory,  24.8.2012] 
 During  the  conversation,  I  tried  to  show  my  interest  in  the  organizational  work  in  Bivdi,  and  
I  tried  to  present  my  own  research  in  ways  that  I  thought  might  appear  useful  for  them.  Jan  Larsen  
was  generous  with  his  time.  He  explained  the  ecological  conditions  in  the  fjord,  and  shared  
information  about  the  ongoing  policy  process.  Later  on,  I  will  return  to  what  he  told  me.  What  I  
now  want  to  show  is  how  the  ethnographer  gained  information  by  getting  involved  in  the  
reciprocity  system. 
 Apparently,  we  were  becoming  better  and  better  friends,  and  in  the  evening,  when  it  had  
become  time  for  food,  Jan  invited  me  to  eat  fresh  salmon.  In  his  car  we  went  to  the  quay  to  get  the  
raw  material  from  the  cool  room.  [....]  Jan  went  to  the  cool  room,  and  got  a  rather  big  salmon.  
[Travel  memory,  27.8.2012] 
 My  impression  is  that  we  reached  a  shared  understanding,  and  that  we  both  saw  a  potential  
practical  relevance  for  my  research.  Therefore,  I  got  the  opportunity  to  eat  high  quality  salmon  as  a  
guest  at  my  informant,s  table. 
 The  value  of  wild  salmon:  Now  I  got  the  opportunity  to  observe  how  wild  salmon  was  
processed.  I  had  noticed  that  researchers  documenting  “traditional  knowledge”  had  been  more  eager  
to  preserve  knowledge  about  fishing  in  the  fjord,  and  less  interested  to  document  the  preparation  of  
food  at  home  in  the  farm.  This  might  be  because  social  science  is  an  institution  with  male  gender  
bias,  and  in  this  area,  it  was  mainly  women  who  kept  the  in-farm  traditional  knowledge.  Still,  what  I  
now  gained  access  to  was  not  traditional  knowledge  in  the  female  farmhouse,  but  rather  traditional  
knowledge  in  the  bachelor’s  house.  This  is  not  untypical.  It  is  well  known  that  more  women  than  
men  leave  the  local  community.  Jan  had  found  a  girlfriend  in  Nikel,  a  factory  town  on  the  Russian  
side  of  the  border.  She  does  not  want  to  leave  her  good  job  as  an  administrative  worker,  while  Jan  is  
attached  to  the  Coastal  Sámi  fjord  fishery.  Jan’s  house  in  Denudat  is  one  of  an  increasing  number  of  
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Figure  11-12:  Using  the  salmon  flesh:  salting  and  frying  at  Jan’s  kitchen,  June  2014 
Upper  left:  Filetting  with  skilful  hands.  Upper  right:  Slices  from  front  and  tail,  a  big  chunk  of  the  middle.   
Bottom  left:  Slices  from  front  and  tail  in  the  frying  pan.  Bottom  right:  The  big  chunk  in  sugar  and  salt. 
          
 
 Back  on  the  small  farm,  the  salmon  was  prepared  in  the  traditional  manner  in  the  kitchen.  I  
photographed  the  process,  took  simple  notes,  with  a  simple  sketch  (see  sketch  and  photos).  (1)  The  
head  and  tail  are  cut  off,  and  are  used  for  boiling.  (2)  The  big  Sámi  knife  is  used  for  filleting.  The  
spine  is  stuck  to  one  of  the  fillets.  (3)  The  back  fin  is  cut  off,  to  be  used  for  boiling.  (4)  The  two  large  
fillets  are  cut  into  smaller  pieces.  The  tail  part  is  cut  off,  at  a  width  similar  to  the  distance  between  
the  shortest  and  the  longest  cuts  of  the  piece.  Two  pieces  are  also  cut  off  from  the  filet  closer  to  the  
head.  Those  two  pieces  are  narrower  than  the  tail  piece,  because  the  fish  is  wider  closer  to  the  head.  
The  two  smaller  pieces  from  the  front,  plus  the  smaller  piece  from  the  tail,  are  used  for  frying.  The  
large  piece  that  remains  of  the  fillet  is  used  for  salting.  [Travel  memory,  27.8.2012] 
 Before  frying  our  fish  for  the  evening,  Jan  demonstrated  how  to  preserve  salmon  by  salting.  
After  he  had  cut  away  the  smaller  parts  that  were  to  be  fried,  the  largest  parts  of  the  two  fillets  
remained.  Those  were  put  in  a  plastic  tub.  He  threw  some  sugar  and  coarse  salt  over  the  pieces.  The  
quantity  was  judged  by  eye  measure.  The  salt  began  to  melt.  The  fisherman  told  me  that  the  salt  
would  become  brine  over  night,  and  that  the  next  morning,  he  would  turn  the  fish  around  in  the  
brine.  Thereafter,  he  would  put  it  into  the  refrigerator  for  some  days.  Modern  technology  has  
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facilitated  older  preservation  techniques.  After  having  prepared  the  salting  process,  Jan  turned  back  
to  the  pieces  that  were  to  be  fried.  He  added  on  some  salt  and  pepper,  did  nothing  with  the  skin,  and  
threw  the  pieces  in  a  warm  pan  with  melted  butter.  “The  skin  is  the  best  part  of  the  whole  fish“,  he  
stated. 
 The  fish  was  served  with  boiled  potatoes,  pickled  beetroot,  sour  cream  [rømme]  and  slices  of  
bread  [kneipp].  The  fisherman  himself  also  used  lingonberry  jam  [tyttebærsyltetøy].  When  I  asked  if  
this  was  according  to  the  custom,  I  got  an  unclear  answer  that  this  was  his  personal  custom  or  
something  like  that.  I  pointed  out  that  it  was  stylish  to  have  the  fish  served  at  a  table  upon  which  
were  placed  a  motor  part  and  lubrication  oil.  Apparently,  the  fisherman  had  not  taken  notice  of  that,  
and  he  surely  had  not  arranged  it  for  aesthetical  reasons,  though  I  found  aesthetical  qualities  in  the  
installation.  [Travel  memory,  27.8.2012] 
 For  ethnographers,  it  is  not  new  to  meet  people  at  home  at  their  kitchen  table.  In  1984,  the  
anthropologist  Marianne  Gullestad  published  Kitchen  Table  Society,  a  study  of  working  class  
mothers  in  a  suburb  in  Southern  Norway.1011  Now,  I  found  myself  in  a  situation  that  can  be  
considered  a  masculine  counterpart  to  the  kind  of  fieldwork  she  conducted.  This  space  had  the  
mixed  function  of  preparing  food  and  repairing  machines,  both  with  precision  and  skill.  The  
situation  provided  a  valuable  sample  of  the  social  organization  of  cooking  and  eating,  praxes  that  
are  central  to  subsistence.  The  taste  was  excellent.  Again  I  could  observe  that  wild  salmon  tastes  
more  than  the  farmed  salmon.  The  fried  skin  was  the  tastiest  part,  as  it  contains  lots  of  fish  fat.  
Thus,  it  also  contains  Omega  3  and  D-vitamins.  I  felt  full  in  a  comfortable  way.  This  was  direct  
observation  of  use  value.  However,  this  situation  had  also  provided  a  valuable  sample  of  exchange  
values. 
 Firstly,  the  situation  conferred  information  of  relevance  for  a  description  of  gift  economy.  
My  own  access  to  this  food  had  been  made  possible  because  I  had  tried  to  demonstrate  that  my  
science  would  do  no  harm.  A  potential  relation  of  reciprocity  and  collaboration  was  being  
cultivated.  Through  participant  observation,  my  research  was  potentially  becoming  an  asset  in  the  
local  gift  economy.  Thus,  I  got  a  sample  of  how  fish  food  may  be  distributed  in  a  reciprocity  
network.  Such  exchange  values  may  be  hard  to  measure  quantitatively.  The  fisherman  shared  the  
use  value  of  his  wild  salmon.  I  had  indicted  the  possibility  to  share  the  use  value  of  my  research.  By  
sharing  use  values,  we  generated  exchange  value  in  the  gift  economy.  Because  wild  salmon  is  good  
to  eat,  it  is  a  powerful  asset  in  the  gift  economy. 
 Secondly,  the  situation  conferred  information  of  relevance  for  the  understanding  of  small-
scale  entrepreneurship  for  the  commercial  market.  By  following  the  preparation  of  salmon,  I  had  
                                                 
1011  Gullestad  1984 
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also  gained  information  about  traditional  knowledge  with  potential  commercial  value  for  the  local  
community.  Jan’s  cousin,  Reidar,  had  told  me  of  one  of  his  ideas  for  small  business  
entrepreneurship.  He  knows  what  the  taste  of  wild  salmon  is  worth,  and  he  knows  the  worth  of  
traditional  knowledge  about  the  preparation  of  food  products  from  wild  salmon.  The  challenge  is  to  
reach  the  gourmet  markets,  to  mobilize  the  local  workforce,  and  to  raise  funds  to  build  a  production  
plant.  Reidar  uses  his  experience  as  a  social  entrepreneur  to  mobilize  resources  to  reach  this  end.  He  
failed,  together  with  Jan  and  others,  when  they  tried  to  establish  cod  farming.  Households  in  the  
region  tend  to  adapt  diverse  livelihood  strategies  in  order  to  survive  in  the  unpredictable  ecosystem  
of  the  sub-Arctic.  Reidar,  Jan  and  their  neighbours  succeeded  in  having  the  fish  receiving  facility  
built.  That  was  a  first  and  necessary  step.  Development  in  postcolonial  regions  most  often  depends  
on  overcoming  the  economic  dependency  on  one-sided  raw  material  production,  and  to  gain  some  
shares  from  the  further  value  chain.  Because  wild  salmon  is  a  raw  material  for  gourmet  products,  
making  such  products  may  be  potentially  empowering  for  the  local  economy  in  Deanudat. 
 Those  exchange  values  are  hard  to  measure  in  monetary  terms.  The  gift  economy  is  not  
monetary,  and  thus,  the  measures  of  exchange  value  are  less  standardized.  Small-scale  
entrepreneurship  is  aimed  at  creating  products  for  a  commercial  market,  but  it  is  hard  to  measure  
the  potential  market  value  of  a  product  that  is  not  yet  on  the  market.  Because  of  the  absence  of  
standardized  measures  of  exchange  value  within  gift  economy  and  social  entrepreneurship,  both  
forms  of  exchange  value  might  be  impossible  to  study  with  any  quantitative  approach.  Still,  these  
are  actual  exchange  values  with  actual  significance  for  real  people.  When  trying  to  make  sense  of  
my  observations,  I  mobilized  concepts  from  economic  anthropology.  This  discipline  was  originally  
developed  in  order  to  interpret  economic  life  in  “traditional”  societies,  while  economists  measured  
the  same  in  “modern”  societies.  Now,  this  distinction  has  become  blurred.  Researchers  like  Ellinor  
Ostrom  and  Keith  Hart  combine  the  two.1012  Also,  in  the  Deatnu  fjord,  traditional  subsistence  
practices  have  included  elements  of  market  economy.  For  example,  fjord  salmon  fishing  gained  a  
central  position  in  local  culture  because  it  provided  good  income  from  around  1914  until  the  1980s.  
Local  historians  tell  me  that,  before  the  First  World  War,  the  Coastal  Sámi  around  the  Deatnu  Fjord  
had  done  much  trade  with  the  Pomor  people  of  the  Kola  Peninsula,  in  the  fjords  further  east  along  
the  Barents  Coast.  This  eastward-oriented  trade  system  had  been  of  importance  until  the  First  World  
War  broke  out.1013  As  with  other  socio-ecological  conjunctures,  this  forced  the  local  people  to  
prioritize  differently  in  adapting  their  livelihoods  to  the  environment.  At  that  time,  the  most  
profitable  opportunity  had  been  to  sell  salmon  meat  through  the  southwestward-oriented  trade  
system.  This  market  provided  good  opportunities  until  the  salmon  farming  industry  succeeded  in  
                                                 
1012  Hann  &  Hart  2011:  88-93 
1013  Norwegian  Official  Report  1984  (NOU  1984:18),  chpt.  2.8  (thanks  to  Gro  Ween  for  this  reference) 
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mass  production  of  cheap  salmon.  The  “mass  market”  of  the  past  has  decreased  drastically,  and  is  
now  mere  memory.  The  “gourmet  market”  of  the  future  is  only  emerging,  and  is  now  mere  
potentiality.  Today,  some  young  people  say  that  salmon  fishing  in  the  fjord  has  merely  “cultural”  
significance.  However,  “culture”  is  more  than  mere  folklore,  it  also  includes  the  systems  of  
reciprocity,  and  those  constitute  the  social  fabric  itself. 
 Still  we  appeared  to  become  better  and  better  friends.  Larsen  offered  me  to  stay  at  his  small  
farm.  He  could  prepare  a  room  for  me  in  a  small  house  on  the  farm  where  nobody  lives.  I  knew  this  
was  a  good  offer.  [Travel  memory,  27.8.2012] 
 However,  I  was  too  tired  to  grab  that  opportunity,  and  this  was  the  last  night  before  I  had  to  
leave  Deanudat  for  other  parts  of  the  Deatnu  water  area.  The  next  day  Jan  would  give  me  a  lift  to  
the  village.  The  following  morning,  I  went  up  to  the  sheep  barn  to  say  farewell  to  Terje  and  Hjørdis. 
   They  were  busy  repairing  an  old  seed  drill.  The  device  could  not  be  called  the  latest  news  in  
agricultural  machinery.  Terje  offered  me  dry  cod,  and  I  got  as  much  as  I  could  carry.  That  was  not  
so  little,  so  it  had  to  hang  outside  my  backpack.  Jan  had  dressed  up  in  a  short  leather  jacket,  camo  
pants  and  slick  hair.  He  looked  tough,  and  made  me  think  that  maybe  his  woman  in  Nikel  thinks  he  
looks  like  Vladimir  Putin.  We  drove  across  the  mountain  towards  Čuollovuotna.  [Travel  memory,  
27.8.2012] 
 When  the  ethnographer  travelled  further  to  Čuollovuotna,  he  was  overloaded  with  gifts  from  
Deanudat.  With  dry  cod  hanging  all  over  his  backpack,  the  smell  was  a  clear  signature  from  a  
generous  fisher-peasant.  The  ethnographer  had  read  his  Marcel  Mauss,  and  knew  that  two  rules  are  
almost  universal  for  all  human  societies:  the  obligation  to  accept  a  gift,  and  the  obligation  to  return  
it.1014  I  would  repeatedly  be  reminded  of  my  moral  debt  to  Terje,  as  the  smell  and  taste  of  his  dry  
cod  would  follow  me  through  the  rest  of  my  travel.   
The  theoretically  relevant  observation  is  that  the  kinship-  and  verdde  system  is  alive  and  
vital,  and  that  implies  both  a  continuous  maintenance  of  ancient  Sámi  customs,  and  also  a  
continuous  inclusion  of  ethnic  and  cultural  “others”.   
The  methodologically  relevant  observation  is  that  the  more  reliable  data  the  ethnographer  
seeks,  the  more  involved  and  positioned  she  has  to  become  as  a  partner  in  the  verdde-system.  Kept  




                                                 
1014  Mauss  1923-4 
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11.3.6  Summing  up:  the  social  biography  of  salmon  flesh 
The  visit  to  the  Denudat  fjord  arm  allowed  us  to  follow  the  flesh  of  the  salmon  through  the  
production  line,  from  the  fisherman’s  fishing  location,  to  the  stomach  of  the  fisherman’s  friend.  
Thus  we  traced  some  particular  associations  through  the  network  of  adjacent  action  situations.  As  a  
result,  we  could  observe  some  of  the  instances  whereby  norms  are  being  applied  and  further  
developed.  At  the  fishing  locations,  we  observed  how  the  institutional  change  is  influenced  by  
political  entrepreneurship,  the  same  action  repertoire  as  was  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter.  At  
the  fish  receiving  facility,  we  visited  various  forms  of  social  entrepreneurship:  the  quay  actualized  
economic  social  entrepreneurship,  the  bio-scientific  reporting  actualized  epistemic  social  
entrepreneurship.  Finally,  I  chose  not  to  follow  the  salmon  flesh  that  is  being  distributed  as  a  raw  
material  on  the  capitalist  market,  but  instead,  I  chose  to  follow  the  salmon  flesh  that  is  being  
distributed  in  the  local  subsistence  and  reciprocity  network.  There,  I  discussed  how  ancient  social  
institutions  are  continuously  maintained  and  developed  in  the  local  kinship  and  verdde  society  (see  
table  11-2). 
 
Table  11-2:  A  social  biography  of  salmon  flesh,  as  it  has  been  traced  in  this  text. 
Paragraph  in  text 11.3.2 11.3.3 11.3.4 11.3.5 









Local  kinship-  and  
verdde  society 
 
While  fjord  fisheries  are  the  main  source  of  the  livelihood  of  the  local  people  in  the  Detnu  Fjord,  
the  salmon  is  one  type  of  catch  with  special  social  value.  The  wild  salmon  is  greatly  vaunted  for  
nutritional  purposes.  When  well  prepared,  it  is  particularly  highly  valued  for  its  taste.  Thus,  it  also  
has  great  value  as  a  gift,  especially  in  the  local  verdde  fellowship.  The  catching  of  wild  salmon  and  
the  preparation  of  its  flesh,  actualize,  maintain  and  further  develop  traditional  norms  and  lore.  Thus,  
it  has  a  political-judicial  value  as  one  “natural  basis  for  the  Sámi  culture”  a  term  introduced  by  UN  
norms  and  established  locally  by  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission.1015  Potentially,  it  may  also  have  a  
high  political-economic  value  as  a  commodity.  Earlier,  the  flesh  was  sold  for  good  income;;  now,  
more  income  comes  from  selling  tourist  angling  experiences.  Some  would  argue  that  nature  tourism  
is  among  the  traditional  Sámi  livelihood  adaptations.1016  In  sum,  the  wild  salmon  is  a  resource  for  
nutrition,  an  object  of  regulation  by  local  informal  customs,  an  asset  for  exchange  in  the  local  
verdde  economy,  an  object  of  local  traditional  knowledge.  All  of  those  functions  serve  the  
maintenance  of  the  local  community,  its  culture,  its  economy,  its  knowledge  and  its  jurisdiction.  By  
                                                 
1015  Norwegian  Ministry  of  Justifce  and  the  Police  1997 
1016  Interview  with  Tapiola,  Aslak,  interpreted  by  Katja  Tapiola,  Utsjoki,  6th  February  2011 
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maintaining  the  “vigour”  of  the  Sámi  wild  salmon  stock  (to  employ  a  patriotic  expression  used  by  
the  Norwegian  fishery  management1017),  the  local  indigenous  people  sustain  their  own  





11.4.0  Social  defence:  the  other  side  of  Deatuvuotna 
 
11.4.1  Accessing  the  other  side  of  the  fjord  –  the  social  back-stage 
Participant  observation  is  a  powerful  tool.  British  social  anthropology  gained  rich  funding  to  
develop  its  methods  and  concepts  under  the  British  Empire.  One  may  ask  for  whom  such  
anthropology  was  empowering.  Who  owns  the  empirical  knowledge?  In  the  Deatnu  Water  Area,  
local  knowledge  entrepreneurs  among  the  Sámi  have  seized  the  means  of  academic  knowledge  
production  for  their  own  use.  They  are  my  more  senior  peers,  who  possess  the  resources  to  guide  
my  research  and  to  assess  the  result.  The  ethnographic  glimpses  exhibit  empirical  knowledge  that  is  
the  property  of  the  local  community.  I  am  the  author  of  the  observation,  but  not  the  author  of  what  I  
have  observed.  The  empirical  input  is  something  I  borrow  from  the  keepers  of  traditional  
knowledge.  My  right  to  use  this  knowledge  depends  on  how  I  use  it.  One  test  is  whether  I  am  
welcomed  back  by  those  who  shared  their  fish  with  me.  This  is  not  only  a  question  of  being  more  or  
less  truthful.  The  more  truthful  the  knowledge,  the  more  empowering  it  is.  The  question  is  how  it  is  
used;;  empowering  for  whom.  Whose  research  questions  do  we  choose  to  pursue? 
 The  samples  from  social  entrepreneurship  were  ordered  and  presented  in  a  linear  manner,  
following  the  value  chain  from  the  fishing  location  to  the  kitchen  table  in  one  specific  fjord  arm.  I  
will  not  be  that  straight  forward  when  I  disclose  samples  from  the  social  defence  of  longstanding  
customs  and  traditional  knowledge  in  Castal  Sápmi.  First  I  will  “beat  around  the  bush”  a  bit,  by  
discussing  whatever  are  the  actual  norms  and  the  actual  perceptions  of  justice  among  the  
population.  Only  thereafter,  will  I  proceed  to  “take  the  bull  by  its  horns”,  facing  head  on  the  
                                                 
1017  Norwegian  Official  Report  1999  (NOU  1999:9):  The  language  of  this  report  not  only  presents  facts,  but  also  
conveys  normative  statements  regarding  collective  rights  toland  and  water,  through  its  choice  rhetorical  means,  as  
well  as  its  reference  to  the  legislative  process.  At  page  23,  the  rhetoric  appears  to  appeal  to  an  assumed  Norwegian  
national  patriotism:  “The  Committee  believes  it  is  realistic  for  the  Norwegian  stock  complex  of  salmon  to  recover  
much  of  its  former  vigour”  (my  emphasis).  At  pp.  25-6,  the  report  mentions  a  dissensus,  where  a  minority  of  
commission  members  states  that  one  should  await  the  results  of  the  investigations  commissioned  by  the  Sámi  Rights  
Commission.  (This  dissensus  is  similar  to  what  we  found  a  generation  before,  see  the  Norwegian  Ministryof  the  
Environment  1978a).   
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contentious  issue  of  everyday  resistance  or  social  defence. 
 Before  we  proceed  to  the  other  side  of  Deanuvutona,  we  will  first  make  a  stop  over  at  
Storraoaivi,  or  Indre  Torhop,  a  tiny  bay  close  to  the  fjord  arm  Čuollovuotna.  Here  we  will  continue  
what  we  started  at  the  end  of  the  story  about  social  entrepreneurship.  At  the  fisherman’s  table,  we  
ventured  beyond  the  issue  of  social  entrepreneurship,  and  entered  into  the  issue  of  local  kinship-  
and  reciprocity  networks,  entailing  the  maintenance  of  social  integration  in  the  social  fabric  itself.  
We  will  now  continue  addressing  the  same  issue,  by  visiting  a  joint  effort  among  village  committees  
in  the  Deanuvuotna.  Gathering  at  common  midsummer  celebration  in  Storraoaivi,  fisher-peasants  
from  Deanudat  and  Čuollovuotna  fjord  arms,  meet  with  peers  from  the  other  fjord  arms.  This  is  a  
temporal  hub  of  social  integration  across  several  localities  around  the  Deantu  Fjord  region.  Such  a  
situation  is  a  relevant  axample  for  the  purpose  of  entering  the  parallel  social  order,  which  consists  
of  longstanding  customs  and  traditional  knowledge,  the  practices  focus  for  the  Sámi  Rights  
Commission  and  the  Coastal  Fisheries  Commission.  These  are  the  local  customs  and  local  
knowledge  that  have  been  maintained  and  developed  since  times  longstanding,  regardless  of  
whether  the  state  builders  have  codified,  criminalized,  or  simply  ignored  those  practices. 
 Only  after  having  learned  more  about  the  mundane  social  reproduction  of  local  morality  and  
local  norms,  is  the  time  ripe  to  approach  the  samples  that  I  have  gathered  from  the  other  side  of  the  
fjord,  from  some  particular  action  situations  where  there  is  friction  between  Norwegian  state  laws  
and  longstanding  Sámi  customs.  Some  samples  are  taken  from  the  complexities  between  traditional  
knowledge  and  state-certified  science.  Other  samples  are  taken  from  the  complexities  of  customary  
barter  and  state-certified  trade.  Finally,  I  will  turn  to  the  tricky  question  of  how  stigmatization  and  
criminalization  from  the  Norwegian  state  may  challenges  the  maintenance  of  local  moral  order  in  a  
Coastal  Sámi  community.  The  term  “Social  defence”  has  been  chosen  to  describe  actions  that  may  
be  more  or  less  functional  in  defending  local  morality.  This  moral  order  is  an  indigenous  
jurisdictional  order,  which  is  parallel  to,  and  older  than,  that  of  the  states.  If  the  Ørebech  Report  is  
correct,  then  those  local  customs  are  like  any  other  local  customs  among  ethnically  Norwegian  
peasants  in  Southern  Norway.  However,  local  customs  in  such  areas  were  codified  by  the  same  
nationalist  state-builders  that  also  criminalized  similar  customs  in  ethnically  Sámi  areas  in  the  
Northern  provinces.  Such  systematic  discrimination  is  the  reason  why  the  Sámi  are  an  indigenous  
people  according  to  UN  norms.  Thus,  the  report  from  the  Coastal  Fisheries  Commission  is  probably  
correct.  Social  defence  is  a  non-violent  and  restrained  method  to  defend  human  rights  that  should  
have  been  guaranteed  under  the  ICCPR  and  ICESCR,  but  that  are  being  denied  by  the  regime.     
 These  data  concerning  the  maintenance  of  the  local  social  order,  plus  samples  of  some  of  the  
situations  where  there  might  be  friction  between  local  norms  and  state  laws,  will  provide  us  with  a  
 431  
 
basis  for  discussing  the  two  contradicting  reports  from  the  Norwegian  Ministry  of  Fisheries,  and  
also,  the  relationship  between  longstanding  indigenous  laws  and  codified  state  laws.  Those  are  
relevant  issues  for  the  explanation  of  state  transformation  in  the  High  North.  It  might  be  that  a  siida  




11.4.2  Biased  state  laws  –  and  the  politics  of  village  committees 
Legal  pluralism  in  the  socio-ecological  environment  has  concrete  consequences  during  tangible  
action  situations.  In  some  situations,  there  may  be  a  diversity  of  normative  praxes,  and  a  diversity  of  
collective  framings.  Before  engaging  with  samples  of  praxes  where  there  is  friction  between  
different  normative  orders,  I  will  first  address  a  sample  of  praxis  where  there  is  a  friction-free  
richness  of  varied  norms  and  interpretations  in  the  community.  Above,  we  followed  the  flesh  of  the  
salmon  to  visit  some  situations  where  social  entrepreneurship  takes  place.  We  ended  up  at  the  
fisherman’s  kitchen  table,  where  everyday  reciprocities  are  being  maintained  and  developed.  The  
salmon  flesh  is  one  of  the  valuable  assets  that  are  used  for  gift  exchange,  which  maintains  social  
integration,  and  which  may  potentially  integrate  newcomers  as  well.  By  eating  with  locals,  the  
ethnographer  gained  some  access  to  this  local  social  fabric.  The  reader  will  now  be  brought  to  a  
gathering  where  people  from  communities  all  over  Deanuvuotna  met  and  shared  grilled  salmon  
flesh.  We  will  visit  the  political  anthropology  of  joint  community  action. 
 At  midsummer,  I  had  lived  some  days  as  a  guest  with  my  new  friend  Truls  in  Čuollovuotna  
(Tarmfjord).  He  was  the  grandson  of  the  fisherman  Per,  who  had  enjoyed  much  respect  in  the  
community.  Truls  had  taken  me  to  Per’s  old  fishing  locations,  and  we  had  visited  Per’s  old  friend  
Olaf.  When  midsummer  came,  we  went  together  to  the  celebration  at  Storraoaivi  (Indre  Torhop).  
There  was  already  a  large  heap  of  firewood  for  the  midsummer  fire.  People  went  to  and  fro  around  
a  caravan.  The  caravan  was  like  a  kiosk.  Here,  we  bought  pieces  of  wild  salmon,  to  grill  over  the  
fire.  Afterwards,  they  sold  coffee  and  cakes.  Each  household  had  brought  their  own  cakes  to  be  sold  
at  the  caravan.  My  friend  Truls  looked  after  Piera,  son  of  his  friend  Magne,  who  lit  the  big  
midsummer  night’s  fire.  The  large  fire  burned  under  the  midnight  sun.  The  caravan  was  a  mobile  
“grendehus”  (community  house),  and  the  celebration  was  organized  as  a  joint  effort  amongst  local  
people  from  around  the  entire  Deatnu  Fjord.  When  each  household  delivered  their  cakes  to  the  
caravan,  they  pooled  resources  in  a  common  hub.  The  coins  with  which  we  paid  for  the  cakes  and  
the  salmon  went  into  the  common  cash  box  in  the  caravan,  funding  the  expenses  incurred  by  the  
celebration. 
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Figure  11-13:  Midsummer  night  under  the  midnight  sun,  at  Storraoaivi  (Indre  Torhop),  June  2012. 
Upper  left:  Magne  lights  the  fire,  while  Truls  looks  after  his  son  piera.  Upper  right:  the  midsummer  fire. 
Bottom  left:  The  mobile  "grendenus".  Bottom  right:  Sharing  wild  salmon  at  the  midsummer  night  fire. 
            
 
 Local  terms:  “bygdelag”  or  “siida”?  The  caravan  was  a  tool  through  which  the  local  village  
committees  could  federate.  Some  of  the  local  associations  call  themselves  Gilli  Saervi,  which  is  a  
Northern  Sámi  translation  of  the  Norwegian  concept  Bygdelag.  Others  call  themselves  Siida,  
referring  to  the  organizational  units  of  the  ancient  stateless  political  system  in  the  area.  Both  
concepts  are  symbolically  and  organizationally  relevant  to  make  sense  of  civil  society  action  in  this  
coastal  Sámi  area.  Historically,  we  might  explain  the  contemporary  praxes  of  the  village  committees  
by  a  process  of  hybridization,  between  the  communalist  movement  in  the  Norwegian  countryside,  
and  the  ancient  stateless  political  system  of  Sápmi.  This  might  explain  the  ambiguous  meaning  of  
the  contemporary  village  associations.  In  some  situations,  some  persons  might  tend  to  frame  their  
activity  as  a  political  alternative  to  the  state:  a  parallel  normative  order.  In  some  situations,  some  
persons  might  tend  to  frame  their  activity  as  an  apolitical  alternative,  a  civil  society  regulated  by  
state  norms.  Those  conflicting  framings  may  vary  between  various  individuals,  or  alternatively,  
between  different  situations. 
 When  local  village  associations  are  named  either  bygdelag  or  siida,  those  naming  
alternatives  may  indicate  different  interpretations  of  the  local  social  fabric.  The  Norwegian  term  
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bygdelag,  and  its  Northern  Sámi  equivalent  gilli  saervi,  indicate  an  affinity  with  a  historical  
movement  for  agricultural  communalism.  This  transnational  movement  became  partly  
accommodated  within  Norwegian  and  Finnish  nationalism,  and  thus,  it  has  become  a  strong  element  
of  the  institutionalized  political  culture  in  the  Norwegian  and  Finnish  entities.  Different  affiliations  
are  indicated  if  the  Northern  Sámi  term  siida  is  used  to  describe  the  village  associations.  This  refers  
to  historical  heritage  from  the  stateless  political  system  that  existed  in  the  region  before  the  
kingdoms  reached  agreements  concerning  the  various  borders  in  the  area.1018  In  some  situations,  the  
name  siida  may  connote  honoring  of  a  past  that  is  long  gone.  In  other  situations,  the  same  
expression  may  connote  a  position  that  the  ancient  stateless  political  system  never  fully  
disappeared,  but  continued  to  exist  as  a  parallel  jurisdictional  order.  The  structure  of  the  local  social  
fabric  might  be  described  as  a  verdde  society,  a  specific  form  of  kinship-  and  affinity  network.  This  
form  of  organization  is  mainly  Sámi,  though  it  has  always  accommodated  ethnical,  linguistic  and  
economic  heterogenity.  It  is  also  politically  heterogeneous.  It  may  function,  at  some  times  or  places,  
as  a  hybrid  bygdelag,  and  at  other  times  or  places,  as  a  siida  reborn.  What  I  have  said  about  the  
meaning  of  those  terms  thus  far  is  how  I  have  learned  to  understand  their  conventional  signification  
or  connotation  in  the  local  communities  that  utilise  these  terms. 
 Scholarly  terms:  social  or  political  system?  We  may  draw  an  analogy  to  similar  distinctions  
within  political  science  and  social  science.  I  think  that,  when  a  village  association  is  described  as  
bygdelag,  it  has  more  or  less  the  same  meaning  as  when  political  and  social  scientists  talk  about  
“civil  society”  or  a  “social  system”:  private  associations  among  citizens,  that  are  separate  from  the  
body  politic,  or  the  body  of  law.  Civil  society  is  contained  within  an  already  constituted  political  
order.  However,  when  the  same  association  is  being  referred  to  as  siida,  then  this  implies  that  the  
local  social  fabric  is  reminiscent  of  the  ancient  stateless  political  system,  and  as  such,  a  valid  source  
of  customary  laws  (regardless  of  whether  these  norms  have  been  codified,  criminalized,  or  simply  
ignored  by  the  states).  Such  practices  maintain  and  develop  constituted  orders  in  their  own  right.  
Consequently  they  (re)produce  constituent  power,  rather  than  being  contained  by  constituted  power.  
This  is  a  “political  system”,  more  than  a  “social  system”,  in  the  terminology  of  the  political  and  
social  sciences.  The  siida-system  never  fully  disappeared,  while  the  state-system  never  became  
fully  consolidated.  With  the  new  proofs  in  legal  history,  presented  by  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission,  
it  is  clear  that  legal  and  jurisdictional  pluralism,  combined  with  un-contested  monopolies  of  
violence,  are  the  fact  on  the  ground  in  many  of  the  areas  where  Sápmi  and  Norway  overlap.  As  
                                                 
1018  For  a  historical-geographical  account  of  the  establishment  of  state  borders  in  the  Sápmi  region,  see  part  5.2.5,  and  in  
particular  the  historical  map  in  Figure  5-5.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  borders  drawn  on  a  map  (de  jure)  are  not  au-­
tomatically  translated  into  actual  useage  of  land  and  water  (de  facto).  See  also  Jebens  (2010:  22)  for  a  distinction  be-­
tween  two  definitions  of  customary  law:  formalists  count  customs  that  are  codified  in  state  laws,  substantivists  also  
include  the  perceptions  and  practices  of  local  people,  regardless  of  codification.  The  same  does  Ostrom  (2005). 
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described  in  Chapter  1,  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission  led  to  a  fundamental  reform  of  Norwegian  
jurisprudence.  This  represented  a  paradigmatic  shift  from  state-centered  “legal  positivism”,  towards  
a  legal  pluralism  that  also  included  communitarian  sources  of  law.  However,  as  discussed  in  
Chapters  1-4,  no  similar  paradigmatic  change  has  taken  place  in  Norwegian  political  science.  In  that  
field,  the  state-centered  “political  realism”  has  not  been  replaced  with  another  paradigm.  Thus,  
Norwegian  political  science  still  does  not  reflect  the  ongoing  efforts  to  heal  the  harm  done  by  
Norwegian  nationalism  to  the  indigenous  peoples  of  Sápmi.  Instead,  Norwegian  statsvitenskap  finds  
itself  in  a  crisis  of  identity,  after  experiencing  competition  from  an  emerging  cluster  of  institutions  
conducting  institutionalist  and  constructivist  I.R.  studies.  All  this  was  described  in  Chapters  2-4,  
concerning  the  rivalry  between  the  old  and  the  new  approaches.  However,  before  I  say  anything  
more  about  what  this  might  imply  for  our  understanding  of  Sámi  social  entrepreneurs,  let  us  return  
to  those  entrepreneurs. 
 The  “Sámi  activists”:  In  the  Deatnu  Fjord  area,  a  Coastal  Sámi  environment,  there  is  
competition  between  the  two  main  state-wide  interest  organizations  for  Sámi  issues,  namely  NSR  
and  SLF.  Of  those  two,  the  former  is  associated  with  the  Nordic  Samirađđi,  while  the  latter  is  
associated  with  the  Norwegian  Labor  Party.  When  drawing  public  attention  to  secret  whispers,  my  
action  may  fit  better  with  the  argumentative  strategy  of  NSR  than  that  of  SLF.  Loyalty  to  the  nation-
state  has  been  a  priority  for  the  Norwegian  Labor  Party  since  1936.  However,  further  upstream  
along  Deatnu  River,  the  infrastructural  tentacles  of  the  state  system  are  less  tightly  woven,  and  date  
from  more  recent  time.  As  I  approached  the  highland  plateau  of  Inner  Sápmi,  other  voices  became  
more  vocal.  Here  I  met  the  so-called  “Sámi  activists”  (sameaktivister).  This  term  is  sometimes  used  
with  somewhat  derogatory  connotations,  by  other  local  Sámi  who  pursue  less  (openly)  contentious  
paths  to  empowerment.  The  “Sámi  activists”  are  rather  vocal,  and  used  to  dealing  with  fellow  
activists  from  the  new  social  movements.  I  stayed  with  some  of  them  in  the  Polmak  and  Utsjok  
areas,  on  either  side  of  the  Norwegian-Finnish  border.  Local  historians  give  significance  to  the  fact  
that  these  two  areas  once  belonged  to  one  and  the  same  territorial  unit  in  the  ancient  political  
system:  Ohcejohka  siida.  In  theory,  the  kingdoms  divided  this  siida  in  two  already  in  1751.  In  
practice,  they  could  not  exercise  much  control  until  modern  infrastructures  were  being  built  in  the  
1970s,  a  process  that  would  culminate  with  the  Alta-dam  plan.  Even  today,  one  can  discuss  to  what  
degree  the  Norwegian  and  Finnish  political  entities  have  consolidated  actual  social  acceptance  
among  the  population  in  the  ancient  Ohcejohka  siida.  This  is  a  particularly  urgent  question  
regarding  the  actual  use  and  management  of  natural  resources.  With  the  Norwegian  Sámi  Rights  
Commission,  it  appears  to  have  become  politically  possible  to  discuss  this  question  in  public,  also  
on  the  Finnish  side.  The  Sámi  activists  in  this  area  claim  that  the  local  social  fabric  is  more  than  a  
set  of  private  family  and  friendship  ties  among  some  citizens  under  two  states.  They  claim  that  the  
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local  kinship-  and  affinity  networks  actually  constitute  a  contemporary  reminiscent  of  an  ancient  
tribal  confederacy.  This  is  the  social  fabric  of  the  local  communities  that  has  continuously  
maintained  and  developed  local  customs  and  local  lore  since  times  immemorial,  regardless  of  
whether  the  latter  have  been  codified,  criminalized  or  ignored  by  the  states.  This  political  discourse,  
or  rather  this  local  experience  of  socio-material  reality,  appears  to  have  provided  hypotheses  for  the  
historical  and  legal  research  led  by  Nordic  Sámi  Institute,  and  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission.1019  The  
Sámi  activists  are  rather  vocal,  and  they  are  definitely  among  those  indigenous  people  who  have  
seized  access  to  the  means  of  knowledge  production.  Several  members  of  the  Nordic  Samirađđi  
possess  doctoral  degrees,  especially  in  human  rights  law.  Some  of  their  expertise  they  shared  with  
me.  In  Chapter  2,  this  was  presented  as  postcolonial  human  rights  law,  and  I  discussed  what  this  
recent  development  in  international  law  might  imply  for  a  potential  decolonization  of  political  
science.  I  have  argued  that  political  science  is  still  encumbered  with  a  colonial  heritage,  and  that  the  
effort  to  overcome  such  biases  is  a  gradual  and  laborious  process.  This  is  the  state  of  the  art  in  the  
uneven  development  of  rights  and  proofs.  Residual  colonial  biases  in  the  body  of  knowledge  are  
inter-dependent  with  residual  colonial  biases  in  the  body  politic.  Thus,  there  might  be  limited  
political  opportunities  to  voice  certain  concerns,  without  being  stigmatized  in  the  official  discourse.  
Therefore,  those  local  Sámi  people  who  are  sceptical  vis-a-vis  the  Sámi  activists  might  have  a  point  
when  they  imply  that  the  “activists”  are  somewhat  alienated  from  the  actual  practical  realities  and  
might  be  too  closely  affiliated  with  social  movements  among  the  urban  middle  class.  However,  as  a  
guest-friend  and  a  comrade  from  exactly  those  movements  I  think  this  implies  that  we  must  take  
action  to  change  the  practical  realities.  To  put  it  bluntly:  I  think  that  the  state-centered  path  pursued  
by  NSL  is  still  a  necessary  component  of  a  plural  action  repertoire,  because,  when  NSR  chooses  “to  
speak  truth  to  power”  this  in  itself  is  not  sufficient  in  order  to  get  the  power  to  accept  the  truth.  To  
put  it  less  bluntly:  Decolonization  is  bound  to  remain  an  open-ended  process,  because  proof-finding  
is  bound  to  remain  open-ended,  and  this  is  also  the  case  for  our  collective  effort  to  develop  a  
decolonized  art  and  science  of  state  transformation. 
 The  framings  and  repertoires  chosen  by  SLF  do  not  pose  any  public  challenge  to  old  school  
political  science:  so-called  “realism”.  By  contrast,  the  framings  and  repertoires  of  NSR  are  more  
                                                 
1019 One example is a rare report that I found in the library  and  archive  of  the  Sámi  collection  at  the  Norwegian  Folk  
Museum:  Tromsø  Sámi  Association  1986:  The First Nations. Report from Indigenous Days 1984. Romssa: Keviselie 
Publisher.  See  in  particular  the  contribution  by  Nils  Jernsletten:  “The  role  of  the  indigenous  people  in  the  world?”  (p  
27).  This  indicates  that  there  was  a  hypothesis  that  the  ancient  Sámi  society  had  been  “some  form  of  primordial  
communism”.  When  the  history  became  better  documented,  this  hypothesis  transpired  not  to  be  quite  correct,  but 
neither to be totally misleading. For the continuous maintenance and development of customary praxes and 
knowledge praxes in Sápmi, see The Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Police 1997. 
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compatible  with  new  school  political  science,  namely  institutionalism  and  constructivism.  
Therefore,  I  hope  my  chosen  research  design  may  potentially  be  of  relevance  for  the  continuous  
deliberation  on  framings  and  strategies  around  the  SLF  and  the  NSR.  The  puzzling  thing,  for  old  
school  political  science,  is  that  after  the  reports  from  the  Norwegian  Sámi  Rights  Commission,  the  
new  proofs  in  legal  history  indicate  an  actual  legal  and  jurisdictional  pluralism,  even  though  there  
are  un-contested  and  clear-cut  monopolies  of  violence  under  each  of  the  four  states.  According  to  
the  predictions  of  state-centred  “realism”,  that  should  not  be  possible,  because  it  is  assumed  that  
jurisdiction  is  a  function  of  sovereignty.  The  social  ecology  of  Sápmi,  in  terms  of  Elinor  Ostrom’s  
SES  framework,  is  a  pluricentric  political  environment  where  formal  and  informal  norms  co-evolve.  
As  I  formulated  it  in  the  four  introductory  chapters:  the  siida-system  never  fully  disappeared;;  the  
state-system  was  never  fully  consolidated.  Both  are  de  facto  sources  of  jurisdiction,  and  both  are  
socially  (re)produced  in  parallel.  Thus,  the  geography  of  jurisdictions,  meaning  actual  sources  of  
law,  is  different  from  the  geography  of  sovereignties,  the  meaning  monopolies  of  violence.  There  
are  entangled  legal  systems:  on  the  one  hand,  the  indigenous  state-less  ones;;  on  the  other  hand,  the  
more  recent  state-based  ones.  The  crucial  thing  to  observe  is  that  the  states  (and  only  the  states)  
apply  coercive  force  as  a  means  to  police  and  defend  laws.  The  indigenous  peoples  of  Sápmi  have  
always  been  reluctant  to  answer  violence  with  violence,  but  still,  they  have  policed  and  defended  
longstanding  customs  through  social  sanctions.  That  may  not  make  sense  for  so-called  “realist”  
political  theory,  but  it  does  make  sense  if  we  import  a  technical  term  from  social  movements  that  
push  for  prefigurative  satyagraha:  When  longstanding  customs  have  been  continuously  maintained  
and  developed,  regardless  of  whether  these  have  been  codified,  criminalized  or  ignored  by  the  
states,  this  may  be  seen  as  social  defence1020  against  the  (more  or  less  benevolent)  racism  of  the  
states.  Whether  or  not  the  presence  of  entangled  legal  systems  implies  that  there  are  entangled  
political  systems  as  well,  is,  in  part,  a  definitional  question.  For  the  state-centered  realist,  there  may  
be  stateless  political  systems,  but  there  cannot  be  a  political  system  without  institutional  violence.  
However,  for  the  institutionalist  or  constructivist,  this  is  not  so  clear.  This  is  a  macrosociological  
issue,  and  I  will  revisit  it  after  at  the  end  of  Case  II.  For  now,  I  will  turn  to  how  the  actual  legal  
pluralism  works  with  regard  to  knowledge  practices  and  political  economy.  In  particular,  I  will  turn  
my  attention  to  samples  of  knowledge  praxes  and  political  economy  where  there  is  some  degree  of  
unresolved  tension  between  state  norms  and  indigenous  la 
 
 
                                                 
1020  Sharp  1990;;  Johansen  2000 
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11.4.3  Biased  funding  of  science  –  and  boycott  of  scientific  monitoring 
Legal  pluralism  has  consequences  for  the  organisation  of  knowledge  praxes,  as  it  also  has  also  for  
other  aspects  of  life.  Let  us  have  a  look  at  some  samples  that  indicate  the  possibility  of  friction  
between  state  certified  science  and  local  traditional  knowledge.  (Afterwards,  the  attention  will  turn  
to  how  legal  pluralism  may  have  similar  consequences  for  political  economy.)  The  reader  has  been  
shown  my  ethnographical  sample  of  how  bio-scientific  sampling  is  conducted  at  Reidar’s  
fisherman’s  laboratory.  That  is  the  front-stage  of  participatory  scientific  practice.  However,  another  
local  fisher-peasant  introduced  me  to  the  back-stage  controversies  surrounding  bio-scientific  
monitoring.  A  local  fishery  biologist  would  later  share  his  frustration  over  local  fishers  who  boycott  
the  monitoring  routines.  In  such  controversies,  the  political-economic  context  of  environmental  
science  becomes  obvious. 
 First,  some  general  words  about  the  socio-economic  function  of  bio-scientific  monitoring.  
Fishery  biology  is  a  shared  resource  for  fishers  who  fish  from  the  same  fish  stock.  They  may  
compete  to  catch  the  fish,  but  everyone  has  common  interest  in  realistic  estimates  of  the  size  of  the  
fish  stocks,  and  reliable  figures  showing  the  ecological  ebbs  and  flows  of  the  shared  resource.  If  this  
reasoning  is  correct,  then  one  might  expect  that  fishers  would  be  likely  to  cooperate  with  the  fishery  
biologists.  Firstly,  it  would  be  costly  for  all  if  some  did  not  care.  Secondly,  fishers  that  did  not  care  
would  meet  with  social  sanctions  from  their  peers.  Such  reasoning  is  in  line  with  Elinor  Ostrom’s  
findings  on  cooperative  natural  resources  management.  However,  fishers  may  not  necessarily  trust  
that  the  monitoring  method  is  a  reliable  indicator  of  the  actual  size  of  the  fish  stock,  and  they  may  
not  necessarily  trust  the  political  policy  makers  that  are  in  a  position  to  utilize  the  data. 
 On  my  second  visit  to  the  Deatnu  Fjord,  bio-scientific  reporting  had  become  a  contentious  
issue.  I  participated  in  the  midsummer  celebration  in  2012.  People  from  various  fjord  arms  
congregated  at  Storraoaivi  (Indre  Torhop),  which  provides  a  nice  viewpoint  towards  the  north,  
where  the  sun  never  went  down.  Old  friends  met  and  exchanged  gossip.  I  also  met  acquaintances  
from  the  year  before. 
 When  I  had  arrived  at  the  midsummer  celebration,  fisherman  X  inquired  about  what  I  had  
learned  since  my  previous  visit  at  the  fjord.  I  had  to  think  a  bit,  and  answered  I  had  learned  that  I  
have  to  be  careful  about  what  I  write,  because  it  might  easily  be  misused.  The  fisherman  answered  
that  yes,  there  are  not  so  many  researchers  who  are  interested  in  their  perspective.  They  had  used  to  
collaborate  with  researchers  and  had  done  measurements  for  them,  but  then  they  had  experienced  
that  the  information  they  gave  was  used  against  them,  so  they  had  become  less  interested  to  
participate  with  the  researchers.  [Fieldnote  27.06.2012] 
 Later,  I  would  learn  more  about  this  issue  from  another  point  of  view.  When  I  had  left  the  
Deatnu  Fjord,  and  travelled  further  up  along  the  Deatnu  River,  I  would  knock  at  the  door  of  the  
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salmon  management  office  for  the  Deatnu  River. 
 Over  a  cup  of  coffee,  the  fishery  biologist  Kjell-Magne  Johnson  updated  me  on  the  situation.  
His  mandate  was  to  monitor  the  river,  and  he  shared  news  from  the  bio-scientific  community.  It  had  
become  more  difficult  to  obtain  the  bio-scientific  reports  from  the  salmon  fishermen  in  the  fjord.  
Difficulties  at  a  diplomatic  level  had  emerged  when  biologists  had  obtained  the  surprising  results  of  
genetic  tests  from  each  of  the  salmon  specimens  being  caught  in  the  fjord.  It  appeared  that  far  from  
all  the  fish  were  heading  for  the  Deatnu  River  to  do  the  mating.  A  considerable  proportion  of  the  
catch  appeared  to  be  salmon  with  origins  in  Barents  rivers  further  east,  under  Russian  jurisdiction.  
This  had  become  an  issue  of  diplomatic  negotiation  between  the  Norwegian  and  Russian  
governments.  Many  local  salmon  fishermen  in  the  Deatnu  fjord  had  started  to  boycott  the  bio-
scientific  reporting.  They  did  not  trust  that  the  Norwegian  government  was  willing  to  take  care  of  
their  interests  in  the  diplomatic  negotiations. 
 The  reliability  of  the  monitoring  system  has  been  increased  over  the  recent  years,  but  its  
reliability  is  still  debatable,  and  it  is  being  actively  debated.  Scale  sampling  is  in  fact  one  of  the  
methods  that  has  increased  the  reliability.  In  the  past,  the  Norwegian  government  used  to  rely  on  
statistics  on  reported  catch.  However,  if  you  ask  a  fisherman  what  he  has  caught,  he  answers  with  a  
poker  face.  Where  to  find  fish  is  a  trade  secret  for  those  who  live  off  natural  resources.  Therefore,  
the  Finnish  government  did  not  accept  catch  statistics  as  a  reliable  indicator,  and  introduced  a  series  
of  more  scientific  measures:  counting  with  underwater  cameras,  echo  sounding,  ultrasound,  and  
finally,  DNA-tests  gathered  with  the  catch  reports.  Still,  the  practical  priorities  of  the  fishery  
biologists  remain  contested,  especially  on  the  Norwegian  side  of  the  Deatnu  water  area.  I  have  met  
few  fishermen  who  question  the  validity  of  DNA-sampling,  or  the  reliability  of  probabilistic  
methods,  but  field  biology  cannot  obey  strictly  probabilistic  methods. 
1. Firstly,  the  Norwegian  government  still  uses  catch  statistics  as  a  main  indicator  of  the  actual  
size  of  the  fish  stock,  while  the  Finnish  government  relies  on  field  observations  to  a  greater  
extent.  I  have  heard  fishermen  being  skeptical  of  the  former  method,  and  biologists  being  
enthusiastic  about  the  latter. 
2. Secondly,  in  all  of  the  Deatnu  Water  Area,  local  fishermen  also  demand  more  research  on  
how  much  fish  is  taken  by  competing  predators:  seals,  ducks  and  especially  large  fishing  
vessels  on  the  open  sea.  I  have  seen  good  research  on  predation  from  ducks,1021  but  nothing  
on  catch  by  large  vessels. 
3. Finally,  especially  in  the  downstream  parts  of  Deatnu,  there  are  contentions  about  how  bio-
scientific  data  is  combined  with  socio-economic  indicators,  in  particular,  how  to  measure  the  
                                                 
1021  Moen  1983  (found  at  Tana  folkebibliotek,  the  municipal  public  library  at  Tana  Bru) 
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relative  economic  benefit  of  different  forms  of  fisheries:  in  purely  monetary  terms,  tourist  
angling  is  provides  more  income  than  selling  one’s  own  catch,  but  the  local  community  also  
has  a  real  barter  economy  that  cannot  be  measured  in  monetary  terms.  This  is  the  economic  
context  of  ecology,  and  I  will  address  it  myself,  towards  the  end  of  the  present  chapter. 
All  three  are  unfinished  controversies,  and  in  my  view,  all  have  profound  implications  for  the  local  
fisher-peasants  as  well  as  for  the  interest  organizations  of  small-scale  fisheries.  However,  I  think  
one  should  be  careful  about  how  to  frame  the  political  cleavage.  In  my  view,  it  would  be  a  
misunderstanding  to  see  this  as  a  conflict  between  science  and  small-scale  fisheries.  On  the  
contrary,  it  seems  to  me  a  conflict  between  bias  and  small-scale  fisheries. 
 While  the  fishery  biologists  and  the  subaltern  fishery  organizations  would  have  a  shared  
interest  in  overcoming  the  existing  political  bias  in  the  monitoring  system,  there  are  other  and  more  
influential  actors  who  profit  more  if  nothing  is  done  about  the  bias.  Those  are  found  in  some  
influential  interest  organizations:  First  and  foremost  is  the  dominant  Norwegian  fisheries  
organization  (Fiskarlaget).  This  is  dominated  by  industrial  fisheries,  and  their  contribution  to  the  
Norwegian  GDP  is  not  insignificant.  Second,  we  have  the  sports  angler  organizations  in  Norway  
and  Finland,  which  are  socially  close  to  environmental  science  as  a  profession.  Similarly,  the  
Norwegian  Ministry  of  the  Environment  and  the  Finnish  Ministry  of  Forestry  deny  the  existence  of  
regional  indigenous  rights  to  natural  resources,  and  instead  insist  that  those  are  specifically  national  
commons  for  the  citizens  of  the  nation-states.1022  It  is  symptomatic  that  a  Norwegian  governmental  
report  on  salmon  rivers  in  Norway  has  chosen  a  national  rhetoric,  presenting  those  salmon  stocks  as  
a  specifically  national  commons.1023  Such  rhetoric  overlooks  the  facts  that  the  Deatnu  River  is  
shared  with  the  Finnish  and  Sámi  nations,  and  that  Atlantic  Salmon  is  a  migrating  species.  Thus,  
there  is  a  tendency  towards  methodological  nationalism  not  only  in  the  human  sciences,  but  in  
environmental  science  as  well.  Such  biases  are  gradually  being  overcome  with  the  development  of  
transnational  epistemic  communities,  related  to  multilateral  institutions.  One  such  institution  is  the  
North  Atlantic  Salmon  Preservation  Organization  NASCO.  However,  this  organization  also  seems  
to  be  closer  to  sports  angler  interests  rather  than  to  small-scale  fisheries  or  indigenous  peoples. 
 In  the  fishery  biology  of  the  Deatnu  Water  Area,  nationalist  biases  seem  to  have  become  less  
significant.  The  monitoring  of  the  salmon  stock  became  more  reliable  through  multilateral  
                                                 
1022  Borch,  Buanes,  Karlsen  &  Olsen  2009 
1023  Norwegian  Official  Report  1999  (NOU  1999:9):  The  language  of  this  report  not  only  presents  facts,  but  also  
conveys  normative  statements  regarding  collective  rights  toland  and  water,  through  its  choice  rhetorical  means,  as  
well  as  its  reference  to  the  legislative  process.  At  page  23,  the  rhetoric  appears  to  appeal  to  an  assumed  Norwegian  
national  patriotism:  “The  Committee  believes  it  is  realistic  for  the  Norwegian  stock  complex  of  salmon  to  recover  
much  of  its  former  vigour”  (my  emphasis).  At  pp.  25-6,  the  report  mentions  a  dissensus,  where  a  minority  of  
commission  members  states  that  one  should  await  the  results  of  the  investigations  commissioned  by  the  Sámi  Rights  
Commission.  (This  dissensus  is  similar  to  what  we  found  a  generation  before,  see  the  Norwegian  Ministryof  the  
Environment  1978a). 
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collaboration  between  Finnish  and  Norwegian  state  agencies,  within  the  framework  of  NASCO.  For  
example,  the  Norwegian  government  has  learned  from  the  Finnish  one,  and  relies  less  on  catch  
statistics  than  previously.  Still,  more  biases  remain  to  be  overcome.  Nothing  has  been  done  to  
inquire  about  how  much  salmon  is  caught  by  larger  vessels.  Little  has  been  done  to  assess  how  
much  salmon  is  eaten  by  seals  or  ducks.  Further,  these  biological  issues  are  closely  entangled  with  
how  the  eco-technocracy  perceives  socio-economic  and  socio-cultural  issues.  Nothing  has  been  
done  to  assess  the  socio-economic  significance  of  the  indigenous  barter  economy.  Finally,  the  
governments  still  deny  the  existence  of  Coastal  Sámi  culture,  which  would  imply  that  local  fishing  
rights  belong  to  the  local  and  regional  demos,  and  not  to  the  nation-state  demoi. 
 When  local  fishers  boycott  bio-scientific  reporting,  it  should  be  understood  as  a  desperate  
manoeuvre.  This  is  because  fishers  who  compete  for  a  shared  fish  stock  also  have  a  shared  interest  
in  sustainable  management  of  that  stock.  If  one  just  assumes  that  the  bio-scientific  reporting  
conforms  with  the  ideal  scientific  method,  then  one  might  easily  conclude  that  local  small-scale  
fishers  are  unenlightened  about  their  own  common  interests.  However,  fishery  biology  is  no  
laboratory  science,  and  many  methodological  issues  are  open  for  discussion.  The  continuous  
deliberation  about  theory  and  method  has  been  a  source  of  scientific  progress  for  fishery  biology  in  
the  Deatnu  Water  Area,  and  this  continuous  deliberation  remains  open-ended.  Biologists  at  the  local  
research  station  RKTL  publish  in  scientific  journals.  Bureaucrats,  politicians  and  diplomats  
deliberate  over  shared  policies  between  the  two  states.  Various  interest  organizations  mobilize  the  
resources  that  each  of  them  can  afford  to  influence  the  policy  process.  Finally,  the  local  fisher-
peasants  participate  directly,  both  in  formalized  and  informal  manners.  Catch  reports  and  the  
delivery  of  scale  samples  is  a  formalized  form  of  direct  participation,  but  this  practice  is  framed  
within  the  already  constituted  monitoring  regime.  Boycott  of  the  reporting  is  an  informal  form  of  
direct  participation,  a  form  of  civil  disobedience  similar  to  strikes,  and  this  signalizes  a  will  to  re-
constitute  the  existing  monitoring  regime.  This  does  not  mean  that  the  fishers  are  against  science,  
but  on  the  contrary,  that  they  have  grave  problems  with  the  residual  biases  that  remain  to  be  
overcome.  There  will  always  be  some  biases  that  remain  to  be  overcome,  but  in  this  case  the  biases  
are  being  perceived  as  so  grave  that  the  benefit  of  participating  in  the  established  monitoring  
system  becomes  less  than  the  cost  of  boycotting  it.  If  I  am  correct  to  assume  that  the  cost  of  scale  
sample  boycott  is  generally  rather  high  for  local  fishers,  then  this  means  that  scale  sample  boycott  is  
a  last  resort. 
 Above,  we  had  a  look  at  how  Sámi  social  entrepreneurs  try  to  develop  an  emerging,  
transnational  epistemic  community  for  indigenous  fishery  science  (see  11.2.4  above).  If  this  
eventually  succeeds,  it  will  continue  the  positive  development  that  was  provided  by  NASCO,  but  in  
a  way  that  overcomes  some  of  the  socio-economic  biases  that  we  still  find  in  this  organization.  
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However,  the  indigenous  fishery  science  is  still  in  its  infancy.  This  counter-power  has  not  yet  
consolidated  its  political  capacity.  The  existing  political  bias  of  the  state-certified  fishery  science  is  
experienced  as  a  threat  to  indigenous  livelihoods.  Thus,  civil  disobedience  is  a  preliminary  tactic  to  
defend  those  livelihoods. 
 
 
11.4.4  Biased  regulation  of  markets  –  and  criminalized  reciprocities 
Legal  pluralism  has  consequences  for  the  political  economy.  The  reader  was  introduced  to  various  
economic  practices  that  are  actualized  by  following  the  salmon  flesh  through  Deanuvuotna.  I  
showed  how  the  fishers  at  the  quay  had  showed  me  the  concrete  result  of  small  business  
entrepreneurship.  I  also  showed  how  the  fisher  who  welcomed  me  at  his  table  had  let  me  get  a  taste  
of  indigenous  reciprocity  practices.  Those  are  samples  of  local  economic  life  that  is  regulated  
according  to  longstanding  customary  norms,  but  they  are  not  in  conflict  with  state  law.  The  state  has  
codified  some  customs  for  business  entrepreneurship,  while  it  simply  does  not  care  about  customary  
distribution  of  fish  flesh  in  kinship  and  reciprocity  networks.  However,  another  fisher-peasant  let  
me  get  a  glimpse  into  some  other  forms  of  economic  exchange,  which  actualize  some  un-resolved  
tensions  between  Norwegian  state  law  and  longstanding  Sámi  customs. 
 I  stayed  on  the  eastern  side  of  Deatnuvuotna  for  only  a  few  days.  The  area  had  a  reputation  
for  having  been  totally  assimilated  into  the  Norwegian  language  and  culture.  The  summer  2012,  
however,  there  was  a  Coastal  Sámi  revival  in  the  area.  One  of  my  drinking  mates  at  the  pub  in  Tana  
Bru  had  a  cousin  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  fjord,  and  I  got  a  lift  in  his  car.  I  put  up  my  tent  in  the  
meadow  of  a  small  farm,  and  the  fisher-peasant  pointed  out  a  good  fishing  location  for  me. 
 I  took  the  fishing  rod  and  went  out  on  the  pier.  There  I  threw  out,  and  dragged  some  nice  
small  fish  out  of  the  water.  They  were  slimmer  than  the  small  codfish  I  had  dragged  up  the  previous  
day.  A  guy  arrived  with  a  car  [...],  and  we  started  chatting.  I  asked  him  what  kind  of  fish  it  was,  and  
he  could  tell  they  were  coal-fish.  I  threw  again,  and  got  a  bite  again.  [....]  I  wanted  to  chat  with  the  
stranger  again.  He  was  conversing  with  Fisherman  Y  about  the  exchange  of  goods  and  services.  
When  they  had  reached  an  agreement,  fisherman  Y  went  to  the  freezer,  and  got  the  largest  salmon  
there.  It  was  wrapped  well  in  newspapers,  and  the  fish  changed  owner.  I  took  out  the  camera,  to  
document  the  distribution  of  fish,  but  the  two  appeared  to  become  a  somewhat  embarrassed.  I  put  
down  the  camera.  (Only  next  day  would  I  get  to  know  that  there  might  be  some  discretion  about  sale  
of  salmon,  because  some  of  the  customary  verdde-system  has  become  criminalized  under  the  “black  
economy”-label.  [Travel  memory,  August  2012] 
 Economic  anthropologists  use  the  Northern  Sámi  term  verdde  somewhat  liberally.  It  is  
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traditionally  used  to  refer  to  a  specific  form  of  arrangement  in  the  Sámi  reciprocity  system,  where  a  
regular  visitor  with  whom  you  establish  regular  reciprocities  becomes  part  of  your  kinship  network,  
a  “guest-friend”.  In  less  precise  language,  verdde  may  be  used  to  refer  to  the  entire  kinship  and  
reciprocity  system  found  in  local  communities  in  Sápmi.  There  is  a  rather  rich  literature  on  gift  
exchange,  barter  economy  and  reciprocity  networks  in  Sámi  cultural  settings.  This  was  what  I  had  
in  mind  when  I  took  my  field  notes. 
 We  became  better  friends.  Now,  we  talked  about  distribution  of  salmon.  It  was  now  I  got  a  
clear  message  that  the  distribution  includes  sale  that  some  would  call  “black  economy”.  The  
information  made  it  easier  to  understand  the  discretion  of  Fisherman  Y  and  his  buyer  […].  Where  is  
the  limit  between  gift  exchange  and  trade?  Since  debt  is  usually  implicit  in  such  gift  exchange,  it  
might  be  difficult  to  insist  that  gift  exchange  is  something  quite  different  if  state-certified  currency  is  
being  used  as  the  means  of  exchange.  In  my  opinion,  the  problem  therefore  is  not  that  there  exists  a  
so-called  black  economy  in  the  distribution  of  salmon  among  traditional  fishermen  in  the  fjord.  
Instead,  the  problem  is  that  state  regulation  of  monetary  economy  is  badly  adapted  to  the  
interaction  between  the  newer  monetary  economy  and  the  older  barter  economy.  If  it  is  a  political  
goal  to  have  vital  local  communities,  then  the  authorities  must  refrain  from  criminalizing  the  barter  
economy.  Myself,  I  have  no  money  to  spend  on  salmon,  and  have  to  rely  on  exchange  with  other  
resources  I  might  possess,  such  as  for  example  investment  of  academic  capital.  [Travel  memory,  
August    2012] 
 Barter  economy  and  monetary  exchange  are  not  mutually  exclusive  things.  Since  times  
immemorial,  the  Sámi  have  occasionally  traded  with  neighboring  peoples  who  used  various  
currencies,  such  as  the  Norse  and  the  Pomors.  Economic  customs  have  been  continuously  
maintained  and  developed  since  prehistoric  times,  and  are  now  an  integral  part  of  the  actual  legal  
pluralism  that  was  shown  by  the  reports  from  the  Norwegian  Sámi  Rights  Commission.  These  
reports  show  that,  in  spite  of  formal  claims  of  state  jurisdiction,  the  actual  management  of  natural  
resources  in  Sápmi  has  been  mostly  regulated  by  longstanding  customs.  This  includes  norms  
regulating  harvesting  from  nature,  but  also  norms  regulating  the  distribution  of  products,  through  
kinship-  and  verdde  relations.  Longstanding  local  customs  have  been  continuously  maintained  and  
developed,  regardless  of  whether  these  have  been  codified,  criminalized  or  simply  ignored  by  the  
states.  Before  I  introduced  the  issue  of  the  so-called  “black  economy”,  the  reader  had  already  been  
introduced  to  reciprocity  systems  that  are  either  codified  or  ignored  by  the  state. 
1. Legalized  reciprocities  are  at  play  among  the  small  business  entrepreneurs,  for  example  
those  that  we  met  at  the  quay  (see  11.3.3  above). 
2. Ignored  reciprocities  are  at  play  when  friends  and  family  share  salmon  flesh  through  gift  
exchange,  such  as  when  I  ate  at  Jan’s  table,  or  at  the  common  midsummer  night  fire  (see  
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11.3.5  and  11.4.2  above). 
3. Criminalized  reciprocities  are  at  play  whenever  the  barter  economy  includes  state  currency  
but  excludes  tax  reporting  (a  topic  introduced  in  the  present  paragraph,  11.4.4). 
This  implies  that  there  is  no  problem  for  state  law  as  long  as  the  monetary  and  state  regulated  
economy  is  being  kept  separate  from  the  informal  and  customarily  regulated  economy.  In  such  
cases  it  is  no  problem  for  state  legislators  that  they  deny  the  existence  of  indigenous  culture  in  
Coastal  Sámi  areas.  However,  in  the  traditional  Sámi  culture,  there  has  never  been  any  strict  
distinction  between  the  formal  and  the  informal  economy.  This  is  because  longstanding  customs  
have  been  continuously  maintained  and  developed,  regardless  of  whether  or  not  trading  partners  
have  introduced  money  to  the  barter  systems,  and  regardless  of  whether  or  not  the  barter  systems  
have  been  legalized,  ignored  or  criminalized  by  the  states.  Consequently,  should  the  Coastal  Sámi  
community  in  downstream  Deatnu  actually  be  definedas  being  within  the  UN-certified  indigenous  
peoples  of  Sápmi,  then  this  means  that  we  must  re-consider  what  should  actually  be  defined  as  
constituting  the  “black  economy”. 
 The  indigenous  human  rights  struggle  in  Coastal  Sámi  communities  gained  a  clear  public  
definition  with  the  report  from  the  Coastal  Sámi  Commission.  However,  advancement  in  state  
recognition  stagnated  with  Helga  Pedersen’s  temporal  defeat  and  tactical  retreat.  The  ICESCR  not  
only  deals  with  the  right  to  speak  one’s  mother  tongue,  dance  folk  dances,  and  sell  traditional  
handicrafts.  It  deals  with  cultural  rights  entangled  with  social  and  economic  rights:  basically,  it  is  a  
right  to  freedom  from  systematic  discrimination,  both  socio-culturally  and  socio-economically.1024  
Thus,  the  ICESCR  deals  with  systematically  unequal  life  chances.  That  also  includes  systematically  
unequal  market  opportunities.  In  my  opinion,  there  is  an  unresolved  tension  between  WTO  norms,  
which  further  corporate  capitalism,  and  the  ICESCR,  wich  is  more  social-liberal.  Postcolonial  
human  rights  law  implies  a  right  to  freedom  from  colonial  exploitation. 
 The  temporal  defeat  and  tactical  retreat  of  Helga  Pedersen  implies  that  the  state  still  applies  
its  coercive  apparatus  to  enforce  the  claimed  right  of  fishery  capitalists  in  Southern  Norway  to  
exploit  the  local  fish  stocks  of  Coastal  Sápmi.  The  coercive  apparatus  of  the  state  is  being  used  to  
police  a  policy  that  fetishizes  GDP  as  as  the  supreme  indicator  of  economic  development.  In  this  
index,  methodological  nationalism,  monetarism  and  capitalism  go  together.  Such  ideology  appears  
highly  biased  in  three  ways  when  I  see  it  from  a  viewpoint  in  Deanudat.  Firstly,  regardless  of  
indigenous  human  rights,  there  are  good  ecological  reasons  to  refrain  from  nationalist  particularism  
and  monetarist  reductionism.  Common  interest  is  not  identical  with  particular  nation-state  interests.  
                                                 
1024  To  some  degree,  the  same  is  prescribed  by  the  ICCPR  §27,  which  has  stronger  implementation  in  the  regional  and  
global  human  rights  regimes.  For  more  info,  see  part  10.2.3,  in  particular  the  footnote  about  the  ICCPR  and  the  
ICESCR. 
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When  the  Coastal  Fisheries  Commission  argues  in  favor  of  local  and  regional  fishing  rights,  this  is  
certainly  not  more  particularistic  than  the  existing  nationalist  exploitation  of  resources.  On  the  
contrary,  locally-based  fishers  are  more  dependent  on  the  local  ecological  balance  than  the  owners  
of  large  vessels,  who  could  fish  anywhere.  Secondly,  also  regardless  of  indigenous  human  rights,  
there  are  good  socio-economic  reasons  to  refrain  from  nationalist  particularism  and  monetarist  
reductionism.    The  current  dominance  of  industrial  fisheries  is  incompatible  with  maintaining  vital  
local  communities  or  sustainable  bio-cultural  diversity  along  the  Barents  Coast.  Thirdly,  in  addition  
to  the  socio-ecological  and  socio-economic  dimensions,  there  is  the  legal  dimension:  postcolonial  
human  rights  law,  including  indigenous  territorial  rights.  If  one  accepts  that  Coastal  Sámi  culture  
still  exists,  which  was  actually  proven  by  the  Coastal  Fisheries  Commission,  then  the  state  is  
obliged  to  follow  the  proposed  reconciliatory  policies  that  were  suggested  by  the  Commission.  This  
is  to  define  the  right  to  fish  from  the  local  fish  stock  not  as  a  (particularist)  national  right,  but  
instead  as  an  (also  particular)  local  and  regional  right.  Thus,  the  local  population  in  Sápmi  would  
enjoy  this  right  regardless  of  whether  one's  forefathers  were  more  Northern  Sámi,  more  Kvän,  or  
were  subaltern  settlers  from  Østerdalen  in  Southern  Norway.  This  framing  of  rights  is  typical  for  the  
reconciliatory  approach  chosen  by  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission  and  the  Coastal  Fisheries  
Commission,  and,  in  my  opinion,  it  makes  sense  in  three  senses:  as  a  path  to  ethno-political  
reconciliation;;  as  an  acceptance  of  how  difficult  it  is  to  know  exactly  what  groups  are  indigenous  
and  not;;  and  finally,  as  a  way  to  address  the  economic  dimension  of  the  ICESCR  –  the  right  to  
freedom  from  colonial  exploitation. 
 I  have  now  zoomed  in  on  the  socio-economic  dimension  of  the  form  of  systematic  
marginalization,  the  harm  resulting  from  which  the  UN  strives  to  heal  via  indigenous  human  rights.  
The  local  people  in  downstream  Sápmi  maintain  and  develop  longstanding  customs  for  subsistence,  
including  the  usage  of  nature,  and  the  distribution  of  products,  but  this  also  implies  five  hundred  
years  of  ambiguous  co-evolution  with  state  politics  and  market-economy.  On  the  one  hand,  the  local  
barter  economy  has  always  been  capable  of  accommodating  monetary  exchange.  On  the  other  hand,  
the  state  builders  have  attempted  to  criminalize  some  customary  forms  of  nature  usage  and  barter  in  
Sámi  areas.  Both  of  these  historical  processes  cross  each  other  whenever  local  fisher-peasants  
practice  the  so-called  “black  economy”.  This  has  several  political  implications. 
 Firstly,  it  implies  that  the  local  population  may  continue  to  conform  with  longstanding  
customs  even  when  state  legislators  have  attempted  to  criminalize  them,  and  also,  in  spite  of  state  
legislators  still  denying  that  Coastal  Sámi  customs  have  actually  been  de-criminalized,  as  a  result  of  
the  ratification  of  postcolonial  human  rights  law. 
 Secondly,  it  implies  that  some  longstanding  customs,  through  ambiguous  co-evolution  with  
state  law,  gain  a  social  function  as  “everyday  forms  of  peasant  resistance”  against  state  laws  that  are  
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seen  as  illegitimate,  or  alternatively,  as  “social  defence”  of  longstanding  customary  sources  of  law.  
This  second  function  has  some  resemblance  with  anti-capitalist  environmentalist  politics:  Some  
indigenous  people  and  environmentalists  seek  to  empower  more  sustainable  economies  through  
social  entrepreneurship.  However,  under  the  rule  of  corporate  capitalism,  small  market  actors  do  not  
compete  on  equal  terms  with  the  large  ones.  Thus,  some  environmentalists  and  indigenous  people  
seek  to  maintain  and  develop  parallel  economies  instead.1025  Regardless  of  whether  the  alternative  
economy  is  longstanding  (as  in  Sápmi)  or  an  innovation  (as  in  eco  villages),  the  joint  effort  to  
cultivate  it,  in  an  agonistic  relation  to  corporate  capitalism,  is  non-violent  direct  action,  
prefigurative  satyagraha,  and  the  maintenance  and  development  of  materially  embedded  customary  
praxes. 
 Thirdly,  the  continuous  maintenance  and  development  of  longstanding  customs,  in  
ambiguous  co-evolution  with  state  law,  appears  to  be  a  continuous  constitutional  process,  whereby  
local  people  deliberate  over  how  socially  accepted  morality  ought  to  be.  This  process  is  a  
contentious  one.  The  conflict  was  particularly  pointed  during  the  witch  trials  of  the  early  modern  
Lutheran  churches,1026  but  the  consequences  for  local  moral  integration  may  also  be  harmful  if  the  
local  population  adopt  the  social  stigma  that  comes  with  criminalization  of  customary  law.  The  
struggle  to  define  or  redefine  the  social  morality  of  the  community  is  a  form  of  symbolic  action,  a  
cosmological  drama,  functioning  on  the  basis  of  bodily  embedded  knowledge  praxes. 
 Now  I  will  turn  to  the  ambiguous  nature  of  anti-capitalist  forms  of  everyday  peasant  
resistance  in  a  Coastal  Sámi  fjord  area:  on  the  one  hand  the  material-semiotic  struggle  to  maintain  
morality  and  cohesion  against  stigmatization  and  criminalization,  on  the  other  hand  the  material-




11.4.5  Between  empowerment  and  stigmatization 
Legal  pluralism  has  consequences  for  everyday  life  in  general,  not  only  for  more  specific  topics,  
such  as  knowledge  production  or  political  economy.  In  some  situations,  there  is  friction  between  the  
parallel  normative  orders,  and  this  may  have  consequences  for  the  maintenance  of  local  moral  
order.  Attempted  criminalisation  may  produce  opposition,  as  a  consequence  of  lost  authority.  
However,  attempted  criminalisation  may  also  subvert  the  local  normative  order,  through  social  
stigmatisation.  I  will  now  turn  to  this  ambiguity:  empowerment  and/or  stigmatisation. 
                                                 
1025  Ressler  2008 
1026  Pollan  2007 
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 Fisherman  X  and  fisherman  Y  spoke  to  me  about  some  criminalized  praxes  in  the  Deatnu  
fjord.  Fisherman  X  expressed  his  frustration  concerning  how  the  state  used  information,  while  the  
local  salmon  biologist  shared  his  frustration  about  the  boycott  of  bio-scientific  reporting.  I  have  
interpreted  this  drastic  method  as  the  last  resort  of  local  fishers  and  as  an  informal,  contentious  way  
to  contribute  to  the  collective,  ongoing  effort  to  overcome  bias  in  science.  Fisherman  Y  allowed  me  
to  observe  criminalized  reciprocities,  which  I  interpreted  as  a  bad  adaptation  of  state  laws  to  the  
customary  barter  economy.  When  state  regulations  of  fisheries  and  economic  entrepreneurship  
remain  biased  in  favor  of  corporate  interests  and  nationalist  particularism,  then  social  
entrepreneurship  is  not  sufficient  for  indigenous  people  and  environmentalists.  Thus,  the  continuous  
maintenance  and  development  of  autonomous  alternative  economies  represent  a  complimentary  
path. 
 Those  two  action  repertoires  may  also  be  seen  in  relation  to  each  other.  According  to  the  
Norwegian  law  concerning  salmon  fishing,  each  fisher  is  obliged  to  account  for  how  much  he  
catches,  but  also  how  much  he  sells.1027  If  a  salmon  fisher  has  found  it  necessary  to  boycott  bio-
scientific  reporting,  he  already  does  not  report  how  much  he  catches.  Then  it  might  appear  too  
dubious  if  he  reports  more  sales  than  catch.  Because  of  the  law,  fishermen  who  find  that  the  bio-
scientific  monitoring  system  remains  so  biased  that  it  must  be  boycotted,  may  perhaps  also  find  
themselves  forced  into  criminalized  reciprocities,  where  barter  and  monetary  exchange  are  mixed. 
 My  observations  from  the  social  back-stage  have  been  presented  in  empowering  terms,  as  
repertoires  of  everyday  resistance  against  residual  colonial  exploitation,  or  alternatively,  as  forms  of  
social  defence  of  longstanding  customs  as  a  source  of  law.  However,  towards  the  end  of  the  
discussion  of  the  so-called  “black  economy”  I  asked  what  might  happen  if  local  people  actually  
adapted  the  frame  of  reference  that  is  propagated  by  the  colonial  state,  and  actually  began  to  
perceive  the  criminalized  reciprocities  as  a  so-called  “black  economy”.  It  appears  to  me  that  in  the  
Coastal  Sámi  Deanuvuotna,  state  laws  are  so  obviously  biased  that  the  state  subverts  its  own  
legitimacy  among  the  population.  However,  even  though  the  state  legislators  have  not  succeeded  
into  defining  the  actual  perception  of  law  in  the  local  community,  they  may  still  engender  
significant  uncertainty  and  confusion.  It  may  be  hard  to  maintain  a  clear-cut  framing  of  
longstanding  customs  as  rightful,  and  of  the  attempted  criminalization  by  the  state  as  being  
unlawful.  The  regime  may  inflict  moral  doubt  in  the  heart  of  indigenous  persons,  in  much  the  same  
way  as  the  early  modern  Lutheran  Christian  state/church  succeeded  in  making  some  Sámi  persons  
see  themselves  as  the  children  of  Satan,1028  and  also,  in  much  the  same  way  as  the  high  modern  
Social  Darwinist  régime  succeeded  in  making  them  see  themselves  as  being  racially  and  culturally  
                                                 
1027  Norwegian  Parliament  1993 
1028  Pollan  2007 
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inferior.  Stigmatization  and  criminalization  are  social  mechanisms  frequently  observed  by  critical  
criminologists.  It  might  be  hard  to  maintain  a  purely  politicized  interpretation  of  one’s  own  actions  
if  those  are  being  stigmatized  by  the  environment. 
 As  I  became  better  friends  with  local  people,  and  I  gained  access  to  participant  observation  
in  more  “backstage”  situations,  I  also  got  the  opportunity  to  observe  some  effects  of  stigmatization.  
Here  is  a  rather  everyday  situation  from  a  typical  meeting  place  in  the  Deatnu  region,  the  shopping  
center  in  Tana  Bru,  the  largest  village  in  the  lower  Deatnu  River.  It  was  the  weekend  after  I  had  left  
Deanudat. 
 Truls  and  I  went  to  buy  food  at  [the  supermarket]  Rema.  At  the  table  outside  G-sport  and  
Rema,  I  accidentally  met  a  fisherman  from  [Denuvuotna]  […]  While  I  shared  a  few  words  with  him,  
anther  guy  showed  up,  carrying  a  bag  of  beer.  I  didn't  recognize  him  […]  It  was  Fisherman  Z.  Now  
that  I  had  already  left  [Denuvuotna],  he  appeared  disgruntled  that  I  hadn’t  visited  him.  He  also  
found  time  to  criticize  the  possibilities  to  succeed  with  the  kind  of  interest  politics  that  [they  do]  in  
Bivdi.  […]  He  went  away  together  with  his  friend.  Suddenly  I  got  a  feeling  that  he  was  some  kind  of  
black  sheep  in  the  family,  because  he  drank  and  idled  about.  [….]  He  is  an  intelligent  guy  who  
forms  his  own  thoughts,  and  has  a  critical  perspective  on  the  environment.  [Travel  memory,  
27.08.2012] 
 The  example  of  Fisherman  Z  at  the  food  market  may  indicate  social  stigma,  but  also  a  kind  
of  nihilistic  capitulation  with  regard  to  the  utility  of  political  activism.  Critical  quietism  appears  as  a  
final  resort  for  civil  resistance.  The  effects  of  social  stigmatization  are  issues  for  social  medicine.  
They  may  include  alcoholism  and  depression,  in  addition  to  unemployment,  clientistic  dependency  
on  the  welfare  state,  and  socio-economic  stagnation.  Such  conditions  are  not  untypical  amongst  
indigenous  populations.  The  popular  culture  of  the  majority  nations  includes  cliché  images  of  
drunken  Sámi  men  who  are  uneducated,  unemployed  and  criminal.  Such  clichés  are  racist  
prejudices,  but  nevertheless,  the  same  clichés  might  be  used  by  the  stigmatized  subalterns  to  make  
sense  of  their  own  idleness,  alcoholism  and  criminalized  praxes.  Certain  problems  or  symptoms  can  
be  clearly  observed,  but  there  is  fundamental  disagreement  on  the  correct  explanation  or  etiology,  
which  in  turn  leads  to  fundamentally  different  strategies  or  treatments.  My  preferred  explanation,  
the  socio-economic  one,  is  a  historical  heritage  from  the  militant  past  of  the  Norwegian  Labor  Party.  
The  rival,  culturalist  explanation  is  a  historical  heritage  from  the  explicitly  racist  Social  Darwinism.  
In  Coastal  Sámi  areas,  as  a  result  of  eugenic  policies  from  the  1880s  to  1980s,  the  Sámi  language  
and  ethnicity  were  deeply  shameful  for  many.1029  During  that  period,  Sámi  belonging  signified  a  
social  stigma  that  most  people  wished  to  hide,  even  for  their  own  children.  In  upstream  areas  of  the  
                                                 
1029  Eyþórsson  2008 
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Deatnu  River,  a  midwinter  Saturday  night  at  Rastegaisa  pub,  I  drank  with  a  truly  subaltern  reindeer  
herder,  who  was  a  highly  reflexive  observer,  but  when  he  got  drunk,  he  became  slightly  aggressive,  
and  referred  to  himself  with  the  derogatory  term  “fjellfinn”  (Mountain  Lapp).  It  felt  as  if  some  poor  
Afro-American  was  explaining  his  own  poverty  by  referring  to  himself  as  a  “nigger”.  In  the  same  
village,  I  met  the  human  rights  lawyer  Aimo  Guttorm,  who  lamented  that  moral  norms  and  social  
cohesion  are  being  subverted  by  the  states.  It  appears  that  the  criminalization  of  longstanding  
customs  might  not  only  have  been  functional  to  erode  respect  for  state  laws,  but  also  have  been  
functional  to  weaken  the  indigenous  Sámi  concepts  of  morality. 
 Some  criminalized  praxes  in  Coastal  Sámi  areas  might  be  framed  in  terms  of  disobedince  
against  an  unlawful  political  system,  and  may,  as  such,  possess  empowering  potency.  This  framing  
is  in  line  with  postcolonial  human  rights  law.  However,  the  same  praxes  might  equally  well  be  
framed  as  uncivil  violations  of  civilized  norms.  As  such,  the  same  praxes  may  potentially  have  a  
stigmatizing  and  disempowering  potency.  Such  framings  were  instituted  locally  as  a  product  of  
eugenic  praxes  and  Social  Darwinist  theory.  Social  defence  is  not  only  an  insistence  on  keeping  
longstanding  customs  in  spite  of  attempted  criminalization.  It  is  quite  as  much  an  attempt  to  defend  




11.4.6  Summing  up  the  repertoires  of  social  defence 
I  have  thus  shown  several  samples  of  local  social  behaviour  where  there  appears  to  be  a  tension  
between  written  state  laws  and  longstanding  indigenous  laws.  However,  in  order  to  introduce  those  
samples,  I  first  described  a  sample  of  smooth  coexistence  between  both  normative  orders  (11.4.2).   
In  many  situations,  the  state  has  neither  codified  nor  criminalized  the  local  longstanding  customs,  
and  the  two  systems  simply  coexist.  I  think  this  is  significant  in  order  to  understand  how  social  
integration  works  in  the  Coastal  Sámi  fjord.  In  some  situations,  it  might  happen  that  behaviour  that  
is  conformist  according  to  local  morality  and  longstanding  customs  is  being  criminalized  according  
to  state  law.  I  have  presented  samples  from  customary  praxes,  regarding  the  economic  salmon  
(11.4.4),  and  from  knowledge  praxes,  regarding  the  scientific  salmon  (11.4.3).  Finally,  I  have  
engaged  in  a  discussion  about  the  power  of  social  stigma,  and  how  criminalisation  from  the  state  
may  lead  to  social  manipulation  of  morality  in  the  local  community  (11.4.5).  Social  defence  is  not  
only  social  sanctions  that  police  and  defend  immemorial  indigenous  laws,  but  it  is  also  an  effort  to  
maintain  the  local  morality  against  eroding  social  stigma. 
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Table  11-3:  Salmon  flesh  and  social  defence,  as  it  has  been  traced  in  this  text. 
Paragraph  in  text 11.4.2 11.4.4 11.4.3 11.4.5 
Social  function Salmon  total  object Economic  salmon Scientific  salmon Political  salmon 
Form  of  
empowerment 






Social  stigma  VS.  
social  defence 
 
Possible  erosion  of  the  local  moral  order  would  not  only  be  a  problem  for  the  local  community,  but  
also  for  the  management  of  common  natural  resources.  Elinor  Ostrom  has  found  examples  of  
sustainable  informal  management  systems  that  are  brought  out  of  equilibrium  by  intrusive  states.1030  
Social  defence  may  not  be  sufficient  to  maintain  the  equilibrium,  if  local  natural  resources  are  
highly  attractive  to  more  resourceful  interest  groups.  In  such  cases,  the  local  community  may  
become  a  target  of  what  FIAN  calls  “resource  grabbing”,  and  the  ideological  apparatus  of  the  state  
may  support  that  grabbing  by  creating  confusion  in  people’s  minds.  In  such  situations,  social  
defence  may  probably  be  a  necessary  survival  strategy  for  the  community,  but  is  not  sufficient  in  
itself.  Local  people  in  the  Deantuvotna  Fjord  area  combine  it  with  social  entrepreneurship,  aimed  at  




11.5.0  Legal  pluralism:  between  social  entrepreneurship  and  social  defence 
 
11.5.1  Summing  up 
Empirically,  this  chapter  makes  use  of  data  from  participant  observation,  both  in  “front  stage”  
situations  and  in  “back  stage”  situations.  Thus  I  provide  some  selected  samples  of  what  subaltern  
fisher-peasants  in  Deanuvutna  might  do  to  empower  themselves,  both  publicly  and  discreetly.   
Some  samples  show  how  local  people  seek  to  empower  themselves  through  various  
entrepreneurial  tactics,  within  the  rules  of  the  game  defined  by  the  state.  Private  and  collective  
efforts  strive  towards  turning  economic  underdevelopment  into  local  development.  Some  collective  
actions  strive  towards  the  further  development  of  alternative  forms  of  fishery  science,  independent  
of  national  interests,  as  those  are  defined  by  states.  None  of  these  actions  are  contentious,  but  they  
are  potentially  empowering,  and  as  such,  they  may  change  the  stakes  in  socio-economic  and  socio-
cultural  conflicts.   
However,  a  few  of  the  samples  bring  actions  to  light  that  are  themselves  contentious,  in  the  
                                                 
1030  Ostrom  2005:  58-64 
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sense  that  they  have  an  unclear  legitimacy.  It  has  been  challenging  for  me  as  an  observer  to  make  
sense  of  actions  that  are  understood  as  conformist  by  the  local  community,  while  being  stigmatized  
by  the  states.  This  combination  was  puzzling  for  me.  I  sought  disruptive  practices,  similar  to  what  
one  might  find  among  environmentalists  who  try  to  build  “a  new  society  within  the  shell  of  the  
old”.  However,  radical  environmentalism  is  alien  to  local  fisher-peasants,  and  those  that  I  met  
showed  skepticism  to  all  forms  of  radicalism.  Therefore,  they  understand  their  means  and  ends  as  
moderate,  even  if  the  state  administration  may  frame  their  actions  as  disruptive.   
Still  other  samples  show  practices  that  are  regulated  by  local  customs,  but  are  neither  
codified  nor  criminalized  by  state  laws.  These  are  practices  that  state  policy  makers  do  not  care  to  
regulate,  and  therefore,  they  also  ignore  them.  However,  the  samples  indicate  that  such  practices  are  
alive  and  kicking,  and  regulate  themselves  informally. 
 Conceptually,  this  chapter  deals  with  the  politics  of  everyday  life.  In  accordance  with  a  
social-anthropological  tradition  instituted  by  Marcel  Mauss,  I  trace  the  circulation  of  socially  
significant  objects  that  can  serve  various  functions:  nutrition,  exchange,  communication,  
integration,  and  finally,  influence  or  social  power.  The  selected  object  is  salmon  flesh.  By  tracing  its  
circulation  and  its  various  uses,  I  constantly  cross  the  conceptual  boundaries  between  the  cultural,  
the  social,  the  economic  and  the  political.  This  classical  anthropological  technique  does  not  assume  
that  there  is  any  actual  functional  differentiation  between  the  political  and  the  social  systems  (or  the  
economic  and  cultural  systems  for  that  matter).  By  following  the  circulation  of  salmon  flesh,  I  am  
brought  to  some  action  arenas  where  local  fishers  are  engaged  in  constituent  praxes  at  the  outside  of  
state-led  policy  processes.  In  some  situations,  I  observed  joint  efforts  to  gain  a  better  position  on  the  
capitalist  market  or  within  the  organization  of  scientific  research.  These  paths  to  empowerment  take  
place  outside  the  state,  but  are  regulated  by  state  laws,  and  I  call  them  social  entrepreneurship.  In  
other  situations,  I  found  actions  that  were  understood  as  conformist  behaviour  in  the  local  
community,  while  state  laws  either  define  them  as  disobedience,  or  do  not  care  about  them  at  all.  
These  are  indicators  of  parallel  normative  orders.  Such  normative  orders  may  co-exist  without  
friction  in  most  situations.  That  may  either  be  because  state  legislators  have  codified  some  local  
customs,  or  it  might  be  because  they  simply  do  not  care  about  some  other  local  customs.  In  some  
other  particular  situations,  the  state  legislators  do  care,  but  also  do  not  accept  the  old  way  of  doing  
things  in  the  local  community,  and  in  those  particular  situations,  there  is  friction  between  the  two  
normative  orders. 
 There  are  different  ways  to  interpret  this.  I  have  observed  a  difference  between  some  
customary  behaviour  that  has  received  the  blessing  of  state  law,  and  some  other  behaviour  that  has  
been  stigmatized  by  state  laws.  Customary  behaviour  that  is  blessed  by  the  state  is  what  I  have  
called  social  entrepreneurship.  It  is  a  relevant  repertoire  of  action  to  observe,  but  it  is  not  
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particularly  challenging  to  interpret.  However,  the  customary  behaviour  that  is  stigmatized  by  the  
state  is  more  tricky  to  interpret.  In  the  introduction  to  this  chapter,  I  suggested  that  such  repertoires  
may  either  be  called  social  resistance,  drawing  a  parallel  to  James  Scott’s  ethnography  from  
lowland  South-East  Asia,  or  alternatively,  they  may  be  called  social  defence,  implying  a  parallel  
with  Scott’s  historical  observations  in  highland  South-East  Asia.  The  difference  would  be  whether  
the  state  is  a  hegemonic  jurisdictional  order,  or  alternatively,  if  it  actually  co-exists  with  an  actual  
parallel  normative  order.  If  the  former  possibility  were  confirmed,  we  would  be  dealing  with  social  
resistance  against  the  hegemonic  order.  If  the  latter  possibility  were  the  case,  we  would  be  dealing  
with  the  social  defence  of  longstanding  indigenous  customs.  These  two  alternatives  are  politically  
relevant,  because  each  possibility  may  be  taken  as  empirical  support  for  each  of  the  two  conflicting  
reports  from  the  Norwegian  Ministry  of  Fisheries.  If  are  indeed  dealing  with  social  resistance  
against  a  hegemonic  order,  then  the  Ørebech  Report  may  be  correct  to  claim  that  the  process  of  
Norwegian  assimilation  has  eradicated  the  Sámi  norms  in  the  fjord.  That  would  imply  that  the  
fisher-peasants  wage  a  class  struggle,  but  cannot  mobilize  indigenous  human  rights.  Alternatively,  if  
are  in  fact  dealing  with  the  social  defence  of  longstanding  indigenous  customs,  then  this  would  
indicate  that  the  report  from  the  Coastal  Fishery  Committee  is  correct.  It  argued  that  the  Sámi  way  
of  doing  things  has  been  continuously  maintained  and  developed,  in  spite  of  superficial  subjugation  
under  the  hegemonic  polity  and  culture.  This  view  would  not  deny  that  the  fisher-peasants  are  
waging  an  ethnically  heterogeneous  class-struggle,  but  in  addition,  it  claims  that  they  can  rightfully  
mobilize  indigenous  human  rights. 
 
 
11.5.2  Political  anthropology  in  support  of  the  Coastal  Fisheries  Commission 
So  which  one  of  the  contradictory  reports  from  the  Ministry  of  Fisheries  should  be  supported?  To  
answer  this  question,  it  is  relevant  that  I  have  found  samples  of  not  only  two,  but  three,  possible  
forms  of  action.  Two  of  the  possible  variants  entail  that  the  state  gives  its  blessing  to  or  stigmatizes  
some  particular  local  customs,  but  the  third  possibility  entails  that  the  state  simply  ignores  some  
local  customs,  or  that  the  state  legislators  do  not  care  about  them.  When  I  had  followed  the  salmon  
flesh  from  the  fishing  location,  through  the  quay  and  the  laboratory,  it  ended  up  on  the  plate,  where  
I  observed  its  role  in  the  local  reciprocity  system.  By  gradually  building  a  guest-friend  relationship  
(verdde),  I  gained  access  to  data  about  how  the  local  kinship-  and  reciprocity  system  works.  This  is  
a  real  economy,  based  on  real  goods,  centred  on  subsistence  and  reciprocity.  This  is  the  social  fabric  
of  the  local  community.  Such  reciprocity  systems  are  one  of  the  first  things  that  were  observed  
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when  anthropologists  started  to  do  participant  observation  in  Sámi  communities.1031  The  actual  
kinship  and  reciprocity  systems  are  ethnically  heterogeneous,  especially  in  Coastal  Sámi  areas.1032  
Economic  anthropologists  have  found  similar  reciprocity  systems  in  purely  “Norwegianized”  
communities.1033  The  various  fjords  along  the  Barents  Coast  have  different  ethnic  compositions.  
The  barter  systems  found  in  highly  homogeneous  Sámi  communities  have  strong  similarities  with  
those  found  in  highly  homogeneous  Norwegian  ones,  or  in  highly  heterogeneous  ones.  This  is  a  
well-documented  fact.  It  has  led  some  to  conclude  that  the  reciprocity  systems  along  the  Barents  
Coast  have  nothing  to  do  with  indigenous  culture,  and  this  is  one  of  the  arguments  used  by  the  
Ørebech  Report.  However,  there  are  two  problems  with  that  kind  of  interpretation.  Firstly,  it  is  a  
fallacy  when  some  social  scientists  look  for  definitional  criteria  to  draw  a  definite  distinction  
between  Sámi  and  Norwegian  culture.1034  All  experts  in  ethno-politics  tell  us  that  hybridity  is  the  
rule,  not  the  exception,  and  consequently,  that  boundary-making  in  ethno-politics  will  rarely  be  
clear-cut.1035  Secondly,  it  is  a  fallacy  that  if  one  cannot  observe  a  clearly  defined  Sámi  deviance,  
then  one  has  to  do  with  a  Norwegian  normality.  It  is  ideological  to  assume  the  normality  of  national  
culture,  and  to  assume  that  the  absence  of  clearly  delimitated  minority  culture  means  that  we  are  
dealing  with  national  majority  culture.  This  ideology  is  normative  nationalism,  which  has  become  
reified  in  the  form  of  methodological  nationalism,  exactly  the  problem  discussed  by  Bauböck  as  
well  as  by  Eriksen  and  Hoëm  (see  Chapter  2).  If  we  take  the  history  of  the  Barents  Coast  into  
consideration,  then  one  must  remember  that  the  states  only  recently  agreed  on  their  de  jure  
boundaries  in  these  areas  (between  1751  and  1945),  and  that  the  de  facto  capacity  to  exercise  state  
power  depended  on  the  development  of  modern  communication  lines  (approximately  from  the  
1850s  until  the  1950s).  Systematic  over-fishing  along  the  Barents  Coast  started  in  the  1880s,1036  
when  tools  for  industrial  fisheries  were  invented,  and  capital  owners  at  more  central  locations  could  
acquire  these.  One  should  also  have  in  mind  that  prior  to  the  time  when  state  power  was  first  
constituted,  and  later  consolidated,  along  the  Barents  Coast,  the  resources  were  managed  by  a  well-
organized  stateless  political  system,  the  one  that  we  now  know  as  the  siida-system.  Bluntly  
speaking:  The  Barents  Coast  was  the  coast  of  Sápmi  before  it  became  the  coast  of  Norway  and  
Russia  (and  for  a  short  period  and  a  small  area,  also  the  coast  of  Finland).  This  is  perhaps  the  most  
important  argument.  What  came  before  state  power  was  indeed  not  any  “state  of  nature”,  also  
known  as  a  Terra  Nullius,  but  on  the  contrary,  a  well-organized  and  territorial,  though  non-violent  
and  egalitarian,  stateless  political  system.  Immigrants  with  various  ethnicities  were  gradually  
                                                 
1031  Paine  1965  and  Eidheim  1971,  cited  in  (respectively)  Eyþórsson  2008:  44  and  Eyþórsson  2008:  45-6,  71,  80-85 
1032  Kramvig  2005 
1033  Lien  1987 
1034  Ween  2012a  has  argued  against  such  fallacies. 
1035  Eriksen  2010 
1036  Eyþórsson  2008:  95-97  and  Pedersen  2012:  72 
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integrated  into  the  existing  social  fabric.  The  local  kinship-  and  reciprocity  networks  accommodated  
persons  with  diverse  ethnicities:  Kväns,  ethnic  Norwegians,  Finns,  Eastern  Sámis,  Southern  Sámis,  
Pomors,  Russians,  Swedes,  Kurdish  refugees...  Immigrants  with  various  ethnicities  became  
integrated  into  the  existing  siida  system,  through  verdde  relations  and  marriage  alliances.  This  was  
the  actual  order,  not  only  until  de  jure  state  power  was  constituted,  but  even  until  de  facto  state  
power  was  consolidated.  It  is  an  open  question  to  what  degree  the  state  builders  ever  succeeded  in  
consolidating  actual  social  legitimacy  in  Deanuvuotna.  In  Chapter  2,  I  argued  that  the  reports  from  
the  Sámi  Rights  Commission  imply  that  in  Inner  Sápmi,  the  siida  system  never  fully  disappeared,  
and  consequently,  the  state  system  was  never  fully  consolidated  –  at  least  not  until  the  states  
succeed  in  codifying  the  customs  they  had  previously  attempted  to  criminalize.  My  impression  is  
that  this  might  be  the  case  for  Deanuvuotna  as  well,  although  Coastal  Sápmi  appears  as  superficially  
more  assimilated  into  the  state.  I  would  simply  suggest  that  the  verdde-society  is  the  contemporary  
remnant  of  the  siida-system.  When  similar  forms  of  reciprocity  are  found  in  purely  Sámi,  purely  
Norwegian  and  mixed  communities,  this  should  be  taken  as  proof  of  the  persistence  of  ancient  Sámi  
customs. 
 There  is  no  question  that  the  state  has  succeeded  in  changing  everyday  life  in  Coastal  Sámi  
areas,  especially  during  the  age  of  forced  assimilation  policies.  However,  this  does  not  necessarily  
mean  that  the  state  builders  succeeded  in  consolidating  social  legitimacy  among  the  population.  On  
the  contrary,  it  may  very  well  be  the  case  that  social  legitimacy  is  negatively  proportional  with  
suppressive  policies.  It  has  been  documented  that  external  loyalty  to  the  state’s  Lutheran  ideological  
apparatus  went  hand-in-hand  with  alternative  lay  Lutheran  movements  that  provided  theological  
blessings  to  ancient  traditional  knowledge,  which  had  previously  been  stigmatized  as  witchcraft  by  
the  state  church.1037  It  might  be  that  Bjørn  Bjerkli  was  on  the  track  of  something  similar  when  he  
argued  that  what  had  been  theorized  as  “conflict  avoidance”  and  “dwelling  landscapes”  could  
equally  well  be  termed  “everyday  resistance”  and  “landscapes  of  resistance”.  This  is  what  he  found  
in  the  fjord  area  called  Kaavuono,  Njoammelgohppi  or  Kåfjord.  However,  when  I  returned  to  the  
fjord  I  had  selected,  Deanuvuotna  or  Tanafjord,  in  order  to  look  for  similar  practices,  I  found  
something  slightly  different.  In  situations  where  state  laws  do  not  care  about  the  local  customs,  I  see  
behaviour  as  constituting  social  reproduction  of  a  parallel  jurisdictional  order.  In  cases  when  state  
laws  and  local  customs  appear  to  be  in  conflict,  I  argue  that  we  are  dealing  with  social  defence  of  an  
ancient  jurisdictional  order,  rather  than  social  resistance  against  any  actual  hegemony.  I  cannot  
generalize  about  the  fjord  that  Bjerkeli  studied,  and  I  can  hardly  generalize  about  the  fjord  I  have  
studied  myself.  However,  I  think  the  proof  I  have  found  does  indicate  that  at  least  in  Deanuvuotna,  
                                                 
1037  Myrvoll  2011 
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the  Ørebech  Report  is  totally  misleading.1038  Thus,  the  samples  I  have  found  confirm  what  has  been  
observed  in  several  previous  studies.1039  The  studies  by  Bjørn  Bjerkli  helped  me  to  get  on  the  track  
of  the  non-state.    By  applying  the  concept  of  social  resistance,  which  he  had  developed  by  
observing  Kaavuono,  I  came  across  slightly  different  praxes  in  Deanuvuotna,  praxes  that  are  better  
termed  social  defence.  Thus,  I  have  proceeded  further  along  the  track  of  the  non-state.  It  would  now  
be  interesting  to  take  the  concept  that  I  developed  here,  and  apply  it  to  conduct  further  research  in  
Kaavuona.  Maybe  one  could  proceed  further  along  the  track  of  the  non-state  there  as  well.  My  
expectation  is  that  also  there,  the  report  from  the  Coastal  Fisheries  Commission  is  more  correct  than  
the  competing  Ørebech  Report.  It  might  very  well  be  that  some  Sámi  political  entrepreneurs  have  
underestimated  the  actual  ethnical  pluralism  of  Sápmi,  but  this  should  not  be  mis-interpreted  as  
evidence  in  favor  of  Norwegian  nationalism.  The  Sámi  activists  pushed  democratization  beyond  the  
limitations  of  the  national  democracies,  while  the  Coastal  Sámi  have  pushed  it  further  beyond  the  
limitations  of  the  first  Sámi  activists.  The  same  struggle  continues  with  other  minorities-within-the-




11.5.3  Complex  constituted  orders  in  Deanuvuotna 
When  the  map  does  not  fit  the  terrain,  the  map  has  to  be  revised,  not  the  terrain.  If  the  map  indicates  
something  we  have  not  observed,  we  can  go  there  and  check.  Maybe  we  gain  new  terrain.  Maybe  
we  must  revise  the  map.  The  political  and  social  sciences  are  map-making,  and  political  action  is  
the  terrain.  When  I  ventured  into  the  field,  my  path  was  guided  by  maps,  both  maps  in  the  literal  
sense,  and  also  maps  in  the  sense  of  various  scientific  concepts.  I  selected  data  of  relevance  to  the  
concepts,  and  if  the  data  did  not  fit  the  concept,  I  had  to  change  my  concepts.  When  I  changed  my  
concepts,  it  led  me  to  search  for  new  data.  This  was  the  abductive  process.  Writing  up  the  
ethnography  is  the  final  stage  of  the  research  process,  before  it  feeds  back  to  society.  This  is  not  the  
first  version  of  this  text. 
 Eventually,  I  chose  to  structure  the  text  around  concepts  from  Elinor  Osrom’s  SES  
framework.  In  the  beginning  of  this  chapter  I  sketched  a  geographical  overview  of  Deanuvuotna  as  
an  environment,  or  constituted  order,  in  terms  of  “social-ecological  systems”.  There,  I  also  laid  out  
the  concepts  of  how  to  observe  constituent  praxes  by  tracing  the  lines  between  various  points  of  
micro-interaction,  in  terms  of  “adjacent  action  situations”.  In  the  descriptions,  I  have  not  used  the  
                                                 
1038  Norwegian  Official  Report  2005  (NOU  2005:10) 
1039  Pedersen  2012;;  Norwegian  Official  Report  2008  (NOU  2008:5) 
 455  
 
terms  social-ecological  systems,  nor  adjacent  action-situations.  However,  those  concepts  are  
templates  or  matrices  that  have  structured  the  empirical  narrative.  Following  the  circulation  of  
salmon  flesh  through  the  local  community  has  allowed  me  to  trace  some  of  the  particular  
associations  in  the  complex  network  of  adjacent  action  situations.  I  have  remained  focused  on  
action  situations  at  the  “operational  level”:  in  the  fishing  boat,  on  the  quay,  in  the  lab,  in  the  frying  
pan,  at  the  dining  table,  and  so  on.  Here,  I  have  seen  norms  in  action,  and  I  have  also  been  brought  
into  contact  with  norms  that  evolve.  As  Ostrom  points  out:  with  regard  to  informal  norms,  there  are  
not  always  any  procedural  distinctions  between  different  “levels”  of  authority,  such  as  operational  
level,  collective  choice  level  and  constitutional  level.1040  The  re-constitution  of  informal  communal  
rules  is  a  complex  process,  but  it  is  not  centralized.  Deliberation  about  norms  may  take  place  in  any  
kind  of  action  situation,  during  everyday  gossip,  or  through  the  execution  of  the  norm-regulated  
practices. 
 This  SES  framework  is  eco-  and  socio-centric,  not  state-centric.  That  distinguishes  it  from  
some  of  the  coding  concepts  I  tried  to  apply,  but  found  misleading.  I  had  used  various  analytical  
concepts  from  the  theory  and  practice  of  environmental  movements,  especially  grass  roots  
democracy.  Some  concepts  that  come  from  the  Marxian  tradition,  such  as  hegemony-versus-
resistance,  turned  out  to  be  too  state-centric.  Some  concepts  inspired  by  the  anarchist  tradition,  such  
as  “sub-politics”  and  “anti-politics”,1041  seem  even  more  state-centric.  None  of  these  concepts  have  
been  developed  while  taking  account  of  the  fact  that  there  may  exist  parallel  jurisdictional  orders  
that  are  more  ancient  than  the  state.  It  is  not  clear  for  me,  when  I  observe  Deanuvuotna,  who  might  
be  trying  to  “build  the  new  society  within  the  shell  of  the  old”.  Is  it  the  so-called  “Sámi  activists”  
from  upstream  Deatnu,  or  is  it  those  who  try  to  enforce  the  claimed  authority  of  the  state?  I  have  
argued  that  in  Sápmi,  the  state  system  is  only  one  component  of  the  actual  constituted  order.  The  
reports  from  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission,  as  well  as  the  report  from  the  Coastal  Fisheries  
Commission,  may  indicate  that  legal  pluralism  remained  the  fact  on  the  ground  during  the  entire  
period  when  the  states  tried  to  establish  dominion  over  the  former  siida  system.  Thus,  the  ways  in  
which  social  movements  influence  state  transformation  may  include  the  activities  whereby  they  
function  in  the  co-evolution  between  the  remnants  of  the  siida  system  (which  never  fully  
disappeared)  and  the  practices  of  the  state  system  (which  was  never  fully  consolidated).  The  study  
of  state  transformation  in  Sámpi  must  take  into  account  that  the  states  are  only  one  of  several  
components  of  the  actual  constituted  order  in  the  area  (see  Figure  11.14).  The  states  co-exist  with  a  
verdde  society.  State  laws  and  indigenous  customs  are  two  partly  overlapping  systems,  each  of  
which  follows  its  own  rules,  but  both  also  adapting  to  each  other.  When  nationalist  state-builders  
                                                 
1040  Ostrom  2005:    2005:  58-64,  290-291 
1041  For  the  concept  “sub-politics”  see  Beck  (1993,  1996a,  1996b),  while  for  “anti-politics”  see  Katsiaficas  (2006). 
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attempted  to  suppress  local  customs  in  Sámi  areas  (while  they  codified  similar  customs  in  ethnically  
Norwegian  or  Finnish  areas),  this  was  one  way  of  adapting  to  the  actual  verdde  society.  This  caused  
much  consternation  in  the  local  communities.  However,  it  did  not  succeed  in  eradicating  the  verdde  
society.  On  the  contrary,  it  provoked  those  who  maintained  the  verdde  society  to  adapt  to  the  new  
conditions  by  developing  tactics  of  social  defence.  Finally,  those  two  systems,  namely  the  state  
system  and  the  verdde  society,  also  co-exist  with  international  norms.  During  the  latter  generation,  
the  colonial  states  lost  their  monopoly  of  representation  in  the  UN.  Political  entrepreneurs  from  the  
verdde  society,  together  with  their  allies,  succeeded  in  gaining  voice  in  the  UN.  Consequently,  the  
UN  now  interprets  internatinal  human  rights  law  in  a  way  that  can  be  seen  as  an  attempt  to  regulate  
the  complex  relationship  between  the  ancient  customs  inherited  from  the  siida  system,  and  the  
recent  laws  introduced  by  the  state  system.1042 
 
Figure  11-14:  Legal  pluralism  in  Sápmi:  hybrid  constituent  praxes  within  complex  constituted  orders 
 
 An  alternative  to  methodological  nationalism  may  be  to  look  for  systems  that  are  folded  into  
each  other,  like  salty  ebbs  of  the  Deatnu  Fjord  mix  with  the  fresh  flow  of  the  Deatnu  River.  Systems  
that  are  “folded”  into  each  other  can  also  be  called  “entangled”  systems  or  “complex”  systems.  For  
ecologists,  this  is  nothing  special.  They  study  complex  dynamic  systems.  Social  scientists,  however,  
have  often  described  social  systems  with  organic  metaphors,  as  static,  closed  systems  with  
relatively  clear  boundaries.  Such  metaphors  belong  to  a  cultural  heritage  from  Structure-
Functionalism,  and  ultimately  from  German  Idealism  and  Social  Darwinism.  Empirical  social  
systems  can  display  a  high  degree  of  complexity,  as  is  the  case  with  cultural  hybridity,  or  inter-
governmental  treaties.1043  They  can  display  a  high  degree  of  dynamism  as  well,  for  example  
conjunctures  and  crises.1044  As  implied  above,  not  only  are  the  ecological  systems  entangled  with  
each  other,  but  the  social  ones  are  also.  This  way  of  thinking  and  observing  is  in  line  with  Elinor  
                                                 
1042  Anaya  2004:  7 
1043  Neuman  &  Sending  2010;;    Eriksen  &  Næss  2011 
1044  Eriksen  2013 
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Ostrom’s  approach  to  research  on  policy-making  and  norm  evolution,  in  polycentric  political  
environments.  With  her  Social-Ecologial  Systems  (SES)  framework,  she  takes  the  interaction  of  
various  causal  factors  into  account,  from  the  physical  environment  to  the  human-made  norms,  and  
within  the  latter,  informal  customs  as  well  as  state  laws.    At  the  beginning  of  this  chapter,  I  provided  
a  brief  overview  of  the  geographical  environment  as  a  SES  (11.2.4):  environmental  landscape  
geography,  what  Ostrom  would  call  the  “resource  system”,  and  also  the  humanistic  landscape  
geography,  which  is  part  of  the  informal  customs  within  her  “governance  system”.  Both  systems  are  
components  of  the  SES.  They  co-evolve  with  another  component  of  the  “governance  system”  which  
is  the  formal  laws.  The  latter  includes  states  and  inter-state  politics,  and  it  was  the  entire  focus  for  
traditional  forms  of  political  geography.  The  SES-perspective,  however,  has  been  tailored  to  trace  
how  the  ongoing  social  (re)production  of  the  political-geographical  formations  is  entangled  with  the  
ongoing  socio-ecological  (re)production  of  resource-geographical  formations  and  cultural-
geographical  formations.  Entangled  ecological  and  social  systems  produce  entangled  political  
systems.  Actual  ecological  and  cultural  complexities  produce  actual  political  complexity.  The  state  
formation  is  in  practice  no  static,  closed  or  finished  system,  and  therefore  it  might  co-evolve  and  
co-exist  with  systems  of  socio-material  power  outside  the  state.  The  politics  of  socio-material  power  
include  complex  political  systems,  where  a  polity  may  be  folded  into  other  normative  systems.  The  
politics  of  socio-material  power  also  includes  complex  socio-cultural  systems:  nation-building  and  
marginalized  ethnicities  are  folded  into  each  other.  The  politics  of  socio-material  power  even  
includes  complex  socio-economic  systems:  peripheral  communities  are  folded  into  central  nodes  of  
capital  accumulation  or  bureaucratic  command.  Thus,  the  social-ecological  realities  appear  to  
include  complex  folding  of  different  formations.  The  mix  between  freshwater  from  the  river  and  
saltwater  in  the  sea  is  structurally  analogous  to  the  dynamics  of  complexity  found  in  other  parts  of  
the  Social-Ecological  System.  This  is  the  environment  in  which  the  evolution  of  norms  takes  place.   
Firstly,  the  practice  of  the  local  community  appears  to  be  ambiguous.  The  use  of  natural  
resources  involves  little  money,  so  there  is  also  a  considerable  presence  of  subsistence  economy  and  
gift  economy.  The  use  of  natural  resources  is  regulated  by  state-certified  law  and  science,  but  also  
by  local  customs  and  lore.  Traditional  skills,  lore  and  norms  have  been  constantly  evolving  since  
times  immemorial,  and  the  medium  for  maintaining  them  is  still  the  Northern  Sámi  language.  
Likewise,  indigenous  kinship  relations  and  practices  of  reciprocity  are  integral  to  the  organization  
of  production  and  distribution,  to  practical  natural  resources  management  and  to  practical  conflict  
resolution.  State-certified  law  may  or  may  not  resonate  with  local  custom.  State-certified  science  
may  or  may  not  resonate  with  local  lore.  It  depends  on  the  particular  moment  and  location.  Concrete  
ethnographic  observations  are  presented  above.  Those  observations  may  indicate  that  the  normative  
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and  epistemic  order  in  the  local  community  might  actually  be  highly  ambiguous  and  flexible.  If  
there  really  is  continuity  from  the  ancient  siida  system,  and  I  think  legal  historians  have  found  good  
indicators  that  there  actually  is,  then  those  ambiguities  should  be  interpreted  as  the  de  facto  legal  
and  jurisdictional  pluralism  of  an  indigenous  homeland.   
Secondly,  the  presence  of  the  state  also  appears  to  be  ambiguous.  Place  names  are  an  issue  of  
contention  within  the  plural  political  geography.  Several  names  are  used  for  the  landscape  that  I  
here  have  chosen  to  call  the  Deatnu  Fjord.  In  North  Sámi  the  name  is  Deanuvuotna,  in  Norwegian  it  
is  called  Tanafjorden.  On  the  topographical  map  I  am  using,  both  names  are  present.  The  map  is  
produced  by  Statens  Kartverk,  the  map-making  institution  of  the  Norwegian  state.  The  copy  I  am  
using  was  printed  in  2010.1045  The  nomenclature  that  appears  on  the  map  is  a  result  of  the  state’s  
ratification  of  international  treaties  regarding  indigenous  rights.  When  this  state-certified  
topographical  map  presents  both  the  names  Tanafjorden  and  Deanuvuota,  then  the  map  can  be  taken  
as  an  indicator  of  an  ongoing  redefinition  of  the  national  territory.  Norway  is  no  longer  a  uni-
national  state,  after  the  Sámi  Act,  the  constitutional  amendment,  and  the  Finnmark  Act.  What  it  has  
become  instead  is  not  clear.  The  early  modern  kingdoms  of  Denmark-Norway  and  Sweden-Finland  
included  some  guarantees  for  the  “Lappiske  Nation”,  or  the  Sámi  population  group,  in  addition  to  
the  Finnish  and  Norwegian  population  groups.  Finnish  and  Norwegian  political  entrepreneurs  broke  
out  during  the  age  of  liberal  nationalism,  and  created  nation-states.  That  increased  the  level  of  
popular  self-rule  for  the  Finnish  and  Norwegian  nations,  but  decreased  the  rule  of  law  for  the  
geographically  entangled  “Lappiske  Nation”.1046  The  fall  of  the  uninational  state  form  coincides  
with  increased  respect  for  human  rights.  However,  it  also  coincides  with  a  general  loss  of  
democratic  power  for  the  national  parliaments.  There  may  be  a  general  decrease  in  democratic  
power,  for  all  citizens,  though  there  is  an  increased  rule  of  law,  even  for  minorities.   
Thirdly,  the  local  community  and  the  state  appear  as  two  co-evolving  systems.  My  
ethnographic  observations  indicate  a  contentious  co-existence  of  local  order  and  state  order.  This  
impression  may  be  explained  historically  by  having  regard  to  recent  findings  in  legal  history  and  
legal  anthropology.  Researchers  informed  by  recent  international  norms  on  indigenous  rights  have  
sought  and  found  documentation  concerning  indigenous  rights  in  Sámi  areas.  Claims  of  the  right  to  
land  and  water  are  supported  by  references  to  continuous  use,  which  imply  the  continuous  
reproduction  of  specific  normative  and  epistemic  orders.1047  Those  traits  of  the  Sámi  culture  have  
been  constantly  evolving  “since  times  immemorial”,  that  is,  since  the  beginning  of  recorded  history.  
Lutheran  witch  trials  and  Eugenic  assimilation  policies  may  be  seen  as  one  form  of  co-evolution,  
                                                 
1045  The  state’s  official  map  of  Deatnu  Fjord  (Statens  kartverk  2010) 
1046  Jensen  2013 
1047  Norwegian  Official  Report  1997a  (NOU  1997:4);;  1997b  (NOU  1997:5) 
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while  gradual  ratification  and  implementation  of  postcolonial  human  rights  is  another  form  of  co-
evolution.  Each  of  those  two  forms  may  perhaps  be  represented  by  each  of  the  two  competing  
reports  from  the  Norwegian  Ministry  of  Fisheries. 
 
 
11.5.4  Repertoires  of  constituent  power  in  Deanuvuotna 
When  salmon  flesh  circulates  throughout  the  local  socio-ecosystem,  it  gains  various  functions  for  
customary  praxes  and  knowledge  praxes.  Thus,  it  is  a  tool  for  the  making  and  maintenance  of  
constituent  power:  the  everyday  maintenance  of  jurisdictional  complexity,  the  everyday  social  
defence  of  longstanding  customs,  and  the  everyday  social  entrepreneurship  aiming  to  transform  the  
opportunity  structure. 
 Customary  praxes  and  knowledge  praxes  are  made  and  maintained  in  practical  subsistence  
practices,  where  nature  and  culture  interact.  The  reports  from  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission  showed  
that  in  Inner  Sápmi,  longstanding  customs  and  traditional  knowledge  had  been  maintained  and  
developed  since  times  immemorial,  regardless  of  whether  those  had  been  codified,  criminalized,  or  
simply  forgotten  by  state  legislators.  In  Chapter  2,  I  showed  that  such  new  proofs  in  legal  history  
have  informed  some  social  science  in  areas  where  Norway  and  Sápmi  overlap.  Gro  Ween  has  used  
the  ANT  approach  to  study  how  state-certified  science  interacts  with  traditional  knowledge.  Audun  
Sandberg  has  applied  the  SES  framework  in  order  to  trace  state  transformation  in  an  environment  of  
de  facto  legal  pluralism,  with  international  norms,  longstanding  customs,  and  state  laws.  This  differs  
from  conventional  studies  of  state  formation.  Those  often  take  military  history  to  be  the  basis  of  the  
political  superstructure,  and  thus,  the  main  explanatory  factor.  However,  to  study  state  
transformation  in  an  indigenous  homeland,  we  must  take  the  actual  legal  pluralism  into  account,  and  
thus,  the  basis  for  this  superstructure  is  not  coercive  force,  but  rather  subsistence  practices.  To  
explain  constituted  power  in  such  an  environment,  we  need  to  take  socio-material  customary  praxes  
and  socio-material  knowledge  praxes  into  account,  in  addition  to  brute  force.  The  mentioned  ANT  
approach  and  SES  framework  have  been  developed  to  address  the  socio-material  aspect  of  customs  
and  knowledge,  the  interaction  of  cultural  geography  and  resource  geography.  When  we  research  
state  transformation  in  the  Sápmi  homeland,  it  becomes  evident  that  subsistence  practices  are  an  
explanatory  factor  or  a  basis  for  the  superstructure,  which  cannot  possibly  be  reduced  to  military  
history.  My  research  has  concisted  of  an  abuductive  dialogue  between  the  selection  of  data  and  the  
selection  of  concepts.  The  conceptual  map  guided  my  venture  into  the  terrains  of  hegemony,  
resistance,  and  defence.  Whenever  the  map  did  not  fit  the  terrain,  I  revised  the  map,  and  with  the  
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revised  map,  I  returned  to  fieldwork  in  the  terrain.  This  conversation  between  the  empirical  and  the  
theoretical  led  to  the  emergence  of  a  hypothetical  typology  of  various  pathways  for  constituent  and  
constituted  power.  Those  are  shown  in  in  Table  11.4.  The  columns  refer  to  different  forms  of  
constituent  praxes,  while  the  rows  refer  to  various  forms  of  constituted  order.  The  forms  of  
constituent  power  are  sorted  in  three  categories  (columns):  the  actions  are  either  directed  towards  
the  politics  of  the  state,  the  politics  of  the  economy,  or  the  politics  of  knowledge.  Those  three  paths  
of  constituent  power  roughly  correspond  with  the  three  approaches  that  were  introduced  in  Chapter  
2:  the  postmodern  Machiavelli,  the  SES  framework  and  the  ANT  approach,  respectively.  The  
different  constituted  orders  are  also  sorted  into  three  categories  (rows). 
 
Table  11-4:  Typology  for  the  paths  of  constituent  and  constituted  power  in  particular  situations. 
Columns:  What  constituent  praxes  is  relevant  –  state  (Machiavellism),  economy  (SES)  or  knowledge  (ANT)? 
Rows:  What  constituted  order  is  relevant  –  mainly  state,  mainly  siida,  or  mainly  tension? 
 Politics  of  state 
(coercive  force) 
Politics  of  economy 
(customary  praxes) 
Politics  of  knowledge 
(knowledge  praxes) 
Praxes  interacting  with  
Norwegian  state  law  
(state  society) 
Politic  entrepreneurship  
in  (inter)state  institutions  
(inclusion  or  resistance) 
Social  entrepreneurship  





Praxes  in  unclear  area  
between  Norwegian  law  
and  Sámi  customs 
Social  defence  by  
dodging  state  violence  
(not  reciprocating  it) 
Social  defence  through  
criminalized  reciprocity  
systems 
Social  defence  through  
boycott  of  biologic  
monitoring 
Praxes  interacting  with  
Sámi  longstanding  
customs  (siida  society) 
Maintaining  the  verdde  
society  (social  sanctions,  






 Everyday  social  entrepreneurship  to  transform  the  opportunity  structure:  The  upper  row  
refers  to  praxes  that  are  contained  within  already  constituted  Norwegian  state  laws,  and  that  are  not  
in  conflict  with  longstanding  Sámi  customs.  Those  praxes  also  contribute  to  the  further  
development  of  state  laws.  The  upper  left  cell  refers  to  political  entrepreneurship,  from  corporatist  
inclusion,  to  syndicalist  resistance.  Examples  are  found  in  Chapter  10.  The  two  upper  right  cells  
refer  to  various  forms  of  social  entrepreneurship,  which  take  place  outside  the  state,  but  are  
regulated  by  the  state.  Examples  are  found  in  the  present  chapter,  in  11.3.  All  of  these  action  
repertoires  utilize  the  opportunities  provided  by  existing  liberal  freedoms:  freedom  of  speech,  
freedom  of  assembly,  freedom  of  association,  and  more  or  less  free  competition.  With  these  liberal  
freedoms,  there  is,  in  principle,  freedom  and  equality  for  all  citizens,  but  in  practice  some  are  more  
equal  than  others.  Subaltern  fisher-peasants  in  Coastal  Sápmi  are  among  those  groups  who  
experience  the  consequences  of  structurally  unequal  opportunities.  Such  conditions  are  what  Otnes  
and  Bourdieu  refer  to  with  the  metaphor  “structural  violence”.  The  police  force  of  the  Norwegian  
state  guard  the  already  constituted  laws,  which  implies  the  protection  of  the  liberal  freedoms  of  
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speech,  assembly,  association  and  competition,  but  it  may  at  times  also  imply  the  protection  of  
unequal  opportunities,  or  structural  violence.  Such  contradiction  between  liberal  freedoms  and  
unequal  opportunities,  in  Sápmi  as  in  many  other  post-colonies,  is  the  reason  why  the  UN  found  it  
necessary  to  supplement  state  rights  and  individual  rights  with  collective  human  rights:  the  
ICESCR.  In  those  areas  of  Inner  Sápmi  where  the  states  have  recognized  that  an  indigenous  people  
exists,  the  police  force  is  now  used  in  a  (more  or  less  successful)  attempt  to  protect  the  freedom  
from  exploitation  and  the  freedom  from  colonization.  However,  Coastal  Sápmi  is  one  of  the  areas  in  
Sápmi  where  the  states  have  not  (yet)  recognized  that  an  indigenous  people  exists,  and  thus,  no  
attempt  has  been  undertaken  to  re-direct  the  police  force  from  protecting  structural  violence,  to  
protecting  the  freedom  from  colonization. 
 Everyday  maintenance  and  development  of  jurisdictional  complexity:  The  bottom  row  
refers  to  praxes  that  are  regulated  by  longstanding  Sámi  customs,  and  that  are  are  not  in  conflict  
with  state  law  (either  because  state  legislators  have  ignored  the  customs,  or  because  they  simply  did  
not  care).  Those  praxes  contribute  to  the  continuous  maintenance  and  development  of  longstanding  
customs  and  traditional  knowledge  in  Sápmi.  That  such  practices  exist  in  Inner  Sápmi  was  
documented  by  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission.  This  process  of  social  reproduction,  as  an  open-ended  
constitutional  process,  is  referred  to  by  the  two  cells  on  the  bottom  right  in  Table  11.2:  one  cell  for  
the  social  reproduction  of  longstanding  customs,  another  for  the  social  reproduction  of  traditional  
knowledge.  Additionally,  the  Coastal  Fisheries  Commission  documented  that  such  praxes  exist  in  
Coastal  Sápmi  as  well,  and  this  interpretation  is  supported  by  some  human  rights  lawyers,  even  
though  it  is  rejected  by  the  hegemonic  political  class  in  the  not-yet-decolonized  state.  Some  selected  
samples  of  such  praxes  were  presented  in  the  present  chapter,  towards  the  end  of  section  11.3  
(distribution  and  consumption  through  the  development  of  verdde  relations),  and  at  the  beginning  of  
section  11.4  (distribution  and  consumption  through  a  village  association).  All  of  these  are  examples  
that  refer  to  the  two  cells  on  the  bottom  right.  There  is  also  a  cell  at  the  bottom  left.  This  refers  to  
social  sanctions  as  a  form  of  non-violent  policing  of  norms,  internally  within  the  Sámi  community.  
In  close-knit  communities,  social  sanctions  can  be  quite  effective,  and  are  not  always  nice,  but  
nevertheless,  they  cannot  be  described  as  a  coercive  force.  This  is  a  main  difference  between  the  
two  entangled  normative  systems:  Norwegian  state  laws  are  sometimes  policed  with  coercive  force,  
while  longstanding  Sámi  customs  are  always  policed  with  social  sanctions.  In  the  continuous  
maintenance  and  development  of  longstanding  indigenous  customs,  indigenous  people  also  settle  
internal  conflicts  regarding  the  right  to  use  various  natural  resources.  Longstanding  Sámi  customs,  
like  Norwegian  state  laws,  may  not  always  be  perceived  as  just  by  every  community  member,  but  
both  systems  are  adaptive,  which  means  that  both  of  them  can  accommodate  internal  deliberation  
about  the  system’s  own  norms.  The  continuous  maintenance  and  development  of  the  verdde  society  
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is  a  form  of  transformative  constituent  power  within  Sámi  jurisdiction,  in  an  analogous  way  to  how  
political  and  social  entrepreneurship  represent  routes  to  transformative  constituent  power  within  
Norwegian  jurisdiction.  (During  my  fieldwork  in  the  Deatnu  Water  Area,  I  also  observed  that  those  
persons  who  might  appear  as  a  local  “chieftains”  tend  to  be  individuals  who  enjoy  certain  state-
certified  rights,  for  example  prosperous  reindeer  owners,  or  net  fishermen  in  the  river.  However,  
what  is  closer  to  the  “original”  siida  economy  is  hunter-gathering  in  the  meacchi,  and  those  praxes  
are  highly  egalitarian.)  The  praxes  referred  to  in  the  bottom  row  are  not  controversial.  Local  people  
give  to  the  emperor  what  belongs  to  the  emperor  –  and  to  the  community  what  belongs  to  the  
community.  However,  even  though  those  practices  are  not  contentious,  they  are  significant  in  
explaining  the  co-evolution  of  state  transformation  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  maintenance  and  
development  of  the  siida  /  verdde  system  on  the  other  hand. 
 Everyday  social  defence  of  longstanding  customs:  The  middle  row  refers  to  situations  that  
exemplify  another  form  of  mutual  adaptation  between  Norwegian  state  law  and  longstanding  Sámi  
customs.  While  the  upper  and  bottom  rows  refer  to  situations  where  the  two  parallel  orders  are  not  
in  conflict  with  each  other,  the  middle  row  refers  to  situations  where  there  is  tension  between  the  
two  orders.  One  context  one  should  have  in  mind  is  that  nation-builders  in  Norway  and  Sweden  
codified  some  longstanding  customs  in  some  communities  that  were  being  defined  as  in-group  to  
these  two  Scandinavian  nations,  whereas  the  various  Sámi  peoples  were  defined  as  out-group,  and  
thus,  they  and  their  territories  became  subject  to  explicit  eugenic  and  colonial  administration.  As  a  
response  to  increased  nationalist  and  statist  suppression,  indigenous  people  adapted  repertoires  of  
outward  “conflict  avoidance”  and  discrete  “everyday  resistance”,  as  Bjørn  Bjerkli  has  observed.  
However  I  have  suggested  that  we  should  rather  use  Gene  Sharp’s  term  “social  defence”,  because  of  
the  actual  presence  of  parallel  legal  orders:  both  Norwegian  state  law  and  longstanding  Sámi  
customs.  The  middle  row  of  Table  11.2  refers  to  various  repertoires  of  social  defence.  The  two  cells  
to  the  right  refer  to  social  defence  within  the  realms  of  economic  activities  and  knowledge  practices.  
A  few  selected  samples  were  disclosed  in  the  present  chapter,  in  sections  11.4.2  and  11.4.3.  
However,  the  cell  to  the  left  refers  to  social  defence  that  engages  directly  with  state  power.  
Examples  of  this  are  found  in  the  historical  case  study  of  the  Alta-dam  conflict,  in  Chapters  6  and  7.  
The  sit-down  blockade  organized  by  Folkeaksjonen,  and  the  hunger  strike  of  Sameaksjonen,  were  
both  inspired  by  other  movements,  for  environmental  protection  or  indigenous  rights.  However,  
they  were  also  in  line  with  Sámi  political  culture  by  refraining  from  answering  violence  with  
violence,  but  resisting  anyway.  During  the  same  controversy,  one  independent  action  group  failed  to  
blow  up  a  bridge.  Whether  such  material  sabotage  is  violence  or  social  resistance  depends  upon  the  
definition  (or  rather  upon  one’s  political  sympathies),  but  it  is  doubtless  a  unique  example  of  
coercive  force  used  in  an  attempt  to  defend  the  Sámi  normative  order.  (This  incident,  and  as  well  as  
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the  violent  Guovdageaidnu  Rebellion  in  1952,  are  the  two  unique  instances  where  Sámi  have  
resorted  to  coercive  means  to  defend  themselves  against  institutional  violence  on  the  part  of  the  
colonial  states.)  The  entire  anti-dam  movement  was  controversial  in  Sápmi,  not  as  much  because  of  
their  aims,  as  because  of  their  means.  Social  defence  is  not  only  non-violent  direct  action,  but  it  also  
implies  a  semiotic  struggle  for  definitional  power  in  the  local  community.  It  is  not  always  easy  to  
maintain  the  indigenous  moral  order  whenever  this  is  being  criminalized  by  the  powerful.  The  
cosmological  struggle  between  stigmatization  and  empowerment  has  gone  on  since  the  age  of  
Lutheran  witchcraft  trials,  and  contemporary  samples  were  discussed  in  the  present  chapter,  in  
section  11.4.4. 
 What  I  have  not  traced:  It  could  also  have  been  academically  interesting  to  conduct  a  
political  science  study  of  the  local  Sámi  kinship-  and  reciprocity  structures,  but  I  am  not  the  right  
person  to  do  that.  As  a  non-Sámi  Norwegian,  I  must  be  careful  to  avoid  being  instrumental  for  the  
purposes  of  dividing  and  conquering,  and  for  this  reason  I  am  not  in  a  position  that  allows  me  to  
inquire  and  disclose  segmentary  lineage  within  the  Sámi  society.  Instead,  however,  I  am  in  a  
position  to  inquire  about  the  partial  overlap  between  a  state-building  Norwegian  nation  and  a  state-
less  Sámi  nation.  What  would  have  been  practically  interesting  would  have  been  to  conduct  
ethnography  of  bureaucratic  praxes.  Some  of  the  informal  praxes  within  the  formal  praxes  could  
have  been  unpacked  if  I  had  conducted  participant  observation  in  the  bureaucratic  lobby,  similarly  
to  the  ethnographic  fragment  from  the  district  court  in  the  previous  chapter.  The  anthropologists  
Marianne  Lien  and  Gro  Ween  have  fruitfully  directed  the  ethnographic  gaze  towards  modern  state  
politics  and  capitalist  markets  in  the  area.1048  Some  anthropologists  have  found  ambiguities  by  
“unpacking”  the  official  political  culture  in  the  Norwegian  state.1049  This  may  be  paralleled  with  
how  other  anthropologists  have  found  ambiguous  culture  in  Sápmi.1050  There  might  be  causal  
interaction  between  those  ambiguities,  in  concrete  situations  of  social  action.  By  directing  the  focus  
of  anthropological  research  towards  the  state  bureaucracy,  I  might  have  revealed  more  ambiguities,  
pluralities  and  hybridism  within  bureaucratic  culture,  than  what  is  conventionally  expected.  This  is  
typical  to  Law  &  Sigleton’s  ANT  approach.  It  would  also  be  in  line  with  Ostrom’s  SES  framework,  
in  particular  with  Keith  Hart’s  elaboration  of  bureaucracy  and  informality  within  that  framework.  
What  remains  under-theorized  is  the  cultural  hybridization  between  tourist  angling  and  traditional  
oaggun,  exemplified  in  the  person  of  my  new  friend  Abbeddissen.  Such  a  practice  is  relevant,  
because  it  invites  discussion  of  some  dichotomous  divisions  in  the  indigenous  rights  struggle.  The  
reason  why  those  data  are  not  included  is  that  our  trajectory  as  fishing  comrades  ventured  beyond  
                                                 
1048  Lien  1997;;    Ween  in  prep. 
1049  Eriksen  &  Næss  2011;;  Vike  2009 
1050  Kramvig  2005;;  Ween  2012a 
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the  fjord,  further  along  the  Deatnu  River  and  its  tributaries  in  the  meacchi.  Therefore,  this  is  another  
story,  to  be  told  in  a  later  work,  after  my  ethnographies  from  the  river  and  the  tributaries  have  been  
written.  If  we  studied  the  politics  of  the  outfields  (meacchi)  in  the  highland  tributaries  of  the  Deatnu  
River,  then  cloudberries  might  have  been  as  useful  an  indicator  as  salmonid  fishes  (freshwater  
trout).  However,  when  studying  the  Deatnu  Fjord,  fisheries  appear  as  the  most  important  livelihood  
adaptation,  and  thus,  the  salmonids  of  the  sea  (wild  salmon  and  saltwater  trout)  appear  as  the  most  
relevant  “total  objects”.  For  the  sake  of  simplicity,  I  will  leave  the  saltwater  trout  to  the  side  here,  
and  focus  on  the  wild  salmon.  Again,  this  is  another  story  to  the  one  I  tell  here. 
 
 
11.5.5  Potential  relevance:  locally,  and  for  other  environmental  justice  movements 
Subaltern  fisher-peasants  in  Deanuvuotna  may  combine  various  paths  to  empowerment,  as  they  
also  combine  various  livelihood  adaptations.  In  order  to  survive  in  the  Arctic  climate,  tradition  has  
adopted  hunting,  gathering  and  angling;;  fjord  fishing;;  river  fishing;;  reindeer  and  sheep  herding;;  
barter  and  trade;;  and  wage-work  in  modern  jobs.  Thus,  households  that  do  not  possess  much  private  
capital  could  nevertheless  support  a  sustainable  economy,  ecology,  culture  –  and  longstanding  
indigenous  jurisdiction.  On  one  side  of  the  Deanuvuotna,  I  met  such  social  entrepreneurs  and  
political  entrepreneurs.  On  the  other  side  of  the  same  fjord  I  gained  some  samples  of  persistent  
social  defence  of  longstanding  customs,  a  result  of  the  regime’s  denial  of  postcolonial  human  rights.  
However,  on  both  sides  of  the  fjord,  I  found  samples  of  continuous  maintenance  and  development  
of  longstanding  Sámi  customs,  regardless  of  whether  the  latter  are  codified,  criminalized  or  simply  
ignored  by  the  colonial  state.  As  long  as  the  kingdoms  were  distant  trading  partners,  it  was  possible  
to  keep  them  at  arm’s  length.  This  is  what  I  have  called  maintenance  and  development  of  
longstanding  customs.  It  may  contain  its  own  internal  entrepreneurial  efforts.  After  the  intrusive  
state  opened  up  the  fjords  for  large  vessels  with  mobile  gear,  it  was  no  longer  possible  for  Coastal  
Sámi  to  dodge  institutional  violence.  Thus,  it  was  no  longer  sufficient  to  mind  one’s  own  business.  
In  addition,  it  became  necessary  to  play  according  to  rules  set  by  the  state.  Through  social  
entrepreneurship,  local  people  strive  to  increase  their  life  chances  by  acting  within  rules  that  have  
been  codified  by  the  state.  However,  with  those  rules,  there  was  and  still  is  a  gap  between  liberal  
norms  and  structurally  unequal  opportunities.  Consequently,  local  people  could  no  longer  flee  from  
the  state  system,  but  had  to  turn  around  and  confront  it  –  by  hacking  into  it,  bypassing  the  
government,  and  redefining  international  law.  Thus,  they  had  to  become  political  entrepreneurs  as  
well.  The  world  wide  postcolonial  struggle  led  to  the  drafting  of  the  ICESCR,  whose  purpose  is  to  
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heal  the  rift  between  liberal  norms  and  structurally  unequal  opportunities.1051  However,  whenever  
social  entrepreneurship  and  political  entrepreneurship  fail,  or  have  not  yet  succeeded,  it  may  be  
necessary  for  subaltern  indigenous  people  to  defend  themselves.  This  is  where  the  various  
repertoires  of  social  defence  have  been  adapted.  This  may  simply  entail  continuing  to  do  things  
according  to  the  customs,  even  though  some  specific  political  elite  tries  to  impose  new  norms.  
However,  new  norms  also  make  a  mess  in  the  local  moral  order.  Through  their  ideological  
apparatus,  the  state  builders  are  hacking  into  the  minds  of  local  subaltern  persons.  That  was  the  case  
with  Lutheran  witch-hunts,1052  and  that  was  the  case  with  Eugenic  assimilation  policies  as  well.1053  
Social  defence  has  a  cosmological  dimension,  where  local  morality  and  the  regulation  of  behaviour  
are  at  stake.  As  Elinor  Ostrom  has  pointed  out,  there  is  even  a  possibility  that  informal  and  
sustainable  nature  management  systems  are  brought  out  of  equilibrium  by  intrusive  states.1054  We  
could  also  use  FIAN’s  term,  “resource  grabbing”.  Social  defence  is  a  struggle  to  maintain  moral  
dignity,  as  well  as  a  repertoire  for  non-violent  direct  action.  In  Deanuvuotna,  political  entrepreneurs  
even  succeeded  in  seizing  the  position  of  Minster  of  Fisheries,  but  were  confronted  by  capitalist  and  
nationalist  interests  that  forced  them  into  a  tactical  retreat.  Social  entrepreneurs  have  succeeded  in  
establishing  a  fish  receiving  facility,  in  spite  of  the  economic  crisis,  and  with  support  from  the  
regional  innovation  system.  They  create  new  facts  on  the  ground.  This  is  non-violent  direct  action.  
Social  entrepreneurs  have  also  started  to  develop  an  Atlantic  network  for  indigenous  fishery  
science,  in  an  attempt  to  compete  with  the  political  biases  that  exist  in  the  existing  transnational  
epistemic  community  for  fishery  science.  Some  have  gathered  to  discuss  biology  and  economy.1055  
Gro  Ween  became  involved  as  an  anthropologist.  I  was  enrolled  to  serve  as  a  political  scientist.  We  
document  more  facts  on  the  ground.  In  the  struggle  for  proofs  and  rights,  science  is  also  non-violent  
direct  action.  Both  in  the  scientific  and  the  economic  spheres,  social  entrepreneurship  contributes  to  
re-constituting  the  already  constituted  patterns  of  power.  Social  and  political  entrepreneurship  
represent  a  struggle  for  capacity  building  (or  resource  mobilization)  and  a  struggle  for  rights  and  
proofs  (of  collective  framing).  The  entire  effort  may  be  defined  as  a  continuation  of  social  defence  
by  different  means.  When  the  non-violent  social  order  cannot  keep  distance  from  the  intrusive  
monopoly  of  violence,  then  one  has  to  engage  with  the  latter  to  transform  it.  When  the  state-builders  
hacked  the  local  morality  of  the  indigenous  people,  the  indigenous  people  defended  themselves  by  
hacking  the  morality  of  the  states.  The  political  and  social  entrepreneurs  in  Coastal  Sámi  
communities  have  taken  part  in  the  redefinition  of  international  law.  With  the  report  from  the  
                                                 
1051  See  part  2.1.1,  in  particular  the  footnote  about  decolonisation  of  human  rights  law. 
1052  Pollan  2007 
1053  Minde  2005a 
1054  Ostrom  2005 
1055  Salmon  Voices  webpage  http://site.uit.no/salmonvoices/  (last  retrieved  22.  april  2014) 
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Coastal  Fisheries  Commission  they  succeeded  in  drawing  public  attention  to  the  gap  between  
competing  interpretations  of  international  law.  Thus,  the  nationalist  state-builders  lost  the  
definitional  monopoly.  However,  the  movement  has  not  yet  succeeded  in  transforming  the  
hegemonic  norms  within  the  ideological  state  apparatus.  The  people  in  Coastal  Sápmi  may  or  may  
not  succeed  in  beginning  to  decolonize  the  state,  like  their  kinfolk  in  some  areas  of  Inner  Sápmi  are  
now  doing.  The  special  combination  of  external  loyalty  and  discrete  resistance,  which  is  found  in  
Coastal  Sápmi,  may  be  a  specific  livelihood  adaptation  in  the  areas  where  the  ideological  apparatus  
of  the  state  is  relatively  more  intrusive.  When  the  Lutheran  ideological  apparatus  disrupted  the  local  
morality,  local  people  adapted  a  lay  Lutheranism,  which  provided  blessings  to  old  beliefs  and  
norms.1056  When  Eugenic  racism  disrupted  the  local  morality,  some  people  re-defined  the  
previously  derogatory  labels  “Mongol”  or  “savage”  by  giving  them  positive  connotations.1057  When  
the  Norwegian  Labor  Party  adopted  Lenin’s  principle  of  “democratic  centralism”,1058  local  people  
nevertheless  maintained  a  form  of  “worker’s  opposition”  with  external  loyalty  to  the  party.  It  does  
not  matter  if  the  Supreme  Being  is  Jupmil,  Gud,  the  Crown,  the  party  politburo  or  the  UN  High  
Commissioner  for  Human  Rights,  as  long  as  this  Supreme  Being  does  not  allow  unilateral,  violent,  
resource  grabbing. 
 Those  are  some  pathways  of  constituent  and  constituted  power  in  some  areas  with  complex  
constituted  orders.  The  samples  are  taken  from  areas  where  the  jurisdiction  of  Norwegian  state  law  
overlaps  with  the  jurisdiction  of  longstanding  Sámi  customs,  and  as  a  result  of  the  ICESCR  §1,  we  
try  to  transform  state  law  so  it  no  longer  suppresses  the  longstanding  customs  of  the  people  whose  
natural  resources  it  has  grabbed.  One  of  the  relatively  unique  features  of  this  case  is  that  a  people  
became  systematically  suppressed  by  the  existing  states,  and  therefore  constitutes  an  indigenous  
people  in  the  terms  of  the  UN  definitions,  yet  still  this  people  has  refrained  from  answering  violence  
with  violence.  This  allows  us  to  highlight  some  specific  pathways  of  constituent  and  constituted  
power:  Firstly,  it  makes  visible  the  non-violent  social  defence  and  non-violent  maintenance  of  
longstanding  customs.  Secondly,  it  makes  visible  the  unilateral  institutional  violence  of  the  states,  
which  have  policed  structurally  unequal  opportunities.  Such  paths  may  be  less  conspicuous  in  other  
cases,  but  when  we  have  identified  such  processes  in  one  case,  we  might  re-visit  other  cases  in  
order  to  see  if  we  might  find  something  similar  there  as  well.  Thus,  my  findings  from  some  of  the  
areas  where  Sápmi  and  Norway  overlap  may  perhaps  have  transfer  value  to  other  areas.  This  may  
perhaps  include  quite  different  cases  involving  environmental  justice  struggles  or  nation-re-
building,  such  as  Native  Americans,  Siberian  indigenous  peoples,  the  Basque  country,  Northern  
                                                 
1056  Myrvoll  2011 
1057  Jensen  2013;;  Jernsletten  1999 
1058  Bye  1997:  47-8 
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11.6.0  Positive  and  negative  findings  from  Case  II 
 
11.6.1  Negative  findings:  some  possible  errors  in  Case  II 
When  zooming  into  the  fjord  as  a  specific  sub-system  within  the  Deatnu  Water  Area,  I  also  actualize  
one  of  the  most  heated  debates  regarding  indigenous  human  rights  in  Sápmi:  the  movement  for  
recognition  of  the  Coastal  Sápmi.  Data  selection  is  no  straightforward  task  in  the  ethnically  
heterogeneous  Barents  Coast  region. 
 Regarding  sea  salmon  fisheries  in  Deanuvuotna,  the  selected  sub-case  within  Case  II,  my  
research  indicates  a  number  of  issues  that  we  remain  collectively  ignorant  about.  Firstly,  some  
ecological  questions  posed  by  fjord  fishers  remain  under-researched,  and  it  is  perhaps  possible  for  
fishery  scientists  to  be  a  little  too  pragmatic  with  standards  of  reliability  when  this  is  not  being  
policed  by  influential  interest  groups.  Second,  some  old  theories  in  history  and  anthropology  were  
falsified  several  decades  ago,  but  are  still  being  misused  by  state  agencies  that  are  against  
indigenous  rights.  Those  are  issues  where  we  can  apply  the  main  mechanism  that  will  be  observed  
regarding  the  sub-case:  in  some  cases  “resources  decide”,  also  regarding  research  agendas  and  
scientific  standards  (see  11.6.2  below).. 
 When  science  itself  is  a  means  of  contention,  it  is  no  straightforward  task  to  suggest  issues  
for  further  research.  Every  suggestion  is  bound  to  be  contentious,  and  this  relates  to  profound  
political  struggles.  The  conflicts  include  class  struggle  between  industrial  fisheries  and  local  fisher-
peasants,  and  additionally,  several  ethnic  minorities-witin-the-minority.  With  such  profound  
asymmetries  of  power,  we  have  no  guarantee  that  progress  in  research  will  serve  progress  in  
democratization.  What  issues  are  too  sensitive?  Everyday  forms  of  peasant  resistance  may  be  too  
sensitive,  but  also  sensitive,  and  in  a  manner  that  makes  it  more  difficult  to  access,  are  informal  ties  
among  elites,  especially  when  such  ties  are  not  quite  legal.  Who  owns  the  information?  
Corporations  buy  themselves  patents,  while  international  norms  on  indigenous  self-determination  
state  that  the  local  knowledge  of  indigenous  peoples  belongs  to  the  local  communities  themselves.  
For  example,  if  one  publicizes  traditional  lore  on  good  fishing  locations,  one  might  facilitate  
resource  grabbing.  Who  funds  or  commissions  the  research?  Whose  question  is  being  investigated?  
Whose  is  the  authority  to  monitor  the  reliability  of  scientific  methods? 
 It  is  no  secret  that  my  research  aims  at  obtaining  reliable  evidence  of  relevance  for  the  
 468  
 
policies  and  strategies  of  the  environmental  justice  movements,  including  the  indigenous  human  
rights  movement.  I  will  try  to  estimate  the  residuals  in  the  sub-case  within  Case  II  by  trying  to  
observe  the  limits  of  my  own  observations,  and  the  limits  of  the  research  to  which  I  am  attempting  
to  contribute.  However,  when  suggesting  issues  for  further  research,  I  will  also  suggest  how  such  
research  should  be  organized;;  whose  questions  and  whose  information  it  should  deal  with.  In  
estimating  the  residuals,  I  identify  six  issues  (a-f)  that  remain  under-researched  in  the  sub-case.  
Consequently,  I  will  suggest  six  issues  (a-f)  for  further  research. 
Estimating  the  residuals  regarding  Deanuvuotna  fisheries:  Several  issues  remain  under-
researched  in  the  sub-case  within  my  Case  II  (Chapters  10  and  11).  Some  such  residuals  I  can  
observe  in  the  previously  published  research  on  relevant  topics.  Other  such  residuals  I  can  observe  
in  my  own  particular  contribution  to  this  research,  in  spite  of  my  own  deliberate  effort  to  overcome  
biases.   
a)  The  sub-case  describes  some  repertoires  of  entrepreneurship  and  resistance,  in  the  
political,  economic  and  semiotic  domains,  but  it  does  not  address  how  widespread  these  action  
repertoires  are,  neither  in  Deanuvuotna,  nor  in  the  Deatnu  and  Alta  water  areas,  nor,  indeed,  beyond.  
The  usual  way  to  test  the  internal  validity  of  ethnographies  regarding  any  defined  “community”  is  
to  replicate  the  fieldwork  within  the  same  bounded  “community”.  As  with  all  fieldwork,  
ethnographic  or  biological,  my  selection  of  information  was  partly  arbitrary,  and  partly  problem-
driven.  The  definition  of  system  boundaries  was  equally  so.  Additionally,  it  is  misleading  to  see  
social-scientific  explanations  in  isolation  from  their  actual  interdependency  with  their  natural  
environment.  I  am  not  the  most  knowledgable  ethnographer  on  the  Deatnu  and  Deanuvuotna  areas.  
It  is  up  to  further  research,  by  myself  or  by  more  competent  colleagues,  to  further  test  or  develop  
the  mechanisms  I  have  suggested. 
 b)  The  sub-case  addresses  ambiguous  adaptations  of  Sámi  culture  to  state  culture,  but  the  
study  does  not  address  the  symmetrical  issue:  How  are  “state  praxes”  such  as  administrative  
procedure  or  policing,  done  in  heterogenous  ways,  developing  ambiguous  adaptations  of  the  state  
to  indigenous  political  culture?  Norwegian  folklorists  and  ethnologists  have  taken  an  interest  in  the  
heterogeneities  of  nation-building  ever  since  the  age  when  these  disciplines  themselves  contributed  
to  that  project.  The  anthropological  CULCOM  project  revisited  Norwegian  nation  building,  and  
discovered  actual  cultural  complexities,  both  past  and  present.  Similarly,  the  political  scientists  
Neumann  and  Sending  have  discovered  some  actual  political  complexities.1059  Neumann  even  
succeeded  in  gaining  access  to  do  ethnographic  fieldwork  among  diplomats.1060  More  particular  
empirical  research  on  the  micro  level  might  perhaps  reveal  that  the  “host”  states  are  no  less  
                                                 
1059  Neumann  &  Sending  2010 
1060  Neumann  2008 
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heterogeneous  than  the  indigenous  political  culture  in  Sápmi.  When  I  attended  conflict  mediation  
training  in  Deatnu  in  2007,  local  youngsters  complained  that  the  new  sheriff  (lensmann)  did  not  
know  local  customs,  and  that  he  therefore  policed  the  law  on  snowmobile  traffic  
(motorferdselsloven)  in  the  wrong  way.  Similarly,  the  local  sheriff  during  the  Alta-dam  conflict  may  
have  shown  great  sensitivity  to  actual  legal  pluralism  when  he  was  accused  of  being  to  hesitant  too  
take  action  against  civil  disobedients.  Those  examples  illustrate  how  actual  political  complexity  
may  manifest  itself  (or  be  performed)  in  particular  action  situations.  Maybe  the  everyday  choices  of  
local  sheriffs  (lensmenn)  can  be  one  particularly  fruitful  topic  of  investigation  for  legal  and  political  
anthropology. 
 c)  The  sub-case  addresses  struggles  to  define  hegemony  and  set  the  agenda  within  the  “host”  
state,  but  the  study  does  not  trace  such  political  struggles  within  the  indigenous  kinship-  and  
affinity  network,  where  internal  political  struggles  might  also  take  place.  I  have  suggested  that  when  
the  literature  has  proven  the  continuous  existence  of  legal  pluralism  and  jurisdictional  pluralism1061  
and  when  political  anthropologists  no  longer  assume  that  systems  are  closed,1062  then  the  
implication  is  that  there  exists  a  form  of  actual  political  complexity  between  the  not-quite-
consolidated  state  system,  and  the  not-quite-extinguished  siida  system.  I  have  suggested  some  
possible  stochastic  mechanisms,  whereby  the  more  ancient  order  is  being  maintained  through  
ambiguous  adaptations,  but  I  have  not  attemped  to  investigate  internal  struggles  to  define  
hegemonies  or  set  agendas  within  internal  politics  of  the  verdde  society.  Such  political  science  on  
Sámi  political  culture  could  easily  backfire,  because  the  information  would  be  misused  by  the  more  
powerful  party  in  asymmetrical  conflicts.  Evans-Pritchard  studied  the  famous  Semitic  tribal  norm  
“my  brothers  and  me  against  my  cousin,  my  cousin  and  me  against  the  foreigners”,1063  but  Gellner,  
observing  daily  life  in  Kabylia,  suggested  that  actual  practice  may  be  better  described  as  “the  
stranger  and  I  against  the  whole  lot  of  my  horse-thieving  relatives”.1064  This  is  all  the  more  urgent  
when  “the  stranger”  is  an  ethnographer  funded  by  a  colonial  state,  and  this  is  the  very  context  that  
Evans-Pritchard  defined  away.  One  may  wonder  if  what  he  called  “segmentary  lineages”  actually  
reflects  what  the  stranger  observes  when  participating  in  a  process  of  divide  et  impera.  I,  as  an  
observer,  belong  to  a  state-building  nation,  without  also  belonging  to  the  stateless  nation  that  was  
subjugated  to  its  internal  colonization.  Therefore,  I  am  not  in  the  appropriate  position  in  relation  to  
the  Sámi  society  that  might  have  allowed  me  to  make  inquiries  concerning  contentious  internal  
affairs,  without  doing  harm.  If  any  political  science  at  all  should  be  undertaken  on  the  internal  
hegemonic  struggles  in  the  verdde  society,  I  think  the  research  should  be  commissioned  by  
                                                 
1061  Pedersen  2012 
1062  Nustad  &  Krohn-Hansen  2005 
1063  Evans-Pritchard  1940 
1064  Geller  1969,  cited  in  Geertz  1971 
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indigenous  interest  organizations  and  funded  by  supranational  institutions.  What  I  assessed  that  I  
could  do,  without  doing  harm,  and  also  have  done,  was  to  apply  Elinor  Ostrom’s  tool  box:  
investigating  how  people  may  be  “working  together”  (rather  than  when  they  are  in  conflict),  within  
polycentric  governance  settings  (rather  than  nationalist  host  states). 
 d)  The  sub-case  includes  an  attempt  at  “triangulation”  between  Deanuvuotna  and  Kåfjord,  
but  there  is  no  attempt  at  comparison  between  a  positive  and  a  negative  case  of  Coastal  Sámi  
revival.  I  refrained  from  comparing  Deanuvuotna  with  Alta  Fjord,  where  Sámi  people  find  
themselves  on  each  side  of  the  Stjernøya  case.  Here  I  reproduce  the  same  limitation  as  the  
“canonical”  historical  research  on  the  Coastal  Sámi  revival.  Pedersen  and  Eiþórsson  both  study  
“positive  cases”  where  this  particular  revival  did  occur.  However,  to  develop  the  strategies  and  
policies  of  this  reform  movement,  it  may  also  be  useful  to  compare  with  “negative  cases”,  where  the  
Coastal  Sámi  cause  has  not  –  thus  far  –  won  broad  support.  I  suggest  that  the  indigenous  human  
rights  movement  should  reclaim  the  research  on  cultural  heterogeneity.  Strangely,  some  state  
agencies  use  the  proof  of  cultural  heterogeneity  as  an  argument  against  the  indigenous  rights  
movement  –  as  if  cultural  heterogeneity  supported  the  myth  about  a  homogeneous  citizenry  under  
the  state  formation.  Historically,  it  was  Norwegian  nationalism  that  established  monoculturalist  
utopian  policies,  in  spite  of  actual  cultural  pluralism.1065  Thus,  so-called  “cultural  essentialism”  was  
not  established  by  the  Sámi  activists,  but  on  the  contrary,  they  started  the  effort  to  overcome  
Norwegian  essentialism.  Perhaps  an  appropriate  continuation  could  be  if  the  organic  intellectuals  of  
the  Coastal  Sámi  cause  can  develop  the  mechanisms  whereby  they  maight  converge  with  the  
mobilization  for  Kvän  rights,  and  avoid  that  the  latter  will  have  to  ally  with  anti-Sámi  Norwegian  or  
Finnish  nationalists. 
 e)  The  sub-case  follows  Sámi  economic  and  political  entrepreneurs,  but  it  remains  ignorant  
of  the  situation  for  the  Kväns  in  Deanuvuotna.  Some  claim  that  they  should  be  regarded  as  
descendants  of  colonial  settlers  in  Sápmi;;  others  argue  that  they  belong  to  the  indigenous  peoples  of  
Sápmi.  The  historical  research  on  that  issue  remains  scarce,  so  the  ignorance  in  my  study  merely  
reproduces  collective  ignorance.  I  have  also  been  incapable  of  tracing  the  history  of  another  kin  
group  who  clearly  are  the  descendants  of  subaltern  settlers:  people  in  Tverrdalen  on  the  Alta  Fjord,  
who  migrated  from  Østerdalen  in  Southern  Norway.1066  If  we  apply  the  perspective  of  postcolonial  
and  subaltern  history,  it  would  be  interesting  to  find  out  if  the  latter  group  had  been  subjugated  to  
some  sort  of  internal  colonization  in  Østerdalen,  like  the  Kväns  in  Kvänland. 
 f)  The  sub-case  addresses  the  practical  context  of  scientific  research,  through  a  close  
dialogue  with  anthropology  (Gro  Ween)  and  a  more  distanced  dialogue  with  biology  (Kjell-Magne  
                                                 
1065  Jensen  2013 
1066  Horgen & Norddølum 1978, a fieldwork report published by Norwegian Ministry of the Environment (1978a) 
 471  
 
Johnsen),  but  it  would  be  beyond  the  limits  of  my  competence  to  contribute  to  the  knowledge  about  
fishery  biology,  what  Elinor  Osrom  would  call  the  “resource  system”  within  Deanuvuotna  and  
Deatnu,  as  two  parly  entangled  SESs.  I  can  merely  study  its  political-economic  context,  and  
indicate  how  different  options  for  biological  researchers  may  be  relevant  for  different  policy  
agendas.  Nevertheless,  my  sub-case  indicates  that  the  establishment  of  such  an  epistemic  
community  might  be  crucial  in  order  to  enable  a  further  increase  in  the  reliability  and  validity  of  
biological  monitoring  in  the  Deanuvuotna  and  Deatnu.  The  potential  of  a  transnational  epistemic  
community  for  indigenous  fisheries  may  imply  the  potential  for  increased  reliability  and  validity  of  
fishery  biology  in  Deanuvuotna  and  Deatnu.  Experience  shows  that  reliability  and  validity  were  
already  increased  when  the  Finnish  Ministry  of  Forestry  contested  the  estimates  provided  by  the  
Norwegian  Ministry  of  the  Environment.  The  latter  ministry  had  relied  on  catch  statistics,  but  inter-
governmental  diplomacy  led  to  the  establishment  of  a  biological  field  research  station  in  Utsjoki.1067  
The  cause  in  that  case  was  competition  between  two  state  governments,  and  what  each  of  those  
accepts  as  its  own  “national”  common  interest.  Similarly,  my  Chapter  9  has  shown  that  the  
reliability  of  biodiversity  monitoring  is  further  increased  as  a  result  of  the  EU  Commission  having  
been  involved,  through  the  EU-WFD.  The  reason  for  this  has  to  do  with  the  relative  independence  
of  EU  institutions  from  Norwegian  and  Finnish  national  economic  interests.  Thus,  relative  progress  
has  been  made  towards  a  decrease  in  collective  ignorance  with  regard  to  the  biology  of  a  common  
fish  resource.  However,  the  research  hypotheses  proposed  by  subaltern  interest  organizations  
remain  under-researched.  The  local  fishers  are  even  more  eager  than  the  Finnish  government  to  
question  the  reliability  of  catch  statistics  as  an  indicator  of  the  size  of  the  fish  stock.  Local  
fishermen  are  not  lying  when  thay  say  that  fishermen  always  lie  about  the  size  of  catch  –  that  
question  always  is  a  trade  secret.  The  local  fishermen  observe  that  seals  in  Deanuvuotna  eat  lots  of  
salmon  when  those  are  swimming  into  the  Deatnu  River.  They  claim  that  there  is  a  correlation  
between  years  with  many  seals  and  fewer  salmons.  Environmentalists  see  seals  as  cute,  and  the  
issue  remains  under-researched.  The  local  fishermen  also  ask  for  estimates  regarding  the  salmon  
catch  in  the  deep  sea.  Many  locals  suspect  that  most  of  the  stock  is  caught  by  international  trawlers  
as  well  as  large  Norwegian  and  Russian  vessels.  However,  the  life  and  death  of  migrating  Deatnu  
salmon  remains  under-researched.  Such  questions  would  be  of  urgent  relevance  for  the  newly  
developed  environmental  policy  of  the  Norwegian  and  Finnish  Sámi  parliaments.  The  policy  is  
based  on  the  Biodiversity  Convention  of  the  UN,  combined  with  indigenous  rights  in  ICESCR  and  
ILO  169.  Thus,  for  international  norms,  the  bio-scientific  research  agenda  pursued  by  the  Sámi  
parliaments  is  no  less  relevant  than  those  pursued  by  the  state  governments  or  the  EU.  However,  in  
                                                 
1067  Ween  in  prep. 
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the  international  negotiations  concerning  the  Deatnu  fishery  management,  the  two  Sámi  parliaments  
cannot  constitute  an  autonomous  bloc,  because  they  are  bound  to  be  loyal  to  each  of  the  state-
appointed  negotiating  commissions.  Therefore,  it  is  likely  that  fishery  biology  in  Deanuvuotna  and  
Deatnu  will  remain  ignorant  of  certain  biological  issues,  until  the  emerging  transnational  epistemic  
community  for  indigenous  fisheries  gains  the  political  weight  to  counter  particular  nation-state  
interests,  and  thus,  open  up  for  further  development  of  reliability  and  validity. 
 Suggestions  for  further  research  regarding  the  Deanuvuotna  fisheries:  Following  my  
discussion  of  biases  at  the  end  of  sub-case  3,  the  four  following  research  agendas  were  suggested: 
 a)  Further  ethnographic  research  on  Deatnu  and  Deanuvuotna,  by  myself  or  by  colleagues  
who  have  more  experience  with  this  particular  area,  could  either  falsify  the  mechanisms  and  action  
repertoires  I  have  suggested,  or  further  specify  their  formulation.  Replication  of  field  study  is  the  
usual  way  to  test  the  internal  validity  of  ethnographic  fieldwork,  since  all  fieldwork,  both  
ethnographic  and  biological,  must  rely  on  arbitrary  observation,  complex  causality,  and  problem-
driven  system  boundaries. 
 b)  Political  anthropology  of  the  host  state  would  be  relevant,  especially  if  uncovering  the  
actual  political  and  cultural  complexity  within  the  process  of  state  formation  and  nation-building.  It  
was  probably  a  bad  idea  to  quell  the  funds  to  folklorists  and  ethnologists  after  they  were  no  longer  
instrumental  to  nation-building.  They  can  be  publicly  useful  for  the  ongoing  rebuilding  of  the  nation  
as  well.  The  macro-research  undertaken  by  Thomas  Hylland  Eriksen  and  Iver  B.  Neumann  should  
be  translated  into  more  microsociological  studies  on  particular  action  situations,  for  example  on  the  
everyday  choices  of  local  sheriffs  (lensmenn)  who  serve  Sámi  communities. 
 c)  Political  science  on  local  verdde  politics  may  or  may  not  be  relevant.  The  application  of  
the  SES  and  IAD  frameworks  might  be  useful  for  all  implicated  parties,  in  order  to  investigate  how  
people  solve  commemorative  action  problems  in  particular  action  situations  within  polycentric  
governance  environments.  More  problematic  are  studies  of  internal  conflicts  to  define  hegemony  
and  set  agendas  within  verdde  politics.  Because  «segmentary  lineages»  may  be  what  the  stranger  
observes  when  participating  in  «divide  et  impera»,  such  research  is  likely  to  be  instrumentalised  by  
host  states  during  asymmetrical  political  conflicts  with  the  objects  of  study.  Perhaps  the  safest  way  
to  research  political  conflicts  within  the  non-state  in  Sápmi  would  be  if  the  research  were  funded  by  
supranational  institutions  and  commissioned  by  the  Nordic  Sámiráđđi,  maybe  in  collaboration  with  
the  Norwegian  Kvän  association. 
 d)  Research  on  Deanuvuotna,  and  other  “positive  cases”  of  the  Coastal  Sámi  rebellion  might  
be  compared  with  Kåfjord,  and  other  “negative  cases”,  where  the  indigenous  revival  took  other  
forms,  or  did  not  take  place  at  all.  Thus,  the  movement  for  indigenous  human  rights  may  identify  
some  possible  mechanisms  that  may  lead  local  subalterns  to  be  recruited  to  the  cause  or  alienated  
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from  it.  Such  knowledge  could  be  useful  for  developing  policies  and  strategies  for  convergence  and  
joint  resistance,  between  various  subaltern  kinship  groups  along  the  Barents  Coast,  and  attracting  
hearts  and  minds  from  the  anti-Sámi  reaction  among  Norwegian  and  Finnish  nationalists,  and  for  
the  purposes  of  bolstering  bolster  aginst  the  possibility  of  neocolonial  devide  et  impera. 
 e)  Research  on  Deanuvuotna  and  Alta  Fjord  could  potentially  gain  from  applying  the  
approach  of  postcolonial  and  subaltern  history  to  investigating  kin  groups  that,  rightfully  or  not,  are  
being  framed  as  descendants  of  colonial  settlers.  More  research  is  needed  on  incoming  migration  
from  Kvänland,  and  how  that  relates  to  the  history  of  internal  colonization  in  Kvänland  and  
Deanuvuotna.  The  same  question  could  be  researched  regarding  the  descendants  of  Eastern  Samis  
who  were  forced  to  seek  refugee  in  Northern  Sámi  lands.  It  is  a  contentious  question  whether  Kväns  
should  be  considered  as  one  of  the  “indigenous»  peoples  of  Sápmi”.  (That  means,  belonging  to  the  
area  previous  to  the  establishment  of  the  state  power  under  which  they  would  be  marginalized.)  
This  question  remains  under-researched.  More  research  is  also  needed  on  the  Norwegian  settlers  in  
Tverrdalen  in  Alta  Fjord,  who  probably  originated  from  subaltern  peasant-workers  in  Østerdalen.  
For  indigenous  peoples  in  the  Americas,  the  poorest  settler  communities  may  potentially  be  allies,  
or  may  potentially  be  recruited  to  do  the  dirty  jobs  for  land  grabbers.  More  empirical  knowledge  
about  non-indigenous  subaltern  settlers  in  Sápmi  may  be  useful  to  develop  strategies  and  policies  
for  joint  resistance  and  to  bolster  communities  against  divide  et  impera. 
 f)  For  bio-scientific  monitoring  in  Deanuvuotna  and  Deatnu  to  gain  further  reliability  and  
validity,  and  in  order  to  manage  the  common  fisheries  resources  in  accordance  with  international  
norms,  it  would  probably  be  necessary  to  establish  a  strong  transnational  epistemic  community  for  
indigenous  fishery  research.  Thus,  the  two  Sámi  parliaments  could  potentially  succeed  in  setting  the  
research  agenda  regarding  certain  under-researched  issues,  and  to  demand  further  quality  proofing  
of  certain  indicators,  the  reliability  of  which  remains  contested.  That  would  be  similar  to  how  the  
diplomatic  deliberation  between  the  Norwegian  and  Finnish  ministries,  as  well  as  the  third-party  
monitoring  from  the  EU  Commission  regarding  the  EU-WFD,  have  contributed  to  increased  
reliability  and  conseptual  validity  in  environmental  monitoring  systems.  By  negotiating  between  
various  vested  interests,  each  with  its  own  research  interest,  one  might  obtain  knowledge  about  the  
various  research  questions  of  importance  for  sustainable  management  of  the  common  natural  
resources.  In  the  absence  of  politically  autonomous  environmental  science,  biases  may  be  decreased  
when  further  interest  groups  empower  themselves  to  set  the  research  agenda,  and  to  sanction  slack  
application  of  scientific  norms.  The  potential  transnational  epistemic  community  for  indigenous  
fishery  science,  similarly  to  the  emergence  of  NASCO,  may  be  a  further  contribution  to  overcoming  
the  bias  of  perceived  “national  interests”  in  environmental  science,  monitoring  and  management.  
Therefore,  the  potential  transnational  epistemic  community  for  indigenous  fishery  science,  like  the  
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NASCO  before  it,  would  enable  further  development  of  reliability  and  conceptual  validity  within  
the  environmental  sciences. 
 
 
11.6.2  Positive  findings:  two  meso-mechanisms,  one  macro-mechanism 
Case  II  has  been  divided  into  three  chapters.  Only  now,  at  the  end  of  the  third  and  last  of  these,  will  
suggest  some  hypothetical  explanatory  mechanisms.  I  have  let  the  reader  wait  through  three  
chapters,  but  now  as  many  as  three  hypothetical  mechanisms  will  be  suggested.   
(1)  One  mechanism  I  call  “arguments  matter,  but  resources  decide”,  or  in  short,  simply,  
“resources  decide”.  This  describes  all  the  experiences  with  political  and  social  entrepreneurship,  
observed  throughout  Chapters  10  and  11.  This  is  a  mechanism  at  the  level  of  micro-meso  links,  and  
it  is  complimentary  with  the  earlier  observed  meso-mechanisms:  “the  struggle  to  define  present  
hegemony”  (Chapter  6)  and  “the  struggle  for  future  agenda-setting”  (Chapter  7).  They  all  deal  with  
network  twinning  aimed  at  broadening  the  scope  of  action.  However,  the  mechanism  “resources  
decide”  also  includes  small  business  entrepreneurship,  something  I  did  not  address  with  the  two  
other  mentioned  meso-mechanism.   
(2)  Another  mechanism  I  call  “ambiguous  adaptations”.  This  also  is  a  mechanism  at  the  level  
of  micro-meso  links.  However,  this  time,  the  focus  is  not  on  state  politics,  nor  is  it  on  the  regional  
innovation  networks,  nor  the  transnational  epistemic  communities  that  are  regulated  by  state  laws.  
Instead  it  addresses  the  complexities,  ambiguities  and  even  tensions  that  may  be  found  in  the  de  
facto  legal  pluralism  in  areas  where  Sápmi  and  Norway  overlap.  Local  longstanding  customs  and  
traditional  knowledge  sometimes  may  be  codified,  criminalized,  or  simply  ignored  by  state  laws.   
(3)  The  third  mechanism  is  called  “maintaining  parallel  order”.  This  mechanism  is  tightly  
related  to  the  previously  mentioned  mechanism,  “ambiguous  adaptations”,  but  now  the  focus  turns  
from  micro-meso  links  to  meso-macro  formations.  “Maintaining  parallel  order”  is  a  macro-
mechanism,  and  as  such,  it  is  complimentary  to  the  mechanism  that  was  suggested  in  the  
geographical  overview,  “ecological  adaptation  of  state”.  Thus,  the  present  chapter  ends  the  
empirical  part  by  revising  the  general  explanation  that  was  provided  at  the  beginning  of  the  
empirical  part  (Chapter  5). 
 
1)  Resources  decide:  Case  II,  zooming  in  on  fjord  fisheries  in  Deanudat,  also  exemplifies  an  
instance  of  a  pathway  similar  to  those  traced  in  Case  I  and  the  geographical  bridge.  The  previously  
observed  meso-mechanisms  both  refer  to  potentially  constituent  collective  actions  aimed  at  
changing  the  constituted  opportunity  structure:  “the  struggle  to  define  present  hegemony”  (Chapter  
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6)  and  “the  struggle  for  future  agenda-setting”  (Chapter  7).  Such  efforts  have  also  been  observed  in  
Case  II,  both  in  the  form  of  political  entrepreneurship  (Chapter  10)  and  social  entrepreneurship  
(Chapter  11).  However,  in  Case  II  there  are  not  yet  any  examples  of  the  “success  stories”  that  were  
observed  in  Case  I  and  in  the  geographical  bridge.  In  Deanuvuotna,  a  fjord  in  Coastal  Sápmi,  
political  and  social  entrepreneurs  have  indeed  mobilized  resources  and  frames,  and  combined  those  
in  clever  ways.  However,  the  hegemonic  political  class  within  the  state  formation  still  denies  that  
indigenous  human  rights  are  relevant  in  Coastal  Sápmi.  In  Case  II,  my  argument  has  been  that  such  
rights  do  in  fact  apply  to  Deanuvuotna,  and  probably  to  other  areas  in  Coastal  Sápmi  as  well.  I  have  
claimed  that  sufficient  proof  exists,  with  the  report  from  the  Coastal  Fisheries  Commission,  as  well  
as  other  research.  My  own  political  science,  political  sociology  and  political  anthropology  provide  
only  add  a  few  more  facts  to  the  already  solid  collection  of  proofs.  This  is  how  I  have  described  the  
state  of  the  art  in  the  Coatal  Sámi  struggle  for  rights  and  proofs.  I  have  argued  that  sufficient  rights  
and  proofs  have  indeed  been  mobilized,  but  that  they  are  still  being  denied  by  the  state.  Therefore,  it  
appears  that  rights  and  proofs  are  not  sufficient.  The  preliminary  outcome  of  the  conflict  has  not  
been  decided  by  truth,  and  not  by  right,  but  simply  by  the  power  of  capital.  Arguments  matter,  but  
resources  decide. 
 
Table  11-5:  One  meso-mechanism  observed  in  Chapter  11. 
Resources  decide  (meso  mechanism,  Case  II) 
i.  failure  to  shape  policy,  confront  myths,  police  scientific  reliability,  when  competing  with  big  biz 
ii.  divergent  technical  and  strategic  framings  among  fishery  organizations  (big  vs  small  business) 
iii.  unequal  capacity  to  counter  benefits  of  less  costing  monitoring  system  (big  vs  small  business) 
 
 Path  i):  Political  and  social  entrepreneurs  in  Deanuvuotna  are  mobilizing  resources  and  
framings,  building  issue  networks  and  innovation  networks.  They  have  been  twinning  those  
networks  through  cooperative  action  with  peers  in  other  fjords.  They  have  twinned  their  networks  
with  some  of  the  already  constituted  policy  networks  and  economic  networks  within  the  corporatist  
state.  All  these  are  processes  similar  to  what  I  observed  in  Case  I  and  in  the  geographical  bridge.  
Similarly  to  those  examples,  Case  II  also  shows  a  struggle  “to  define  the  present  hegemony”  and  
“for  future  agenda-setting”,  with  regard  to  policy  making  as  well  as  scientific  inquiry.  However,  in  
addition,  Case  II  also  made  inquiries  regarding  similar  processes  in  (constituent)  small  business  
entrepreneurship,  embedded  in  (constituted)  regional  innovation  clusters.  Coastal  Sámi  mobilize  
resources  and  frames  to  change  their  stakes  under  three  “modern”  institutions:  bureaucratic  states,  
epistemic  sciences,  and  capitalist  markets.  Even  though  they  have  mobilized  scientific  proof,  they  
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have  (thus  far)  failed  to  confront  the  state’s  politically  biased  research  priorities  and  its  continued  
use  of  colonial  myths.  Even  though  they  have  mobilized  collective  human  rights  (namely,  the  
ICCPRI  and  the  CESCR),  they  have  (thus  far)  failed  to  garter  acceptance  for  those  in  state  law.  
Even  though  they  have  pooled  enough  financial  and  political  capital  to  build  a  fish  receiving  facility  
for  locally  based  fishers  in  the  fjord,  they  have  (thus  far)  failed  to  compete  with  corporate  industrial  
fisheries,  wich  grab  local  resources  with  mobile  gear,  and  enjoy  direct  access  to  law  makers  in  the  
Russian  and  Norwegian  political  entities.  Those  three  failures  are  tightly  intertwined.  The  case  
study  indicates  that  anthropological  proof  is  being  ignored  when  it  is  in  conflict  with  certain  
influential  economic  interests.  It  also  indicates  that  bio-scientific  monitoring  practices  lack  
scientific  autonomy  from  the  same  influential  economic  interests,  while  the  subaltern  economic  
interests  have  not  yet  been  capable  of  funding  their  own  bio-scientific  expertise.  Finally,  and  as  a  
consequence  of  the  two  mentioned  observations,  the  ruling  policy  makers  in  the  state  transformation  
deny  (the  fact)  that  local  longstanding  customs  count  according  to  the  ICCPR/ICESCR,  and  they  
similarly  deny  (the  fact)  that  local  traditional  knowledge  counts  according  to  the  UN  Biodiversity  
Convention.  Summa  summarum,  the  official  stance  of  the  state  is  still  that  Coastal  Sámi  culture  in  
Coastal  Sápmi  disappeared  during  the  period  of  forced  assimilation.  Thus,  the  state  continues  to  
silence  and  suppress  the  actual  indigenous  culture  in  Coastal  Sápmi.  This  case  study  suggests  that  
successful  mobilization  of  rights  and  proofs  is  not  sufficient,  when  the  indigenous  struggle  has  to  
confront  corporate  private  capitalists  who  have  succeeded  in  defining  their  particularistic  individual  
profit  as  beneficial  for  GDP,  and  thus,  for  the  particularistic  national(ist)  interest  of  the  state.  In  this  
case,  the  indigenous  rights  struggle  confronts  persistent  colonial  resource  grabbing,  and  thus,  
successful  mobilization  of  rights  and  proofs  has  not  been  sufficient.  The  power  of  epistemic  truth  
and  human  rights  is  (thus  far)  beaten  by  the  power  of  corporate  capital  (i). 
 Path  ii):  Since  the  struggle  for  scientific  reliability  and  against  cultural  myths  is  so  central  to  
this  process,  it  is  obviously  relevant  to  regard  the  function  of  the  collectively  unknown,  explanans  2.  
First,  regarding  the  causal  interaction  between  Explanans  1  (the  socio-ecological  environment),  and  
Explanans  2  (the  collectively  unknown),  there  is  an  obvious  discrepancy  between  the  various  
descriptions  of  reality  presented  by  the  competing  fishery  interest  organizations.  This,  in  part,  may  
be  explained  as  a  series  of  rhetorical  priorities,  concerning  what  realities  are  strategic  to  emphasize.  
However,  the  same  differences  may  also,  in  part,  be  explained  by  the  different  technical  and  
ecological  specificities  of  fjord  fisheries,  coastal  fisheries  and  trawler  capitalism,  leading  to  different  
empirical  experiences  of  practical  reality,  and  thus,  to  the  evolution  of  different  forms  of  local  
knowledge  and  ignorance  (ii). 
 Path  iii):  Regarding  the  impact  of  the  collectively  unknown  (Explanans  2),  on  state-certified  
sciences  (Explanandum),  we  also  find  divergent  forms  of  knowledge  and  ignorance,  but  this  does  
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not  mean  that  all  competing  truths  are  equally  true.  Regarding  cultural  knowledge,  the  ministries  
that  are  politically  opposed  to  indigenous  rights  for  the  coastal  population  continue  to  select  social  
scientists  that  have  no  training  in  anthropology  or  history,  and  who  continue  to  use  some  specific  
cultural  “theories”  that  all  cultural  sciences  consider  as  falsified,  and  therefore  as  myths.  Regarding  
biological  knowledge,  one  must  rely  on  indicators,  because  it  is  impossible  to  know  everything  
about  an  ecosystem,  and  therefore,  there  is  a  trade-off  between  cost  and  benefit  regarding  how  
much  data  to  gather.  Some  fisheries  organizations  have  the  capacity  to  give  state  agencies  a  hard  
time  if  those  organizations  see  that  agencies  are  relaxing  the  reliability  of  monitoring  with  regard  to  
causal  links  that  the  interest  organizations  see  as  relevant.  The  national  organization  for  industrial  
fisheries  has  a  large  degree  of  influence.  The  national  organization  for  sports  anglers  also  has  much  
influence.  Finnish  and  Russian  national  agencies  further  the  interests  of  particular  interest  
organizations  in  inter-state  negotiations.  Least  influential  are  the  interest  organizations  for  small-
scale  fjord  and  coast  fisheries,  and  also,  for  Coastal  Sámi  indigenous  human  rights.  Those  are  the  
organizations  that  have  not  succeeded  in  policing  the  reliability  of  bio-scientific  monitoring,  and  
that  have  not  succeeded  in  confronting  the  persistent  use  of  already  falsified  cultural  “theories”  (iii). 
 In  sum,  the  whole  process  so  far  appears  to  have  been  decided  by  resources.  Capital  is  the  
main  asset  of  the  national  interest  organization  for  industrial  fisheries.  The  financial  profit  of  
corporate  industrial  fisheries  is  in  direct  conflict  with  the  subaltern  and  sustainable  local  fjord-
fisheries.  However,  sports  angling  poses  no  threat  to  industrial  fisheries.  Additionally,  social  status  
and  cultural  ties  are  the  main  assets  of  the  Norwegian  national  angler’s  association.  Nature  
conservationists  and  sports  anglers  have  succeeded  in  establishing  a  limited  space  for  themselves  
within  state  policy,  as  long  as  they  refrain  from  confronting  their  real  adversary:  industrial  fisheries,  
as  well  as  the  oil  and  gas  industry.  On  the  Finnish  side,  the  sports  anglers’  association  organizes  
more  subaltern  interests  from  all  over  the  Finnish  territory.  They  compete  and  cooperate  with  the  
Norwegian  sports  anglers’  association.  On  the  Russian  side,  the  industrial  fisheries  are  equally  well  
established  as  on  the  Norwegian  side.  They  compete  with  Norwegian  industrial  fisheries.  Among  
the  local  Sámi  population  in  Deatnu,  several  of  the  small-scale  traditional  fisheries  have  gained  
some  recognition  by  states.  The  traditional  form  of  angling,  oaggun,  has  gained  recognition  via  the  
Finnmark  Act.  Traditional  net  fishing  in  the  river  was  accommodated  (or  co-opted)  already  over  a  
century  ago,  while  the  traditional  tourist  industry,  mainly  attracting  angling  tourists,  has  been  
accommodated  (or  co-opted)  by  Finnish  district  politics.  There  are  many  conflicts  that  remain  
unresolved  in  the  Deatnu  water  area,  but  the  Coastal  Sámi  fjord  fisheries  appear  to  me  as  being  the  
most  marginalized  of  all  the  marginalized  subaltern  interests.  In  the  competition  to  define  the  actual  
hegemony,  and  the  competition  for  future  agenda  setting,  the  most  dominant  fisheries  are  the  
corporate  industrial  fisheries  in  Norway  and  Russia,  which  combine  the  power  of  money  (financial  
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capital)  with  the  power  of  lobbying  (political  capital).  The  second  most  influential  category  seem  to  
be  the  national  angling  organizations  in  Norway  and  Finland,  which  actually  represent  quite  
different  socio-economic  interests  (the  one  more  bourgeois,  the  other  more  subaltern),  but  both  
organizations  enjoy  relatively  good  access  to  the  lobby  (political  capital)  and  some  symbolic  
prestige  in  official  nation-building  (cultural  capital).  As  long  as  the  Finnish  and  Norwegian  angling  
interests  refrain  from  confronting  the  Russian  and  Norwegian  industrial  fisheries,  they  may  
dominate  over  more  subaltern  interests.  Thus,  they  constitute  a  political  bloc  against  traditional  
small-scale  and  Sámi  fisheries.  While  the  traditional  small-scale  and  Sámi  fisheries  have  
successfully  mobilized  rights  and  proofs,  this  has  not  been  sufficient  to  challenge  the  political  bloc.  
Thus  far,  the  process  has  not  been  decided  by  the  power  of  the  better  argument,  but  by  a  coalition  of  
resourceful  actors.  The  most  important  resource  seems  to  be  financial  capital,  with  political  capital  
as  second,  and  cultural  capital  as  the  third  most  important  resource.  When  the  outcome  of  the  
process  (so  far)  has  been  determined  by  resources  rather  than  argument,  then  it  resembles  Rokkan’s  
much-cited  phrase  “votes  count,  but  resources  decide”.  In  this  case  I  have  not  studied  voting,  but  
other  forms  of  democratic  participation,  through  political  and  social  entrepreneurship.  Deliberative  
democracy  is  not  entirely  powerless,  just  as  voting  is  not  entirely  powerless:  Arguments  matter,  but  
resources  decide. 
 
Table  11-6:  Another  meso-mechanism  observed  in  Chapter  11 
Ambiguous  adaptations  (meso  mechanism,  Cases  I  and  II) 
i.  ambiguous  adaptations  of  local  customs  and  lore  to  state-codified  law  and  science 
ii.  divergent  practical  realities  with  different  socio-material  locations  (in  bureaucracy,  landscape) 
iii.  divergent  research  &  teaching  priorities  within  disciplines  (bio  indicators,  hist  syllabus) 
 
2)  Ambiguous  adaptations:  Case  I,  the  geographical  bridge,  and  Case  II  included  some  empirical  
data  that  were  difficult  to  analyse  and  interpret.  It  was  hard  to  find  coding  categories  that  fitted  in  
order  to  describe  the  observations  (etic  terms),  without  leaving  a  feeling  that  I  somehow  
disrespected  the  self-understanding  among  local  people  (emic  terms). 
 At  the  end  of  Chapter  6,  I  discussed  this  issue  under  “positive  findings”,  but  without  
drawing  any  conclusions.  I  came  onto  the  track  of  the  non-state  when  I  realized  that  ethnographic  
research  from  the  Alta-dam  watershed  during  the  time  of  the  dam  conflict  indicated  the  presence  of  
what  I  called  a  “local  human  ecology”,  a  well-integrated  system,  which  was  defended  against  an  
intrusive  state.  This  fitted  badly  with  the  Post-Marxist  concepts  I  tried  to  use  to  make  sense  of  the  
struggle  for  definitional  power.  Laclau  and  Mouffe,  as  well  as  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  all  refer  to  
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realities  where  the  capitalist  state  is  seen  as  an  old  and  well-established  order,  while  labor  
organizing  practices  are  seen  as  a  potential  parallel  power.  However,  in  upstream  parts  of  the  Alta-
Kautokeino  River,  the  state  is  the  more  recent  system,  while  the  human  ecology  of  reindeer  
husbandry  is  the  older  one.  These  empirical  observations  would  make  more  sense  theoretically  
when  I  got  to  know  Elinor  Ostrom’s  Social-Ecological  Systems  (SES)  framework. 
 One  constant  thread  through  Chapter  11  has  been  the  question  of  how  to  categorize  some  
selected  samples  of  local  practices  where  there  appears  to  be  some  degree  of  contradiction  between  
state  norms  on  the  one  hand,  and  local  longstanding  customs  and  traditional  knowledge  on  the  
other.  What  puzzled  me  was  that  local  people  appeared  to  understand  their  own  actions  as  
conformist  even  when  they  did  not  conform  to  state  norms  (emic  terms).  When  I  tried  to  describe  
samples  of  such  actions,  I  mobilized  terms  I  had  learned  from  my  own  trajectory  through  political  
science  and  practice,  such  as  “non-violent  direct  action”  or  “anti-politics”  (etic  terms).1068  However,  
such  a  representation  of  the  others  became  ethically  questionable  for  me,  because  of  the  gap  
between  the  ethnographer’s  terminology  of  radicalism  and  the  fisher-peasant’s  terminology  of  
conformism.  I  had  to  avoid  projecting  my  own  radical  agenda  onto  the  intentions  of  those  whose  
voices  I  tried  to  represent.  In  any  event,  I  have  stumbled  upon  very  few  samples  of  behaviour  where  
there  is  evident  tension  between  state  norms  and  local  norms.  In  most  situations  I  observed,  there  
appeared  to  be  a  general  agreement  about  whatever  actions  are  actually  allowed,  forbidden,  or  
obligatory.  In  other  situations  I  observed  practices  that  are  regulated  by  local  customs,  but  which  
state  legislators  ignore  or  do  not  care  about.  This  is  the  case  for  some  local  subsistence  practices  and  
reciprocity  systems,  which  might  be  the  contemporary  remnants  of  the  ancient  siida  system.  
However,  in  a  few  situations  I  had  stumbled  upon  samples  of  behaviour  that  appeared  to  be  in  
tension  with  state  norms,  while  still  being  understood  as  conformist  actions  in  their  local  context  of  
local  customs  and  lore.  I  suggested  that  there  are  two  slightly  different  ways  to  interpret  such  
praxes.  One  option  is  to  use  James  Scott’s  term  “everyday  forms  of  peasant  resistance”,  something  
suggested  by  the  anthropologist  Bjørn  Bjerkli.  Another  option  is  to  use  Gene  Sharp’s  term  “social  
resistance”.  I  suggested  that  the  choice  of  term  should  depend  on  how  we  accept  to  describe  the  
practical  normative  context,  the  de  facto  constituted  legal  order.  The  Norwegian  Ministry  of  
Fisheries  has  published  two  conflicting  reports  on  this  matter:  the  Ørebech  Report,  which  found  
indigenous  culture  to  have  disappeared  in  Coastal  Sápmi,  and  the  report  from  the  Coastal  Fisheries  
Commission,  which  claimed  that  indigenous  customs  and  lore  had  been  continuously  maintained  
and  developed  “behind  closed  doors”,  so  to  speak.  If  the  former  report  is  less  misleading,  then  it  
implies  that  the  de  facto  constituted  legal  order  only  consists  of  state  law.  However,  if  the  latter  
                                                 
1068  Greaeber  2009;;  Katsiaficas  2006 
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report  is  less  misleading,  then  it  indicates  that  the  de  facto  constitutional  order  is  in  fact  pluralistic,  
even  whenever  this  is  being  denied  by  the  (colonial)  state.  If  the  former  is  the  case,  then  we  might  
observe  “everyday  forms  of  peasant  resistance”  against  a  hegemonic  capitalist  state,  drawing  an  
analogy  to  what  James  Scott  observed  in  Lowland  Southeast  Asia.  However,  if,  instead,  the  latter  is  
the  case,  then  we  might  rather  observe  “social  defence”,  similarly  to  the  social  reproduction  of  a  
parallel  social  order  that  James  Scott  found  in  Highland  Southeast  Asia.  Coastal  Sápmi  is  the  
lowland,  Inner  Sápmi  is  the  highland,  but  it  may  still  be  possible  that  de  facto  legal  pluralism  might  
have  been  continuously  maintained  and  developed  as  a  consequence  of  social  defence. 
 In  many  action  situations,  both  norm  systems  prescribe  the  same  action.  In  some  action  
situations,  actors  may  be  confronted  with  the  dilemma  of  being  lawful  either  vis-á-vis  the  state  law  
or  vis-á-vis  local  customs.  Since  I  have  come  across  few  samples  of  actual  situations  of  normative  
ambiguity,  I  will  resort  to  theory  when  explaining  the  mechanism.  Useful  theoretical  tools  are  
offered  by  the  reports  from  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission:  Its  perspective  is  rather  social-ecological.  
Therefore,  we  may  talk  about  a  mechanism  of  ambiguous  adaptations,  in  the  co-evolution  between  
the  practices  of  the  indigenous  non-state  and  the  practices  of  the  host  state.  What  regards  this  co-
evolution  most  directly,  is  the  environmentally  situated  adaptation  of  local  customs  and  lore  to  state-
codified  laws  and  science.  Since  vital  culture  is  seldom  static,  there  is  always  some  degree  of  
adaptation  or  learning  going  on,  within  the  reproduction  of  traditional  customs  and  lore.  The  
environmental  situation  includes  state  policies,  such  as  accommodation  or  suppression,  but  also  a  
host  of  other  variables. 
 Path  i):  In  some  environments,  it  may  have  been  functional  for  the  bearers  of  local  culture  to  
accept  state  norms,  maybe  even  trying  to  leave  the  indigenous  culture  behind.  In  other  
environments,  it  may  have  been  functional  to  ignore  state  norms,  and  just  go  on  as  before.  In  some  
environments,  it  may  even  have  been  a  survival  strategy  to  resist  the  attempted  criminalization  of  
ancient  customs  or  lore,  by  maintaining  and  developing  those  discretely,  serving  a  function  that  
Gene  Sharp  would  call  “social  defence”.  Such  a  variety  of  environmental  conditions  may  cause  
ambiguous  adaptations  to  the  host  state  (i). 
 This  process  not  only  involves  customs  and  norms,  but  also  science  and  lore.  Those  paths  I  
will  explain  as  I  did  with  regard  to  the  mechanism  called  “the  struggle  for  agenda-setting”. 
 Path  ii):  Between  Explanans  1  and  Explanans  2,  one  may  find  divergent  practical  realities,  
according  to  the  socio-material  location  in  bureaucratic  nodes  or  in  operational  situations  (ii). 
 Path  iii):  Between  Explanans  2  and  Explanandum,  one  may  find  divergent  priorities  for  
scientific  research,  as  well  as  for  school  syllabi,  that  may  contribute  to  the  accumulation  of  
knowledge  regarding  some  issues,  but  may  maintain  ignorance  regarding  others  (iii). 
 In  those  particular  environmental  situations  where  ambiguous  adaptations  may  function  as  
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“social  defence”,  it  may  sometimes  be  a  functional  survival  strategy  to  keep  the  action  discreet,  
away  from  public  eyes.  That  is  often  the  case  with  “everyday  forms  of  peasant  resistance”,  and  the  
maintenance  of  autonomous  stateless  societies.1069  However,  if  the  attempt  to  consolidate  a  
colonizing  state  becomes  intrusive  enough,  it  may  be  more  functional  to  go  public,  and  to  let  the  
resistance  become  known.  For  good  or  bad,  this  thesis  contributes  to  the  latter. 
 
Table  11-7:  A  macro-mechanism  observed  in  Chapter  11 
Maintaining  parallel  order  (macro  mechanism) 
i.  parallel  order  (re)produced,  collective  learning  of  lore  &  norms  in  local  traditional  subsistence 
ii.  divergent  (or  bridged)  practical  experiences  in  up-  and  downstream  areas 
iii.  parallel  systems  of  local  knowledge  (metis)  in  relation  to  scientific  knowledge  (episteme) 
 
3)  Maintaining  parallel  order  is  a  mechanism  at  the  macro  level.  It  refers  to  the  ways  in  which  the  
indigenous  people  of  Sápmi  “preserve  and  develop  its  own  language,  culture  and  way  of  life”.  This  
definition  uses  the  words  of  paragraph  110a  in  the  Norwegian  constitution,  which  was  added  with  a  
constitutional  amendment  in  1988,  and  which  prescribes  that  that  the  host  state  is  responsible  for  
creating  the  conditions  for  such  practices.1070  I  prefer  to  use  the  wider  term  “indigenous  people  of  
Sápmi”  rather  than  “the  Sámi”  because  we  cannot  yet  know  what  the  struggle  for  rights  and  proofs  
amongst  Kväns  and  Lappalainen  might  lead  to.  Nevertheless,  I  have  chosen  to  describe  the  second  
macro-mechanism  on  the  basis  of  paragraph  110a  of  the  constitution  of  the  Norwegian  state.  This  is  
because  it  is  necessary  to  be  clear  that  this  parallel  order  is  not  illegal.  The  paragraph  also  uses  the  
precise  expression  “preserve  and  develop”,  which  indicates  that  vital  culture  is  not  static,  but  is  
consists  of  various  customs  that  are  continuously  maintained  in  changing  environments,  and  
therefore  also  continuously  adapted  to  the  changes  in  the  environment.  The  right  to  indigenous  
culture  is  not  only  a  right  to  be  backward  looking,  but  also  a  right  to  self-determined  socio-
economic  development. 
 In  sum,  the  macro-mechanism  “maintaining  parallel  order”  functions  in  a  way  that  is  rather  
similar  to  the  macro-mechanism  “the  progressive  or  ecological  adaptation  of  the  state”:  Both  
mechanisms  refer  to  processes  of  socio-ecological  emergence.  Thus,  just  as  I  sketched  a  general  
macro-mechanism  for  the  transformation  of  the  state  (Explanandum),  I  also  sketch  a  general  
mechanism  for  the  reproduction  of  the  non-state,  another  historical-geographical  formation  within  
the  wider  socio-ecological  environment  (Explanans  1). 
                                                 
1069  Scott  1985,  2006 
1070  Norwegian  Parliament  2013  (For  the  Norwegian  Constitution  in  English,  see:  http://www.stortinget.no/en/In-
English/About-the-Storting/The-Constitution/The-Constitution/  last  retrieved  3.  May  2014.  This  has  now  been  
revised,  28.  May  2014.) 
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 However,  with  regard  to  the  reproduction  of  the  non-state,  unlike  the  transformation  of  the  
state,  I  do  not  have  data  that  allow  me  to  trace  more  particular  processes.  Chapters  6-11  can  all  be  
seen  as  an  effort  to  unpack  and  specify  some  of  the  many  particular  causal  pathways  (at  micro-meso  
level)  that  were  generalized  away  in  Chapter  5,  where  I  black-boxed  the  “ecological  adaptation  of  
state”  (at  macro  level).  This  is  a  study  of  state  transformation.  Therefore  I  do  not  go  into  detail  
regarding  the  continuous  maintenance  and  development  of  Sápmi  culture.  However,  in  order  to  get  
a  realistic  explanation  of  state  transformation  in  areas  where  Norway  and  Sápmi  overlap,  we  should  
not  ignore  the  actual  co-evolution  between  the  two  systems,  the  de  facto  legal  pluralism  since  times  
immemorial.  Still,  if  I  do  not  unpack  the  “maintenance  of  parallel  order”,  like  I  did  with  the  
“ecological  adaptation  of  the  state”,  how  can  we  know  the  inner  workings  of  the  former  macro  
mechanism?  The  findings  of  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission  indicate  that  the  traditional  cultural  
praxes  of  Sápmi  are  being  maintained  and  developed  through  subsistence  practices,  involving  not  
only  the  population  of  each  locality  in  Sápmi,  but  also  the  natural  resources  of  those  localities.1071  
The  natural  resources  of  Sápmi  constitute  “the  natural  basis  of  the  Sámi  culture”.  This  is  one  
component  of  indigenous  territorial  rights,  but  another  component  of  that  right  is  that  explicitly  
racist  policies  to  the  Sámi1072  and  explicitly  colonialist  administration  of  Sápmi1073  produced  a  clear  
boundary  between  Scandinavian  and  Sámi  culture,  through  systematic  ethic  discrimination  in  
public,  combined  with  systematic  social  defence  in  private.1074  Such  gaps  between  actual  ethnic  
discrimination  and  claimed  universal  rights  for  each  citizen  are  the  reason  why  collective  human  
rights  were  seen  as  as  a  necessary  specification  of  international  human  rights  law.  The  
ICCPR/ICESCR  prescribe  freedom  from  colonial  resource  grabbing  and  freedom  from  racist  
discrimination.  The  Norwegian  Sámi  Rights  Commission  publicized  new  proofs  regarding  the  legal  
history  of  Inner  Sápmi.  When  longstanding  customs  and  traditional  knowledge  have  been  
continuously  maintained  and  developed,  regardless  of  whether  these  have  been  codified,  
criminalized  or  ignored  by  the  states,  then  this  implies  a  continuous  situation  of  de  facto  legal  
pluralism,  regardless  of  state  builders  having  attempted  to  claim  a  de  jure  unity  of  jurisprudence.  In  
some  areas  and  periods,  the  pluralism  has  been  a  friction-less  coexistence.  In  other  areas  and  
periods,  the  explicitly  racist  and  explicitly  colonialist  policies  from  ethnocentric  state  builders  have  
produced  everyday  social  resistance,  or  rather  everyday  social  defence  among  the  suppressed  ethnic  
group.  I  think  we  have  rather  certain  historical  and  anthropological  knowledge  about  such  processes  
being  at  play  in  upstream  Deatnu,  which  is  in  Inner  Sápmi.  However,  I  also  think  that  there  are  
strong  indications  that  similar  processes  have  taken  place  in  downstream  Deatnu,  which  is  located  
                                                 
1071  NOU  1997:  4 
1072  Skorgen  2002 
1073  Pedersen  1999 
1074  Jensen  2013 
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in  Coastal  Sápmi.  The  conflicting  interpretations  regarding  this  area  are  brougnth  into  relief  by  the  
two  conflicting  reports  published  by  the  Norwegian  Ministry  of  Fisheries.  If  the  report  from  the  
Coastal  Fisheries  Commission  is  the  more  correct  (or  less  misleading)  of  the  two,  then  this  implies  
that  there  has  always  been  a  de  facto  situation  of  legal  pluralism  in  Coastal  Sápmi,  similar  to  the  
situation  in  Inner  Sápmi.  However,  if,  instead,  the  Ørebech  Report  is  the  more  correct  (or  less  
misleading)  of  the  two,  then  this  means  that  the  indigenous  culture  in  Coastal  Sápmi  has  been  so  
totally  suppressed  that  it  does  not  exist  anymore.  That  would  imply  that  the  state  is  the  one  and  only  
de  facto  source  of  laws  in  Coastal  Sápmi.  There  are  two  reasons  why  I  believe  that  the  Ørebech  
Rport  is  the  less  correct  and  the  Coastal  Fisheries  Commission’s  report  the  less  misleading  of  the  
two.  The  first  reason  is  that  many  ethnographers,  including  myself,  have  observed  the  continuous  
presence  of  a  subsistence  and  reciprocity  economy  that  remains  invisible  for  the  monetarist  
indicators  used  in  fisheries  research,  but  which  clearly  reproduces  patterns  that  have  been  observed  
in  the  old  verdde-  and  kinship  network,  and  before  that,  in  the  ancient  siida  system.  When  such  
practices  are  found  in  thoroughly  “Norwegianized”  communities,  such  as  Båtsfjord,  then  it  should  
be  logical  to  take  it  as  a  proof  of  the  persistence  of  Sámi  cultural  praxes.  Those  are  the  practices  that  
are  regulated  according  to  the  longstanding  customs  and  traditional  knowledge  in  Sápmi,  but  remain  
ignored  by,  and  free  from,  intrusive  state  laws.  The  other  reason  why  I  think  we  should  reject  the  
Ørebech  Report  is  that  newer  studies  of  political  anthropology  suggest  that  phenomena  that  
anthropologists  knew  as  “conflict  avoidance”  and  “dwelling  landscapes”,  at  the  social  front  stage,  
should  be  better  understood  as  “everyday  resistance”  and  “landscapes  of  resistance”,  if  we  turn  to  
the  social  back  stage.1075  My  own  humble  contribution  is  to  push  further  in  the  turn  from  economic  
anthropology  to  political  anthropology,  a  turn  which  was  started  by  Bjerkli.  Thus  I  suggest  that  the  
contemporary,  ethnically  mixed  verdde  society  is  the  remnant  of  the  ancient,  also  ethnically  mixed,  
siida  system.  Consequently,  I  suggest  that  what  Bjerkli  called  “everyday  resistance”  might  actually  
be  even  better  described  with  the  term  “social  defence”,  and  what  he  called  “landscapes  of  
resistance”  might  in  fact  be  even  more  precisely  described  as  “terrains  of  non-violent  defence”.  The  
siida  system  never  fully  disappeared,  while  the  state  system  never  was  fully  consolidated.  They  
both  co-evolved,  within  a  de  facto  pluralistic  constituted  legal  order. 
 Path  i):  With  the  selected  causal  model,  I  have  set  out  to  explain  state  transformation.  Thus,  
the  purpose  of  the  study  is  not  to  explain  the  maintenance  of  Sámi  customary  laws.  Therefore,  state  
transformation  is  Explanandum.  However,  the  continuous  maintenance  of  Sámi  customary  law  is  
one  of  the  components  within  Explanans  1.  This  also  fits  with  my  use  of  the  SES  framework.  
Explanandum  equals  formal  rules  within  the  governance  system  within  a  social-ecological  system.  
                                                 
1075  Bjerkeli  2000;;  Bjerkeli  2010;;  Ingold  1986;;  Ingold  1995;;  Paine  1969 
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Explanans  1  equals  all  other  parts  of  the  social-ecological  system,  everything  that  appears  as  
“environment”  when  the  formal  rules  are  being  defined  as  a  “system”.  This  environment  includes  
the  entire  resource  system,  but  also  the  informal  rules  of  the  actual  governance  system.  “Informal  
rules”  is  a  wide  category,  encompassing  everything  from  customary  international  law,  to  
constitutional  practices  in  the  state,  to  lobbying  and  corruption,  to  longstanding  customs  amongst  
peasants  in  Norwegian  cultural  core  ares,  to  the  indigenous  customary  laws  in  areas  where  Norway  
and  Sápmi  overlap.  The  latter  is  clearly  part  of  the  contemporary  remnants  of  the  ancient  siida  
system.  However,  customs  in  an  apparently  totally  “Norwegianized”  village,  such  as  Båtsfjord  may  
also  be  defined  within  the  contemporary  remnants  of  the  ancient  siida  system.  The  internal  
dynamics  of  the  siida  system  /  verdde  society  is  a  story  that  I  have  not  inquired  about  here.  
However,  it  is  one  complex  dynamic  system  within  Explanans  1,  and  thus,  it  has  an  indirect  impact  
on  Explanandum,  state  transformation.  The  state  is  a  complex  dynamic  system  that  co-evolves  with  
various  other  complex  dynamic  systems,  and  one  of  those  systems  is  indigenous  customary  law  in  
Sápmi.  In  some  particular  areas  and  periods,  the  two  systems  have  been  brought  into  resonance.  In  
some  other  particular  areas  and  periods,  explicitly  racist  and  explicitly  colonialist  state  politics  
produced  a  response  in  the  form  of  covert  or  open  social  defence,  and  terrains  of  non-violent  
defence.  Strictly  speaking,  those  were  not  terrains  of  hegemony  and  resistance,  but  terrains  of  
colonisation  and  defence.  This  is  because  the  state  system  was  never  fully  consolidated,  while  the  
siida  system  never  fully  disappeared.  The  main  effect  on  Explanandum  is  the  continuous  existence  
of  a  parallel  order,  which  is  older  than  the  state,  which  is  (re)produced  in  relative  autonomy  from  
the  state,  and  where  norms  are  policed  and  defended  with  social  sanctions,  not  by  coercive  force.  
The  siida  system  that  never  fully  disappeared  is  continuously  maintained  and  developed  through  
collective  learning  of  local  lore  and  norms  during  traditional  subsistence  practices  and  practices  of  
reciprocity  (i). 
 Path  iii):  There  is  an  even  more  indirect  influence  from  Explanans  1  on  Explanandum,  via  
Explanans  2,  collective  ignorance.  The  parallel  order  in  Sápmi  has  never  been  totally  ignored  by  
state-certified  sciences,  even  though  the  knowledge  disciplines  have  changed.  State-certified  
scientists  are  not  always  capable  of  observing  local  practical  realities,  nor  of  identifying  what  
research  questions  or  analytical  terms  might  be  relevant  in  a  local  context.  For  me,  it  has  been  a  
challenge  to  analyse  historical  and  ethnographic  data,  because  academic  coding  categories  (etic  
terms)  may  skew  local  practical  realities  (emic  terms).  I  have  also  heard  fishers  along  the  Deatnu  
River  and  Fjord  complain  that  fishery  biologists  lack  data  about  questions  that  concern  local  fishers,  
such  as:  How  much  of  the  local  salmon  stock  is  caught  by  local  seals  or  by  trawlers  in  the  ocean?  It  
is  not  easy  for  science  to  address  the  limits  of  its  own  capacity.  With  fancy  academic  terms,  we  may  
say  that  what  remains  unknown  to  épisteme  (scientific  knowledge)  may  differ  from  what  is  
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unknown  to  métis  (local  knowledge),  and  thus,  science  may  ignore  practical  realities  that  are  
addressed  by  local  lore  (iii). 
 Path  ii):  That  is  not  to  say  that  local  lore  necessarily  has  to  be  less  ignorant  than  science.  
Indeed  the  anthropological  reports  I  read  for  the  Alta-dam  case  study  indicate  that  during  that  
conflict,  the  practical  reality  among  fishers  in  the  Alta  fjord  may  have  differed  strongly  from  the  
practical  reality  among  reindeer  owners  in  upstream  areas.  Thus,  different  local  environments  may  
imply  different  practical  realities,  and  divergent  local  lores  (ii). 
 Those  two  pathways  of  ignorance  (iii  and  ii)  do  interact.  With  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission,  
state-certified  épisteme  became  less  ignorant  of  the  métis  among  Sámi  at  the  plateau,  but  it  is  open  
for  discussion  if  they  have  become  any  more  receptive  of  the  métis  and  practical  realities  in  
downstream  areas,  in  Coastal  Sápmi. 
 In  sum,  the  mechanism  called  “maintaining  parallel  order”  explains  paths  i,  ii  and  iii  in  a  
way  which  indicates  a  continuous  co-evolution  between  state-certified  nature  management,  my  
Explanadum,  and  a  parallel  indigenous  human  ecology,  one  component  of  my  Explanans  1.  The  
macro-mechanism  “maintenance  of  parallel  order”  indicates  that,  in  territories  where  Sápmi  and  
Norway  overlap,  the  earlier  observed  macro-mechanism  “the  progressive  adaptation  of  the  state”  
co-evolves  with  indigenous  customary  law,  in  a  de  facto  situation  of  legal  pluralism.  The  explicitly  
racist  and  colonialist  policies  of  nationalist  nation-builders  never  succeeded  in  destroying  
indigenous  customary  law,  but  only  in  provoking  social  resistance,  and  in  institutionalizing  a  socio-
cultural  boundary  between  Scandinavian  and  Sámi,  colonizing  nations  and  colonized  indigenous  
peoples.  The  social-ecological  perspective  used  by  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission  and  the  Coastal  
Fisheries  Commission  has  affinities  with  the  SES  framework  coined  by  Elinor  Ostrom.  SES  
scholars  address  institutinal  change  as  “organizational  learning”  on  multiple  spatial  and  temporal  
scales,  within  pluricentric  social-ecological  systems.1076  Explanandum,  state  transformation,  is  one  
complex  dynamic  system  within  the  wider  social-ecological  system.  Explanandum  consists  of  
formal  rules,  but  that  is  only  one  component  of  actual  governance  of  natural  resources.  It  co-
evolves  with  resource  systems,  which  may  be  best  explained  in  terms  of  evolutionary  ecology.  It  
also  co-evolves  with  various  systems  of  informal  rules  in  the  actual  governance  of  natural  
resources.  One  such  informal  rule  system  consists  of  indigenous  law  and  indigenous  lore  in  Sápmi.  
This,  and  other  systems  of  informal  rules,  may  be  best  explained  in  terms  of  social  (re)production,  
also  called  cultural  learning,  the  kind  of  process  that  has  been  theorized  by  Giddens  and  Bourdieu.  
Each  of  the  particular  meso-mechanisms  that  were  identified  in  this  research  may  be  seen  as  ways  
of  specifying  the  co-evolution  between  Norwegian  state  transformation  and  Sámi  indigenous  law.  
                                                 
1076  McGinnis  &  Ostrom  2012 
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One  form  of  social  defence  is  found  in  “ambiguous  adaptations”.  This  is  a  defensive  form  of  social  
defence.  It  appears  to  me  that  evasion  of  state  power  has  been  a  preferred  tactic  in  Sámi  political  
culture,  as  also  in  Mahgreb  or  Zomia.1077  Another  form  of  social  defence  is  found  in  the  “struggle  to  
define  the  actual  hegemonic  norms”  for  policy  and  research  in  the  state,  the  “struggle  to  set  the  
agenda  for  future  policy  and  research”  in  the  state,  also  in  cases  when  “arguments  matter,  but  
resources  decide”.  All  these  mechanisms  describe  what  happens  when  issue  nets  aspire  for  
constituent  power  within  the  already  constituted  state.  Active  engagement  with  state  politics  is  a  
relatively  recent  component  in  Sámi  political  culture.  It  appears  to  me  that  modern  infrastructure  
development,  such  as  the  Alta-dam,  led  to  consolidation  of  the  presence  of  the  state  in  Sápmi.  Thus,  
it  was  no  longer  possible  to  flee  from  the  colonial  power,  and  instead  it  became  necessary  to  turn  
around  and  to  engage  with  it.  Sámi  political  entrepreneurs  were  the  sons  and  daughters  of  
shamanistic  noaidi,  and  their  offensive  form  of  social  defence  was  to  fundamentally  transform  the  
states  that  had  colonized  them. 
 
Legal  and  ethical  afterthought:  Gaining  access  to  observe  these  dilemma  situations  is  no  
straightforward  task,  and  that  is  perfectly  legitimate.  The  dominant  political  class  still  deny  the  
existence  of  indigenous  human  rights  in  Coastal  Sápmi,  but  the  monopoly  of  definitional  power  
within  the  public  sphere  has  been  unsettled  after  the  Norwegian  Ministry  of  Fisheries  itself  
publicized  two  contradictory  reports  on  this  issue.  One  may  disagree  with  my  argument  that  the  
report  from  the  Coastal  Fisheries  Commission  is  more  correct  (or  less  misleading)  than  the  Ørebech  
Report.  In  any  case,  however,  one  cannot  contest  that  local  fisher-peasants  may  be  likely  to  act  in  
good  faith  if  they  assume  that  indigenous  human  rights  actually  do  apply  in  Deanuvuotna,  just  as  
fisheries  bureaucrats  are  likely  to  act  in  good  faith  if  they  assume  that  only  state  law  exists  in  
Coastal  Sápmi.  In  Coastal  Sápmi,  there  has  not  even  been  any  attempt  to  sort  out  whatever  
contradiction  there  might  be  between  ethnocentric  Norwegian  state  law  and  longstanding  Sámi  
customs.  This  in  contrast  to  Inner  Sápmi,  where  at  least  some  territories  experience  such  an  attempt  
with  an  ongoing  political  experiment,  the  Finnmark  Act.  In  my  view,  it  would  be  virtuous  for  the  
scientific  researcher  to  be  careful  with  moral  judgements  of  individuals.  At  the  same  time  I  do  have  
the  conviction  that  indigenous  human  rights  actually  do  apply  in  Deanuvuotna,  and  possibly  in  
other  parts  of  Coastal  Sápmi  too,  even  though  this  is  denied  by  the  hegemonic  political  class  in  the  
state.  Consequently,  I  also  believe  that  both  fishing  quotas  and  local  knowledge,  rights  and  proofs,  
belong  to  the  local  population.  In  fact  I  consider  that  my  own  data  are  the  copyright  of  the  local  
fjord-fishers,  who  have  shared  their  fish  and  data  with  me.  
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12.1.0  Chapter  introduction 
 
Throughout  the  empirical  chapters  5-11,  an  attempt  has  been  made  to  record  some  possible  
observational  biases,  and  some  possible  explanatory  mechanisms.  Those  were  called  negative  and  
positive  findings,  respectively. 
 Negative  findings,  or  recordings  of  possible  observational  biases,  have  been  pursued  as  an  
equivalent  to  the  estimation  of  measurement  error  in  quantitative  methods.  In  this  chapter  I  will  
briefly  recapitulate  the  observed  observational  biases,  under  the  label  “unobserved  facts”.  However,  
I  will  combine  this  recapitulation  with  a  critical  discussion  of  possible  biases  in  my  selected  coding  
categories,  which  I  label  “unexplained  observations”.  This  is  meant  as  an  equivalent  to  what  
quantitative  causal  analysts  do  when  they  engage  in  critical  theoretical  discussions  about  the  
conceptual  validity  of  their  causal  model.  In  sum,  the  negative  findings  will  then  include  problems  
of  reliability  as  well  as  problems  of  conceptual  validity,  which  are  two  different  ways  of  addressing  
the  “residual”  of  potentially  relevant  causal  factors  that  have  been  ignored  in  any  aetiology,  either  in  
the  form  of  quantitative  causal  analysis  or  qualitative  process  tracing. 
 Positive  findings,  or  observations  of  possible  explanatory  mechanisms,  have  comprised  of  a  
pursuit  of  empirically  grounded  explanations  of  ongoing  state  transformation  across  four  decades,  
within  two  water  areas  on  the  Arctic  fringe  of  Europe.  The  explanations  are  supposed  to  be  
“grounded”  in  two  ways.  First,  by  choosing  a  specifically  geographical  approach,  where  systems  or  
structures  are  understood  as  formations  of  empirical,  material  phenomena  distributed  in  empirical,  
material  terrains.  Second,  by  searching  for  mechanisms,  understood  as  precise  descriptions  of  
particular  causal  chains,  which  might  have  potential  transfer  value  for  precise  description  of  other  
particular  causal  chains  as  well.  In  this  chapter  I  will  recapitulate  each  of  the  possible  explanatory  
mechanisms  that  were  suggested  throughout  the  empirical  Chapters  5-11. 
 The  final  critical  assessment  of  the  findings  will  not  be  undertaken  within  the  present  
chapter,  but  will  have  to  wait  until  Chapter  14.  In  the  meantime,  Chapter  13  will  be  spent  on  
discussing  alternative  empirical  explanations,  which  have  been  found  within  another,  parallel  
research  tradition.  Through  my  participatory,  abductive  research  strategy,  I  gradually  came  to  
realize  that  there  were  parallel  traditions  of  empirical  research  regarding  state  transformation  in  
areas  where  Norway  and  Sápmi  overlap:  The  major  tradition  is  affiliated  with  human  rights  policies,  
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and  I  have  operated  within  that  tradition.  The  minor  tradition  appears  to  be  affiliated  with  public  
security  policies.  Those  traditions  were  discussed  in  Chapter  3,  as  the  two  rival  theories:  one  is  
close  to  Elinor  Ostrom's  “new  theory”,  the  other  is  closer  to  the  “old  theory”  that  she  associates  
with  Hobbes  and  Hardin.1078  In  Chapter  13,  I  will  address  findings  from  the  minor  tradition,  close  to  
the  “old  theory”.  In  the  present  chapter,  I  will  summarize  my  own  empirical  findings,  which  have  
been  discovered  by  operating  within  the  major  tradition,  close  to  the  “new  theory”.   
 
 
12.1.1  The  general  causal  model 
This  is  an  empirical  study  of  one  particular  process  of  state  transformation  in  the  High  North.  
However,  the  purpose  is  to  identify  some  possible  causal  patterns  that  might  potentially  have  a  more  
general  transfer  value.  The  purpose  of  tracing  those  causal  paths  is  not  only  descriptive  (as  in  
political  history),  but  also  theoretical  (as  in  political  science).  The  general  causal  model  is  applied  
not  only  to  trace  some  or  the  particular  causal  chains  within  one  particular  process  of  state  
transformation.1079  Additionally,  the  purpose  is  to  suggest  some  possible  explanatory  mechanisms  of  
hypothetical  transfer  value  to  other  case  as  well.1080  The  search  for  possible  explanatory  
mechanisms  has  been  guided  by  the  assumption  of  a  very  general  causal  model: 
 Explanandum:  State  transformation  is  the  phenomenon  I  aim  to  explain;;  what  we  call  
explanandum.  The  explanandum  is  not  state  transformation  in  general  or  abstract  terms,  but  one  
concrete  process  of  state  transformation,  as  it  has  taken  place  over  the  past  four  decades  (1970-
2012)  within  two  selected  watersheds  (Alta  and  Deatnu)  on  the  Arctic  periphery  of  Europe.  The  
study  identifies  some  of  the  particular  causal  chains  that  have  fed  into  the  ongoing  process  of  state  
transformation  within  the  selected  period  and  area. 
 Explanans:  In  order  to  explain  this  phenomenon,  I  will  place  a  focus  on  some  selected  
explanatory  factors  (which  implies  that  I  focus  away  from  other  possible  explanatory  factors).  
Selected  explanatory  factors  are  what  we  call  explanans.  The  main  focus  is  on  the  struggle  for  
rights  and  proofs,  the  pathways  of  prefigurative  satyagraha  and  prefigurative  enlightenment.  Those  
are  labelled  Explanans  1  and  Explanans  2,  respectively.  However,  in  order  to  control  for  the  
potential  bias  of  wishful  thinking,  I  will  also  have  a  look  at  the  (mis)use  of  coercive  force,  the  
pathway  of  prefigurative  war-of-position.  Thus,  an  Explanans  3  will  also  be  taken  into  account. 
 All  casual  models  are  heuristic  devices,  simplifications  of  the  complex  practical  reality.  The  
model  takes  into  account  those  explanatory  factors  that  are  being  defined  as  relevant,  But  exactly  
                                                 
1078 Ostrom, Walker & Gardner 1992 
1079  Carr  1987  (1961) 
1080  Hedström  &  Ylikoski  2010 
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what  factors  are  relevant  or  not  is  open  for  discussion.  The  choice  depends  on  problem  formulation,  
theoretical  and  empirical  interest,  and  ultimately  upon  practical/technical  purposes.  As  the  
epidemiologists  say  it:  the  actual  “web  of  causation”  is  immense.1081  Therefore,  we  can  safely  
assume  that  any  chosen  causal  model  remains  ignorant  of  residual  explanatory  factors  that  exist  in  
practical  reality.  Explanans  N  is  my  generic  label  for  residuals. 
 
Figure  12-1:  The  general  causal  model,  made  to  be  specified  empirically  (Fig.  4-2) 
 
The  explanandum  might  appear  slightly  different,  depending  on  what  explanatory  factor  is  being  
highlighted.  If  we  zoom  in  on  coercive  force  or  military  history  as  an  explanatory  factor,  then  we  
gain  information  mostly  about  the  state  formation  as  a  monopoly  of  violence.  If,  instead,  we  zoom  
in  on  customary  praxes  and  knowledge  praxes,  we  primarily  gain  information  about  the  state  
formation  as  a  body  of  codified  law,  and  as  a  body  of  certified  knowledge.  All  three  may  be  
components  of  a  body  politic,  and  it  may  be  reductionist  to  simply  assume  that  any  one  of  these  
three  components  or  processes  is  more  decisive  than  the  other  two.  I  reject  the  assumption  that  a  
state  formation  is  primarily  a  system  of  coercive  force.  That  is  what  Elinor  Ostrom  called  the  “old  
theory”  about  how  common  pool  problems  are  sorted  out.1082  However,  I  also  reject  the  assumption  
that  it  does  not  matter  at  all.  This  is  in  line  with  Ostrom's  “new  theory”  on  how  common  pool  
problems  are  overcome,  because  she  does  not  pretend  to  possess  any  panacea.1083 
 
 
12.1.2  Multi-scalar  explanations 
Political  and  social  sciences  operate  at  various  analytical  levels.  The  most  particular  level  may  be  
individual  choices  or  face-to-face  interaction,  depending  on  one’s  preferred  explanatory  conceptual  
                                                 
1081  Krieger  1994 
1082 Ostrom, Walker & Gardner 1992 
1083  ibidem;;  Ostrom & Cox 2010 
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framework.  However,  we  also  trace  the  formation  of  practice  networks  at  the  sociological  meso  
level.  Finally,  we  map  how  such  networks  may  constitute  historical-geographical  formations  at  a  
macro  level. 
 Methodologists  in  another  multi-scalar  science,  namely  physiology,  have  suggested  that  
explanatory  mechanisms  can  be  identified  at  various  levels  (e.g.  nerve  signals  at  electron  level,  
chemical  transmitters  at  molecular  level,  and  biological  processes  at  cell  level).1084  Social  scientists  
also  operate  at  multiple  levels:  one  research  project  may  identify  causal  processes  at  one  level,  by  
black-boxing  processes  at  another.1085  There  is  not  necessarily  any  inconsistency  in  this.  Some  
philosophers  of  science,  such  as  Niels  Bohr,  suggest  that  physical,  chemical,  biological  and  
sociological  explanations  can  sometimes  be  complementary,  and  that  it  may  be  impossible  to  reduce  
the  one  to  the  other.1086  Multi-scalar  explanations  are  perfectly  legitimate,  but  only  if  we  are  careful  
about  specifying  what  kind  of  entities  we  are  dealing  with.1087  Some  suggest  that  each  and  every  
mechanisms  should  be  specified  according  to  the  activity  of  that  mechanism,  the  entity  conducting  
the  activity,  the  function  of  the  entity  for  the  process,  the  start-condition  or  input,  and  the  end-
condition  or  output  of  each  mechanism.1088 
 For  each  of  the  possible  mechanisms  observed  in  this  study,  I  have  identified  start-
conditions  and  end-conditions  in  the  form  of  empirical  descriptions.  Evidence  is  provided  in  the  
empirical  chapters  of  this  study.  This  is  an  inductive  moment. 
 The  entities  conducting  the  process  and  the  activities  they  produce  have  been  identified  in  
the  choice  of  coding  categories.  The  common  denominator  is  that  all  the  applied  categories  have  
been  chosen  to  identify  actual  practice  networks  in  various  forms.  Practice  networks,  as  they  unfold  
through  various  locations  in  space  and  time,  constitute  particular  configurations  with  some  
geographical  density  and  scope,  some  historical  density  and  duration.  The  search  for  coding  
categories  can  be  seen  as  a  deductive  moment. 
 The  function  of  each  mechanism  has  been  identified  by  formulating  how  each  of  the  
                                                 
1084  Machamer,  Darden  and  Craver  2000 
1085  Mahoney  2003 
1086  Bohr  1938  argues  that  biological  processes,  when  compared  to  physical  processes,  possess  some  emergent  
properties  that  cannot  be  reduced  to  the  physical  level,  and  similarly,  that  sociological  processes,  when  compared  to  
biological  processes,  possess  emergent  properties  that  cannot  be  reduced  to  biological  properties.  However,  whether  
or  not  socio-ecological  systems  also  possess  emergent  characteristics,  is  a  question  that  Bohr  did  not  ask. 
1087  In  the  present  study,  I  have  sought  to  dissect  the  historical-geographical  macro  formations  into  some  of  their  con-­
stituent  socio-material  practice  networks,  in  accordance  with  the  theory  of  bounded  rationality  (Ostrom  2005;;  
McAdam  2011a;;  Coleman  1990)  as  well  as  the  concept  of  the  actor-network  (Latour  2004;;  Law  &  Singleton  2012),  
and  the  postmodern  Machiavelli  (Althusser  1998,  Althusser  2003,  Deleuze-Guattari  1980:  Chpt.  XII-XIII).  See  parts  
4.3.7  and  12.3.4  for  further  elaboration.  This  way  of  approaching  sociological  macro  phenomena  constitutes  a  break  
with  the  "funding  fathers"  of  sociology.  When  I  studied  sociology  in  the  1990s,  my  teachers  discussed  whether  or  
not  we  find  examples  of  "ecological  fallacy"  in  Durkheim's  and  Weber's  classical  works  of  sucicide  and  protestant  
ethics,  respectively.  My  impression  is  that  these  organic  intellectuals  of  the  World  War  I  could  take  for  granted  a  
shared  assumption  with  their  readership:  that  the  noition  of  national  or  sectarian  Volksgeist  is  no  metaphor,  but  an  
actual  phenomenon.  In  contemporary  time  one  can  hardly  assume  any  such  consensus.   
1088  Machamer,  Darden  and  Craver  2000 
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mechanisms  operate.  This  is  the  sum  of  the  inductive  and  the  deductive  moment:  the  abduction  or  
hypothesis-development.  For  each  of  the  mechanisms  I  have  observed  in  the  empirical  chapters,  the  
function  of  the  mechanism  has  been  defined  according  to  how  it  operates  at  each  of  the  three  
pathways  i,  ii  and  iii  in  the  general  explanatory  model.  Thus,  the  suggested  function  of  each  
mechanism  is  specified  as  in  Table. 
 
Table  12-1  (4-1):  standardised  mould  for  describing  the  effect  of  each  of  the  mechanisms  observed 
Name  of  mechanism  (macro,  meso  or  micro  level) 
i.  effect  on  two-way  causal  link  between  Explanans  1  and  the  Explanandum 
ii.  effect  on  two-way  link  between  Explanans  1  and  Explanans  2  (causal  interaction  between  explanatory  factors) 
iii.  effect  on  two-way  link  between  Explanans  2  and  the  Explanandum 
 
The  identification  of  possible  mechanisms  (abduction)  implies  the  application  of  theoretical  
concepts  in  order  to  explain  empirical  data,  exactly  like  quantitative  causal  analysis1089  and  
historiographical  explanations.1090  In  James  Mahoney's  terms,1091  causal  mechanisms  are  informed  
by  specific  meta-theoretical  approaches.  As  with  causal  analysis  and  historiography,  there  is  no  
guarantee  whatsoever  that  the  applied  causal  model  includes  all  variables  that  would  have  been  
relevant.  Spurious  effects  belong  to  aetiology  like  the  limits  of  knowledge  do  to  knowledge. 
 Therefore,  the  identification  of  mechanisms  not  only  opens  up  some  black  boxes  at  one  
analytical  level,  but  also  closes  some  black  boxes  at  a  more  particular  analytical  level.  
Consequently,  I  must  disagree  with  Mahoney  that  “the  black  box  problem”  is  resolved  when  one  
chooses  a  theoretical  approach.  Instead,  explicit  awareness  of  the  limitations  of  meta-theories  
(together  with  explicit  awareness  of  the  holes  in  the  data)  can  be  used  to  make  rough  estimates  of  




                                                 
1089  Hellevik  1991 
1090  Carr  1987  (1961) 
1091  Mahoney  2000 
1092    This  argument  can  be  related  to  the  state  of  the  art  in  social  movement  research.  In  my  opinion,  a  flaw  with  the  
modern  classic  Dynamics  of  Contention  (Tillay,  Tarrow  &  McAdam  2001)  is  that  it  suggests  a  research  program  for  
causal  mechanisms,  without  discussing  the  role  of  theory  to  formulate  propositions  about  mechanisms.  In  my  opin-­
ion,  this  shows  insufficient  awareness  to  the  dialogue  between  conjectures  and  refutations  (Popper  2002  (1963),  and  
consequently,  the  problem  is  not  that  this  is  a  positivistic  work,  but  that  it  lazily  assumes  an  outdated  form  of  posi-­
tivism.  This  critique  is  harder  to  raise  agianst  the  recent  volume  Spaces  of  Contention  (Nicholls,  Miller  &  Beaumont  
2013),  because  it  provides  an  honest  attempt  to  asses  the  correct  usage  of  theory  (Miller  2013).  (However,  regarding  
the  latter  volume,  some  other  critical  issues  have  been  raised  in  the  journal  Antipode.  See  Halvorsen  2013.) 
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12.2.0  Negative  findings:  some  residual  biases 
 
12.2.1  Negative  findings  from  abductive  research 
Ideographic,  abductive  research  has  challenges  and  limitations  that  are  different  from  those  met  by  
nomothetical,  hypothetical-deductive  methods.  The  constant  iteration  between  the  empirical  and  the  
theoretical  makes  the  choice  of  explanatory  models  more  flexible,  and  more  adaptable  to  changing  
pragmatical  needs.  However,  this  constant  dialogue  also  implies  specific  limitations  to  data  and  
concepts. 
 Now,  I  will  go  through  two  forms  of  residual  bias:  unobserved  facts  and  unexplained  
observations.  The  issue  of  unobserved  facts  is  an  empirical  problem.  This  has  been  discussed  in  
detail  throughout  the  empirical  chapters,  and  below  I  will  offer  a  brief  recapitulation  of  some  of  the  
main  observations. 
 Thereafter,  I  will  proceed  to  the  issue  of  unexplained  observations.  This  is  a  conceptual  
problem.  In  this  regard,  I  will  present  some  of  the  problems  I  have  encountered  in  my  attempt  to  
find  coding  concepts  that  make  sense  with  the  actual  data. 
 Finally,  I  will  sum  up  both  the  unobserved  facts  and  unexplained  observations,  to  discuss  
what  this  may  imply  regarding  the  ongoing  attempt  to  decolonize  political  science  and  practice. 
 
 
12.2.2  Tentative  observation  of  the  residual  of  unobserved  facts 
Data  selection  in  ideographic  research  may  seldom  be  based  on  probabilistic  sampling,  and  thus,  it  
is  impossible  to  conduct  statistical  estimations  of  measurement  error.  While  the  historian  or  
ethnographer  may  discuss  the  reliability  of  particular  sources  of  information,  the  ultimate  test  of  
internal  validity  is  its  replicability.  Their  suggested  explanations  may  be  falsified  or  adjusted  by  
colleagues,  or  competitors,  who  research  the  same  archives  or  the  same  locality.  Historiography  and  
ethnography  are  collective,  cumulative  efforts.  New  research  builds  upon  and  further  develops  old  
research.  However,  while  information  may  accumulate  with  regard  to  some  issues,  there  is  also  a  
path  dependency  with  regard  to  what  issues  remain  under-researched.  Thus,  collective  ignorance  is  
institutionalized  in  the  discipline,  while  every  research  project  provides  one  particular  contribution  
to  a  slight  decrease  in  collective  ignorance.  This  is  what  I  have  tried  to  estimate  as  the  “residual  of  
unobserved  facts”.  In  my  attempt  to  observe  my  own  observational  errors,  I  have  not  been  
interested  in  looking  for  every  possible  form  of  ignorance.  I  have  been  particularly  interested  in  
observing  possible  reproduction  of  some  ideological  biases  of  special  relevance  to  the  ongoing  
decolonization  of  political  science  and  practice.  One  particular  observation  of  my  own  research  is  of  
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special  relevance:  that  is  my  failure  to  overcome  the  biases  inherited  from  colonial  social  science.  
One  is  the  bias  of  naturalized  Norwegian  nationalism,  which  silences  that  the  Nordic  states  in  fact  
still  co-exist  with  another  spatial  order,  sometimes  referred  to  as  Sápmi.  Another  is  the  bias  of  
multicultural  neoliberalism,  which  silences  the  persistent  presence  of  real  class  conflicts.  The  two  
biases  are  closely  linked.  Collective  ignorance  about  the  experiences  of  working  people  and  
indigenous  people  may  not  have  been  reproduced  on  purpose,  but  it  has  been  functional  in  
justifying  resource  grabbing:  colonization  in  the  past,  absent  decolonization  in  the  present.  Those  
are  the  issues  of  interest  for  postcolonial  and  subaltern  studies. 
 Regarding  Case  I,  the  aim  is  to  estimate  what  remains  under-researched,  not  only  in  my  own  
research  project,  but  also  in  what  I  call  the  “canonical”  historiographical  and  ethnographical  
research.  With  regard  to  Case  I,  the  canonical  knowledge  is  the  accumulated  historical  research  on  
the  Alta-dam  conflict.1093  My  own  historical  study  (Chapter  6)  contributes  to  a  slight  decrease  of  our  
collective  ignorance  regarding  the  social  historical  component  of  the  Alta-dam  conflict.  However,  
this  is  not  sufficient  to  overcome  an  inherent  bias  in  the  historiography  of  the  Alta-dam  conflict:  the  
tendency  to  exclude  explanatory  factors  that  are  exogenous  to  the  nation-state  formation  that  was  
hegemonic  in  the  Alta-Kautokeino  watershed.  At  the  end  of  Chapter  7,  several  under-researched  
issues  are  identified.  There,  I  discuss  how  the  research  has  remained  within  the  type  of  limitation  
that  Bauböck  has  characterised  as  “methodological  nationalism  and  statism”.1094  However,  when  
discussing  this  bias  in  the  existing  historiography,  I  also  tried  to  assess  how  my  own  contribution  
has  failed  to  overcome  those  same  limitations.  Thus,  I  suggested  several  topics  for  further  research  
(end  of  Chapter  7). 
 Regarding  Case  II,  the  attempt  has  been  to  estimate  the  limits  of  my  own  research,  and  in  
particular,  how  I  have  not  succeeded  in  my  effort  to  break  out  of  the  limitations  inherited  from  
Norwegian  methodological  nationalism  and  methodological  statism.  This  theme  is  also  the  constant  
thread  throughout  the  discussion  about  unobserved  facts.  At  the  end  of  the  first  part  of  Case  II  
(Chapter  9),  I  discuss  several  residual  biases  regarding  my  attempt  to  break  with  nationalist  biases,  
and  instead,  to  trace  the  emergence  of  bio-regional  management  within  its  actual  bio-regional  
context.  After  that  chapter,  Case  II  zooms  in  on  the  downstream  areas  within  the  Deatnu  water  area,  
dealing  with  small-scale  fisheries  and  indigenous  rights  in  one  of  the  fjords  of  Coastal  Sápmi.  Here  
I  build  on  the  canonical  research  in  history  and  anthropology  about  the  Coastal  Sámi  awakening  and  
the  Coastal  Fisheries  Commission.1095  In  this  research,  the  impact  of  Norwegian  methodological  
nationalism  is  more  subtle.  This  is  something  I  already  addressed  in  Chapter  2.  There  is  high  degree  
                                                 
1093  Dalland  1994;;  Hjorthol  2006 
1094  Bauböck  2008;;  Eriksen  and  Hoëm  1999 
1095  Eiþórsson  2008;;  Pedersen  2012;;  Bjerkli  2000;;  Bjerkli  2010;;  Kramvig  2005;;  Pedersen  and  Høgmo  2012 
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of  cultural  and  ethnic  heterogeneity  in  Deanuvuotna  as  well  as  along  other  parts  of  the  Barents  
Coast.  Some  observers  use  this  fact  as  a  proof  against  indigenous  rights,  but  I  argued  that  they  
ignore  the  new  proof  about  the  actual  colonial  history  of  the  area.  In  Chapter  11,  this  issue  returns,  
especially  in  the  end,  when  I  discuss  the  issue  of  residual  bias  in  the  general  literature  as  well  as  in  
my  own  research.  Many  issues  remain  under-researched  in  the  area,  and  at  the  end  of  Chapter  11,  
some  priorities  for  further  research  are  suggested.  Nevertheless,  I  argue,  the  burden  of  proof  has  to  
be  reversed.  As  the  retired  syndical  leader  Yngve  Hågensen  wrote  in  his  comment  to  Olav  Gunnar  
Ballo:  it  is  not  the  indigenous  rights  activists  that  introduced  racial  discrimination  in  the  region,  but  
on  the  contrary,  the  nationalist  state  builders  that  the  indigenous  people  rebelled  against.1096  
Therefore,  the  rich  ethnic  plurality  of  Coastal  Sápmi  is  a  proof  in  favour  of  indigenous  human  
rights,  not  the  opposite. 
 
 
12.2.3  Tentative  discussion  of  the  residual  of  unexplained  observations 
For  abductive  research,  or  hypothesis  development,  the  explanatory  model  is  not  provided  at  the  
beginning,  but  is  produced  at  the  end.  On  the  one  hand,  the  map  (theory)  is  revised  whenever  it  does  
not  fit  the  terrain  (observations).  On  the  other  hand,  the  gradual  exploration  of  the  terrain  
(observation)  is  guided  by  the  preliminary  map  (theory).  Therefore,  the  abductive  researcher  keeps  
the  discussion  open  about  what  models  to  choose  and  why.  This  is  in  contrast  to  hypothetic-
deductive  research,  or  hypotrhesis  testing,  for  whom  the  choice  of  theory  is  takes  place  before  and  
outside  the  scientific  research  itself.  This  metatheoretical  moment  is  an  integral  part  of  the  research  
process  for  the  abductive  scientist.  The  researcher  does  not  pick  theories  on  an  open  market,  but  
makes  choices  that  are  limited  by  access  to  literature,  educational  background,  and  public  
relevance,  and  that  is  always  open  for  discussion.  This  I  have  tried  to  address  in  terms  of  “residual  
of  unexplained  observations”.  Through  the  abductive  process,  theoretical  concepts  are  continuously  
applied  to  observations,  but  at  the  same  time,  are  also  continuously  revised  to  fit  the  observed  
reality.  Categories  are  applied  during  data  gathering  as  guiding  tools  to  select  bits  of  data  that  might  
potentially  have  theoretical  relevance.  They  are  applied  during  analysis  and  synthesis  as  tools  for  
sorting  and  coding  of  data,  and  comparisons  of  segments  of  data  across  each  coding  cateogry.  
However,  during  this  process,  the  researcher  may  find  that  the  theoretical  concepts  do  not  fit  well  
with  the  actual  data.  Some  theoretical  concepts  may  be  added  or  subtracted  before  returning  to  the  
field,  in  order  to  gather  new  data,  with  new  guiding  concepts.  In  my  research,  I  have  undertaken  
several  iterations,  between  data  gathering  and  academia.  My  historical  research  has  proceeded  
                                                 
1096  Hågensen  2007 
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through  iterations  between  archival  research  on  primary  sources,  and  library  searches  for  relevant  
secondary  sources.  For  my  ethnographic  research,  there  have  been  iterations  between  participant  
observation  in  the  field  and  observant  participation  in  the  academy.  Throughout  the  research  
process,  two  gaps  between  theory  and  data  have  become  increasingly  evident. 
 (a)  One  gap  between  theory  and  data  comes  from  the  discrepancy  between  the  assumed  
practices  of  power  in  the  theories  of  political  science,  and  the  observed  practices  of  power  in  the  
actual  local  human  ecologies  in  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  watersheds,  in  the  past  and  in  the  present.  The  
observations  were  material  traces  (index)  of  a  practical  reality  that  the  observer  had  been  ignorant  
of,  a  parallel  world  hidden  from  my  perceptive  apparatus.  Observation  put  me  on  the  track  (index)  
of  the  indigenous  non-state.  I  will  return  to  this  discovery  below.     
 (b)  Another  gap  between  theory  and  data  has  been  the  discrepancy  between  two  parallel,  but  
separate,  bodies  of  accumulated  empirical  knowledge  regarding  the  chosen  cases.  The  mainstream  
research  tradition,  to  which  my  own  empirical  research  contributes,  has  maintained  its  principal  
focus  on  local  customs  and  lores,  embedded  in  local  human  ecologies.  This  research  has  been  
enabled  by  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission,  which  was  appointed  by  the  Norwegian  political  entity.  
The  side-stream  has  been  more  interested  in  coercive  force  and  state  security.  This  research  is  based  
on  access  to  the  archives  of  the  secret  police  in  the  Norwegian  political  entity.  My  entire  research  
project  belongs  to  the  maintream  tradition,  but  I  have  mobilized  resources  from  the  side-tradition  in  
my  theoretical  discussion,  in  an  attempt  to  control  for  the  possible  bias  of  wishful  thinking. 
 The  empirical  data  used  for  this  study  put  me  on  the  track  of  the  indigenous  non-state.  I  had  
consciously  refrained  from  reading  the  reports  of  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission  before  beginning.  If  
I  had  done  so,  I  would  have  known  that  it  had  already  found  proof  that  local  customs  had  been  
continuously  maintained  and  developed  ever  since  1751,  in  spite  of  the  attempted  criminalization  of  
some  such  customs  from  that  year  onwards.1097  Even  while  ignoring  this  literature,  I  found  that  my  
empirical  data  (index)  fitted  badly  with  my  coding  categories  (metonymy).  Thus,  I  observed  
material  traces  (index)  of  something  I  cound  not  make  sense  of  by  using  the  conventions  I  had  
previously  learned  (metonymy). 
 The  first  traces  of  the  non-state  emerged  when  I  tried  to  analyze  historical  data  for  the  Alta-
dam  case  study,  I  wished  to  include  historical-anthropological  data  about  the  local  communities  
along  the  Alta  River.  In  the  archives,  I  found  one  study  of  highly  assimilated  fisher-peasants  in  the  
downstream  area,  another  study  of  reindeer  nomadism  based  in  areas  upstream  from  the  coast.1098  
Those  studies  dealt  with  local  livelihoods  located  in  particular  environments.  Such  human-
                                                 
1097  Norwegian  Official  Report  1997a  (NOU  1997:4);;  1997b  (NOU  1997:5):  4;;  Norwegian  Official  Report  2007a  (NOU  
2007:13);;  2007b  (NOU  2007:14):  34 
1098  Bjørklund  &  Brantenborg  1981;;  Norwegian  Ministry  of  the  Environment  1978a 
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ecological  information  did  not  fit  too  well  when  I  tried  to  compare  the  two  blocs  in  terms  of  post-
Marxist  constructivism1099  and  Machiavellism.1100  Local  social-ecological  systems  could  not  easily  
be  reduced  to  terms  of  semiotic  power  and  coercive  power.  Instead,  those  data  fitted  the  literature  
about  how  state  formation  (my  Explanandum),  interacts  through  subsistence  practices  with  with  
landscape  geography  (my  Explanans  1).1101  This,  however,  fitted  badly  with  Machiavellian  (or  
post-Marxist)  concepts  of  state  formation.1102  It  became  rather  obvious  that  some  local  cultural  
norms  were  maintained  through  the  interaction  between  subsistence  and  local  natural  environment,  
instead  of  being  enforced  by  arbitrary  coercive  power,  and  instead  of  being  constructed  through  
arbitrary  semiotic  power. 
 Further  traces  of  the  non-state  were  found  when  I  tried  to  code  ethnographic  data  from  the  
Deatnu  River  and  Fjord.  The  problem  was  how  to  apply  concepts  such  as  “civil  society”  or  “sub-
politics”.1103  Most  of  the  subsistence  practices  and  social  entrepreneurship  that  I  observed  dealt  with  
bureaucratic  states  or  capitalist  markets.  However,  there  were  some  instances  of  normative  
ambiguity,  and  maybe  even  normative  discrepancy,  between  state  norms  and  local  customs.  I  tried  
to  code  this  as  “everyday  resistance”  or  even  as  “anti-politics”,1104  but  among  my  few  observations  
of  ambiguity  between  state  norms  and  local  practices,  few  instances  appeared  to  be  directly  
oppositional.  They  were  certainly  not  anti-systemic,  because  they  appeared  to  be  rather  conformist  
in  the  local  setting.  These  mature  traditional  fishermen  would  probably  feel  rather  alienated,  or  even  
instrumentalised,  if  the  young  cultural  radical  (that  is  me),  tried  to  push  their  own  practical  reality  
(emic  view)  into  the  mold  of  radical  green  ideology  (etic  view).  During  my  fieldwork,  local  lawyers  
had  inspired  me  to  have  a  look  at  the  mentioned  reports  from  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission.  I  also  
read  political  science  and  political  anthropology  on  non-coercive  stateless  political  systems.1105  
Some  interviewees  from  the  Nordic  Sámerađđi  and  the  ČSV  movement  were  clear  in  their  stance  
that  the  ancient  tribal  confederacy  never  fully  disappeared.  My  preliminary  conclusion  is  that  those  
voices  expressed  a  practical  reality  in  upstream  Deatnu,  and  that  this  probably  has  transfer  value  to  
describe  less  public,  more  hidden,  more  “occult”  practical  realities  in  downstream  Deatnu  as  well.  
Thus,  in  spite  of  the  language  barrier,  I  think  participant  observation  has  enabled  a  few  glimpes  into  
a  traditional  indigenous  human  ecology  that  is  parallel  to  the  state-certified  nature  management,  but  
hidden  –  or  huldr  as  we  say  in  Norwegian  folklore.1106 
                                                 
1099  Callon  &  Latour  1981;;  Laclau  &  Mouffe  2001  (1985) 
1100  Deleuze  &  Guattari  1980  (their  chapters  XII-XIII  on  state  formation  frequently  refer  to  Althusser) 
1101  Olwig  2002 
1102  Deleuze  &  Guattari  1980:  in  particular  chapter  12 
1103  Beck  1993;;  Beck  1996 
1104  Scott  1995,  Katsiaficas  2006 
1105  Scott  2006;;  Gibson  &  Sillander  2011 
1106  The  Scandinavian  and  Sámi  languages  have  both  maintained  folklore  about  hidden  peoples  in  parallel  worlds.  The  
Norwegian  oral  tradition  tells  about  our  co-existence  with  the  strange  hulder-folk,  from  huldr,  hidden.  Sothern  Sámi  
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 When  I  returned  from  fieldwork,  I  found  the  works  by  Elinor  Osrom  at  the  library  of  my  
university.  I  found  that  she  had  also  written  one  article  about  Sámi  reindeer  nomads.  I  think  her  
concept  of  pluricentric  social-ecological  systems,  including  formal  laws  and  informal  norms,  
provides  a  handy  tool  to  characterize  the  general  environment  where  state-certified  nature  
management  co-exists  with  a  more  discrete  indigenous  human  ecology.  Thus,  I  sketched  one  more  
general  macro-mechanism  to  describe  how  state  transformation  (Explanandum)  is  being  co-
determined  by  ongoing  mutual  adaptation  between  two  complex  adaptive  systems:  On  the  one  hand  
is  the  state  formation  itself  (the  Explanandum).  On  the  other  hand  is  a  parallel  system  of  indigenous  
law  and  indigenous  knowledge  (one  component  of  Explanans  1).  Thus,  within  the  process  of  
collective  learning  learning  in  poly-centric  social-ecological  systems,1107  there  is  an  ongoing  co-
evolution  between  two  partly  autonomous  historical-geographical  formations:  The  state  system  was  
never  fully  consolidated,  while  the  siida  system  never  fully  disappeared.  This  is  how  I  suggest  to  
explain  the  de  facto  legal  pluralism  in  Sápmi.  This  legal  pluralism  includes  complex  jurisdictions  
(in  the  meaning  of  sources  of  valid  law),  even  though  there  are  clear-cut  sovereignties  (in  the  
meaning  of  monopolies  of  violence). 
 
 
12.2.4  In  sum:  the  unexplained  observations  and  the  unobserved  facts 
Conditions  of  collective  ignorance  that  are  laborious  to  overcome.  Public  relevance  may  always  be  
open  for  discussion.  Thus,  both  the  empirical  observation  and  the  conceptual  schemata  are  limited  
by  pragmatic,  socio-material  situations.  Our  collective  knowledge  about  political  history  is  
encumbered  by  collective  ignorance  about  the  histories  of  colonised  peoples  and  subaltern  classes.  
Furthermore,  the  decolonisation  of  political  historiography  cannot  be  accomplished  overnight.1108  It  
is  a  laborious  process,  which  requires  much  empirical  research  on  lots  of  issues  that  remain  under-
researched  or  ignored.  We  have  no  guarantee  that  this  task  will  ever  be  completed.  Any  attempt  to  
prefigure  a  potentially  decolonized  political  science  remains  provisional  and  prefigurative.  I  have  
tried  to  tackle  this  by  being  explicit  about  the  problem,  and  trying  to  observe  some  of  the  limits  of  
my  own  observational  capacity.  I  have  tried  to  be  frank  about  the  unfinished  character  of  my  own  
research,  as  well  as  the  existing  knowledge  in  the  relevant  research.  I  have  also  tried  to  be  frank  
                                                                                                                                                                  
folklore  tells  similar  stories  about  the  strange  saajve-people,  which  co-exists  with  the  sámi-people.  There  are  strik-­
ing  similarities  between  these  Norwegian  and  Southern  Sámi  oral  traditions,  though  this  affinity  in  itself  remains  
under-researched,  hidden,  or  huldr.  For  example,  the  Norwegian  peasants  had  to  move  thir  cowshed  because  their  
cows  where  shitting  at  the  huldr-people  below,  while  the  Southern  Sámi  reindeer  owners  had  to  move  their  reindeer  
fence  because  the  reindeer  were  peeing  at  the  saajve-people  underneath  (sic!).  These  traditions  have  similarities  with  
Celtic  fairy-myths.  However,  it  may  also  be  relevant  that  Sámi  and  Scandinavian  tribes  shared  the  same  outfields  
and  took  part  in  the  same  barter  systems,  while  at  the  same  remaining  alien  to  each  other’s  linguistic  fellowships.   
1107  McGinnis  and  Ostrom  2012 
1108  Chakrabarty  2000 
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about  how  access  to  reliable  data  depends  on  the  degree  of  involvement  or  positionality  within  the  




12.3.0  Positive  findings:  some  possible  mechanisms 
 
12.3.1  The  perspective  from  landscape  ecology  and  collective  action 
When  possible  explanatory  mechanisms  were  suggested  in  the  empirical  chapters,  I  applied  an  
explanatory  framework.  However,  this  framework,  in  turn,  had  emerged  as  a  product  of  the  
participatory  and  abductive  research  process.  The  dialogue  between  the  selection  of  data  items  and  
the  selection  of  coding  categories  gradually  led  me  to  focus  on  collective  action  as  constituent  
practice,  and  landscape  ecology  as  constituted  order.  Thus,  in  the  empirical  chapters,  I  did  not  focus  
on  coercive  force  as  constituent  practice,  or  geo-strategical  theatres  as  constituted  order. 
 Explandum  includes  ambiguities  within  the  state  formation:  What  are  the  valid  
constitutional  norms  and  valid  scientific  disciplines  within  the  various  branches  of  state  power?  
This  ambiguity  includes,  among  other  issues,  the  ambiguous  co-evolution  of  state-certified  nature  
management  and  indigenous  human  ecology:  at  some  times  and  places  there  was  mutual  
misrecognition  of  norms  and  knowlege,  at  other  times  and  places  there  was  mutual  recognition.  The  
ratification  of  recent  human  rights  instruments  has  opened  the  question  of  how  state  law  might  
regulate  its  own  relationship  to  some  of  the  local  customs  (and  lore)  that  have  been  subject  to  
attempted  criminalization. 
 Explanans  1  includes  the  informal  jurisdiction  in  Sápmi,  its  local  customs  and  lore  
regulating  actual  nature  management.  My  case  studies  reveal  that  local  customs  and  local  lore  may  
vary  according  to  local  differences  in  differnt  socio-ecological  environments.  Those  varieties  
include  ambiguities  in  relation  to  state  politics.  Local  customs  and  lore  have  co-evolved  with  state  
law  and  science,  either  through  mutual  harmonization,  or  through  mutual  non-recognition.  The  
practices  that  are  autonomous  of  the  state  have  resemblances  with  stateless  political  systems  of  the  
anarchist  type  (informal,  egalitarian,  non-coercive).  Explanans  1  also  includes  international  norms,  
or  the  “soft  law”  of  intergovernmental  institutions.  It  further  includes  the  policy  process  in  such  
institutions,  where  governments  interact  with  INGOs  and  TSMOs.  In  fact,  all  international  and  
transnational  diplomacy  might  be  included  here.  Explanans  1  also  includes  the  relationship  between  
local  customs  in  Sápmi  and  international  norms  in  the  UN.  The  former  have  received  institutional  
blessing  from  the  latter,  with  recent  human  rights  norms.  This  thesis  is  a  study  of  state  
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transformation  in  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  water  areas.  Those  rivers  run  through  the  heartland  of  Sápmi.  
The  political  cultures  of  the  siida-system-that-never-fully-disappeared  partially  overlap  with  the  
political  cultures  of  the  state-system-that-was-never-fully-consolidated.  The  Sámi  Rights  
Commission,  appointed  by  the  Norwegian  state,  found  proof  that  local  customs  had  been  
continuously  maintained  and  developed  ever  since  1751,  in  spite  of  the  attempted  criminalization  of  
some  such  customs  from  that  year  on.1109  Thus,  in  many  periods  and  areas,  the  actual  resource  use  
in  inner  Sápmi  has  been  regulated  by  local  oral  customs  and  lore  rather  than  state-certified  laws  or  
science.  This  non-state  system  is  not  the  object  of  study  here,  but  the  socio-material  reproduction  of  
the  non-state  has  interacted  with  the  socio-material  reproduction  of  the  states.  In  my  causal  model,  
the  maintenance  of  the  indigenous  non-state  along  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  rivers  is  part  of  Explanans  1,  
while  the  transformation  of  the  states  along  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  rivers  constitutes  the  Explanandum. 
 Explanans  2  refers  to  the  collectively  unknown  as  an  explanation  of  divergent  truths.  
Divergent  practical  realities  exist  both  amongst  state-certified  scientists  active  within  different  
disciplines  (Explanandum)  and  also  amongst  subsistence  practitioners  operating  in  different  socio-
ecological  environments  (Explanans  1).  All  knowledge  remains  unfinished,  bounded,  and  
consequently,  both  knowledge  and  ignorance  remain  situated.  This  not  only  the  case  for  local  lore,  
or  traditional  knowledge,  it  is  also  the  case  for  science,  or  epistemic  knowledge.  The  various  parts  
of  the  state  apparatus  include  a  heterogenous  body  of  state-certified  knowledge,  and  there  may  be  
competition  or  even  contradiction,  between  different  state-certified  expert  groups.  The  indigenous  
non-state  in  Sápmi  also  includes  a  heterogeneous  assemblage  of  traditional  knowledge,  
continuously  maintained  and  developed  by  fitting  to  particular  social-ecological  conditions  within  
each  locality.  The  heterogeneities  of  epistemic  knowledge  and  traditional  knowledge  include  
dynamics  of  contention  where  social  entrepreneurs  may  engage  in  the  struggle  to  define  the  
research  agenda,  or  to  define  what  is  a  valid  method.  Even  when  knowledge  is  based  on  strict  
empirical  and  rational  procedures,  its  practice  nevertheless  takes  place  within  concrete  socio-
ecological  contexts,  with  sociological  and  ecological  strains,  as  well  as  social  and  ecological  
consequences. 
 Both  Explanans  1  and  Explanans  2  zoom  in  on  different  aspects  of  constituent  collective  
action  and  constituted  landscape  ecology.  The  former  deals  with  customary  praxes  (embedded  in  the  
usage  of  natural  resource  systems).  The  latter  deals  with  knowledge  praxes  (embedded  in  the  
experience  of  natural  phenomena).  Those  factors  may  be  identified  and  explained  with  the  help  of  
various  conceptual  resources.  The  SES  approach  has  been  developed  to  deal  mainly  with  Explanans  
1,  and  the  ANT  approach  has  been  fitted  mainly  to  address  Explanans  2,  but  this  is  merely  a  
                                                 
1109  Norwegian  Ministry  of  Justice  and  Police  1997:  4;;  Norwegian  Ministry  of  Justice  and  Police  2007:  34 
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difference  of  degree.  Both  approaches  in  fact  deal  with  both  explanatory  factors,  but  they  do  it  in  
slightly  different  ways.  While  ANT  is  geared  towards  increased  specification,  SES  is  specialized  on  
increased  generalisation.  ANT  is  possibilistic,  SES  is  probabilistic,  and  consequently,  they  are  both  
non-deterministic  and  non-reductionistic,  and  therefore  compatible. 
 
 
12.3.2  Two  macro-mechanisms 
In  the  empirical  chapters,  this  study  has  observed  two  “macro-mechanisms”  that  describe  the  
dynamics  of  large-scale  (trans)formations  in  the  landscape  geography. 
 The  main  (trans)formation  of  interest  is  state  transformation,  the  selected  Explanandum.  
This  research  interest  decides  the  definition  of  analytical  system  boundaries.  What  interests  me  
within  the  state  transformation  is  mainly  the  de  jure  practices  that  co-determine  natural  resources  
management.  These  practices  include  a  plural  body  of  state-codified  laws,  and  a  plural  body  of  
state-certified  science.  Ambiguities  are  contained  within  the  de  jure  natural  resources  management;;  
it  is  a  constituted  pluricentred  policy  network. 
 What  is  not  defined  within  the  system  is  consequently  defined  as  its  environment.  This  
environment  includes  everything  other  than  the  state  formation,  or  in  general,  the  landscape  
ecology.  This  is  the  social-ecological  environment  of  state  system.  The  customary  praxes  that  co-
determine  de  facto  use  of  natural  resources  constitute  Explanans  1.  The  knowledge  praxes  co-
determining  the  de  facto  use  of  natural  resources  constitute  Explanans  2.  These  practices  are  no  less  
heterogeneous  than  the  formalized  practices  of  the  state.  They  include  a  highly  heterogeneous  and  
fluid  constituent  pluricentred  issue  network.  They  also  include  longstanding  social-ecological  
institutions  in  the  Sámi  society,  a  constituted  pluricentred  kinship  network. 
 I  have  observed  two  “macro-mechanisms”  to  describe  the  system-level  dynamics  between  
Explanandum  (state  transformation)  on  the  one  hand,  and  Explanans  1  and  2  (its  social-ecological  
environment)  on  the  other  hand. 
 Ecological  (or  progressive)  adaptation  of  the  state  is  a  “mechanism”  at  the  macro  level.  It  
refers  to  an  adaptive  process  of  collective  learning  within  the  state  apparatus,  understood  as  a  body  
of  codified  law  and  a  body  of  certified  knowledge.  This  is  functionalist  or  evolutionary  thinking,  
and  it  should  be  used  with  caution.  Firstly,  the  process  is  being  “black  boxed”  at  a  macro  level,  
without  unpacking  some  of  the  specific  causal  chains  at  a  more  particular  level  of  analysis.  
Secondly,  with  such  a  grand  general  view,  one  runs  the  risk  of  overlooking  much  actual  plurality,  or  
in  other  words,  silencing  minor  voices  and  suppressing  actual  conflict.  Thirdly,  the  functionalist  or  
evolutionist  perspective  may  be  misinterpreted  as  teleological,  optimistic  or  even  as  a  one-size-fits-
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all  standard  of  development.  However,  apart  from  all  of  these  (profound)  shortcomings,  the  
functionalist  or  evolutionist  perspective  has  some  (limited)  value  in  providing  a  rough  overview  of  
socio-ecological  adaptation.    It  is  valuable  as  long  as  we  do  not  keep  it  as  a  black  box,  but  also  open  
up  that  box,  in  order  to  identify  some  of  the  particular  heterogeneities,  differences,  and  conflicts  at  
more  particular  levels. 
 
Table  12-2:  Macro-mechanism  identified  in  Geographical  Overview,  Chapter  5 
Ecological  (or  progressive)  adaptation  of  state  (macro-mechanism) 
i:  progressive  adaptation  (of  state-certified  a.  norms  &  b.  science)  (lim  –  liminal  value) 
ii:  gradual  decrease  in  ignorance  within  the  folk’s  lore  (lim) 
iii:  gradual  decrease  in  ignorance  within  scientific  knowledge  (lim) 
 
Maintaining  parallel  order  is  a  “mechanism”  at  the  macro  level.  It  refers  to  the  ways  in  which  the  
indigenous  people  of  Sápmi  “preserve  and  develop  its  own  language,  culture  and  way  of  life”.  This  
definition  uses  the  words  from  paragraph  110a  in  the  Norwegian  constitution.  This  macro-
mechanism  is  an  adjustment  of  the  previous  macro-mechanism  (ecological  adaptation  of  the  state).  
Today’s  SES  framework,  unlike  yesterday’s  Structure-Functionalism,  is  interested  in  complex  
dynamic  systems,  with  capability  to  co-exist  and  co-evolve.  Because  I  build  on  Ostrom,  it  is  no  
problem  for  me  to  make  sense  of  actual  legal  pluralism  in  Sápmi.  Rokkan,  however,  built  on  
Parsons  and  Lipset,  for  whom  there  was  either  static  order  or  sudden  change.  The  gradual  
refinement  of  Functionalist  political  theory,  away  from  Parsons,  and  towards  Ostrom,  is  in  itself  an  
ecological  adaptation  of  the  states.  Ostrom  recognises  informal  rules  and  pluri-centeric  
institututional  arrangements,  and  as  such,  her  Functionalism  is  one  that  no  longer  denies  the  de  
facto  co-existence  between  state  formations  and  other  socio-ecological  formations,  such  as  the  
Sápmi  homeland.  Nevertheless,  there  still  is  a  need  to  unpack  some  of  the  particular  mechanisms  of  
institutional  change,  what  Ostrom  refers  to  as  “organisational  learning”  within  socio-ecological  
settings. 
 
Table  12-3:  Macro-mechanism  observed  in  Case  II,  Chapter  11 
Maintaining  parallel  order  (macro  mechanism) 
i.  parallel  order  (re)produced,  collective  learning  of  lore  &  norms  in  local  traditional  subsistence 
ii.  divergent  (or  bridged)  practical  experiences  in  up-  and  downstream  areas 
iii.  parallel  systems  of  local  knowledge  (metis)  in  relation  to  scientific  knowledge  (episteme) 
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12.3.3  Four  meso-mechanisms 
Throughout  the  empirical  chapters,  I  have  identified  four  of  the  possible  mechanisms  at  the  level  of  
particular  practice  networks  (meso  level),  each  of  which  contribues  to  specifying  the  observed  
dynamics  of  relatively  wide  and  durable  geographical  formations  (macro  level).  The  observed  
meso-mechanisms  deal  with  some  of  the  particular  pathways  whereby  constituent  and  constituted  
power  operate. 
 “Ambiguous  adaptations”  is  a  meso-mechanism  regarding  the  heterogeneous  and  ambiguous  
relationship  between  state  law  and  indigenous  law  in  some  situations  within  the  two  selected  
watersheds,  during  the  four  selected  decades.  It  refers  to  the  difference  between  situations  where  
indigenous  laws  and  knowledge  are  being  either  codified,  criminalized,  or  simply  ignored,  by  the  
state  builders.  The  fact  that  they  might  be  ignored  is  crucial.  This  shows  that  the  maintenance  of  
longstanding  customs  and  lore  is  not  simply  a  way  of  resisting  or  negating  the  state  order,  but  also  a  
way  of  maintaining  or  confirming  another  order.  This  has  consequences  for  how  to  interpret  
observations  of  situations  where  there  appears  to  be  friction  between  de  jure  state-certified  nature  
management  and  de  facto  indigenous  nature  management.  Unlike  Bjerkli,1110  I  have  argued  that  it  is  
more  correct  to  use  Gene  Sharp's  concept  “social  defence”  rather  than  Scott's  term  “everyday  
resistance”.1111  Part  of  social  defence  is  the  daily  work  to  maintain  the  local  moral  order,  to  bolster  
against  the  potentially  subversive  effect  of  criminalization  and  stigmatization.  Finally,  there  are  also  
some  situations  where  state-codified  laws  and  state-certified  sciences  are  brought  into  harmony  with  
indigenous  customs  and  lore.  In  those  situations,  it  may  be  quite  different  cleavages  that  matter. 
 
Table  12-4:  Meso-mechanism  observed  in  Case  II,  Chapter  11 
Ambiguous  adaptations  (meso  mechanism,  sub-cases  I  and  II) 
i.  ambiguous  adaptations  of  local  customs  and  lore  to  state-codified  law  and  science 
ii.  divergent  practical  realities  with  different  socio-material  locations  (in  bureaucracy,  landscape) 
iii.  divergent  research  &  teaching  priorities  within  disciplines  (bio  indicators,  hist  syllabus) 
 
Three  other  meso-mechanisms  concern  some  of  the  paths  to  empowerment  within  political  
entrepreneurship  and  social  entrepreneurship.  Firstly,  I  observed  a  “struggle  to  define  the  present  
hegemony”.  This  is  a  social  struggle  for  the  capacity  to  define  the  already  constituted  rules  of  the  
game  within  law  and  science.  Secondly,  I  found  a  “struggle  for  future  agenda  setting”.  This  is  a  
similar  social  struggle,  for  the  capacity  to  set  the  agenda  for  future  policy  making  as  well  as  future  
research  priorities.  Thirdly,  I  identified  that  in  some  situations  “arguments  matter,  but  resources  
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decide”.  The  common  denominator  for  all  those  three  is  that  all  of  them  refer  to  processes  whereby  
entrepreneurial  persons  bond  together  in  collective  action,  and  also,  how  they  may  broaden  the  
scope  of  their  action  by  bonding  with  persons  at  other  localities,  taking  collective  action  with  them  
as  well.  This  process  is  similar  to  the  “twinning”  of  issue  nets  which  was  identified  by  della  Porta  
and  Piazza  in  their  study  of  some  Italian  environmental  justice  movements.1112  By  scaling  out  the  
scope  of  collective  action,  political  entrepreneurs  may  produce  constituent  issue  nets,  interacting  
with  the  constituted  policy  nets.  In  a  similarly  manner,  social  entrepreneurs  create  constituent  
innovation  nets,  interacting  with  constituted  entities  such  as  regional  innovation  clusters  or  
transnational  epistemic  communities.  Social  entrepreneurs  take  (non-violent)  direct  action  for  
political-economic  and  political-semiotic  empowerment.  Political  entrepreneurs  take  indirect  action  
for  empowerment  via  the  state  apparatus.  The  latter  is  not  non-violent  in  the  strict  sense  because  the  
state  apparatus  also  includes  institutional  violence,  in  addition  to  political-economic  and  political-
semiotic  arrangements.  However,  even  though  I  distinguish  between  social  and  political  
entrepreneurship,  I  think  both  phenomena  can  be  described  with  all  three  mechanisms. 
 
Table  12-5:  Meso-mechanism  observed  in  Geographical  Bridge,  Chapter  8 
Struggle  for  future  agenda-setting  (meso-mechanism,  geographical  bridge) 
i.struggle  for  agenda-setting  (within  state-certified  policy  making  and  scientific  inquiry) 
ii.  divergent  practical  realities  with  different  socio-material  locations  (in  bureaucracy,  landscape) 
iii.  divergent  research  &  teaching  priorities  within  disciplines  (bio  indicators,  hist  syllabus) 
 
 “The  struggle  for  future  agenda-setting”  is  perhaps  the  one  of  the  three  mechanisms  that  is  
intuitively  easiest  to  grasp.  Particular  interest  groups  may  push  for  particular  policy  or  research  
priorities,  to  gain  the  rights  that  seem  beneficial  to  them,  and  the  knowledge  that  seems  applicable.  
Thus,  there  is  a  struggle  for  the  social  power  to  set  the  agenda  for  future  policy  and  research. 
 
Table  12-6:  Meso-mechanism  observed  in  Case  I,  Chapter  7 
Struggle  to  define  present  hegemony  (meso-mechanism,  case  I) 
i.  struggle  to  define  actual  hegemony  in  state  (valid  constitutional  norms  &  valid  scientific  praxes) 
ii.  diverging  practical  realities  of  livelihoods  up-  or  downstream  (ecology,  policy  &  jurisdiction) 
iii.  diverging  scientific  disciplines  (technology  and  economy  versus  ecology  and  anthropology) 
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 “The  struggle  to  define  present  hegemony”  may  perhaps  be  somewhat  less  intuitive.  There  
may  be  competing  interpretations  of  what  is  actually  the  established  normative  order,  and  there  may  
be  competing  interpretations  of  what  constitutes  valid  scientific  methods  too.  Such  disagreement  
may  be  strong  when  the  context  is  changing,  and  the  citizenry  is  confronted  with  the  question  of  
how  to  interpret  old  rules  in  a  new  historical  situation.  This  appears  to  have  been  the  case  during  the  
Alta-dam  conflict:  Case  I  described  two  emerging  coalitions,  each  of  them  transforming  the  
opportunity  structure  for  the  other.  Both  of  them  tackled  the  new  historical  situation  by  developing  
two  competing  interpretations  of  what  the  old  rules  actually  looked  like. 
 
Table  12-7:  Meso-mechanism  observed  in  Case  II,  Chapter  11 
Arguments  matter,  resources  decide  (meso  mechanism,  case  II) 
i.  failure  to  shape  policy,  confront  myths,  police  scientific  reliability,  when  competing  with  big  biz 
ii.  divergent  technical  and  strategic  framings  among  fishery  organizations  (big  vs  small  business) 
iii.  unequal  capacity  to  counter  benefits  of  less  costing  monitoring  system  (big  vs  small  business) 
 
 “Arguments  matter,  resources  decide”  is  a  mechanism  that  I  observed  in  Case  II  when  
zooming  in  on  the  Deanuvuotna  Fjord.  I  observed  political  entrepreneurs  who  struggle  to  set  the  
future  agenda,  and  also  to  define  the  present  hegemony.  I  also  observed  social  entrepreneurs  
working  for  empowerment  within  small  business  entrepreneurship  and  the  development  of  new  
epistemic  communities.  For  either  of  these  paths  to  empowerment,  the  collective  action  seems  to  
function  in  much  the  same  way  as  the  two  previously  mentioned  meso-mechanisms.  However,  one  
striking  observation  in  Deanuvuotna,  where  the  River  Sámi  and  Coastal  Sámi  cultural  areas  overlap,  
is  that  the  indigenous  rights  struggle  has  thus  far  failed  to  transform  the  state.  The  preliminary  
failure  of  political  entrepreneurship  implies  that  the  opportunities  for  social  entrepreneurship  remain  
limited.  The  liberal  laws  enforced  by  the  state  are  supposed  to  ensure  freedom  for  all  citizens,  but  in  
practice,  some  are  freer  than  others.  My  fieldwork  in  Deanuvuotna  exemplies  structurally  unequal  
life  chances:  On  the  one  hand,  there  are  locally  based,  self-employed  fisher-peasants.  On  the  other  
hand,  there  are  industrial  fisheries  controlled  by  capital  owners  in  more  central  locations  in  Norway  
and  Russia.  This  socio-economic  conflict  highlights  the  socio-economic  aspect  of  the  International  
Covenant  on  Economic  Social  and  Cultural  Rights  (ICESR).1113  There  is  a  history  of  forced  
expropriation  of  local  fishery  resources.  Additionally,  the  history  of  forced  cultural  assimilation  
highlights  the  socio-cultural  aspecs  of  both  ICESCR  and  the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  
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Political  Rights  (ICCPR).1114  These  covenants  constitute  the  basis  for  the  right  to  freedom  racial  
discrimination  and  the  right  to  freedom  from  forced  colonisation,  which  in  turn,  is  the  reason  that  
indigenous  peoples,  not  only  state-building  peoples,  have  a  right  to  self-determination  according  to  
international  human  rights  norms.1115  In  Chapters  10  and  11,  my  argument  is  that  the  indigenous  
rights  struggle  in  Coastal  Sámi  areas  in  fact  does  have  both  right  and  proofs  on  its  side,  in  the  form  
of  already  ratified  international  laws,  and  empirically  solid  social  science  research.  If  I  am  correct  to  
argue  this,  then  there  is  no  lack  of  rights  or  proofs  that  can  explain  the  lack  of  success  for  the  
indigenous  rights  struggle  in  Coastal  Sápmi.  Thus,  I  suggest  that  that  the  explanation  might  be  the  
highly  unequal  access  to  financial  capital  and  political  influence.  Democratic  participation  seems  to  
have  been  impotent  so  far,  because  the  opportunities  therein  are  structurally  highly  unequal.  With  
reference  to  a  more  limited  form  of  democratic  participation,  Rokkan  famously  said  that  “votes  
count,  but  resources  decide”.  With  reference  to  the  wider  field  of  deliberative  democracy,  we  could  
also  say  that  “arguments  matter,  but  resources  decide”. 
 The  four  meso-mechanisms  I  have  observed  all  address  some  ways  whereby  practice  nets  
may  serve  as  channels  for  constituent  and  constituted  power.  Three  of  the  mechanisms  describe  
different  aspects  of  political  entrepreneurship  and  social  entrepreneurship.  One  of  the  mechanisms  
describes  different  aspects  of  everyday  life  when  de  facto  legal  pluralism  includes  some  persistent  
tensions.  Together,  those  four  mechanisms  specify  some  of  the  possible  pathways  whereby  
constituent  power  has  been  executed  within  the  larger  process  of  state  transformation  over  the  four  
latter  decades,  in  two  selected  watersheds.  Those  mechanisms  highlight  some  of  the  actual  
processes  that  transform  the  constituted  pluricentred  policy  net  that  is  the  state  (Explandum).  This  
is  done  by  tracing  some  ways  whereby  persons  congregate  in  collective  action,  in  order  to  exert  
influence  on  the  continuous  co-evolution  between  the  state  formation  and  its  socio-ecological  
environment.  However,  the  different  meso-mechanisms  deal  with  different  forms  of  action  
repertoires,  and  partly  with  different  forms  of  practice  networks  as  well.  Three  of  four  mechanisms  
refer  to  interaction  between  constituted  policy  nets  and  constituent  issue  nets  (alternatively  
constituent  innovation  nets).  This  is  the  case  for  the  “struggle  to  set  the  future  agenda”,  as  well  as  
for  the  “struggle  to  define  the  present  hegemony”,  and  this  is  the  case  also  whenever  “arguments  
matter,  resources  decide”.  All  of  these  three  mechanisms  deal  with  political  or  social  
entrepreneurship.  The  fourth  mechanism,  by  contrast,  deals  with  social  action  in  situations  where  
there  is  an  overlap  between  different  systems  of  actual  natural  resources  management:  on  the  one  
hand,  the  constituted  pluricentred  policy  net;;  on  the  other  hand,  the  constituted  pluricentred  kinship  
net.  The  report  from  the  Coastal  Fisheries  Commission  disclosed  an  actual  legal  pluralism  in  
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Deanuvuotna  and  other  parts  of  Coastal  Sápmi,1116  though  it  remains  debated  whether  this  implies  
that  the  nation-state  must  return  the  resources  to  the  local  communities.  There  appears  to  be  a  
continuous  reproduction  of  longstanding  social-ecological  order,  regardless  of  whether  this  is  being  
codified,  criminalized,  or  ignored  by  the  states.  Whenever  I  observed  tension  between  local  
indigenous  laws  and  national  state  laws,  I  first  mis-interpreted  this  as  civil  disobedience,  but  I  
realized  that  the  fjord  fishers  tended  to  be  politically  moderate,  and  to  understand  their  own  
behaviour  as  conformist.  Thus,  I  adapted  the  term  social  defence  to  describe  instances  when  the  
continuous  maintenance  of  the  local  moral  order  comes  in  conflict  with  intrusive  state  builders. 
 In  sum,  the  practice  networks  at  play  may  be  categorized  into  at  least  four  types:  constituent  
issue  nets  (serving  political  entrepreneurship),  constituent  innovation  nets  (serving  social  
entrepreneurship),  constituted  policy  nets  (serving  formalized  governance),  and  constituted  kinship  
nets  (serving  the  moral  economy).  All  of  them  are  practice  networks.  The  term  “social  capital”  may  
refer  to  the  degree  of  connectivity  within  either  of  those  practice  networks,  but  they  are  also  
qualitatively  different.  In  spite  of  all  the  differences,  these  types  of  networks  all  appear  to  be  
pluricentric,  dynamic,  and  entangled  into  each  other.  This  seems  to  be  the  reason  why  it  is  possible  
that  there  is  complex  jurisdiction  (meaning  valid  sources  of  law)  even  though  there  are  clear-cut  
sovereignties  (meaning  monopolies  of  violence).  Cleavages  and  alliances  may  emerge  in  various  
ways.  During  the  Alta-dam  conflict,  the  two  coalitions  divided  the  state  apparatus  as  well  as  the  
local  population.  Sápmi  was  divided  and  conquered,  the  Sámi  interest  organizations  NSR  and  SLF  
finding  themselves  on  either  side  of  the  cleavage.  During  the  indigenous  rights  struggle  in  Coastal  
Sápmi,  there  have  been  attempts  to  constitute  a  unified  bloc  of  various  groups  of  indigenous  
peoples,  even  with  other  subaltern  classes  along  the  coast. 
 
 
12.3.4  One  micro-mechanism 
In  order  to  avoid  overly  swift  generalisations,  it  may  be  a  virtue  to  specify  explanations  at  the  most  
particular  level  of  analysis.  This  does  not  mean  that  explanations  at  one  level  of  analysis  can  always  
be  reduced  to  a  more  particular  level  of  analysis.  I  have  argued  that  Niels  Bohr's  “principle  of  
complementarity”  applies  when  physiologists  combine  electromagnetic  and  biochemical  
mechanisms,  or  when  political  ecologists  combine  resource  geography  and  cultural  geography.  
However,  if  we  cannot  reduce  all  explanations  to  one  theory  of  everything,  this  does  not  mean  that  
we  should  accept  everything  as  a  valid  explanation.  I  think  a  valid  explanation  must  at  least  be  
based  on  empirical  evidence  and  consistent  argument.  The  empirical  chapters  have  provided  
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empirical  evidence.  I  will  now  make  a  more  consistent  argument.  Thus,  I  will  turn  to  the  most  
particular  “nuts  and  bolts”  of  practice  networks,  like  Jon  Elster  turns  to  the  most  particular  building  
blocs  of  his  rational  choice  theory.  Above,  I  have  made  extensive  use  of  some  social  movement  
research  on  how  collective  action  may  emerge  at  the  sociological  meso-level:  coordination  between  
networks  and  negotiations  between  issues  enable  the  grafting  and  expansion  of  issue  networks.1117  
However,  there  are  various  ways  to  explain  how  this  process  takes  place.  Here  I  will  visit  two  of  
them:  methodological  individualism,  and  micro-interactionism.1118 
 One  option  is  methodological  individualism,  which  sees  the  human  organism  as  a  unified,  
calculating  unit,  geared  towards  self-maintenance.1119  This  option  is  in  line  with  neoclassical  
economy,  and  models  all  macro-sociological  phenomena  as  the  aggregate  effects  of  individual  
preferences.  Less  ideological  is  the  model  of  bounded  rationality,  which  has  been  chosen  for  the  
SES  framework.1120  Ostrom  takes  into  account  how  individual  choices  are  formed  in  collective  
action  situations,  which  are  conditioned  by  various  ecological  and  sociological  factors. 
 Another  option  is  the  micro-interactionist  model,  according  to  which  the  smallest  building  
block  of  society  is  face-to-face  interaction  situations,  where  regular  social  relations  links  one  
situation  to  the  next,  constituting  social  networks.  This  is  the  option  chosen  by  Susanne  
Staggenborg,  who  builds  on  Randall  Collins.1121  His  micro-interactionism  belongs  to  a  US  tradition,  
influenced  by  social  psychology  and  phenomenology.  Another,  more  materialistic,  form  of  micro-
interactionism  is  offered  by  ANT.1122  Latour  argues  that  practical  reality  is  not  only  inter-subjective,  
but  also  “inter-objective”. 
 In  my  opinion,  there  is  no  contradiction  between  SES  and  ANT,  because  neither  of  them  are  
extreme  in  their  theoretical  stance  (either  individualist  or  interactionist).  As  a  general  theory,  
Ostrom  has  found  rather  strong  evidence  for  her  SES  framework.  As  a  tool  to  uncover  silenced  
pluralities,  ANT  has  proven  effective.  Both  are  valuable,  but  to  get  a  theory  that  may  travel  better,  I  
suggest  to  use  the  SES  framework,  in  order  to  explain  how  the  presence  or  absence  of  collective  
action  may  cause  a  practice  network  to  scale  out  or  not  in  a  particular  direction.  In  each  action  
situation,  the  actors  may  or  may  not  find  a  common  understanding  of  common  interest.  If  they  do,  
convergence  or  cooperation  emerges.  If  their  interests  are  unbridgeable,  agonism  or  rivalry  arises.  
Those  are  ideal  types.  What  looks  like  convergence  may  be  internal  hegemony,  the  suppression  of  
dissent.  What  looks  like  rivalry  may  be  unrecognised  common  interest. 
                                                 
1117  Della  Porta  and  Piazza  2008 
1118  One  third  option  is  organic  collectivism  of  the  type  preferred  by  Hegel,  Durkheim  or  Marx,  but  as  far  as  I  know,  this  
form  of  explanation  is  no  longer  in  use. 
1119  Elster  1989;;  Coleman  1990 
1120  Ostrom  2005;;  Potete,  Janssen  &  Ostrom  2010 
1121  Staggenborg  2002;;  Collins  1988 
1122  Latour  3004;;  Law  &  Singleton  2012 
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Figure  12-2:  Collective  action  scaling  out  from  particulars  action  situation,  producing  social  change. 
The  axis  f(x)  is  a  function  of  the  axis  x.   
Axis  f(x)  =  the  total  social  power  of  the  praxis  net  formation 
Axis  x  =  the  spatio-temporal  scope,  duration  and  density  of  the  praxis  net  formation  (system-level  may  be  
any  system  boundary  that  is  analytically  relevant,  such  as  water  area,  state,  or  the  UN.  Indeed,  Sámi  
resource  mobilization  has  included  transnational  coalition  building  and  accommodation  at  the  UN  in  order  to  
empower  themselves  vis  a  vis  the  intrusive  states  and  the  state-defined  national  economic  interests. 
 
Praxis  nets  consist  of  interpersonal  networks  across  action  situations,  as  well  as  networks  of  
adjacent  action  situations.  Ostrom’s  main  category,  “the  presence  or  absence  of  collective  action”  is  
the  micro-mechanism  used  to  explain  the  formation  of  practice  nets.  This  mechanism  may  lead  to  
two  possible  (manifest)  outcomes,  either  to  convergence  or  cooperation,  or  to  agonism  or  rivalry.  
(At  the  latent  level,  convergence  may  conceal  internal  hegemony,  while  open  rivalry  may  conceal  
potential  common  interest.) 
 Agonism  or  rivalry  may  mean  economic  competition,  cultural  conflict,  or  a  struggle  to  form  
state  politics.  Agonism  may  include  conflicting  empirical  experiences  of  practical  realities. 
 Convergence  or  cooperation  may  mean  economic  cooperation,  cultural  fellowship,  or  
alliances  to  form  state  politics.  Convergence  may  include  inter-subjective  “frame  resonance”  
across  various  empirical  experiences  of  practical  realities. 
How  do  these  processes  operate?  They  involve  the  impact  of  Explanans  1  (path  i),  but  also  the  
impact  of  Explanans  2  (iii)  as  well  as  the  interaction  between  the  two  explanatory  factors  (iii). 
 Path  i:  Collective  action  is  nice,  but  it  is  not  the  best  option  for  every  action  situation.  
Between  unequal  parties,  the  absence  of  cooperation  may  sometimes  be  necessary  in  order  to  
empower  the  weaker  party  so  that  cooperation  on  equal  terms  might  become  possible.  This  is  a  
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strategical  option,  and  it  is  one  regarding  pathway  i  in  the  general  explanatory  model:  convergence  
results  in  social  capital  (bonding,  bridging),  agonism  results  in  competition  (opposition)  (i). 
 Path  ii,  iii:  Collective  action  always  includes  a  variety  of  inter-subjective  positions.  
Therefore,  the  relationship  between  two  groups  will  seldom  be  only  cooperative  or  only  conflictual.  
Consequently,  apparent  cooperation  may  or  may  not  imply  the  suppression  of  internal  conflict,  
while  apparent  conflict  may  or  may  not  imply  suppression  of  actual  joint  interest.  There  might  be  
some  minor  positions  within  any  virtual consensus.  There  might  exist  some  silenced  minor  minority  
within  every  minority.  Minor  positions  may  keep  the  outward  loyalty  to  the  larger  group,  or  they  
may  ally  with  the  adversaries  of  the  larger  group  to  which  they  belong.  This  is  a  source  of  
dynamics.  Schematically  speaking,  this  can  be  put  into  two  sentences:  Firstly,  convergence  
emphasizes  consensus,  not  dissent,  while  agonism  emphasizes  conflict,  not  reciprocity.  Secondly,  
convergence  is  vulnerable  to  internal  dissent,  whereas  agonist  fronts  are  vulnerable  to  fifth  columns. 
 
Table  12-8:  Micro-mechanism  used  to  explain  all  the  observed  meso-mechanisms 
Mobilize  resources  of  frames:  convergence  or  agonism  (micro  mechanism) 
i.  convergence  makes  social  capital  (bonding,  bridging);;  agonism  makes  competition  (opposition) 
ii.  convergence  emphasizes  consensus,  not  dissent;;  agonism  emphasizes  conflict,  not  reciprocity 
iii.  convergence  is  vulnerable  to  internal  dissent;;  agonist  front  is  vulnerable  to  fifth  columns 
 
This  praxis  net  forms  “hierarchical  scales”,  in  the  sense  that  its  trans-local  ties  may  connect  action  
situations  that  are  more  or  less  widespread  over  time  and  space.  However,  this  does  not  necessarily  
imply  that  there  is  any  hierarchical  relationship  of  authority  or  capacity  between  each  of  the  local  
nodes.  Hierarchy  as  a  logical  order  does  not  always  imply  hierarchy  as  a  social  relationship.  Action  
at  a  rather  wide  scale  may  be  composed  of  rather  egalitarian  relations.  “Redistribution  is  a  system  of  
reciprocities”,  while  each  reciprocity  may  be  more  or  less  symmetrical,  as  Marshall  Sahlins  
shows.1123  Cooperatives  are  made  to  pool  resources  in  a  central  node,  but  also  to  ensure  distributed  
control  over  that  node.  Corporations,  by  contrast,  are  organized  on  the  basis  of  central  command,  
often  with  an  externally  distributed  ownership  structure.  Both  of  them  have  a  centraliced  structure,  a  
hierarchical  logical  order,  but  only  the  latter  type  has  a  hierarchical  social  order,  while  the  former  
type  is  socially  egalitarian.1124   
 The  logical  hierarchy  here  is  one  of  geographical  scale,  or  scope.  This  is  not  the  same  as  the  
                                                 
1123  Sahlins  1972 
1124  Corporations  may  be  regulated  according  to  market  capitalistic  rules  (ownership  by  private  stockholders),  but  may  
also  be  state  capitalistic  (as  in  corporatist  states  or  centralized  planned  economy).  Cooperatives  may  be  social  liberal  
(as  with  Lay  Lutheran  entrepreneurship  in  agrarian  areas  in  the  Nordic  countries),  but  may  also  be  anarcho  syndical-­
istic  (as  with  the  self-managed  villages  during  the  Spanish  Civil  War).   
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logical  hierarchy  used  in  the  SES  framework  to  sort  out  the  relationship  between  operational  level  
situations,  collective  action  situations,  the  constitutional  level  and  the  meta-constitutional  level.  The  
two  hierarchies  may  largely  coincide,  especially  in  some  formal  structures,  but  they  also  may  not  
coincide  at  all,  particularly  not  in  local  communities  where  informal  norms  are  being  deliberated  in  
close  proximity  to  the  operational  action.1125   
 Additionally,  it  should  be  noted  that  different  forms  of  geographical  scales  are  in  focus  
regarding  the  explanans  and  the  explanandum.  The  empirical  chapters  of  this  thesis  have  sought  to  
explain  political  geography  (explanandum)  on  the  basis  of  praxis  nets  that  produce  its  adaptation  to  
the  landscape  geography  (explanans).  Thus,  the  empircal  chapters  have  sought  to  trace  how  
networks  and  contention  may  cause  the  political  geography  at  various  political-economic  scales  to  
adapt  to  the  actual  culture-  and  resource  geography  at  various  socio-ecological  scales.1126   
 A  praxis  net  may  constitute  an  organization  or  an  institution  if  reaffirming  feedback  loops  
exist,  either  purposely  engineered  or  spontaneously  emerging.  Thus,  even  a  macropolitical  system  
might  be  unpacked  as  a  composition  of  stabilized  praxis  nets.  Such  a  system  may  be  more  or  less  
coherent  or  chaotic,  more  or  less  static  or  flexible,  more  or  less  hierarchical  or  distributed,  and  more  
or  less  coercive  or  non-violent.  Stateless  political  systems  may  show  various  combinations  of  those  
variables.  State  systems  are  rather  coherent,  static,  hierarchical  and  coercive,  and  by  maintaining  
that,  the  relative  accountability  of  that  state  might  be  maintained.  In  the  particular  processes  of  state  
transformation  that  I  have  traced  in  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  water  areas,  the  state  appears  to  be  co-
existing  and  co-evolving  with  an  older,  parallel  political  system.  Thus,  both  systems  appear  de  facto  
ambiguous.  Perhaps  the  state  conforms  with  the  ideal  type  “state”  to  the  same  degree  that  the  non-
state  conforms  with  the  ideal  type  of  non-coercive,  egalitarian,  flexible,  stateless  political  system. 
 Thus,  with  this  explanatory  model,  the  composition  of  socio-ecological  order,  including  
politics,  may  be  reduced  to  its  smallest  constituent  parts,  that  is  microsociological  deliberation,  
situated  in  particular  action  situations,  embedded  in  particular  socio-ecological  environments.  (This  
micro-mechanism  may  be  formulated  according  to  the  SES  framework  or  the  ANT  approach,  
according  to  one’s  preference.  Here  I  have  used  SES.) 
                                                 
1125  Ostrom  2005:  58-64,  290-291 
1126  These  different  forms  of  geographical  scales  are  not  made  from  the  "same  stuff",  even  though  both  can  be  dissected  
into  heterogeneous  socio-material  networks  (Latour  2005).  One  the  one  hand,  political-economic  scales  can  be  dissect-­
ed  into  centralized  organizational  routines,  accumulated  capital  flows,  and  material  media  of  exchange  or  communica-­
tion  (formalistic  economy,  formalist  law,  and  "formal  norms"  in  the  SES  framework).  On  the  other  hand,  socio-
ecological  scales  consist  of  every  kind  of  matter  and  praxes,  and  are  far  too  complex  to  be  disentangled.  One  may  trace  
some  of  the  particular  causal  pathways,  but  must  treat  the  rest  as  "context"  or  "environment".  In  the  terminology  of  the  
SES  framework,  these  are  "levels  of  accumulation"  at  various  "spatial  and  temoral  scales"  (Potete,  Jansen  &  Ostrom  
2010;;  McGinnis  &  Ostrom  2012).  These  scales  can  be  defined  by  choosing  pragmatically  relevant  analytical  system  
boundaries,  which  define  a  historical  duration  and  a  geographical  scope.  Similarly,  it  is  pragmatically  relevant  to  con-­
sider  the  de  jure  claim  of  territorial  jurisdiction  by  political  and  administrative  hierarchy,  even  though  de  facto  civil  
obedience  within  the  territory  may  or  may  not  be  another  story.  Such  pragmatic  definitions  of  territory  can  be  seen  as  
technologies  for  management  of  landscape  and  poplulation.   
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12.4.0  Shortcomings  of  the  chosen  perspective? 
 
The  suggested  micro-mechanism  is  meant  as  a  general  explanation  of  the  four  observed  meso-
mechanisms,  and  thus,  it  is  also  meant  as  one  possible  explanation  of  the  two  observed  macro-
mechanisms.  However,  among  the  observed  meso-mechanisms,  there  is  one  to  whom  the  suggested  
micro-mechanism  may  not  apply  very  well.  The  mechanism  “resources  decide”  may  or  may  not  be  
reducible  to  deliberation  as  I  have  used  the  term  here.  When  resources  decide,  there  is  not  only  
agonism  rather  than  convergence,  but  in  addition,  the  coercive  apparatus  of  the  state  may  be  
involved  in  the  maintenance  of  structurally  unequal  opportunities.  Thus,  when  resources  decide,  the  
process  cannot  be  fully  explained  in  terms  of  presence  or  absence  of  collective  action  (as  with  SES  
or  ANT),  but  additionally,  there  is  an  element  of  coercive  force  (as  with  the  postmodern  
Machiavelli).  This  actualizes  the  need  to  control  for  the  possible  bias  of  wishful  thinking. 
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13.1.0  Chapter  introduction 
 
The  previous  chapter  summarized  the  empirical  explanations  that  I  found  in  my  research.  However,  
in  the  present  chapter,  I  will  discuss  some  alternative  explanations  that  have  been  suggested  by  
colleagues  within  a  rival  research  tradition.  Only  after  having  discussed  their  findings  as  well,  will  I  
proceed  to  the  final  discussion  of  the  results.  That  will  be  the  topic  of  the  next  chapter  (Chapter  14). 
 The  two  rival  traditions  were  presented  in  Chapter  3,  with  a  resumé  of  my  field  travels.  It  
was  only  through  my  empirical  research  that  I  became  aware  of  the  rivalry  between  two  different  
clusters  of  organic  intellectuals.  There  seems  to  be  one  major  tradition,  affiliated  with  human  rights  
policies,  and  within  this  tradition  I  have  operated.  However,  there  also  seems  to  be  another,  minor  
tradition,  more  affiliated  with  public  security  policies.  Chapter  3  defined  the  two  rival  traditions  
with  reference  to  Elinor  Ostrom.  The  major  tradition  I  described  in  terms  of  her  own  “new  theory”  
of  cooperative  natural  resources  management.  The  minor  tradition  I  associated  with  what  she  calls  
the  “old  theory”,  which  she  ascribes  to  Hobbes  and  Hardin.1127  While  their  old  theory  had  
pretensions  of  being  the  definite  political  theory  about  everything,  Ostrom’s  new  theory  is  far  less  
pretentious.  She  merely  argues  that  her  theory  sometimes  applies,  and  therefore,  that  the  old  theory  
does  not  always  apply.  I  have  tried  to  cultivate  a  similar  sensitivity  to  uncertainty. 
 For  this  reason,  I  will  now  present  and  discuss  the  findings  from  colleagues  who  have  
researched  the  same  transformative  process  as  I  have,  but  seen  from  within  the  rival  tradition.  
Specifically  I  am  interested  in  controlling  for  the  potential  bias  of  wishful  thinking  within  my  own  
research  tradition.  However,  I  am  also  out  to  demonstrate  that  a  one-sided  or  self-rightous  use  of  so-
called  realism  might  render  realism  no  less  naïve.  Transformative  social  movements  require  neither  





                                                 
1127 Ostrom, Walker & Gardner 1992 
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13.2.0  The  perspective  from  geo-strategical  theatres  and  coercive  force 
 
Let  us  have  a  look  at  rival  explanations.  My  research  has  largely  ignored  one  strand  of  research  that  
has  developed  in  parallel  to  what  I  have  called  the  “canonical”  historical  narrative.  I  have  build  
further  on  the  work  of  historians,  anthropologists  and  sociologists  with  an  interest  in  the  various  
perceptions  of  rights,  various  forms  of  local  knowledge,  and  how  these  phenomena  relate  to  
particular  socio-ecological  environments.  Such  a  view  was  used  by  many  organic  intellectuals  as  
well  as  by  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission.  In  parallel,  and  in  relative  isolation,  some  research  has  
been  carried  out  within  so-called  “realist”  state  science  (statsvitenskap).  This  strand  of  research  is  as  
well  close  to  policy,  but  not  so  much  to  human  rigths  policies  as  to  security  policies.  Anne-Julie  
Semb  has  undertaken  archive  studies  at  the  Norwegian  police,  analysed  minutes  from  debates  in  the  
Norwegian  parliament,  and  interpreted  results  from  Norwegian  national  elections.  In  one  article,  she  
suggests  two  micro-political  pathways  that  may  explain  why  the  Alta-dam  struggle  appears  to  have  
led  to  attempts  to  institutionalise  indigenous  rights.  In  another  article,  she  sketches  a  macro-political  
overview  of  possible  geopolitical  consequences.  The  explanations  she  suggests  are  based  on  reliable  
empirical  data,  but  also  application  of  a  well-defined  theoretical  approach.  The  latter  implies  a  
specific  reductionism,  which  differs  from  the  reductionism  found  in  the  main  tradition,  within  
which  I  have  operated. 
 Now  I  will  try  to  control  for  the  possible  bias  of  wishful  thinking  in  my  own  interpretation.  
Therefore  I  mobilize  the  three  mechanisms  suggested  by  Semb,  in  order  to  confront  my  own  
findings  with  a  competing  theory.  However,  since  my  purpose  here  is  to  carry  out  a  systematic  
control  for  the  bias  of  wishful  thinking,  I  will  turn  to  a  form  of  state-centred  realism  that  is  even  
more  consequent  or  clear-cut  than  Semb’s  version  of  it.  Chapter  4  explained  why  I  think  it  is  
virtuous  to  maintain  a  conceptual  distinction  between  coercive  force  and  the  legitimation  of  such  
force.  Following  Morghenthau  and  Chomsky,  two  critical  realists,1128  I  rejected  the  “neo-neo-
smear”  of  “neo-realism”  and  “neo-liberalism”,  and  instead  I  embraced  the  ice-cold  instrumentalism  
of  Machiavelli,  re-read  and  re-interpreted  for  the  age  of  network-centred  warfare  and  global  security  
threats.1129  The  viewpoint  of  geo-strategical  theatres  and  coercive  force  is  rather  different  from  the  
viewpoint  of  landscape  ecology  and  collective  action.  If  we  now  take  the  alternative,  cynical  
viewpoint,  then  we  must  also  re-define  the  Explanans  and  the  Explanandum. 
 Explanandum  includes  ambiguities  within  the  state  formation:  How  can  we  draw  the  
distinction  between  military  alliancs  securing  the  sovereignty  of  a  member  state,  and  the  member  
state  giving  up  its  own  sovereignty  to  the  same  military  alliance?  This  variable  includes  the  
                                                 
1128  Morgenthau  1970;;  Chomsky  1969 
1129  Althusser  1998;;  see  also:  Weizman  2007;;  RAND  1998;;  Langlais  1999 
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coercive  apparatus  internal  to  the  state,  especially  the  police  policies,  entangled  with  international  
police  cooperation.  It  also  includes  the  coercive  apparatus  for  external  use  by  the  state,  mainly  
defence  policies,  entangled  with  military  alliances.  In  fact,  the  globalised  security  situation  has  
made  it  more  difficult  to  separate  the  policy  areas  of  internal  order  and  external  defence. 
 Explanans  1  includes  unresolved  issues  regarding  the  authority  to  use  coercive  force  in  some  
Sámi  areas,  mainly  the  Finnmark  Plateau,  but  also  some  other  areas.  Concretely,  this  concerns  the  
question  of  when,  if  ever,  the  police  has  the  right  to  use  coercion.  In  two  particular  instances,  it  has  
also  involved  the  question  of  whether  the  indigenous  people  have  the  right  to  defend  themselves  
with  coercive  means.  The  first  instance  was  the  insurgency  in  1852,  while  the  second  was  the  
attempted  sabotage  action  against  a  bridge  during  the  Alta-dam  controversy.  Explanans  1  also  
includes  unresolved  issues  regarding  coercive  force  in  the  politics  between  states,  for  example  the  
competition  between  NATO  and  the  CSTO  regarding  control  over  the  Arctic  Ocean.  This  further  
relates  to  debates  on  the  right  to  intervene  in  foreign  states,  politically  or  militarily,  in  order  to  
police  human  rights  violations. 
 Explanans  2  refers  to  the  collectively  unknown  as  a  factor  to  explain  the  conflicts  between  
different  practical  realities,  those  that  are  the  major  or  dominant  ones  within  any  given  hegemony,  
and  those  that  are  the  minor  or  silenced  ones  within  that  hegemonic  arrangement.  This  is  relevant  
with  regard  to  the  struggles  to  define  what  are  valid  scientific  disciplines,  as  well  as  the  struggle  for  
agenda-setting  within  each  discipline  (Explanandum).  It  is  also  relevant  with  regard  to  a  rich  variety  
of  informal  knowledge  about  nature  use,  for  example  the  practical  realities  of  fjord  fishers  versus  
trawler  capitalists  (Explanans  1).  The  Machiavellian  “effective  truth”  is  a  purely  instrumentalist  
theory  of  knowledge  (epistemology):  what  works  is  true.  However,  what  works  for  the  practical  
needs  of  one  group  differs  from  what  works  for  the  practical  needs  of  another.  From  the  point  of  
view  of  ice-cold  instrumentalism,  there  may  be  incommensurable  differences  of  perception  between  
antagonistic  groups,  but  scarce  opportunities  to  deliberate  concerning  shared  standards  of  truth. 
 In  the  following  sections,  I  will  discuss  Anne-Julie  Semb’s  empirical  findings.  She  has  
conducted  valuable  empirical  findings,  which  I  will  present  as  three  explanatory  mechanisms.  
However,  unlike  her,  I  will  try  not  to  mix  normative  justification  and  strategic  analysis.  That  will  
lead  me  to  suggesting  a  few  adjustments  to  how  she  interprets  the  mechanisms  she  observed,  and  
additionally,  I  will  also  suggest  a  fourth  mechanism.  Thus,  I  end  up  formulating  four  ultra-realist  
explanatory  mechanisms,  but  I  will  also  warn  against  using  those  four  explanations  in  isolation.  
This  ultra-realist  perspective  remains  totally  ignorant  of  the  social-ecological  perspective.  The  latter  
is  what  I  have  used  in  my  own  empirical  research,  which  has  led  me  to  suggesting  eight  other  
explanatory  mechanisms.  All  twelve  mechanisms  should  be  seen  together  if  we  are  to  overcome  
reductionism,  and  develop  a  really  realistic  explanation. 
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Table  13-1:  Four  explanatory  mechanisms  from  so-called  “realism” 
Mechanisms  identified  by  Semb Suggested  amendments  to  the  mechanisms 
possibility  of  hypothetical  Sámi  separatism geostrategical  fortunes  (separatist  host  states) 
Governmen’s  fear  of  hypothetical  insurgency asymmetrical  interactive  (de)escalation 
Government’s  fear  of  loosing  prestige  in  the  UN diplomatic  face-saving 




13.3.0  Positive  findings:  some  possible  mechanisms 
 
13.3.1  One  macro-mechanism 
The  ongoing  state  transformation  in  the  High  North  does  correlates  with  some  geo-strategical  
changes.    Four  host  states  share  responsibility  for  different  parts  of  the  Sámi  cultural  area:  Russia,  
Finland,  Sweden  and  Norway.  The  former  is  responsible  for  many  other  indigenous  peoples  as  well,  
while  the  latter  is  responsible  of  most  of  the  Sámi  core  area  and  population.  The  former  is  the  
leading  partner  of  the  CSTO  alliance,  whereas  the  latter  is  part  of  NATO.  Sweden  is  neutral,  while  
Finland  used  to  take  part  in  the  economy  of  the  USSR.1130  In  1989  the  regime  suddenly  changed  on  
the  Russian  side,  while  on  the  Norwegian  side,  a  special  “Sámi  parliament”  was  created,  following  
the  Finnish  example.  However,  the  sudden  events  of  1989  are  no  explanation,  because  the  reform  
process  had  started  about  ten  years  previously,  and  in  1988,  it  had  led  to  the  amendment  of  
Norway’s  written  constitution.  This  coincided  with  the  Glasnost  policy  on  the  other  side  of  the  Iron  
Curtain.  The  further  reform  process  took  place  in  a  geo-strategical  environment  that  included  the  
collapse  of  the  USSR,  with  the  fall  of  bi-polar  geopolitics,  and  the  rise  of  the  BRIC-countries,  with  
the  return  of  a  multi-polar  world.  After  1989,  the  security  doctrine  of  NATO  was  transformed,  from  
liberal  nationalism  to  unbounded  network-centred  warfare.1131  Regional  integration  takes  place  
within  the  EU,  within  the  Russian  Federation,  and  even  between  the  two,  in  the  Barents  Region.  At  
the  same  time,  NATO  and  CSTO  compete  for  Arctic  resources,  with  the  oil  companies  Statoil  and  
Gazprom  on  each  side  (see  Figures  13-1  and  13-2).  
                                                 
1130  Arter  2008:  268 
1131  Østerud  &  Matlary  2009 
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Figure  13-1:  Sápmi  and  Europe  between  two  military  alliances 
Two  military  alliances:  NATO  and  CSTO,  with  Europe  divided,  and  Sápmi  divided  in  the  north.1132 
Figure  13-2:  Sápmi  and  Europe  between  two  competing  free  trade  areas  (before  TISA) 
Two  free  trade  areas:  the  Western-European  EEA  and  the  Eurasian  CES,  with  Sápmi  divided  in  the  north1133 
 
Some  observers  worry  about  a  perceived  loss  of  national  integrity  for  the  small  states.  Semb  implies  
that  the  implementation  of  indigenous  rights  in  Sápmi  may  potentially  lead  to  separatism.1134  For  
me,  that  is  not  realistic,  even  if  I  leave  aside  the  socio-ecological  systems  that  I  investigated  above.  
From  the  viewpoint  of  Geopolitik,  the  state  borders  that  divide  North-Eastern  Sápmi  were  virtually 
stable  from  1945  until  1989,  but  never  before,  and  not  after.  Since  1751,  the  Norwegian-Swedish  
border  has  been  stable  as  far  north  as  Lake  Boulbmát,  which  is  in  the  Deatnu  water  area.  However,  
north  and  east  of  that,  state  sovereignty  remained  contested  until  1945.1135  In  fact,  this  area  is  the  
Arctic  extreme  of  a  north-south  belt  that  includes  the  entirety  of  Eastern  Europe,  from  Finland  and  
the  Baltic  States,  through  Western  Russia,  Poland,  Belarus,  Ukraine  and  Romania,  to  the  Black  Sea  
and  the  Balkans.  The  peoples  of  Eastern  Europe  have  suffered  many  wars,  something  that  has  
sometimes  been  explained  with  reference  to  a  theory  about  the  Eurasian  inland  as  the  strategical  
“pivot  of  history”  (see  Figure  13-4).  
                                                 
1132  Map  source:  Wikimedia  Commons,  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:NATO_CSTO.PNG  last  retrieved  April  2014. 
1133  Map  source:  Wikimedia  Commons:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:EEA_CES.PNG  last  retrieved,  April  2014. 
1134  Semb  2005 
1135  For  a  historical-geographical  account  of  the  establishment  of  state  borders  in  the  Sápmi  region,  see  part  5.2.5,  and  in  
particular  the  historical  map  in  Figure  5-4(b).  It  should  also  be  noted  that  borders  drawn  on  a  map  (de  jure)  are  not  
automatically  translated  into  actual  useage  of  land  and  water  (de  facto),  see  also  Jebens  (2010:  22).  For  the  Machia-­
vellian  "old  theory"  such  acceptance  or  social  authority  is  mainly  a  matter  of  coercion,  whereas  for  the  "new  theory"  
it  is  mainly  a  question  of  concent  (Ostrom,  Walker  &  Gardner  1992).  Regarding  power  through  coercion  or  concent,  
see  also  Routledge  (1993:  31). 
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Figure  13-3:  Norwegian  Maritime  Boundaries 
Rich  fish,  oil  and  gas  resources  located  within  the  Norwegian  Maritime  Boundaries.1136 
Figure  13-4:  The  Heartland  Theory 
The  Barents  Sea  Basin  located  at  the  northwest  of  the  geo-strategically  “pivotal”  area.  1137 
 
  
                                                 
1136  Map  source:  ©  The  Norwegian  Military  Geographic  Service,  ungraded  map,  retrieved  February  2013. 
1137  Map  source:  Wikimedia  Commons  (Wikimedia:  “The  Geographical  Pivot  of  History”).  First  published  in:  
Mackinder  (1904:  435).  Copyright  has  expired  (70  years  after  death  of  author),  and  the  work  is  in  the  public  domain. 
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This  geopolitical  history  may  provide  an  explanation  of  the  existence  of  Sápmi  that  is  
complimentary  to  the  social-ecological  one.  The  Sámi  were  never  accommodated  by  state  builders  
between  1500  and  1989,  but  controlled  at  an  arm’s  length,  in  some  areas  and  periods  through  forced  
assimilation,  in  other  areas  and  periods  through  segregation  policies.  That  may  have  been  a  way  for  
state  builders  to  secure  access  to  local  natural  resources  used  by  the  population  in  an  area  where  
competing  state  builders  at  any  time  might  violate  the  claimed  monopoly  of  violence.  Along  the  
Deatnu  River,  the  local  population  were  subjugated  to  shifting  state  borders  and  sometimes  
competing  tax  collectors.  This  created  a  specific  set  of  limitations  and  opportunities,  where  the  local  
population  continued  to  sort  out  the  de  facto  use  of  natural  resources  locally,  and  the  overlords  
seldom  cared  as  long  as  they  could  collect  taxes.  Therefore,  there  is  absolutely  nothing  exceptional  
in  the  attempt  by  the  Nordic  Sámerađđi  to  protect  and  develop  this  local  self-rule.  Instead,  what  is  
exceptional  is  the  increasing  state  bureaucracy  after  1945,  whereby  Norway  and  Finland  dare  to  
enforce  their  claimed  sovereignty,  thus  dividing  the  river  that  they  had  always  shared.  Those  novel  
policies  from  Norway  and  Finland  constitute  the  actual  political  separatism  in  the  Deatnu  Water  
Area.  By  contrast,  the  ongoing  experiments  with  bioregional  management  in  the  area  may  be  seen  
as  regional  institutions  designed  to  come  to  terms  with  the  de  facto  ambiguity  of  sovereignty  within  
this  boundary  zone  of  history’s  geopolitical  pivot  area. 
 
Table  13-2:  Macro-mechanism,  the  geopolitik  view 
Geo-strategical  fortunes  (stabilized  Fortuna,  macro  mechanism) 
(i)  stochastic  mechanicism  (Heisenberg) 
(ii)  situated  experience  (Haraway)  under  the  fog  of  war  (Clausewitz) 
(iii)  act  of  observing  co-determines  the  observation  (Bohr) 
 
 Path  i:  This  viewpoint  from  classical  Geopolitik  has  similarities  with  the  landscape  ecology  
view  that  I  have  applied  in  my  own  empirical  studies.  Both  explain  ongoing  de-territorialization  of  
sovereignty  as  a  product  of  environmental  factors.  Both  describe  emergent  processes.  However,  the  
macro-mechanisms  are  still  different.  With  the  landscape  ecology  view,  I  mobilized  functionalist  
explanations  from  sociology  and  ecology.  Those  may  be  misinterpreted  as  teleological  development  
optimism  (as  with  Lamarck,  Parsons  or  Lenin).  The  geopolitical  view,  by  contrast,  provides  a  
mechanistic,  physicalistic  view,  though  one  that  observes  the  unpredictable,  nonlinear  dynamics  of  
strategy.  When  the  mechanic  is  nonlinear,  it  cannot  be  misinterpreted  as  deterministic  (Newtonian),  
but  must  be  seen  as  stochastic  (Heisenberg).  Thus,  the  path  between  Explanans  1  and  Explanandum  
is  interpreted  in  terms  of  modern  physics  (i). 
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 Path  iii:  Since  the  process  is  unpredictable,  this  also  implies  some  assumptions  about  the  
impact  of  Explanans  2.  With  the  functionalist  view,  knowledge  is  seen  as  an  experimental  
adaptation  to  practical  realities.  However,  a  stochastic  mechanicism  may  provide  a  less  optimistic  
view.  In  line  with  Bacon,  knowledge  is  seen  as  power,  not  only  because  it  is  empowering,  but  also  
because  research  priorities  are  entirely  determined  by  power.  Nuclear  physics,  or  stochastic  
materialism,  was  the  Royal  science  of  the  Cold  War.  For  Niels  Bohr,  this  led  to  consciousness  about  
how  the  act  of  observing  co-determines  observation.  As  a  nuclear  physicist,  he  found  his  findings  
misused  by  the  military-industrial  complex,  but  as  a  social  philosopher  he  sabotaged  their  strategy,  
by  engaging  in  peace  activism  with  colleagues  from  the  East.  His  epistemology  describes  how  
research  on  the  unknown  interacts  with  social  arrangements,  such  as  states  (iii). 
 Path  ii:  Uncertainty  is  not  only  found  in  state-certified  scientific  disciplines  (a  component  of  
Explanandum),  but  also  in  the  strategical  and  technical  knowledge  in  the  geopolitical  environment  
(Explanans  1).  Consequently,  both  are  influenced  by  Explanans  2;;  there  is  a  causal  interaction  
between  Explanans  1  and  2  (in  addition  to  both  of  them  having  direct  impact  on  Explanandum).  
Radical  feminists  argue  that  all  knowledge,  formal  or  informal,  is  situated,  relative  to  situational  
practical  reality.1138  This  is  even  more  the  case  within  the  chaos  of  the  battlefield,  the  infamous  “fog  
of  war”.1139  The  “fog  of  war”  and  “situated  knowledge”  are  terms  that  describe  howthe  unknown  
interacts  with  hands-on  geopolitical  practice  (ii). 
 In  sum,  this  view  on  paths  i,  ii,  and  iii,  is  an  application  of  aleoatory  materialism,  the  
position  developed  by  Althusser  in  order  to  defend  against  the  critique  from  post-structural  and  neo-
positivist  anti-foundationalists.  Althusser  went  back  to  Machiavelli,  where  he  found  an  
instrumentalist  epistemology  about  “the  effective  truth”,  combined  with  the  instrumentalist  strategy  
about  how  “stabilized  Fortuna”  may  be  created  through  acts  of  “creative  Virtú”.1140  This  realism  
does  not  assume  that  sovereignties  are  territorialized  or  finished,  but  it  is  still  state-centred,  because  
of  its  one-sided  focus  on  coercive  force.  It  is  fit  for  the  goals  of  Trotksysm  and  network-centred  
warfare,  and  it  remains  reductionist.  For  my  purposes,  however,  this  is  useful  as  a  complimentary  
approach  to  control  for  the  bias  of  my  own  reductionism.  What  I  found  by  applying  it  is,  that  
contrary  to  Semb’s  suggestion,1141  the  actual  political  separatism  in  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  water  
areas  is  not  found  in  the  indigenous  rights  movement,  but  in  the  attempt  by  state  bureaucracies  after  
1945  to  consolidate  claimed  territorial  divisions  that  had  never  before  been  enforced.  Such  
utopianism  contributes  to  political  destabilization,  while  what  contributes  to  stabilization  is  the  
attempts  at  regional  integration,  codifying  the  actual  entanglement  of  sovereignties.  By  suggesting  
                                                 
1138  Haraway  1991 
1139  Clausewitz  1837:  Book  1,  Chapter  3,  cited  at  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fog_of_war  Last  accessed  26.  May  2014 
1140  Althusser  1998  (Norwegian  translation:  Althusser  2003) 
1141  Semb  2005 
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that  state  sovereignty  and  indigenous  self-determination  must  be  sorted  out,  the  ICESCR  is  not  
(only)  an  idealistic  normative  instrument  but  (also)  a  pragmatic  contribution  to  “stabilized  Fortuna”  
in  the  geo-strategically  troubled  Eastern  Europe. 
 
 
13.3.2  One  meso-mechanism 
The  first  causal  path  has  been  identified  through  archives  left  behind  by  the  Alta-dam  controversy.  
Semb  proposed  an  explanatory  mechanism  on  the  basis  of  archival  work  in  the  Norwegian  police,  
combined  with  minutes  from  debates  in  the  Norwegian  parliament.  Those  primary  sources  are  seen  
in  the  context  of  election  statistics,  indicating  that  the  popular  opinion  might  not  have  provided  any  
incentive  for  the  political  class  to  implement  indigenous  rights.  In  my  opinion,  Semb  bases  those  
suggestions  on  solid  empirical  proof.  She  is  also  careful  to  emphasize  that  she  is  not  assessing  the  
actual  risk  of  violent  escalation  at  the  time,  but  what  might  have  been  the  perceptions  amongst  
policy  makers.  Still,  her  findings  have  not  been  incorporated  into  the  “canonical  narrative”  from  
Dalland  through  Hjorthol,  to  myself.  On  the  other  hand,  this  canonical  narrative  was  ignored  by  
Semb  in  her  interpretation  of  her  own  data.  In  my  own  case  study,  I  included  data  about  law  
enforcement  from  Hjorthol’s  archive  work  and  interviews.    He  confirms  that  it  was  a  high  priority  
for  the  police  to  uncover  a  hypothetical  Sámi  guerrilla  force,  and  he  emphasizes  that  still  they  never  
found  any.  Additionally,  he  documented  the  political  struggle  between  the  Minister  for  Justice,  who  
asked  the  army  to  intervene,  and  the  Minister  of  Defence,  who  rejected  the  request.  For  the  latter  
author,  it  was  important  to  find  proof  that  de-dramatized  the  story,  because  he  was  the  former  
regional  leader  of  the  Maoist  party,  the  internal  discipline  of  which  had  been  disobeyed  by  Niilas  
Somby  and  his  group  when  they  tried  to  engange  in  material  sabotage  of  a  bridge.  His  forefather  
Mons  Somby  had  participated  in  the  Guovdageaidnu  Uprising  in  1952,  and  had  been  beheaded  by  
the  authorities  for  the  murder  of  two  of  the  King’s  servants.  Those  are  the  two  singular  examples  in  
recorded  history  when  the  Sámi  applied  coercive  force  to  defend  themselves  against  institutional  
violence  from  host  states.1142  However,  during  the  Second  World  War,  Finnmark  County  had  a  
rather  active  partisan  movement  against  the  Nazi  occupation,  and  it  was  aligned  with  Murmansk,  
rather  than  London.  Both  historical  memories  were  evoked  by  Niilas  Somby  in  an  interview  in  
2010,  where  he  claimed  that  he  had  tried  to  convince  his  group  to  blow  up  the  ship  that  had  
                                                 
1142  Some  argue  that  the  historian  or  the  anthropologist  should  treat  threats  of  witchcraft  similarly  to  threats  of  brute  
force,  because  the  receivers  of  the  threats  may  have  perceived  both  as  equally  violent  (Graeber  2004).  If  this  is  the  
case,  then  it  has  implications  for  our  understanding  of  the  witchcraft  trials  against  the  Sámi  under  the  early  modern  
state  churches.  If  my  study  had  been  a  historical  anthropology  of  early  modern  Sápmi,  I  might  have  adapted  such  a  
conceptualisation,  but  for  the  present  study,  I  have  defined  coercive  force  according  to  contemporary  ethical  and  
strategical  needs,  see  Chapter  2. 
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transported  the  police  forces  that  were  used  against  non-violent  civil  disobedience  from  
Folkeaksjonen  and  Sameaksjonen.1143  This  suggestion  had  not  succeeded  in  influencing  the  
consensus  within  his  affinity  group.  However,  the  moderate  Sámi  politician  Ole  Henrik  Magga  
claims  that  if  the  army  had  been  used  against  the  non-violent  civil  disobedience,  then  it  would  have  
become  “impossible  to  keep  the  militants  among  the  Sámi  in  check”.1144  All  of  this  proof  should  be  
taken  together:  the  recent  newspaper  articles,  the  canonical  historical  research,  and  Semb’s  
contribution.  The  latter  documented  the  fear  of  hypothetical  insurgent  violence  among  the  political  
class.  The  historians  found  proof  that  the  activists  restrained  each  other;;  in  Magga's  words,  they  
kept  each  other  “in  check”,  and  the  same  might  be  said  about  the  interaction  between  the  two  
ministers  that  maintained  command  over  the  police  and  the  army,  respectively.  Those  processes  may  
be  compared  with  two  general  mechanisms  of  insurgent  political  violence,  suggested  by  della  
Porta:1145  escalating  policing  from  the  ruling  coalition,  and  competitive  escalation  among  the  
oppositional  coalition.  One  of  the  contexts  where  those  mechanisms  were  identified  is  the  
“interactive  diffusion”  where  the  interactions  between  riot  police  and  black  bloc  protestors  became  
increasingly  violent  from  one  counter-summit  to  another.  Thus,  one  may  talk  about  interactive  
escalation.  In  the  case  of  the  Alta-dam  conflict,  the  interaction  implied  quite  as  much  restraint  as  
escalation.  Thus,  we  may  identify  a  mechanism  of  asymmetrical  interactive  (de)escalation. 
 
Table  13-3:  One  suggested  meso-mechanism 
Asymmetrical  interactive  (de)escalation  (meso-mechanism) 
(i)  actors  in  ruling  and  oppositional  blocs  co-evolve  tactics,  and  keep  internal  tactics  in  check 
(ii)  police  action  is  perceived  differently  from  communities  at  different  locations  in  the  terrain 
(iii)  if  all  you  have  is  a  hammer,  all  problems  look  like  nails,  also  for  policy  makers 
 
 Path  i:  The  particular  path  it  took  may  be  explained  by  means  of  comparison  with  
counterfactual  history:  if  the  Ministry  of  Defence  had  been  under  the  control  of  militants  within  the  
pro-dam  bloc,  then  the  army  would  have  been  mobilized,  and  then  “the  militants”  among  the  Sámi  
might  not  have  accepted  being  restrained  by  their  more  pragmatic  peers.  Activists  keeping  each  
other  “in  check”  within  the  oppositional  bloc  depended  on  members  of  the  political  class  keeping  
each  other  “in  check”  within  the  ruling  bloc.  So,  the  process  was  interactive,  but  it  was  also  a  
conflict  on  unequal  terms.  We  deal  with  an  asymmetrical  political  conflict,  which  did  not  escalate  
into  an  asymmetrical  military  one  (i). 
                                                 
1143  Larsen  &  Kalvemo  2010 
1144  Aftenposten  2011  (2006) 
1145  Della  Porta  2013 
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 Path  iii:  This  physicalist  mechanism  also  involves  different  forms  of  being  under-informed  
at  different  strategical  positions,  Explanans  2.  Within  the  state  apparatus  (Explanandum),  
information  is  being  gathered  about  the  unknown  (Explanans  2)  and  analysed  within  the  context  of  
various  policies:  security  studies,  international  law,  police  science,  etc.    If  all  you  have  is  a  hammer,  
all  problems  look  like  nails.  The  different  branches  of  the  state  produce  competing  interpretations  
(iii). 
 Path  ii:  Within  the  strategical  terrain  (Explanans  1),  all  actors  find  themselves  in  strategical  
positions  relative  to  other  actors,  but  also  find  themselves  under-informed  about  their  own  positions  
(Explanans  2).  Within  the  tent  camps  of  Folkeaksjonen  and  Sameaksjonen  some  intersubjective  
empirical  perceptions  emerged,  while  within  the  opposing  Borgervernet,  some  quite  different  
perceptions  emerged,  and  so  on.  Population  groups  with  different  socio-material  positions  within  
the  terrain  of  the  watershed  tended  to  experience  the  police  action  in  quite  different  ways  (ii). 
 My  suggestion  is  that  we  interpret  the  mechanism  of  asymmetrical  interactive  (de)escalation  
in  the  context  of  my  socio-ecological  findings,  above.  Legal  pluralism  was  the  practical  fact  on  the  
ground,  even  though  the  Supreme  Court  in  1982  attempted  to  affirm  the  unity  of  jurisprudence.  
Under  conditions  of  legal  pluralism,  it  may  not  be  entirely  clear  what  coercive  force  is  legitimate,  if  
any.  Thus,  while  some  policy  makers  may  have  seen  Somby’s  sabotage  action  as  a  symptom  of  
potential  insurgent  violence,  other  policy  makers  may  have  seen  is  at  a  symptom  of  absent  social  
legitimacy  for  institutional  violence.  Semb  found  proof  for  the  existence  of  the  former  perception  in  
her  archive  work.  I  see  proof  for  the  existence  of  the  latter  perception  in  the  reports  from  the  Sámi  
Rights  Commission,  commissioned  by  the  Ministry  of  Justice  and  the  Police.  This  implies  that  I  
think  that  some  forms  of  state  investigation  are  more  fruitful  than  others.  In  particular,  I  think  that  
security  studies  may  easily  become  misleading  if  their  bias  is  not  controlled  for  with  studies  of  
human  rights  law,  legal  anthropology  and  legal  history.  Thus,  the  geo-strategical  mechanism  of  
“interactive  (de)escalation”  cannot  lead  to  valid  interpretation  if  seen  in  isolation  from  the  actual  
context  of  the  landscape  ecology,  for  example  the  mechanism  called  “ambiguous  adaptations”.  
Similarly,  it  may  be  fruitful  to  control  the  neorealist  mechanisms  “(de)escalating  policing”  (within  
constituted  power)  and  “competitive  (de)escalation”  (within  a  constituent  power)  for  what  the  data  
reveal  when  we  apply  the  more  constructivist  mechanisms  “the  struggle  to  define  (actual)  
hegemony”  and  “the  struggle  for  (future)  agenda-setting”.  While  the  army  was  not  being  mobilized  
during  the  Alta-dam  struggle,  this  may  partly  be  understood  as  a  strategical  adaptation,  where  
several  heads  think  better  than  one,  but  it  may  also  be  partly  understood  as  an  outcome  of  a  
symbolic  struggle  between  competing  clusters  of  party  bosses,  who  had  gained  control  over  
different  ministries.  It  might  be  that  the  non-militaristic  faction  within  the  ruling  bloc  succeeded  in  
defining  the  policy  agenda. 
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13.3.3  Another  meso-mechanism 
The  second  mechanism  suggested  by  Semb  was  in  play  during  the  attempt  to  implement  indigenous  
rights,  my  Cases  II.  She  asks  what  might  have  led  the  Norwegian  parliament  in  the  1980s  and  1990s  
to  ratify  the  new  international  norms  on  indigenous  human  rights.  One  of  the  explanations  she  
suggested  was  the  fear  of  hypothetical  insurgent  violence,  which  I  discussed  above  as  
“asymmetrical  interactive  (de)escalation”,  and  saw  in  the  context  of  “ambiguous  adaptations”.  The  
second  explanation  she  suggests  is  that  the  political  class  feared  that  the  state  might  lose  its  prestige  
in  the  UN,  and  since  the  state  is  small,  it  possesses  few  other  assets  in  international  politics.  For  me,  
this  makes  sense  intuitively,  though  she  does  not  provide  much  evidence  for  this.  However,  one  
author  who  does  provide  evidence  is  Henry  Minde,  who  took  part  in  the  international  policy  
process,  as  a  representative  of  Sámi  NGOs.1146  His  narrative  about  the  process  is  somewhat  
different.  He  portrays  the  Norwegian  diplomatic  corps  and  the  Sámi  interest  organizations  not  only  
as  adversaries  in  the  negotiations,  but  also  as  allies.  The  two  explanations  may  both  be  correct.  
Norway  had  already  established  an  image  of  itself  as  being  in  favour  of  indigenous  rights,  when  
suddenly  its  political  leadership  realized  that  their  domestic  political  entity  contained  an  indigenous  
people.  This  happened  when  the  Sámi  interest  organizations  gained  acceptance  among  the  
international  interest  organizations  for  indigenous  peoples.  From  then  on,  the  Sámi  organizations  
participated  in  the  transnational  indigenous  rights  movement,  which  struggled  to  influence  the  
policy  process  in  the  UN.  In  parallel,  the  same  Sámi  organizations  also  engaged  in  diplomacy  with  
their  host  states.  This  multi-level  policy  process  was  rather  complex,  and  more  research  would  be  
needed  in  order  to  further  specify  the  explanations  suggested  by  Minde  and  Semb.  One  hypothesis  
may  be  that  the  Sámi  under  Norwegian  jurisdiction  succeeded  in  pressuring  the  colonial  state  to  
collaborate  because  they  had  bypassed  the  state  and  sought  accommodation  at  the  UN  level  before  
seeking  accommodation  at  state  level.  We  may  elaborate  this  as  a  mechanism,  regarding  pathways  i,  
ii  and  iii. 
 Path  i:  The  direct  impact  from  Explanans  1  on  Explanandum  may  be  explained  by  the  
aleatority  of  strategy  (its  element  of  impredicability):  The  double  standards  of  a  liberal  state  
backfire  when  that  state  suddenly  faces  strong  claims  that  it  breaks  human  rights  at  home  (i). 
 Path  ii:  This  relates  to  how  various  positions  in  the  strategical  environment  (Explanans  1)  
are  underinformed  in  different  ways  (Explanans  2).  The  minority  population  experiences  human  
rights  breaches,  while  the  majority  remains  ignorant  (ii). 
 Path  iii:  This,  in  turn,  also  influences  the  state’s  diplomats  (Explanandum),  who  are  under-
informed  (Explanans  2).  The  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  started  out  by  being  under-informed,  when  
                                                 
1146  See  e.g.  Minde,  Eide  &  Åhrén  2007 
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pushing  for  indigenous  human  rights  abroad,  and  only  after  that  process  had  started,  did  the  
ministry  obtain  information  about  domestic  human  right  breaches  (iii). 
 This  explanatory  model  reduces  international  politics  to  pure  strategy,  in  line  with  so-called  
realist  I.R.  theory.  It  may  or  may  not  be  the  case  that  rational  deliberation  plays  a  more  significant  
role,  something  assumed  in  neoliberal  institutionalist  I.R.  theory.  Some  indications  of  the  latter  can  
be  found  in  the  proof  gathered  by  Hjorthol.1147  He  interviewed  the  former  minister  of  defence,  who  
refused  to  use  the  army  against  peaceful  civil  disobedients  during  the  Alta-dam  controversy.  This,  I  
discussed  in  the  context  of  the  mechanism  of  “asymmetrical  interactive  (de)escalation”  above.  The  
minister  was  Thorvald  Stoltenberg,  and  as  Hjorthol  emphasizes,  this  person  had  been  involved  in  
international  human  rights  legislation  at  the  UN  level.  It  is  an  empirical  question  as  to  whether  he  
was  already  informed  about  the  Sámi  struggle  for  human  rights  at  that  time.  There  is  not  much  
transparency  around  the  internal  political  struggles  in  the  Norwegian  Labor  Party  and  the  
Norwegian  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs.  What  is  for  certain  is  that  if  one  opens  up  the  black  box  of  
“Norwegian  foreign  policy”  one  will  find  further  particular  pathways,  that  may,  in  turn,  be  further  
described  in  terms  of  internal  strategy  or  internal  deliberation.  Again,  as  observed  with  regard  to  the  
previous  mechanism,  it  might  be  the  case  that  the  non-militaristic  faction  within  the  ruling  bloc  
succeeded  in  setting  the  policy  agenda. 
 As  the  I.R.  scholar  Iver  Neumann  showed  with  his  second  doctorate,  it  is  not  impossible  to  
conduct  anthropological  fieldwork  among  diplomats,  though  it  is  rather  challenging  for  an  
ethnographer  to  gain  access  to  their  arenas.1148  International  diplomacy  between  states  and  NGOs  
had  a  rather  crucial  impact  on  the  struggle  for  indigenous  rights  in  Sápmi,  and  therefore,  more  
research  on  this  process  would  be  needed  to  gain  better  explanations  of  state  transformation  in  the  
Alta  and  Deatnu  River  areas.     
 
Table  13-4:  Another  meso-mechanism 
Diplomatic  face  saving  (meso-mechanism) 
(i)  Double  standards  of  liberal  state  backfire1149  in  the  face  of  own  human  rights  breaches 
(ii)  Minority  population  experience  human  rights  breaches,  while  majority  remains  ignorant 
(iii)  Diplomats  are  first  under-informed,  then  informed  about  domestic  human  rights  breaches 
 
 
                                                 
1147  Hjorthol  2006 
1148  Neumann  2009 
1149    When  the  double  standards  of  the  liberal  state  "bacfire",  it  may  be  a  particular  form  of  the  more  general  process  that  
Keck  &  Sikkink  (1998:  12,  102,  107)  have  characterised  as  "boomeraing  effect".  (Thanks  to  Paul  Routledge  for  the  
reference.) 
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13.3.4  A  third  meso-mechanism 
Finally,  I  will  suggest  a  neorealist  mechanism  that  was  not  observed  by  Semb.  She  did  not  discuss  
the  issue  of  unpredictability  in  strategical  situations,  what  Clausewitz  called  “the  fog  of  war”.1150  
Regarding  the  two  mechanisms  she  suggested,  I  have  discussed  how  various  strategical  positions  in  
the  terrain  imply  different  ways  of  being  under-informed  (path  ii),  and  how  such  under-informed  
positions  may  inform  particular  state  policies  (path  iii).  Being  under-informed  is  a  chronic  condition  
for  strategic  situations,  and  this  has  real-world  effects,  on  forming  the  strategical  theatres  about  
which  they  are  under-informed.  Under-informed  observation  and  analysis  was  integral  to  the  
tactical  and  strategic  choices  among  police  and  protestors  during  the  Alta-dam  struggle  
(“asymmetrical  interactive  (de)escalation”),  and  the  same  was  the  case  for  the  interaction  between  
state  diplomats  and  human  rights  organizations  in  the  years  that  followed  (“diplomatic  face  
saving”).  My  discussion  of  this  topic  has  touched  upon  one  most  controversial  issue  of  under-
information. 
 For  the  majority  of  citizens  in  Norway  (Explanans  1),  there  is  no  question  as  to  whether  
there  exists  a  legitimate  monopoly  of  coercive  force.  However,  there  is  a  minority  of  citizens  for  
whom  that  is  not  the  case.  The  moderate  Sámi  politician  Magga  mentioned  that  there  existed  some  
“militants”  among  the  Sámi  that  his  faction  would  not  have  been  able  to  “keep  in  check”  if  the  
governing  political  bloc  had  mobilized  the  army.1151  The  public  face  of  those  militants,  Niilas  
Somby,  draws  parallels  not  only  to  the  Guovdageaidnu  Uprising  in  1852,  but  also  to  the  partisans  
against  occupation  during  the  Second  World  War.1152  The  latter  comparison  would  probably  sound  
outrageous  to  most  Norwegian  citizens,  perhaps  including  most  Norwegian  Sámi.  However,  what  is  
interesting  is  that  this  form  of  communication  appears  to  work  in  some  contexts.  The  really  difficult  
question  is:  What  coercive  force,  if  any  at  all,  enjoyed  de  facto  social  legitimacy  in  Inner  Sápmi  
during  the  Alta-dam  conflict? 
 When  I  switched  methods  from  qualitative  interviews  to  participant  observation,  I  gained  
some  data  here  and  there,  which  indicates  that  for  some  communities  within  the  Finnmark  Plateau,  
the  use  of  police  against  non-violent  civil  disobedience  in  the  area  was  not  seen  as  law  enforcement,  
but  on  the  contrary  as  occupation.  Consequently,  for  those  communities,  Somby’s  sabotage  action  
was  not  an  extreme  insurgent  act,  but  on  the  contrary,  a  moderate  defensive  act.  In  fact,  the  only  
non-state  group  that  used  coercive  force  against  humans  was  Borgervernet,  the  pro-dam  action  
group,  which  claimed  to  be  doing  the  job  that  the  sheriff  (lensmann)  was  hesitant  to  do.  Thus,  
within  the  Alta  Water  Area,  different  persons  at  different  locations  had  different  intersubjective  
                                                 
1150  Clausewitz  1837:  Book  1,  Chapter  3,  cited  at  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fog_of_war  Last  accessed  26.  May  2014 
1151  Aftenposten  2011  (2006) 
1152  Larsen  &  Kalvemo  2010 
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experiences  of  practical  reality,  including  diverging  opinions  on  what  uses  of  coercive  force  are  
legitimate,  if  any  at  all.  Were  the  police  used  for  law  enforcement  or  for  occupation?  Did  Niilas  
commit  extremist,  insurgent  coercion  or  was  it  moderate,  defensive  coercion?  To  my  knowledge,  
this  difficult  issue  is  not  being  publicly  discussed,  and  thus,  there  is  little  attempt  at  deliberation  
about  the  issue.  In  the  Norwegian  language,  I  have  found  nothing,  but  for  the  sake  of  democratic  
deliberation,  one  may  hope  that  at  least  the  Northern  Sámi  media  debate  the  issue.  I  have  only  
observed  one  public  statement  that  voices  the  minor  practical  reality  regarding  this  issue,  one  street  
art  piece.  This  was  in  the  Arctic  city  that  I  knew  under  its  Norwegian  name,  Tromsø,  but  while  
being  there  I  learned  that  for  some  it  may  be  called  Romssa  (in  Northern  Sámi)  or  Tromssa  (in  
Kvän).  Even  though  the  majority  of  the  citizenry  remain  ignorant  of  the  minor  practical  reality  (one  
component  of  Explanans  1),  I  do  not  think  that  the  political  class  of  the  state  formation  is  equally  
ignorant  (one  component  of  the  Explanandum).  This  because  the  reality  of  legal  or  even  
jurisdictional  pluralism  was  documented  in  the  official  reports  from  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission,  
published  by  the  Norwegian  Ministry  of  Justice  and  the  Police. 
 For  the  political  elite,  it  must  be  challenging  to  keep  balancing  between  the  two  poles  of  an  
asymmetrical  political  conflict:  on  the  one  hand,  those  who  claim  to  protect  individual  human  rights  
against  “privileges”  among  a  “minority”  of  citizens;;  on  the  other  hand,  those  who  push  for  
collective  human  rights  against  “colonization”  of  an  indigenous  people  and  their  homeland.  Thus,  
the  authority  of  the  Norwegian  Sámi  Parliament  is  being  subverted  by  two  opposing  camps:  the  
Norwegian  Progress  Party  (FrP)  and  the  Sámi  cultural  revival  movement  (ČSV).  In  spite  of  their  
opposing  stances,  both  camps  are  committed  to  human  rights.  On  my  travels,  I  met  a  man  who  
voted  FrP  in  the  Sámi  Parliament  election,  but  then  he  learned  more  about  the  colonial  history,  and  
now  he  works  together  with  ČSV  activists.  The  disagreement  between  the  two  movements  is  
whether  or  not  colonization  has  taken  place,  while  both  of  them  push  for  human  rights  and  against  
the  ruling  political  elite.  Therefore,  when  their  activism  is  simply  being  stigmatized  as  “the  two  
extremes”,  it  may  save  the  political  elite  from  a  difficult  public  debate,  exactly  as  when  the  Russian  
government  labels  human  rights  activists  as  “hooligans”.  Such  simplistic  rhetorical  moves  could  be  
explained  by  the  geopolitical  context  (Explanans  1).  After  1989,  both  NATO  and  CSTO  claim  to  be  
engaged  in  unbounded  wars  against  terror.  Potential  threats  against  the  political  systems  are  being  
framed  as  potential  threats  to  the  security  of  the  nation.  Russia  uses  the  term  “hooliganism”,  
Norway/NATO  the  term  “radicalisation”.1153  In  both  cases,  movements  for  fundamental  systems  
transformation  are  being  lumped  together  with  armed  groups  and  organized  crime,  a  process  known  
by  constructivist  I.R.  scholars  as  “securitisation”  of  politics.1154  Those  scholars  quite  correctly  point  
                                                 
1153  Ahmhed  2014;;  Ballovara  2014;;  Langlais  1999 
1154  Buzan,  Wæver  &  Wilde  1998 
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out  that  the  naïve  realists  among  their  colleagues  are  unaware  that  their  concept  of  radicalisation  is  a  
source  of  confusion.1155  However,  if  we  take  the  ultra-realist  (strategic)  position  of  Clausewitz,  we  
may  let  the  pendulum  swing  back  to  the  realist  pole,  by  redefining  a  “source  of  confusion”  as  a  
“weapon  of  psychological  warfare”. 
 Path  i:  Regardless  of  the  intentions  of  well-meaning  police  scientists  (such  as  Tore  Bjørgo),  
their  research  on  so-called  “radicalisation”  may  serve  the  (unintended)  function  of  suppressing  and  
silencing  minor  practical  realities  that  are  somehow  troublesome  for  any  regime.  Thus,  regardless  of  
what  mechanical  or  intentional  reasons  there  might  be  for  the  terms  “radicalisation”  or  
“hooliganism”  to  exist,  one  of  the  functional  reasons  that  those  terms  are  still  in  use  is  certainly  that  
they  serve  strategical  securitisation.  By  silencing  dissent  and  suppressing  deliberation,  this  
mechanism  provides  a  direct  path  from  the  background  variable  to  the  dependent  variable  (i). 
 Path  ii:  The  impact  of  Explanans  2  on  Explanandum  involves  the  divergent  practical  
experiences  of  coercive  force:  the  majority  experienced  the  sabotage  action  as  terrorism  and  the  
police  action  as  law  enforcement,  while  a  minority  experienced  the  police  action  as  occupation  and  
the  sabotage  action  as  militant  social  defence.  Different  groups  within  the  population  experienced  
coercion  differently,  as  bodily  experience,  observed  through  the  senses,  but  within  different  socio-
material  situations.  (ii). 
 Path  iii:  Finally,  the  causal  interaction  between  Explanans  1  and  Explanans  2  reproduces  
similar  divergent  experiences:  On  the  one  hand  the  realist  state  scientist  Semb  is  worried  about  
challenges  to  a  presumed  monopoly  of  violence.  On  the  other  hand,  the  journalist  Hjorthol  is  eager  
to  show  that  this  worry  was  ungrounded  However,  no  state-certified  science  so  far  has  taken  
Somby’s  perception  seriously.  (iii). 
 The  research  you  are  now  reading,  dear  reader,  is  to  my  knowledge  the  only  attempt  by  
state-certified  science  so  far  to  take  Somby’s  framing  seriously,  as  an  index  of  a  particular  
intersubjective,  empirical  practical  reality.  When  I  suggest  the  mechanism  of  “strategic  
securitisation”,  it  has  been  formulated  in  ultra-realistic  terms.  I  am  not  in  favour  of  any  
reductionistic  use  of  such  ultra-realistic  explanations.  This  is  because  the  war  against  terror  may  
only  potentially  function  as  a  war  against  political  dissent.  Likewise,  there  is  no  reason  that  defence  
against  such  suppression  would  be  bound  to  resort  to  coercive  force,  because  it  may  very  well  be  
possible  to  use  the  repertoires  that  Gene  Sharp  calls  “social  defence”.1156  Indeed,  the  diverging  
social  experiences  about  the  legitimacy  of  institutional  violence  in  the  Alta  and  Deatnu  Water  Areas  
is  in  its  entirety  a  conflict  between  different  forms  of  norms  and  knowledge,  and  in  no  way  a  
conflict  between  any  competing  attempts  to  impose  institutional  violence.  This  is  because  the  siida-
                                                 
1155  Sedgwick  2010 
1156  Sharp  1973 
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system  (which  never  fully  disappeared)  and  the  state-system  (which  was  never  fully  consolidated)  
are  not  overlapping  sovereignties  (understood  as  monopolies  of  violence),  but  are  complex  
jurisdictions  (understood  as  normative  orders).  This  is  a  feature  of  landscape  ecology,  but  not  of  
geo-strategical  theatres.  Such  practical  realities  can  be  uncovered  with  institutinalist  and  
constructivist  tools  (such  as  ANT  and  SES),  but  remain  ignored  by  state-centred  “realism”  (such  as  
the  postmodern  Machiavelli).     
 
Table  13-5:  One  more  meso-mechanism 
Strategical  securitisation  (meso-mechanism) 
(i)  Securitisation  of  controversial  claims  silences  particular  experiences  of  practical  reality 
(ii)  Human  bodies  experience  coercion  differently,  if  located  in  minority  or  majority  territories 
(iii)  State-certified  sciences  ignore  practical  realities  informing  to  clams  that  are  “securitised” 
 
 
13.3.5  One  micro-mechanism 
In  order  to  complete  the  logical  argument,  and  in  order  to  complement  the  two  micro-mechanisms  
that  were  identified  empirically  by  my  study,  one  might  also  make  explicit  the  assumptions  on  
micro-political  mechanisms  that  are  implicitly  assumed  when  I  have  controlled  for  state-centred  
realism. 
 Path  i:  The  mature  Althusser  borrowed  the  expression  “creative  Virtù”  from  Machiavelli,  
referring  to  the  capability  of  identifying  opportunities,  and  grabbing  them,  in  order  to  combine  
various  physical  forces,  and  thus  impose  one’s  will.  Fortuna  (Explanans  1)  must  be  seized  (i). 
 Path  ii:  However,  the  mature  Althusser  highlights  that  Machiavelli’s  potential  Prince  must  
have  cognitive  capabilities  in  addition  to  practical  ones.  Fortuna  must  be  found  (Explanans  2)  
before  she  can  be  seized.  Technically  applicable  (or  experimentally  valid)  statements  about  the  
world  constitute  the  “effective  truth”  (ii). 
 Path  iii.  Finally,  the  practical  and  cognitive  capabilities  of  the  potential  Prince  are  closely  
integrated  (interaction  between  Explanans  1  and  Explanans  2).  To  find  and  to  seize  Fortuna  are  two  
sides  of  the  same  process.  For  aleaotory  materialism,  reality  is  itself  a  process:  practical  reality.  To  
illustrate  this,  we  could  use  the  English  verb  “to  realize”  in  a  double  sense:  On  the  one  hand,  the  
tactical  actor  should  decrease  his  lack  of  information,  and  cognitively  realize  the  potentials,  by  
perceiving  them.  On  the  other  hand,  the  tactical  actor  must  also  execute  actions  to  practically  
realize  the  potentials,  by  utilizing  them  (iii). 
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Table  13-6:  One  micro-mechanism 
Realizing  the  potentials  (creative  Virtù,  micro-mechanism) 
i.  combine  existing  physical  forces  in  order  to  impose  one’s  will 
ii.  cognitively  realize  potentials,  as  in  perceiving  them 
iii.  practically  realize  potentials,  as  in  actualizing  them 
 
So  how  do  we  link  action  and  structure?  How  is  it  that  the  actor  with  strong  willpower  and  good  
cognitive  and  technical  capability  can  empower  his  Virtù  to  form  and  stabilize  Fortuna?  Again,  I  
conceptualise  the  means  whereby  constituent  and  constituted  power  operate  as  praxis  networks  at  
the  meso-level. 
 Constituent,  micropolitical  action  equals  “creative  Virtù”,  or  the  capability  of  finding  and  
using  opportunities,  to  combine  forces,  and  thereby,  to  impose  one’s  will.1157 
 Constituted  macropolitical  structure  equals  “stabilized  Fortuna”,  and  such  an  order  is  being  
constituted  and  policed  by  the  total  Virtù  assembled  as  central  node(s)  of  power. 
 The  mediating  meso-pathways  are  vectors  of  matter-energy,  each  of  them  producing  effects  
on  other  vectors  of  matter-energy,  in  an  immense  web  of  causation.1158 
This  conceptualisation  of  practice  networks  is  strictly  physicalistic,  and  as  such,  it  differs  from  the  
sociological  and  ecological  orientation  in  “adjacent  action  situations”  (SES)  and  “actor-networks”  
(ANT).  The  physicalistic  conceptualisation  of  practice  networks  comes  from  the  mature  Althusser’s  
aleatory  materialism,  and  builds  on  his  adaptation  of  Deleuze  and  Guattari.1159  I  think  these  
physicalistic  practice  networks  may  be  used  to  explain  all  the  three  meso-mechanisms  discussed  
above,  in  a  similar  manner  to  how  social-ecological  practice  networks  were  used  to  explain  the  
mechanisms  that  I  identified  in  my  own  empirical  chapters. 
 In  the  final  analysis,  the  postmodern  Machiavelli  reduces  the  sociological  and  ecological  
factors  to  stochastic  physicalistic  forces.  These  are  the  most  particular  “nuts  and  bolts”  of  this  clear-
cut  state-centred  realism.  In  the  final  analysis,  it  reduces  everything  to  physical  force,  though  with  a  
stochastic  understanding  of  physics.  That  is  very  different  from  the  concepts  I  mobilised  in  my  own  
empirical  chapters,  where  the  nuts  and  bolts,  at  the  end  of  the  day,  are  concepts  about  
intersubjective  deliberation,  situated  within  particular  socio-ecological  environments.1160  Therefore,  
                                                 
1157  Althusser  1998 
1158  De  Landa  1997 
1159  While  the  Marxist,  early  Althusser  informed  Deleuze  &  Guattari  (1980),  they  in  turn  informed  the  post-marxist,  
mature  Althusser  (Holland  2013:  141).  De  Landa  (1997)  builds  on  Althusser’s  reading  of  Deleuze  &  Guattari  
(1980). 
1160    This  re-actualizes  the  question  of  what  kind  of  matter  the  various  forms  of  geographcial  scales  are  made  from.  Part  
12.3.4  elaborated  on  how  this  is  explained  in  the  empirical  parts  of  this  thesis,  where  political  geography  (explanan-­
dum)  is  adapted  to  landscape  geography  (explanans)  through  praxes  nets  (intervening  causal  factor  or  mechanism).  
This,  however,  has  been  different  in  the  present  chapter,  becuse  of  another  choice  of  theoretical  concepts.  Here  it  has  
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those  are  two  strictly  different  explanations  of  how  meso-political  action  networks  emerge.  Some  
believe  that  it  makes  sense  to  reduce  sociological,  biological  and  chemical  factors  to  physicalistic  
ones.  Others  believe  that  each  of  those  realms  of  knowledge  include  mechanisms  that  are  
irreducible  to  the  others.  I  will  remind  the  reader  about  “the  principle  of  complementarity”  as  it  was  




13.4.0  Negative  findings:  some  possible  residuals 
 
Regarding  the  attempt  to  control  my  own  biases,  I  have  introduced  some  selected  studies  from  state-
centred  realism,  and  some  selected  information  about  the  general  geo-strategical  environment.  Here,  
I  have  used  all  the  existing  research  that  I  know  about,  but  I  am  not  familiar  enough  with  state-
centred  realism  to  suggest  further  research  within  that  field.  However,  I  do  observe  some  particular  
limitations  to  my  own  observations: 
 a)  My  discussion  of  the  geo-strategical  context  is  not  very  systematic,  and  I  am  far  from  well  
informed  about  military  science.  I  have  mostly  based  myself  on  two  maps:  One,  the  theory  about  
the  Eurasian  Heartland,  is  one  of  the  old  classics  in  geo-strategy,  presented  in  all  standard  
textbooks.  Another,  the  map  over  Norwegian  territorial  waters,  is  a  publicly  well-known  issue,  and  
the  map  can  be  freely  downloaded  from  the  Internet.  One  relevant  question  to  ask  might  have  been  
the  relative  importance  of  geo-strategical  theatres  versus  landscape  ecology,  in  order  to  give  an  
accurate  description  of  the  actual  opportunity  structure  that  has  enabled  the  particular  state  
transformation  to  take  place.  In  less  abstract  terms:  It  may  be  that  the  relative  success  of  the  Sámi  
rights  movement,  compared  to  other  indigenous  rights  movements,  may  be  partly  explained  by  the  
                                                                                                                                                                  
been  inqired  how  the  same  political  geography  (explanandum)  has  been  adapted  to  geostrategical  theatres  (ex-­
planandum),  also  here  mediated  by  praxis  nets  (intervening  causal  factor  or  mechanism).  Such  theatres  also  take  
place  at  various  scales,  from  the  most  particular  tactical  situation  to  the  global  geopolitical  game.  Their  spatial  scope  
is  defined  instrumentally.  The  definition  of  spatial  scope  is  a  technology  of  war.  Similarly,  a  footnote  to  part  12.3.4  
addressed  the  pragmaticsm  involved  in  the  definition  of  analytical  system  boundaries  for  socio-ecological  analysis,  
as  well  as  the  claim  of  territorial  jurisdiction  under  administrative  hierarchies.  Thus,  the  definition  of  spatial  scope  is  
a  technology  for  the  management  of  landscape  and  population.  From  the  viewpoint  of  the  postmodern  Machavelli,  
all  this  can  be  reduced  to  tactical  or  strategical  interventions  (Virtù)  into  an  opportunity  structure  of  physical  forces  
known  and  unknown  (Fortuna).  The  asumption  then  is  that  all  geographical  scales,  in  theory,  may  be  dissected  into  
vectors  of  matter-energy,  influencing  each  other  in  a  complex  web  of  causation  (De  Landa  1997),  thus  giving  rise  to  
various  spatio-temporal  formations  (Deleuze  &  Guattari  1980:  Chpt.  XII-XIII). 
1161  Bohr  1938.  Especially  relevant  is  his  interest  for  what  we  today  would  call  "emergent  properties":  physical  
processes  partly  explain  biological  processes,  but  these  also  possess  some  emergent  properties  on  their  own,  and  
similarly,  biological  processes  partly  explain  sociological  processes,  but  also  these  possess  some  emergent  properties  
on  their  own.  Consequently,  natural  resources  management  involve  sociological,  biological  and  physical  
explanations.  The  logic  is  similar  to  how  the  physiology  of  neurons  involves  different  explanations  from  cell  
biology,  chemistry  and  electrophysics  (Machamer,  Darden  &  Craver  2000).   
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general  absence  of  war  in  this  area  after  1945,  or  alternatively,  by  the  specific  terror  balance  
between  the  two  military  blocs  whose  frontier  is  within  the  heartland  of  the  Sámi  homeland.  The  
question  may  be  if  the  relative  position  of  the  Sámi  cultural  heartland  in  relation  to  the  Eurasian  
strategical  heartland  is  a  principal  explanation  of  the  relative  success  of  the  Sámi  rights  movement,  
compared  to  other  indigenous  rights  movements.  It  may  be  that  such  questions  are  doomed  to  
remain  questions  of  theoretical  speculation.  If  not,  some  indicators  may  perhaps  be  gained  by  
conducting  some  most-different  case  comparisons  with  other  indigenous  rights  struggles. 
 b)  My  discussion  has  suggested  that  the  host  states  in  Sápmi  have  not  established  de  facto  
legitimacy  for  institutional  violence  within  their  territories.  One  suggested  reason  is  the  long  history  
of  unclear  boundaries  and  geopolitical  competition  between  the  states,  in  Sápmi  as  in  the  entirety  of  
Eastern  Europe.  Whether  that  is  a  relevant  explanation  or  not,  I  claim  that  there  is  an  actual  
jurisdictional  pluralism  in  Sámpi,  where  local  customs  are  de  facto  being  respected  even  though  
they  are  not  supported  with  any  coercive  forms  of  policing  or  defence.  Thus,  I  have  suggested  that  it  
is  an  empirical  question  what  coercive  force,  if  any  at  all,  might  enjoy  social  legitimacy  in  the  
various  indigenous  areas.  This  is  certainly  a  controversial  suggestion.  The  statement  could,  at  least  
in  theory,  be  empirically  tested.  Still,  one  must  expect  that  it  would  be  methodologically  
challenging  to  acquire  any  reliable  indicators  on  the  degree  of  social  legitimacy  of  institutional  
violence,  alternatively  the  degree  of  social  legitimacy  of  Niilas  Somby’s  sabotage  action,  
alternatively  the  degree  of  social  legitimancy  of  no  coercion  at  all,  in  the  various  areas. 
 Personally,  I  am  skeptical  regarding  the  researchability  of  those  questions,  so  I  do  not  care  to  
suggest  any  issues  for  further  research  regarding  the  so-called  “realist”  research  on  state  
transformation  in  the  High  North.  Anyway,  I  have  already  concluded  that  I  think  this  approach,  if  




13.5.0  Shortcomings  of  the  alternative  perspective? 
 
In  order  to  control  for  the  bias  of  wishful  thinking  in  my  own  research,  I  have  engaged  in  a  
discussion  about  alternative  explanations  from  the  literature  of  state-centred  realism.  In  particular  
one  article  by  Anne  Jule  Semb  suggests  two  mechanisms  to  explain  why  the  Alta-dam  controversy  
appears  to  have  caused  the  implementation  of  indigenous  righs  in  some  areas  of  “Norwegian”  
Sápmi.  Another  article  by  the  same  author  suggests  an  overview  of  the  geopolitical  consequences.  
Thus,  she  has  suggested  two  meso-political  mechanisms  and  one  macro-political  mechanism.  Her  
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research  had  gone  on  in  parallel  with,  and  isolated  from,  what  I  have  called  the  “canonical”  
historical  research  on  the  issue,  upon  which  I  myself  have  built  further. 
 In  this  theoretical  discussion,  I  have  discussed  the  relevance  of  Semb’s  observations,  in  light  
of  the  proof  provided  by  the  other  research.  However,  in  order  to  control  for  the  possible  bias  of  
wishful  thinking,  I  have  followed  Morgenthau  and  Chomsky,  two  critical  realists  who  insist  on  
keeping  a  conceptual  distinction  between  coercive  force  and  normative  justification.1162  For  this  
reason,  this  chapter  has  taken  a  (strategic)  theoretical  position  that  is  even  more  “realist”  than  
Semb’s  own  position,  harking  back  to  Clausewitz,  with  his  “fog  of  war”,  and  Althusser’s  “aleatory  
materialism”.1163 
 I  conclude  that  the  two  meso-political  mechanisms  and  the  one  macro-political  mechanism  
suggested  by  Semb  indeed  have  relevance,  but  additionally,  that  her  mechanisms  are  not  sensitive  
enough  to  the  cynicism  of  her  own  realist  tradition,  nor  are  they  sensitive  to  the  competing  
explanations  provided  by  other  empirical  studies  applying  competing  theoretical  traditions.  This  is  
in  line  with  the  ethical-strategical  suggestions  from  Morgenthau  and  Chomsky. 
 Thus,  I  suggest  some  slightly  different  interpretations  of  the  three  mechanisms  that  were  
suggested  by  Semb,  and  in  addition,  I  add  two  more.  These  five  mechanisms  refer  to  empirical  
pathways  that  are  of  relevance  to  a  purely  reductionistic  version  of  state-centred  realism.  Regarding  
these  four  mechanisms  in  isolation  would  be  highly  biased,  but  they  provide  a  useful  supplement  to  
the  eight  other  mechanisms  that  I  have  identified,  which  uncover  quite  different  empirical  realities.  
They  should  all  be  combined  in  order  to  develop  a  really  realistic  explanation  of  state  
transformation  in  the  High  North. 
 If  landscape  ecology  and  collective  action  (the  preferred  view)  did  not  matter,  while  geo-
strategical  theatres  and  coercive  force  (the  competing  view)  did  matter,  then  the  five  mechanisms  
identified  in  the  present  chapter  would  hold  currency,  while  the  eight  mechanisms  I  found  in  my  
empirical  chapters  would  be  irrelevant.  The  clear-cut  state-centred  realism  is  useful  to  address  
issues  of  institutional  violence,  a  topic  that  was  ignored  in  my  own  empirical  studies.  However,  the  
clear-cut  state-centred  realism  cannot  discover  any  sources  of  order  outside  the  effects  of  physical  
forces.  From  this  particular  (and  one-sided)  viewpoint,  moral  or  legal  orders  can  only  exist  as  a  side  
effect  of  relatively  stabilized  Fortuna  or  relatively  stabilized  geo-strategical  theatres.  One  
implication  is  that  Fortuna  cannot  ever  become  fully  fixed.  Another  implication  is  that  indigenous  
peoples  cannot  have  real  laws  if  their  stateless  political  systems  do  not  include  their  own  systems  
for  coercive  policing  and  defence.  This  clear-cut  state-centred  “realism”  is  so  one-sided  that  I  hope  
that  no-one  would  believe  that  this  is  how  the  world  actually  works.  The  chosen  perspective  may  be  
                                                 
1162  Morgenthau  1970;;  Chomsky  1969 
1163  Clausewitz  1937;;  Althusser  1998;;  De  Landa  1997 
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a  caricature,  but  it  is  no  straw  man  argument,  since  the  purpose  is  to  isolate  variables  in  order  to  
control  for  them. 
 This  is  the  “evil  twin”  of  the  socio-ecological  meso-theories  of  Latour  and  Ostrom,  which  I  
have  used  to  describe  the  pathways  identified  in  my  own  research.  Thus,  we  have  two  competing  
theoretical  articulations  of  socio-material  praxis  nets:  one  in  terms  of  physical  coercion,  another  in  
terms  of  customary  praxes  and  knowledge  praxes  within  socio-ecological  settings.  When  I  present  
those  as  two  rival  explanations,  the  purpose  is  not  to  reject  one  in  order  to  choose  the  other,  but  to  
isolate  the  explanatory  force  of  coercive  force,  in  order  to  help  the  practical  purpose  of  keeping  
violence  limited  and  contained. 
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14.1.0  Summa  summarum 
 
Finally,  time  is  ripe  to  summarize  the  findings  of  this  inquiry  into  the  art  and  science  of  constituent  
power.  This  will  be  done  by  summarizing  the  two  previous  chapters. 
 Chapter  12  summarized  all  the  positive  and  negative  findings  that  were  made  throughout  the  
empirical  Chapters  5-11.  The  purpose  was  to  present  the  observations  within  a  consistent  argument.  
The  focus  was  on  constituent  collective  action  and  constituted  landscape  geography,  what  Elinor  
Ostrom  characterizes  as  the  “new  theory”  of  natural  resources  management.1164  However,  when  
discussing  one  of  the  observed  mechanisms,  namely  “arguments  matter,  resources  decide”,  I  
concluded  that  one-sided  use  of  the  social-ecological  perspective  might  run  the  risk  of  naïve  
idealism. 
 Chapter  13  presented  and  discussed  the  alternative  explanations  that  have  been  observed  by  
colleagues  with  a  perspective  from  within  the  rival  tradition.  Chapter  3  defined  this  tradition  as  
what  Ostrom  calls  the  “old  theory”,  which  she  associates  with  Hobbes  and  Hardin.1165  I  reviewed  
empirical  findings,  but  argued  that  those  are  better  interpreted  if  one  leves  norms  to  those  who  are  
experts  on  that  subject,  namely  constructivists  and  institutionalists,  and  keeping  political  cynicism  
clear-cut.  I  contest  the  “neo-liberal  neo-realism”  synthesis,  because  the  mixing  of  coercion  and  
justification  may  feed  dangerously  naïve  realism.1166 
 Summa  summarum,  the  present  Chapter  14  attempts  to  avoid  the  two  symmetrical  pitfalls  of  
naïve  idealism  and  naïve  realism,  and  approach  towards  critical  realism.  Thus  I  will  draw  a  few  
conclusions  on  the  basis  of  my  own  positive  and  negative  findings,  as  well  as  the  observations  made  
my  my  colleagues  within  the  rival  tradition.  (My  own  findings  are  of  course  indebted  to  colleagues  
within  my  own  tradition.)  The  present  chapter  will  start  out  in  a  reader  un-friendly  way,  by  
addressing  negative  findings,  in  a  rather  counter-intuitive  way.  Thereafter,  the  chapter  proceeds  with  
a  rather  easier  to  stomach  summary  of  positive  findings,  the  possible  explanatory  mechanisms.  This  
leads  to  a  presentation  of  the  emerging  research  approach,  and  finally  I  draw  some  conclusions  for  
the  art  and  science  of  social  movements:  first  their  practical  action;;  and  then,  the  research  that  
serves  that  end. 
                                                 
1164 Ostrom, Walker & Gardner 1992 
1165  ibidem 
1166  Morgenthau  1970;;  Chomsky  1969 
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14.2.0  Main  findings 
 
14.2.1  Negative  findings:  reproduction  of  colonial  bias? 
The  constituent  power  of  knowledge  praxes  poses  special  methodological  challenges  for  political  
research.  I  discussed  this  issue  in  Chapter  4.  It  led  me  to  try  to  bring  the  critique  of  ideology  back  
in,  and  to  emulate  the  quantitative  researchers  in  their  estimation  of  measurement  errors.  
Throughout  the  empirical  chapters,  I  have  tried  to  observe  some  of  the  limitations  of  my  own  
observational  capacity,  similarly  to  how  the  quantitive  researcher  estimates  measurement  errors.  
The  result  was  discussed  in  Chapter  12,  and  the  result  was  not  encouraging.  It  appeared  to  me  that  
there  is  a  great  deal  of  colonial  bias  that  remains  to  be  overcome,  not  only  in  the  discipline  at  large,  
and  in  the  research  to  which  I  contribute,  but  in  my  particular  contribution  as  well. 
 There  has  been  an  ongoing  attempt  at  internal  decolonisation  within  the  political  and  social  
sciences  themselves,  at  least  since  Antonio  Gramsci’s  seminal  essay  “The  Southern  Question”.1167  
Stein  Rokkan  took  an  interest  in  regionalist  movements  as  a  response  to  the  debate  about  “internal  
colonialism”.1168  Per  Otnes  was  among  the  first  social  scientists  to  research  decolonisation  in  
Sápmi.1169  As  the  postcolonial  historian  Chakrabarty  observes,  a  decolonised  historiography  is  not  
created  overnight.1170  On  the  one  hand,  colonial  historiography  had  a  systematic  bias.  On  the  other  
hand,  this  is  the  discipline  that  we  further  develop,  through  laborious  empirical  investigation  of  
under-researched  issues,  the  one  after  the  other.  Consequently,  no-one  yet  possesses  a  really  
decolonised  historiographical  knowledge.  Decolonising  is  an  open-ended  and  maybe  endless  effort,  
because  the  best  we  can  do  (as  with  all  science)  is  to  decrease  our  collective  ignorance. 
 Gradual  democratization  and  decolonisation  hane  led  to  new  political  practice,  but  also  to  
renewed  political  knowledge.1171  For  the  attempts  to  decolonize  political  science  and  practice,  an  
issue  of  special  relevance  is  the  systematic  spatial  selection  bias:  the  political  history  of  former  
colonial  states,  traced  in  isolation  from  their  historical  interdependency  with  their  former  colonies,  
is  being  (mis)used  to  draw  general  conclusions  about  processes  of  democratization  in  postcolonial  
areas  as  well.1172  Consequently,  political  ideologies  of  development  were  used  to  justify  ethnic  
discrimination  and  territorial  colonization,  and  thus,  to  impose  the  underdevelopment  they  were  
supposed  to  fix.1173 
                                                 
1167  Gramsci  1930;;  Spivak  1988;;  Capuzzo & Mezzadra 2012 
1168  Rokkan  &  Urwin  1982:  2;;  for  the  democratisation  of  political  science  see  Rokkan  1970:  13 
1169  Otnes  1970 
1170  Chakrabarty  2000 
1171  Rokkan  1970:13;;  De  Brito,  Enriques    and  Aguilar  2001 
1172  Sidaway  2008 
1173  Hulme  &  Turner  1990;;  Wolf  2010  (1982);;  Scott  1998;;  Cordoso  &  Faletto  2003  (1969) 
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 Collective  ignorance  follows  collective  knowledge  as  a  shadow,  and  such  ignorance  may  be  
functional  for  the  social  reproduction  of  structurally  unequal  opportunities.  Bourdieu  and  Passeron  
used  the  metaphor  “symbolic  violence”  to  describe  how  biased  school  syllabi  might  contribute  to  
maintaining  highly  unequal  life  chances.1174  There  is  no  doubt  that  during  the  age  of  eugenic  
policies,  the  Norwegian  school  system  was  used  as  a  tool  for  the  control  and  assimilation  of  
indigenous  peoples  and  national  minorities.1175  In  my  empirical  Chapters  10  and  11,  the  argument  
was  that  outdated  science  from  the  age  of  eugenic  and  nationalist  policies  still  circulates  as  popular  
myth,  and  that  this  hampers  the  struggle  for  indigenous  human  rights  in  Coastal  Sápmi.  If  this  is  
correct,  then  residual  colonial  bias  contributes  to  the  reproduction  of  structurally  unequal  life  
chances.  This  has  concrete  consequences  for  the  livelihoods  of  human  bodies,  and  it  is  exactly  the  
kind  of  process  that  Bourdieu  and  Passeron  describe  with  the  metaphor  “symbolic  violence”.  Thus,  
it  might  not  be  incorrect  to  characterise  residual  colonial  bias  as  a  form  of  symbolic  violence.  
However,  I  have  also  argued  that  the  decolonisation  of  political  and  social  science  is  an  open-ended  
and  perhaps  endless  endeavour.  If  also  this  is  correct,  then  it  means  that  the  discipline  is  not  only  a  
body  of  collective  knowledge,  but  at  the  same  time  also  a  body  of  collective  ignorance,  and  that  our  
open-ended  effort  to  overcome  this  ignorance  is  an  open-ended  effort  to  overcome  symbolic  
violence.  During  this  research  project,  I  have  tried  to  seek  methods  and  concepts  for  a  non-violent  
political  science,  but  instead  I  found  colonial  heritage  reproduced  through  the  limitations  of  my  
own  formation. 
 The  constituted  and  constituent  power  of  political  science  is  a  double-edged  sword.  This  
metaphor  combines  the  two  rival  theories:  the  ice-cold  instrumentalism  of  the  postmodern  
Machiavelli;;  and  the  probabilism  and  possibilism  of  SES  and  ANT.  The  double-edged-ness  of  
political  science  is  not  due  to  its  dual  nature  as  a  constituted  knowledge  discipline  (or  scholasticism)  
and  as  a  constituent  proof  finding  practice  (or  enlightenment),  it  is  more  subtle  than  that:  On  the  one  
hand,  historical  path  dependency  causes  the  the  research  practice  to  contribute  to  the  reproduction  
of  historical  biases,  collective  ignorance:  symbolic  violence.  On  the  other  hand,  the  discipline  
nevertheless  maintains  and  opens  up  some  limited  opportunities  for  prefigurative  enlightenment. 
 
 
14.2.1  Positive  findings:  twelve  possible  mechanisms 
In  total,  this  study  has  suggested  12  possible  mechanisms,  by  tracing  some  of  the  macro  pathways  
within  the  ongoing  process  of  state  transformation  during  four  selected  decades,  within  two  selected  
                                                 
1174  Bourdieu  &  Passeron  1970 
1175  Minde  2005a 
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water  areas  (table). 
 Mechanisms  1-7  were  identified  in  my  own  empirical  research,  presented  in  Chapters  5-11.  
In  this  study,  I  selected  data  about  socio-ecological  factors,  which  may  be  explained  in  terms  of  
customary  praxes  and  environmental  landscape  geography,1176  or  knowledge  praxes  and  humanistic  
landscape  geography.1177  With  this  priority,  I  build  further  on  the  already  established  “canonical  
narrative”,  from  history,  anthropology,  and  the  legal  investigations  undertaken  by  the  Sámi  Rights  
Commission.  This  major  tradition  is  entangled  with  human  rights  policies. 
 However,  this  whole  tradition  is  parallel  and  separate  from  a  smaller  body  of  literature,  
which  tends  to  select  data  about  coercive  force  and  strategical  Realpolitk,  and  seek  explanations  in  
terms  of  neorealism  and  geo-strategy.  The  publicly  accessible  part  of  this  literature  has  been  
produced  within  the  discipline  of  state  science  (statsvitenskap),  and  through  its  access  to  archival  
sources,  it  is  socially  close  to  law  enforcement.  This  minor  tradition  seems  to  be  entangled  with  
public  security  policies. 
 The  relative  compartmentalisation  and  specialization  between  those  bodies  of  literature  
indicates  that  there  exist  competing  theories  on  the  same  process  of  state  transformation.  Even  
though  the  former  tendency  is  dominant  among  academic  specialists,  one  should  not  underestimate  
the  impact  that  the  latter  tendency  may  have  within  more  closed  policy  institutions.  Since  I  had  
operated  within  one  tradition  and  not  the  other,  I  saw  a  need  to  compare  my  own  (selective)  
observations  with  the  (selective)  observations  provided  by  the  competing  theory. 
 
Table  14-1:  The  mechanisms  discussed  in  this  study 
 Mechanisms  from  empirical  chapters Mechanisms  from  theoretical  discussion 
Macro:  structure 1.  Ecological  adaptation  of  state 
2.  Maintaining  parallel  order 
I.  Geo-strategical  fortunes  (stabilized  Fortuna) 
Meso:  praxis  nets 3.  Ambiguous  adaptations 
4.  Struggle  to  define  present  hegemony 
5.  Struggle  for  future  agenda-setting 
6.  Resources  decide  * 
II.  Asymmetrical  interactive  (de)escalation 
III.  Diplomatic  face  saving 
IV.  Strategical  securitisation  * 
Micro:  action 7.  Mobilize  resources  and  frames V.  Realize  the  potentials  (creative  Virtù) 
        *)  Note:  these  two  mechanisms  need  special  caution  and  care  from  transformative  movements 
 
 
 Mechanisms  I-V  were  formulated  by  using  the  published  research  from  the  competing  
theory.  Those  were  carefully  re-interpreted  in  the  context  of  some  relevant  data  included  in  my  own  
study,  and  some  data  taken  from  earlier  historical  and  anthropological  studies.  In  this  re-
                                                 
1176  McGinnis  &  Ostrom  2012;;  Klemsdal  2000 
1177  Law  &  Singleton  2012;;  Olwig  2002 
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interpretation,  I  also  tried  to  maintain  a  conceptual  distinction  between  coercive  force  and  
normative  justification,  following  on  from  the  ethical-strategical  advice  of  Morgenthau  and  
Chomsky.1178  Thus,  I  reserve  the  study  of  norms  to  those  who  are  specialized  in  that  domain:  human  
rights  lawyers  and  the  mainstream  tradition.  However,  I  also  suggest  that  the  so-called  realists  
should  have  placed  even  more  emphasis  on  what  they  supposedly  are  specialized  in,  namely  cynical  
strategical  analysis.  As  a  result,  I  suggest  that  the  existing  explanation  from  state-centred  realism  
must  be  qualified,  but  still,  this  perspective  appears  to  be  sensitive  to  some  actual  empirical  
pathways  that  had  been  ignored  by  myself  and  others  from  the  main  tradition. 
 Those  two  sets  of  possible  mechanisms  are  complementary.  Taking  one  set  in  isolation  may  
lead  to  explanations  that  are  unnecessary  biased.  Mechanisms  1-7  were  observed  in  my  own  
empirical  research,  and  this  research  builds  further  on  the  mainstream  tradition,  with  its  tendency  to  
select  data  on  socio-ecological  factors.  However,  in  this  tradition,  we  may  run  the  risk  of  wishful  
thinking  by  overlooking  Realpolitik  and  coercive  force.  Mechanisms  I-V  deal  with  exactly  those  
factors,  which  are  the  speciality  of  state-centred  “realists”.  This  camp,  however,  runs  the  risk  of  
overlooking  actual  jurisdiction  whenever  this  does  not  emerge  from  coercive  force. 
 Ignoring  Realpolitik  may  be  counter-productive  in  a  region  that  is  divided  under  four  host  
states.  Still,  it  is  definitely  no  more  fruitful  to  ignore  the  existence  of  informal  customary  praxes  and  
knowledge  praxes  when  the  region  in  question  is  the  traditional  territory  of  an  indigenous  people.  In  
the  table  above,  there  is  only  one  macro-mechanism  provided  by  state-centred  realism,  while  two  
are  provided  by  the  socio-ecological  perspective.  This  is  simply  because,  for  state-centred  realism,  
there  is  no  valid  source  of  law  outside  a  coercive  apparatus.  Therefore,  the  assumption  is  that  
indigenous  people  live  in  Terra  Nullius,  a  land  to  legally  colonize,  a  state  of  nature  without  
institutions.  That  is  an  old  colonialist  lie.  State-centred  realism,  if  taken  alone,  is  simply  unrealistic. 
 Therefore,  in  sum,  I  think  it  is  correct  to  critically  incorporate  the  empirical  findings  from  
the  minor  research  tradition,  the  one  affiliated  with  public  security  policies,  even  though  I  think  the  
main  focus  should  still  be  on  the  findings  from  the  major  research  tradition,  the  one  serving  human  
rights  policies.  Even  though  both  bodies  of  knowledge  remain  provisional  and  unfinished,  they  may  
nevertheless  provide  knowledge  bases  that  are  complementary  in  Niels  Bohr’s  sense.1179  Both  
schools  remain  limited  by  the  residual  colonial  bias  that  remains  to  be  overcome,  but  by  combining  
the  findings  from  both  of  them,  it  may  be  possible  to  decrease  two  risky  biases:  The  major  research  
tradition  should  avoid  the  potential  bias  of  wishful  thinking;;  the  minor  tradition  should  avoid  being  
ignorant  of  the  actual  socio-ecological  diversity. 
 
                                                 
1178  Morgenthau  1970;;  Chomsky  1969 
1179  Bohr  1938 
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14.3.0  Emerging  composite  approach 
 
14.3.1  Outcome  of  abductive-participatory  research   
The  selection  of  data  items,  and  the  selection  of  coding  categories,  unfolded  through  a  dialogical  
process,  which  was  abductive  and  participatory.  Through  this  process,  a  composite  approach  to  state  
(trans)formation  emerged.  When  I  wandered  along  the  Deatnu  River,  I  came  across  various  tools  on  
the  way:  fishing  nets  and  the  SES  framework,  underwater  cameras  and  the  ANT  network,  veterans  
from  UNIFIL  and  the  postmodern  Machiavelli.  I  picked  up  the  tools  I  found  along  the  road,  and  
mobilized  them  as  resources  to  empower  my  critical  inquiry.  By  being  in  the  field,  I  adapted  coding  
categories  that  were  at  home  in  the  field.  A summary is given in Table 14-2. 
 
Table  14-2:  A  composite  explanatory  framework 
Focus Meta-theory Methodology 
Reduction  to  political-economic  
dimension 
Reduction  to  material  customary  
praxes,  institutionalism  (SES)1180 
Nomothetical  inquiry,  progress  of  
conjectures  /  refutations  (Popper)1181 
Reduction  to  political-semiotic  
dimension 
Reduction  to  material  knowledge  
praxes,  constructivism  (ANT)1182 
Ideographic  inquiry,  to  destabilize  
ideological  myths  (Derrida)1183 
Reduction  to  political-military  
dimension 
Reduction  to  physical  force,    
realism  (postmodern  
Machiavelli)1184 
Ice-cold  instrumentalism:  “the  
effective  truth”  (postmodern  
Machiavelli)1185 
Non-reductionism:  the  “principle  
of  complementarity”1186 
Distinction:  cooperation  (SES,  
ANT)  VS.  command  
(Machiavelli)1187 
Critical  realism:  Doxa  is  co-
determined  by  structural  violence1188 
 
 Table 14-2 provides  a  schematic  overview  of  the  emerging  composite  approach  and  how  it  is  
being  applied  to  explain  the  Explanandum.  The  two  first  lines  in  the  model  characterize  most  of  the  
research  that  I  have  undertaken  with  my  empirical  case  studies.  Those  two  lines  may  be  
characterized  as  a  combination  of  institutionalist  and  constructivist  political  science  (the  SES  
framework  and  the  ANT  approach).  The  third  line  shows  the  so-called  realist  models  used  in  some  
of  the  existing  literature  (the  postmodern  Machiavelli),  which  I  have  taken  into  account  in  an  
                                                 
1180  McGinnis  &  Ostrom  2012 
1181  Popper  2002  (1963) 
1182  Law  &  Singleton  2012 
1183  Derrida  1967 
1184  Althusser  1998  (Norwegian  translation:  Althusser  2003) 
1185  Re-readings  of  Machiavelli  have  been  a  particular  tendency  within  Marxian  and  post-Marxist  theory.  Gramsci’s  re-
reading  was  used  to  develop  a  strategy  for  the  presumedly  “proletarian  party”  as  a  “modern  Prince”  (Gramsci  (2012 
(1932-4)).  Althusser’s  re-reading  continues  in  the  same  tradition,  but  after  the  ideology  of  a  “proletarian  party”  had  
become hard to maintain (Althusser 1998; Althusser 2003). In my view, the implication is that networked politics 
and  warfare  may  constitute  “postmodern  Princes”. 
1186  Bohr  1938 
1187 Ostrom, Walker & Gardner 1992; Negri 2002 (1992): 409; Morgenthau 1970; Chomsky 1969; Gordon 2007: 78-108 
1188  Bourdieu  1977 
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attempt  to  control  for  my  own  bias  as  an  organic  intellectual.  The  fourth  line  indicates  how  I  have  
tried  to  combine  the  three  approaches. 
 With this emerging approach have combined multiple perspectives or models regarding one 
and the same matter, namely: socio-material praxis networks that mediate between (constituent) 
micro action and (constituted) macro formations. 
 Praxis networks are located at a sociological meso-level, and function as channels, media or 
pathways for the functioning of constituent micro action and constituted macro order. In my own 
empirical research, I have mixed two of three perspectives: SES and ANT, which highlight 
political-economic and political-semiotic dimensions. However, in the final theoretical discussion, I 
have drawn on the research of others, to discuss the third perspective: the postmodern Machiavelli, 
which highlights the political-military dimension. 
 For  mechanisms  1-8,  praxis  nets  are  traced  in  terms  of  SES  and  ANT  combined 
 For mechanisms, I-V, praxis nets are traced in terms of the postmodern Machiavelli 
In sum, I have maintained the ethical and strategical distinction between different components of 
state (trans)formation: On the one hand the political-economic and political semiotic dimensions; on 
the other hand the political-military dimension. 
 In Table 14-3 (see below),  the  column  called  “Explanans  1”  represents  the  geographical 
conceptualisation of constituted order or opportunity  structure,  while  the  column  “Paths  i,  ii,  iii”  
represents the praxiological conceptualisation of constituent praxes or social movement action.1189 
 Those  views  were  presented  in  3.2.0  and  3.3.0,  as  response  to  Routledge's  term  “terrains  of  
hegemony and resistance”  (introduced  in  2.2.0)  and  Della  Porta's  models  of  mutual  causation  
between social movement action and opportunity structure (introduced in 2.3.0). My distinction 
between SES and ANT on the one hand, and the clear-cut neo-Machiavellian view on the other hand, 
correspond with distinctions made by the two mentioned authors. Routledge draws a pragmatic 
distinction between non-violent and violent social movements within the Indian Subcontinent 
(though both are facing institutional violence).1190 Similarly, della Porta has applied the model of 
mutual causation to inquire after two different issues: the mutually reinforcing dynamic of political 
democratisation and social mobilisation, but also the mutual escalation between protest policing and 
                                                 
1189  This  political  sociology  is  meant  to  be  sensitive  to  the  material  embeddedness  of  social  action:  the  “socio-material”.  
For  a  definition  of  the  “socio-material”,  see  Østerberg  (2011)  and  Otnes  (1997).  For  a  brief  intellectual  history  of  
this  concept,  see  part  3.3.1,  in  particular  the  long  footnote  about  materialist  praxeology.  My  own  sociological  train-­
ing  was  within  the  same  tradition,  with  Otnes  as  my  supervisor  and  Østerberg  being  strongly  influential.  My  own  
work  has  developed  towards  a  combination  of  neopositivst  and  poststructuralist  tendencies  (Jensen  2000,  2002,  
2013),  under  influence  from  Bhaskar  (1983),  and  thus,  the  present  chapter  has  referred  to  Bohr  (1938)  and  Popper  
(2002  [1963])  as  metatheoretical  and  methodological  foundation.  Nevertheless,  I  remain  deeply  indebted  to  my  
teachers,  firstly  Otnes,  secondly  Østerberg  (See  part  3.3.1,  in  particular  the  footnote  about  materialist  praxeology.)  
1190  Routledge  1993 
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political violence.1191 (Still, both non-violent and violent movements are facing institutional 
violence.) When taken together, della Porta and Routledge already offer an empirically oriented 
orientation, where micro-action is traced praxiologially, while macro-order is mapped 
geographically. Additionally, it is conventional wisdom in social movement studies to approach the 
sociological meso-level in terms of networked action.1192  
 What is more unusual, is to see the constitution of such networks as constituent praxes, which 
in turn may constitute transformations of the constituted order. It is not easy to trace constituent 
power through a complex web of causation, so this will have to be a collective endeavour. 
Empirically, a seed was sown by della Porta and Piazza in their study on how some environmental 
movements  may  “create  communities”.1193 Theoretically, the soil was prepared by the lawyers 
Bailey and Mattei, who conceptualised social movements as constituent power.1194 My own study 
waters the germ, by specifying hypotheses about a few of the possible causal paths whereby 
environmental justice movements in general (and indigenous rights movements in particular) might 
empower themselves to re-constitute their political environment. I have tried to observe how 
environmental justice movements may sow seeds of sprawling change through concrete action 
(micro), how they may nurture germs of change sprawling through socio-material networks (meso), 
and eventually, how they perhaps might cultivate a new order (macro). 
 
 
14.3.2  Relevance  for  the  discipline? 
With this composite approach, I try to avoid reductionistic, one-sided explanations, but it is also 
different  from  the  “holistic”  ambitions  among  political  scientists  ferom the earlier generations. As 
heretics within two old paradigms, Structure-Functionalism and Marxist-Leninism, Stein Rokkan 
and Antonio Gramsci ended up with more or less identical sets of explanatory factors: the economic, 
the semiotic and the coercive. Both of them defined the coercive factor as including both the 
military and the political system.1195 Such a pre-definition of the political as being contained within 
coercive force is far too restrictive, and far too fatalistic. This pre-definition of the political is 
problematic in at least two ways: Firstly, it ignores the constituent power of knowledge praxes and 
customary praxes, what I have called prefigurative enlightenment and prefigurative satyagraha. This 
ignorance makes it appear as if coercive force is the only path to constituent power, or as if a 
                                                 
1191  Della  Porta  2013:  18-21;;  della  Porta  2014:  14-22 
1192  Staggenborg  2002 
1193  Della  Porta  &  Piazza  2008 
1194  Bailey  &  Mattei  2012 
1195  Rokkan  &  Urwin  1982:  15  (also  in  Rokkan  &  Flora  1999:  118);;  Rokkan  &  Urwin  1982;;  Gramsci  according  to  Cini  
2012:  31-33  and  Routledge  1993:  29;;  see  also  Steiner  2010 
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prefigurative war-of-position is a shining path to a bright future. Secondly, it ignores the fact that 
indigenous peoples may have well established property regimes, also in the absence of coercive 
force. This ignorance makes it appear as if the colonial Terra Nullius doctrine had its roots in 
empirical fact. Thirdly, it ignores the fact that a state formation includes a heterogeneous body of 
codified laws and a heterogeneous body of certified knowledge, and that these may be possible to 
re-constitute independently of the monopoly of violence. This ignorance makes it appear as if a 
military coup would be the most effective way to revolutionize a political system. Those three 
biases are all challenged by practical experience from the ongoing decolonisation in Sápmi. The 
reports from the Norwegian Sámi Rights Commission demonstrate that there has been a continuous 
situation of de facto legal pluralism in many areas of Sápmi, regardless of attempted de jure 
colonisation by the states. Through the actual use of natural resources, local people have 
continuously maintained and developed the longstanding customary praxes and knowledge praxes 
that were inherited from the ancient siida system. Thus, the state system was never quite 
consolidated, and the siida system never quite disappeared, but the indigenous people have 
refrained from answering violence with violence, and also, there has been sustainable usage of 
natural resources until recently. The relative success of the indigenous human rights struggle in 
Sápmi is a strong indicator that it might be possible to obtain fundamental systems transformation 
through the constituent power of customary praxes and knowledge praxes. The empirical parts of 
my thesis furnish some of the proof in this regard. The practical experience from decolonisation in 
Sápmi demonstrates that it is highly biased if the political science of state (trans)formation lumps 
the political and the military together. Politics and political systems formation do not only belong to 
the coercive dimension, but equally to the economic and semiotic dimensions. Rokkan and Gramsci 
were correct to operate with a political-military dimension, but they should also have been 
observant of the political-economic and political-semiotic dimensions as relatively independent 
explanatory factors. On the one hand, those two authors were encumbered with a residual 
Hobbesian bias that made them ignorant about the transformative power of social movements, and 
the actual legal orders of indigenous peoples. On the other hand, the same two authors cared greatly 
about resource grabbing from the provinces, empowerment of the subaltern classes, and internal 
decolonisation of political science and practice.1196 Those classics of political science prefigured the 
ongoing decolonisation of the discipline, but this endeavour remained even more unfinished at their 
time than it is today. I have attempted to furnish a further contribution in the same direction. 
However, the negative findings in my empirical chapters indicate that there are still is many colonial 
biases that remain to be hurdled, and we can only gradually address each one of them. With 
                                                 
1196  Gramsci  1930;;  Rokkan  &  Urwin  1982:  2;;  for  the  democratization  of  political  science  see  Rokkan  1970:  13 
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laborious empirical research, it may be possible to prefigure a potentially decolonised political 
science of the future. Postcolonial and subaltern studies in the present generation are more acutely 
aware of ideological bias than what Gramsci and Rokkan were,1197 because of the increased 
awareness of the constituent power of rights and proofs. Political science is in itself political 
practice. 
 The composite approach that emerges from my study is different from Gramsci and Rokkan, 
in two ways: Firstly, constituent practice and constituted order are not only seen as a matter of 
coercive force, but also as a matter of customary praxes and knowledge praxes.1198 Secondly, and 
connected with the first point, there is a more acute awareness of the constituent power of political 
science, and therefore also of its positionally, uncertainty, limitations and symbolic violence.1199 In 
sum, my composite approach leaves behind the holistic ambition found in Rokkan and Gramsci, but 
instead, I adapt the principles of uncertainty and complementarity from Niels Bohr, as well as the 
pragmatic distinction between coercive force and social justification, from Chomsky and 
Morgenthau (Table 14-3).   
                                                 
1197  See  for  example  Chakrabarty  2000 
1198    For  further  discussions  on  this  issue,  see  part  3.3.2,  in  particular  the  footnote  with  notes  on  Gramsci.  See  also  part  
7.2.2  for  a  discussion  of  how,  during  the  Alta-dam  controversy,  coercion  and  concent  were  involved  in  the  struggle  
for  the  capacity  to  define  the  social  hegemony.  See  also  part  14.3.2,  in  particular  the  footnote  reflections  on  nonvio-­
lence;;  and  part  14.4.1,  in  particular  the  footnote  reflections  on  structural  violence.  (Thanks  to  Paul  Routledge  for  in-­
viting  me  to  elaborate  on  this  issue.)  Though  I  deny  that  coercive  force  has  any  preveleged  position  as  an  explana-­
tion  of  constituent  power,  I  cannot  deny  that  it  is  one  of  the  relevant  factors,  alongside  norms  (customary  praxes)  
and  peceptions  (knowledge  praxes).  Even  non-violent  transformative  movements  have  to  consider  the  potential  
power  of  violent  force,  because  they  might  be  met  by  suppressive  violence,  which  in  turn  might  breed  insurgent  vio-­
lence.  For  a  consideration  of  ethical  consequences  for  research  design,  see  part  4.2.2. 
1199    In  this  research  I  have  based  myself  on  a  standpoint  theory  of  knowledge  (Stengers  1999  (1997)),  and  its  affinities  
within  the  neo-positivist  SES  framework,  the  post-structuralist  ANT  approach,  and  the  instumentalistic,  postmodern  
Machiavelli.  Thus,  the  search  for  proof  is  seen  as  one  of  the  paths  to  constituent  power.  Consequently,  this  under-­
standing  of  knowledge  praxes  informs  my  framing  of  the  object  of  observation  (Explanans  2)  as  well  as  the  act  of  
observing  (the  research  design).  On  the  one  hand,  knowledge  and  power  within  the  object  of  observation  include  
popular  "spatial  imaginaries"  (Wolford  2004),  developed  by  fisher-peasants  during  their  subsistance  practices.  For  
more  on  this,  see  the  long  footnote  in  part  3.4.0.  On  the  other  hand,  the  issue  of  knowledge  and  power  in  the  act  of  
observing  has  led  me  to  seek  critique  of  ideology  through  conjectures  and  refutations,  by  a  participatory  and  abduc-­
tive  approach.  For  a  consideration  about  methodological  consequences  for  research  design,  see  part  4.2.3. 
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Table  14-3:  The  dimensions  of  state  (trans)formation  according  to  the  composite  approach 
Explanandum Explanans  1 Explanans  2 Mechanisms 




Decrease  in  collective  
ignorance1201 
Praxis  nets  as  “adjacent  
action  situations”  
(SES)1202 






Praxis  nets  as  “actor-
networks”  (ANT)1205 
Body  politic  as  monopoly  
of  coercive  force 
Classical  and  critical  
geopolitics1206 
The  effective  truth(s):  
plural  instrumentalism1207 
Praxis  nets  as  network  
warfare  (Machiavelli)1208 
Body  politic  as  hetero-
geneous  assemblage1209 
Regional  geography:  no  
isolated  causal  factor1210 
Collective  ignorance  is  
symbolic  violence1211 
Praxis  nets  as  totality  of  
human  existence1212 
 
                                                 
1200  SES  is  one  of  several  approaches  (Evans  &  Manson  2007)  within  a  wider  field  of  landscape  geography  research  
from  an  environmental  science  viewpoint  (Klemsdal  2000;;  Johnston  et.  al  2014).   
1201  SES  implies  a  nomothetical  and  probabilistic  approach  to  knowledge  praxes  (Ostrom  2007),  and  regarding  the  
politics  of  knowledge,  it  includes  consideration  about  "regimes  of  information"  as  an  object  of  study  (Ekiba  &  
Evans  2009),  as  well  as  the  usage  of  normative  "evaluation  models"  during  the  act  of  observation  (Manson  2007). 
1202  SES  implies  an  ecological  model  regarding  the  emergence  of  scale  (Ostrom  2005:  58-64,  290-291),  and  in  an  
attempt  to  research  institutional  change  (McGinnis  2011a)  has  suggested  to  trace  "networks  of  adjacant  action  
situations",  including  knowldge  praxes,  but  this  concept,  however,  remains  "a  beta-version"  on  experimental  stage,  
and  has  not  been  included  in  the  latest  "official  release"  of  the  SES  framework  (McGinnis  &  Ostrom  2012). 
1203  ANT  is  one  of  several  tools  (Mezger  2014b)  used  within  the  wide  category  of  landscape  geography  research  within  
the  humanities  (Olwig  2002,  Ingold  1986;;  Ingold  1995;;  Makhzoumi  &  Pungetti  1999;;  Jensen  2002). 
1204  ANT  takes  an  ideographic  and  possibilistic  approach  to  knowledge  praxes  (Law  &  Singleton  2012),  and  as  a  
response  to  the  critique  from  feminist  geography  (Massey  1991,  1994),  ANT  has  been  applied  in  political  geography  
to  inqure  the  intersection  between  local  place  identities  and  global  flows  of  capital  (Thrift  1999,  Mezger  2014b) 
1205  ANT  takes  a  "myopic"  focus  on  some  of  the  particular  relations,  processes  and  links  that  together  constitute  
assemblages  that  may  be  pramattically  referred  to  as  emergence  of  scale  (Latour  2004:  154,  169,  171),  and  in  spite  
of  the  "myopic"  focus  on  particular  associations,  he  still  admits  that  “...a  'structure'  is  simply  an  actor-network  on  
which  there  is  scant  information”  (Latour  2004:  202).  In  a  respinse  to  the  feminist  critique  (Haraway  1996),  Law  &  
Singleton  (2012)  argue  that  the  virtue  of  maintaining  a  myopic  focus  is  the  possibility  to  discover  surprising  
pluralism,  and  dive  voice  to  monor  groups  that  have  been  silenced.   
1206  Machiavellism  is  a  main  characteristic  of  classical  geopolitics  (Chauprade  2007),  and  postmodern  re-reading  of  
Machiavelli  (Althusser  1998)  are  particularly  close  to  critical  geopolitics  (Ó  Tuathail,  Dalby,  Routledge  2006). 
1207  Machiavellism  offers  ice-cold  instrumentalism,  not  only  ethicly,  but  also  epistemologically  (Althusser  1998,  2003).  
To  find  the  "effective  truth"  is  to  have  the  capacity  (Virtù)  to  discover  and  utilize  opportunities  in  a  largely  
inpredictable  environment  (Fortuna),  in  order  to  intervene  among  the  vectors  of  physical  forces  known  and  
unknown.  For  the  application  of  such  an  epistemology  for  geopolitical  analysis,  see  Limes  2012  (special  issue). 
1208  Machiavellism  takes  a  primary  interest  in  the  production  of  political  scale,  how  willfull  action  at  the  micro  scale  
(Virtù)  may  transform  its  own  opportunity  structure  at  the  macro  scale  (Fortuna)  (Althusser  1998,  2003);;  and  for  this  
purpose,  the  political/strategical  analyist  should  inquire  into  the  network  of  processes  among  physical  forces  known  
and  unknown  (De  Landa  1997;;  Negri  2002  (1992);;  Deleuze  &  Guattari  1980:  Chpts.  XII-XIII). 
1209  Complimentarity  has  some  (superficial)  resemblence  with  the  "social  threefolding"  found  in  Gramsci  (Cini  2012:  
31-33  and  Routledge  1993:  29),  Rokkan  (Rokkan  &  Urwin  1982:  15,  also  in  Rokkan  &  Flora  1999:  118)  and  even  in  
Rudolf  Steiner  (2010).  However,  they  had  totalizing  or  "holistic"  ambitions,  whereas  my  ambition  is  to  find  tools  
that  are  complimentary  in  Bohr's  (1938)  sense.  Each  of  the  three  perspectives  has  its  strength  regarding  one  of  three  
constituent  powers:  customary  praxes,  knowledge  praxes  or  coercive  force. 
1210  Complimentarity  gives  a  varied  knowledge  of  the  opportunity  structure,  similarly  to  regional  geography,  "at its best", 
which, "ensured that students knew the basic lineaments of the wider world and  gave  some  appreciation  of  ‘place’"  
(Johnsten et a. 2014b), see also  Holt-Jensen  2007:31. 
1211  Complimentarity  fits  with  a  standpoint  theory  of  situated  knowledge  (Spivak  1998;;  Stengers  1999  (1997);;  Haraway  
1996;;  Massey  1994),  and  also,  with  concertns  about  how  prejudices  or  doxa  may  function  as  symbolic  violence  
(Otnes  2006;;  Bourdieu  &  Passeron  1970;;  Bourdieu  1977).  For  such  diagnoses,  various  treatments  are  suggested:  
Some  hard  sciences  are  acutely  aware  of  their  role  as  social  engineers  (Wiener  1947).  Participatory  methods  seek  
research  with  rather  than  on  the  subjects  (Halvorsen  2013;;  Chambers  2008).  Open  Source  and  Open  Content  
publishing  is  an  alternative  mode  of  knowlege  production  (Schweik,  Evans  &  Grove  2005).   
1212  Complimentarity  facilitates  varied  knowledge  about  emergence  of  scale.  For  a  discussion  of  the  various  
explanations,  see  parts  12.3.4  and  13.3.5,  including  the  footnotes  on  geographical  scales  in  each  of  these  parts.   
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 Critical realism: The three mentioned figures, Bohr, Chomsky and Morgenthau, can all be 
characterized as critical realists, because they all avoid two symmetrical, dangerous pitfalls: On the 
one hand, naïve realists may be so fixed on physicalistic factors that they are ignorant of non-
violent transformative power and non-state legal orders. On the other hand, critical theorists may be 
so idealistic (in both senses of the word) that they ignore the actuality of institutional violence. Both 
may mislead policy. In my opinion, the existing research on state transformation in Sápmi may 
easily stumble into either of these pitfalls. The minor tradition, which is associated with public 
security policy, appears to me as lapsing into naïve realism and fatalism. The major tradition, which 
is associated with human rights policy, might run the risk of falling into over-optimism or critical 
theory (political or philosophical idealism). Both of those traditions might have discovered 
perspectives that are not partial truths, but complimentary truths. If the minor tradition is taken in 
isolation, I consider it useless for everything else than serving the power-mechanism I have called 
“strategical securitisation”.  However, if the major tradition is taken in isolation, it may not help us 
much in addressing how to handle the most contentious issues, such as the power-mechanism I have 
called  “arguments matter, resources decide”.  Therefore,  the major tradition should continue to be 




14.4.0  Conclusion  regarding  social  movement  action 
 
14.4.1  Political  risk  factors? 
For  Sámi  human  rights  movements  and  other  environmental  justice  movements,  it  is  useful  to  know  
one’s  socio-ecological  opportunities  for  potential  empowerment.  However,  it  is  also  useful  to  make  
well-informed  choices  regarding  how  to  avoid  repressive  state  violence  (which  in  turn  might  
produce  insurgent  violence).  This  is  particularly  relevant  if  we  regard  two  particular  mechanisms,  
one  from  each  of  the  columns  in  the  table  above.  The  potential  relevance  of  those  two  power  
mechanisms  may  require  special  caution  and  care  from  transformative  social  movements 
 “Resources  decide”  was  the  final  meso-mechanism  identified  in  my  own  socio-ecological  
study.  This  describes  how  the  mobilization  for  indigenous  human  rights  for  the  Coastal  Sámi  has  
failed  thus  far,  not  because  it  lacks  scientific  proof,  not  because  it  lacks  international  norms,  but  
because  those  have  less  weight  than  the  resources  of  competing  fishery  organizations.  In  particular,  
the  trawler  capitalists  from  Southern  Norway  have  succeeded  in  setting  the  agenda  and  defining  the  
hegemony  within  the  Nowegian  political  entity.  Industrial  fisheries  are  powerful  both  on  the  
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Norwegian  and  on  the  Russian  sides  of  the  Barents  Coast.  Similarly,  industrial  forestry  is  influential  
in  Northern  Finland,  mining  in  the  region  is  profitable  for  all  the  four  (colonial)  states  in  Sápmi,  and  
most  powerful  of  all  are  the  two  oil  and  gas  companies:  the  Russian  Gazprom  and  the  Norwegian  
Statoil.  On  the  Russian  side,  environmental  and  human  rights  activists  are  in  political  conflict  with  
the  government  over  infrastructures  that  serve  Gazprom’s  offshore  drilling,  and  on  the  Norwegian  
side,  Statoil  is  planning  to  begin  offshore  drilling  as  well.  All  the  meso-mechanisms  that  I  have  
observed  suggest  we  should  severely  qualify  the  assumption  that  gradual  macro-political  
development  will  inevitably  be  progressive.  The  struggle  to  set  the  agenda  for  policy  and  research  
does  not  show  any  teleological  pattern.  The  observed  pathway  labeled  “resources  decide”  even  
suggests  the  opposite  of  teleological  progress,  namely  arbitrariness.  This  mechanism  may  have  
transfer  value  to  other  parts  of  Sápmi.  The  governments  of  Norway  and  Russia,  and  maybe  Finland  
and  Sweden  as  well,  appear  to  reject  the  relevance  of  indigenous  human  rights,  as  long  those  are  in  
conflict  with  strong  vested  interests.  There  is  no  guarantee  that  the  indigenous  rights  struggle  will  
succeed  when  confronting  state  capitalist  institutions  such  as  industrial  fisheries,  as  well  as  Statoil  
and  Gazprom.  Decolonisation  becomes  costly  when  it  challenges  actual  resource  grabbing. 
 “Strategical  securitisation”  was  the  final  meso-mechanism  identified  when  I  attempted  to  
control  for  the  bias  of  wishful  thinking.  This  mechanism  has  not  been  observed  in  the  existing  
“realist”  research  on  the  implementation  of  indigenous  rights  in  “Norwegian”  Sápmi.  This  
mechanism  is  an  explanation  of  particular  pathways  that  became  evident  in  the  empirical  data  when  
I  interpreted  existing  empirical  findings  from  state-centred  realism  in  the  context  of  empirical  
findings  from  more  socio-ecological  research.  There  appears  to  be  a  tendency  to  apply  concepts  like  
“extremist”,  “radical”  or  “hooligan”  to  refer  to  human  rights  movements  whose  claims  are  not  –  yet  
–  recognized  by  the  existing  government.  In  particular,  this  is  the  case  with  regard  to  public  voices  
that  express  doubts  about  what  coercive  force,  if  any,  might  actually  be  legitimate  in  the  indigenous  
homeland.  The  existing  proofs  regarding  the  Alta-dam  controversy  suggest  that,  in  that  case,  violent  
escalation  was  avoided  because  the  army  was  not  mobilized,  as  a  result  of  one  particular  struggle  
for  internal  hegemony  within  the  government.  Today,  the  indigenous  peoples  of  Sápmi  enjoy  a  
degree  of  recognition  by  the  states,  which  they  did  not  during  that  period.  However,  on  the  other  
hand,  the  globalization  of  security  threats  has  blurred  the  division  of  labor  between  the  police  and  
the  military.  In  2013,  Russia  used  the  term  “hoologanism”  to  frame  Greenpeace  protestors  in  the  
Arctic,  while  Norway/NATO  mobilizes  the  term  “radicalisation”  in  suppressive  policies  against  the  
global  justice  movement.  The  economic  power  of  Gazprom  and  Statoil  is  potentially  backed  up  by  
the  military  power  of  NATO  and  CSTO.  If  the  actual  truth  about  Coastal  Sámi  communities  is  to  be  
found  amongst  the  secret  whispers  that  “this  is  still  a  colony”,  then  it  is  also  understandable  that  the  
Coastal  Sámi  are  known  for  being  cautious  about  not  being  associated  with  “radicalism”.  For  
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Coastal  Sámi  in  Norway  and  Eastern  Sámi  in  Russia,  there  may  be  a  need  to  stand  together  against  
resource  grabbing  on  the  part  of  industrial  fisheries,  Gazprom  and  Statoil,  while  at  the  same  time  
defending  themselves  discursively  against  stigmatization  as  “hooligans”  or  “radicals”,  which  may  
function  as  weapons  of  strategic  securitisation  used  by  governments  against  domestic  human  rights  
activists. 
 Those  two  possible  mechanisms  may  have  potential  relevance  not  only  in  Coastal  Sápmi,  
but  also  in  the  Barents  Sea  Basin,  the  Circumpolar  Arctic,  and  perhaps  also  among  indigenous  
peoples  in  more  contentious  contexts,  such  as  the  Mapuche  in  Chile  and  Argentina.  Whenever  




14.4.2  Practical  remedies? 
The  potential  relevance  of  these  two  mechanisms  poses  particular  risks  and  challenges  for  the  art  
and  science  of  transformative  social  movements.  Regarding  the  science  of  constituent  power,  
movements  need  conceptual  and  methodological  tools  that  are  practical  for  the  purpose  of  knowing  
                                                 
1213  Reflections  on  non-violence:  Hegemony  consists  of  both  coercion  and  consent.  Non-violent  action  consists  on  the  
withdrawal  of  consent.  This  may  happen  through  symbolic  action  or  non-violent  action,  and  may  either  weaken  the  
dominant  hegemony,  as  with  civil  disobedience,  or  may  strengthen  an  alternative  hegemony,  as  in  the  creation  of  
parallel  institutions  (Routledge  1993:  29-35).  In  the  classical  conceptualization,  social  hegemony  (cultural  and  eco-­
nomic)  is  seen  as  relatively  independent  from  political  hegemony,  the  latter  being  dependent  on  the  hegemony  of  co-­
ercive  force.  Therefore  it  was  assumed  that  coercive  forced  played  a  privileged  role,  when  compared  to  customary  
praxes  and  knowledge  praxes,  for  the  constitution  of  political  order.  (For  a  more  detailed  critique,  see  notes  on  
Gramsci  in  a  footnote  to  part  3.3.2.)  That  is  what  I  have  labeled  as  "old  school"  theory.  In  this  research,  by  contrast,  
I  have  described  non-violent  constituent  action,  as  well  constituted  order  that  is  maintained  through  non-coercive  
means.  When  we  strive  to  sort  real  life  phenomena  as  either  "violent"  or  "non-violent",  then  we  will  find  some  ex-­
amples  that  are  being  categorised  as  either.  The  category  "nonviolent  coercion"  includes  strikes  and  boycotts  (Sharp  
1973,  cited  in  Routledege  1993:  34-5).  Arguably,  that  category  may  include  some  instances  of  sabotage,  though  
some  activists  claim  that  all  property  destruction  is  violence,  because  it  may  function  as  psychological  violence,  and  
may  have  indirect  consequences  for  physiological  health  (Gordon  2007:  78-108).  In  some  contexts  there  are  various  
shades  of  grey  between  the  purely  violent  and  purely  nonviolent  forms  of  contentious  action.  The  interpretation  may  
depend  on  particular  context  or  situation,  on  the  viewer's  position  or  situatedness,  and  finally  on  the  theoretical  ap-­
proach.  Regarding  areas  where  the  territories  of  Norway  and  Sápmi  overlap,  I  had  learned  that  the  attempted  sabo-­
tage  of  a  bridge  in  1982  was  violence,  and  that  there  had  been  nonviolent  usage  of  police  against  peaceful  civil  diso-­
bedience  activists.  During  fieldwork  I  learned  that  some  local  groups  might  have  the  opposite  perception  (see  part  
2.3.2).  These  are  practices  in  the  grey  zone  between  prefigurative  satyagraha  and  prefigurative  war-of-position.  
When  confronted  with  empirical  examples  of  "nonviolent  coercion",  a  proponent  of  the  "new  school"  may  tend  to  
lump  most  of  these  examples  together  with  other  instances  of  "nonviolent  action",  whereas  a  follower  of  the  "old  
school"  may  lump  most  of  the  same  examples  together  with  other  instances  of  "coercive  force".  The  former  classifi-­
cation  may  tend  to  give  over-optimistic  predictions,  while  the  latter  one  may  result  in  overly  fatalistic  predictions.  
(See  also  reflections  on  structural  violence  in  footnote  on  14.4.1.)  In  this  research,  I  have  drawn  a  clear  distinction  
between  these  two  forms  of  reductionism,  following  the  advice  from  Morgenthau  (1970)  and  Chomsky  (1969).  By  
treating  the  "new  school"  and  the  "old  school"  as  separate,  but  complimentary  perspectives,  I  strive  to  avoid  the  dual  
pitfalls  of  over-optimism  and  over-fatalism,  of  naive  idealism  and  naive  realism,  and  instead  embrace  critical  real-­
ism.   
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one’s  opportunity,  knowing  one’s  enemy,  and  making  wise  strategic  and  ethical  decisions.  I  will  
return  to  this  below.  However,  regarding  the  art  of  constituent  power,  movements  also  need  
practical  judgment,  not  only  knowledge.  The  indigenous  human  rights  struggle  in  Sápmi  is  an  
example  of  an  environmental  justice  struggle  that  has  enjoyed  at  least  some  degree  of  success.  It  has  
succeeded  better  in  Inner  Sápmi,  with  regard  to  reindeer  husbandry,  and  under  the  Norwegian  state.  
It  has  thus  far  had  more  limited  success  in  several  other  areas  of  Sápmi.  Some  of  the  groups  that  
remain  marginalized  are  found  along  the  Barents  Coast,  from  the  Coastal  Sámi  and  Kväns  on  the  
“Norwegian”  side  of  that  coastline,  to  the  Eastern  Sámi  and  Pomors  on  the  “Russian”  side  of  the  
same  coastline.  Both  these  areas  have  a  strong  presence  of  industrial  fisheries,  and  both  experience  
an  increasing  presence  of  oil,  gas  and  mining  industries.  Both  have  a  history  of  labor  militancy  prior  
to  1917,  and  both  were  militarized  during  the  Cold  War.  During  the  recent  decades,  the  relationship  
has  become  less  tensed  in  the  Barents  Sea  Basin,  with  increased  regional  cooperation  across  the  
border  between  the  Russian  Federation  and  the  NATO  state,  Norway.  This  is  in  spite  of  the  
relationship  between  Russia  and  NATO  having  become  colder  on  other  fronts.  Social  movements  in  
the  area  deal  with  a  specific  opportunity  structure,  which  is  highly  determined  by  conditions  in  the  
landscape  ecology,  but  which  is  also  highly  determined  by  conditions  in  the  geo-strategical  theatre.  
Control  over  attractive  resources  is  at  stake. 
 In  my  opinion,  the  indigenous  rights  movements  in  Sápmi  should  be  addressed  in  a  trans-
boundary  context,  because  the  actual  natural  and  cultural  heritage  is  a  shared  richness,  and  also  
because  the  actual  geo-strategical  theatres  are  much  more  complex  than  idealized  state  sovereignty.  
Indigenous  human  rights  movements  and  other  environmental  justice  movements  create  issue  
networks  with  micro-regional  grounding  and  macro-regional  scope. 
 On  the  “Norwegian”  side  of  the  Barents  Coast,  the  Kvän  minority  remain  weakly  organized,  
but  the  Coastal  Sámi  organizations  have  played  an  active  role  in  the  indigenous  rights  struggle  
under  the  Norwegian  political  entity.  Their  strength  has  been  to  work  within  the  social-radical  
tendency  within  the  main  catchall  party  of  the  country.  This  appears  to  have  been  effective  as  a  
complimentary  strategy  to  the  more  publicly  spectacular  forms  of  contention  pursued  by  
organisations  from  Inner  Sápmi.  However,  the  Coastal  Sámi  have  gained  comparatively  less  than  
the  Mountain  Sámi  and  the  River  Sámi,  at  least  within  the  “Norwegian”  context.  It  may  be  hard  to  
find  a  good  equilibrium  between  political  participation  and  political  resistance,  between  social  
entrepreneurship  and  social  defence,  when  one  represents  highly  marginalized  socio-cultural  and  
socio-economic  interests,  the  truly  subaltern  classes.  There  is  a  highly  asymmetrical  social  conflict,  
where  the  control  over  profitable  resources  is  at  stake.  If  the  indigenous  fisher-peasants  pursue  
political  resistance  and  social  defence,  they  may  run  the  risk  of  being  met  with  “strategic  
securitisation”.  If  they  instead  pursue  political  inclusion  and  social  entrepreneurship,  they  may  
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experience  that  “arguments  matter  but  resources  decide”.  It  may  look  like  a  double  bind:  whatever  
you  do,  it  will  be  sanctioned;;  whatever  you  say,  it  will  be  used  against  you.  Some  claim  that  now  is  
the  “twelfth  hour”  for  the  Coastal  Sámi  culture  and  society.1214  Under  such  conditions  we  might  ask,  
like  Spivak,  can  the  subaltern  speak?1215  She  argues  that  subalterns  may  need  to  be  represented,  and  
in  Coastal  Sápmi  I  have  met  political  and  social  entrepreneurs  who  are  not  subaltern  anymore.  They  
combine  a  plurality  of  tactics,  and  it  looks  as  though  they  are  heading  towards  increasing  
internationalisation  of  their  struggle,  like  the  wider  Sámi  movement  did  one  generation  earlier.  (My  
own  research,  by  virtue  of  its  institutional  affiliation,  is  one  particular  contribution  to  such  
internationalisation.)  My  impression  is  that  the  political  and  social  entrepreneurs  from  Coastal  
Sápmi  have  succeeded  in  going  beyond  the  double  bind,  because  they  have  empowered  their  
practice  networks  to  expand  internationally,  beyond  the  state. 
 On  the  “Russian”  side  of  the  Barents  Coast,  I  have  not  conducted  any  research,  and  my  
competence  to  do  so  is  limited,  because  I  speak  neither  Russian  nor  Sámi.  One  relevant  
development  is  that  the  regional  cooperation  for  the  Barents  Area  has  contributed  to  less  geo-
strategical  tension  and  more  open  political  opportunities.  Another  relevant  development  is  that  local  
interest  organisations  seem  to  be  divided  between  those  that  are  dependent  on  the  federal  state,  and  
those  that  receive  funding  from  foreign  powers.  This  appears  to  be  a  contentious  issue  on  the  
“Russian”  side  of  the  coastline,  where  the  state  has  labelled  the  Western-funded  NGOs  as  “foreign  
agents”.1216  Public  media  on  the  Western  side  of  the  Barents  Coast  tend  to  frame  this  as  suppressive  
policies  from  the  Russian  side.  That  is  not  untrue,  but  it  might  not  be  the  whole  truth.  I  suspect  that  
this  local  public  debate  remains  under-informed  about  how  suppressive  the  Norwegian  state  
actually  is  against  the  Coastal  Sámi  and  the  Kväns,  and  how  aggressive  NATO  actually  is  on  other  
fronts.  The  former  point  I  have  tried  to  demonstrate  in  Chapters  10  and  11.  The  latter  point  is  well  
documented  in  other  studies.1217  On  the  Norwegian  side,  the  whole  corporatist  tradition  implies  a  
symbiosis  between  interest  organisations  and  the  state  apparatus,  and  one  might  wonder  how  
official  opinion  would  have  reacted  if  the  Coastal  Sámi  human  rights  organisations  started  to  
receive  funding  from  Moscow.  Before  I  apply  for  a  visa  to  conduct  fieldwork  on  the  Russian  side,  I  
will  suggest  a  hypothesis  about  what  may  be  found  there.  It  might  very  well  be  the  case  that  the  
local  organisations  for  environmental  justice  find  themselves  in  a  situation  of  double  bind  similar  to  
the  one  I  have  argued  that  Coastal  Sámi  political  and  social  entrepreneurs  are  now  slowly  
transcending.  Organisations  that  choose  accommodation  with  the  state  may  perhaps  run  the  risk  of  
becoming  tools  for  an  intrusive  Gazprom,  while  organisations  that  choose  accommodation  with  the  
                                                 
1214  Måsø  2012b 
1215  Spivak  1988 
1216  Ballovara  2014 
1217  See  e.g.  Limes  (#2,  2013),  for  a  further  comment,  see  14.5.2,  the  final  footnote. 
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West  might  need  to  prove  that  they  are  not  being  misused  as  pawns  for  intrusive  Western  interests.  
The  regional  environmental  justice  movement  in  the  Barents  Sea  area  needs  to  take  care  of  both  
accommodation  and  resistance  under  both  of  the  two  competing  governments.  That  is  a  rather  
complex  diplomatic  balancing  act.  Perhaps  such  a  coordinated  balancing  act  might  be  facilitated  if  
we  acknowledge  that  both  the  Western  and  the  Eastern  side  of  the  coastline  does  have  their  own  




14.4.3  Geopolitical  games 
Environmental  justice  movements  may  be  balanceing  between  two  different  strategical  needs:  On  
the  one  hand,  there  is  a  strategic  need  to  avoid  being  divided  from  similar  movements  subject  to  
other  governments.  On  the  other  hand,  there  may  also  be  a  strategical  need  to  avoid  (being  
perceived  as)  being  used  as  a  proxy  against  one’s  domestic  government.  Both  of  those  concerns  
may  be  seen  as  a  need  to  avoid  imperialist  divide-et-impera,  at  different  levels  in  a  polycentric  
political  environment.  These  strategic  considerations  may  be  described  with  a  simple  model  made  
to  keep  track  of  transnational  social  movement  action  (Figure  14.1).     
 
Figure  14-1:  A  simple  model  to  keep  track  of  international  interactions 
International  interactions  consisting  of  inter-governmental  relations  between  state  goverments,  plus  trans-
national  relations  between  social  movements  within  each  state.1218 
 
 
The  full-stroke  lines  show  state-centred  political  activities:  social  movements  within  each  country  
provide  input  to  governments  within  each  country,  while  the  governments  take  care  of  international  
relations  between  the  two  countries.  The  dotted  lines  show  some  other  alliances:  social  movements  
may  coordinate  joint  resistance  across  the  state  boundaries,  or  they  may  cooperate  with  a  foreign  
                                                 
1218  Based  on:  Della  Porta,  Kriesi  &  Rucht  1999:  5  (figure  1.1) 
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government  against  their  domestic  government.  It  appears  to  me  that  the  environmental  justice  
movements  along  the  Barents  Coast  seek  to  get  out  of  double  binds  under  their  domestic  
governments  (defined  in  14.4.2  above),  by  building  transnational  alliances.  However,  it  also  seems  
to  me  that  they  strive  to  avoid  being  used  as  proxies,  either  by  being  used  by  foreign  governments  
against  their  domestic  government,  or  being  used  by  either  government  against  other  social  
movements  subject  to  foreign  states. 
 Transformative  social  movements  that  generate  constituent  power  have  different  needs  than  
the  reformist  social  movements  that  are  contained  within  already  constituted  power.  Transformative  
social  movements  require  knowledge  about  the  opportunities  for  empowerment,  but  also  need  
knowledge  about  the  limitations  for  action.  Whenever  control  over  attractive  natural  resources  is  at  
stake,  there  might  be  a  potential  that  “resources  decide”,  and  that  opposition  might  be  met  with  
“strategic  securitisation”.  In  such  situations,  social  movements  may  need  to  build  their  political-
economic  and  political-semiotic  capacity  beyond  the  mere  power  of  the  better  argument.  From  my  
fieldwork  among  a  few  of  the  environmental  justice  movements  in  the  Barents  Sea  region,  it  
appears  to  me  that  they  seek  constituent  power  by  scaling  out  their  practice  networks  at  the  
international  stage,  especially  with  other  grass-roots  movements,  and  also  with  multilateral  inter-
governmental  organisations.  At  the  same  time,  it  appears  that  they  carry  out  challenging  balancing  
acts  between  loyalty  to  their  domestic  government,  and  resource  mobilisation  outside  of  it.  This  
may  be  typical  for  transformative  social  movements.  While  reformist  social  movements  are  
contained  within  the  confines  of  already  constituted  political  entities,  transformative  social  
movements  are  not,  because  they  generate  potentially  constituent  power.  Therefore,  transformative  
movements  are  geopolitical  actors.  They  deal  with  the  “nice”  geopolitical  games  of  landscape  
ecology,  but  they  must  also  somehow  relate  to  the  “dirty”  geopolitical  games  of  geo-strategic  
theatres.  To  identify  opportunities  and  limitations,  they  may  need  both  the  “new  theory”  suggested  




14.5.0  Conclusion  regarding  social  movement  research 
 
14.5.1  Reflections  on  violence 
Among mainstream social movement researchers in the North Atlantic area, few have been 
                                                 
1219 Ostrom, Walker & Gardner 1992 
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interested in coercive power, as in the interaction between protest policing and insurgent violence. 
Donatella della Porta is among the few exceptions.1220 Awareness of the impact of coercive force is 
necessary if social movement research is to be beneficial for transformative social movements that 
produce constituent power (and not only for reformist movements that are contained by already 
constituted power). Even though most transformative movements choose non-violent paths towards 
prefiguration,1221 all of them face political systems that apply coercive force. States are not non-
violent. Active non-violence is to overcome violence, not to be pacified by state violence. 
 If a social movement is being seen as a challenge to a political hegemony, it may be met by 
coercive force. This is a real danger for indigenous rights movements and other environmental 
justice movements in the Circumpolar Arctic. They are stigmatised as  “hooligans”  or  “radicals”  
whenever they resist fracking and the tar sands industry in the land of American First Nations, or 
the gas industry, polluting mining, unsustainable forestry, or over-fishing in the lands of Sámis and 
Nenets. 
 Additionally, if a social movement succeeds in  influencing  a  state’s constitution or its policies, 
then this has consequences for how the coercive apparatus of the state is being applied. Thus, social 
movements may feel indirectly responsible for how coercion is applied, and indeed, if social 
movements are constituent powers, then they may find themselves within a governing position. 
Political reformism is not a non-violent strategy, because the state form is not non-violent. When the 
Sámi could no longer evade state power, they had to reform the states. 
 Finally, if an anti-regime movement in one state chooses to ally with the government of a 
competing state, then the outcome may be a result of foreign military capacity as well as local 
movement action. This was written while Syrian reformists had become enrolled in Saudi proxy 
warfare, while various nationalist groups in Kiev and Crimea pursued challenging balancing acts 
between NATO and CSTO. Both terrains are rupture zones between grand military coalitions. 
Sápmi is a third example. Therefore, the Sámi people resist colonial resource grabbing within two 
competing free trade areas  (EEA  vs.  CES),1222 while they also maintain diplomatic relations with 
two competing military alliances (NATO vs. CSTO).1223  This  is  also  a  balancing  act.  When  
transnational  social  movements  are  constituent  powers,  they  are  political  actors  in  geopolitical  
games. 
 Environmental justice movements, regardless of whether they are in opposition, in 
government or choose evasive paths, need to discover positive opportunities for empowerment, but 
they also need to observe structural limitations.  In  order  to  empower  one’s own movement and to 
                                                 
1220  Della  Porta  2013 
1221  Graeber  2009 
1222  On  Common  Economic  Space  (CES),  see:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commonwealth_of_Independent_States 
1223  On  the  CSTO  military  alliance,  see:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CSTO 
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evade violent suppression from agonistic movements, it is useful to observe both violent and non-
violent mechanisms of constituent and constituted power.1224 In particular, I suggested that when we 
explain the maintenance and transformation of constituted order, then we should not pre-define the 
explanatory factor of coercive power as being necessarily more relevant than those of customary 
praxes  or  knowledge  praxes.  Thus,  we  have  to  leave  the  “old  theory”  behind  (see  Chapter  3),  while  
also acknowledging the  limitations  of  the  “new  theory”.  Thus, I suggest that political science is 





                                                 
1224  Reflections  on  structural  violence:  Special  caution  and  care  is  required  from  transformative  social  movements,  be-­
cause  of  the  potential  relevance  of  the  two  possible  mechanisms  that  were  discussed  here.  In  situations  where  "re-­
sources  decide",  there  might  be  a  higher  risk  of  suppression,  including  "strategic  securitization".  These  two  mecha-­
nisms  actualize  the  problem  of  how  to  draw  the  distinction  between  nonviolent  action  and  coercive  force  (see  the  
footnote  with  reflections  on  nonviolence  in  part  14.3.2).  In  between  the  purely  violent  and  purely  non-violent  forms  
of  contention,  there  are  several  shades  of  grey,  such  as  boycott  and  sabotage.  In  this  shady  area  we  find  the  two  
mechanisms  called  "resources  decide"  and  "strategic  securitization".  Whenever  "resources  decide"  there  are  socio-
economic  limitations  to  those  who  pursue  the  path  of  prefigurative  satyagraha.  The  (neo)institutionaists  have  great  
belief  in  social  entrepreneurship  (Ressler  2008,  Hart  et  al.  2010,  Ostrom  &  Ahn  2003).  By  contrast,  the  
(post)modern  Machiavellians  Gramsci  (1930,  1919)  and  Deleuze  &  Guattari  (1980)  would  reduce  accumulation  of  
value  to  merely  exploitation  of  labor  or  expropriation  of  land  ("surplus  value"),  and  thus,  they  would  reduce  socio-
economic  development  to  a  prefigurative  war-of-position  over  the  control  over  the  means  of  production.  While  the  
(neo)institutionaists  may  be  over-optimistic,  the  (post)modern  Machiavellians  may  be  over-fatalistic.  Whenever  
"strategic  securitization"  takes  place,  there  are  discursive  limitations  for  those  who  pursue  the  path  of  prefigurative  
enlightenment.  Some  constructivists  are  committed  to  critique  of  every  ideology,  in  order  to  liberate  the  voices  of  
the  silenced  groups  (Spivak  1988,  Haraway  1996,  Derrida  1967,  Law  &  Singleton  2012).  By  contrast,  the  postmod-­
ern  Machavellians  Althusser  (1998)  or  Deleuze  &  Guattari  (1980)  consider  as  an  "effective  truth"  any  proposition  
that  works  instrumentally  for  any  given  purpose  in  any  given  context,  thus,  "one  person's  terrorist  is  another  person's  
freedom  fighter",  and  consequently  all  critique  is  reduced  to  prefigurative  war-of-position  for  control  over  media.  
The  mentioned  constructivists  may  be  over-optimistic,  but  the  postmodern  Machiavellians  are  over-fatalistic.  All  in  
all,  the  postmodern  Machiavellians  should  not  be  allowed  to  reduce  all  transformative  social  action  to  prefigurative  
war-of-position,  because  that  is  an  over-fatalistic  form  of  reductionism,  but  at  the  same  time,  the  neoinstitutionalists  
and  constructivists  should  avoid  reductionism  in  their  own  right,  when  they  explain,  predict  and  prescribe  paths  to  
prefigurative  satyagraha  and  prafigurative  enlighetenment.  From  the  Coastal  Sámi  community,  the  success  has  been  
limited  with  either  pathway:  for  political  entrepreneurs  within  the  state  apparatus,  for  the  social  entrepreneurs  within  
the  market  economy,  and  for  social  entrepreneurs  within  institutionalized  academia.  There  is  no  reason  to  deny  that  
customary  praxes  and  knowledge  praxes  are  constituent  powers  in  themselves,  in  relative  autonomy  from  the  power  
of  coercive  force.  However,  we  should  also  not  deny  the  possible  intersection  between  these  different  constituent  
powers.  Such  complex  interactions  between  the  vectors  of  violence  and  non-violence  could  be  described  with  Bour-­
dieu's  metaphors  "structural  violence"  and  "symbolic  violence"  (Otnes  2006,  Bourdieu  &  Passeron  1970,  Bourdieu  
1977).  The  environmental  justice  struggles  among  the  Coastal  Sámi  has  won  some  limited  gains  through  a  plurality  
of  tactics,  but  not  least  by  bonding  environmental  justice  struggles  from  other  locations,  thus  expanding  their  net-­
work  to  a  transnational  scale,  and  as  a  result,  changing  their  own  structural  position  in  relation  to  the  state  hegemo-­
ny.  The  terms  autonomy,  intersection,  structural  violence,  and  structural  position  indicate  how  the  "old  theory"  (ob-­
sessed  by  cooperation  by  coercion)  and  the  "new  theory"  (focused  on  cooperation  by  consent)  may  be  treated  as  
"complimentary  theories"  in  Niels  Bohr's  (1938)  sense.  Beyond  the  dichotomy  of  over-optimism  and  over-fatalism,  
naive  idealism  and  naive  realism,  this  critical  realism  indicates  a  positive  alternative  to  Gramsci's  (and  Rokkan's)  old  
school  dogmatism  (see  also  notes  on  Gramsci  in  a  footnote  to  part  3.3.2). 
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14.5.2  Social  movement  research  as  constituent  praxis 
The  two  alternative  conceptualisations  both  deal  with  mutual  causation  between  (constituent)  social  
movement  action  and  (constituted)  political  opportunity  structures.  This  is  one  particular  
articulation  of  two  general  causal  models  suggested  by  Donatella  della  Porta.  She  is  among  the  few  
mainstream  social  movement  researchers  in  the  North  Atlantic  area  who  takes  an  interest  in  the  
prefigurative  potential  of  social  movements,  and  also,  in  the  problems  of  coercive  force. 
 On the one hand, she has conducted research on the mutual causality  between  (A)  political  
democratisation  and  (B)  social  mobilisation  (see  figure,  left  side).1225  On  the  other  hand,  della  Porta  
has  also  carried  out  research  on  the  mutual  causality  between  (A)  protest  policing  and  (B)  insurgent  
political  violence  (see  figure,  right  side).1226 
 
Figure  14-2:  Constituted  structre  and  constituent  action   
Two  models  of  (constituted)  opportunity  structure  and  (constituent)  social  movement  action1227 
 
This  model  was  implicitly  present  in  the  discussion  of  geography  and  praxiology  in  Chapter  3.  The  
two  models  should  not  be  mis-read  as  stating  that  these  are  two  parallel  but  un-related  causal  paths.  
On  the  contrary,  the  two  models  zoom  in  on  different  aspects  of  one  and  the  same  complex  web  of  
causation.  All  states  police  their  norms  with  coercive  force  (and  perhaps  most  stateless  political  
systems  as  well).  Most  social  movements  are  non-violent,  but  they  may  nevertheless  interact  with  
other  movements  that  are  violent.  (In  colonial  India,  many  followed  the  path  of  prefigurative  
satyagraha,  while  others  answered  violence  with  violence.)  In  spite  of  empirical  complexity,  I  think  
it  is  virtuous  to  to  keep  an  analytical  separation  between  non-violent  and  violent  pathways  of  
constituted  and  constituent  power.  The  purpose  is  practical.  For  the  science  of  constituent  power,  
coercive  force  may  be  treated  as  a  control  variable.  This  is  in  order  to  help  the  art  of  constituent  
power  to  keep  coercive  power  under  control. 
 For  social  movement  studies,  the  models  are  helpful  to  venture  beyond  reformist  movements  
that  are  contained  by  already  constituted  power,  and  also  follow  prefigurative  movements  that  
                                                 
1225  Della  Porta  2014:  14-22 
1226  Della  Porta  2013:  18-21 
1227  Della  Porta  2014:  ibidem;;  della  Porta  2013:  ibidem 
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generate  constituent  power.  Model  number  2  corresponds  with  “old  school”  studies  of  state  
formation,  such  as  Tilly’s  sociological  analysis  of  military  history.1228  Model  number  1,  by  contrast,  
invites  “new  school”  re-thinking  of  the  same  phenomenon.  This  model  incorporates  Mattei’s  use  of  
SES  to  study  constitutional  change,  Mattoni’s  application  of  ANT  to  trace  social  movement  media  
praxes,  Staggenborg’s  use  of  Randall  Collins  to  synthesize  organisation  and  framing,  and  Graeber’s  
description  of  strategies  to  build  the  new  society  within  the  shell  of  the  old.1229 
 For  studies  of  areas  where  Sápmi  and  Norway  overlap,  the  models  are  also  applicable.  
Model  number  2  corresponds  with  Anne-Jule  Semb’s  “old  school”  research  on  how  norms  affect  
policy  (and  polity)  in  Sápmi.1230  Her  research  was  contained  by  the  already  constituted  paradigm  of  
Norwegian  state  science  (statsvitenskap).  Model  number  1,  by  contrast,  is  in  line  with  the  “new  
school”  contributions  of  Audun  Sandberg  and  Gro  Ween,  who  use  SES  and  ANT  to  research  Sámi  
customs  and  lore.1231  They  find  new  proofs  that  contribute  to  the  on-going  re-constitution  of  
Norwegian  legal  history  and  jurisprudence,  pioneered  by  the  Sámi  Rights  Commission. 
 My  own  empirical  research  follows  in  the  footsteps  of  all  the  mentioned  researchers  who  are  
compatible  with  Della  Porta’s  model  number  1:  Ween,  Sandberg,  Mattoni,  Mattei,  Staggenborg  and  
Graeber.  However,  in  the  final  discussion  of  my  findings,  when  I  try  to  control  for  the  possible  bias  
of  wishful  thinking,  I  apply  Della  Porta’s  model  number  2,  and  follow  the  researchers  that  are  
compatible  with  that  model,  namely  Semb  and  Tilly.  The  concepts  I  have  used  in  this  research,  to  
discover  empirical  findings,  and  to  discuss  them  critically,  have  been  specified  in  Chapters  12,  13  
and  14  (the  present  one).  Three  pathways  of  constituent  and  constituted  power  have  been  specified  
in  geographical  and  praxiological  terms.  This  operationalisation  was  also  one  particular  way  to  
adapt  and  adopt  the  more  general  causal  models  formulated  by  della  Porta.  Her  model  number  1  
incorporates  my  use  of  landscape  ecology,  SES  and  ANT,  while  her  model  number  2  is  in  line  with  
my  use  of  strategical  geopolitics  and  the  postmodern  Machiavelli  (table  3.3). 
 
Table  14-4:  How  I  adopt  and  adapt  della  Porta's  causal  models  to  areas  where  Sápmi  and  Norway  overlap 
Model  of  mutual  causality Opportunity  structure  side Social  movement  action 
Both  models  1  and  2 A  =  constituted  order B  =  constituent  praxes 
Model  1  (della  Porta  2014) A  =  landscape  ecology B  =  customs  /  knowledge  praxes 
Model  2  (della  Porta  2013) A  =  geo-strategical  Fortuna B  =  cognitive  /  technical  Virtù 
 
                                                 
1228  Tilly  1980 
1229  Mattei  2011;;  Bailey  and  Mattei  2012;;  Mattoni  2011;;  Staggenborg  2002;;  Graeber  2009 
1230  Semb  2001;;  Semb  2003 
1231  Sandberg  2006;;  Sandberg  2008a;;  Sandberg  2008b;;  Ween  2010;;  Ween  2011;;  Ween  2012a;;  Ween  2012b;;  Ween  (in  
prep.);;  Ween  &  Lien  2012 
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This  specific  adaptation  of  della  Porta’s  causal  models  constitutes  a  particular  contribution  towards  
the  prefiguration  of  a  positive  alternative  to  Tilly,  Tarrow  and  McAdam’s  suggested  synthesis  of  
social  movement  theory.  In  their  Dynamics  of  Contention,  the  main  conceptual  dualism  is  between  
insiders  and  outsiders  to  already  constituted  political  systems.1232  This  is  is  suitable  for  observing  
the  actions  of  reformist  movements  that  are  contained  by  already  constituted  power.  However,  it  is  
dysfunctional  when  the  purpose  is  to  observe  transformative  movements  that  generate  new  
constituent  power.  Then  we  need  to  address  the  process  that  maintains  and  creates  the  very  
boundary  between  those  actors  that  were  defined  as  insiders  and  outsiders.  However,  such  a  
research  interest  requires  caution  and  care.  As  I  showed  in  Chapter  2:  To  find  new  proofs  about  the  
struggle  for  rights  and  proofs  is  a  way  of  getting  involved  in  the  uneven  development  of  rights  and  
proofs,  which,  in  turn,  has  consequences  for  the  uneven  application  of  institutional  violence.  The  art  
and  science  of  constituent  power  implies  some  profound  ethical  and  epistemological  challenges. 
 The  constituent  power  of  social  movements  is  too  important  to  be  left  to  national  security  
studies.  The  topic  is  particularly  urgent  for  movements  where  the  human  body  and  its  geographical  
environment  are  at  stake:  radical  feminists  and  environmentalists,  regionalists  and  anti-colonial  
movements,  indigenous  human  rights  movements,  mobilisations  for  environmental  health,  and  
transnational  solidarity  movements.  Such  materialist  and  spatial  issues  require  a  geographical  turn  
for  social  movement  studies,  and  this,  in  turn,  destabilises  reified  assumptions  about  who  is  
conservative  and  who  is  radical.  One  example  is  the  social  movement  for  social  justice  in  Syria,  
which  became  enrolled  by  the  Saudi  regime  as  an  instrument  for  proxy  warfare.1233  Another  
example  is  the  indigenous  human  rights  movement  in  Sápmi,  which  originates  in  the  social  defence  
of  local  social  ecologies,  against  a  political  class  of  Jacobin  nation-builders.  The  latter  is  what  I  
inquire  about  here.  Those  are  two  different  “terrains  of  hegemony  and  resistance”,  though  in  those  
cases,  the  pathways  of  constituted  and  constituent  power  are  very  different.  However,  in  both  of  
them,  as  in  other  “terrains  of  hegemony  and  resistance”,  various  transformative  social  movements  
might  be  found  both  in  opposition  and  within  government,  or  they  may  prefer  autonomous,  
apparently  a-political  paths  to  prefiguration.  Reformist  social  movements  that  are  contained  by  
                                                 
1232  Tilly,  Tarrow  &  McAdam  2001 
1233  That  story  is  not  to  be  told  here,  even  though  I  have  conducted  a  relevant  fieldwork.  Let  me  instead  refer  to  the  
following  secondary  sources:  Limes  #  2,  2013;;  Limes  #5,  2013;;  Limes  #9,  2013;;  and  Limes  #2,  2014.  See  also  Figure  
14-1  above.  This  actualises  the  concept  of  "proxy  warfare",  see  e.g.  Limes  (#2,  2013).  This,  in  turn,  might  shed  new  
light  on  the  potentialities  of  the  so-called  "boomerang  effect",  a  term  coined  by  Keck  &  Sikkink  (1998:  12,  102,  
107)  referring  to  successfull  attempts  by  sub-state  groups  to  mobilise  international  human  rights  norms  against  the  
states  to  which  they  are  subjects.  (Thanks  to  Paul  Routledge  for  the  latter  reference.)  On  the  one  hand,  
transformative  social  movements  should  be  aware  that  the  "boomerang  effect"  has  been  effective  and  empowering  in  
several  cases,  including  the  various  regional  struggles  in  Latin  America  and  the  indigenous  rights  struggle  in  Sápmi.  
On  the  other  hand,  transformative  social  movements  should  also  be  aware  of  the  potential  risk  that  alliances  with  
foreign  powers  or  international  organisations  may  attract  suppression  from  governments,  because  such  alliances  may  
be  portrayed  (truthfully  or  not)  as  potential  "proxy  war".  This  may  be  one  of  the  reasons  why,  in  Syria  and  Libya,  
the  Arab  Spring  mutated  into  sectarian  wars.  As  an  extreme  example,  this  may  highlight  more  general  challenges. 
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already  constituted  power  find  themselves  safely  within  the  confines  of  civil  society.  
Transformative  social  movements  that  generate  constituent  power,  by  contrast,  are  political  actors,  
conditioned  by  and  contributing  to  geopolitical  games.  There  is  no  innocence  for  social  movement  
research  and  action  outside  the  box  of  containment.  Therefore  we  need  epistemological  tools  to  take  
responsibility  for  the  constituent  power  of  proof,  and  we  need  ethical  tools  to  control  for  the  
potential  bias  of  wishful  thinking. 
  




Truth  hides  under  fallen  rocks  and  stones   
At  the  end  of  a  disconnected  phone   
Truth  hides  down  an  unmarked  street   
Buried  deep  beneath  your  feet   
 
Truth  hides  in  people  written  out  of  history   
Black  leaders  and  inventors  whose  names   
Remain  a  mystery   
Great  women  recorded  on  ripped  out  pages   
Obliterated  wisdom,  covered  up  faces   
 
Truth  is  lost  in  the  mists  of  eMpTy  Vision,   
And  found  in  the  notebooks  of  those   
Wrongfully  imprisoned,   
And  in  the  evidence  that  was  never  brought  to  trial,   
 
But  not  in  the  void  behind  the  newsreaders’  smile.   
Truth  hides  whenever  we  lose  our  focus   
Slips  out  the  back,  quickly  replaced  by  the  bogus,   
Fleeing  soundbites  disguised  as  facts   
 
That  reappear  in  the  small  print  on  every  contract   
Truth  hides  on  the  other  side  of  a  two-way  mirror   
In  countless  documents  sent  straight  to  the  shredder   
That  might  finally  give  us  the  whole  of  the  picture   
 
But  until  the  day  we  decide  to  dig  a  little  deeper   
We  know  that  truth  will  hide   
Under  fallen  rocks  and  stones   
At  the  end  of  a  disconnected  phone   
 
Down  an  unmarked  street   
And  buried  deep  beneath  your  feet   
 
Truth  it  a  hide  under  rocks  and  stones   
At  the  end  of  your  line   
Down  an  unmarked  street   
Truth  it  a  hide  under  rocks  and  stones   
At  the  end  of  your  line... 
 




Songwriters:  Das,  Anirudda  /  Pandit,  John  /  Savale,  Steven  /   
Tailor,  Sanjay  /  Zaman,  Saidullah 
Truth  Hides  lyrics  ©  Universal  Music  Publishing  Group 
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Note:  This  list  of  unpublished  sources  includes  all  types  of  primary  data  that  are  unfit  for  being  
listed  in  the  bibliography.  I  have  chosen  to  include  online  register  data  and  newspapers  into  the  list  
of  unpublished  sources,  even  though  those  sources,  strictly  speaking,  have  been  published.  
Excluded  from  this  list,  but  included  in  the  bibliography,  are  web  pages  (webography),  online  
publications,  printed  reports  (grey  literature)  and  printed  topographical  maps  (without  GIS  data).  
The  list  of  unpublished  sources  is  sorted  into  the  following  categories: 
A. Quantitative  register  data  (including  GIS  maps) 
B. Qualitative  interview  data  (including  some  informal  encounters) 
C. Historical  archives  (including  archives  of  ongoing  correspondence) 
D. Participant  observation  (incl.  observant  participation  in  Academia) 




A.  Quantitative  register  data 
 
1.  Statistics  Norway,  municipal  and  election  statistics:  www.ssb.no  (retrieved  20.05.2011) 
2.  Statistics  Finland,  municipal  and  election  statistics:  www.stat.fi  (retrieved  20.05.2011) 
3.  NASCO  river  database:  www.nasco.int/RiversDatabase.aspx  (retrieved  February  2013) 
4.  UNEP-GRID  Arendal,  various  GIS  maps:  www.grida.no  (retrieved  February  2013).  ©  UNEP-
GRID  and  Philippe  Rekacewicz 
5.  UNEP-GRID  Warsawa,  various  GIS  maps:  www.eea.europa.eu/legal/copyright  (retrieved  
February  2013).  ©  European  Environment  Agency  (EEA).  EEA  standard  re-use  policy:  unless  
otherwise  indicated,  re-use  of  content  on  the  EEA  website  for  commercial  or  non-commercial  
purposes  is  permitted  free  of  charge,  provided  that  the  source  is  acknowledged. 
6.  European  Social  Survey  (ESS),  ESS  Round  1-5  (2012)  www.europeansocialsurvey.org/ 
6.1  ESS  data:  ESS  Cumulative  File,  ESS  1-5,  2012.  (Data  file  edition  1.0.)  ©  Norwegian  Social  
Science  Data  Services,  Norway  –  Data  Archive  and  distributor  of  ESS  data.   
6.2  ESS  documentation:  see  bibliography  and  published  sources:  European  Social  Survey  (2012).   
7.  Finnmark  County  Municipality,  “Statistikk”:  www.ffk.no/fakta/statistikk.default.aspx  (May  2011) 
8.  Regional  Council  of  Lapland,  “Lapland  in  Figures  2010-2011”:  
www.kommunerna.net/sv/databanker/statistik/kommunvis/Sidor/default.aspx  (May  2011) 
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B.  Qualitative  interview  data 
 
Ahlakorpi,  Anni,  student,  works  at  the  Nature  Hut  in  Ohcejohka,  19.08.2011 
Aikio,  Esko,  river  fisher  and  human  rights  lawyer,  Ohcejohka  08.07.2012 
Aikio,  Marja  Sofia,  fisher,  hunter  and  Sámi  politician,  Ohcejohka  09.07.2012 
Aronsen,  Terje,  school  teacher  and  Kvän  political  entrepreneur,  Fronger  Church,  Oslo,  04.03.2012 
Aslaksen,  Oddmund,  works  at  Tana  Family  Camping,  Skiippagurra,  20.08.2011 
Andersen,  Jon  Ole,  master  artisan  (duodji),  Karasjok,  18.08.2011 
Antti,  Günther,  reindeer  herder,  Rastegaisa  pub,  04.02.2011 
Borgersen,  Svein  og  Laila  Astrid,  local  tourist  business,  Vardø,  25.06.2011 
Brattland,  Camilla,  a  Sámi  social  scientist,  at  the  Riddu  Riđđu  festival  12.07.2012 
Gilbert,  Mads,  physician,  during  the  hunger  strike  of  Afghan  refugees  in  Oslo,  summer  2006 
Guttorm,  Aimo  lawyer  at  for  Samediggi  Finnland,  at  Rastegaisa  pub,  03.02.2011 
Guttorm,  Asbjørn,  river  fisher,  Karasjok,  18.08.2011 
Hansen,  Håvald,  river  fisher  and  social  researcher,  SEG,  05.07.2012 
Hansen,  Hjalmar,  river  fisher,  06.07.2012 
Hansen,  Olaf,  river  fisher,  former  local  politician,  06.07.2012 
Hellander,  Svein  Ottar,  municipal  planner,  Tana  municipality,  28.01.2011 
Holmen,  Svein  Harald,  regional  developer,  Vardø,  25.06.2011 
Jakobsen,  Leif,  designer  and  dance-musician,  at  cultural  festival,  Tana  Hotell,  09.02.2011 
Johansen,  Jonas  E.  &  Andersen,  Daniel  (Hasson),  museum  workers  Varanger  Museum,  21.08.2011 
Johnsson,  Kjell  Magne,  fishery  biologist,  Tana  Bru,  09.02.2011,  12.08.2011,  Masjoka  River  2012 
Johnsson,  Kjell-Magne,  fishery  biologist,  during  LBT  meeting  at  Tana  Hotel,  07.02.2011 
Joks,  Solveig,  collector  of  traditional  knowledge,  Romssa  airport,  22.02.2012. 
Länsmann,  Maija,  fishery  biologist,  RKTL  research  station,  Utsjok,  04.02.2011 
Länsmann,  Trine,  sociologist,  in  a  goahti  at  Buolbmat,  02.02.2011 
Larsen,  Nils,  ex-fisher  og  UNIFIL-veteran,  Deanudat,  15.08.2011 
Larsen,  Reidar,  salmon  fisher  and  outfield  practitioner,  Deanudat,  13.08.2011 
Lindbakk,  Harald,  Norwegian  State  archive,  at  the  Riddu  Riđđu  festival  12.07.2012 
Mellem,  Kristin,  folk  musician  with  Sámi,  Kvän  and  Norwegian  repertoire,  Romssa,  21.02.2012 
Nordsletta,  Edvard,  river  fisher,  local  LBT  leader,  Karasjok,  18.08.2011 
NVE  employees,  informal  conversations  at  wind  power  conference,  Stiklestad  25.-27.08.2008 
Nyysölä,  Jarkko,  worker  for  Lomatärppi  cottages,  Rastagaisa  pub,  03.01.2011 
Nango,  Joar,  a  Sámi  architect,  several  interviews  in  2012  and  2013. 
Niittyvuopio,  Laura-Maija,  the  Samediggi  Youth  Council  in  Finland,  Ohcejohka,  07.07.2012 
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Ødegaard,  Merete,  anthropologist,  Alta  Museum,  10.07.2012 
Opdahl,  Jørn  Stephan,  ecologist  at  EU-WFD,  the  County  Municipality,  Vadsø,  26.01.2011 
Partanen,  Toivo,  municipal  engineer  Utsjok  municipality,  03.02.2011 
Pedersen,  Anne  Marit,  Finnmark  Commission,  21.-22.10.2010;;  09.02.2011 
Pedersen,  Terje,  sheep  farmer  and  outfield  practitioner,  Deanudat,  13.08.2011 
Pettersen,  Ove,  former  librarian,  meeting  in  Oslo  before  I  went  to  the  archives,  2009 
Petterson,  Knut,  lawyer  and  judge,  meeting  in  Oslo  before  I  went  to  the  field,  2010 
Rasmussen,  Torkel,  researcher  at  Sámi  allskuvla,  Utsjoki  06.02.2011 
Roger  (Brodin)  &  Geir  (Sunde-Lie),  young  crab  fishers,  Deanudat,  12.08.2011 
Selfors,  Finn-Arne,  Inner  Finnmark  District  Court,  22.10.2010 
Solbakk,  Aage,  Sámi  activist,  Buolbmát,  16.08.2011 
Solbakk,  Aage,  Sámi  activist,  several  informal  interviews  from  from  2010  until  2012 
Sottinen,  Jorunn,  LBT-leader,  at  Tana  hotel,  04.07.2012 
Tapiola,  Aslak,  local  fisherman  (with  Meeri  and  Katja  Tapiola),  Utsjoki,  06.02.2011 
Tapiola,  Katja,  a  Sámi  artist,  shop  worker,  Ohcejohka  07.07.2012 
Tapiola,  Nilla,  teacher  and  camping  site  owner,  Lapinkylä  camping,  04.01.2011 
Tapiola,  Tapani,  municipal  planner,  Utsjok  municipality,  03.022011 
Utsi,  Esther,  small  business  entrepreneur  Polmakmoen  Guest  House,  30.01.2011 
Valen,  Gerd  Johanne,  director,  Alta  Museum,  10.07.2012 




C.  Historical  archives 
 
Riksarkivet  i  Oslo  (The  Norwegian  National  Archive):   
 Private  archive  from  “Folkeaksjonen  mot  utbygging  av  Alta-Kautokeinovassdraget,  Oslo- 
 avdelingen  1977-1983”,  one  archive  box 
Alta  museum  (The  local  museum  and  UNESCO  World  Heritage  Site  in  Alta) 
Private  archive  from  “Folkeaksjonen  mot  utbygging  av  Alta-Kautokeinovassdraget”,  65  
archive  boxes.  Archive  of  the  main  office  in  Alta,  includes  minutes  from  meetings  in  the  
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Norwegian  Water  Resources  and  Energy  Directorate  (NVE): 
The  online  photo  archive  “Museumsordningen”:  http://museumsordningen.wordpress.com/  
(last  accessed  August  2014) 
Utsjoen  municipality  (Finnish  side),  public  planning  office: 
-  Outgoing  correspondence  with  Utsjoki  municipality 
-  Diverse  documents  from  the  planning  cycle  (see  bibliography  for  some  of  them) 
Tana  municipality  (Norwegian  side),  public  planning  office: 
-  Outgoing  correspondence  with  Tana  municipality 
-  Diverse  documents  from  the  planning  cycle  (see  bibliography  for  some  of  them) 
  -  See  especially  Hellander  (2010)  in  the  bibliography  (printout  of  power  point  presentation) 
  -  See  also  Tana  municipality  (2006),  Burgess  (1996)  in  the  bibliography  ("grey  literature")   
Tana  folkebibliotek  (Public  library  of  Tana  Municipality): 
-  Private  archive  “Kjell  Moens  arkiv”,  after  a  committed  salmon  biologist  in  the  region 
  -  See  especially  Moen  (1983)  in  the  bibliography  (M.Sc.  thesis  on  Alta  River  salmon) 
Laksebreveierne  i  Tanavassdraget  (LBT),  before  the  re-organisation  in  2012: 
  Fishery  biologist  Kjell  Moen’s  unfinished  manuscript  on  Deatnu  River  salmon 
Norsk  folkemuseum  (Norwegian  Folk  Museum):  library  of  the  Sámi  collection1234   
 -  Various  “grey  literature”:  reports,  theses,  pamplets  and  other  rare  published  sources 
-  See  especially  Tromsø  Sámi  Association  (1986)  in  the  bibliography 
Sámi  Trade  and  Development  Centre  /  Sámi  Ealáhus-  ja  Guorahallanguovddáš  (SEG): 
    Diverse  documentation  from  various  RaD  projects 
Byarkivet  i  Tromsø  (The  Town  Arcive  of  Tromsø/Romssa) 
 The  newspaper  clip  archive“Alta-saken”,  one  archive  box 
 
 
                                                 
1234  Museuological  note:  Two  national  historical  museums  in  Oslo  operate  with  nearly  identaical  names  in  English:  
Norwegian  Museum  of  Cultural  History  and  Museum  of  Cultural  History,  respectively.  The  former  is  called  Norsk  
folkemuseum  in  Norwegian,  literally  “The  Norwegian  Folk  Museum”,  which  is  the  name  I  have  used  in  this  thesis.  
The  latter  is  called  Kulturhistorisk  museum,  literally  “The  Museum  of  Cultural  History”,  and  is  part  of  the  
University  of  Oslo.  The  former  deals  with  Norwegian  national  history  after  reformation.  The  latter  deals  with  the  
same  history  before  the  reformation,  but  this  also  deals  with  ethnographic  exhibitions  of  “foreign”  cultures.  The  two  
have  been  playing  a  political  game  regareding  the  control  over  a  collection  of  Sámi  historical  artifacts.  It  was  
originally  collected  by  the  University  of  Oslo’s  Kulturhistorisk  museum,  which  emphasize  how  the  Sámi  are  similar  
to  other  Arctic  indigenous  peoples,  but  different  from  Norwegian  and  Scandinavian  culture.  The  collection  was  later  
taken  over  by  the  Norsk  folkemuseum,  which  presented  the  Sámi  as  one  of  several  national  minorities,  ethnically  and  
culturally  partly  overlapping  with  a  culturally  Norwegian  majority  within  a  shared  Norwegian  state.  When  this  is  
written,  most  of  the  collection  is  being  “repatriated”  to  the  Sámi  local  communities,  represented  by  Riddo  Duottar  
Museat  and  other  regional  federatins  of  local  Sámi  museums.  Before  embarking  in  this  PhD-research,  my  
knowledge  had  been  shaped  by  work  at  Norsk  folkemuseum,  but  while  I  carried  out  language  correction  for  my  
thesis,  I  was  based  at  the  Kulturhistorisk  museum,  and  learned  their  viewpoint  while  also  observing  repatriation  to  
Riddo  Duottar  Museat  and  others.  Historians  operating  within  three  contexts  all  claim  the  Sámi  historical  artifacts. 
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D.  Participant  observation 
 
Note:  Observational  data  have  been  gathered  through  the  technique  contemporary  social  
anthropologists  refer  to  as  “multi-sited  fieldwork”.1235  This  means  that  the  ethnographer  do  not  
strive  to  gain  any  holistic  thick  description  within  a  geographically  clearly  delimitated  field,  but  
instead,  she  tries  to  trace  some  particular  ties  and  processes  between  some  particular  situations,  
some  of  which  are  within,  others  outside,  the  area  that  might  be  conventionally  referred  to  as  a  
“local  community”.  Additionallty,  I  have  blurred  the  distinction  between  “scribal”  and  “tribal”  
knowledge,  by  learning  concepts  from  local  fisher-peasants,  and  by  observing  the  social  (political)  
interactions  within  academic  institutions.  Finally,  I  went  back  and  fro  between  fieldwork  in  Sápmi  
and  Lebanon.  The  latter  is  of  peripherial  relevance,  after  the  abductive  process  led  me  to  leave  the  
initial  comparative  research  design.  Still,  these  travels  were  part  of  the  researcher’s  actual  Grand  
Tour  (ar-riḥla),  and  thus,  the  actual  abductive  process.  The  following  list  includes  all  the  travels  that  
I  seem  as  relevant  data  for  this  particular  thesis  text.  Dates  of  each  field  travel  is  in  the  format  
yyyy.mm.dd.  Brackets  indicate  field  visits  to  Lebanon.  Asterisk  (*)  indicates  participant  observation  
situations  within  the  “local  communities”  referred  to  in  the  study.  Dagger  (†)  indicates  observant  
participation  in  within  “academic”  situations.   
 
1999-2003:   Oslo    Pedagogical  work  at  Norwegian  Folk  Museum 
2007.09.  16.-21.   *Deatnu  Area Conflict  meditation  training  at  the  local  court 
2008.08.25-27.   †Stiklestad NVE:  Wind  power  and  energy  conference 
2008.08.08.-10.   †Cambridge   Workshop:  “The  Right  to  Landscape” 
2009.03.03-10.   (Lebanon) Fieldwork 
2009.03.17 †Oslo  WWF:  Waterways  and  biodiversity  conference 
2009.03.24 †Oslo  Norsk  vannforening:  Border  rivers  and  conflicts 
2009.06.05.-22.   (Lebanon) Fieldwork 
2009.06.03.-07.   Berlin  Visits  to  Wagendorfen  and  bookshop  Pro  QM 
2009.12.07.-18.   Copenhagen Field  observation  at  UN  climate  summit  COP15 
2010.01.08.-2010.02.21. (Lebanon) Fieldwork 
2010.07. †Florence,  EUI Submitted  draft,  Alta-dam  case  study 
2010.07.07.-08.05.   (Lebanon) Fieldwork 
2010.09.09.-14. *Deatnu  Area First  fieldtrip  to  Deatnu  River  and  Fjord 
2010.11.01.-10.   (Lebanon) Fieldwork 
                                                 
1235 Madden  2010 
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2011.01.12.   Oslo    Debate  meeting:  “’Fjellfinnhua’  uncensored”1236   
2011.01.25.-2010.02.13. *Deatnu  Area Second  field  trip  to  Deatnu  River  and  Fjord 
2011.03.02 †Oslo  Norsk  vannforening:  Internat.  develop.  projects 
2011.04.01.-27.   (Lebanon) Fieldwork 
2011.05.01.-2012.05.01.   Oslo  Visiting  scholar,  social  anthropology  at  UiO 
2011.06.03 †Florence,  EUI   Submitted  draft  (Lebanese  case  study) 
2011.08.10-21.   *Deatnu  Area Third  field  trip  to  Deatnu  River  and  Fjord 
2011.08.23.-30.   †Reykjavik   ECPR  General  Conference 
2011.10.31. †Florence,  EUI   Submitted  draft,  two  thirds  thesis 
2012.02.20.-22.   *†Romssa,  UiT Field  trip  and  PhD-course  at  UiT 
2012.02.21.   *Romssa  Area Tromsø  Museum,  “Becoming  a  nation”  exhibition 
2012.03.04.   Oslo    Two  church  services  with  Kväns  and  with  Copts 
2012.03.28.   Oslo    Dialogue  meeting:  “Kan  vi  leve  sammen”1237 
2012.0329.   †Oslo,  UiO Roundtable:  “Anarchy/anarchism,  egalitarianism”   
2012.0412.   †Oslo,  UiO Seminar  “Decolonizing  the  Arctic”1238 
2012.04.21.   Oslo  Meeting  with  Norske  kveners  forbund 
2012.06.05. †Florence,  EUI   Colloquium:  “Grassroots  Environmentalism” 
2012.07.21.-2012.08.02.   *Deatnu  Area Fourth  field  trip  to  Deatnu  River  and  Fjord 
2012.08.10.   *Álttá  area Field  visit  to  Alta  museum 
2012.08.11.-14.   *Romssa  Area Observant  participation,  Riddu  Riđđu  festival 
2012.08.15.-18.   *Romssa  Area Second  field  trip  to  Romssa 
2013.04.01. †Florence,  EUI Submitted  draft  (first  full  thesis  draft) 
2013.04.27-28.   †Florence,  EUI Workshop:  “Popular  Protest  in  20th  Century  Europe”   
2013.07.   *Romssa  Area Observant  participation,  The  Karlsøy  Festival 
2014.05.29.-30. †Florence,  EUI   Workshop:  “Contentious  Politics  and  Space” 
2014.05.31 †Florence,  EUI Submitted  thesis,  final  version 
2014.10.22. †Florence,  EUI Workshop:  “Gender  Fest”  (presentation  about  Lebanon) 
2014.11. *Álttá  area Digitalisation  of  the  Folkeaksjonen  archive 
 
 
                                                 
1236  Field  observation  at  film  screening  of  Guro  Saniola  Bjerk’s  “Fjellfinnhua”  at  Fritt  Ord.  http://www.fritt-
ord.no/no/hjem/mer/fjellfinnhua_usensurert_samepolitikk_Finnmark/ 
1237  Organized  by  Marianne  Lien  and  Gro  Ween  at  the  research  project  “Newcomers  to  the  Farm” 
1238  Ibidem 
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E.  Focus  groups 
 
Note:  Focus  groups  might  be  group  interviews,  but  also  other  processes  where  persons  get  together  
and  deliberate,  alternatively  forming  a  shared  understanding  and  translating  it  to  action.  Here  I  list  
six  examples,  where  only  two  of  them  were  organized  by  myself,  and  one  of  them  I  did  not  even  
attend  in  person. 
 
1.  SEG  group  interview,  Miljøbygget  in  Tana  Bru,  08.02.2011.  Organized  by  myself.  Participants:  
Elisabeth  Hegge  Guttorm,  Håvald  Hansen,  Trine  Länsman,  Renate  Westlien  and  Ranveig  
Ballovara  Varsi  and  Helge  Hiram  Jensen 
2.  UiT  group  interview,  the  university  cantine  23.02.2012.  Organized  by  myself.  Participants:  Brit  
Kramvig  and  Nina  Foss. 
3.  LBT  info  meeting  in  Tana  Hotell,  07.02.2011.  Led  by  the  LBT  secretariat:  Hans  Erik  Varsi  and    
Kjell  Magne  Johnsson 
4.  LBT  info  metting  in  Polmak  community  house  09.02.2011.  Led  by  the  LBT  secretariat:  Hans  
Erik  Varsi  and  Kjell  Magne  Johnsson 
5.  The  dialogue  meeting  “Kan  vi  leve  sammen”,  at  the  House  of  Literature  in  Oslo,  28.  March  2012.  
Arranged  by  Marianne  Lien  and  Gro  Ween,  from  the  research  project  Newcomers  on  the  Farm.  
http://www.sv.uio.no/sai/forskning/prosjekter/newcomers/arrangementer/2012/seminar-kan-vi-
leve-sammen.html 
6.  The  seminar  “salmon  voices”,  in  Munich,  7-8  Oct.  2011.  Participation  by  among  others  Bjarne  
Johansen,  Marianne  Balto,  Steinar  Pedersen,  Håvald  Hansen  and  Camilla  Brattland.  (I  did  not  






 Finnmarken,  2010-2012 
 Ságat,  2010-2012 
 Fiskarbladet  Fiskaren,  2010-2012 
 Finnmark  Dagblad,  2010-2012 
 Sør-Varanger  Avis,  2010-2012 
Nordlys,  2010-2012
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LIST OF ERRATA 
 
 Prof.&Dr.&Steinar&Pedersen&is&a&fisherman,&historian&and&politician,&with&great&experience&about&the&issue&at&hand.&He&has&discovered&several&factual&errors&in&this&thesis.&All&these&factual&errors&are&dealt&with&in&this&three>page&list&of&errata.&&&For&the&reader,&it&would&be&easier&if&such&corrections&had&been&implemented&directly&into&the&text,&but&this&is&not&allowed,&since&doctoral&theses&at&the&EUI&cannot&be&revised&after&its&defense.&&&In&order&to&avoid&a&too&lengthy&list&of&errata,&the&list&excludes&all&purely&typographical&or&grammatical&errors.&The&errata&were&finished&in&Oslo,&29.&November&2015.&&&
The$colonization$of$Sápmi$may&be&dated&in&various&ways.&When&the&thesis&claims&that&Finnamark&became&a&colony&in&1751&or&in&1820,&this&certainly&does&not&reflect&the&official&policy&of&the&Crown.&It&was&not&until&1848&that&the&process&was&officially&defined&&–&in&retrospect&–&as&one&of&colonization.&&&p.&165& Line&3:&The&year&“1820”&should&be&“1848”.& &p.&168& Line&7:&The&year&“1820”&should&be&“1848”.&p.&293& Line&11&from&below:&The&phrase&“In&1751,&the&Crown&had&stated&that&this&land&was&Terra%
Nullius...”&should&be:&“In&1848,&the&Crown&stated&that&this&land&had&been&Terra%Nullius...”.&&&





The$Norwegian$Official$Report,&known&in&Norwegian&as&Norsk%offentlig%utredning&(NOU)&is&a&state&commissioned&report&with&a&similar&function&to&the&British&“green%paper”,&not&the&“white&paper.”&An&NOU&is&commissioned&by&a&state&ministry,&and&is&applied&to&inform&the&policy&process,&at&a&preparatory&stage&of&the&process,&previously&to&decision>making.&Hence,&the&NOU&does&not&express%any%official%stance&or&policy&from&the&polity&that&has&commissioned&it.&&p.&13& Line&6:&The&word&“white&paper”&should&be&replaced&by&“green&paper”.&p.&194& Footnote&495:&The&word&“white&paper”&should&be&replaced&by&“green&paper”.&p.&210& Footnote&556:&The&word&“white&paper”&should&be&replaced&by&“green&paper”.&p.&323& Footnote&835:&The&word&“white&paper”&should&be&replaced&by&“green&paper”.&p.&347& Footnotes&887>888:&The&author&“Norwegian&Ministry&of&Fishery”&should&be&“Norwegian&Official&Reports”.&p.&354& Line&14:&The&phrase&“report&from”&should&be&“report&commissioned&by”.&p.&374& Line&12&from&below:&The&word&“report”&should&be&“green&paper”.&p.&375& Line&11:&The&word&“report”&should&be&“green&paper”.&p.&402& Line&3&from&below:&The&word&“report”&should&be&“green&paper”.&p.&402& Footnote&982:&The&reference&“Norwegian&Ministry&of&Justice&and&Police&1997”&should&be&“Norwegian&Official&Report&1997a”.&p.&451& Line&10&from&below:&The&word&“report”&should&be&“green&paper”.$
$
$




Some$ethnographic$mistakes&have&been&identified.&These&range&from&simple&typing&errors&regarding&place&names,&via&terms&which&might&sound&awkward&to&local&ears,&to&some&instances&of&plain&misunderstanding.&All&mistakes&that&have&been&identified&are&corrected&in&the&following.&&&p.&48& The&final&line:&The&year&“1970”&should&be&replaced&by&“1980”.&p.&54& Line&10:&The&word&“murdered”&should&be&replaced&by&“severely&wounded”.&p.&54& Line&7&from&below:&Delete&“the&retired&leader&of&the&national&trade&union&federation”.&The&public&discussant&cited&here&is&another&person&with&the&same&name.&&p.&147& Line&12:&“Kvän&ethnicity”&should&be&“mixed&descent&(e.g.&Kvän/Sámi)”.&p.&323& Line&10:&The&wrongly&spelled&place&name&“Nieden”&is&correctly&spelled&“Neiden”.&&p.&361& Footnote&921:&Further&references&should&be&added&regarding&the&critical&assessment&of&the&green&paper&(NOU)&by&Peter&Ørebech,&and&therefore,&after&“Norwegian&Official&Reports&2005&(NOU&2005:10)”&there&should&be&added&the&following&period:&“,&see&Chpt.&3.2&(cited&in&Eyþórsson&2008:209).&See&also&Norwegian&Official&Reports&2001&(NOU&2001:34)&pp.&587>652&(cited&in&Eyþórsson&2008:199>208).”&p.&333& Second&last&line:&The&word&“act”&should&be:&“ILO&convention”.&p.&348& Line&10&from&below:&the&place&name&“Kirkenes”&should&be&“Vadsø”.&&p.&363& First&line:&The&word&“president”&should&be&“Acting&Vice&President”.&p.&363& Line&10&from&below:&My&use&of&“syndicalist”&might&be&a&Latin>ism,&since&sindicalista&(It.)&or&
syndicaliste&(Fr.)&primarily&denote&trade&union&leader,&with&secondary&connotations&towards&ideological&syndicalism,&but&syndicalist&(En.)&is&used&primarily&in&latter&meaning.&p.&391& Caption&title:&The&word&“western”&should&be&“eastern”.&&p.&391& Line&7:&The&wrongly&spelled&place&name&“Deadeanuvuotna”&should&be&“Deanuvuotna”.&p.&400& Line&7&from&below:&Delete&the&word&“because”.&p.&400& Line&6&from&below:&Delete&the&phrase&“,&Olaf&had&already...&...household&economy”.&&&
The$head$of$the$Sámi$Rights$Commission,&Carsten&Smith,&was&not&only&a&Supreme&Court&judge,&but&also&its&leader,&the&Chief&Justice&of&the&Supreme&Court&in&Norway.&&p.&325& Line&13&from&below:&The&phrase&“the&Supreme&Court&Judge”&should&be:&“the&Chief&Justice&of&the&Supreme&Court&in&Norway&(høyesterettsjustitiarius)”.&p.&258& Line&11&from&below:&The&phrase&“the&Supreme&Court&Judge”&should&be:&“the&Chief&Justice&of&the&Supreme&Court&in&Norway&(høyesterettsjustitiarius)”.&p.&360& Line&5&from&below:&The&phrase&“the&Supreme&Court&Judge”&should&be:&“the&Chief&Justice&of&the&Supreme&Court&in&Norway&(høyesterettsjustitiarius)”.&&&
Various$other$mistakes&have&also&been&identified&throughout&the&thesis&and&here&they&are&corrected:&&p.&49& Footnote&93:&Add&a&reference&to&“Norwegian&Official&Reports&2001&(NOU&2001:31)”.&p.&66& Line&15:&After&the&phrase&“’hooligans’&and&‘foreign&agents’”&there&should&be&a&footnote&referring&to:&“Ahmhad&2014;&Ballovara&2014;&Langlais&1999;&see&also&Sedgwick&2010”.&p.&152& Line&7&from&below:&The&author&name&“Eithorsson”&is&correctly&spelled&“Eyþórsson”.&p.&553& Line&13:&After&the&phrase&“They&are&stigmatized&as&‘hooligans’&or&‘radicals’&whenever&they&resist...&...unsustainable&forestry&or&over>fishing&in&the&lands&of&Sámis&and&Nenets.”&there&should&be&added&a&footnote&referring&to:&“Ahmhad&2014;&Ballovara&2014;&Langlais&1999;&see&also&Sedgwick&2010”.&p.&588& Line&12&from&below:&In&the&bibliography,&“Norwegian&Official&Report&2001”&should&be&listed&after&“Norwegian&Official&Report&1999”&and&before&“Norwegian&Official&Report&2005”.&&
